hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.1 Poor key generation
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.2 Poor key management
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.3 Weak cryptographic algorithms
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.3 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.4 Insecure Data Storage
| - Threat name: Insecure Data Storage
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure
- Threat Description: The GCNP remotely stores sensitive data (e.g. passwords, private keys) on the logical volume that the orchestrator allocates to the GCNP. An attacker can retrieve these data if they have been stored in an insecure way (e.g. clear text, unsalted hashes).
- Threatened Asset: any sensitive data stored on the logical volume of the GCNP
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.5 System Fingerprinting
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.6 Malware
| - Threat name: Malware.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: A malware installed on the logical volume that the orchestrator allocates to the GCNP can access to the stored sensitive data (e.g. subscription data, logs).
- Threatened Asset: any sensitive data stored on the logical volume of the GCNP
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.7 Personal Identification Information Violation
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.8 Insecure Default Configuration
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.8 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.9 File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.9 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.10 Insecure Network Services
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.10 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.11 Unnecessary Services
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.11 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.12 Log Disclosure
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.12 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.13 Unnecessary Applications
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.13 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.14 Eavesdropping
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.14 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.15 Security threat caused by lack of GCNP traffic isolation
| The threat in clause 5.3.6.15 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP with the following addition:
- Threat name: Security threat caused by lack of GCNP traffic isolation.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Absence or misconfiguration of network traffic isolation within the GCNP (Global Container Network Platform) can lead to unauthorized visibility and access to network communications between containers, pods, or services. Without proper isolation mechanisms - such as Kubernetes Network Policies, namespace segmentation, or service mesh controls - traffic can flow freely across workloads that should be isolated. This exposes sensitive data in transit, increases the risk of eavesdropping, data leakage, and lateral movement by malicious actors who compromise one component of the cluster. Attackers may intercept unencrypted or unauthorized traffic, gain insights into internal service architectures, and exploit this information to escalate attacks or exfiltrate confidential information. Effective traffic isolation is critical to maintaining confidentiality and limiting the blast radius of breaches especially in multi-tenant or complex microservices environments.
- Threatened Asset: inter-pod/network traffic confidentiality
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.16 Secrets in Environment Variables
| - Threat name: Secrets in Environment Variables.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Storing secrets such as credentials or tokens in environment variables exposes them to significant security risks. These secrets are easily accessible by anyone with access to the container or node since environment variables can be inspected inside the container, appear in pod specs, and may be exposed in logs or debugging output. This exposure increases the chance of credential leakage, unauthorized access, and lateral movement within the cluster. Additionally, environment variables typically lack encryption at rest and in transit, have poor auditability, and are difficult to rotate once compromised, further exacerbating the risk. Attackers who access these environment variables can use the exposed secrets to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
- Threatened Asset: container runtime secrets
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.7.17 Secrets in Image Layers
| - Threat name: Secrets in Image Layers
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Embedding secrets, such as private keys or credentials, within container image layers exposes them to anyone who can pull or inspect the image. Even if later removed in newer layers, these secrets remain retrievable from image history. Attackers gaining access to these secrets can authenticate to sensitive systems, bypass security controls, and potentially compromise the wider environment. This risk is heightened when images are stored in public or unsecured registries without proper scanning or scrubbing.
- Threatened Asset: embedded image secrets
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.8 Denial of Service
| The threats in all clauses of clause 5.3.7 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GCNP.
In addition, the following threats apply to GCNP.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.8.1 Resource Starvation via Orchestration
| - Threat name: Resource Starvation via Orchestration
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker who orchestrates pods with excessive CPU and memory requests can deliberately exhaust cluster resources, causing denial of service across workloads. By scheduling malicious pods that consume disproportionate compute or memory resources without proper limits, the attacker starves legitimate applications of critical resources, leading to degraded performance, application crashes, or total service unavailability. This threat is amplified in environments lacking resource quotas, limits, or proper orchestration policies, and can also drive up cloud costs through unnecessary autoscaling. Such attacks impact cluster stability, availability, and reliability, making resource management and enforcement crucial to mitigating risk.
- Threatened Asset: cluster resource availability
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.8.2 Container Spawn Storm
| - Threat name: Container Spawn Storm
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker who abuses the ability to create large numbers of pods or containers can overwhelm cluster resources, causing performance degradation, service disruption, and denial of service. By rapidly spawning excessive pods without proper controls or limits, the attacker exhausts CPU, memory, network, and orchestration resources, destabilizing the Kubernetes environment. This attack may also increase cloud infrastructure costs due to uncontrolled scaling. The threat is particularly severe in clusters lacking effective resource quotas, rate limiting, or admission controls, enabling the attacker to degrade availability or cause outages across multiple applications and services.
