hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.1.1 Use case #1: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N47 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF and a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF is to be initiated, updated or terminated. When a failure detected between V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF, How the charging system handles the failur... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.1.2 Use case #2: Failures detected between the CTF and the H-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N47 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF and a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF is to be initiated, updated or terminated. When a failure detected between V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF. How the charging system handles the failur... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.2 Potential charging requirements
| REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-1: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-2: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the ... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3 Key issues
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3.1 Key issue #1: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-1. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement, if any, for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3.1 Key issue #2: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the H-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-2. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement, if any, for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the H-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.4 Possible solutions
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.5 Evaluation
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.6 Conclusion
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 6 Conclusions and recommendations
|
Annex <A> (informative):
PlantUML
A.1 Figures
A.1.1 Figure 5.1.4.1-1
@startuml
participant "V-SMF(CTF)" as CTF
participant "V-CHF" as VCHF
participant "H-CHF" as HCHF
CTF <--> VCHF : 1. Failures detected between the V-SMF(CTF) and the V-CHF
rnote over VCHF #white
2. V-CHF releases the resources betwee... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.2 Solution #1.2: Handling of abnormal messages received by V-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
When a Charging Data Request [Update, or Termination] received by the V-CHF, which cannot be associated to any existing charging session (i.e.... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies management aspects, with emphasis on the NRM definitions, required to provide a unified multi-RAT management interface (netconf/yang) for 4G and 5G.
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
CM Configuration Management
DM Domain Manager
IOC Information ... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 4 Concepts and background
| |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 4.1 IRP and SBMA overview
| The 3GPP management architecture has evolved across generations, reflecting a transition from interface-oriented to model-driven and service-based paradigms. Two main frameworks are currently defined in 3GPP specifications: IRP and SBMA.
The IRP framework, introduced and widely applied in legacy systems such as 4G/E-U... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 4.2 NRM in 4G and 5G
| The management specifications of 3GPP have evolved over successive generations, transitioning from the IRP–based framework used in 4G systems towards the SBMA adopted for 5G. This evolution reflects the shift from a traditional, interface-oriented management paradigm to a service-oriented and model-driven approach alig... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 4.2.1 IRP framework definitions
| The 4G management model is defined using the IRP framework, which specifies the exchange of management information between an IRPManager and an IRPAgent through standardized ISs and corresponding SS. Each managed entity is represented by an NRM, consisting of IOCs, their attributes, relationships, and behaviour.
To pr... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 4.2.2 SBMA framework definitions
| For 5G, 3GPP adopted SBMA, which enable MnS Producer to provide as MnS. This model introduces a consistent use of YANG-based data definitions to represent NRMs and their associated behaviour, improving flexibility, programmability, and interoperability.
The following tables summarize the main SBMA specifications defin... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 4.2.3 Observations
| The comparison between 4G and 5G specification sets reveals a clear continuity in structure but a major divergence in modelling technology and representation. The 4G NRMs define the necessary information objects and relationships for E-UTRAN management but do so under the IRP paradigm and with XML-based Solution Sets. ... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5 Use cases
| |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1 Use case #1: Management support for co-management of 4G nodes and 5G nodes
| |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.1 Description
| This section focuses on how legacy 4G NRMs can be represented within the SBMA. SBMA enables the exposure of management capabilities as standardized MnS, allowing NFs from different generations to interoperate under common architectural principles.
3GPP TS 28.530 [2] defines the overall structure of SBMA and its relati... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.2 Example
| To illustrate the practical implications of the gaps between IRP and SBMA models, a useful starting point is the examination of 3GPP TS 28.541 [4]. Since this specification focuses on 5G management, the content related to 4G is imported from previous releases. In particular, clause 4.1.1 of 3GPP TS 28.541 [4] lists the... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.3 Potential requirements
| REQ-UMMR_CoMgt-01: The 3GPP management system should be able to expose configuration management information of 4G nodes using SBMA-based interfaces.
REQ-UMMR_CoMgt-02: The 3GPP management system should enable an authorized consumer to retrieve and modify configuration data of both 4G and 5G nodes using consistent SBMA... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4 Potential solutions
| |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.1.2 Advantages
| • Clear separation between legacy IRP-based management and SBMA-based management.
• No modifications required to existing IRP or 5G management specifications.
• Preserves backward compatibility with existing IRP-based deployments.
• Enables SBMA-based co-management of 4G and 5G nodes.
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.1.3 Disadvantages
| • Risk of partial duplication of concepts already defined in 5G SBMA specifications.
• Requires careful alignment with existing 5G SBMA models to avoid inconsistencies.
• Introduces an additional specification that must be maintained independently.
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.2 Solution #2: Extension of existing 5G management specifications with SBMA-based support for 4G nodes
| 5.1.4.2.1 Description
This solution considers extending existing 5G management specifications, such as 3GPP TS 28.540 [3] and 3GPP TS 28.541 [4], to include SBMA-based configuration management definitions for 4G nodes.
