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d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5 Tampering
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.1 Software Tampering
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
Different from traditional physical network products, the entire GCNP is instantiated from the container image(s) and other information (e.g. configuration data, software environmental parameters, license terms information, script, manifest file, checksum... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.2 Ownership File Misuse
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.3 Boot tampering
| This threat is not applicable for GCNP since GCNP do not have a boot process in the traditional sense.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.4 Log Tampering
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.4 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.5 OAM traffic Tampering
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.6 File Write Permissions Abuse
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.6 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.7 User Session Tampering
| The threat in clause 5.3.4.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.8 Exposed Containerization API
| - Threat Name: Exposed Containerization API
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who gains access to this API can exploit it to escalate their privileges within the system, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive container configurations, network settings, and runtime data. This... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.9 Image Registry Tampering
| - Threat Name: Image Registry Tampering
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who gains unauthorized access to a container image registry can insert malicious layers or replace trusted images with backdoored versions. This allows the attacker to embed malware, backdoors, or exploit code withi... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.10 Pod Spec/Manifest Modification
| - Threat Name: Pod Spec/Manifest Modification
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who alters deployment manifests or pod specifications can modify pod configurations to add elevated capabilities, host mounts, or enable privileged mode. This manipulation enables the attacker to bypass contai... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.5.11 File Tampering inside Containers
| - Threat Name: File Tampering inside Containers
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who gains access to a container with writable filesystem layers can modify container files if read-only enforcement is not applied. Such tampering allows insertion or alteration of binaries, scripts, or conf... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.6 Repudiation
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.6.1 Lack of User Activity Trace
| The threat in clause 5.3.5.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.6.2 Lack of Container-Level Audit Logging
| - Threat Name: Lack of Container-Level Audit Logging
- Threat Category: Repudiation
- Threat Description: Absence of comprehensive audit logs for container-related events - such as container start/stop, image pulls, and capability assignments - creates a blind spot in monitoring and security. Without these logs, it b... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.6.3 Orchestrator Audit Logs Disabled
| - Threat Name: Orchestrator Audit Logs Disabled
- Threat Category: Repudiation
- Threat Description: When Kubernetes orchestrator audit logs are disabled or not properly configured, it becomes impossible to prove or track actions taken via kubectl commands or API requests. This lack of audit trail severely undermines... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7 Information disclosure
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.1 Poor key generation
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.2 Poor key management
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.3 Weak cryptographic algorithms
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.3 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.4 Insecure Data Storage
| - Threat name: Insecure Data Storage
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure
- Threat Description: The GCNP remotely stores sensitive data (e.g. passwords, private keys) on the logical volume that the orchestrator allocates to the GCNP. An attacker can retrieve these data if they have been stored in an insecure way... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.5 System Fingerprinting
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.6 Malware
| - Threat name: Malware.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: A malware installed on the logical volume that the orchestrator allocates to the GCNP can access to the stored sensitive data (e.g. subscription data, logs).
- Threatened Asset: any sensitive data stored on the logical volume of... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.7 Personal Identification Information Violation
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.8 Insecure Default Configuration
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.8 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.9 File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.9 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.10 Insecure Network Services
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.10 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.11 Unnecessary Services
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.11 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.12 Log Disclosure
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.12 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.13 Unnecessary Applications
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.13 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.14 Eavesdropping
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.14 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.15 Security threat caused by lack of GCNP traffic isolation
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.15 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP with the following addition:
- Threat name: Security threat caused by lack of GCNP traffic isolation.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Absence or misconfiguration of network traffic isolation within the GCNP (Global Conta... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.16 Secrets in Environment Variables
| - Threat name: Secrets in Environment Variables.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Storing secrets such as credentials or tokens in environment variables exposes them to significant security risks. These secrets are easily accessible by anyone with access to the container or node since... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.17 Secrets in Image Layers
| - Threat name: Secrets in Image Layers
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Embedding secrets, such as private keys or credentials, within container image layers exposes them to anyone who can pull or inspect the image. Even if later removed in newer layers, these secrets remain retrievab... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.8 Denial of Service
| The threats in all clauses of clause 5.3.7 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GCNP.
In addition, the following threats apply to GCNP.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.8.1 Resource Starvation via Orchestration
| - Threat name: Resource Starvation via Orchestration
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker who orchestrates pods with excessive CPU and memory requests can deliberately exhaust cluster resources, causing denial of service across workloads. By scheduling malicious pods that consume d... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.8.2 Container Spawn Storm
| - Threat name: Container Spawn Storm
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker who abuses the ability to create large numbers of pods or containers can overwhelm cluster resources, causing performance degradation, service disruption, and denial of service. By rapidly spawning excessive ... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.8.3 DoS via Log Volume
| - Threat name: DoS via Log Volume
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker generates excessive container logs to fill storage resources, causing denial of service by exhausting disk space or overwhelming log processing systems. This attack can disrupt cluster operations, block legitima... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9 Elevation of privilege
| All threats in clause 5.3.8 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GCNP.
