hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.7.2 Solution details
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.7.2.1 Procedure
| The purpose of this solution is to enable multiple inventory operations while protecting the AIoT device permanent identifier during the AIoT device inventory procedure.
Figure 5.7.2.1-1: Inventory procedure
0. Step 1-6 of clause 6.2.2 Procedure for Inventory or clause 6.2.3 Procedure for command in TS 23.369 [7] i... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.7.2.2 Tag generation
| 1. TagD generation
The following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the k KDFs:
- FC = 0xNN,
- P0 = Device permanent identifier,
- L0 = length of Device permanent identifier,
The input key KEY shall be KAIOT_root. The P0 input is the stored AIoT device permanent identifier. The outputs of the k KD... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.7.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.8 Solution #8: SUCI
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.8.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #4 and applies to topology 1 and topology 2.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.8.2 Solution details
| This solution proposes the use of SUCI (Subscription Concealed Identifier), as specified in TS 33.501 [9], to protect the AIoT device permanent ID. The SUCI is calculated with non-null scheme.
Editor’s note: how to protect AIoT device permanent ID in SNPN is FFS
Editor’s note: Whether AIoT devices have capability to... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.8.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses Key Issue #4 thanks to ID protection mechanism already specified in TS 33.501 [9].
The possibility to perform SUCI calculation depends on AIoT device capability.
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation is FFS.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.9 Solution #9: AKA-based authentication for DO-A capable AIoT devices
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.9.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 for DO-A capable AIoT devices.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.9.2 Solution details
| For DO-A capable AIoT device in public network or PNI-NPN: 5G AKA or EAP-AKA’ authentication procedure specified in clause 6 of TS 33.501 [9] is used to perform the mutual authentication between the DO-A Capable AIoT device and the network. The ADM plays the role of the AUSF/UDM, and the AIoTF plays the role of the SEA... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.9.3 Evaluation
| TBD.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.10 Solution #10: 5G AKA for authentication
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.10.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 and applies to topology 1 and topology 2.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.10.2 Solution details
| This solution proposes the use 5G AKA as specified in TS 33.501 [9] for mutual authentication between AIoT device and the network.
The solution makes the following assumptions:
- DO-A-capable devices are to be used for AIoT services supported in Topology 1 and Topology 2 for deployment in public networks.
- DO-A-c... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.11 Solution #11: Authentication and security establishment for DO-A capable device
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.11.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address the first security requirement of Key Issue #2, and Key Issue #3, supporting the authentication and security establishment for DO-A capable device.
This solution assumes that the DO-A capable device should perform the initial registration procedure before transferring the DO-A data... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.11.2 Solution details
|
Figure 5.11.2-1: Authentication procedure for DO-A capable device
1. The DO-A device sends the registration request to AIoTF via the Reader (e.g., RAN reader, UE reader), including the Device identifier and security capability.
2. The AIOTF sends the authentication request to the ADM, including the Device identifie... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.11.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
Editor’s Note: Feasibility analysis of AKA based authentication for AIOT device type 2 is FFS.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.12 Solution #12: AKA-based authentication for inventory, command and registration
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.12.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 (Authentication for AIoT devices).
The main idea is to use AKA-based authentication for scenarios studied for DO-A devices in Rel-20: inventory, command and registration. For inventory and command, this solution describes the case that the device is currently not registered, and n... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.12.2 Solution details
| Case 1: Registration
The following procedure describes how AKA-based authentication can be used for registration of DO-A capable devices.
Figure 5.12.2-1:AKA-based authentication for registration of DO-A capable devices.
1. The AIoT device sends a registration request to the AIOTF via the NG-RAN. The request con... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.12.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.13 Solution #13: Efficient authentication for DO-A capable AIoT devices
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.13.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#2. This solution enables AKA (i.e., Authentication and Key Agreement) by reversing the roles between AIoT device and network. It can reduce the number of signalling exchanged between the AIoT device and network, leading to an efficient mutual authentication.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.13.2 Solution details
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.13.2.1 Authentication procedure
| KAIoT_root is the long-term key of AIoT device which is stored in the AIoT device and ADM.
Editor’s Note: Whether the solution can be used in a public network is FFS.
