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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.35.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| The guidelines and best practices on algorithm verification are directed towards software libraries that perform cryptographic operations, which are not specified in 3GPP 5G SBA.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.35.3 Assessment
| Guidelines and best practices for software libraries that perform cryptographic operations are not applicable to 3GPP 5G SBA specifications. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.36 BSP#36: Validating all cryptographic operations
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.36.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the validation of all cryptographic operations, as described in section 3.3 of RFC 8725 [5].
All cryptographic operations used in the JWT are required to be validated and the entire JWT is required to be rejected if any of them fail to validate.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.36.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 13.3.8.3 of TS 33.501 [3]
The validation of JWS signature of the CCA token follows the guidelines described in RFC 7515 [10]. However, it is not explicitly mentioned that if the validation of the signature fails, the CCA token is required to be rejected.
Reference: clause 6.7.5 of TS 29.500 [7]
If ... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.36.3 Assessment
| For access token verification, it is specified that if the verification of the token fails, the NF Service Producer is required to reject the service request by sending an error response to the requester NF. For CCA token verification, such Stage 2 specification is missing. However, it is specified how to handle verifi... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.37 BSP#37: Using end-to-end TLS between the client and the resource server
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.37.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses end-to-end TLS communication between the client and the resource server, as described in section 2.6 of RFC 9700 [2].
It is recommended to use end-to-end TLS between the client and the resource server.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.37.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 13.3.2.1 of TS 33.501 [3]
In direct communication, authentication between a NF Service Consumer and a NF Service Producer within one PLMN can be achieved either through protection at the transport layer for mutual authentication or implicitly by NDS/IP or physical security. Specifically, if the PLMN ... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.37.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.38 BSP#38: Configuration of client_id
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.38.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the configuration of the client_id, as described in section 2.6 of RFC 9700 [2] and in clause 5.22 of this document.
It is recommended that authorization servers do not allow clients to influence their client_id or any other claim that could cause confusion with a genuine resource owner.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.38.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| In 5G SBA, only client credentials grant is used, which does not involve resource owners.
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23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.38.3 Assessment
| This practice is not applicable for the client credentials grant type, which is applied to 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
5.X BSP#X: <Title>
5.X.1 Description of best practice
Editor’s Note: This clause identifies and documents the target measure/practice and includes the precise referenc... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 6 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause provides a conclusion for relevant assessment results. Whether the best practice is relevant in 5G and whether it has been applied? Statement on what to do with relevant best practices that are not applied in 5G?
Editor’s Note: Provide a statement on whether future steps are envisioned.
An... |
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 1 Scope
| The scope of this document is to study the security aspects of the solutions provided in TR 29.867 [2].
NOTE 1: The potential solutions are assumed to not weaken the IMS security.
NOTE 2: It is assumed that the same PLMN has control of both the IMS system and 5GC.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 4 Overview
| Editor’s Note: This clause includes the overview applicable for the study.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
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23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#X
KI#Y
KI#Z
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution d... |
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex <X>: Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253609
Skeleton for TR 33.768
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253724
... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the complexities involved with the introduction of standalone and/or hybrid Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms in existing security protocols used by 5G specifications. These security protocols and their associated algorithms have been listed in TR 33.938 [2] “3GPP Cryptographic Inv... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
AE Authenticated (Symmetric) Encryption
AEAD Authenticated Encryption... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 4 Overview
|
4.1 Background Information
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 4.1.1 General
| The security protocols that use symmetric and/or asymmetric cryptography in 3GPP systems are listed in TR 33.938 [2]. Particularly, 3GPP heavily depends on IETF standards for the usages of public-key cryptography. All the security protocols using traditional asymmetric cryptography are vulnerable to attacks using a Cry... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 4.1.2 Transition Timeline
| Editor’s Note: More timeline information from other organizations is ffs.
Countries and agencies around the world are generally aligned on the need to migrate to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The common recommendation is to complete migration for high priority systems by around 2030 and for all systems by approxima... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 4.1.3 PQ and PQT Algorithm Standards
| There are three principal alternatives to traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithms which have progressed furthest in relevant standards bodies. These are ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for digital signature [21–23]. These are standards designed by cryptograp... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 4.1.4 Summary of cybersecurity organisations’ recommendations
| NOTE: Details of the meanings of Level 3 and Level 5 are found in clause 5.1.
Advice and recommendations for parameter choices is provided in e.g. NIST [21], NCSC [27], BSI [79], NSA [13], ANSSI [28], and AIVD [19] which is summarised below:
1. Level 3 is accepted for general use (i.e. situations where AES-128 is... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 4.2 General Assumptions
| In the present document, PQC is referred to as cryptographic algorithms that are deemed to be secure against attacks from both classical and quantum computing.