In addition, the following threats apply to GCNP:
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9.1 Abuse of Linux Capabilities
| - Threat name: Abuse of Linux Capabilities
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: An attacker who exploits excessive or unnecessary Linux capabilities (e.g. CAP_SYS_ADMIN) granted to a container can escalate privileges beyond the intended scope. Linux capabilities break down root privileges ... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9.2 Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
| - Threat name: Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: An attacker who exploits RBAC misconfiguration in a Kubernetes cluster can create pods with elevated privileges by assigning themselves roles or permissions beyond their intended sco... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9.3 Running as Root inside Containers
| - Threat name: Running as Root inside Containers
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: When containers run with root user privileges by default, attackers who compromise such containers gain powerful capabilities that facilitate exploitation of container breakout vulnerabilities. Root execu... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9.4 Use of Privileged Containers
| - Threat name: Use of Privileged Containers
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: Allowing containers to run in privileged mode grants them nearly unrestricted access to the host system, effectively bypassing key security mechanisms and container isolation. This elevated access enables an a... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 5.3.2.10 Generic assets and threats for network functions supporting SBA interfaces
| The assets and threats for containerized network functions supporting SBA interface are the same as the assets and threats specified in clause 6 for TR 33.926 [2].
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6 Test cases for Container-based Products
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1 Analysis of existing general test cases
| The following table lists all test cases present in TS 33.117 [4] and states their applicability for GCNP.
All test cases marked with „applicable“ do not need any further work and can be applied for GCNP.
Section Nr
Section Title
Test Name
Applicability for GCNP
4.2.2.2.2
Protection at the transport layer
TC_PR... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1.1 Security functional requirements deriving from containerization and related test cases
| |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1.1.1 Security non-functional requirements related to passwords
| All text from TS 33.117 [4], clause 4.2.3.4.3 applies to containerized elements.
|
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1.1.2 Security requirements related to logging
| All text from TS 33.117 [4], clauses 4.2.3.6.1, 4.2.3.6.2 and 4.2.3.6.3 apply to containerized elements.
Requirement Name: Logs from containerized functions are available
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall provide sufficient logging mechanisms (e.g., stdout/stderr container logs, audit logs, orches... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1.1.3 Using trusted image repositories for container image handling
| Requirement Name: Securing container function source by using trusted image repositories
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall use trusted/private source image repositories while building the container image.
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_IMAGE_REPOSITORIES
Purpose:
Ensure that containers are built ... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1.1.4 Vulnerability scanning for containerized NF
| All text from TS 33.117 [4], clause 4.4.3 applies to containerized elements. Because of the nature of containerized applications and their high dependency on 3rd party software specific vulnerability scanning tools need to be used. Therefore, the test case TC_BVT_VULNERABILITY_SCANNING specified in 4.4.3 need to be enh... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1.1.5 Containerized NF run-time security
| Requirement Name: Securing container functions by configuration and hardening testing
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall not contain any known misconfigurations.
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_ RUNTIME_CONFIGURATION
Purpose:
Ensure proper Security hardening was performed. Apart from vulnerability ... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1.1.6 Data protection in containerized NF
| All text from TS 33.117 [4], clause 4.2.3.2.3 applies to containerized elements.
Requirement Name: Data protection of secrets, credentials and keys in containerized NFs
Requirement Description:
Secrets, credentials and keys shall be stored in secure way, and the access rights to those secrets, credential, keys sha... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.1.1.7 Resource quotas and limits enforcement
| Requirement Name: Resource quotas and limits enforcement
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall have resource requests and limits defined for CPU, memory, and storage to prevent resource exhaustion and denial of service. Resource quotas shall be configured at appropriate levels (namespace, pod, containe... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 6.2 Potential new test cases for GCNP
| The following table lists potential new test cases for GCNP currently not covered by existing test cases.
Test Name
Purpose
Threat Reference
TC_CNF_NO_EXPOSED_CONTAINERIZATION_API
Ensure kube-API / container runtime sockets aren’t reachable from workloads.
Related to “Exposed Containerization API” threat.
Expose... |
d9464f7617312bca1fbaa3c36be20713 | 33.730 | 7 Conclusions
| The analysis in this document shows that some assets and threats in TR 33.926 [2] and test cases in TS 33.117[4] are not relevant to GCNP. Some assets, threats and test cases need adaptation. Few new test cases are needed for GCNP. There are some critical assets and security threats specific to generic containerized ne... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 4 Overview
| The present document provides an analyses of the best practices documented by RFC 9700 [2] and RFC 8725 [5] and whether they are applicable to the existing TS 33.501 [3] security requirement and procedures, documents the status, and provides an assessment.
NOTE: The usual method of documenting (key issue, threat, req... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5 Best practices and counter measures analysis
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.1 BSP#1: Access token privilege restriction
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.1.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses access token privilege restriction, as described in clause 2.3 of RFC 9700 [2].
