hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.5.1 Key issue details
| Some commercial Femto nodes lack essential hardware hardening, e.g., disabling the debug interfaces, thus allowing an attacker to gain direct local access to the Femto nodes and perform further exploitation.
Common debug interfaces include the Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART), which allows serial co... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.5.2 Security threats
| Without hardware hardening, such as disabling debug interfaces, an attacker could gain direct access to NR Femto nodes to perform further exploitation, such as extracting embedded credentials.
If any hardware tampering of NR Femto devices gets un-detected by the 5GS, it can expose many threats including eavesdropping... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 5.5.3 Potential security requirements
| NR Femto nodes shall harden the hardware platform, including protecting the debug interfaces with strong authentication and authorization, and/or disabling the debug interfaces in commercial deployment.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requi... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6 Solutions
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
KI#4
KI#5
1
X
2
X
3
X
4
X
5
X
6
X
7
X
8
X
9
X
X
10
X
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.2 Solution #1: Security detection of misconfigured 5G NR Femto node
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the requirements of KI #1 and KI #5.
It is proposed to enhance the 5G NR Femto node to support to report itself configuration information for security detection and monitoring to the security management function which is a part of the 5G NR Femto MS.
It is proposed to enhance the 5G NR Femto... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.2.2.1 Security procedure for security detection of NR Femto node
| The security procedure for security detection of 5G NR Femto node are further depicted in Figure 6.2.2.1-1.
Figure 6.2.2.1-1: Security procedure for security detection of 5G NR Femto node
0a. The 5G NR Femto node and Security gateway has established a secure connection of management plane with the Security Manageme... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.2.2.2 Recommended configuration information for detection
| Based on typical attack threats targeting the NR Femto node, the table 6.2.2.2-1 lists the recommended configuration information to be collected for security detection and monitoring from the NR Femto node.
Table 6.2.2.2-1: Recommended configuration information for detection
Configuration information for security det... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements of KI #1 and KI #5 by enhancing the 5G NR Femto and 5G NR Femto Management System as defined in TS 33.545 [3] to support the detection and of misconfigured 5G NR Femto nodes.
This solution includes steps for configuring configuration information collection policies, collecting... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.3 Solution #2: Security for detection of misconfigured/compromised NR Femto
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to connect to the SeGW can pose various threats on the UEs as well as on the operator’s network. NR Femto nodes are expected to comply with location restrictions. Residential or enterprise Femto nodes are allowed to cover a limited g... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| Following steps are followed:
• Following information about a valid registered NR Femto can be stored in UDM:
◦ NR Femto's geographic location information
◦ NR Femto's neighboring cell IDs, PCI, etc.
◦ NR Femto's neighboring cell locations
• After successful authentication and NAS s... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| This solution has the following limitations:
• This solution applies only to a compromised Femto that has moved its location. A compromised NR Femto that has not moved its location cannot be detected by this solution.
• The locations of multiple UEs can be checked before confirming that the NR Femto is compr... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4 Solution #3: Enhance SeGW to support security protection for N4 interface
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #2. Considering the locally deployed UPF is located outside the operator’s security domain and interact with core network through N4 interface, which leads to the exposure threats to the core network, this solution propose to enhance the Security Gateway as defined in TS 33.545 [3] to ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.1 Security architecture
| The security aspect enhancements to system architecture of clause 4.1 in TS 33.545 [3] for security protection for N4 interface are further depicted in Figure 6.4.2.1-1.
Figure 6.4.2.1-1: Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
Security protections provided by the Security Gateway for the traffic through ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.2 Topology hiding
| The core network topology shall not be directly exposed to the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface.
The SeGW hide the 5GC topology so that the core network entity address information (such as IP addresses of SMF etc.) are not inadvertently exposed to the locally deployed UPF.
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.3 Signalling message filtration
| The Security Gateway supports to discard malformed signalling messages sent from the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface over the trust boundary according to 3GPP specifications.
The Security Gateway supports to block messages with wrong NF types sent from the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface over the t... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.4 Security protection
| Security requirements and functions as defined in clause 4.2.1.7 of TS 33.545 [3] can provide the mutual authentication and transport protection between the locally deployed UPF and the Security Gateway.
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4.2.5 Access control
| The Security Gateway supports the access control mechanism for the locally deployed UPF accessing the SMF deployed in core network, e.g. configure the access control list.
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements of KI #2 by enhancing the SeGW in architecture of NR Femto to provide security protection for N4 interface between the locally UPF and core network, including topology hiding, signalling message filtration, security protection for traffics over N4, access control.
It is assumed... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.5 Solution #4: Security of local UPF
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes the following:
• Perform additional verification of parameters when UE attempts to setup PDU session or sends service requests to local UPF.
