hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.3 Key issue #3: AEAD Keys
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| The AEAD algorithms differ from the current set of algorithms as they use a single key for both encryption and integrity protection. However, the existing key hierarchy does not include single keys to be used by AEAD algorithms.
As described in clause 6.2 of TS 33.501 [5], the existing 5G key hierarchy is derived from... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.3.2 Security threats
| Inappropriate AEAD key derivation can lead to breach of confidentiality or integrity.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| 6GS shall support key derivation for the AEAD algorithms.
NOTE: Full key hierarchy is studied in the scope of TR 33.801-01 [7].
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.4 Key issue #4: Authenticated encryption
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.4.1.1 General
| The key issue is to analyze the potential use of mandatory integrity protection for encrypted data in order to utilize the security advantage of authenticated encryption schemes.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.4.1.2 Mandatory integrity protection for encrypted data
| The aLTEr attack on 4G [8] made the importance of integrity protection for UP clear even to the general public. In 5G, integrity protection was made possible. For 6G it needs to be evaluated whether integrity protection for encrypted UP ought to be mandatory rather than optional.
The main arguments for having no or op... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.4.1.3 Achieving authentication encryption using different mechanisms
| Authenticated encryption as a property can be achieved by simultaneous use of integrity protection (message authentication) and encryption algorithms. In 5G, authenticated encryption is achieved in PDCP and NAS protocols by invoking different combinations of the standalone algorithms.
AEAD algorithms provide authenti... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.4.2 Security threat
| Without the use of authenticated encryption, there are attacks possible such as the one described in the aLTEr [8].
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 5.4.3 Potential requirements
| TBD
5.X Key issue #X: <Key issue name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study. Not all key issues may have security threats due to the nature of this study.
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threat
Editor’s Note: Place holder for a security threat if any.
5.X.3 Pot... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause addresses potential requirements on procedures and protocols to support AEAD algorithms.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
Solution 1: NAS and AS SMC enhancement with AEAD
X
Solution 2: enhancement for security mode command
X
Solution 3: NAS SMC enhancement to support AEAD algorithms
X
Solution 4: AEAD Algorithm negotiation
X
Solution 5: A... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.1 Solution 1: NAS and AS SMC enhancement with AEAD
| Existing NAS Security mode command procedure, AS security mode procedure, RRC reconfiguration procedure is enhanced with AEAD algorithm selection.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue#1.
NAS and AS procedure (option1) – Integrity‑only AEAD for NAS/AS SMC
The approach limits exposure by protecting the security‑mode command (SMC) with integrity only, keeping the payload in clear‑text until the UE confirms the selected AEAD algorithm. This reduces processing load... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| Editor’s Note: Clarification on the reuse of the procedures is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Explanation of the purpose of sending the NAS SMC both in plaintext and encrypted is FFS.
NAS and AS procedure (option1)
Overview: With this approach, the AMF and RAN will use AEAD algorithm with NULL encryption option or integrity on... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| TBD
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation to be added.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.2 Solution 2: enhancement for security mode command
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#1: Algorithm selection. Clause 5.11.1 of TS 33.501 [5] defines algorithm identifiers for encryption and integrity protection algorithms. In NAS and AS security mode command message, these identifiers are exchanged between UE and network to decide which algorithm is used for a session. The ident... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| During the security mode command message exchange, UE sends its security capability. Based on the received security capability, network selects the algorithm and notifies to the UE. This solution proposes to split the security mode command procedures into two phases as shown in Figure 6.2.2-1.
Figure 6.2.2-1 Securit... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1 by enhancing the algorithm selection in NAS and AS Security Mode Command without rapidly consuming the limited 4‑bit identifier space defined in TS 33.501 [5].
In the first phase, the existing 4‑bit identifiers are reused for 128‑bit standalone algorithms, and a single dedicated id... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.3 Solution 3: NAS SMC enhancement to support AEAD algorithms
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Algorithm selection.
This solution proposes to take the existing NAS SMC procedure in clause 6.7.2 of TS 33.501 [5] as baseline and introduce adaption to support AEAD algorithm selection.
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acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| The enhanced NAS SMC procedure is as depicted in figure 6.3.2-1. Key modifications include introduction of algorithm identifier of AEAD algorithms and an AEAD algorithm mode indicator support for distinct ‘integrity-only’ and ‘encryption + integrity’ modes in the NAS Security Mode Command message.
Figure 6.3.2-1: En... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the requirements in KI#1.
This solution reuses the existing NAS SMC procedure by introducing AEAD algorithm identifier and mode indicator in the NAS Security Mode Command message, enabling the negotiation and activation of AEAD algorithms.