- Threatened Asset: cluster orchestration capacity
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.8.3 DoS via Log Volume
| - Threat name: DoS via Log Volume
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker generates excessive container logs to fill storage resources, causing denial of service by exhausting disk space or overwhelming log processing systems. This attack can disrupt cluster operations, block legitimate logging and monitoring, and hinder incident detection and response. Without controls like log rate limiting, retention policies, or alerting on unusual log volumes, excessive logging can degrade cluster performance, cause service outages, and increase operational costs. This threat is especially impactful in busy Kubernetes environments where logs are critical for security and operational visibility.
- Threatened Asset: storage and logging subsystems
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9 Elevation of privilege
| All threats in clause 5.3.8 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GCNP.
In addition, the following threats apply to GCNP:
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9.1 Abuse of Linux Capabilities
| - Threat name: Abuse of Linux Capabilities
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: An attacker who exploits excessive or unnecessary Linux capabilities (e.g. CAP_SYS_ADMIN) granted to a container can escalate privileges beyond the intended scope. Linux capabilities break down root privileges into fine-grained permissions, and when improperly assigned or not dropped, they enable a compromised container process to perform privileged actions such as modifying system configurations, accessing sensitive kernel interfaces, or escaping container isolation. This abuse can lead to full host compromise, lateral movement within the cluster, or persistent control over the Kubernetes environment. The risk increases when containers run with default or elevated capabilities without careful restriction, lacking security context settings like dropping all unused capabilities or disabling privilege escalation mechanisms. Properly restricting Linux capabilities and using Kubernetes securityContext controls (e.g., allowPrivilegeEscalation: false) is critical to mitigating this threat.
- Threatened Asset: host and container privilege boundaries
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9.2 Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
| - Threat name: Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: An attacker who exploits RBAC misconfiguration in a Kubernetes cluster can create pods with elevated privileges by assigning themselves roles or permissions beyond their intended scope. Misconfigured role-based access control (RBAC) settings may allow an attacker to create or modify roles and role bindings that grant them the ability to launch pods with privileged settings, such as adding capabilities, mounting host filesystems, or running in privileged mode. This can lead to container breakout, host compromise, lateral movement within the cluster, and full cluster takeover. The risk is particularly high when the attacker is allowed the escalate permission on roles or clusterroles, enabling them to escalate privileges beyond their assigned limitations.
- Threatened Asset: RBAC and orchestration policies
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9.3 Running as Root inside Containers
| - Threat name: Running as Root inside Containers
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: When containers run with root user privileges by default, attackers who compromise such containers gain powerful capabilities that facilitate exploitation of container breakout vulnerabilities. Root execution inside containers enables attackers to perform privileged operations, bypass container isolation, manipulate kernel interfaces, and potentially escape to the host system. This gives them the ability to gain full root access on the underlying host, escalate privileges within the cluster, and control critical resources. Running containers as root increases the risk surface for attacks leveraging known and unknown kernel or runtime vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code with minimal restrictions and achieve persistent control over the Kubernetes environment.
- Threatened Asset: container isolation enforcement
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.9.4 Use of Privileged Containers
| - Threat name: Use of Privileged Containers
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: Allowing containers to run in privileged mode grants them nearly unrestricted access to the host system, effectively bypassing key security mechanisms and container isolation. This elevated access enables an attacker who compromises such a container to interact directly with the host kernel, modify system files, and access sensitive data on the host and other workloads. Privileged containers can facilitate container escape, lateral movement, and full host takeover, significantly expanding the attacker’s capabilities. Running containers as privileged violates the principle of least privilege and greatly increases the risk of privilege escalation, cluster compromise, and persistence of malicious activity.
- Threatened Asset: host and cluster security controls
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 5.3.2.10 Generic assets and threats for network functions supporting SBA interfaces
| The assets and threats for containerized network functions supporting SBA interface are the same as the assets and threats specified in clause 6 for TR 33.926 [2].
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6 Test cases for Container-based Products
| |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.1 Analysis of existing general test cases
| The following table lists all test cases present in TS 33.117 [4] and states their applicability for GCNP.
All test cases marked with „applicable“ do not need any further work and can be applied for GCNP.
Section Nr
Section Title
Test Name
Applicability for GCNP
4.2.2.2.2
Protection at the transport layer
TC_PROTECT_TRANSPORT_LAYER
applicable
4.2.2.2.3.1
Authorization token verification failure handling within one PLMN
TC_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_VERIFICATION_FAILURE_ONE_PLMN
applicable
4.2.2.2.3.2
Authorization token verification failure handling in different PLMNs
TC_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_VERIFICATION_FAILURE_DIFF_PLMN
applicable
4.2.2.2.4.1
Correct handling of client credentials assertion validation failure
TC_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_ASSERTION_VALIDATION
applicable
4.2.3.2.2
Protecting data and information -- Confidential System Internal Data
TC_CONFIDENTIAL_SYSTEM_INTERNAL_DATA
applicable
4.2.3.2.3
Protecting data and information in storage
TC_PSW_STOR_SUPPORT
applicable
4.2.3.2.4
Protecting data and information in transfer
TC_PROTECT_DATA_INFO_TRANSFER_1
applicable
4.2.3.2.5
Logging access to personal data
TC_LOGGING_ACCESS_TO_PERSONAL_DATA
applicable
4.2.3.3.2
Boot from intended memory devices only
TC_BOOT_INT_MEM_1
N/A
4.2.3.3.3
System handling during excessive overload situations
TC_SYSTEM_HANDLING_OF_OVERLOAD_SITUATIONS
applicable
4.2.3.3.5
Network Product software package integrity
TC_SW_PKG_INTEGRITY_1
Adaptation or new test case needed
Keep the same intent but validate signed OCI images/Helm charts at pull/admission time; ensure only authorized principals can change trust roots/admission policies (e.g., imagePolicyWebhook).
