hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21.2.1 Generic AEAD interface
| According to RFC 5116 [6], an AEAD algorithm takes a fixed length key (K), a fixed length Nonce (N), an arbitrary length plaintext (P), an arbitrary length associated data (A) as input and produces a ciphertext (C) as output. The corresponding decryption algorithms takes the key (K), the nonce (N), the ciphertext (C), ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21.2.2 How to use generic AEAD interface in the 3GPP system
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21.2.1.1 Potential 3GPP specific parameters
| Assume that potential 3GPP specific parameters to be used in the AEAD operations are the following.
- KEY: a 256-bit key.
- COUNT: 32-bit value.
- BEARER: a 5-bit bearer identity.
- DIRECTION: a 1-bit direction of the transmission. It is 0 for uplink and 1 for downlink.
- EXTRA_IV: a 48-bit value.
- PLAINTEXT: an... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21.2.1.2 Mapping of 3GPP specific parameters to the generic AEAD parameters
| Figure 6.21.2.1.2-1 and 6.21.2.1.2-2 illustrate the use of the generic AEAD algorithm in encryption and decryption mode in the sender and receiver side, respectively, in 3GPP. The mapping of potential 3GPP specific parameters and generic AEAD algorithm parameters is shown below:
- Generic AEAD parameter K: is the pote... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21.2.1.3 Analysis on how the 256-NCA4/5/6 algorithms can be treated as AEAD algorithms having generic AEAD interface
| Figure 6.21.2.1.3-1 and 6.21.2.1.3-2 illustrate how to construct AEAD algorithms having generic interface from the 256-NCA4/5/6 algorithms. The mapping of parameters is presented below:
- 256-NCA4/5/6 parameters EXTRA_IV, COUNT, BEARER, DIRECTION are extracted from generic AEAD parameter N.
- 256-NCA4/5/6 parameter ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.22 Solution 22: AEAD Key for NAS and AS algorithm
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.22.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#1, 3.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.22.2 Solution details
| The AEAD keys can be derived as follows while considering the existing NAS and AS Key derivation specified in TS 33.501 [5] Annex A.8 and 6.2.2 Key derivation and distribution scheme as the baseline. NAS SMC and AS SMC in TS 33.501 [5] can be reused with the adaptation of indicating selected AEAD algorithm ID and mode ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.22.3 Evaluation
| TBD
6.Y Solution Y: <Solution Name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains solutions for key issues. Not all solutions may have evaluation due to the nature of this study.
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Not... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 7 Conclusion
| 7.Z Key Issue #Z: <Key Issue Name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions for Key Issue #Z.
Annex A: Introduction to AEAD
A.1 Protection provided by AEAD
The key characteristic of Authenticated Encryption (AE) is that ciphering, and integrity protection are executed in a combined operation. Thi... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 4 Architecture assumption
| Annex AA in TS 33.501[2] is the starting point of this study.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 5 Key issues
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 5.1 Key issue #1: PSK support for MPQUIC TLS
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| In TS 33.501 [1] Annex AA.2, server authentication for MPQUIC/TLS [2], [3], [5] is specified. The scope of this key issue is to cover the PSK-based option for MPQUIC/TLS. Solutions to this key issue are expected to provide the means for enabling the PSK option for MPQUIC/TLS. More specifically, the PSK option refers to... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| N/A
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall be able to securely derive, deliver, update, and use the PSK (i.e., TLS 1.3 psk_dhe_ke) between UE and UPF to be used for authentication with MPQUIC/TLS.
5.X Key Issue #X: key issue names
5.X.1 Key issue details
Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the key issue detail of a key issue.
... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6 Solutions
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.1 Solution #1: MPQUIC/TLS using PSK derived from KAMF
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key issue #1 by enabling a secure UP communication channel between the UE and the UPF. The approach leverages the current KAMF to derive a pre-shared key (UPF_PSK) and a corresponding identifier (UPF_PSK ID). The UPF_PSK/ID is delivered to the UPF and then used for a mutual-authentication and ke... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| Assumptions and scope:
- UE is registered to the 5GS and has established a KAMF with the network.
- Distribution path for UPF_PSK/ID: AMF/SMF → UPF over N2/N4.
Key derivation and identifiers:
- UE and AMF derive UPF_PSK and UPF_PSK ID using current KAMF.
- Input parameters for the KDF include at least the PDU S... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| This solution depends on the visited network supporting the relevant functionality of this solution.