By introducing the missing SBMA representations for 4G NRMs within the existing 5G specification f... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.2.2 Advantages
| • Provides a single specification framework for SBMA-based management across multiple RAT generations.
• Enables direct reuse of existing SBMA mechanisms without additional specifications.
• Simplifies reference handling for implementers using a single specification set.
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.2.3 Disadvantages
| • Increases the complexity and size of already extensive 5G management specifications.
• Makes the specifications more difficult to read, navigate and maintain.
• Mixes management definitions for different RAT generations, potentially reducing clarity.
• Increases the risk of unintended side effects ... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.3 Solution #3: Extension of existing IRP specifications with SBMA-based representations
| 5.1.4.3.1 Description
This solution considers extending existing IRP-based management specifications to include SBMA-based representations of 4G NRMs. YANG and OpenAPI based definitions would be introduced alongside the existing IRP Information Services and Solution Sets within the same specifications, enabling SBMA-... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.3.2 Advantages
| • Preserves close alignment with existing 4G IRP specifications.
• Maintains backward compatibility with current IRP-based management deployments.
• Avoids the need for new standalone specifications.
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.3.3 Disadvantages
| • Introduces multiple management paradigms (IRP-based and SBMA-based) within the same specifications.
• Further increases the complexity of IRP specifications, which already include management definitions spanning multiple generations (e.g. 3G and 4G).
• Blurs architectural boundaries between legacy and s... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.4 Solution #4: Introduction of a delta specification aligned with 3GPP TS 28.541
| 5.1.4.4.1 Description
This solution considers the introduction of a new 3GPP specification that provides SBMA-based configuration management support for 4G nodes as a delta to the existing 5G SBMA framework defined in 3GPP TS 28.540 [3] and 3GPP TS 28.541 [4].
The new specification would not duplicate existing SBMA ... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.4.2 Advantages
| • Maintains a clean separation between 4G and 5G management specifications.
• Avoids duplication of SBMA concepts already defined in 3GPP TS 28.541 [4].
• Provides a clear and modular extension path aligned with the existing SBMA framework.
• Limits the impact on existing IRP and 5G management specif... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.4.3 Disadvantages
| • Introduces an additional 3GPP specification.
• Requires clear definition of dependencies and normative references between specifications.
• Implementation guidelines must ensure consistent interpretation across specifications.
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.5 Evaluation of potential solutions
| TBD
|
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.2 Use Case #2: Scope of SBMA-based configuration management for 4G nodes
| |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.2.1 Description
| This use case focuses on clarifying the scope of CM capabilities to be supported for 4G nodes when managed through SBMA-based interfaces under UMMR. While UMMR aims at enabling unified management across generations, CM in 4G and 5G is specified using different abstractions and functional decompositions.
In legacy 4G s... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.2.2 Examples
| In 4G, CM capabilities are specified through different IRPs, including:
• Basic CM, as specified in 3GPP TS 32.612 [14];
• Bulk CM, as specified in 3GPP TS 32.615 [15].
In the SBMA framework, equivalent CM capabilities are exposed through different MnS:
• Basic CM capabilities can be supported using the... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.2.3 Potential requirements
| REQ-UMMR_CM-01: The 3GPP management system should clearly define the scope of CM capabilities to be supported for 4G nodes when exposed through SBMA-based interfaces.
REQ-UMMR_CM-02: The 3GPP management system should identify the SBMA-based MnS required to provide functionally equivalent CM capabilities for 4G nodes, ... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.2.4 Potential solutions
| 5.2.4.1 Solution #1: Limited SBMA-based CM scope
This solution considers supporting a limited subset of CM capabilities for 4G nodes through SBMA-based interfaces, focusing on basic CM use cases. Under this approach, Generic Provisioning MnS would be used to expose configuration data, while bulk CM and other advanced ... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.2.5 Evaluation of potential solutions
| Solution #1 limits the scope of SBMA-based CM for 4G nodes and minimizes the number of MnS required. This approach reduces complexity and avoids overextending the scope of UMMR but may result in partial coverage of existing 4G CM use cases.
Solution #2 provides broader CM coverage by supporting both basic and bulk CM ... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 6 Conclusions and recommendations
| Editor's Note: This clause captures the conclusions and the recommendations of the study.
Annex X (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5#163
S5-254377
Initial skeleton
0.0.1
S5-254730
Scope
2025-11
SA5#164... |
96067bd5084d8ab47b84037f2ede3244 | 28.892 | 5.1.4.1 Solution #1: Introduction of a new standalone specification for SBMA-based management support of 4G nodes
| 5.1.4.1.1 Description
This solution considers the introduction of a new dedicated 3GPP specification defining SBMA-based configuration management support for 4G nodes. The specification would include the necessary SBMA-related definitions, such as YANG and OpenAPI based representations and the exposure of correspondi... |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 1 Scope
| The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the NR Femto Security Gateway (SeGW) network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptations of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requi... |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
|
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 3.2 Symbols
| Void.
|
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
SeGW Security Gateway
|
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4 SeGW-specific security requirements and related test cases
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.1 Introduction
| NR Femto SeGW-specific security requirements include both requirements derived from NR Femto SeGW-specific security functional requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to NR Femto SeGW as described in TR 33.926 [3]. Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network ... |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.2 SeGW-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.2.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains SeGW-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.
|
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the SeGW deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.2.2.0 General
| The general approach in TS 33.117 [2] clause 4.2.2.1 applies to the SeGW network product class.