Validate provenance and signature of container base images as well as application layers
4.2.3.4.1.1
Successful authentication and authorization of system functions
TC_SYS_FUN_USAGE
applicable
4.2.3.4.1.2
Unambiguous identification of the user
TC_ACCOUNT_DOCUMENTATION
applicable
4.2.3.4.1.2
Unambiguous identification of the user
TC_ACCOUNT_DEFAULTS
applicable
4.2.3.4.1.2
Unambiguous identification of the user
TC_ACCOUNT_NUMBER
applicable
4.2.3.4.2.1
Account protection by at least one authentication attribute.
TC_ACCOUNT_PROTECTION
applicable
4.2.3.4.2.2
Deletion or disablement of predefined accounts
TC_PREDEFINED_ACCOUNT_DELETION
Adaptation needed
Check for predefined user accounts, service accounts, and default credentials present in container images or orchestration manifests.
Editor’s Note: It is needed to clarify whether certificate is a kind of credentials.
4.2.3.4.2.3
Deletion or disablement of predefined or default authentication attributes.
TC_PREDEFINED_AUTHENTICATION_ATTRIBUTES_DELETION
Adaptation needed
Instead of only checking for default passwords or keys on the network product’s host OS, the tester inspects container images and orchestration configuration for predefined authentication attributes, like e.g. API keys, tokens ...
Any such attributes should either:
• Trigger a forced change/rotation at first use or deployment, or
• Be replaced with dynamically generated secrets at runtime via a secure secret management mechanism.
4.2.3.4.3.1
Password Structure
TC_PASSWORD_STRUCT
applicable
4.2.3.4.3.2
Password changes
TC_PASSWORD_CHANGES
applicable
4.2.3.4.3.3
Protection against brute force and dictionary attacks
TC_PROTECT_AGAINST_BRUTE_FORCE_AND_DICTIONARY_ATTACKS
applicable
4.2.3.4.3.4
Hiding password display
TC_HIDING_PASSWORD_DISPLAY
applicable
4.2.3.4.4.1
Network Product Management and Maintenance interfaces
TC_MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION-ON_NETWORK_PRODUCT_MANAGEMENT_PROTOCOLS
applicable
4.2.3.4.5 a
Policy regarding consecutive failed login attempts
TC_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS a
applicable
4.2.3.4.5 b
Policy regarding consecutive failed login attempts
TC_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS b
applicable
4.2.3.4.6.1
Authorization policy
TC_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY
applicable
4.2.3.4.6.2
Role-based access control
TC_RBAC_SUPPORT
applicable
4.2.3.5.1
Protecting sessions -- logout function
TC_PROTECTING_SESSION_LOGOUT
Adaptation or new test case needed
For stateless APIs, test token revocation/expiry and session invalidation on role/secret rotation rather than UI cookie sessions.
4.2.3.5.2
Protecting sessions -- Inactivity timeout
TC_PROTECTING_SESSION_INAC_TIMEOUT
4.2.3.6.1
Security event logging
TC_SECURITY_EVENT_LOGGING
Adaptation needed
Evidence and method should target container logs (stdout/err), audit logs, and orchestrator audit; verify shipping via sidecar/DaemonSet/agent rather than OS syslog alone.
Verify audit logging from Mandatory Access Control systems (AppArmor, SELinux) inside the CNF
4.2.3.6.2
Log transfer to centralized storage
TC_LOG_TRANS_TO_CENTR_STORAGE
4.2.3.6.3
Protection of security event log files
TC_EVENT_LOG
4.2.4.1.1.1
Handling of growing content
TC_HANDLING_OF_GROWING_CONTENT
Adaptation or new test case needed
Clarify to run within the pod’s network/UTS namespace and evaluate the image and pod security context (non-root, read-only FS, dropped caps) instead of host OS
4.2.4.1.1.2
Handling of ICMP
TC_HANDLING_OF_ICMP
4.2.4.1.1.3
Handling of IP options and extensions
TC_HANDLING-IP-OPTIONS-AND-EXTENSIONS
4.2.4.1.2.1
Authenticated Privilege Escalation only
TC_OS_PRIVILEGE
4.2.4.2.2
System account identification
TC_UNIQUE_SYSTEM_ACCOUNT_IDENTIFICATION
4.2.5.1
HTTPS
HTTPS
applicable
4.2.5.2.1
Webserver logging
TC_WEBSERVER_LOGGING
applicable
4.2.5.3
HTTP User sessions
TC_HTTP_USER_SESSIONS
applicable
4.2.6.2.1
Packet filtering
TC_PACKET_FILTERING
applicable
4.2.6.2.3
GTP-C Filtering
TC_GTP-C_FILTERING
applicable
4.2.6.2.4
GTP-U Filtering
TC_GTP-U_FILTERING
applicable
4.3.2.1
No unnecessary or insecure services / protocols
TC_NO_UNNECESSARY_SERVICE
Adaptation needed
Also target containerization/orchestrator APIs (e.g., kube-API, container runtime sockets) reachable from inside workloads.
