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5.3.2.5.10 Pod Spec/Manifest Modification
- Threat Name: Pod Spec/Manifest Modification - Threat Category: Tampering - Threat Description: An attacker who alters deployment manifests or pod specifications can modify pod configurations to add elevated capabilities, host mounts, or enable privileged mode. This manipulation enables the attacker to bypass contai...
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5.3.2.5.11 File Tampering inside Containers
- Threat Name: File Tampering inside Containers - Threat Category: Tampering - Threat Description: An attacker who gains access to a container with writable filesystem layers can modify container files if read-only enforcement is not applied. Such tampering allows insertion or alteration of binaries, scripts, or conf...
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5.3.2.6 Repudiation
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5.3.2.6.1 Lack of User Activity Trace
The threat in clause 5.3.5.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.6.2 Lack of Container-Level Audit Logging
- Threat Name: Lack of Container-Level Audit Logging - Threat Category: Repudiation - Threat Description: Absence of comprehensive audit logs for container-related events - such as container start/stop, image pulls, and capability assignments - creates a blind spot in monitoring and security. Without these logs, it b...
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5.3.2.6.3 Orchestrator Audit Logs Disabled
- Threat Name: Orchestrator Audit Logs Disabled - Threat Category: Repudiation - Threat Description: When Kubernetes orchestrator audit logs are disabled or not properly configured, it becomes impossible to prove or track actions taken via kubectl commands or API requests. This lack of audit trail severely undermines...
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5.3.2.7 Information disclosure
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5.3.2.7.1 Poor key generation
The threat in clause 5.3.6.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.2 Poor key management
The threat in clause 5.3.6.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.3 Weak cryptographic algorithms
The threat in clause 5.3.6.3 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.4 Insecure Data Storage
- Threat name: Insecure Data Storage - Threat Category: Information Disclosure - Threat Description: The GCNP remotely stores sensitive data (e.g. passwords, private keys) on the logical volume that the orchestrator allocates to the GCNP. An attacker can retrieve these data if they have been stored in an insecure way...
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5.3.2.7.5 System Fingerprinting
The threat in clause 5.3.6.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.6 Malware
- Threat name: Malware. - Threat Category: Information Disclosure. - Threat Description: A malware installed on the logical volume that the orchestrator allocates to the GCNP can access to the stored sensitive data (e.g. subscription data, logs). - Threatened Asset: any sensitive data stored on the logical volume of...
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5.3.2.7.7 Personal Identification Information Violation
The threat in clause 5.3.6.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.8 Insecure Default Configuration
The threat in clause 5.3.6.8 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.9 File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse
The threat in clause 5.3.6.9 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.10 Insecure Network Services
The threat in clause 5.3.6.10 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.11 Unnecessary Services
The threat in clause 5.3.6.11 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.12 Log Disclosure
The threat in clause 5.3.6.12 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.13 Unnecessary Applications
The threat in clause 5.3.6.13 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.14 Eavesdropping
The threat in clause 5.3.6.14 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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5.3.2.7.15 Security threat caused by lack of GCNP traffic isolation
The threat in clause 5.3.6.15 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP with the following addition: - Threat name: Security threat caused by lack of GCNP traffic isolation. - Threat Category: Information Disclosure. - Threat Description: Absence or misconfiguration of network traffic isolation within the GCNP (Global Conta...
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5.3.2.7.16 Secrets in Environment Variables
- Threat name: Secrets in Environment Variables. - Threat Category: Information Disclosure. - Threat Description: Storing secrets such as credentials or tokens in environment variables exposes them to significant security risks. These secrets are easily accessible by anyone with access to the container or node since...
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5.3.2.7.17 Secrets in Image Layers
- Threat name: Secrets in Image Layers - Threat Category: Information Disclosure. - Threat Description: Embedding secrets, such as private keys or credentials, within container image layers exposes them to anyone who can pull or inspect the image. Even if later removed in newer layers, these secrets remain retrievab...
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5.3.2.8 Denial of Service
The threats in all clauses of clause 5.3.7 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GCNP. In addition, the following threats apply to GCNP.
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5.3.2.8.1 Resource Starvation via Orchestration
- Threat name: Resource Starvation via Orchestration - Threat Category: Denial of Service. - Threat Description: An attacker who orchestrates pods with excessive CPU and memory requests can deliberately exhaust cluster resources, causing denial of service across workloads. By scheduling malicious pods that consume d...
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5.3.2.8.2 Container Spawn Storm
- Threat name: Container Spawn Storm - Threat Category: Denial of Service. - Threat Description: An attacker who abuses the ability to create large numbers of pods or containers can overwhelm cluster resources, causing performance degradation, service disruption, and denial of service. By rapidly spawning excessive ...
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5.3.2.8.3 DoS via Log Volume
- Threat name: DoS via Log Volume - Threat Category: Denial of Service. - Threat Description: An attacker generates excessive container logs to fill storage resources, causing denial of service by exhausting disk space or overwhelming log processing systems. This attack can disrupt cluster operations, block legitima...
