hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| None.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.8 Solution #7: Security and Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This clause outlines the security considerations for AF authentication, communication security between NEF and AF and authorization for data collection procedure between both AFs and DCF utilizing NRF token-based approach. General mechanism to utilise the token-based authorization is specified in clause 13.4.1 of TS 33... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.8.2 Solution details
| NOTE 1: Whether the DCF is a new NF or the existing one is not addressed in the present document.
Figure 6.8.2-1: Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
1a. In case of untrusted AF OTT server, the NEF registers its NF profile at the NRF with AF’s related parameters that includes AF ID, data cont... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| None.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.9 Solution #8: Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.9.1 Introduction
| As studied in TR 23.700-04 [2], the CN may exposure the data to the OTT Servers. These data are collected by the CN from various UEs which may belong to different Vendors or TACs. And some vendors or chipsets vendors may have concern to exposure the data of its product (e.g., UE or chipset) to other vendors. The CN nee... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.9.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.9.2-1: Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
0. The OTT servers register the data exposure concerns to the CN. The data exposure concerns include: UE information (e.g., Vendor ID, TAC) and its allowed vendor list. The OTT server agree to exposure the data collected from the UE in the UE ... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.9.3 Evaluation
| None.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.10 Solution #9: Secure mechanism for NEF and OTT/AF interaction
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.10.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#2.
Specifically, existing mechanisms defined in TS 33.501 [3] are reused to address the issue.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.10.2 Solution details
| TLS based mechanism defined in clause 12.2 of TS 33.501 [3] is reused for mutual authentication between the NEF and the OTT/AF servers handling UE-related data.
Authorization mechanism defined in clause 12.4 or 12.5 of TS 33.501 [3] is reused for authorizing services related to exposure of UE-related data to the OTT ... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.10.3 Evaluation
| Existing TLS based mechanism defined in clause 12 of TS 33.501 [3] can be reused for mutual authentication and communication protection between NEF and the OTT/AF servers handling UE-related data.
NOTE: Evaluation is not completed.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.11 Solution #10: Granular authorization for OTT/AF
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.11.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses requirements of key issue #2.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.11.2 Solution details
| When AF or OTT requests UE-side model training data from DCF via NEF, the exposure of such UE data outside the 3GPP domain introduces security risks requiring control at the exposure interface, particularly for authorization.
Figure 6.11.2-1: Granular authorization for OTT/AF
1: An AF/OTT server requests UE-side mo... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.11.3 Evaluation
| None.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.12 Solution #11: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF using TLS
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.12.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1 "Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF".
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.12.2 Solution details
| This solution proposes that the security between the UE and the Data Collection NF is based on TLS. TLS is a well-established security protocol at the transport layer and provides authentication, confidentiality, integrity and replay protection.
Authentication of the Data Collection NF towards the UE can be based on ... |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 6.12.3 Evaluation
| None.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 7 Conclusions
| |
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 7.1 Conclusion for Key Issue #1
| The architecture does not support the KI and therefore no normative work is performed.
|
ff9f00e514ee34b6ce3c3436640d4dec | 33.785 | 7.2 Conclusion for Key Issue #2
| The architecture does not support the KI and therefore no normative work is performed.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-253064
S3-252564, S3-252988, S3-252990 for endorsed TR skeleton, overview and new key issue
0.... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 1 Scope
|
The present document has the following objectives:
• Identify and study the authentication and authorization aspects for AIMLE services specified in TS 23.482 [3].
• Study the solutions to address the identified scenarios to support AIMLE service security.
NOTE 1: For the above objectives existing SEAL se... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
AIMLE AI/ML enablement
ADAE Application Data Analytics Enablement
FL ... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 4 Security Assumptions
| The AIMLE security should use authorization aspects specified in TS 33.434 [2] as baseline.
The AIMLE server is deployed as a SEAL server, hence SEAL architecture is enhanced to incorporate the AIMLE service as shown below, where Figure 4-1 illustrates the service-based representation including AIMLE server as part of... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5 Key Issues
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization for AIMLE Service Security for AIML members
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
|
3GPP TS 23.482 [3] introduces support for AIMLE services, enabling AI/ML operations through interactions between the AIMLE client and AIMLE server(s) over the AIML-UU reference point, and between the VAL servers and AIMLE servers over AIML-S respectively. These services involve distributed AI/ML operations across mul... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| Unauthorized AIMLE members (e.g., FL members) participating in AIMLE services may gain access to data exchanged between AIMLE clients and servers.
Lack of robust authorization allows unreliable or unauthorized AIMLE members (e.g., FL members) to degrade the quality, efficiency, or availability of AIMLE operations.
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 3GPP system shall support authorization mechanisms for AIML members (e.g., FL members) utilising AIMLE services for various AIMLE procedures.