This solution maintains backwards compatibility since... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.4 Solution 4: AEAD Algorithm negotiation
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue #1. The solution lists possible AEAD algorithm negotiation for both AEAD-only and AEAD and standalone options.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| UE sends UE 6G Security capabilities to the network entity.
The network entity select AEAD algorithm based on the UE 6G Security capabilities and algorithm priority list.
AEAD-only:
The UE 6G Security capabilities only include NCA algorithms, i.e. NCA4, NCA5, NCA6.
The selected AEAD algorithm (e.g. NCA4) is indicat... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| The solution addresses the key issue #1. The solution lists possible AEAD algorithm negotiation for AEAD-only and AEAD and standalone.
For both cases, when NCA algorithm is selected for signalling protection, both the selected NCA and an additional indication on whether encryption is activated or not are signed to the... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.5 Solution 5: AEAD algorithm negotiation
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address the key issue#1 on algorithm selection.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| Each network entity (e.g., RAN, AMF) is assumed to be configured with be one list for NAS AEAD algorithms, similarly to how it is done in TS 33.501[5].
The network entity then initiates an algorithm negotiation procedure (e.g., security mode command procedure), and include the chosen algorithm. If the AEAD algorithm ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| This solution addressed the key issue#1 on algorithm selection.
The selected AEAD algorithm identifier is included in the algorithm negotiation message.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.6 Solution 6: AEAD algorithms negotiation
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes to address the security requirement of Key Issue #1.
Based on the UE security capability and network security capability, the UE and the network can negotiate the AEAD algorithms. If the AEAD algorithms are supported by both the UE and network, the network selects one AEAD algorithm for integrit... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| For AEAD algorithms negotiation, the UE provides its security capability to the network. The network selects the algorithms considering the UE security capability and the associated priority. The network provides the selected algorithms to the UE. The negotiation can be categorized into the following cases:
Case 1: T... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the security requirement of KI#1.
This solution proposes to prioritize the AEAD algorithms over the standalone algorithms. In case the security capability of the UE and the network support the AEAD algorithms, the network selects the AEAD algorithm for NAS security and the AEAD algorithm for AS... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.7 Solution 7: AEAD key usage for NAS and AS algorithm
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue#2.
Like the existing NAS algorithms and AS algorithms for integrity protection and ciphering (reference from Annex D of TS 33.501 [5]), the combined algorithm needs to be shown for the AS and NAS module usage.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.7.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.7.2-1: Derivation of MAC-I
The input parameters to the NCA (NG Combined Algorithm) algorithm are 256-bit (array of 32 bytes) security Key (example: KNASAEAD or KRRCAEAD or KUPAEAD), 32-bit NAS or PDCP COUNT (UL or DL COUNT),1 bit of MODE of 0(encrypt) or 1(decrypt), 5-bits of BEARER identity, DIRECTION bit ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| The proposed interface abstracts NCA operations as a black‑box, preserving algorithm‑independent parameter definitions. By explicitly incorporating the extra‑entropy IV field and standardized AAD handling (applicable for combined mode), it mitigates the risk of IV reuse. Solution also aligns with Annex D.2 and D.3 of T... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.8 Solution 8: Input & output definition
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#2: AEAD algorithm input and output.
The input and output for AEAD algorithm basically follow the definition of RFC 5116 [6]. It defines the input of the AEAD as 1) a secret key, 2) a nonce, 3) a plaintext, 4) the associated data, and the output as a ciphertext. The ciphertext also includes d... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.8.2 Solution details
| The input for encryption is defined as (K, N, AAD, P, ENC_ONLY).
- The key K is a secrete key only known to a sender and a receiver. Clause 6.2 of TS 33.501[5] defines the key hierarchy for 5G from long term key to algorithm keys. The key for AEAD can be defined in the similar way.
- A nonce N can be public but canno... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.9 Solution 9: Interface of AEAD
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.9.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address the key issue#2 on AEAD interface.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.9.2 Solution details
| The input parameters to the AEAD algorithm include:
• a 256-bit AEAD key named KEY,
• a 48-bit EXTRA_IV,
• a 32-bit COUNT,
• a 5-bit bearer identity BEARER,
• the 1-bit direction of the transmission i.e. DIRECTION. The DIRECTION bit shall be 0 for uplink and 1 for downlink.
• 1-bit MO... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.9.3 Evaluation
| This solution addressed the key issue#2 by proposing to use on AEAD interface, specified as is, which is based on the specified algorithm in TS 35.240[2], TS 35.243[3] and TS 35.246[4].
This solution addressed the key issue#2 by proposing to use NCA parameters, specified in TS 35.240[2], TS 35.243[3] and TS 35.246[4]... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.10.2 Solution details
| When deriving keys for AEAD algorithms, the EXTRA_IV can also be derived at the same time using an EXTRA_IV distinguisher.