Figure 5.13.2.1-1: AIoT registration procedure
1. NG-RAN broadcasts RAND.
Editor’s Note: Alignment with TR 23.700-03 [4] whether NG-RAN broadcasts ... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.13.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
TBD
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.14 Solution #14: DO-A capable AIoT Device registration procedure
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.14.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2: Authentication for AIoT devices.
This solution is only for isolated private networks.
Editor’s Note: How to design the authentication vector generation so that the device can be used in a public network is FFS.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.14.2 Solution details
| DO-A capable AIoT Device registration procedure is shown in the following figure.
Figure 5.14.2-1: DO-A capable AIoT Device registration procedure
0. Both the ADM and the DO-A Device are configured with device permanent ID and device root key. To support device permanent ID privacy protection, configure the net... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.14.3 Evaluation
| TBD.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.15 Solution #15: Authentication procedure for DO-A capable AIoT devices
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.15.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 (Authentication for AIoT devices) and Key Issue #4 (AIOT device ID protection) by defining the authentication procedure when a DO‑A capable AIoT device autonomously initiates the registration. The proposed solution follows the similar design principles to the authentication procedur... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.15.2 Solution details
|
Figure 5.15.2-1: Authentication procedure during initial registration
1. AIoT device initiates an initial registration by sending a AIoT NAS Registration Request message. This message includes the device registration ID (R-ID), auth token, and RANDAIoT device. The auth token is generated using a KAIoT auth, R-ID, a... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.15.3 Evaluation
| TBD.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.16 Solution #16: DO-A capable AIoT Device communication protection
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.16.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #3: Protection of information to support DO-A Capable AIoT Devices during AIoT service communication.
The basic idea of this solution follows the principle adopted in TS 33.369 for protecting AIoT service communication of AIoT Devices. That is, first negotiate a session key, and then ... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.16.2 Solution details
| Editor’s Note: Why not a NAS counter can be used is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Why the device cannot store NAS keys is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Whether the solution aligns with the agreed SA2 architecture is FFS.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.16.2.1 DO-A communication request initiated by DO-A AIoT Device
| DO-A capable AIoT Device communication protection procedure initiated by DO-A Device is shown in the following figure.
Figure 5.16.2.1-1: DO-A capable AIoT Device communication protection procedure initiated by DO-A Device
0. The DO-A Device and the network perform the mutual authentication, and then set the DO... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.16.2.2 DO-A communication request initiated by network
| DO-A capable AIoT Device communication protection procedure initiated by network is shown in the following figure. This procedure is similar to that initiated by DO-A devices, with the only difference being that it is initiated by the AIOTF.
Figure 5.16.2.2-1: DO-A capable AIoT Device communication protection proced... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.16.3 Evaluation
| TBD.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.17 Solution #17: Protection of AIoT device initiated AIoT NAS procedure for DO-A capable devices
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.17.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #3 (Protection of information) in AIoT device initiated AIoT NAS procedures (e.g., AIoT NAS data transfer and registration update described in TR 23.700-30 [2]). The protection of AIoT NAS data transfer message uses a session key (KAIoT session) that is derived based on the AIoT device... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.17.2 Solution details
|
Figure 5.17.2-1: Protection of AIoT data transfer procedure for DO-A capable devices
1. When an AIoT device initiates a DO-A data transmission, it constructs the AIoT NAS data transfer message containing the device identification information, RANDAIoT device in addition to DO-A data. The message is protected based ... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.17.3 Evaluation
| TBD.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.18 Solution #18: DO-A request using UICC services
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.18.1 Introduction
| The solution provides a procedure to protect the identity during DO-A request. The method uses a SUCI based approach, as this study addresses PLNM deployments, implying UICC services are available in the AIoT device including authentication methods and identifier concealment. The solution includes a T-ID in the DO-A me... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.18.2 Solution details
| The procedure shown in figure 5.18.2-1 is initiated when a AIoT device determines that data must be sent as DO-A. This could be sensor data which periodically needs to be updated, warnings i.e. basement flooding, temperature surge/drop, or others.