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Secure AIMLE ML Model Access
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5.2.1 Key Issue details
| TS 23.482 [3] describes AIMLE services which supports ML Model retrieval, ML model training, ML model management (model information storage and discovery) ML model update, and ML model selection aspects. AIMLE Services uses SEAL as the fundamental architecture and the authorization aspects of SEAL Security in TS 33.434... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| Unauthorized AIMLE client(s)/ VAL server using AIMLE services may gain access to ML model data leading to leakage of model.
Lack of robust authorization allows unauthorized AIMLE client(s) or VAL servers to degrade the quality, efficiency, or availability of AIMLE operations.
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 3GPP system shall support authorization to secure AIMLE service-based ML Model operations such as retrieval, training, update, selection, and management (i.e., ML model information storage and discovery).
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6 Solutions
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.1 Solution #1: Authorization for AIMLE Services
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#1.
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| AIMLE authorization related to AIML Services can reuse the authorization procedure specified in TS 33.434 [2] clause 5.2.2 (SEAL service authorization) and clause B.3.3 (SEAL service authorization) as the baseline where, SIM-S acts as an authorization server and issues access token to the AIMLE service consumer. The AI... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| The solution uses the SEAL service authorization procedure as baseline with the following impacts:
SIM-S acts as an authorization server for enabling the AIMLE security.
To secure the SEAL based AIMLE Services, this solution provides enhancements to the access token claims (such as AIMLE resource specific additional... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.2 Solution #2: Authorization of AIMLE clients acting as FL members for access to AIMLE Service Security
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes the authorization of AIMLE clients in support of federated learning (FL). It ensures that only authorized clients (FL members) are selected, and that secure token-based verification is performed using authorization server. Tokens include only the minimum required claims such as ML model ID / Appl... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.2.2.1 The procedure for AIMLE clients’ authorization
|
Figure 6.2.2.1-1 Authorization’s procedure of AIMLE clients acting as FL members
1. The VAL server sends a FL member grouping support request to the AIMLE server. The request includes the requestor ID, security credentials, and FL grouping criteria (e.g., grouping method, member selection criteria). The initial req... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses authorization in AIMLE client-related service procedures in TS 23.482 (e.g., client selection, participation, and FL member grouping in clauses 8.8-8.10, 8.13, 8.17) by requiring VAL servers to provide authenticated credentials for requests, enabling AIMLE servers to monitor and select clients w... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.3 Solution #3: Re-using existing mechanisms
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #1 (Authorization for AIMLE Service Security for AIML members) and key issue #2 (Secure AIMLE ML Model Access) by re-using existing mechanisms available in SEAL security architecture.
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| As stated in TS 29.482 [7], the AIMLE Layer forms part of the SEAL Enabler Layer defined in 3GPP TS 23.434 [5]. The entity AIMLE client becomes a special SEAL client, AIMLE server becomes a special SEAL server, ML repository is a repository that can be accessed by the AIMLE server. With that information, the mapping of... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements in key issue #1 and #2 by proposing re-usage of existing SEAL security mechanisms specified in TS 33.434 [2] having no impact on the base existing SEAL security system. The solution leaves AIMLE information specific authorization to static local authorization. The case of how a... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.4 Solution #4: Authorization for Secure AIMLE based ML Model Access
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#2.
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| AIMLE authorization related to AIML Services can reuse the authorization procedure specified in TS 33.434 [2] clause 5.2.2 (SEAL service authorization) and clause B.3.3 (SEAL service authorization) as the baseline where, SIM-S acts as an authorization server and issues access token to the AIMLE service consumer. The AI... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| The solution uses the SEAL service authorization procedure as baseline with the following impacts:
SIM-S acts as an authorization server for enabling the AIMLE security.
To secure the SEAL based AIMLE Services, this solution provides enhancements to the access token claims (such as AIMLE resource specific additional ... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.5 Solution #5: FL member authorization for AIMLE services
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| As specified in TS 23.482 [3], the FL members consuming the AIMLE services are AIMLE or VAL server or VAL clients. There are several procedures defined such as ML model retrieval, ML model training, FL member registration, event subscription, AIMLE client registration/discovery/selection/participation so on.
As most o... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| For any interaction between AIMLE clients and the AIMLE server, the AIMLE client is provided with the access token by the SIM-S as specified in 5.2 of clause 33.434 [2].
For any interaction between VAL server and AIMLE server (e.g., model training), the VAL server is provisioned with an access token by out of band mea... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements for key issue#1 and key issue#2 by re-using existing mechanisms specified in TS 33.434 [2] and TS 33.122 [a].
|
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 7 Conclusions
| |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 7.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization for AIMLE Service Security for AIML members
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions for Key Issue #1.