4.3.2.2
Restricted reachability of services
TC_RESTRICTED_REACHABILITY_OF_SERVICES
Adaptation needed
Enforce via NetworkPolicies / service mesh policy; no wildcard allows
4.3.2.3
No unused software
TC_NO_UNUSED_SOFTWARE
Adaptation or new test case needed
Inspect container images for installed packages, binaries, or libraries not required for the CNF’s documented functionality. Remove or rebuild images without such software to reduce attack surface.
Assess OCI images & SBOMs; strip shells/pkg managers unless justified; ensure supported, patched bases
Use automated container scanning or SBOM tools (e.g., Syft/Grype).
4.3.2.4
No unused functions
TC_NO_UNUSED_FUNCTIONS
Adaptation or new test case needed
Review deployment manifests, Helm charts, and application configs to ensure disabled/undocumented features, debug endpoints, or optional APIs are not present or exposed in running containers.
Use automated container scanning or SBOM tools (e.g., Syft/Grype).
4.3.2.5
No unsupported components
TC_NO_UNSUPPORTED_COMPONENTS
Adaptation or new test case needed
Verify base images, libraries, and runtime dependencies in container images are vendor-supported and security-patched; replace unsupported OS layers or packages before deployment.
Use automated container scanning or SBOM tools (e.g., Syft/Grype).
4.3.2.6
Remote login restrictions for privileged users
TC_REMOTE_LOGIN_RESTRICTIONS_PRIVILEGED_USERS
applicable
4.3.2.7
Filesystem Authorization privileges
TC_FILESYSTEM_AUTHORIZATION_PRIVILEGES
applicable
4.3.3.1.1
IP-Source address spoofing mitigation
TC_IP_SPOOFING_MITIGATION
applicable
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_PROXY_ARP_DISABLING
applicable
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_DIRECTED_BROAD_DISABLING
applicable
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_IP_MULTICAST_HANDLING
applicable
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_GRATUITOUS_ARP_DISABLING
Adaptation or new test case needed
In containers, ARP behaviour is often governed by the node kernel/CNI. Scope the test to the pod namespace (send/observe) or mark N/A if the CNF cannot influence L2
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_BROADCAST_ICMP_HANDLING
applicable
4.3.3.1.3
No automatic launch from removable media
TC_NO_AUTO_LAUNCH_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
N/A
4.3.3.1.4
SYN Flood Prevention
TC_SYN_FLOOD_PREVENTION
applicable
4.3.3.1.5
Protection from buffer overflows
TC_PROTECTION_FROM_BUFFER_OVERFLOW
applicable
4.3.3.1.6
External file system mount restrictions
TC_EXTERNAL_FILE_SYSTEM_MOUNT_RESTRICTIONS
applicable
4.3.4.2
No system privileges for web server
TC_NO_SYSTEM_PRIVILEGES_WEB_SERVER
applicable
4.3.4.3
No unused HTTP methods
TC_NO_UNUSED_HTTP_METHODS
applicable
4.3.4.4
No unused add-ons
TC_NO_UNUSED_ADD-ONS
applicable
4.3.4.5
No compiler
TC_NO_COMPILER_FOR_CGI
applicable
4.3.4.6
No CGI or other scripting for uploads
TC_NO_CGI_OR_SCRIPTING_FOR_UPLOADS
applicable
4.3.4.7
No execution of system commands with SSI
TC_NO_EXECUTION_OF_SYSTEM_COMMANDS
applicable
4.3.4.8
Access rights for web server configuration
TC_ACCESS_RIGHTS_WEB_SERVER_FILES
applicable
4.3.4.9
No default content
TC_NO_DEFAULT_CONTENT
applicable
4.3.4.10
No directory listings
TC_NO_DIRECTORY_LISTINGS
applicable
4.3.4.11
Web server information in HTTP headers
TC_NO_WEB_SERVER_HEADER_INFORMATION
applicable
4.3.4.12
Web server information in error pages
TC_NO_WEB_SERVER_ERROR_PAGES_INFORMATION
applicable
4.3.4.13
Minimized file type mappings
TC_NO_WEB_SERVER_FILE_TYPE MAPPINGS
applicable
4.3.4.14
Restricted file access
TC_RESTRICTED_FILE_ACCESS
applicable
4.3.5.1
Traffic Separation
TC_TRAFFIC_SEPARATION
Adaptation or new test case needed
Verify that control plane, user plane, and management/OAM traffic are isolated at the container networking level — e.g., by using separate Kubernetes network policies, CNI configurations, service mesh policy enforcement, namespaces, or dedicated interfaces — so that no pod or container can send or receive traffic outside its assigned plane.
