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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| This solution fully satisfies the security requirements of key issue #3 by reusing existing NG-RAN security mechanisms for N2, N3 and Xn interfaces.
No new security mechanisms, protocols, or procedures are introduced; thus, the solution has no impact on existing specifications and requires no normative work.
|
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.4 Solution #4: Reuse of Existing NDS/IP and Plug and Connect Mechanisms for MWAB-gNB and OAM
| |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: "Security of the link between WAB-gNB and OAM".
This solution proposes to reuse existing mechanisms defined in Plug and Connect (PnC) framework to provide confidentiality and integrity protection for connectivity between the MWAB-gNB and the 3GPP management system.
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50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| The OAM connectivity for MWAB-GNB is the process of setting up connectivity between MWAB-gNB and the 3GPP management system. The requirement associated to the OAM connectivity for MWAB is specified in TS 28.540, clause 5.11 (REQ-VMR-CON-001) [10], and the corresponding management information model is defined in TS 28.5... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| The solution fulfils the security requirements in KI#1 by reusing existing mechanisms that provide confidentiality and integrity protection for OAM traffic.
The solution reuses existing mechanisms and procedures and does not introduce new WAB-specific security mechanisms or procedures.
6.5 Solution #5: WAB-node Mu... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses security risks from compromised WAB nodes in untrusted environments by reusing existing 3GPP security mechanisms specified in TS 33.501[4] and NDS/IP framework for authentication and message protection, enabling secure interaction with the 5GC and NG-RAN without introducing new security primitiv... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| This solution reuses existing 3GPP security mechanisms specified in TS 33.501[4] and the Network Domain Security for IP-based protocols (NDS/IP) framework. The WAB-MT applies 5G primary authentication (e.g. 5G-AKA) for mutual authentication with the AUSF/UDM, as specified in TS 33.501[4]. The WAB-gNB reuses certificate... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| The solution leverages existing security mechanisms and procedures.
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security require... |
50a22aa683c9265ddffed9d2ca6d4bba | 33.724 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex <C>:
Change History
Change history
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Meeting
TDoc
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Rev
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New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-252987
S3-252684 and S3-252686 for endorsed TR Skeleton for WAB Securi... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the security mechanisms that permit an authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites without performing UE authentication or key negotiation (NAS SMC) between the UE and satellites in split-MME architecture for Store and Forward Satellite operation.
The study of securi... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 3 Definitions of terms and abbreviations
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 3.2 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 4 Architecture assumptions
| The following architecture assumptions are applied to the study:
- The general features and the Split MME architecture of Store and Forward Satellite operation are described in Annex O.2 of TS 23.401 [2] are used as architecture assumptions in this study.
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| One of the architectural assumptions for Store and Forward Satellite operation is that when the service link is available, there is no feeder link and inter satellite link. There are two example deployment options for Store and Forward Satellite operation given in Annex O of TS 23.401 [2], i.e. Split MME architecture a... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| If the NAS COUNTs are not synchronized across multiple satellites, an attacker may intercept and replay previously transmitted NAS messages. Since different satellites may accept outdated NAS COUNT values, the replay protection mechanism could be bypassed, leading to unauthorized actions.
Key stream may be reused if t... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 3GPP system shall support means to secure NAS messages exchange in the store and forward satellite operations.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.0 Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
Key Issues
Solutions
1
1
X
2
X
3
X
4
X
5
X
6
X
7
X
8
X
9
X
10
X
11
X
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.1 Solution #1: Derivation of Satellite-Specific NAS keys for S&F Operation
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture.
This solution proposes a mechanism to derive unique NAS integrity and encryption keys for each satellite by using the satellite ID as an additional input parameter during the NAS key deri... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| In this solution, it is proposed to derive distinct set of NAS keys for each satellite from the common root key KASME. The satellite-specific NAS keys are derived by the UE and the network using the KDF as specified in TS 33.220 [x].
For a serving Satellite n, the NAS integrity key KNASint and the NAS encryption key K... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| This solution proposed to use satellite-specific NAS keys for each satellite to prevent key stream reuse. There is no need to synchronize the NAS COUNT between satellites.
The solution has the following impacts:
- a new KDF needs to be defined;
- The UE and the MME-onboard needs to derive and store satellite-specifi... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.2 Solution #2: NAS Security Context Isolation via Satellite-Specific NAS COUNT
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture.
This solution proposes a mechanism ensuing different satellite using different COUNT to protect NAS message and therefore eliminates the need for real-time NAS COUNT synchronization acros... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| This solution is based on the following assumptions and principles:
- the UE and each MME-onboard maintain independent pairs of NAS COUNTs (one for uplink, one for downlink) for their mutual communication. The NAS COUNTs are not synchronized with other satellites.