The solution fully addresses Key issue #1 requirement, including derivation, delivery, update and usage of the PSK between UE and UPF used for authentication with MPQUIC/TLS.
Impacts:
- AMF and UE derive a new UPF_PS... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.2 Solution #2: PSK derivation bound with MA PDU session
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| According to TS 23.501 [8] clause 5.32.6, for steering functionalities based on MPQUIC that apply the QUIC protocol and its multipath extensions, the MPQUIC functionality(ies) in the UE communicates with the associated MPQUIC Proxy functionality(ies) in the UPF. The MPQUIC functionality in the UE and the associated MPQ... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| To bound the PSK with a specific MA PDU session, it is proposed to use an identity which can uniquely identify the MA PDU session on both the UE side and network side as an input parameter for PSK derivation. It can be the PDU session ID or IP address of the MA PDU session, given that both the UE and the SMF have the P... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| The solution leverages a key in core network as the root key for deriving the PSK. The root key can be an existing key or an intermediate key derived from the existing key.
The existing key can be KAMF or KSEAF derived after UE authentication. If KSEAF is used, there will be an impact on the AMF/SEAF, which needs to s... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.3 Solution #3: PSK delivery during MA PDU session establishment
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| According to TS 23.502 [9] clause 4.22.2, when receiving the UE requested PDU session establishment request with Request Type as "MA PDU Request", the AMF supporting MA PDU sessions selects an SMF supporting MA PDU sessions. It is proposed that:
- When selecting an SMF supporting MA PDU, the AMF sends a key to the SMF... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| The detailed procedure is shown in Figure 6.3.2-1.
Figure 6.3.2-1: MPQUIC/TLS Security Establishment during MA PDU session establishment
1. The UE provides Request Type as "MA PDU Request" in UL NAS Transport message and its ATSSS capabilities in PDU Session Establishment Request message.
2. Based on Request Ty... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| The solution incorporates the PSK delivery in the MA PDU session establishment procedure in non-roaming scenario. In this way, the existing messages can be reused to deliver the PSK so as to avoid defining a new procedure or new messages. The PSK or an intermediate key can be delivered from the AMF to the SMF as part o... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.4 Solution #4: Using 5G security context to derive authentication pre-shared key for MPQUIC
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #1 “PSK support for MPQUIC TLS”.
This solution proposes to derive authentication pre-shared key from the 5G security context to establish the security of MPQUIC for UE and UPF.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.4.2.1 The procedure for PSK retrieval
| Considering UE and network already generated shared security context during the registration procedure, a sub-level shared key can be generated, and be used as a pre-shared key for MPQUIC.
AMF derives the KUPF from KAMF during the PDU session establishment procedure as shown in the following procedure (Figure 6.4.2.1)... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.4.2.2 Key hierarchy
| The key hierarchy defined in TS 33.501[2] for this scenario can be extended as follows:
Figure 6.4.2.2 Key hierarchy for KUPF retrieval
A new key KUPF is derived from KAMF as depicted in Figure 6. 4.2.2.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.4.2.3 KUPF generation
| The KUPF is generated by KAMF using the following input parameters.
- FC = 0xXX
- P0 = PDU session ID
- L0 = length of PDU session ID
- P1 = NAS Uplink COUNT value
- L1 = length of NAS Uplink COUNT value
The input key KEY is KAMF.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.4.2.4 Key ID generation
| The Key ID is generated from the PDU session ID and UE ID (i.e. SUPI) as follows:
KID = H(SUPI)|| PDU session ID
6.2.2.X Key Update
The KUPF is PDU session granularity and only be used for authentication purpose between UE and UPF. The lifetime of KUPF is equal to the lifetime of the corresponding PDU session, i.e... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| This solution proposes a solution of deriving a pre-shared key from the 5G security context to establish the security of MPQUIC for UE and UPF.
