hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.3 Evaluation
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This solution is reminiscent of hybrid cryptography in that it relies on two different cryptographic components. However, the combination of these mechanisms is highly unconventional here because some keys, e.g. the MAC key, are derived from one component (namely the ECIES scheme) alone. It concretely means that it i... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6 Solution #6 to SUCI calculation: Enhancement on SUCI calculations using quantum encapsulated key
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.1 Introduction
| This solution provides enhancement for SUCI calculations to resolve post-quantum threats to existing ECIES scheme.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.2 Solution details
| This solution describes SUCI calculations using Quantum Channel. The UE can provision Public key of HN and Quantum Public Key. Based on ECIES scheme, the ephemeral public key and MAC tag can be generated as a part of output. To cipher plain text, The Ephemeral Encryption key is encapsulated using Quantum Public Key. Us... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The steps shown Figure 7.2.1.6.2.1 are described as below:
7. As a prerequisite, the UE provisions both Public key of HN and Quantum Public key.
8. The UE generates Ephemeral key pair consisting of Ephemeral Public Key and Ephemeral Private Key.
9. Based on the generated Ephemeral Private Key and the Pub... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The steps shown Figure 7.2.1.6.2.2 are described as below:
6. Based on the received Ephemeral Public Key, the Home Network generates Ephemeral Shared Key.
7. Using ECIES scheme, Ephemeral Decryption Key and Ephemeral MAC Key are generated.
8. The Home Network decapsulates the received Quantum-ciphered te... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.3 Evaluation
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This solution is reminiscent of hybrid cryptography in that it relies on two different cryptographic components. However, the combination of these mechanisms is highly unconventional here because some keys, e.g. the MAC key, are derived from one component (namely the ECIES scheme) alone. It concretely means that it i... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7 Solution #7 to SUCI calculation: SUCI calculations using standalone and hybrid algorithms
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.1 Introduction
| Annex C of TS 33.501 [4] specifies two protection schemes for concealing a SUPI into a SUCI. The protection schemes are called Profile A and Profile B. These two profiles use SECG ECIES [9], which is a so called KEM-DEM scheme — combining a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and a Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM). SEC... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2 Solution details
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.1 General
| PQC migration for SUCI calculations can be done by introducing new SUCI profiles, and the new SUCI profiles can be created by extending the existing SUCI profiles with simple algorithm updates. Using such extensions is not a new thing to do. It was also the case when 5G was specified — following recommendations from ET... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.2 ML-KEM is the Most Suitable Option
| ML-KEM is already standardized, and its implementations are widely available. During the specification of SUCI protection in 33.501 [4], SA3 had considered the future need for PQC and therefore specified a maximum SUCI length of 3000 bytes to allow the introduction of quantum-resistant protection schemes. NIST has now ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.3 Considerations for Hybrid KEM
| When using a hybridized PQC KEM with ML-KEM, it is essential to use a standardized key combiner that preserves the IND-CCA2 security of ML-KEM, hybridization must not weaken the security properties. While ML-KEM is currently the only practical option, the key combiner should be designed in a general way so that the sam... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.4 KDF, MAC, and Encryption
| Any implementation of ML-KEM [21] already support of SHA3-256, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, and SHAKE256, which ML-KEM uses natively — therefore, using SHA-3 for key derivation and MAC in PQC SUCI is a natural choice. Also, SEC1 standard [9], specifying ECIES, published in 2009, says that future versions of the standard are lik... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.5 New SUCI Profiles
| This solution proposes that the 3GPP SUCI profiles in TS 33.501 [4] should be updated to include profiles for both standalone ML-KEM and ML-KEM hybridized with X25519 — both fit into the designed length limit (3000 bytes). These profiles should use algorithms from the SHA-3 family (e.g., SHA3-256, KMAC256) [31, 32], bo... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.5 Some details on how the profiles are used in an implementation
| Standalone ML-KEM Profile:
According to this profile, the use of Elliptic curve is completely replaced by a ML-KEM-768.
Processing on the UE Side: Unlike ECIES, the use of ML-KEM does not require the UE to generate any ephemeral public-private key pair. Instead, the UE uses the HN’s public key to encapsulate the eph... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.3 Evaluation
| The solution provides a mechanism for computing quantum-resistant SUCIs using standalone ML-KEM.
The solution provides a hybrid mechanism for computing quantum-resistant SUCIs by using ML-KEM-768 and X25519 in a fashion specified in NIST SP 800-227 [73].
