hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #1 (Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group) by taking the procedure specified in clause 8.34 of TS 23.222 [2] as the baseline. As stated in the specified procedure, how to obtain authorization data from the GRO is out of scope, which m... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| Security related addition to the procedure specified in clause 8.34 of TS 23.222 [2] is shown below.
- In step 2 of the procedure in clause 8.34.3 of TS 33.222 [2], the CCF also obtains the GPSI of UE2 (API Invoker) in an authenticated way and uses that authenticated UE2 GPSI information in step 3. This solution does ... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| This Solution addresses the requirements of the Key Issue #1 by adding a security requirement in the procedure of Clause 8.34.3 of TS 23.222 [2] where the security requirement needs to be addressed by an implementation specific way.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.2 Solution #2: Security aspect of group authorization
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#1: Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group. The existing API invoker authorization mechanism for RNAA is enhanced to support group authorization.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| This solution reuses the procedure of UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group defined in clause 8.34.3 of TS 23.222 [2]. The security enhancement is limited to additional checks performed by the CCF and does not change the RNAA access token structure as defined in TS 33.122 [3].
Figure 6.2.... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirement in KI#1.
This solution reuses the procedure of UE‑deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources defined in clause 8.34.3 of TS 23.222 [2]. The access token content and the AEF behavior remain aligned with clause 6.5.3 of TS 33.122 [3].
The main enhancement is shown as fol... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.3 Solution #3: Client credentials flow based group authorization
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#1.
This solution uses the client credentials flow to enable the group authorization.
Specifically, the CCF uses the locally stored group related authorization information to authorize the API invoker.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.3.2 Solution details
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Figure 6.3.2-1: Client credentials flow based group authorization
It is assumed that the group resource owner has provisioned the group authorization information to the CCF.
1-3. are identical to steps 1-3 defined in clause 8.34.3 of TS 23.222 [2].
4. The CCF identifies the group authorization information based on... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| This solution reuses the client credentials flow to enable the group-based authorization.
The solution has the following impact to the existing client credentials flow.
The access token issued by the CCF includes the group identifier.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.4 Solution #4: Supporting Group Authorization based on authorization information provided by GRO
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution aims to address KI#1 to support authorization of a UE-hosted API invoker accessing resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group.
The solution proposes to reuse the TS 33.122 [3] clause 6.5.3 with the following enhancement:
1) Authorization information provided by GRO(for simplicity called ... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| The authorization information provided by GRO(for simplicity called GRO authorization information) is transferred to the CCF.
NOTE: The details of the procedure to obtain GRO authorization information are out of the scope of the present document.
The GRO authorization information contains the same information of auth... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| This solution partly addresses the requirements of KI#1 by enhancing the procedures specified in TS 33.122[3] clause 6.5.3 and has the following impacts:
- For CCF: find the correct authorization information using group identifier and authorizes the API invoker based on GRO authorization information;
- For Authorizat... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.5 Solution #5: Group authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the security requirements of Key issue#1. It is proposed to use the procedure as specified in clause 8.24 of TS 23.222 [2] and include group identifier as an optional parameter in the access token.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.5.2 Solution details
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Figure 6.5.2-1: Procedure for Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
1. The API invoker (e.g., in UE 2) sends an Obtain service API authorization request to the CCF for obtaining permission to access the service API for other UE's resources hosted in the network (e... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses security requirements of key issue#1. The procedure for group authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group can follow clause 8.34 in TS 23.222 [2], additionally the access token includes the group identifier for the AEF to check if UE2 belongs to the group.... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.6 Solution #6: Addressing security of Open Discovery Service API
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| Open service API introduces the possibility for a requestor of accessing non-sensitive API Information before on-boarding. Due to the publicity of the information, i.e., non-sensitive information, there is no need to authorize the requestor at CCF.
To ensure the correctness of the information provided by CCF to the re... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.6.2 Solution details
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1. Requestor will initiate a TLS connection with server-side certificate verification, towards CCF.
2. Requestor initiates the open discovery service API request with CCF and retrieves the required information as detailed in TS 23.222 [2].
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| The solution does not require the implementation of new functionalities. The first and last requirement are addressed by the TLS establishment. Moreover, authorization is not required since no sensitive API information are shared as part of open discover service API procedure, as defined in TS 23.222 [2].