NOTE: KDF uses a pseudorandom function to derive one or more secret keys from a secret value. Compared with fixed value as EXTRA_IV, the use of the KDF to generate additional pseudorandom values ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.10.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses key issue #2 on AEAD algorithm interface. Specifically, this proposal addresses the issue of the generation of EXTRA_IV for the IV input of AEAD algorithms.
This solution proposes to use a KDF for generating EXTRA_IV, other methods of generating EXTRA_IV are not within the scope of this solutio... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.11 Solution 11: Key Derivation for NAS and AS AEAD
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.11.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue#3.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.11.2 Solution details
| Keys for NAS signalling:
- KNASAEAD is a key derived for particular combined algorithm (256-NCA4/256-NCA5/256-NCA6).
Keys for UP traffic:
- KUPAEAD is a key derived for a particular combined algorithm(256-NCA4/256-NCA5/256-NCA6).
Keys for RRC signalling:
- KRRCAEAD is a key derived for a particular integrity & ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.11.3 Evaluation
| The proposed derivation method extends the existing 5G Key derivative function, by introducing dedicated AEAD type distinguishers, ensuring backward‑compatible key hierarchy while providing a single 256‑bit AEAD key per algorithm. By binding the key to both the algorithm identifier and the underlying master key (KAMF o... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.12 Solution 12: Selection of AEAD algorithms and protection of traffic
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.12.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #1, key issue #2 and key issue #3.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.12.2 Solution details
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.12.2.1 Solution Overview
| The solution uses the 5G security procedures as baseline and modifies them as described below, i.e. the solution focus on how the 5G procedures would be modified to handle the inclusion of AEAD algorithms.
The changes to the 5G security procedures are the following:
Signalling of the algorithm choice uses the exist... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.12.2.2 Algorithms selection
| Algorithm selection follows the 5G procedure with the below described changes. In particular, the bidding down used is 5G is also used with this solution, i.e. the use of the NAS SMC procedure to replay the UE capabilities to detect a man-in-the-middle attacker (similar to the 128-bit algorithm, 2 bits are used for ea... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.12.2.3 Protection of signalling or user data
| The 256-bit algorithm specifications provide 3 different algorithms, namely the integrity only, ciphering only and combined mode 256-bit algorithm for each of AES, SNOW and ZUC. The algorithm selection method above ensures that only either AES, Snow or ZUC algorithms are used to protect the data at a particular time.
... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.12.2.4 Key hierarchy changes
| This solution proposes to have a new key for when the combined mode AEAD 256-bit algorithm so that use of that algorithm is cryptographically separate from use of the ciphering only or integrity only AEAD 256-bit algorithms. This requires new values assigned in table A.8-1 of TS 33.501 [5]. Possible new values are the ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.12.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.13 Solution 13: Re-using AS security mode command for AEAD algorithm negotiation
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.13.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the requirement of key issue#1 by focusing on access stratum. This solution assumes that in 6G only AEAD algorithms will be supported. 5G procedures are used as baseline to show how the AEAD algorithm negotiation would look like in the 6G system if only AEAD algorithms are supported.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.13.2 Solution details
| It is assumed that, like done in 5G, in 6G the access stratum security mode command (AS SMC) procedure is used for RRC and UP security algorithms negotiation and RRC security activation. This solution only highlights the minor changes on top of the 5G AS SMC specified in clause 6.7.3 and 6.7.4 of TS 33.501 [5].
Each ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.13.3 Evaluation
| This solution presents how to re-use the AS SMC procedure for the negotiation of AEAD algorithms to be used in the PDCP layer and show how it becomes very simple when only AEAD algorithms are supported in the 6G system.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.14 Solution 14: AEAD Algorithm negotiation
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.14.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue #1. The solution lists possible AEAD algorithm negotiation for both AEAD-only and AEAD & standalone options.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.14.2 Solution details
| UE sends UE 6G Security capabilities to the network entity.
The network entity selects AEAD algorithm based on the UE 6G Security capabilities and algorithm priority list.
AEAD-only:
The UE 6G Security capabilities only include NCA algorithms, i.e. NCA4, NCA5, NCA6.
The selected AEAD algorithm (e.g. NCA4) is indica... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.14.3 Evaluation
| TBA.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.15 Solution 15: General principle for the AEAD inputs
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains solutions for key issues. Not all solutions may have evaluation due to the nature of this study.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.15.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue #2.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.15.2 Solution details
| When AEAD algorithms are used for NAS, AS and UP security, the following general principle applies for mapping protocol fields to AEAD inputs:
- Information that requires both confidentiality and integrity protection shall be treated as plaintext (P) and be encrypted and authenticated by the AEAD algorithm.