The KEM combiner used in the hybrid solution is IND-CCA secure.... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8 Solution #8 to SUCI calculation: GSMA-based solution
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.1 Introduction
| GSMA published guidelines "Post Quantum Cryptography – Guidelines for Telecom Use Cases – v2.0" [33] to support the planning, setup and execution of a quantum safe cryptography journey for telco industry. This GSMA report contains a detailed analysis of an initial set of Telcom use cases that are impacted by Post Quant... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.2 Solution details
| The solution for concealment of the Subscriber Public Identifier is based on the hybridization between ML-KEM (Level 3) and classic ECC based key exchanged algorithms that is described in clause 5.8 of GSMA guidelines [33].
GSMA solution is enhanced thanks to the addition of KEM ciphertext as input to the Key Derivat... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.2.1 Profile A’ (update of Profile A to support PQC algorithm)
| The ME and SIDF shall implement this profile. The parameters for this profile shall be the following:
- KEM domain parameters : ML-KEM-768 [21]
- EC domain parameters : Curve25519
- KEM primitive : ML-KEM-768 [21]
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitive : X25519
- point compression : N/A
- K... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.2.2 Profile B’ (update of Profile B to support PQC algorithm)
| The ME and SIDF shall implement this profile. The parameters for this profile shall be the following:
- KEM domain parameters : ML-KEM-768 [21]
- EC domain parameters : secp256r1
- KEM primitive : ML-KEM-768 [21]
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitive : Elliptic Curve Cofactor Diffie-Hellman Primitiv... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.3 Evaluation
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Editor’s Note: Evaluation on impact of initial access due to increased length of SUCI is ffs.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation on computing overhead of SUCI calculation on both UE and network side is ffs.
Editor’s Note: Whether the solution work for case that user does not update USIM card is ffs.
Editor’s Note: Whether ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9 Solution #9 to SUCI calculation: SUPI Concealment using PQC Shared Key
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.1 Introduction
| To counter the threat of quantum computing to asymmetric cryptography used in ECIES scheme it is necessary to replace existing algorithms with new, quantum-resistant Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) ML-KEM algorithms proposed by NIST [21].
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2 Solution details
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The PQC shared key generation scheme is implemented such that for computing a fresh SUCI, the UE uses the provisioned PQC-based public key of the home network, and PQC-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) according to the parameters provisioned by home network. The processing on UE side is done as mentioned below.
... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The PQC shared key generation scheme is implemented such that for deconcealing a SUCI, the home network uses the received encrypted PQC shared key, and the PQC-based private key of the home network.
1. Home network (HN) decapsulates the encrypted PQC shared key to derive the ephemeral shared key.
2. HN generates ep... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2.2 Sample profile for SUCI Calculation
| Profile C uses ML-KEM as defined in [21] to generate shared key Z1 integrated with AES encryption scheme.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2.2.1 Profile C (PQC only)
| The ME and SIDF implement this profile. The parameters for this profile are the following:
- ML KEM parameters : Level 3 (k, lattice dimension 3)
- KDF : ANSI-X9.63-KDF [9]
- Hash : SHA-256
- Shared secret key Z1 : Shared secret field from ML-KEM
- MAC : HMAC–SHA-256... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.3 Evaluation
| This solution is for direct replacement of asymmetric cryptography methods used in ECIES with PQC ML-KEM algorithms proposed by NIST.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation on impact of initial access due to increased length of SUCI is ffs.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation on computing overhead of SUCI calculation on both UE and networ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10 Solution #10 to SUCI calculation: SUPI Concealment using Hybrid shared Key
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.1 Introduction
| Replacing classical cryptography with PQC algorithms at an early stage carries an inherent risk as a first time widespread deployment and more rigorous testing of PQC algorithms may be needed. So it will be beneficial to have it integrated with classical asymmetric cryptography based security mechanisms via a hybrid ap... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2 Solution details
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The Hybrid shared key generation scheme is implemented such that for computing a fresh SUCI, the UE uses the provisioned EC based public key of the home network, provisioned PQC-based public key of the home network, freshly generated ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) ephemeral public/private key pair and PQC-based key ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The Hybrid shared key generation scheme is implemented such that for deconcealing a SUCI, the home network uses the received ECC ephemeral public key of the UE, encrypted PQC shared key, EC based private key of the home network and the PQC-based private key of the home network.