For any interaction between AIMLE clients and the AIMLE server, the AIMLE client is provided with the access token by the SIM-S as specified in 5.2 of clause 33.434 [2].
For any interaction between VAL server and AIMLE server, the mechanism... |
d1b6cddbf8b8197fec2cac64684aa95b | 33.786 | 7.2 Key Issue #2: Secure AIMLE ML Model Access
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions for Key Issue #2.
The conclusion for key issue#2 follows same principles as described in clause 7.1.
Annex A: Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-252919
AIMLE Serv... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 1 Scope
| This document studies potential security and privacy architecture and procedures for 6G mobile networks for improvement of existing services and support of new services, to meet the 6G system requirements and architecture.
One goal of this document is to study how to create lean and streamlined standards for 6G, e.g.... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 4 Security Areas and High Level Security Requirements
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 4.1 Security Areas
| Editor's Note: This clause further clarifies the scope of the study by listing the security areas that SA3 is working on.
This document includes the following security areas:
1. Security Architecture deals with aspects such as identifying the different security domains and their characteristics, defining the di... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 4.2 Potential High Level Security Requirements
| Editor's Note: This clause will document high-level requirements that guide the study.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5 Key Issues
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1 Security Area #1: Security Architecture
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.1 Introduction
| This security area addresses the security principles, features, and requirements inherent to the security and trust architecture of 6G systems. This will lay the foundation for all the procedures and the mechanisms necessary to protect the communication and facilitate trust establishment between the UE and the network ... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3 Key Issues
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.1 Key Issue #1.1: Security Domains and Trust Anchors
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.1.1 Key issue details
| This Key Issue investigates security aspects of the security domains and trust anchors in 6GS.
Editor's note: Further details are FFS.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.1.2 Security threats
| N/A
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.1.3 Potential security requirements
| N/A
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.1.4 Interim agreements
| TBD
Editor's note: This clause will include the principles that are agreed as work progresses for the specific KI#x.y. This may be populated directly or e.g. also when a topic in Area #x gets resolved and a principle is agreed. Where there is consensus, interim agreements pertaining to this key issue (e.g. solution pr... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.2 Key Issue #1.2: 6G Key Hierarchy
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.2.1 Key issue details
| This Key Issue investigates security aspects of the key hierarchy in 6GS.
Editor's note: Further details are FFS.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.2.2 Security threats
| N/A
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.2.3 Potential security requirements
| N/A
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3.2.4 Interim agreements
| TBD
Editor's note: This clause will include the principles that are agreed as work progresses for the specific KI#x.y. This may be populated directly or e.g. also when a topic in Area #x gets resolved and a principle is agreed. Where there is consensus, interim agreements pertaining to this key issue (e.g. solution pr... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2 Security Area #2: RAN Security
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.1 Introduction
| Purpose is to study potential attack vectors, vulnerabilities, security and privacy risks, impact and mitigations. This includes the following aspects:
Editor’s Note: To be aligned with TR 38.914 [1] and TR 38.760-2 [2] as 6G RAN study progresses in RAN WGs.
- Radio protocol stack, architecture and procedures
Edito... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.2 Security Assumptions
| Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.3 Key Issues
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.3.1 Key Issue # 2.1: MAC CE Security
| 5.2.3.1.1 Key issue details
In 5G NR, MAC Control Elements (MAC CEs) are used to convey time‑critical control information within the MAC layer, such as scheduling control, buffer status, timing advance, and resource management signaling. The MAC layer forms a payload from the layers above and adds its own Control... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.3.2 Key Issue #2.2: Security for RAN Mobility
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.3.2.1 Key issue details
| Mobility within 6G radio and between 5G NR and 6G radio introduces challenges related to security context handling. In legacy systems (4G/5G), key separation cannot be achieved immediately during X2/Xn handover.
This key issue investigates whether and how key separation between the source and target RAN nodes during ... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.3.2.2 Security threats
| Editor's Note: threats are FFS.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.3.2.3 Potential security requirements
| Editor's Note: potential security requirements are FFS.
|
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.2.3.2.4 Interim agreements
| Editor's note: This clause will include the principles that are agreed as work progresses for the specific KI#x.y. This may be populated directly or e.g. also when a topic in Area #x gets resolved and a principle is agreed. Where there is consensus, interim agreements pertaining to this key issue (e.g. solution princip... |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.3 Security Area #3: UE to Core Network Security
| |
d5a4674079022b1e119b815facd2ddd5 | 33.801-01 | 5.3.1 Introduction
| This security area studies how to establish and manage secure communication(s) between the UE and the Core Network. This includes the following aspects:
Editor's Note: work is to be aligned and in coordination with TR 23.801-01 [4] based on SA2 progress.
Editor's Note: Any potential NAS impact due to the use of AEAD... |
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