It recommends to limit access token privileges to the minimum required for a particular use case. Thus, access tokens are recommended to be audience-restricted to a specific resource server or a small set of re... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.1.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 14.3.2 of TS 33.501 [3]
Access tokens are mandatorily audience-restricted using the "audience" claim. Audience includes the NF type of the NF Service Producers, or one or several NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer, potentially appended with PLMN ID (or SNPN ID).
Access tokens are... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.1.3 Assessment
| Token-based authorization relies on "audience", "scope", and "additional scope" as specified in clause 13 of TS 33.501 [3] and other use case specific claims, for example as specified in Annex X of TS 33.501 [3], to restrict the privileges of issued access tokens.
Access token privilege restriction applies to 5G SBA a... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.2 BSP #2: Token replay prevention
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.2.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses token replay prevention as described in clause 2.2 of RFC 9700 [2].
RFC 9700 [2] cover access token and refresh token under token replay prevention. Both types of token can be replayed, hence replay prevention is necessary.
The best practice recommends to use sender-constrained access tok... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.2.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Refresh tokens are not utilised and applicable to 5G SBA.
In the 5G SBA, access tokens are bound to mTLS authentication state between the network functions, these checks are made either at the discovery, access token request or service request.
Reference: 13.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.501 [3]:
The access tokens request is va... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.2.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Further assessment is FFS
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.3 BSP #3: Client Authentication
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.3.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses client authentication, as described in clause 2.5 of RFC 9700 [2]. The clause does highlight the need to authenticate the client with the authorization server.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.3.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 13.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.501 [3]
In service access authorization for direct communication within the PLMN, prior to the access token request the NRF and NF mutually authenticate each other, and the NF Service Consumer is identified by the NF Instance ID of the public key certificate of the NF Service Cons... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.3.3 Assessment
| As highlighted in clause 13.3.2.2 of TS 33.501 [3] mTLS based authentication in indirect communication is not achieved because of by hop-by-hop security. Thus, there is no means to verify that an CCA token request sent by SCP on behalf of a certain NF Service Consumer, is actually authorized by this consumer as specifi... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.4 BSP#4: Protecting Redirect-Based Flows
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.4.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses protecting redirect-based flows, as described in section 2.1 of RFC 9700 [2].
Redirect-based flows are OAuth 2.0 authorization flows where the client is redirected through the browser to the authorization server to authenticate and grant access, and the authorization result is returned via... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.4.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Redirect-based flows are not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.4.3 Assessment
| Redirect-based flows as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.5 BSP#5: Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.5.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses resource owner password credentials grant, as described in section 2.4 of RFC 9700 [2].
The resource owner password credentials grant is an OAuth 2.0 flow where the client directly uses the user’s username and password to obtain an access token, typically only used in highly trusted scenar... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.5.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Resource owner password credentials grant is not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.5.3 Assessment
| Resource owner password credentials grant as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.6 BSP#6: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.6.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata, as described in section 2.6 of RFC 9700 [2].
Authorization servers publish OAuth Authorization Server Metadata according to RFC 8414 [11] to enable automatically security features, to reduce client misconfigurations and to facilitate rotation of cry... |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.6.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata is not used in 5G SBA. Cryptographic key rotation is facilitated by the access token retrieve key service operation.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.6.3 Assessment
| OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA security. Token-based authorization uses only a few and well-defined features of OAuth 2.0, so there is no need to enable automatically security features or reduce client misconfigurations. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.7 BSP#7: Termination of TLS at intermediary
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.7.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Termination of TLS at intermediary, as described in section 2.6 and section 4.13 of RFC 9700 [2]. This current best practice is linked to the BSP#20.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.7.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| TLS terminating reverse proxy deployment architecture is not used in 5G SBA specifications.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.7.3 Assessment
| Termination of TLS at an intermediary that acts as reverse proxy on upper layer is a mechanism that is not applied in 5G SBA specifications. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.8 BSP#8: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (authorization endpoint)
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.8.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (authorization endpoint), as described in section 2.6 of RFC 9700 [2].
Cross origin resource sharing is layered on top of HTTP and allows responses to declare they can be shared with other origins.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.8.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Cross-Origin Resource Sharing is not used in 5G SBA.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.8.3 Assessment
| Cross origin resource sharing (authorization endpoint) as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA security. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.9 BSP#9: Insufficient Redirection URI Validation
| |
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.9.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Insufficient Redirection URI Validation, as described in section 4.1 of RFC 9700 [2].
Insufficient validation of the Redirection URI effectively breaks client identification or authentication and allows an attacker to obtain an authorization code or access token.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.9.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Redirection URIs are not used between the authorization server and the client in 5G SBA token-based authorization.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.9.3 Assessment
| Redirection URIs between the authorization server and the client are not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
23040b7697031e42eb433df5b0514622 | 33.755 | 5.10 BSP#10: Credential Leakage via Referer Headers
|
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