Based on the above principle, the existing procedures... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution proposed to use satellite-specific NAS COUNTs for each satellite to prevent key stream reuse. There is no need to synchronize the NAS COUNT between satellites, and no change to the NAS keys.
The solution has the following impacts:
- A new NAS COUNT construction mechanism is needed;
- The UE and MME-gro... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.3 Solution #3: UE context management for S&F operation
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture.
After the UE is authenticated and NAS security is established, the satellite will send a security token to the UE, which contains the UE's current context. When the UE attempts to connect... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| UE context management procedure for S&F operation is shown in the following figure.
Figure 6.3.2-1: UE context management procedure for S&F operation
0. The security key materials used to provide confidentiality and integrity protection for security tokens used in S&F operations are pre-configured in the satellites... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| This solution uses the target UE as an intermediate entity to securely transmit the UE context from one satellite to another, thereby meeting the requirements of Key Issue #1.
The advantages of this method are:
- UE can connect to any satellite that supports S&F services.
The disadvantages of this method are:
- Nee... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.4 Solution #4: Separate NAS COUNT pair per SatelliteID within an EPS Security Context
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1.
This solution is based on using separate pairs of NAS counters per Satellite ID in the EPS security context when the UE is served by multiple satellites operating in S&F mode and the UE registration remains valid even the serving satellite changes over time (i.e., the UE is not re... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| This solution applies to a satellite network operating in S&F mode and, it’s especially relevant for deployments based on the split MME architecture (see TS 23.402 Annex O.2) in which a UE registration remains valid across multiple satellites (unlike a full EPC deployment, where registration is only valid in one satell... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| The following impacts are needed:
- The EPS Security Context in the UE and MME needs to handle separate pairs of NAS COUNT per SatelliteID.
- A new NAS COUNT construction mechanism is needed to include the SatelliteID.
- To ensure backward compatibility, a new network capability and UE capability are needed to indic... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.5 Solution #5: Protection for NAS message of authenticated UE in split-MME architecture
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address Key Issue #1, providing a protection method for exchanging the NAS message in the Store and Forward satellite operations.
As specified in TS 33.401 [3], the NAS security is terminated on the MME-onboard, and the ground segment of the network ensures that the latest NAS security con... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.2.1 DL NAS signalling protection
|
Figure 6.5.2-1: Protection for DL NAS messages of authenticated UE
0. The UE and MME-ground hold the latest NAS COUNTs, including the UL NAS COUNT and DL NAS COUNT.
At Time 1:
1. The MME-ground receives the DL NAS signaling #1 of the authenticated UE from another EPS NF.
2. Based on the coverage avail... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.2.2 UL NAS signalling protection
| In the split-MME architecture, the UE includes the Satellite ID in the UL NAS signalling, then uses the NAS security keys to protect the UL NAS signalling, including the Satellite ID.
Once receiving the NAS signalling, the MME on-board verifies the integrity by using the NAS security key. If the verification is succe... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the security requirements of Key Issue #1.
For the protection of DL NAS messages, the coverage availability information is used by the MME-ground for selecting the MME on-board. By using the coverage availability information, this solution assumes that the UE can receive the DL NAS messages fro... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.6 Solution #6: Secure NAS messages via using different NAS keys in multiple satellites
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses “Key issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture”.
This solution is based on split MME architecture. S&F Satellite operation may involve multiple satellites allocated by an S&F Monitoring List. In order to prevent reusing key stream, o... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| Based on the existing authentication procedures, this solution proposes to use different NAS keys when UE exchanges data with multiple satellites.
Figure 6.6.2-1 Enhanced NAS security for multiple satellites in S&F mode
SAT#1 has available Service Link.
1. The UE sends the Attach Request to SAT#1.
2. If S... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the Key Issue #1, and it applies for S&F operations with multiple satellites. In this solution, the UE can exchange data with multiple satellites efficiently without security risk.
The solution has the following impacts:
This solution requires the MME-ground and the UE to derive new keys (i.e... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.7 Solution #7: Solution for NAS COUNT synchronization in store-and-forward operations
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| As per the threat described in the key issue #1, an attacker may intercept and replay previously transmitted NAS messages. This solution proposes the following to address this threat:
• A new “Satellite access information” can be included as part of Initial UE message sent from satellite eNB to MME. This informati... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.7.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.7.2-1: Message sequence showing NAS COUNT verification at MME
As shown in Figure 6.7.2-1:
- In Step 2, UL and DL NAS COUNTs are synchronized between MME-onboard and MME-onground entities. Note that from UE’s perspective, MME is expected to be seen as a single logical entity. Hence, in this solution, the pr... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1.