4.3.6.2
No code execution or inclusion of external resources by JSON parsers
TC_JSON_PARSER_CODE_EXEC_INCL
applicable
4.3.6.3
Unique key values in Information Elements (IEs)
TC_UNIQUE_KEY_VALUES
applicable
4.3.6.4
The valid format and range of values for IEs
TC_IE_VALUE_FORMAT
applicable
4.4.2
Port scanning
TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING
applicable
4.4.3
Vulnerability scanning
TC_BVT_VULNERABILITY_SCANNING
Adaptation needed
Adapt to running vulnerability scans against container images and, where applicable, the running containers to identify known CVEs in OS packages, libraries, or application code, using tools that understand container layers and registries, and ensuring findings are addressed before deployment.
4.4.4
Robustness and fuzz testing
TC_BVT_ROBUSTNESS_AND_FUZZ_TESTING
applicable
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.1.1 Security functional requirements deriving from containerization and related test cases
| |
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.1.1.1 Security non-functional requirements related to passwords
| All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.2.3.4.3 applies to containerized elements.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.1.1.2 Security requirements related to logging
| All text from TS 33.117 [1], clauses 4.2.3.6.1, 4.2.3.6.2 and 4.2.3.6.3 apply to containerized elements.
Requirement Name: Logs from containerized functions are available
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall provide sufficient logging mechanisms (e.g., stdout/stderr container logs, audit logs, orchestrator audit, audit log from MAC, like AppArmor or SELinux). Security and Audit logs shall be collected and stored allowing security monitoring, forensic and threat detection. The possibility of forwarding relevant Security and Audit logs to external SIEM system must be in place (e.g., Syslog over TLS, REST API over HTTPS, SFTP).
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_LOGGING_CAPABILITIES
Purpose:
Ensure that Security and Audit logs are collected and stored allowing security monitoring, forensic and threat detection.
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester reviews the documentation provided by the vendor describing how logs from containerized functions are being handled and verifies that this in line with the requirement description
2. The tester verifies the forwarding to an external SIEM by enabling log forwarding, triggering a security event and verifying at the SIEM, that the event has been forwarded.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the information gathered from documentation.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.1.1.3 Using trusted image repositories for container image handling
| Requirement Name: Securing container function source by using trusted image repositories
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall use trusted/private source image repositories while building the container image.
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_IMAGE_REPOSITORIES
Purpose:
Ensure that containers are built using trusted image bases. Images coming from untrusted/public source code repositories (e.g., Public-DockerHub) shall not be used due to risk factors.
- HTTPS protocol for accessing internal repositories shall be used.
- Trust level of image content shall be checked to ensure source and integrity of the image.
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester reviews the documentation provided by the vendor describing the container build procedure and listing trusted image repositories.
2. The tester verifies that the build procedure enforces image integrity verification using at least cryptographic verification.
3. For both static and dynamically built containers, the tester reviews the build files (e.g., Dockerfile, CI/CD pipeline scripts) to verify the image sources specified are only trusted repositories and there are no references to public or untrusted repositories (e.g., Public-DockerHub).
4. The tester verifies the image repositories referenced in the build files are accessed via HTTPS.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots of the configuration or documentation.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.1.1.4 Vulnerability scanning for containerized NF
| All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.4.3 applies to containerized elements. Because of the nature of containerized applications and their high dependency on 3rd party software specific vulnerability scanning tools need to be used. Therefore, the test case TC_BVT_VULNERABILITY_SCANNING specified in 4.4.3 need to be enhanced with the testcase below.
Requirement Name: Securing container functions by vulnerability scanning
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall not contain any known vulnerabilities.
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_VULNERABILITY_SCANNING
Purpose:
Ensure that containers are not containing any known vulnerabilities. Trust level of image content shall be checked to ensure security and integrity of the image. Vulnerability scanning of container image shall be performed during development phase, discovering the vulnerabilities, and remediating those vulnerabilities before Developer/SO ships the container image to the Container registries. Vulnerabilities shall be resolved, and validated security patches shall be installed in a timely manner by the vendor.
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester runs suitable vulnerability analysis tool to scan containers for known vulnerabilities.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots of the configuration or documentation, snapshots from vulnerability scanner.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.1.1.5 Containerized NF run-time security
| Requirement Name: Securing container functions by configuration and hardening testing
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall not contain any known misconfigurations.
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_CONFIGURATION
Purpose:
Ensure proper Security hardening was performed. Apart from vulnerability scan of container image, analysis of container security measures implemented for FN in running state shall be performed. Test should prove that all misconfigurations were resolved, and validated security patches were installed.