4.2.2.1. Location verification
Requirement Name: TC_LOCATION_VERIFICATION
Requirement Reference: TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.4.1
Requirement Description:
The SeGW can act as the verifying node to perform the location veri... |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.2.3 Technical Baseline
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.2.4 Operating systems
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.2.5 Web servers
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.2.6 Network devices
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.3 SeGW-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.3.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains SeGW-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
|
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.3.2 Technical Baseline
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.3.3 Operating Systems
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.3.4 Web Servers
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.3.5 Network Devices
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture
| |
f78340f1b02e22fa05f6e5716359560a | 33.547 | 4.4 SeGW-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases
| Annex <X> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253632
TS skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253768
S3-253767, S3-253442, S3-253425, S3-253771
0.1.0
2025-11
SA3#125
S3-254533
S3-254637,S3-254734 ... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 1 Scope
| The present document investigates the following security enhancement for CAPIF:
• New possible security requirements for new functionalities in CAPIF introduced in TR 23.700-43[4];
• Whether and how to address open security issue specified in TS 23.222[2] during Rel-19 and not yet analysed in TS 33.122[3]. Sp... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 4 High-level architectures
| TS 33.122[3] provides security architecture for CAPIF based on the architecture specified in TS 23.222[2]. The security architecture in TS 33.122 [3] is the baseline of the present document. The procedures of section 8.34 and 8.38 of TS 23.222[2] are the basis for the solutions of this document.
Editor’s note: New pos... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5 Key issues
| |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.1 Key issue #1: Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
| |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| The procedure specified in clause 8.34 of TS 23.222 [2] enable a UE-hosted API invoker accessing network-hosted resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group. According to clause 8.34.2 of TS 23.222 [2], the security aspect of that procedure is left with the following note:
"NOTE: The security aspects of ... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.1.2 Threats
| Without proper authorization mechanism, an unauthorized API invoker can claim membership in a privileged group to access resources of UEs within that group, resulting in information leakage and unauthorized modification to the resources of the resource owner.
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The CCF should support authorization of a UE-hosted API invoker accessing resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group.
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.2 Key issue #2: Security for open discover service API
| |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| As specified in TS 23.222[2], the requestor which doesn’t register to the CAPIF can discover service API from CCF. There is a NOTE:
NOTE: The security aspects of this procedure are unspecified in this release of the specification.
The existing security mechanism specified in TS 33.122[3] does not discuss the security... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.2.2 Threats
| Without proper protection mechanism, the API invoker may obtain sensitive service API information beyond its permission.
An attacker impersonating the CCF can send wrong information to the Requestor about the service APIs.
An attacker between the CCF and the Requestor can access to the information about the service ... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| CAPIF should support authentication of CCF by the requestor.
CAPIF should support authorization for the requestor not recognized by CAPIF to discover sensitive API information through service API from CCF.
CAPIF should support confidentiality, integrity protection, and replay protection for the secure communication b... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.3 Key issue #3: More granular authorization based on purpose information
| |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| The purpose for data processing has been captured in TS 23.222 [2] in authorization, but it has not been addressed in TS 33.122 [3]. With the lack of more granular authorization based on purpose information, it will not be possible for the resource owner to give permission for data sharing only for some specific purpos... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.3.2 Threats
| The API Invoker can access to the resources of the resource owner for any purposes. This can lead to a threat of unauthorized access.
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| CAPIF RNAA should support the usage of purpose information in authorization and authorization revocation of the API Invoker to access the resources of the resource owner.
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.4 Key Issue #4: Study on security aspects of Credentials unavailability
| |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| KI#3 in TR 23.700-43 [4] aims to study how to manage entities which do not have access to their CCF provided certificate.
Due to the nature of the study around security credentials and their management, it is proposed to study such aspect in SA3. In particular, this key issue focuses on the unavailability of the API ... |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.4.2 Threats
| - The API invoker cannot communicate with the CCF anymore if its certificate stored in the API profile in the CCF is expired or revoked, or if API invoker loses access to its valid certificate.
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 5.4.3 Potential security requirements
|
- CAPIF should provide mechanisms to address certificate unavailability issue at API invoker.
5.X Key issue #X: <Title>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6 Proposed solutions
| |
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
Solution #1
X
Solution #2
X
Solution #3
X
Solution #4
X
Solution #5
X
Solution #6
X
Solution #7
X
Solution #8
X
Solution #9
X
Solution #10
X
Solution #11
X
|
3a3e73bc7987fdac628c206ceffa8d3c | 33.700-23 | 6.1 Solution #1: Addressing security aspects of "UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group" procedure
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.