This solution has the following advantages:
• proposes the use of a new “Satellite access information” which can be included in the initial UE message sent from satellite eNB to MME and also recommends the MME-onboard and MME-onground synchronize the NAS COUNT values for U... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.8 Solution #8: New specific rules to handle NAS Counter Overflow in S&F mode
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#1.
In S&F Satellite operation, the subset of satellites operating in S&F Mode in which a given UE registration is valid (i.e. satellites included in the S&F Monitoring List), are expected to maintain a synchronised UE context, even though the synchronisation mechanism is outside the scope of... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.2 Solution details
| This section provides further details on this solution by analysing the uplink case (UE MME-onboard) and the downlink case (UE MME-onboard) when considering (1) UE is served by multiple satellites as per the S&F Monitoring List provided to the UE and (2) UE assumes that NAS counters in the MME-onboard(s) of those s... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.2.1 Uplink case
| Figure 6.8.2.1-1 shows the steps taken by the MME-onboard. Changes introduced by this solution are marked in red.
a) Upon receiving an integrity protected NAS uplink message, the MME-onboard retrieves the SQN and the NAS message authentication code (NAS-MAC) which are then used to compute the expected NAS message ... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.2.2 Downlink case
| Figure 6.8.2.2-1 shows the steps taken by the UE. Changes introduced by this solution are marked in red.
a) Upon receiving an integrity protected NAS downlink message, the UE retrieves the SQN and the NAS message authentication code (NAS-MAC) which are then used to compute the expected NAS message authentication c... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.2.3 Considerations on the range of NAS counters deviation between satellites
| When “NAS counters synchronization relaxation” is enabled, to avoid the NAS counters in each of the MME-onboard(s) to deviate much between them, UE context synchronisation across satellites to update the NAS counters can still be performed by the network from time to time as per NW implementation policy (e.g., periodic... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.2.4 Message sequence
| Figure 6.8.2.4-1 provides an illustrative message sequence of the proposed solution. The sequence considers a system of two satellites (Sat#A and Sat#B) utilizing the split-MME architecture. It covers the entire process, starting from the triggering of the initial attach and default PDN connectivity request through to ... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| The following impacts are identified:
• The UE's handling of the Downlink (DL) NAS OC must account for scenarios where the DL NAS OC stored in the UE from interactions with a previous satellite may be up to X units lower than the DL NAS OC used by the current serving satellite.
• The on-board MME's handling o... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.9 Solution #9: Secure NAS messages via one pair of COUNTs
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.9.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses “Key issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture”.
For MME-split architecture in S&F mode, UE could interact with more than one satellites. The NAS COUNTs are not synchronized across multiple satellites. However, the UE has the latest N... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.9.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.9.2 Secure NAS messages via one pair of COUNTs
0. The UE has completed authentication and NAS SMC procedure with an MME-onboard.
1. The UE maintains the latest NAS COUNTs, including the UL NAS COUNT and DL NAS COUNT. NAS COUNT is constructed by NAS OVERFLOW and NAS SQN.
2. At Time T1, the UE s... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.9.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the Key Issue #1, and it applies for S&F operations with multiple satellites.
This solution introduces extra overhead for UE to send additional parameter to MME.
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.10 Solution #10: NAS keys isolation in S&F operations
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.10.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Authenticated UE to exchange NAS messages with multiple satellites in split-MME architecture.
According to Annex N.2 of TS 33.401, a typical S&F authentication and data transmission procedure is:
1. The MME-ground provides authentication vectors to one or multiple satellites.... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.10.2 Solution details
| The NAS keys isolation procedure in S&F operations is shown in the following figure.
Figure 6.10.2-1: NAS keys isolation procedure in S&F operations
0. The secret parameter for NAS key derivation is pre-configured in the UE and the Network.
Editor’s Note: Whether and how the secret parameter is used is FFS.
... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.10.3 Evaluation
| TBD.
|
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.11 Solution #11: Solution to the NAS key stream re-use issue during S&F operations
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.11.1 Introduction
| The solution addresses Key Issue #1.
The solution is based on two new mechanisms:
• The Satellite ID obtained from SIB31 is used as a separation parameter in the COUNT input parameter as described in Solution #2. This prevents an attacker from replaying messages and masquerading as if they were from the UE or fro... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.11.2 Solution details
| |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.11.2.1 Key stream separation
| As described in Solution #2, it is proposed to concatenate the Satellite ID parameter when forming the COUNT input to the NAS algorithms. The Satellite ID is an 8-bit long identifier that uniquely maps to the MME onboard as specified in 3GPP TS 24.301 [4]. The Satellite ID is broadcast by eNB in SIB31.
