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f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 4 Architecture
| TR 33.757[3] has studied two scenarios of PLMN hosting a NPN, where the interface between PLMN operational domain and PNI-NPN domain is N4 or SBA interface.
Figure 4-1 N9 interface across PLMN operational domain and PNI-NPN operational domain
In addition to the scenarios in TR 33.757[3], the interfaces between PLM... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 5 Security assumptions
| The following security assumption in TR 33.757[3] clause 5 apply:
- The present document assumes that mutual trust between PLMN and the dedicated Network functions at the PNI_NPN is not in place.
- The present document assumes that attacks can happen from NPN to PLMN and PLMN to NPN.
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 6 Evaluation for SBA interface protection
| The 5G System architecture consists of the network functions is list in TS 23.501[4] clause 4.2.2, while the service-based interface is list in TS 23.501[4] clause 4.2.6.
The following NFs specified in TS 23.501[4] clause 4.2.2 with service-based interface specified in TS 23.501[4] clause 4.2.6 may be considered not ... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7.1 Key Issue #1: TEID issue in N9 interface
| |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7.1.1 Key issue details
| A UPF can be deployed in the PNI-NPN operational domain and connects to a UPF deployed in the PLMN operational domain via N9 interface. Attackers in the PLMN operational domain or in the PNI-NPN operational domain (e.g., a misbehaving employee in PNI-NPN or an external attacker gaining unauthorized access to the PNI-NP... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7.1.2 Security threats
| Attackers in one PNI-NPN operational domain can forge TEIDs and infer the TEIDs assigned to other PLMN operational domains. With this information, further attacks can be launched into the other operational domains.
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7.1.3 Potential security requirements
| TBD.
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7.2 Key Issue #2: Inter domain security on N9 interface
| |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7.2.1 Key issue details
|
Figure 7.2-1 Scenario involving N9 interface
Considering the scenario depicted in Figure 7.2-1, attackers (e.g., a misbehaving employee in the PNI-NPN, or in the PLMN, or an external attacker gaining unauthorized access to the PNI-NPN or PLMN networks) can attack the opposing domain through the N9 interface.
TR 33.... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7.2.2 Security threats
| When there is no security enabled on the N9 interface between PLMN operation domain and PNI-NPN operation domain, attackers in the PNI-NPN or PLMN operational domain can launch attacks to PLMN or NPN over the intersection.
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 7.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall support a mechanism to protect the endpoints of the N9 interface between PLMN operation domain and PNI-NPN operation domain.
7.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
7.X.1 Key issue details
7.X.2 Security threats
7.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 8 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 8.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 8.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#Z
1
X
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 8.2 Solution #1: Extended IPUPS for inter domain security on N9 interface between PLMN and PNI-NPN
| |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 8.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#2 Inter domain security on N9 interface.
This solution proposes to extend the use of the IPUPS from inter-PLMN only to both inter-PLMN and intra-PLMN.
|
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 8.2.2 Solution details
| According to clause 4.2.2 TS 33.501[2], Inter-PLMN UP Security (IPUPS) is introduced at the perimeter of the PLMN, which enforces GTP-U security on the N9 interface between UPFs of the visited and home PLMNs.
This solution proposes to extend the IPUPS in intra-PLMN scenario. The IPUPS is deployed between PLMN and PNI-... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 8.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution extends the use of IPUPS to intra-PLMN.
The IPUPS can discard GTP-U packets without an active F-TEID and malformed GTP-U messages from PNI-NPN.
This solution fulfills the security requirement in KI #2.
8.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
8.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the ... |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 9 Conclusions
| |
f119066b8f1d15bd38cd4aed89254906 | 33.758 | 9.2 Conclusion for KI#2: Inter domain security on N9 interface
| The IPUPS shall be reused for inter domain security between PLMN and NPN on N9 interface as normative in Annex AB.x of TS 33.501 [2].
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253336
Skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 1 Scope
| The present document investigates and identifies the security threats, requirements and potential solution for Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC). Based on the architecture and system level enhancements studied in TR 23.700-14 [2], the work in this document focuses on the security and privacy aspects of gNB-ba... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 4 Architecture and security assumptions
| The following architecture and security assumptions are applied to the study:
- The architecture assumptions and principles for Integrated Sensing and Communication as defined in TR 23.700-14 [2] are used as architecture assumptions in this study.