All traditional public key cryptographic algorithms used in 3GPP systems need to be migrated to PQC algorithms. If suitable PQC options are not available, the... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 5.1 PQC security level
| The NIST use the concept of security levels/security strength categories to group algorithms, keys, and protocols related to PQC [37]. Security is defined as a function of resources comparable to or greater than those required to break AES and SHA2/SHA3 algorithms, i.e., key search on block cipher for AES and collision... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 5.2 Hybrid and standalone schemes
| Post-Quantum Traditional (PQT) hybrid scheme as defined in RFC 9794 [7] is a multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional algorithm. Both the PQT hybrid scheme and the standalone PQC scheme are considered in the present document.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 5.3 Cryptographic agility
| Cryptographic agility [40, 41] refers to the capabilities needed to replace and adapt cryptographic algorithms while preserving security and ongoing operations. The 3GPP systems need to consider cryptographic agility.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 5.4 PQC algorithm types and cryptographic diversity
| PQC algorithms can be categorized based on different mathematical foundations. The following are a few typical types of PQC algorithms [38, 5]: Lattice-based cryptography, Hash-based cryptography, Multivariate cryptography, Code-based cryptography, and Isogeny-based cryptography.
NOTE: The types for NIST selected algo... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.1 General
|
According to the inventory in TR 33.938 [2], many security protocols and algorithms used in 3GPP (e.g. (D)TLS, IKEv2, JWE, JWS, etc.) are specified in other standard organizations (e.g. IETF). They are expected to be updated using PQC in the corresponding organizations.
In this clause, the progress of the post-quan... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.2 COSE
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.2.1 General
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.2.2 Current Work in IETF
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.2.2.1 IETF RFCs
| No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in COSE are published yet.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.2.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| The IETF is developing support for PQC algorithms in COSE. The following drafts are relevant:
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-03, "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE" [67], describes the conventions for using Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEMs) within JOSE and CO... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3 IKEv2
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3.1 General
| IKEv2 specified in IETF RFC 7296 [80] provides mutual authentication and establishes Security Associations (SA) for IPsec tunnels. The IKEv2 is also used by MOBIKE specified in IETF RFC 4555 [81].
The IETF IPSECME group has introduced multiple RFCs and Drafts to enable a smooth PQC transition for the Internet Key Exch... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3.2 Current Work in IETF
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3.2.1 IETF RFCs
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3.2.1.1 Key Exchange
| KEM-based Key Exchange
• IETF RFC 9242 [43] introduces a new exchange, called "Intermediate Exchange" for IKEv2 to avoid IP fragmentation of large IKE messages and enable transferring large amounts of data during Security Association (SA) establishment expected for some PQC key exchanges.
• IETF RFC 9370 [44]... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3.2.1.2 Authentication and Signature
| - IETF RFC 9593 [46] defines a mechanism that allows implementations of IKEv2 to indicate the list of supported authentication methods to their peers while establishing IKEv2 SAs. This mechanism improves interoperability when IKEv2 partners are configured with multiple credentials of different types (for example, ECC-b... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3.2.2.1 Key Exchange
| KEM-based Key Exchange
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-03, "Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)" [45] proposes to use the ML-KEM [21] as an additional key exchange in IKEv2 along with traditional key exchanges.
• IETF Draft draft-iet... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.3.2.2.2 Authentication and Signatures
| - IETF Draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-04, "Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC" [48] outlines how Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures (ML-DSA) [22] and Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signatures (SLH-DSA) [23], can be employed as authentication methods within the ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.4.1 General
| The IETF JOSE Working Group has specified the JSON Web Signatures (JWS) [83] and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [84] that are being used in OAuth 2.0 and other procedures in 3GPP systems. For PQC migration, a few Working Group Adopted Drafts are being developed, as described below.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.4.2 Current Work in IETF
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.4.2.1 IETF RFCs
| No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in JWE or JWS are published yet.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.4.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| The IETF is developing support for PQC algorithms in JOSE. The following drafts are relevant:
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-03, "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE" [67], describes the conventions for using Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEMs) within JOSE and CO... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.5 PKI certificate
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.5.1 General
| The Internet X.509 (PKIX) Certificate is being used in 3GPP PKI systems [82] and the OCSP protocol listed in the TR 33.938 [2]. The IETF LAMPS Working Group has introduced multiple RFCs and Drafts to enable a smooth transition to PQC in PKIX to provide quantum-resistant security for PKIX.