Container and orchestrator in a running state shall be hardened in relation to security benchmark (e.g., CIS benchmark or other common auditing tools). Network Access Policies shall be configured for securing containerized functions by default. If network segmentation in applicable, related policies preventing lateral movement across containers should be present. Security polices shall be configured for securing PODs and Containers where applicable. Usage of Privileged container, Default Namespace, Ports, Services, Public IP Address etc. shall be restricted.
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester runs a benchmark analysis tool to scan container for known misconfigurations.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots of the configuration or documentation, snapshots from benchmark tool.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.1.1.6 Data protection in containerized NF
| All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.2.3.2.3 applies to containerized elements. Encryption at-rest, in-transit shall be applied for control plane and data plane. Secrets, credentials, keys shall be securely stored in secure way, and the access rights to those secrets, credential, keys shall be restricted rather than keeping them in configuration file.
Execute the following steps:
1. Review the documentation provided by the vendor describing data handling procedures.
2. Run container vulnerability analysis tool or a configuration check tool capable of analysing the way secrets are stored by the containerized functions.
3. Ensure secrets, keys, credentials are not stored in plain text.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots of the configuration or documentation, snapshots from security testing tool.
Editor’s Note: The requirement and threat references will be edited during normative phase.
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 6.2 Potential new test cases for GCNP
| The following table lists potential new test cases for GCNP currently not covered by existing test cases.
Test Name
Purpose
Threat Reference
TC_CNF_NO_EXPOSED_CONTAINERIZATION_API
Ensure kube-API / container runtime sockets aren’t reachable from workloads.
Related to “Exposed Containerization API” threat.
Exposed Containerization API
5.3.2.5.8
TC_CNF_NO_UNUSED_CAPABILITIES
Explicitly check for Linux caps in pod security context (drop all; no CAP_SYS_ADMIN/NET_ADMIN/PTRACE unless justified).
Abuse of Linux Capabilities
5.3.2.9.1
TC_CNF_IMAGE_PROVENANCE_AND_SIGNATURE
Verify signed OCI images/Helm at pull/admission (distinct from classic SW package integrity).
Editor’s Note: Additional description is needed to explain about the aforementioned distinction.
Software Tampering
5.3.2.5.1
TC_CNF_REGISTRY_SECURITY
authN/Z, TLS, signing, and scanning on the image registry to deter Image Registry Tampering
Image Registry Tampering
5.3.2.5.9
TC_CNF_NO_SECRETS_IN_ENV
Forbid or securely use (e.g., encrytped) credentials/tokens in env vars; check manifests/pods/logs
Secrets in Environment Variables
5.3.2.7.16
TC_CNF_NO_SECRETS_IN_IMAGE_LAYERS
Ensure no embedded keys/passwords in layers/history or they are used in a secure way (e.g., encrypted); use SBOM
Secrets in Image Layers
5.3.2.7.17
TC_CNF_POD_SECURITY_ENFORCEMENT
Admission/Pod Security must enforce non-root, read-only FS, no privileged, minimal caps, no hostPath/hostNetwork unless justified (covers Elevation of Privileges threats).
Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
5.3.2.9.2;
Running as Root inside Containers
5.3.2.9.3;
Use of Privileged Containers
5.3.2.9.4
TC_CNF_RESOURCE_QUOTAS_AND_LIMITS
Quotas/limits/rate-limits to block Resource Starvation and Container Spawn Storm
Resource Starvation via Orchestration
5.3.2.8.1;
Container Spawn Storm
5.3.2.8.2
TC_CNF_LOG_VOLUME_GUARDRAILS
Rate-limit & rotate logs; alert on spikes to mitigate DoS via Log Volume
DoS via Log Volume
5.3.2.8.3
TC_CNF_ORCHESTRATOR_AUDIT_LOGGING
kube-audit enabled, retained, and secured (authZ changes, pod/role/secret ops, pulls, admission). Complements but goes beyond “security event logging.”
Orchestrator Audit Logs Disabled
5.3.2.6.3
TC_CNF_CENTRAL_USER_AUTH
Test CNF’s ability to integrate with external auth (RADIUS, TACACS+, LDAP)
Service Account Token Abuse
5.3.2.4.8
|
2340c2cfa704707f92168cb0e8c7ec1f | 33.730 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor's Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
TR skeleton
0.0.0
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-253038
Incorporating skeleton (S3-252890) and scope (S3-252710)
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253722
Incorporating S3‑253147, S3‑253148, S3‑253149, S3‑253719, S3‑253720 and S3‑253721
0.2.0
2025-11
SA3#125
S3-254539
Incorporating S3-254097
0.3.0
2025-12
SA#110
SP-251519
Presented for information
1.0.0
3GPP TSG-SA Meeting #110 Tdoc SP-251519
Baltimore, US , 9 – 12 December 2025
Title: Presentation of Report to TSG:
TR 33.730 Study on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for Container-based Product, Version 1.0.0
Source: TSG SA WG3
Agenda item: 7.1.3
Release: Rel-20
Work Item: FS_SCAS_CP
Rapporteur: Markus Hanhisalo, Ericsson
Document for: Information
Abstract of document:
The present document studies the applicability and adaptation of the Generic Network Product (GNP) threats/assets in TR 33.926, the Generic Virtualized Network Product (GVNP) threats/assets in TR 33.927 and the existing general SCAS test cases in TS 33.117 to generic 3GPP container-based network products (GCNPs) in TR 33.730.