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5.3.2.9 Elevation of privilege
All threats in clause 5.3.8 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GCNP. In addition, the following threats apply to GCNP:
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5.3.2.9.1 Abuse of Linux Capabilities
- Threat name: Abuse of Linux Capabilities - Threat Category: Elevation of privilege - Threat Description: An attacker who exploits excessive or unnecessary Linux capabilities (e.g. CAP_SYS_ADMIN) granted to a container can escalate privileges beyond the intended scope. Linux capabilities break down root privileges ...
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5.3.2.9.2 Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
- Threat name: Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration - Threat Category: Elevation of privilege - Threat Description: An attacker who exploits RBAC misconfiguration in a Kubernetes cluster can create pods with elevated privileges by assigning themselves roles or permissions beyond their intended sco...
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5.3.2.9.3 Running as Root inside Containers
- Threat name: Running as Root inside Containers - Threat Category: Elevation of privilege - Threat Description: When containers run with root user privileges by default, attackers who compromise such containers gain powerful capabilities that facilitate exploitation of container breakout vulnerabilities. Root execu...
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5.3.2.9.4 Use of Privileged Containers
- Threat name: Use of Privileged Containers - Threat Category: Elevation of privilege - Threat Description: Allowing containers to run in privileged mode grants them nearly unrestricted access to the host system, effectively bypassing key security mechanisms and container isolation. This elevated access enables an a...
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5.3.2.10 Generic assets and threats for network functions supporting SBA interfaces
The assets and threats for containerized network functions supporting SBA interface are the same as the assets and threats specified in clause 6 for TR 33.926 [2].
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6 Test cases for Container-based Products
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6.1 Analysis of existing general test cases
The following table lists all test cases present in TS 33.117 [4] and states their applicability for GCNP. All test cases marked with „applicable“ do not need any further work and can be applied for GCNP. Section Nr Section Title Test Name Applicability for GCNP 4.2.2.2.2 Protection at the transport layer TC_PR...
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6.1.1 Security functional requirements deriving from containerization and related test cases
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6.1.1.1 Security non-functional requirements related to passwords
All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.2.3.4.3 applies to containerized elements.
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6.1.1.2 Security requirements related to logging
All text from TS 33.117 [1], clauses 4.2.3.6.1, 4.2.3.6.2 and 4.2.3.6.3 apply to containerized elements. Requirement Name: Logs from containerized functions are available Requirement Description: The containerized NF shall provide sufficient logging mechanisms (e.g., stdout/stderr container logs, audit logs, orches...
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6.1.1.3 Using trusted image repositories for container image handling
Requirement Name: Securing container function source by using trusted image repositories Requirement Description: The containerized NF shall use trusted/private source image repositories while building the container image. Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_IMAGE_REPOSITORIES Purpose: Ensure that containers are built ...
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6.1.1.4 Vulnerability scanning for containerized NF
All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.4.3 applies to containerized elements. Because of the nature of containerized applications and their high dependency on 3rd party software specific vulnerability scanning tools need to be used. Therefore, the test case TC_BVT_VULNERABILITY_SCANNING specified in 4.4.3 need to be enh...
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6.1.1.5 Containerized NF run-time security
Requirement Name: Securing container functions by configuration and hardening testing Requirement Description: The containerized NF shall not contain any known misconfigurations. Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_CONFIGURATION Purpose: Ensure proper Security hardening was performed. Apart from vulnerability scan of c...
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6.1.1.6 Data protection in containerized NF
All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.2.3.2.3 applies to containerized elements. Encryption at-rest, in-transit shall be applied for control plane and data plane. Secrets, credentials, keys shall be securely stored in secure way, and the access rights to those secrets, credential, keys shall be restricted rather than k...
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6.2 Potential new test cases for GCNP
The following table lists potential new test cases for GCNP currently not covered by existing test cases. Test Name Purpose Threat Reference TC_CNF_NO_EXPOSED_CONTAINERIZATION_API Ensure kube-API / container runtime sockets aren’t reachable from workloads. Related to “Exposed Containerization API” threat. Expose...
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7 Conclusions
Editor's Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work. Annex A: Change history Change history Date Meeting TDoc CR Rev Cat Subject/Comment New version 2025-08 SA3#123 TR skeleton 0.0.0 2025-08 SA3#123 S3-253038 Incorporating skeleto...
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2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. - References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific. - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. -...
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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3.2 Symbols
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: <symbol> <Explanation>
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3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. <ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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4 Overview
Editor’s Note: This clause includes the overview of the study.
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5 Best practices and counter measures analysis
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5.1 BSP#1: Access token privilege restriction
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5.1.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses access token privilege restriction, as described in clause 2.3 of RFC 9700 [2]. Access token privileges should be limited to the minimum required for a particular use case. Thus, access tokens should be audience-restricted to a specific resource server or a small set of resource servers.
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5.1.2 Usage in 5G SBA
Reference: clause 14.3.2 of TS 33.501 [3] Access tokens are mandatorily audience-restricted using the "audience" claim. Audience includes the NF type of the NF Service Producers, or one or several NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer, potentially appended with PLMN ID (or SNPN ID). Access tokens are...