6.5.2 Current Work in IETF
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.5.2.1 IETF RFCs
| • IETF RFC 9802 [51] has specified algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding format for several stateful Hash-Based Signature (HBS) schemes: Hierarchical Signature System (HSS), eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), and a multi-tree variant of XMSS, XMSS^MT. These schemes are applicable to the Internet X.509 Publ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.5.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| • IETF Draft draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-11 "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)" [52] specifies the conventions for using the ML-KEM [21] in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure.
•
• IETF Draft draft-ietf... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.6 TLS 1.2
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.6.1 General
| The TLS 1.2 handshake in IETF RFC 5246 [57] is used in TLS 1.2, DTLS 1.2, EAP-TLS 1.2, EAP-TTLS, and OAuth 2.0. The DTLS handshake is also applied in DTLS over SCTP and can be used in DTLS-SRTP.
The 3GPP TLS profile is defined in clause 6.2 of 3GPP TS 33.210 [59]. Since Release 15, TLS 1.3 has been mandatory for all 3... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.6.2 Current Work in IETF
| TLS 1.2 has been obsoleted since 2018, as superseded by TLS 1.3 in IETF RFC 8446 [58]. The IETF will no longer approve any additions or updates to TLS 1.2, including PQC support (IETF draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-08 [60]).
6.6.3 3GPP Considerations
Since TLS 1.2 will not be updated any further, 3GPP will consider pha... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.7 TLS 1.3
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.7.1 General
| The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol as defined in clause 4 of IETF RFC 8446 [58] is used in TLS 1.3, EAP-TLS 1.3, EAP-TTLS 1.3, OAuth 2.0, DTLS 1.3, and QUIC, and it can also be used in DTLS-SRTP. Since Release 15, TLS 1.3 has been mandatory to implement for the core network (cf. Annex E in TS 33.310 v15.0.0), and starting ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.7.2 Current Work in IETF
| The IETF has prioritized post-quantum migration in TLS as follows [61]:
• Now (Hybrid + Pure ML-KEM)
• Later (signatures)
• Much later (dual certificates/composite signatures)
The IETF TLS Working Group has planned not to adopt work on hybrid signatures until "much later" [61].
The IETF TLS Working Group has intro... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.7.2.1 IETF RFCs
| No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in TLS 1.3 are published yet.
Editor's Note: several of the adopted drafts are in the final stages and may be published before this document is finalised.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 6.7.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| - draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16, "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3" [63], specifies combining multiple key exchange algorithms (e.g., classical ECDHE with a PQ KEM) so that session security holds if at least one component remains secure.
- draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-04, "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3" [64],... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.1 Threats
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.1.1 General
| Most of security protocols used in 3GPP systems are specified in other standards development organizations (SDOs). In case that these protocols are not updated to use PQC in other SDOs, the 3GPP system may be vulnerable to attacks based on quantum computation. The clauses 7.1.2, 7.1.3, and 7.2 contain all of these prot... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.1.2 SUCI calculation
| Editor’s Note: If only SUCI calculation is considered, this subclause may be removed. If other protocol, e.g. MIKEY-SAKKE is studied, this subclause is used for each of such protocol identified.
As per TS 33.501 [4] and Table 4.3.2-1 of 3GPP Cryptographic inventory 3GPP TR 33.938 [2], the SUCI calculation is done base... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.1.3 MIKEY-SAKKE key exchange
| MIKEY-SAKKE is a key exchange method specified in the IETF RFC 6509 [6]. As described in TR 33.938 [2], it is used in the 3GPP system to securely transport cryptographic keys for Mission Critical Services [3]. It employs asymmetric cryptography for key distribution.
Assuming MIKEY-SAKKE will not be updated by IETF wi... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains solutions to update 3GPP defined security protocols (for example SUCI calculation) to use the appropriate PQC algorithm, if those protocols are not expected to be updated by other SDOs to use PQC algorithms.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1 Solutions to SUCI calculation
| Editor’s Note: If only SUCI calculation is considered, this subclause may be removed. If other protocol, e.g. MIKEY-SAKKE is studied, this subclause is used for each of such protocol identified.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.1 Solution #1 to SUCI calculation: SUCI calculation with PQC enhancement
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.1.1 Introduction
| It is proposed to introduce new SUCI calculation mechanism. The solution is applicable for SUCI calculation in ME.