- Informa... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.15.3 Evaluation
| TBD
Editor’s Note: Place holder for an evaluation if necessary.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.16 Solution 16: AEAD Algorithm Interface
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.16.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address the key issue#2 on AEAD interface.
Editor’s Note: Usage of MAC_BYTES is ffs.
Editor’s Note: Analysis on complexity of partial ciphering with full integrity using NCA is ffs.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.16.2 Solution details
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.16.2.1 Generic inputs and outputs of AEAD algorithm
| The input parameters to the AEAD algorithm include:
• a 256-bit AEAD key named KEY,
• a 48-bit EXTRA_IV,
• a 32-bit COUNT,
• a 5-bit bearer identity BEARER,
• the 1-bit direction of the transmission i.e. DIRECTION. The DIRECTION bit shall be 0 for uplink and 1 for downlink.
• 1-bit MO... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.16.2.2 Guidance for using AEAD algorithm
| EXTRA_IV: May vary per message.
COUNT: NAS COUNT for NAS message, PDCP COUNT for AS message.
NOTE: COUNT usage for MAC CE protection will be discussed in TR 33.801-01 [7].
MAC_BYTES: May vary per message.
Protection Parameters: IBS, S_LENGTH, AAD, and AAD_LENGTH: May differ across messages depending on the protecti... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.16.3 Evaluation
| TBA.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.17 Solution 17: Using 256-NCAx as Cipher Algorithm
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.17.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue #2. The solution specifies the inputs to the interface of 256-NCAx so that the algorithm can be used as a pure cipher algorithm.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.17.2 Solution details
| The following are assumed:
- 256-bit AEAD key KAEAD_NAS or KPDCP has been generated and agreed upon as a result of authentication and key agreement.
NOTE 1: Single key used in 256-NCAx is denoted as KAEAD_NAS or KPDCP for NAS and for PDCP protection
- negotiation of algorithm and/or algorithm mode of operation (e.g... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.17.3 Evaluation
| Inputs and outputs of the above solution conform to the inputs and outputs as specified in TS 35.240 [2], TS 35.243 [3], and TS 35.246 [4] for 256-NCAx algorithms. No further evaluation is warranted.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.18 Solution 18: Using 256-NCAx as Integrity Algorithm
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.18.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue #2. The solution specifies the inputs to the interface of 256-NCAx so that the algorithm can be used as a pure integrity algorithm.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.18.2 Solution details
| The following are assumed:
- 256-bit AEAD key KAEAD_NAS or KPDCP has been generated and agreed upon as a result of authentication and key agreement.
NOTE 1: Single key used in 256-NCAx is denoted as KAEAD_NAS or KPDCP for NAS and for PDCP protection
- negotiation of algorithm and/or algorithm mode of operation (e.g... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.18.3 Evaluation
| Inputs and outputs of the above solution conform to the inputs and outputs as specified in TS 35.240 [2], TS 35.243 [3], and TS 35.246 [4] for 256-NCAx algorithms. No further evaluation is warranted.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.19 Solution #19: Using NCAx as cipher and integrity algorithm
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.19.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key issue #2: AEAD algorithm interface.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.19.2 Solution details
| It is assumed that key (256-bits KAEAD) has been generated and algorithm negotiation has been performed between UE and network, it is agreed to use AEAD algorithm NCAx as cipher and integrity algorithm.To use 256-NCAx as both cipher and integrity algorithm, inputs and outputs to the algorithm interface as specified in ... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.19.3 Evaluation
| Inputs and outputs of the above solution conform to the inputs and outputs as specified in TS 35.240 [2], TS 35.243 [3], and TS 35.246 [4] for 256-NCAx algorithms. No further evaluation is warranted.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.20 Solution #20: On-demand Extra-IV Value Generation
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.20.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #1 and key issue #2.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.20.2 Solution details
| During the algorithm negotiation procedure, the network can decide whether a pseudo-random number or a fixed value (e.g. 0x00) is used as the value of EXTRA_IV, based on the UE security capability and network policy (e.g. service security requirement, UE security level, etc.). Then the network notifies the way of gener... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.20.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Place holder for an evaluation if necessary.
|
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21 Solution 21: AEAD algorithm parameters
| |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the requirement of key issue #2 (AEAD algorithm interface) by following RFC 5116 [6] defined AEAD interface (it is called generic AEAD interface throughout the document) and 3GPP related parameters that are used so far in the encryption and integrity protection of the air interface.
Following t... |
acc5ac69ee9bfa7c0312897a4fb9deb2 | 33.771 | 6.21.2 Solution details
|
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