Editor's Not... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.7 Solution #7: Security procedure for open discover service APIs
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #2 (Security for open discover service API). Open Discover Service APIs procedure introduced in TS 23.222 allows API invokers not recognized by the CAPIF Core Function to discover APIs without being onboarded to the CAPIF Core Function.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.7.2 Solution details
| The requester who wants to discover service API information about the available set of APIs offered by CCF before onboarding and the CCF who supports open discover service APIs follows the procedure explained below for security of the open discover service APIs procedure specified in clause 8.38 of TS 23.222 [3].
The ... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| The solution addresses the requirement on authorization of the open discover service API request of the requester by proposing to reuse the mechanism of API invoker onboarding request authorization.
Editor’s Note: Whether the onboarding procedure is in line with SA6 and therefore needed is ffs.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.8 Solution #8: TLS based secure open service API discover
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#2.
Specifically, the TLS is used to protect the open service API discover procedure.
The CCF’s local policy is used for requestor authorization.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.8.2 Solution details
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Figure 6.8.2-1: Open Discover service APIs
0. It is assumed that the requestor is preconfigured the certificate chain used to verify the CCF’s certificate. The requestor authenticates the CCF based on the CCF’s certificate. Then the requestor builds TLS based on CCF’s certificate. Thus, the messages exchanged betwee... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| This solution uses the TLS to secure the communication between the requestor and the CCF.
The TLS is built on CCF’s certificate.
Editor’s Note: Whether this solution addresses the security requirement is FFS.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.9 Solution #9: Augmenting scope parameter with purpose information
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.9.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #3 and consists of augmenting the scope parameter in the token/authorization request and the token with purpose information; the resource owner authorization revocation request would likewise include purpose information.
As aligned with the key issue description, the solution is not ... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.9.2 Solution details
| - For the client credential flow in CAPIF RNAA, the purpose information is included in the scope parameter of the token request.
- For the authorization code flow in CAPIF RNAA, the purpose information is included in the scope parameter of authorization request.
- The scope parameter in the issued token includes th... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.9.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirement of key issue #3 by making the authorization mechanism in CAPIF RNAA aligned with the other working groups architecture and CAMARA architecture, in terms of purpose information usage.
Since the purpose information is included in the token, that information will be implicitly ve... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.10 Solution #10: Purpose based authorization and authorization revocation
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.10.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the KI#3.
Specifically, if API invoker needs to obtain resource owner’s data from the network, the data processing purpose is used to determine whether CCF issues the token to the API invoker.
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.10.2 Solution details
| For RNAA related client credentials flow, the following enhancements are needed to support the purpose based authorization.
• If the API invoker needs to get resource owner’s data from the network, the API invoker sends the data processing purpose (e.g., the location data is used for advertising) to the CCF.
... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.10.3 Evaluation
| This solution enables the resource owner to authorize the API invoker for a specific data processing purpose when the API invoker needs to get resource owner’s data from the network.
The following enhancements are applied to the existing RNAA related client credentials flow and authorization code flow.
• If the A... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.11 Solution #11: Enhancing finer granularity for purpose of information
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.11.1 Introduction
| This solution is addressing KI#3 by enhancing authorization mechanism to validate the purpose for retrieving the information. The solution proposes to enhance the already existing mechanisms available in CAPIF ecosystems, i.e., the access token as part of RNAA procedure.
After authentication between the CCF and the A... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.11.2 Solution details
| 6.11.2.1 Authorization provisioning
Pre-requisites:
CAPIF-1e authentication and secure session establishment is performed as specified in subclause 6.3.1 of 33.122.
1. After successful establishment of TLS session over CAPIF-1e, the API invoker shall send an Access Token Request message to the CAPIF core funct... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.11.3 Evaluation
| The solution has an impact on the API invoker, CCF and AEF. In particular, the first element is required to insert the purpose of its request both during the authorization and the service requests. CCF is impacted because it needs to verify the purpose of the request against its internal knowledge and, if allowed, it w... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 7 Conclusions
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3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 7.1 Key issue #1: Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
| The procedure for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group can follow clause 8.34 in TS 23.222 [2] and for group authorization clause 6.5.3.2 in TS 33.122 [3] can be followed.
Editor’s Note: Further conclusion is FFS.