Presumption:
If a ME/Network support PQC algorithms:
• USIM indicates the SUCI calculation is done in the ME
• USIM contains new public key for calculating SUCI with PQC
If a ME does not sup... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.1.2 Solution details
| If a ME supports PQC algorithms, the indication in USIM is the SUCI calculation should be done in the ME, and the operator’s decision is to use PQC to calculate the SUCI, then the public key for calculating SUCI using PQC shall be available in USIM. The ME reads the SUPI, the SUPI Type, the Routing Indicator, the Home ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.1.3 Evaluation
| This solution is not a cryptographic solution as it only discusses the interaction between the USIM and the ME and the way to proceed in case several schemes are defined.
This solution does not cover the scenario where the SUCI is calculated by the USIM.
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation is FFS.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.2 Solution #2 to SUCI calculation: Solution on pure PQC for SUCI protection
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.2.1 Introduction
| The ECIES procedure as depicted by the 5G system architecture [21] is the basis for the development of the PQC solution.
This solution proposal refers to a pure PQC implementation. Therefore, for the transition to PQC the relevant functional blocks will have to replace the existing/corresponding ECIES functional block... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.2.2 Solution details
|
The solution is replacing the ECIES functional blocks with corresponding/related PQC related functional blocks.
The following Figure depicts the PQC concept at the UE side. The functions which must be modified for the support of PQC are with green coloured background.
Figure 7.2.1.2.2-1: SUCI protection based... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.2.3 Evaluation
| TBD
EN#1: Evaluation on impact of initial access due to increased length of SUCI is ffs.
EN#2: Evaluation on computing overhead of SUCI calculation on both UE and network side is ffs.
EN#3: Whether the solution work for case that user does not update USIM card is ffs.
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e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.3 Solution #3 to SUCI calculation: SUCI calculation with hybrid KEMs
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.3.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes a hybrid encryption approach with both PQC and traditional cryptography for SUCI calculation. The proposed solution uses two different KEM algorithms for key derivation. The hybrid solution can provide higher security protection as long as either the classical algorithm or the PQC algorithm succe... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.3.2 Solution details
|
The proposed solution is illustrated below. Figure 7.2.1.Y-1 shows the SUCI calculation at the UE. Figure 7.2.1.Y-2 shows the scheme output that the UE sends to the HN. Figure 7.2.1.Y-3 is the HN decryption of the SUCI from the UE.
Figure 7.2.1.3-1 SUCI calculation using hybrid KEM schemes at UE
1a. UE genera... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.3.3 Evaluation
|
This solution addresses SUCI calculation. This solution follows a hybrid approach and combines a traditional KEM and a PQC KEM to protect against both existing threats and future quantum computer threats.
The MAC-1 computed on c1 and c2 is a hash function evaluation. It is primarily used to allow the network to ver... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.4 Solution #4 to SUCI calculation: SUPI Pseudonym
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.4.1 Introduction
| This contribution proposes SUPI concealment using pseudonym instead of asymmetric encryption for SUPI.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.4.2 Solution details
| The Figure 7.2.1.4.2-1 illustrates the procedure:
Figure 7.2.1.4.2-1 procedure of using random number to do SUPI concealment
0. The UE is pre-configured with the UE’s SUPI, a random value RAND generated by the network and a routing indicator binding to the UDM instance storing the UE’s subscription data. The UDM ... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.4.3 Evaluation
|
This solution addresses the key issue about PQC migration for SUCI calculation.
This solution relies on a one-time pseudonym RAND that will serve as the SUCI value. This pseudonym is known to the UDM that can then identify the corresponding UE. After each authentication, a new pseudonym RAND’ is generated by the UD... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5 Solution #5 to SUCI calculation: Enhancement on SUCI calculations using quantum key
| |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.1 Introduction
| This solution provides enhancement for SUCI calculations to resolve post-quantum threats to existing ECIES scheme.
|
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.2 Solution details
| This solution describes SUCI calculations using Quantum Channel. The UE can provision Public key of HN and Quantum Public Key. Based on ECIES scheme, the ephemeral public key, cipher text, and MAC tag can be generated as an output. Additionally, using the Quantum Public Key, the cipher text can be encapsulated. The enc... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The steps shown Figure 7.2.X.Y.2.1 are described as below:
0. As a prerequisite, the UE provisions both Public key of HN and Quantum Public key.
1. The UE generates Ephemeral key pair consisting of Ephemeral Public Key and Ephemeral Private Key.
2. Based on the generated Ephemeral Private Key and the Pub... |
e8f5b49b77d75a7d08d8f2e4351f64ac | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The steps shown Figure 7.2.1.5.2.2 are described as below:
1. By decapsulating the encapsulated cipher-text using Quantum Private Key, the Home Network generates the cipher-text.
2. Based on the received Ephemeral Public Key, the Home Network generates Ephemeral Shared Key.
3. Using ECIES scheme, Ephemer... |
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