- The security architecture, procedures, and security requirements for... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5 Key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security of sensing service authorization and sensing result exposure
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| In TR 23.700-14 [2], architecture for sensing services is studied to enable the 3GPP network to support sensing service invocation and revocation from the service consumer, and sensing result exposure to the service consumer.
Solutions addressing the KI#2 in TR 23.700-14 [2] of authorization and revocation for particu... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| Without proper authentication and authorization for sensing service, unauthorized party may be able to access to sensing service.
If the connection between sensing service consumer and NEF/SF is not protected, the attacker can tamper, inject, sniff or replay messages related to sensing service invocation, revocation a... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall be able to support mutual authentication between sensing service consumer and NEF/SF.
The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the communication between sensing service consumer and NEF/SF.
The 5G system shall be able to auth... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security protection for sensing service operations
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| According to TR 23.700-14 [2], after the sensing service request from the service consumer is authorized by the network, sensing service operations will be triggered and performed by the relevant network functions, which communicate with each other to obtain the sensing result.
In TR 23.700-14 [2], there are multiple ... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| As the sensing service operations are performed among sensing function(s) and sensing entities, if the 5GC does not support sensing service operation authorization, the sensing service operation can be abused.
If the connection between sensing entity and sensing function is not securely established, an attacker is abl... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall be able to support authorization for sensing service operations.
The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connection between sensing entity and SF.
Editor’s Note: More security requirements will be added depends on SA2 pr... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.3 Key issue #3 on privacy for sensing
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| This key issue focuses on the privacy aspect of sensing.
The introduction of sensing capabilities enables the network to collect and process sensing data about objects in the public or even private environment and expose derived sensing results, all without the direct participation or awareness of the sensed object. C... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.3.2 Security threats
| If any privacy related information is contained in the sensing data and is leaked to an unauthorized party, it could lead to privacy violation.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall provide a mechanism to mitigate privacy threats in the sensing system.
Editor's Note: further refinement of the above requirement is FFS.
Editor’s Note: whether this key issue needs 3GPP solution(s) is FFS, as there may be mechanism out-of-3GPP.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.4 Key issue #4 on active attacks in sensing
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| One of the use cases for sensing technology is detection of aerial objects. In order to be useful, the result has to be reliable, ie. report an aerial object when there is one, and report empty airspace only when the airspace is in fact empty.
During the sensing operation, an attacker could generate a radio signal tha... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.4.2 Security threats
| Editor's note: threat description is FFS
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.4.3 Potential security requirements
| Editor's note: Requirements are FFS
Editor's note: Whether or not to coordinate with RAN1 is FFS
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.5 Key issue #5 on unauthorized passive sensing
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.5.1 Key issue details
| The sensing mode considered in the present document is a collocated sensing transmitter and receiver. However, the sensing signal sent by the sensing transmitter is not only reflected to the collocated sensing receiver, but also attenuated and scattered in all directions. Therefore, it can be possible for an attacker t... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.5.2 Security threats
| Editor's note: threat description is FFS
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 5.5.3 Potential security requirements
| Editor's note: requirements are FFS.
Editor's note: Whether or not to coordinate with RAN1 is FFS.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6 Solutions
| Editor's Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
KI#4
KI#5
#1.1
X
#1.2
X
#1.3
X
#1.4
X
#1.5
X
#1.6
X
#1.7
X
#2.1
X
#2.2
... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1 Solutions to KI#1
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.1 Solution #1.1: Authorization for sensing service request from AF
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Security of authorization for sensing service invocation and revocation.
In this solution, the sensing service consumer is assumed to be an external AF. The NEF performs the access authorization by verifying the AF's identity, and the SF performs the service authorization by valid... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.1.2 Solution details
| This solution proposes mutual certificate-based authentication between the NEF and the external AF/sensing service consumer using TLS. Certificate based authentication follows the profiles given in 3GPP TS 33.310 [6], clause 6.1.3a. The identities in the end entity certificates is used for authentication and policy che... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.1.3 Evaluation
| This solution is based on the assumption that the sensing service consumer is an external AF. This solution does not address authorization for internal AF.
This solution proposes to reuse the existing mechanism to perform mutual authentication and secure communication between sensing service consumer and NEF. Details ... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.2 Solution #1.2: Authorization for Sensing Service
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses requirements of key issue #1.