1. Home network (HN) generates a fi... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.3 Sample Profiles for SUCI calculation
| Profile C uses Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid scheme as defined in RFC 9794 [7] which is a multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional algorithm. The traditional algorithm component uses its own standardized processing for key gener... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.3.1 Profile C (Hybrid 1)
| The ME and SIDF implement this profile. The parameters for this profile are the following:
- Identifier : X25519MLKEM768 (Combining X25519 ECDH with ML-KEM-768)
- EC domain parameters : Curve25519 [35]
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitive : X25519 [35]
- point compression : N/A
- ML-KEM para... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.3.2 Profile D (Hybrid 2)
| The ME and SIDF implement this profile. The parameters for this profile are the following:
- Identifier : SecP256r1MLKEM768 (Combining secp256r1 ECDH with ML-KEM-768)
- EC domain parameters : secp256r1 [10]
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitive : Elliptic Curve Cofactor Diffie-Hellman Primitive [9]
- ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.3 Evaluation
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The proposed solution is a hybrid approach of combining legacy elliptical cryptography with PQC KEM. It satisfies IND-CPA security (i.e., security against passive eavesdropping attacks) but not IND-CCA2 security (i.e., security against active attacks) as per clause 4.6.3 of SP 800-227 [73].
Editor’s Note: Evaluation... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11 Solution #11 to SUCI calculation: SUPI Concealment using hybrid method
| Editor’s Note: Performances due to PQC operations performed after ECIES operations are FFS.
Editor’s Note: The pros and cons (including security, complexity and efficiency) of combining traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithms with post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for SUCI calculation is FFS.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.1 Introduction
| Replacing classical cryptography with PQC algorithms at an early stage carries an inherent risk as a first time widespread deployment and more rigorous testing of PQC algorithms may be needed. So it will be beneficial to have it integrated with classical asymmetric cryptography based security mechanisms via a hybrid ap... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.2 Solution details
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The processing on UE side is done as follows.
Figure 7.2.1.11.2.1-1: SUCI generation using hybrid method at UE
1. UE generates a final output_ECC using ECIES as described in Annex C.3.2 in TS 33.501 [4], where the final output_ECC is Eph. EC public key||ciphertext||MAC tag.
2. UE generates an ephemeral shared key ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The processing on home network (HN) side is done as follows.
Figure 7.2.1.11.2-3: Decryption based on hybrid method at home network
1. Home network (HN) decapsulates the encrypted PQC shared key to derive the ephemeral shared key (KPQC).
2. HN generates ephemeral symmetric encryption key and ephemeral MAC key usin... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.3 Evaluation
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Proposed solution encrypts the final scheme output from ECIES using symmetric key derived from PQC based KEM.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation on impact of initial access due to increased length of SUCI is ffs.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation on computing overhead of SUCI calculation on both UE and network side is ffs.
Edit... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.12 Solution #12 to SUCI calculation: Hybrid SUCI calculation
| 7.2.1.12.1 Introduction
This solution addresses the key issue#1.
7.2.1.12.2 Solution details
SUPI and SUCI type
The SUPI is a globally unique 5G Subscription Permanent Identifier allocated to each subscriber in the 5G System. It is defined in clause 5.9.2 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [85].
The SUPI is defined as:
- ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.13 Solution #13 to SUCI calculation: Symmetric crypto based SUCI
| Overview: The UDM is creating a collection of relevant SUPI values. The UDM is encrypting by using symmetric crypto each of SUPI values from the list and is sending these to the UE. The UE is appending the selected encrypted SUPI and is hashing the encrypted SUPI together with the concatenated hashed Key KSUPI. The UDM... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.13.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue#1.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.13.2 Solution details
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Overview of Encrypted SUCI in UDM:
Figure 7.2.1.13.2-1: Encrypted SUCI in UDM (overview)
In the above Figure 7.2.1.13.2-1 the list of Encrypted SUCI is generated in UDM is shown. The UDM will first generate the key KSUPI using hash of SUPI, long term credentials of Subscriber K, RANDSUPI. Also, in parallel ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.13.3 Evaluation
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This design does not require the generation of keys for symmetric cryptography.
Standard key-derivation functions are being used for key stream generation, and with this the long-term key and the SUPI are bound to a session between UE and UDM without revealing the user.
The re-/synchronization can be handled in con... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14 Solution #14 to SUCI Calculation: Symmetric solution on SUCI protection
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.1 Introduction
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The following are principles of the solution:
- UE is able to be provisioned with an enhanced SUCI (eSUCI) by UDM, or by pre-configuration, which is calculated with quantum resistant symmetric algorithm, symmetric home network key, and SUPI.
