hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.10.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential credential leakage via Referer headers, as described in section 4.2 of RFC 9700 [2].
Authorization codes or state values can unintentionally be disclosed to attackers through the Referer HTTP header.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.10.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| The Referer HTTP header is not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.10.3 Assessment
| Referer HTTP header as a feature is not applied to 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.11 BSP#11: Credential Leakage via Browser History
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.11.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential credential leakage via browser history, as described in section 4.3 of RFC 9700 [2].
Credential leakage via browser history refers to the unintended exposure of OAuth credentials (e.g., access tokens, authorization codes) when they are transmitted through front-channel mechanisms... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.11.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Browser-based authorization is not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.11.3 Assessment
| This practice is applicable to clients using browser-based authorization and is not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.12 BSP#12: Mix-Up Attacks
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.12.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Mix-Up attacks, as described in section 4.4 of RFC 9700 [2].
OAuth client is configured to interact with multiple authorization servers, and at least one of those authorization servers is controlled or influenced by an attacker in such a scenario client may be unable to reliably distinguis... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.12.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Applicable to only implicit or authorization code grant types. There is no security related usage in 5G SBA security.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.12.3 Assessment
| This practice is only applicable to implicit or authorization code grant types, which are not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.13 BSP#13: Authorization Code Injection
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.13.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential Authorization Code injection, as described in section 4.5 of RFC 9700 [2].
An authorization code is a short-lived credential issued to the client, which the client later exchanges directly with the authorization server to obtain access tokens securely. An attacker who has gained ... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.13.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Authorization codes are not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.13.3 Assessment
| Authorization code is not applied in 5G SBA security. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.14 BSP#14: Access Token Injection
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.14.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential access token injection, as described in section 4.6 of RFC 9700 [2].
Applicable to implicit and authorization grant types, an access token injection attack happens when an attacker takes a stolen access token and tricks a legitimate application (the client) into accepting and usi... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.14.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Implicit grant type, which is a precondition for the attack, is not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.14.3 Assessment
| The attack is applicable to implicit grant type and this grant type is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.15 BSP#15: Cross-Site Request Forgery
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.15.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential Cross-Site Request Forgery, as described in section 4.7 of RFC 9700 [2].
An attacker attempts to inject a request to the redirection URI of a legitimate client on a victim's device, e.g., to cause the client to access resources under the attacker's control.5.15.2 Usage in 5G SBA
... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.15.3 Assessment
| Redirection URI is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.16 BSP#16: PKCE Downgrade Attack
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.16.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses PKCE downgrade attacks, as described in section 4.8 of RFC 9700 [2].
A PKCE downgrade attack happens when an attacker forces a login process to skip using PKCE, even though the authorization server supports it. This is possible when PKCE is optional instead of mandatory. PKCE (Proof Key fo... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.16.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| PKCE is a security extension for the Authorization Code Grant, which is not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.16.3 Assessment
| PKCE as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.17 BSP#17 Preventing Leakage via Metadata
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.17.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the prevention of leakage via OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata, as described in section 4.10.3 of RFC 9700 [2].
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata is a standard way for an authorization server to publish its configuration (such as endpoints URL’s) so that clients can automatica... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.17.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata is not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.17.3 Assessment
| OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA security. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.18 BSP#18: Open Redirection
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.18.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses open redirection, as described in section 4.11 of RFC 9700 [2].
An attacker may use open redirectors to produce URLs pointing to a client to exfiltrate authorization codes and access tokens, or it can utilize a user’s trust in the authorization server to perform phishing attacks.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.18.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| URL redirection is used in 5G SBA to redirect access token requests between trusted NRFs (see clause 5.19 307 Redirect), but it is not used in communication flows between the authorization server and the client or for sharing issued access tokens.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.18.3 Assessment
| URL redirection as a feature is not applied while issuing access tokens in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.19 BSP#19: 307 Redirect
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.19.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses 307 redirect, as described in section 4.12 of RFC 9700 [2].
After a user submits their credentials with HTTP POST to the authorization server to authorize a client, the authorization server checks the credentials and redirects the user agent to the client’s redirection endpoint. If the aut... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.19.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 5.4.2.2.3 of TS 29.510 [8]
When multiple NRFs are deployed in one PLMN, one NRF (NRF-1) can request an OAuth2 access token from a different NRF (NRF-2) to address an access token request from an NF Service Consumer. The access token request between these two NRFs can be redirected to a third NRF (NRF... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.19.3 Assessment
| In 5G SBA, 307 redirect is not used between the authorization server and the client. Additionally, the concept of a user providing credentials towards the authorization server to authorize a client does not apply in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.20 BSP#20: TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.20.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses TLS terminating reverse proxies, as described in section 4.13 of RFC 9700 [2] and in clause 5.7 of this document.