In this solution, existing SBA security framework is reused so that authentication and communication protection among sensing service consumer and NEF/SF can be protected using existing SBA mechanism, for authorization, NRF is deemed as authorization check point, ... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.2.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.1.2.2 - Authorization for Sensing Service
1. AF sends sensing service request to the NEF. The message includes the AF ID, the requested sensing services and optionally the requested sensing location for the sensing service.
2. The NEF performs SF discovery procedure via NRF.
3. The NEF sends t... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.2.3 Evaluation
| The solution address authorization requirements of key issue #1.
The solution reuses existing SBA framework for token-based authorization.
According to conclusion made for static authorization in table 7.1.2-1 of TS 23.700-14 [2], AF ID, sensing area for sensing, sensing service type are criteria for authorization f... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.3 Solution #1.3: Solution on authorization for sensing service request
| 6.1.3.1 Introduction
This solution addresses Key Issue#1 on Security of authorization for sensing service invocation and revocation. Specifically, it addresses the third requirement in KI#1: “The 5G system shall be able to authorize sensing service request from a sensing service consumer”.
According to TR 23.700-1... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.4.1 Introduction
| This solution aims to address the security requirements in Key Issue #1. In TR 23.700-14 [2], architecture for sensing services is studied to enable the 3GPP network to support sensing service invocation and revocation from the service consumer.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.4.2 Solution details
| The Sensing service consumer acts as Application Function (AF) to interact with the network. Based on the operator deployment, the Sensing service consumer can be considered as either internal AF (i.e. within operator trusted domain) or external AF (i.e. outside operator trusted domain).
If the Sensing service consume... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.4.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the security requirements of Key Issue#1, by reusing existing security mechanisms between AF and the network.
Editor’s Note: The scope of the authorisation token is FFS.
6.1.5 Solution #1.5: authorize sensing service request using OAuth-based authorization mechanism
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.5.1 Introduction
| The solution addresses KI#1 to authorize sensing service request from the sensing service consumer
Key issues related to System Architecture to Support Sensing, Authorization and Revocation to Support Sensing Service, and Sensing Result Exposure are studied in TR 23.700-14 [2]. Based on solutions for those KIs, a sens... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.5.2 Solution details
| 6.1.5.2.1 Sensing service consumer is an AF inside the trusted domain
Precondition:
• OAM provisions sensing authorization policies in NRF enabling which sensing consumers are allowed to access / trigger what type of sensing operation on which kind of object in which area at which time with what level of accur... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.5.3 Evaluation
| The solutions address the requirements of KI#1 when the AF is either external or internal. Both options leverage existing mechanisms, like mTLS for the authentication purposes, but differ on the authorization aspect:
• When the AF is internal, the solution proposes to enhance the OAuth2.0 framework to support sens... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the potential authorization requirement of Key Issue #1: Security of authorization for sensing service invocation and revocation:
“The 5G system shall be able to authorize sensing service request from a sensing service consumer..”
It is proposed that the Sensing Function performs the authoriza... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.6.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.1.6.2-1: Sensing Service Authorization at the Sensing Function
1. It is assumed the Sensing Service Consumer (AF) and the NEF have a security association as described in 3GPP TS 33.501 [5], clause 12 “Security aspects of Network Exposure Function (NEF)”. The Sensing Service Consumer sends a Sensing Service ... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.6.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
This solution fullfills the potential security requirements of key issue #1:
Sensing Service Consumer (AF) authentication and auhtorization at the NEF as well as integrity protection,... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the Key Issue #1 (security of sensing service authorization and sensing result exposure). Authentication, communication security, and authorization aspects for NEF and AF interaction have already been specified in Clause 12 of TS 33.501 [5]. The interface between the sensing service consumer act... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.7.2 Solution details
| Two network entities may be involved to perform authorization of the sensing service requested by a sensing service consumer (AF) from the network. After receiving a sensing service request, NEF determines whether the sensing service consumer is authorized to invoke sensing APIs to the network. The security mechanism, ... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.1.7.3 Evaluation
| The solution addresses the security of sensing service authorization and security of sensing results exposure. It fulfils all the security requirements mentioned in Key Issue #1. In this solution the NEF performs the service access authorization of the AF for Sensing Service request and the SF performs sensing service... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2 Solutions to KI#2
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.1 Solution #2.1: Security for sensing service operation
| |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the following requirement of Key Issue #2: Security protection for sensing service operations: “The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connection between sensing entity and SF.”