• Use either NATing OR Femto Gateway to hide network topology from local UPF
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| When UE attempts PDU session establishment or sends service request to local UPF, following additional steps are followed for additional verification:
• 5GC performs additional verfication for local UPF by:
◦ Verifying that the gNB ID maps to NR Femto node
◦ Verifying that the local UPF ID maps t... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2: “Security and privacy aspect for local access”.
The solution addresses the following:
• With additional verification of parameters, this solution provides stricter checks to enhance security of local access services for NR Femto. This caters to the potential security requir... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.6 Solution #5: Security protection for NR Femto MS
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the KI #3: security protection for NR Femto MS. It is propose to enhance the security architecture and requirements of NR Femto which is defined in clause 4.1 of TS 33.545 [3] as the follow aspects:
- Provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective.
- ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.6.2.1 Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
| The security aspect enhancements to system architecture of NR Femto for security purpose are further depicted in Figure 6.6.2.1-1.
Figure 6.6.2.1-1: Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
Consider the NR Femto MS may be subjected to attacks when it located outside the operator’s network, such as DDoS and... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.6.2.1 Topology hiding between the NR Femto and the NR Femto MS
| The NR Femto Management System server topology shall not be directly exposed to the NR Femto.
When the NR Femto MS server located inside the operator’s network, the SeGW hide the NR Femto Management System server topology so that the NR Femto Management System server address information (such as IP addresses and port ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements of KI#3 i.e. provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective, support the topology hiding between the NR Femto and the NR Femto MS.
This solution proposes to enhance the security Architecture of NR Femto as defined in clause 4.1 of TS 3... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.7 Solution #6: Enhance SeGW to support QoSA mitigation
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the KI#4: mitigation of QoSA in edge computing. It is proposed to enhance the NR Femto security architecture in follow aspects:
- Enhance the SeGW to perform N4 Session Report monitoring and report the QoS attack to the SMF.
- Enhance the SMF to support the edge relocation after receiving the ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.7.2 Solution details
| The security procedure for QoSA mitigation is further depicted in Figure 6.7.2-1. It is assumed that NR Femto GW is integrated with SeGW in this solution.
Figure 6.7.2-1: Security procedure for QoSA mitigation
1. After or during the establishment of the PDU session, the SMF sends QoSA Report Notify to the SeGW.... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements of KI #4 by enhancing the SeGW in architecture of NR Femto to provide QoSA mitigation for N4 interface between the locally sites UPF and the SMF in the core network. It is assumed that NR Femto GW is integrated with SeGW in this solution.
This solution impacts the following:
-... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.8 Solution #7: Detection and reporting hardware tampering of NR Femto devices
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes the following:
• Including a tampering detection module inside the Trusted Environment (TrE) of NR Femto device.
◦ This module can be implemented as part of TrE defined in TS 33.320[4] clause 5.1.2. NOTE that as per clause 5.1 from TS 33.545 [3], clauses 5 to 11 from TS 33.320 [4] ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.8.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.8.2 1: Steps followed for femto node tampering detection and reporting
Figure 6.8.2 1 illustrates the high level steps followed.
Step 1: Operators can configure maintenance windows if some hardware maintenance is required for femto nodes. Also, periodicity of r... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| This solution proposes addition of a tampering detection module in the TrE. Such a module can detect hardware or software tampering using sensors, enhanced POST and computing the hash values of the executable binaries and configuration files. This solution addresses key issue #1.
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.9 Solution #8: Security protection for N2 interface for NR Femto
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.9.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the requirements of key issue #1.
A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to connect to the SeGW can pose various threats including abnormal traffics, abnormal signalling messages, denial of service attacks to the NR Femto MS and the core network.... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.9.2 Solution details
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.9.2.1 Security architecture
| The security aspect enhancements to system architecture of clause 4.1 in TS 33.545 [3] for security protection for N2 interface are further depicted in Figure 6.9.2.1-1.
Figure 6.9.2.1-1: Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
In addition to security requirements for N2 interface as defined in TS 33.545 ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.9.2.2 Signalling message filtration
| The Security Gateway or NR Femto Gateway supports to discard malformed signalling messages sent from the 5G NR Femto nodes through N2 interface over the trust boundary according to 3GPP specifications.
The Security Gateway or NR Femto Gateway supports to block messages with wrong NF types sent from the 5G NR Femto nod... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.9.2.3 Access control
| The Security Gateway or NR Femto Gateway supports the access control mechanism for the 5G NR Femto nodes accessing the AMF deployed in core network, e.g. configure the access control list.
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.9.3 Evaluation
| In order to eliminate risks associated with compromised NR Femto nodes, e.g., preventing the abnormal traffic or signalling threats, this solution addresses the requirements of KI #1 by enhancing the Securtiy Gateway or NR Femto Gateway in the architecture of NR Femto to provide enhanced security protection for the N2 ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.10 Solution #9: Security protection for N3 and N9 interface for NR Femto system
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.10.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the requirements of key issue #1 and key issue #2.