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 1 Scope
| This present document aims to identify potential threats and security requirements to support additional features for AIoT in Rel-20. Specifically,
• Security aspects of concluding on authorization of intermediate UE for AIoT services in Topology 2
Editor’s note: which types of AIoT device are in the scope of t... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT services
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.1.1 Key issue details
| In TR 23.700-13 [2], Key Issues #1 and #3 describe the issues on the system architecture and procedure to support 5G Ambient IoT services, furthermore TR 23.700-30 [4], KI#1 describes the issues on the support AIoT services under the RRC-based option for UE Reader connectivity.
The architecture for topology 2 is defi... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.1.2 Security threats
| If the 5GC do not authorize the UE acting as an intermediate node, the attacker UE may misuse the Ambient IoT services provided by the core and hereby impersonate an authorised intermediate node.
Editor’s Note: The threats may be refined based on SA2 agreed procedures.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS shall be able to support the authorization of the AIoT capable UE as an intermediate node.
Editor’s Note: Requirements are FFS.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.2 Key Issue #2: Authentication for AIoT devices
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.2.1 Key issue details
| DO-A capable AIOT devices can inform the network of their presence and send data to the AIOTF autonomously. The TR 23.700-30 [4] studies the architecture framework and procedure for DO-A capable AIoT devices, including the device initiated registration-like procedure and data transfer procedure.
With the capability o... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.2.2 Security threats
| An attacker may impersonate the victim AIoT device and report fake identification to the network side. If the billing is based on per AIoT device’s identity, the fake identity may lead to charging problem. This can be used by an adversary to steal an AIoT device by replacing the AIoT device with a fake device, which mi... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall provide a means to perform mutual authentication between the DO-A capable AIoT device and the network.
NOTE 2: AIoT device Type 1 is restricted to isolated private network.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.3 Key Issue #3: Protection of information to support DO-A Capable AIoT Devices during AIoT service communication
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.3.1 Key issue details
| As per TS 22.369 [6], Ambient power-enabled IoT (AIoT) services aim to support various use cases, including inventory taking, sensor data collection, asset tracking, and actuator control. These services intended to operate with lower power consumption and complexity than the existing IoT technologies such as eMTC, NB-I... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.3.2 Security threats
| In addition to the command operation (e.g., write, read) as specified in TS 23.369 [7], DO-A Capable AIoT Device can send data to the AIOTF autonomously. The following threats are still applicable:
An attacker may acquire data transmitted to/from AIoT devices by eavesdropping messages if the communication of AIoT serv... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.3.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall support a means to ensure confidentiality, integrity and/or replay protection of information transmitted between DO-A Capable AIoT Device and the network.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.4 Key Issue #4: DO-A capable AIOT device ID protection
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.4.1 Key issue details
| For AIoT device type 1, all communications between the network and the AIOT device are initiated by the network. Unlike AIOT device type 1, the DO-A AIOT device could autonomously initiate communication by sending a message to the network. Due to this change, privacy mechanisms specified in TS 33.369[8] for AIOT device... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.4.2 Threats
| An attacker can identify, monitor and track a DO-A AIoT devices based on the identifiers associated with the AIoT device if the identifiers are not privacy protected.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.4.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall support mechanisms to prevent privacy threats (e.g., identifying, linking, and tracking) against the identifier of the DO-A capable AIOT device(s).
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.5 Key Issue #5: Amplification of resource exhaustion by exploiting AIoT paging messages
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.5.1 Key issue details
| Paging of AIoT devices is different than "regular" paging of regular UEs. In AIOT, one single paging message coming from the reader/network can be used to trigger multiple devices to respond by using, for example, a mask/filter based on target device identification, or by a group ID of the target devices. Once the targ... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.5.2 Security threats
| An adversary can cause the core network of a PLMN or the AF wasting computational resources by corrupting or spoofing one single paging message, which is surprisingly little work on the adversary’s behalf, that triggers a lot of devices to send a paging response to the legitimate reader.
The above attack can also caus... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 4.5.3 Potential security requirements
| Editor’s Note: Potential security requirements are FFS
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause captures mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 5.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Key Issues
Solutions
1
2
3
4
5
1
X
2
X
3
X
4
X
5
X
6
X
7
X
8
X
9
X
10
X
11
X
X
... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.1 Solution #1: Information protection after registration
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#3.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.1.2 Solution details
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.1.2.1 Registration procedure
| The following figure depicts the AIoT registration procedure to activate information protection.
Figure 5.1.2.1-1: AIoT registration procedure
1. AIoT device sends initial Register Request (Device ID, Device security capabilities) towards AIoTF.
Editor’s Note: How to protect security capabilities is ffs.