Figure 5.18.2-1: DO-A signalling initiating an inventory + command pr... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.18.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
TBD
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.19 Solution #19: ID privacy for DO-A capable AIOT device
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.19.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address the key issue#4 on protection of ID privacy during AIoT service communication. AIOTF assigns the AIoT temporary ID information (e.g., GUTI-like identifier) to the device and the device is required to store the AIoT temporary ID information.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.19.2 Solution details
| Initial registration is supported and used by the DO-A capable AIoT Device to inform the network of its presence and get authenticated/authorized by the network. In the initial registration, the AIoT Device identifier using SUCI scheme is sent by the AIoT Device.
NOTE 1: If the home network has not provisioned the Ho... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.19.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.20 Solution #20: T-ID based AIOT device privacy protection
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.20.1 Introduction
| This solution utilizes Temporary ID (T-ID) to protect AIOT device privacy, and considering following procedures: 1. Initial Registration procedure, 2. DO-A procedure, 3. Inventory and command procedure.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.20.2 Solution details
| The solution makes the following assumptions:
• DO-A-capable devices are to be used for AIoT services supported in Topology 1 and Topology 2 for deployment in public networks.
• DO-A-capable devices support the use of UICC and therefore support the security capabilities that are necessary to perform device pr... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.20.3 Evaluation
| This solution requires the AIOT device to support SUCI based permanent ID concealing mechanism, and store new T-ID generated by the Network.
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation is FFS.
|
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.21 Solution #21: UE Authorization during Intermediate UE selection
| |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.21.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address Key Issue #1, supporting the authorization during intermediate UE selection. This solution applies to RRC-based Topology 2.
The authorization of Intermediate UE is based on the UE subscription data stored in the UDM. For AF providing UE reader ID case, the AIoTF interacts with AMF ... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.21.2 Solution details
|
Figure 5.21.2-1: Intermediate UE Authorization during Intermediate UE selection
1. The AF sends the Service request to AIoTF via NEF. The Service request may include Ambient IoT device ID, UE Reader ID(s), etc.
2. Based on the UE Reader ID(s), the AIoTF determines the corresponding AMF and sends the Intermediate UE... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.21.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
5.22 Solution #22: Solution on authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT
5.22.1 Introduction
This solution addresses Key Issue#1 on Authorization of intermediate UE for ... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 6 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause captures the conclusions of this study.
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
10/2025
SA3#124
S3‑253300
Initial draft TR
0.0.1
10/2025
SA3#124
S3‑253732
Incorporated accepted contributions S3‑25... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the security architecture and security requirements for WAB-nodes, security impacts of potentially compromised WAB nodes and requirements for countermeasures against any compromised WAB nodes.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 4 Security Architecture and Assumptions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains security architecture and assumptions to be considered for the study (e.g., per work task/KI).
Figure 5.49.1.1-1 in TS 23.501[2] shows the MWAB architecture for 5GS. In the architecture. There are two components in MWAB, i.e. MWAB-gNB and MWAB-UE. The WAB-node integration procedur... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security of the link between WAB-gNB and OAM
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| Based on the WAB-node integration procedure, the WAB-gNB will receive the OAM of WAB through the WAB-MT’s network. The link between WAB-gNB and OAM needs to have sufficient security protection for configuration data transmission.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| If the link between WAG-gNB and OAM is not well protected, the configuration data will be tampered or disclosure.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.1.1 Potential security requirements
| The link between the MWAB-gNB and the OAM shall be ciphering and integrity protected.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security Protection of Compromised WAB Nodes and Core Network Measures
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| Wireless Access Backhaul (WAB) nodes, consist of a WAB-gNB (gNB-like functionality) and a WAB-MT (UE-like functionality). These nodes operate in non-trusted environments and may serve as moving backhaul nodes for the 5GS, establishing NG, Xn, and OAM interfaces over PDU sessions through 3GPP backhauls. While 3GPP TR 33... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| Potential security threat:
• Rogue WAB-gNB Injection: A compromised WAB node may inject unauthorized signalling or reroute traffic maliciously, particularly via spoofed message. Furthermore, a compromised WAB-gNB can attempt to broadcast unauthorized network identifiers or initiate rogue Xn association attempts w... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 3GPP system shall support security mechanisms to mitigate risks from compromised WAB nodes, preventing topology spoofing, rogue signalling, and mobility-related traceability threats.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.3 Key Issue #3: Ensuring secure N2, N3 and Xn interfaces for MWAB nodes
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| According to the architecture in 23.501[2],the MWAB-gNB establishes the N2 interface with UE’s 5GC, and setup a Xn link with a traditional gNB.