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5.1.3 Assessment
Token-based authorization relies on "audience", "scope", and "additional scope" as specified in clause 13 of TS 33.501 [3] and other use case specific claims, for example as specified in Annex X of TS 33.501 [3], to restrict the privileges of issued access tokens. Access token privilege restriction applies to 5G SBA a...
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5.2 BSP #2: Token replay prevention
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5.2.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses token replay prevention as specified in clause 2.2 of RFC 9700 [2] OAuth2.0 security best current practice. The RFC 9700 [2] cover access token and refresh token under token replay prevention. Both type of token can be replayed hence replay prevention of it is necessary.
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5.2.2 Usage in 5G SBA
Refresh token are not utilised and applicable to 5G SBA. In the 5G SBA, access tokens are bound to mTLS authentication state between the network functions, these checks are made either at the discovery, access token request or service request. Reference: 13.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.501 [3]: Where the access tokens request ...
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5.2.3 Assessment
Though comparison of NFc Instance ID in the "sub" and subjectAltName in the NFc client certificate may be sufficient for the case of direct communication, For indirect communication being hop-by-hop in nature, mTLS cannot be used to link the access token with mTLS authentication state as a result, there is no reliabl...
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5.3 BSP #3: Client Authentication
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5.3.1 Description of best practice
This best practice covers Client Authentication as specified in clause 2.5 of RFC 9700 [2] OAuth2.0 security best current practice. The clause does highlight the need to authenticate the client with the authorization server.
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5.3.2 Usage in 5G SBA
Reference: 13.3.1.1 and 13.3.2.1 of TS 33.501 [3]: For direct communication the aforementioned clause in the specification states that interaction between (NF – NRF) or (NF-NF) authenticates each other during discovery, registration, and access token request. This authentication is performed by comparing the NF insta...
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5.3.3 Assessment
As highlighted in clause 13.3.2.2 of TS 33.501 [3] mTLS based authentication in indirect communication is not achieved because of by hop-by-hop security. Thus, there is no means to verify that an CCA token request sent by SCP on behalf of a certain NF Service Consumer, is actually authorized by this consumer as specifi...
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5.4 BSP#4: Protecting Redirect-Based Flows
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5.4.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses protecting redirect-based flows, as described in clause 2.1 of RFC 9700 [2].
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5.4.2 Usage in 5G SBA
There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
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5.4.3 Assessment
Redirect-Based Flows are OAuth 2.0 authorization flows where the client is redirected through the browser to the authorization server to authenticate and grant access, and the authorization result is returned via a redirect back to the client. Redirect-Based Flows as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no fu...
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5.5 BSP#5: Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
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5.5.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant, as described in clause 2.4 of RFC 9700 [2].
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5.5.2 Usage in 5G SBA
There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
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5.5.3 Assessment
The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant is an OAuth 2.0 flow where the client directly uses the user’s username and password to obtain an access token, typically only used in highly trusted scenarios. Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigat...
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5.6 BSP#6: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata
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5.6.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata, as described in clause 2.6 of RFC 9700 [2]. Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
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5.6.2 Usage in 5G SBA
There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
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5.6.3 Assessment
Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
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5.7 BSP#7: Termination of TLS at intermediary
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5.7.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses Termination of TLS at intermediary, as described in clause 2.6 and clause 4.13 of RFC 9700 [2].
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5.7.2 Usage in 5G SBA
There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
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5.7.3 Assessment
Termination of TLS at intermediary that act as reverse proxy on upper layer is a mechanism that is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
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5.8 BSP#8: Cross origin resource sharing (authorization endpoint)
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5.8.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses Cross origin resource sharing (authorization endpoint), as described in clause 2.6 of RFC 9700 [2]. Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
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5.8.2 Usage in 5G SBA
There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
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5.8.3 Assessment
Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
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5.9 BSP#9: Insufficient Redirection URI Validation
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5.9.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses Insufficient Redirection URI Validation, as described in clause 4.1 of RFC 9700 [2]. Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
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5.9.2 Usage in 5G SBA
There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
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5.9.3 Assessment
Redirection URI as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
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5.10 BSP#10: Credential Leakage via Referer Headers
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5.10.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses potential credential leakage via Referer headers, as described in clause 4.2 of RFC 9700 [2]. Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
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5.10.2 Usage in 5G SBA
There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
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5.10.3 Assessment
Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
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5.11 BSP#11: Credential Leakage via Browser History
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5.11.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses potential credential leakage via browser history, as described in clause 4.2 of RFC 9700 [2]. Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
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5.11.2 Usage in 5G SBA
There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
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5.11.3 Assessment
This practice is applicable to clients using a browser-based authorization and is not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.
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5.12 BSP#12: Mix-Up Attacks
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5.12.1 Description of best practice
This best practice addresses Mix-Up attacks, as described in clause 4.4 of RFC 9700 [2]. Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
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5.12.2 Usage in 5G SBA
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
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5.12.3 Assessment
This practice is applicable to only implicit or authorization code grant types which is not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.