AMF has to derive a key for UPF after SMF determines that MPQUIC functionality will be used and send a request to AMF. UPF has to store the key and the corresponding key iden... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5 Solution #5: two layer PSK generation method
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes a two layer key generation. The AMF will use KAMF generates a Key KSMF and send the KSMF to the selected SMF. The SMF will further generate KUPF using KSMF, and then deliver the key KUPF to the UPF. Meanwhile, the SMF also generates a key ID, and the Key ID is also sent to the UPF together with t... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.1 The procedure for PSK retrieval
|
Figure 6.5.2-1 Procedure to get a PSK between UE and UPF for MPQUIC
1. UE sends PDU Session Establishment Request message to the AMF. The message contains the MAP PDU session information defined in TS 23.502[9] and a PSK capability indication. The PSK capability indication is to indicate that the UE supports to gene... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.2 Key hierarchy
|
Figure 6.9.2-2 Key hierarchy for KUPF retrieval
Based on the procedure in clause 6.9.2.1, the AMF generates the KSMF by using the KAMF and deliver it to the SMF, and then the SMF uses the KSMF to generate the KUPF that will be further delivered to the UPF.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.3 KSMF generation method
| The KSMF is generated by KAMF reusing the method in A.13 of TS 33.501[2] with the following updated:
- Set the P0 input parameter DIRECTION to the value 0x02.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.4 KUPF generation method
| The KUPF is generated by KSMF using the method in A.13 of TS 33.501[2] with the following updated:
- Set the input KEY to KSMF.
- Set the P0 DIRECTION to 0x01.
- Set the COUNT value is set to the value of PDU session ID.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.5 Key ID generation method
| The Key ID is generated by KSMF using the method in A.3 of TS 33.535[10] with the following updated:
- Set the input key KAUSF to KSMF.
- Set the P0 = "A-TID" to P0 = "UPF Key ID”.
- Set the L0 = length of "A-TID"; (i.e. 0x00 0x05) to L0 = length of " UPF Key ID "; (i.e. 0x00 0x05).
6.5.2.6 Key Update
The KSMF ... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| The solution considers the backward compatibility issue to let the SMF knows whether the UE is upgraded to support generating PSK.
In 3GPP system, all PSKs in the key hierarchy are delivered in one hop only. Thus deliver the PSK to the UPF from SMF does not fully comply with the principle. In case that no new interfac... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.6 Solution #6: Key derivation and delivery to UE and UPF
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| The following solutions addresses KI#1 by proposing a mechanism to derive the key inside the 5G core and distribute it to both UE and UPF. Additionally, it proposes a mechanism to initiate re-authentication by deriving and delivering new keys to UE and UPF.
|
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.6.2.1 Key derivation and distribution
|
1. A Multi-Access PDU session is established and one or more ATSSS rules require the use of MPQUIC.
2. The UPF request SMF the pre-shared secret for the session with the UE.
3. SMF forwards the Key request to AMF.
4. AMF generates the new key by deriving it from KAMF. The following parameters should be use as inp... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.6.2.2 Re-Keying mechanism
|
1. MPQUIC connection has been set up through PSK.
2. Based on internal policies, either the UE or 5G core can require to renew the pre-shared secret. This could include 5G security policy for re-authentication, such as in the case of inter-system mobility.
3. AMF generates a new key through the same protocol desc... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| The solution completely addresses the problem highlighted by KI#1 both for initial authentication of the connection and for update of the key in case of a compromise. The security is achieved by deriving a new dedicated key for each MPQUIC connection, ensuring that each connection is independently secured, and the comp... |
2c77899e159133c1fd004dd198dae225 | 33.778 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the conclusions of this study.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025.10
SA3#124
S3-253745
The merger of S3-253753,711,712,713,714,715,717,718,415
0.1.0
2025.11
SA3#125
S3-254536
... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 1 Scope
| The present document investigates security and privacy for transfer, collection and exposure of UE-level data to support AIML Enhancement Ph2 based on the TR 23.700-04 [2].
Specifically, this document:
- Studies the security and privacy aspects on standardized transfer of standardized data over UP for UE data collect... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 3.2 Symbols
| Void
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 4 Overview
| TR 23.700-04 [2] studies transfer of standardized data over UP for UE data collection to meet requirements for AI/ML for NR air interface operation with UE-side model training, all the architecture assumptions and architecture requirements defined in TR 23.700-04 [2] are also applicable to the present document, and any... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5 Key issues
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| The architecture requirement in clause 4.2 of TR 23.700-04 [2] is that MNO has full controllability and visibility for standardized data and a UP path is used between the UE and a data collection network function for transferring standardized collected data from the UE using PDU connectivity service provided by a PDU s... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| Lack of authentication and authorization may lead to unauthorized access to network services.
Lack of confidentiality, integrity protection in collecting UE related data can lead to disclosure and tampering of UE related information.
Tampering of UE related data in transit can also impact the quality of training data... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS should support authentication and authorization between UE and data collection NF before data transmission takes place.