- If eSUCI is available, UE uses the eSUCI for initial Registration proced... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.2 Solution details
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.2.1 Procedure
| The following figure depicts the initial Registration procedure using eSUCI, which is calculated with quantum resistant symmetric algorithm, symmetric home network key, and SUPI.
Figure 7.2.1.14.2.1-1: Initial Registration with eSUCI
1. If an enhanced SUCI (eSUCI), which is generated as described in clause 7.2.1.14... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.2.2 Format of eSUCI
| The following figure shows the format of the eSUCI:
Figure 7.2.1.14.2.2-1: Structure of eSUCI
The structure of eSUCI is aligned with SUCI, and when Protection Scheme ID indicates symmetric scheme, the Home Network Symmetric Key ID is used instead of Home Network Public Key ID, the 128-bit NONCENW is generated by UD... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.2.3 Consideration of desynchronization
| The update of eSUCI can be achieved through reliable exchange of NAS messages. Specifically, the UE shall send a NAS Registration Complete message to the AMF upon receiving and storing a new eSUCI. If the NAS Registration Complete message is not received (e.g., due to a radio link issue), the AMF is required to retrans... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.3 Evaluation
| This solution for SUCI calculation has the following benefits:
a. Compared to SUCI calculation using the KEM algorithms, eSUCI is shorter in length. This reduction in size benefits air interface transmission, particularly in initial access scenarios where the message containing the UE ID typically has very limited ca... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15 Solution #15 to SUCI calculation: SUCI calculation with symmetric key
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.1 Introduction
| This solution derives the encryption key EK, ICB and MAC key MK from the root key K. The encryption key length and MAC key length are increased to 256 bit and AES-256-CTR is used for encrypting the SUPI.
For Key Identification of the Root Key K, the UE and the home network are preconfigured with a Default Key ID for ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.2 Solution details
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The UE generates a 256 bit Nonce#1 and similar to MILENAGE, the UE creates two additional Nonces by using a 64 bit rotate operation. The Nonce#2 is created by rotating/shifting 64 bits to the left of Nonce#1 and Nonce#3 by rotating/shifting 64 bits to the left of Nonce#2.
Figure 7.2.1.15.2.1-1: Key Derivation
The ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The home network detects the new SUCI format based on the 6G SUCI indication and fetches the Root Key K based on the Key ID.
The home network creates based on the received Nonce#1 the two additional nonces Nonce#2 and Nonce#3.
The home network derives the 256 bit Encryption key EK, 128 bit ICB and 256 bit MAC key MK... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.3 Evaluation
| The UE and the network need to support the following additional functionalities:
• UE and network need to be preconfigured with the Default Key ID and Hash Chain Length.
• The UE and the network need to compute a Key ID Hash Chain of Length L based on a NonceKID (generated in the network)
• The network n... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.16 Solution #16 to SUCI calculation: Solution for PQC based SUCI Computation
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.16.1 Introduction
| This solution address PQC algorithm based SUCI calculations.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.16.2 Solution details
| Processing on UE side:
Figure 1a: Encryption based on PQC shared key generation at UE
The UE computes a fresh SUCI, using the provisioned PQC-based public key of the home network (HN), and PQC-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) according to the parameters provisioned by home network as follows:
1. UE gene... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.16.3 Evaluation
| The solution has the following impacts:
New PQC algorithms and related profiles need to be supported by the UE and Network.