This solution propose to enhance the Security Gateway as defined in TS 33.545 [3] to prevent core network against the attacks through N3 and N9 (if local UPF co-located) interface.
5G NR Femto securely communicate with the UPF deployed in co... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.10.2 Solution details
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.10.2.1 Security architecture
| The security aspect enhancements to system architecture of clause 4.1 in TS 33.545 [3] for security protection for N3 and N9 interface are further depicted in Figure 6.9.2.1-1.
Figure 6.10.2.1-1: Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
The security protections provided by the Security Gateway for the traf... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.10.2.2 Topology hiding
| The topology hiding function for N3 interface as defined in clause 5.7 of TS 33.545 [3] can be reused.
The core network topology shall not be directly exposed to the locally deployed UPF through N9 interface.
The Security Gateway hide the 5GC topology so that the core network entity address information (such as IP ad... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.10.2.3 Abnormal traffics filtration
| The Security Gateway supports to discard malformed GTP-U protocol traffics and non-GTU-U protocol traffics sent from the 5G NR Femto nodes through N3 interface over the trust boundary according to 3GPP specifications.
The Security Gateway supports to discard malformed GTP-U protocol traffics and non-GTU-U protocol tra... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.10.2.4 Access control
| The Security Gateway supports the access control mechanism for the 5G NR Femto nodes accessing the UPF deployed in core network, e.g. configure the access control list.
The Security Gateway supports the access control mechanism for the Locally deployed UPF accessing the UPF deployed in core network, e.g. configure the... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.10.3 Evaluation
| In order to eliminate risks associated with compromised NR Femto nodes, e.g., preventing the abnormal traffic or signalling threats, this solution addresses the requirements of KI #1 by enhancing the Securtiy Gateway in the architecture of NR Femto to provide enhanced security protection for the N3 interface between th... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.11 Solution #10: Mitigation of risks against QoS based attacks in edge computing
| |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.11.1 Introduction
| As described in the key issue#4, QoS based attacks can be launched from a set of compromised UEs or UPFs. This solution proposes detection and mitigation of risks against QoS attacks from:
• compromised local UPFs connected via femto devices
◦ the core network can configure QoS monitoring reporting interv... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.11.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.11.2-1: Detecting and mitigating QoS based attacks from local UPF
Figure 6.11.2-1 illustrates the detailed steps proposed by this solution.
Step 1: UE performs registration as per 23.502 Clause 4.2.2.2.2
Step 2: UE establishes PDU session with the network
Step 3: During PDU session establishment in s... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 6.11.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses key issue#4, for attacks from compromised UPFs as well as malicious UEs.
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation is FFS.
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
|
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 7.1 Conclusions to Key Issue #1: Detection of misconfigured/compromised 5G NR Femto devices
| It is agreed to consider the following principles for the normative work:
1) For the requirements of detection of misconfigured 5G NR Femto nodes:
- 5G NR Femto supports reporting configuration information for detection and monitoring to the management function in accordance with pre-configured requirements. The ... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 7.2 Conclusions to Key Issue #2: Security and privacy aspect for local access
| It is agreed to consider the following principles for the normative work:
- The SeGW is enhanced to provide security protection for N4 interface between the locally UPF and core network, including topology hiding, signaling message filtration, security protection for traffics over N4, access control.
NOTE: It is assu... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 7.3 Conclusions to Key Issue #3: Security protection for the NR Femto MS
| It is agreed to consider the following principles for the normative work:
- NR Femto MS is deployed inside operator’s domain (accessible on the MNO Intranet via security connection) and connect to the NR Femto via SeGW.
- The SeGW hide the 5G NR Femto Management System server topology so that the 5G NR Femto Manageme... |
8853173a0adb7368c220d967f293b247 | 33.746 | 7.4 Conclusions to Key Issue #4: Mitigation of QoSA in edge computing
| It is agreed to consider the following principles for the normative work:
- The SeGW is enhanced to perform N4 Session Report monitoring and report the QoS attack to the SMF in the core network.
- The SMF is enhanced to perform edge relocation after receiving the QoSA alert.
Editor’s Note: Further conclusions are FF... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the applicability and adaptation of the GNP threats/assets in TR 33.926 [2], the GVNP threats/assets in TR 33.927 [3] and the existing general SCAS test cases in TS 33.117 [4] to generic 3GPP container-based network products (GCNPs).