COUNT: = Satell... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.11.2.2 NAS COUNT synchronization
| This solution uses a single NAS COUNT pair on the UE and the MMEs on board. The handling of the NAS COUNT stored values differs as follows.
When the UE is about to trigger NAS communication with an MME via for example a service request, the UE sets the UL COUNT value to the max among the stored DL and UL COUNT values.... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 6.11.3 Evaluation
| The solution addresses the requirements of Key Issue #1.
The solution introduces the Satellite ID when forming the COUNT parameter to guarantee separation. The solution also proposes a new handling of the store COUNT values both on the network and the UE side to ensure synchronization. The solution requires also the i... |
c7e00a4756a8eddf7adde59e28cefea1 | 33.700-30 | 7 Conclusions
| 7.Z Key Issue #Z: <Key Issue Name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions of Key Issue #Z.
Annex <A>:
<Informative annex title for a Technical Report>
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253723
... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the potential security enhancements for 5G NR Femto. More specifically, the study investigates potential security enhancements in the following areas:
- The security requirements and potential solutions to enhance the security of NR Femto devices, to detect misconfigured or compromised NR ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 4 Security Architecture and Assumptions
| The following security architecture and assumptions are applied to the present document:
- Annex V in TS 23.501[2] captures the architecture for NR Femto. The architecture option of NR Femto with a local UPF is reused as the basis for this study.
- The security architectural and requirements captured in TS 33.545 [... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5 Key issues
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Detection of misconfigured/compromised 5G NR Femto devices
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| NR Femto devices are deployed outside operator domain and considered to be in un-trusted environments. Un-detected misconfigured or compromised NR Femto devices can lead to disruptions in services to UEs. A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to serve the victim UE can p... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to serve the victim UE can pose various threats including authentication replay attacks, broadcasting CAG IDs that it is not authorized to serve, denial of service attacks, etc.to the connected UEs.
A misconfigured or compromised NR... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall be able to detect and report misconfigured or compromised NR femto device(s) and eliminate associated risks, e.g. preventing the abnormal traffics/signalling threats.
The 5GS shall ensure the integrity of the reporting for misconfigured or compromised femto devices.
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security and privacy aspect for local access
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| As defined in TS 23.501 [2] for NR Femto, if a local UPF is deployed close to the location of NR Femto node, the edge computing functionality shall be applied and the deployment options of NR Femto with a locally deployed UPF is also given the annex V. The security and privacy aspect for NR Femto and locally deployed U... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| The locally deployed UPF is located outside the operator’s security domain, if the 5GS core network topology is not hided towards locally deployed UPF, the core network topology and address information may be exposed outside the operator’s security domain.
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS should support a mechanism to provide secure local access services for NR Femto.
The 5GS should support a mechanism to hide the 5GS core network topology from the locally deployed UPF.
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.3 Key Issue #3: Security protection for the NR Femto MS
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| As defined in clause 4.1 of TS 33.545 [3], an NR Femto node connects to NR Femto Management System (NR Femto MS) directly or connects to NR Femto MS via Security Gateway (SeGW) . The NR Femto MS server may be located inside the operator's access or core network (accessible on the MNO Intranet) or outside of it (accessi... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.3.2 Security threats
| The NR Femto MS may be subjected to attacks such as DDoS and Vulnerability exploitation, as it directly connect to a compromised NR Femto and is exposed to public internet when it located outside the operator’s network.
The NR Femto MS topology may be directly exposed to a compromised NR Femto device when it located i... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| 3GPP shall provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective.
NOTE: Recommendation or Mandate to deploy the NR Femto MS server inside the operator’s network and connect to the NR Femto device via SeGW can help strengthen the security of NR Femto MS.
The 5GS shall provide a mean... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.4 Key Issue #4: Mitigation of QoSA in edge computing
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| Quality of Service (QoS) based Attack (QoSA) exploits UE access to the user plane to cause a DoS attack on the control plane in the core network. It consists of using a set of compromised UEs or UPFs to forge and transmit incorrect QoS measurements to the network to trick core network into considering that a QoS violat... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.4.2 Security threats
| A set of compromised UEs or UPFs can forge and transmit incorrect QoS measurements to the core network can cause DoS attack on the NFs receiving the measurements.
Incorrect QoS measurement will affect the selection of local UPF and the quality of edge computing services.
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.4.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS shall provide mechanisms to detect and mitigate QoSA in NR Femto edge computing services.
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.5 Key Issue #5: Hardware hardening for the NR Femto
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