It identifies:
- Critical assets and threats relevant to Generic Containerized Network Products (GCNP), including adaptations of existing threats and new GCNP-specific threats.
- Applicability of existing SCAS test cases to GCNPs.
- New or modified test cases to address GCNP-specific threats and deployment characteristics.
Study on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for Container-based Product, TR 33.730 is ready for first presentation to TSG.
Changes since last presentation to TSG Meeting #110:
This is a first presentation to TSG.
Outstanding Issues:
Conclusion of the study.
Contentious Issues:
None.
Change history of this document:
1999-11-17: original issue
2007-09-06: removal of references to Working Groups; bring names of TSGs up to date; correction of typo
2015-01-06: adds tdoc header & removes redundant information below
2024-11-23: aligns RAN and SA/CT templates by adding information to the header
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] IETF RFC 9700: "Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
[4] IETF RFC 7519: "JSON Web Token".
[5] IETF RFC 8725: "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices".
[6] 3GPP TS 33.210: " Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security ".
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 4 Overview
| Editor’s Note: This clause includes the overview of the study.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5 Best practices and counter measures analysis
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.1 BSP#1: Access token privilege restriction
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.1.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses access token privilege restriction, as described in clause 2.3 of RFC 9700 [2].
Access token privileges should be limited to the minimum required for a particular use case. Thus, access tokens should be audience-restricted to a specific resource server or a small set of resource servers.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.1.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: clause 14.3.2 of TS 33.501 [3]
Access tokens are mandatorily audience-restricted using the "audience" claim. Audience includes the NF type of the NF Service Producers, or one or several NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer, potentially appended with PLMN ID (or SNPN ID).
Access tokens are mandatorily restricted at service level using the "scope" claim. Scope includes the expected service name(s) of the expected NF Service Producers for NF type-level access tokens or of the requested NF Service Producer.
Access tokens are optionally audience-restricted by a list of S-NSSAIs or NSI IDs, the NF Set ID and/or NF Service Set Id of the expected NF Service Producer instances.
Reference: clause 13.4.1.0 of TS 33.501 [3]
Access tokens may optionally be restricted with higher level of granularity using the "additional scope" claim. The additional scopes included within the access token restrict authorization on service operation and/or resource/data level.
Reference: Annex X of TS 33.501 [3]
Access tokens may optionally be restricted with other use case specific claims, such as the sourceNfinstanceId that includes the NF Instance ID of ML model consumer.
Reference: clause 13.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.501 [3]
During the verification of the access token, the NF Service Producer enforces the privilege restriction by checking that the "audience" claim matches its own identity or NF type.
Depending on if the respective claim is present, the NF Service Producer checks that
• the "scope" claim matches the requested service operation,
• the "additional scope" claim matches the requested service operation,
• at least one of the S-NSSAIs or NSI IDs served by the NF Service Producer is included in the list of S-NSSAIs or NSI IDs,
• the NF Set ID matches its own NF Set ID, and
• the NF Service Set ID matches the requested NF Service Set ID.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.1.3 Assessment
| Token-based authorization relies on "audience", "scope", and "additional scope" as specified in clause 13 of TS 33.501 [3] and other use case specific claims, for example as specified in Annex X of TS 33.501 [3], to restrict the privileges of issued access tokens.
Access token privilege restriction applies to 5G SBA and is already implemented in token-based authorization, enabling the NRF to define the scope of issued access tokens at slice, NF type, NF set, NF instance, service, service operation and resource level. No further investigation of access token privilege restriction is required.
Editor’s Note: Further assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.2 BSP #2: Token replay prevention
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.2.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses token replay prevention as specified in clause 2.2 of RFC 9700 [2] OAuth2.0 security best current practice.
The RFC 9700 [2] cover access token and refresh token under token replay prevention. Both type of token can be replayed hence replay prevention of it is necessary.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.2.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Refresh token are not utilised and applicable to 5G SBA.
In the 5G SBA, access tokens are bound to mTLS authentication state between the network functions, these checks are made either at the discovery, access token request or service request.
Reference: 13.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.501 [3]:
Where the access tokens request is validated at NRF based on the identity of the NFc by comparing the NF Instance Id to the subjectAltName in the NFc TLS client certificate subsequently issuing the access token, which contains the subject claim "sub" that is the identity of the NFc which ties the access token to the NFc instance ID. This access token binding at the "sub" provides a means at NFp to perform validation by comparing the "sub" matches the subjectAltName in the NFc client certificate.