TLS terminating gateway acting as reverse proxies specifically on http layer where it normalizes, sanitizes and enforces policies on http headers.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.20.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| TLS terminating reverse proxy deployment architecture is not used in 5G SBA specifications.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.20.3 Assessment
| HTTP based header sanitization, normalization and enforcement as part of TLS terminating reverse proxies are not applied in 5G SBA security. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.21 BSP#21: Refresh Token Protection
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.21.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses refresh token protection, as described in section 4.14 of RFC 9700 [2].
The refresh token is used to request a new access token when needed, instead of keeping long-lasting access tokens active avoiding client proving its identity again when requesting a new token.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.21.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Refresh tokens are not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.21.3 Assessment
| Refresh tokens are not applied in 5G SBA as the tokens are expected to be short-lived already. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.22 BSP#22: Client Impersonating Resource Owner
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.22.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses scenarios of clients impersonating resource owners, as described in section 4.15 of RFC 9700 [2].
If a client can select its own client_id during registration with the authorization server, it may set it to a value identifying a resource owner to confuse the resource server and access reso... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.22.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Resource owner is involved in other type of grants such as authorization code grant, hence there is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.22.3 Assessment
| This practice is only applicable to implicit or authorization code grant types, which are not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.23 BSP#23: Clickjacking
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.23.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential clickjacking, as described in section 4.16 of RFC 9700 [2].
In clickjacking attacks, an attacker embeds the authorization endpoint user interface in an innocuous context to deceive the user and obtain the user’s credentials.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.23.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
Browser-based user communication is not relevant to SBA and hence there is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.23.3 Assessment
| User interfaces and their usages are not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.24 BSP#24: Attacks on In-Browser Communication Flows
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.24.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential attacks on in-browser communication flows, as described in section 4.17 of RFC 9700 [2].
In-Browser Communication Flows are OAuth/OIDC interactions where the browser mediates communication between the authorization server and client, so tokens or codes transit through browser-sid... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.24.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Browser-based authorization is not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.24.3 Assessment
| This practice is applicable to clients using browser-based authorization and is not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.25 BSP #25: Use Appropriate Algorithms
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.25.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the use of appropriate algorithms, as described in section 3.2 of RFC 8725 [5].
Applications are required to accept only strong and up to date cryptographic algorithms for JWTs. If an algorithm is weak or not allowed, the JWTs are treated as invalid.
Specifically, usage of RSA-PKCS1 v1.5 ... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.25.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: 6.3.3 of TS 33.210 [6]
It is required that the "none" algorithm parameter is not supported..
The JWS profile specifies additional requirements to the profile in JWA (RFC 7518 [12]). According to JWA, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is recommended or optional. The JWS profile in TS 33.210 [6] does not mention RSASSA-PKC... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.25.3 Assessment
| Strong and up to date acceptable cryptographic algorithms are already specified, and the use of "none" algorithm is required to not be supported. It is recommended to update the JWS profile to not recommend the usage of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.26 BSP #26: Do Not Trust Received Claims
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.26.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the trust of received claims as described in section 3.10 of RFC 8725 [5].
• The "kid" (key ID) header is used by the relying application to perform key lookup. Applications ensures validation of the received KID.
• Similarly, blindly following a "jku" (JWK set URL) or "x5u" (X.50... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.26.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 13.3.8.2 of TS 33.501[3]
In 5G SBA, specifically with in the use of CCA tokens where the use of x5u is pertinent, the x5u URL are not public or arbitrary and are assumed to be trusted via operator managed PKI, though the possibility of the CCA token bypass still exists.
Reference: clause 6.3.3.3 of ... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.26.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.27 BSP #27: Use Explicit Typing
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.27.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the use of explicit typing as specified in section 3.11 of RFC 8725 [5].
Explicit Typing provides means to avoid confusing one kind of JWT for another. To avoid this, the JWT can include a header parameter to enable the validation of the JWT type.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.27.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 13.4.1 of TS 33.501 [3] and clause 6.3.5.2.3 of TS 29.510 [z]
Access tokens are JWTs that are issued by the NRF and enable NF Service Producers to authorize requests from NF Service requestors.
As specified in TS 29.510 clause 6.3.5.2.3 in the access token response, the information element “token_ty... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.27.3 Assessment
| Different kinds of JWTs are clearly separated through implicit typing in TS 33.501 [3]. CCA and access tokens have different issuers and contain different claims. They also support slightly different header parameters. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.28 BSP #28: Validate Issuer and Subject
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.28.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the validation of issuer and subject, as described in clause 3.8 of RFC 8725 [5].