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.1.2 Solution details
| The solution proposes a security mechanism to secure the connection between the sensing entity and SF.
For the interface between the sensing entities and SF, the communication between the sensing entity and the SF is secured by the NDS/IP security procedures specified in TS 33.210 [7].
Editor’s Note: Whether using di... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.1.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the following requirement of Key Issue #2: Security protection for sensing service operations: “The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connection between sensing entity and SF.”
This solution is based on the assumpti... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.2.1 Introduction
| This solution aims to address Key Issue #2.
This solution to secure the connection between Sensing Entity and Sensing Function (SF). SF is responsible for to handle both sensing service control and sensing data processing.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.2.2 Solution details
| The SF supports a direct interface (e.g. Nx interface) to send the sensing service control signalling to sensing entity, and the sensing entity uses the same interface to reply the sensing data to the SF.
In this architecture, the integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connectio... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution assumes the SF and sensing entity are connected via direct connection.
This solution reuses existing mechanisms to address the following security requirement: The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connection between sensing e... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.3.1 Introduction
| This solution is for security protection for sensing service operations between sensing entity and Sensing Function (SF) Security.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.3.2 Solution details
| Security between SF (Sensing Function) and sensing entity is same as security procedures for non-service based interface security defined in clause 9 of 33.501 [5] using DTLS/IPsec.
Security profiles for DTLS implementation and usage shall follow the TLS profile given in clause 6.2 of TS 33.210 [6] and the certificat... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 6.2.3.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
6.X Solutions to KI#X
6.X.Y Solution #X.Y: <Solution Title>
6.X.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.X.Y.2 Solution deta... |
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor's Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
|
975052649990d9a78bcd8c799436e96a | 33.777 | 7.1 Conclusions for KI#1
| If the sensing service consumer is the third-party AF, already existing security mechanisms in clause 12 of TS 33.501 [5] are reused to provide mutual authentication, authorisation, integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection between sensing service consumer and the NEF.
NOTE: third-party AF... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 1 Scope
| The present document identifies potential challenges and requirements for supporting AEAD algorithms specified in TS 35.240 [2], TS 35.243 [3], and TS 35.246 [4] for NAS and AS security (including control and user plane security) in the 6G System, including the following:
- Impact to AS and NAS security
- Key hierar... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
Ciphering only algorithm:... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
AAD Additional Authenticated Data
AEAD Authenticated Encryption... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 4 Overview and assumption
| Editor’s Note: This clause gives a brief explanation for background information of this SID, e.g. security assumption, existing algorithm specifications and a brief description of AEAD.
The solution of present document does not cover architecture dependent procedure aspects, such as Xn handover, but will cover archite... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all key issues identified during the study. Due to the nature of this study, not all issues are derived from security threats but all are essential for the adoption of AEAD algorithms in 6G System.
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.1 Key issue #1: Algorithm selection
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| The current 5G System uses dedicated algorithms for encryption (NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3) and integrity protection (NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3) which are selected independently. This means a given session may use the same or different algorithms for encryption and integrity protection (including NULL)... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.1.2 Security threat
| There is a threat where unintended algorithm being selected if there is no clear definition of the algorithm selection.
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.1.3 Potential requirements
| 6GS may need to support algorithm selection to indicate AEAD algorithms.
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.2 Key issue #2: AEAD algorithm interface
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| One of the advantages of using a combined AEAD mode is that some important security decisions have already been made in the construction of the mode, such as in which order encryption and integrity protection is applied. From SA3 perspective, this means that we don’t need to discuss in which order operations are to be ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| There is a threat to system evolution. For example, if the interface is not designed well from day one, it will not be stable for future enhancements and there can be problems to add new functionality. This will not only increase complexity of the system but will also make it more difficult to analyze from a security p... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The input and output parameters (e.g. format, sizes and allowed values) of the AEAD algorithms shall be specified in a way that is independent of the realisation of the AEAD algorithm.
Editor’s Note: How to support interleaved ciphered and un-ciphered IEs (e.g., as in initial NAS messages) with NCA is ffs.
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