Editor's... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.1.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
TBD
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.2 Solution #2: Protection of information during AIoT service communication
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue#3 on protection of information during AIoT service communication. The solution reuses the security mechanisms for NAS protection from TS 33.501 [9] modulo some simplifications in order to avoid the need for an additional security activation procedure. By comparison to the mechanisms sp... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.2.2 Solution details
| It is assumed that following a successful authentication procedure, the device and the network derive a session key called KAIOTF, for example in a similar manner to the procedure in TS 33.369 [8]. The device stores this key as part of the security context until a new authentication run. The authentication procedure is... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses key issue#3 on protection of information during AIoT service communication. The solution assumes the AIOTF is the termination point for information protection. The device may communicate multiple NAS messages following a successful authentication procedure.
The device and AIOTF are required to... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.3 Solution #3: Protecting information for DO-A communication
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.3.1 Introduction
| KI#3 describes the need to “support a means to ensure confidentiality, integrity and/or replay protection of information transmitted between DO-A Capable AIoT Device and the network.” This solution intends to fulfill this requirement.
The solution makes the following assumption:
- DO-A communication is a new procedu... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.3.2 Solution Details
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1. DO-A device having data to send may initiate an AIoT DO-A data transmission request (if supported) to NG-RAN. If such data transmission request is not supported, DO-A device proceeds to perform Step 2.
1a. NG-RAN sends AIoT DO-A data transmission to AIOTF if a supported AIoT DO-A data transmission request is rece... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.3.3 Evaluation
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The solution relies on security context established between DO-A device and network to protect information being sent to the network. Key identification scheme described in TS 33.501[9] can be used for security context maintenance between the DO-A device and network. Since security context is established as a result... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.4 Solution #4: ID privacy based on stored type T-ID
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#4.
This solution proposes to reuse T-ID update method of release 19 as much as possible. In release 19, two T-ID types are defined: concealed and stored. This solution propose to reuse stored type T-ID and corresponding update method.
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.4.2 Solution details
| The following figure depicts the AIoT device ID protection based on stored type T-ID.
Figure 5.4.2-1: AIoT Device ID protection based on stored type T-ID
1. AIoT device is preconfigured with initial T-ID (i.e. T-ID0), which can be derived from AIoT device permanent ID. The ADM also stores the initial T-ID for the A... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.4.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation of T-ID storage on device side in de-registration state is ffs.
TBD
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.5 Solution #5: Privacy-preserving device identification responding to group paging using AICI
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.5.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#4: AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure. The solution describes how a device identifies itself to the network in response to a group paging message, when the device does not have an established session or registered state with the network. The solution uses AIoT Concealed Device Identi... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.5.2 Solution details
| Figure 5.5.2-1 presents a high-level message flow of the solution. The figure is described step-by-step in the following:
In Step 0, the ADM provides the AIOTF necessary information to page a group of devices — e.g., an identifier identifying a group (let us call it a group identifier) and an authentication challenge.... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.5.3 Evaluation
| The solution assumes that group paging is used to page DO-A capable devices that are not registered to the network.
Editor’s Note 1: Further Evaluation is FFS
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.6 Solution #6: Privacy-preserving group paging using Bloom filter
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11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#4: AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure. The solution uses a Bloom filter to page a group of devices. First the network generates privacy-preserving concealed identifiers for every device in the group to be paged. Then the network inserts the privacy preserving concealed identifiers in... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.6.2 Solution details
| The proposed solution is explained step-by-step in the following:
Step1. The AIOTF sends group identification information (e.g., Filtering Information) to the ADM for the group that the AIOT is intends to reach to.
Step2. the ADM computes a concealed temporary identifier CT-ID for each device in a group (let us call ... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.6.3 Evaluation
| Bloom filters, as used in this solution, can page a group of devices in a privacy preserving manner — it does not leak any bits of the long-term identifiers of the target devices.
Bloom filters of size (e.g., 500 bits long using three hash functions), which can be accommodated in a paging message, can be used to page ... |
11f4ed6ea5e5dd2e209745d7bbd2025e | 33.714 | 5.7.1 Introduction
| The solution addresses Key Issue #4: AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure. The solution introduces a Bloom filter-based procedure, together with filtering information, to efficiently page multiple DO-A Capable AIoT devices while protecting identifier privacy.
In this solution, the ADM determines the actually p... |
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