When a JWT contains an "iss" (issuer) claim, the application validates that the cryptographic keys used for the cryptographic operations in the JWT belong to the issuer. Similarly, when the JWT contains a "su... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.28.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: 13.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.501[3]
The claims in the access tokens issued by the NRF include the NF Instance Id of the NRF (issuer) and the NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer (subject).
The recipient NF Service Producer checks the integrity of the received JWT using the public key of the NRF which issued th... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.28.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.29 BSP #29: Use and Validate Audience
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.29.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the use and validate audience as specified in section 3.9 of RFC 8725 [5].
JWTs are required to contain an “aud" (audience) claim to validate if the recipient node is the intended "audience" for that particular token.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.29.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 13.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.501 [3]
The access token claims are required to include the audience claim. The NF Service Producer is required to verify that the audience claim matches its own identity or the NF type of the NF Service Producer.
Reference: clause 13.3.8.3 of TS 33.501[3]
CCA tokens are require... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.29.3 Assessment
| The inclusion of audience in the token claims is already required in 5G SBA. Additionally, the validation of "aud" claim in direct and indirect communication scenarios is required at the recipient node in 5G SBA security. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.30 BSP#30: Validate Cryptographic Inputs
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.30.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the validate cryptographic inputs, as described in section 3.4 of RFC 8725 [5]. While using Elliptic Curve cryptography (like ECDH-ES) for key exchange, , it is important to make sure that the input keys or points are valid, according to the specified elliptic curve.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.30.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| In 5G SBA, CCA and access tokens are signed using JWS. JWS as used in 5G SBA does not use elliptic curve key exchange, according to section 3.1 of RFC 7518 [12] (JSON Web Algorithms) and clause 6.3.3 (JWS profile) of TS 33.210 [6].
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.30.3 Assessment
| Elliptic curve key exchange is not used for JWTs in 5G SBA, so the validation of cryptographic inputs as described in section 3.3 of RFC 8725 [5] does not apply. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.31 BSP#31: Ensure Cryptographic Keys Have Sufficient Entropy
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.31.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses ensure cryptographic keys have sufficient entropy, as described in section 3.5 of RFC 8725 [5].
Cryptographic keys are required to be truly random and strong and not predictable.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.31.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| While the use of cryptographic keys exists for JWT operations in 5G SBA as specified in clause 6.3 of TS 33.210 [6], the validation of such cryptographic entropy is implementation specific.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.31.3 Assessment
| This best practice is considered implementation specific. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.32 BSP#32: Avoid Compression of Encryption Inputs
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.32.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses avoiding compression of encryption inputs, as described in section 3.6 of RFC 8725 [5].
Avoiding the compression of encryption inputs means do not compress data before encrypting it, because compression can create patterns that attackers can exploit to recover secret information from the e... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.32.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Although it is not directly relevant to JWT operations in 5G SBA, the use of "null" compression method for TLS 1.2 has been specified in clause 6.2.3 of TS 33.210 [6].
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.32.3 Assessment
| 5G SBA does not use compression of encryption inputs. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.33 BSP#33: Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different Kinds of JWTs
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.33.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Use mutually exclusive validation rules for Different Kinds of JWTs, as described in section 3.12 of RFC 8725 [5].
If more than one kind of JWTs can be issued by the same issuer, it is required to prevent the substitution of JWTs from one context into another.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.33.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 13.3.8 of TS 33.501 [3]
CCA tokens are JWTs that are issued by the NF Service Consumer and enable the NF Service Consumer to authenticate towards a receiving NF.
Reference: clause 13.4.1 of TS 33.501 [3]
Access tokens are JWTs that are issued by the NRF and enable NF Service Producers to authorize ... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.33.3 Assessment
| Both token types, access tokens and CCA tokens, have exclusive independent validation rules as described in clause 5.27. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.34 BSP#34: Use UTF-8
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.34.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses using UTF-8, as described in section 3.7 of RFC 8725 [5].
JSON in Header Parameters and JWT Claims Sets needs to be encoded and decoded in UTF-8.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.34.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Clause 5.4 of TS 29.500 [7] mandates UTF-8 encoding for the content of JSON attributes.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.34.3 Assessment
| This best practice is already mandatory in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.35 BSP#35: Performing algorithm verification
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.35.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses performing algorithm verification, as described in section 3.1 of RFC 8725 [5].
Libraries are required to use only algorithms specified by the caller and to ensure that the "alg" or "enc" header specifies the same algorithm which is used to perform cryptographic operations.
Each key is re... |
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