The UE generates ephemeral symmetric encryption key and ephemeral MAC key using a KDF function and ephemeral shared key along with input parameters such as Freshness parameter i.e., combination... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.17 Solution #17: Solution for Hybrid PQC based SUCI Computation
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.17.1 Introduction
| This solution address Hybrid PQC algorithm SUCI calculations. The solution uses GSMA described solution [33] as base but proposes updates to use SUPI for SUCI computation along with the clarifications on key generation for the Hybrid PQC scenario.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.17.2 Solution details
| PQC key encapsulation is performed and hybridization with ECC based key exchange is performed through Key Derivation Function (KDF). Security enhancement could be done by using input parameters such as Freshness parameter i.e., timestamp, SUCI Protection Profile ID, Hybrid PQC Code, and other information e.g. cipher te... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.17.3 Evaluation
| TBD
7.2.1.18 Solution #18 for SUCI calculation: SUPI Concealment using hybrid method
7.2.1.18.1 Introduction
This solution leverages both classical cryptography and PQC algorithms while applying them sequentially to calculate SUCI. In addition, PQC Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is also proposed as an option to p... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.18.3 Evaluation
| TBD
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.19 Solution #19 to SUCI calculation: Hybrid PQC SUCI Calculation with AEAD
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.19.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes a hybrid PQC based SUCI calculation mechanism. The ECIES scheme and the PQC ML-KEM are used together to generate AEAD keys, and AEAD algorithm is used to provide encryption and integrity protection for SUPI.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.19.2 Solution details
| 7.2.1.19.2.1 Processing on UE side
The proposed scheme is implemented such that for computing a fresh SUCI, the UE uses the provisioned ECC public key of the home network, provisioned PQC public key of the home network, freshly generated ECC ephemeral public/private key pair, and PQC ML-KEM. The UE’s step is illustrat... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.19.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.20 Solution #20 to SUCI calculation: ECIES-MLKEM Hybrid SUCI Calculation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation on impact of initial access due to increased length of SUCI is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation on computing overhead of SUCI calculation on both UE and network side is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Whether the solution work for case that user does not update USIM card is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Whether th... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.20.3 Evaluation
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.21 Solution #21 to SUCI calculation: ECKEM-MLKEM Hybrid SUCI Calculation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation on impact of initial access due to increased length of SUCI is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation on computing overhead of SUCI calculation on both UE and network side is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Whether the solution work for case that user does not update USIM card is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Whether th... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.21.3 Evaluation
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.22 Solution #22 to SUCI calculation: Backward Compatible Hybrid SUCI Calculation
| Editor’s Note: Evaluation on impact of initial access due to increased length of SUCI is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Evaluation on computing overhead of SUCI calculation on both UE and network side is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Whether the solution work for case that user does not update USIM card is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Whether th... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.22.3 Evaluation
| 7.2.1.23 Solution #23 to SUCI calculation: A hybrid scheme for SUPI protection
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.23.1 Introduction
| A hybrid scheme used to protect SUPI is proposed, which combines ECIES and PQC KEM scheme to calculate SUCI. Consequently, the quantum-computing attacks on the ECIES can be mitigated.
Preassumption: UEs are provisioned with both ECC public key and PQC public key of HN (Home Network ).
7.2.1.23.2 Solution details
... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.23.2.2 Processing on home network side
| After receiving SUCI, the home network finds the corresponding ECC private key and PQC private key based on the home network ECC public key identifier and home network PQC public key identifier in SUCI. The home network then uses these two private keys to process SUCI to obtain SUPI. The process is shown in the followi... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.23.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.2 Solutions to MIKEY-SAKKE key exchange
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.2.1 Solution #1 to MIKEY-SAKKE key exchange: mitigate
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.2.1.1 Introduction
| There are a number of existing mitigations built into the Mission Critical system. Pending development of a post-quantum replacement for MIKEY-SAKKE it is possible these offer sufficient mitigation for threats, in particular harvest-now-decrypt-later. This is not proposed as a long term migration plan. That will requir... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.2.1.2 Solution Details
| In the on-network case, MIKEY-SAKKE key exchanges are protected by one or more layers of additional cryptographic protections as specified by clauses 5 and 6 in TS 33.180 [3]. Assuming these protocols, e.g. IPsec, are migrated to quantum-safe alternatives, this mitigates the risk of a passive attacker being able to har... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.3 Overall Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains evaluation of all solutions.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.3.1 Evaluation of solutions for SUCI calculation
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.3.1.1 Grouping of solutions
| The solutions for SUCI calculation can be grouped as follows, based on underlying principles and cryptographic algorithms used:
• Group A: Standalone PQC: Sol#2, Sol#7, Sol#9, Sol#16
• Group B: Hybrid PQC: Sol#3, Sol#8, Sol#7, Sol#10, Sol#12, Sol#17, Sol#18, Sol#19,
• Group C: Hybrid Nested PQC: Sol#11,... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 8 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains agreed conclusions and any normative work is recommended.
8.1 Conclusions for protocols expected to be updated for PQC by other SDOs
8.1.1 Conclusions for IKEv2
It is agreed to consider the following principles for the normative work:
- The KEM-based key exchange related protoc... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the security when a PLMN hosts an NPN with dedicated NFs deployed in the PNI-NPN operational domain, including:
1.Key issues and potential security requirements for the scenario of PLMN hosting a NPN where the interfaces between PLMN operational domain and PNI-NPN domain include N9. And s... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and TR 33.757 [3] apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and TS 23.501 [4] apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
|
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