NOTE 1: Authentication and authorization between UE and data collection NF is not addressed in the present document.
The 5GS should support confidentiality, integrity and replay protection ... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security and Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| As studied in TR 23.700-04 [2], training data for AI/ML-based NR air interface operation with UE-side model training may be transferred via the 5G Core (5GC) and then exposed to external OTT servers. The exposure of such UE-related data outside the 3GPP domain introduces security risks that need to be addressed at the ... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| Unauthenticated or impersonating OTT servers could obtain sensitive UE-related data.
Without authorization, OTT servers can abuse UE-related data exposure services.
Leakage, tampering, or replay of UE-related data at the NEF and OTT/AF interface could compromise integrity, confidentiality.
Exposure of UE information... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS shall support mutual authentication between the NEF and OTT/AF servers handling UE-related data.
The 5GS shall support authorization mechanisms for services related to exposure of UE-related data to the OTT server.
The 5GS shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection for UE-related data dur... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6 Solutions
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Table 6.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Key Issues
Solutions
#1
#2
#1
X
#2
X
#3
X
#4
X
#5
X
#6
X
#7
X
#8
X
#9
X
#10
X
#11
X
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.2 Solution #1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses requirements of key issue #1.
For authorization and user consent check between UE and data collection NF, it proposes that the entity who selects UE for data collection is deemed as enforcement point. Especially for user consent check, the existing mechanism can be reused.
For authentication ... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.2.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.2.2-1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
1. Data consumer (e.g. UE model training entity server) requests UE data collection to DCF.
2. DCF retrieves UE subscription data from UDM. The subscription data includes:
a) User consent data: existing user consent parameters can be reused.
... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| None.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.3 Solution #2: Security for Data Collection using a DCF
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1.
This solution builds on TR 23.700-04 (for the standardized transfer of standardized data over UP for UE-side data collection) and introduces security enhancements in the 5GS for secure UE connection setup and data transfer with a Data Collection Function (DCF).
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| Architecture scope and roles
- DCF in the MNO domain manages Data Collection Profiles (DCPs) and orchestrates UE data collection and transfer,
Security functions
1) Authentication and session protection between UE and DCF
- The UE establishes a secure association with the DCF using shared key derived from network ... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| None.
NOTE 1: The need for UE authentication is not addressed in the present document.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.4 Solution #3: Security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#1 Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF by reusing the existing TLS based mechanism.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| The UE establishes the user plane connection to the Data Collection NF, to protect the interface, the TLS based mechanism is supported. AKMA specified in TS 33.535 [4] or GBA specified in TS 33.220 [9] could be reused to secure the end-to-end connection between the UE and the Data collection NF. The Data collection NF ... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| None.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.5 Solution #4: New solution for Security of UE connection setup with Data collection NF
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses requirements of key issue #1: "Security of UE connection setup with Data collection NF", particularly by hop-by-hop security. For authorization and user consent check between UE and data collection NF, it proposes detailed authorization checks against UE subscription data and operator policies a... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.5.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.5.2-1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
1. The UE model training entity/server sends a request to the DCF to collect UE data for UE side model training.
2. The DCF checks subscription data for UE data collection and transfer from the UDM.
3. After successful authorization and user... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| None.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.6 Solution #5: Secure communication between UE and the data collection function
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses part of KI#1, i.e. secure communication and mutual authentication between UE and the data collection function.
Secure connection is required between the UE and the data collection function, the connection between the UE and the data collection function can be secured by the TLS or NDS/IP and UP... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| For connection between UE and the data collection function located in home network, the TLS connection between the UE and the data collection function can be used for protecting the UE data. The TLS can be established based on key shared between the UE and the data collection function.
The shared key is generated bas... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| None.
NOTE 1: How the UE perform data collection is not addressed in the present document.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.7 Solution #6: UE-side Data Collection Exposure
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2.
This solution builds on TR 23.700-04 [2] (for the standardized transfer of standardized data over UP for UE-side data collection) for the secure, authorized, and privacy-preserving exposure of UE-related data towards OTT servers via the 5GC exposure function (e.g., NEF).
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.7.2 Solution details
| Architecture scope and roles
- DCF in the MNO domain manages Data Collection Profiles (DCPs) and orchestrates UE data collection and transfer towards the OTT server via NEF. The NEF exposes authorized subsets of collected data with any applicable post-processing done by DCF prior to being forwarded to OTT servers.
S... |
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