It identifies:
- Critical assets and threats relevant... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
CISM Container Infrastructure Service Management
CNF Containerized Netw... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 4 Assumptions
|
A Generic Container-based Network Product (GCNP) constitutes a minimal container product consisting of:
- Container image(s) containing the network function implementation and dependencies
- Image registry reference with associated metadata (tags, manifests)
- Basic configuration parameters (environment variables,... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 4.1 Overview
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 4.1.1 Description of the GCNP model
| A container-based network product class is the class of products that implement 3GPP defined network functionalities running on container infrastructure (e.g. Container as a Service platform), along with PaaS supporting container-based services. The deployment scenarios are summarized in ETSI NFV-IFA 029 [6]. There are... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 4.1.2 Functions defined by 3GPP
| A generic container-based network function implements 3GPP-defined functions. The 3GPP-defined functions are deployed over the Container Infrastructure Service as defined in ETSI NFV-IFA 029 [6].
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 4.1.3 Other functions
| A GCNP will also contain functionalities not or not fully covered by 3GPP specifications.
Examples include, but are not limited to, remote management functions.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 4.1.4 Operating system (OS)
| The GCNP does not include any OS, since it shares the host OS of the container infrastructure. Depending on the vendors product boundary definition, the test lab has to decide on the applicability of OS-related test cases.
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d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 4.1.5 Container Infrastructure
| Depending on the vendors product boundary definition, the test lab has to decide on the applicability of Container Infrastructure-related test cases.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 4.1.6 Interfaces
| Remote logical interfaces are those interfaces used to communicate with the GCNP from other network nodes. These interfaces also include remote access interfaces for GCNP maintenance through e.g. an Element Management (EM) or a Virtualized Network Function Manager (VNFM).
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d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5 Assets and threats for Container-based Products
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d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains assets and threats that are believed to apply to more than one container-based network product (GCNP).
The format follows TR 33.926 [2] and TR 33.927 [3] to allow alignment with existing SCAS threat catalogues, with adaptations for containerized deployments.
Container-based network product... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.2.1 Mapping of existing Critical Assets from GNP
| Mapping of critical assets of GNP (see TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.2) to GCNP.
Critical Asset for GNP
Applicablity for GCNP
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords)
applicable for GCNP
Log data
applicable for GCNP
Configuration data, e.g. GNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Objects (e.g. user group... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.2.2 Mapping of existing Critical Assets from GVNP
| Mapping of critical assets of GVNP (see TR 33.927 [3], clause 5.2.1) to GCNP.
Critical Asset for GVNP
Applicablity for GCNP
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords, private key)
applicable for GCNP
Log data
applicable for GCNP
Configuration data, e.g. GVNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Object... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.2.3 Critical Assets for GCNP
| List of new, copied and derived critical assets for GCNP.
Critical Asset for GCNP
Origin
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords, private key, API tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens)
copied from GNP and GVNP
Log data (container logs, orchestrator audit logs, security event logs)
copied from GNP a... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.1 Generic threats format
| Threats are described using the following format:
- Threat Name:
- Threat Category:
- Threat Description:
- Threatened Asset:
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2 Generic threats for GCNP
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.1 Introduction
| The common STRIDE threat categories used in TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.3.1 also apply to GCNP. Many generic threats from TR 33.926 clause 5.3 are applicable with adaptation for container contexts. In addition, GCNP have unique threats due to container runtime, orchestration APIs, and image distribution.
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d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.2 Threats related to 3GPP-defined interfaces
| GCNP inherit all the threats related to 3GPP-defined interfaces in TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.3.2, without any changes. It means that there is no need repeat the threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces which are covered in 3GPP security specifications. If threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces are found to be not... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.3 Threats related to interfaces introduced in container environments
| Two interfaces unique to GCNP are identified as critical assets:
- Interface between GCNP workloads and the orchestration control plane (e.g. Kubernetes API).
- Interface between GCNP workloads and the container runtime API (e.g. Docker socket, containerd API).
If unprotected, these interfaces can be exploited for p... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4 Spoofing identity
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.1 Default Accounts
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
The difference is that VNF is accessed through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface, an attacker can use a default account to access a CNF via VNC.
Default accounts can be present in container images.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.2 Weak Password Policies
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
However, the attacker using the weak password accesses GCNP through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.3 Password peek
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.3 of TR 33.926 applies to GCNP.
However, the attacker using the peeked password accesses GCNP through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.4 Direct Root Access
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.4 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.5 IP Spoofing
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
However, the objective of unauthorized access is a VNF, not a computer.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.6 Malware
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.6 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.7 Eavesdropping
| The threat in clause 5.3.3.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.8 Service Account Token Abuse
| - Threat Name: Service Account Token Abuse
- Threat Category: Spoofing identity
- Threat Description: An attacker could steal a Kubernetes service account token from a pod and use it to impersonate the GCNP, resulting in the attacker being able to interact with the container API, enumerate resources, privilege escala... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.4.9 API Endpoint Impersonation
| An attacker could spoof an orchestration API or SBA endpoint to mislead GCNP components.
|
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