Figure 5.3-1: Architecture for MWAB operation support - non-roaming with one PLMN
A MWAB may be mounted on a moving vehicle and may serve UEs inside or outside the vehicle... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.3.2 Security threats
| Lack of end-to-end protection for MWAB-gNB’s N2, N3 and Xn can lead to potential tampering of UE related signaling messages and potential breach of confidentiality, integrity and possible availability risks.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| Credentials for NDS/IP for Xn, N3 and N2 connection between MWAB and UE’s network shall be provided with confidentiality protection and integrity protection.
During movement of MWAB nodes, the end-to-end security of N2, N3 and Xn interfaces shall be ensured.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.4 Key Issue #4: Protection of MWAB-gNB control plane over BH-PDU sessions
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| In MWAB, OAM, N2, Xn and N3 traffic for the MWAB-gNB is carried over backhaul PDU session(s) that the MWAB-UE establishes. The MWAB broadcasted PLMN/SNPN may differ from the BH PLMN/SNPN which creates inter-PLMN/SNPN trust boundaries for these control plane and OAM links.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.4.2 Security threats
| Interception or modification of OAM/N2/Xn control traffic over BH PDU session(s); replay during mobility or BH PDU session changes are possible.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 5.4.3 Potential security requirements
| OAM/N2/Xn control traffic over BH PDU session(s) shall be confidentiality, integrity, and replay protected.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
KI#4
#1
X
#2
X
#3
X
#4
X
#5
X
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.1 Solution #1: reusing NDS/IP to N2 and Xn interfaces in WAB
| |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes a the credential is provided to the WAB by OAM in the phase 2-1 of the WAB-node integration procedure defined in TS 38.401 [3]
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.1.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.1.2-1 Procedure to configure the credential for NDS/IP connection
0. The WAB-node is pre-configured a credential for accessing to the OAM of WAB
Phase 1. WAB-MT Setup. It is described in TS 38.401[3].
Phase 2-1. WAB-gNB initialization. Addition to the description in TS 38.401[3], the WAB-gNB uses the pre-... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| The solution addresses the situation when the credential of UE’s 5GC or NG-RAN cannot be pre-configured at WAB. The phase 2-1 can be used to configure the credentials of potential serving UEs’ PLMN.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.2 Solution #2: Reuse of existing mechanisms for MWAB-gNB control plane over BH PDU sessions
| |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #4: "Protection of MWAB-gNB control plane over BH-PDU sessions".
The solution proposes to reuse existing NG-RAN and management security mechanisms to provide confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection for OAM, N2, and Xn control traffic carried over BH PDU session(s), without ... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| - N2 control traffic is protected using the existing N2 security mechanisms specified in TS 33.501 [4], clause 9.2.
- Xn control traffic is protected using the existing Xn security mechanisms specified in TS 33.501 [4], clause 9.4.
- OAM traffic between the MWAB-gNB and the management system is protected using existi... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution fully satisfies the confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection requirements identified in Key Issue #4 by reusing existing NG-RAN security mechanisms and management mechanisms.
The solution reuses existing mechanisms and procedures and does not introduce new WAB-specific security mechanisms or pr... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.3 Solution #3: Reuse existing security mechanisms for N2, N3, and Xn interfaces
| |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #3: "Ensuring secure N2, N3 and Xn interfaces for MWAB nodes".
This solution proposes to reuse existing NG-RAN security mechanisms defined in TS 33.501 [4] for N2, N3 and Xn interfaces, without introducing MWAB-specific security enhancements.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| - N2 interface is secured by applying the existing N2 security mechanisms as specified in TS 33.501, clause 9.2.
- N3 interface is secured by applying the existing N3 security mechanisms as specified in TS 33.501, clause 9.3.
- Xn interface is secured by applying the existing Xn security mechanisms as specified in T... |
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