Reference: 13.3.8.1 of TS 33.501 [3]:
In the indirect communication,
CCA token does provide means to the authenticate NFc towards the receiving end point (NRF, NF Service Producer) but it doesn’t provide integrity protection on the full-service request which makes CCA token prone to replay attacks.
Editor’s Note: Further analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.2.3 Assessment
| Though comparison of NFc Instance ID in the "sub" and subjectAltName in the NFc client certificate may be sufficient for the case of direct communication,
For indirect communication being hop-by-hop in nature, mTLS cannot be used to link the access token with mTLS authentication state as a result, there is no reliable way to confirm that an intermediate node is legitimately authorized to present the access token on behalf of the NFc.
Refresh token are not utilised and applicable to 5G SBA hence no further action is required.
Editor’s Note: Further assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.3 BSP #3: Client Authentication
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.3.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice covers Client Authentication as specified in clause 2.5 of RFC 9700 [2] OAuth2.0 security best current practice. The clause does highlight the need to authenticate the client with the authorization server.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.3.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: 13.3.1.1 and 13.3.2.1 of TS 33.501 [3]:
For direct communication the aforementioned clause in the specification states that interaction between (NF – NRF) or (NF-NF) authenticates each other during discovery, registration, and access token request. This authentication is performed by comparing the NF instance ID carried in the message to the subjectAltName in the NF Service Consumer's TLS client certificate presented during TLS handshake.
Reference: 13.3.1.1 and 13.3.2.1 of TS 33.501 [3]:
For Indirect communication between NF-NRF, Client credentials assertion (CCA) based authentication as specified in clause 13.3.8 of TS 33.501[3] is utilised, where CCA based authentication does not provide authentication of the NRF towards the NF Service Consumer or protection of the service request sent by the NF Service Consumer to the NRF, thus relying on implicit hop-by-hop security for authentication with further elaboration in NOTE 3 of the specific clause.
Editor’s Note: Further analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.3.3 Assessment
| As highlighted in clause 13.3.2.2 of TS 33.501 [3] mTLS based authentication in indirect communication is not achieved because of by hop-by-hop security. Thus, there is no means to verify that an CCA token request sent by SCP on behalf of a certain NF Service Consumer, is actually authorized by this consumer as specified in 13.3.1.2 of TS 33.501[3] NOTE 3. Also, CCA tokens do not provide integrity protection on the full service request as highlighted in 13.3.8.1 of TS 33.501 [3].
Editor’s Note: Further assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.4 BSP#4: Protecting Redirect-Based Flows
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.4.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses protecting redirect-based flows, as described in clause 2.1 of RFC 9700 [2].
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.4.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.4.3 Assessment
| Redirect-Based Flows are OAuth 2.0 authorization flows where the client is redirected through the browser to the authorization server to authenticate and grant access, and the authorization result is returned via a redirect back to the client. Redirect-Based Flows as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.5 BSP#5: Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.5.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant, as described in clause 2.4 of RFC 9700 [2].
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.5.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.5.3 Assessment
| The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant is an OAuth 2.0 flow where the client directly uses the user’s username and password to obtain an access token, typically only used in highly trusted scenarios. Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.6 BSP#6: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.6.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata, as described in clause 2.6 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.6.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.6.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.7 BSP#7: Termination of TLS at intermediary
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.7.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Termination of TLS at intermediary, as described in clause 2.6 and clause 4.13 of RFC 9700 [2].
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.7.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.7.3 Assessment
| Termination of TLS at intermediary that act as reverse proxy on upper layer is a mechanism that is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.8 BSP#8: Cross origin resource sharing (authorization endpoint)
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.8.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Cross origin resource sharing (authorization endpoint), as described in clause 2.6 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.8.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.8.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.9 BSP#9: Insufficient Redirection URI Validation
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.9.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Insufficient Redirection URI Validation, as described in clause 4.1 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.9.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.9.3 Assessment
| Redirection URI as a feature is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.10 BSP#10: Credential Leakage via Referer Headers
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.10.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential credential leakage via Referer headers, as described in clause 4.2 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.10.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.10.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.11 BSP#11: Credential Leakage via Browser History
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.11.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential credential leakage via browser history, as described in clause 4.2 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.11.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.11.3 Assessment
| This practice is applicable to clients using a browser-based authorization and is not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.12 BSP#12: Mix-Up Attacks
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.12.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Mix-Up attacks, as described in clause 4.4 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.12.2 Usage in 5G SBA
|
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.12.3 Assessment
| This practice is applicable to only implicit or authorization code grant types which is not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.13 BSP#13: Authorization Code Injection
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.13.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential Authorization Code injection, as described in clause 4.5 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.13.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.13.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.14 BSP#14: Access Token Injection
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.14.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential Access Token injection, as described in clause 4.6 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.14.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
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