hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.1 Use cases
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.1.1 Use case #1: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N107 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, there is a charging session between the V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, and there is also a charging session between the V-CHF and H-CHF. When a failure detected between V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
F... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.1.2 Use case #2: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N107 architecture, for a specific PDU session, there is a charging session between the V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, and there is also a charging session between the V-CHF and H-CHF. When a failure detected between V-CHF and H-CHF, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.1.1.2... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.2 Potential charging requirements
| REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2: charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the ... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.3 Key issues
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.3.1 Key issue #1: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.3.2 Key issue #2: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4 Possible solutions
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.1 Solution #1.1: Handling of the charging session between V-CHF and H-CHF when V-CHF detected failure of charging session with CTF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
When the V-CHF detects that an expected charging data request for a particular session has not been received within a period of time, the char... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.3 Solution #1.3: CTF detected failure
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF. This solution only applicable on application level failure handling.
When the V-CHF is determined not reachable by V-SMF(CTF), V-SMF(CTF) uses... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.4 Solution #1.4: V-CHF release the charging session with CTF when V-CHF detected failure of charging session with H-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #2 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF.
When the V-CHF, acting as an NF consumer, detects a failure of the H-CHF, it determines how to handle the charging session with the NF (CTF)... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.5 Solution #1.5: V-CHF suspend quota management when V-CHF detected failure of charging session with H-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #2 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF. This solution only applicable for online charging.
When the V-CHF, acting as an NF consumer, detects a failure of the H-CHF, it determines h... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.6 Solution #1.6: Handling of abnormal messages received by H-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #2 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF.
When a Charging Data Request [Initial] is received by the H-CHF, which can be associated to an existing charging session, the H-CHF handles ... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.7 Solution #1.7: Handling of messages received by H-CHF from alternative V-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #2 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF. This solution only applicable for application level failure handling.
When the V-CHF is determined not reachable by V-SMF(CTF), the V-SMF(CT... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.5 Evaluation
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.6 Conclusion
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2 Topic 2: Home Routed charging scenario
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.1 Use cases
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.1.1 Use case #1: Failure of one charging session
| In the HR roaming charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, there are two charging sessions simultaneously. When a failure is detected in one of the charging sessions, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.2.1.1-1: An example of the failure between H-SMF and H-CHF in HR roa... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.2 Potential charging requirements
| REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-01: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Home Routed charging scenario in which a failure is detected in one of the charging sessions.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.3 Key issues
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.3.1 Key issue #1: Failure is detected in one of the charging sessions
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-01. This investigation covers the following:
- Whether and how to handle when failure is detected in one of the charging sessions;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.4 Possible solutions
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.4.1 Solution #2.1: Failures detected between the H-CHF and the H-CTF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-1, failure is detected in one of the charging sessions. This solution only applicable for application level failure handling.
When the H-CHF detects that an expected charging data request for a particular session has not been received within a ... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.4.2 Solution #2.2: Failures detected between the V-CHF and the V-CTF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-1, failure is detected in one of the charging sessions. This solution only applicable for application level failure handling.
When the V-CHF detects that an expected charging data request for a particular session has not been received within a ... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.5 Evaluation
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.6 Conclusion
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3 Topic 3: Local Breakout V-SMF to H-CHF scenario
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.1 Use cases
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.1.1 Use case #1: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N47 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF and a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF is to be initiated, updated or terminated. When a failure detected between V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF, How the charging system handles the failur... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.1.2 Use case #2: Failures detected between the CTF and the H-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N47 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF and a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF is to be initiated, updated or terminated. When a failure detected between V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF. How the charging system handles the failur... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.2 Potential charging requirements
| REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-1: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-2: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the ... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3 Key issues
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3.1 Key issue #1: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-1. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement, if any, for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3.1 Key issue #2: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the H-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-2. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement, if any, for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the H-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.4 Possible solutions
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.5 Evaluation
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0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.6 Conclusion
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 6 Conclusions and recommendations
|
Annex <A> (informative):
PlantUML
A.1 Figures
A.1.1 Figure 5.1.4.1-1
@startuml
participant "V-SMF(CTF)" as CTF
participant "V-CHF" as VCHF
participant "H-CHF" as HCHF
CTF <--> VCHF : 1. Failures detected between the V-SMF(CTF) and the V-CHF
rnote over VCHF #white
2. V-CHF releases the resources betwee... |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.2 Solution #1.2: Handling of abnormal messages received by V-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
When a Charging Data Request [Update, or Termination] received by the V-CHF, which cannot be associated to any existing charging session (i.e.... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies management aspects, with emphasis on the NRM definitions, required to provide a unified multi-RAT management interface (netconf/yang) for 4G and 5G.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
CM Configuration Management
DM Domain ... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4 Concepts and background
| |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.1 IRP and SBMA overview
| The 3GPP management architecture has evolved across generations, reflecting a transition from interface-oriented to model-driven and service-based paradigms. Two main frameworks are currently defined in 3GPP specifications: IRP and SBMA.
The IRP framework, introduced and widely applied in legacy systems such as 4G/E-U... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.2 NRM in 4G and 5G
| The management specifications of 3GPP have evolved over successive generations, transitioning from the IRP–based framework used in 4G systems towards the SBMA adopted for 5G. This evolution reflects the shift from a traditional, interface-oriented management paradigm to a service-oriented and model-driven approach alig... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.2.1 IRP framework definitions
| The 4G management model is defined using the IRP framework, which specifies the exchange of management information between an IRPManager and an IRPAgent through standardized ISs and corresponding SS. Each managed entity is represented by an NRM, consisting of IOCs, their attributes, relationships, and behaviour.
To pr... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.2.2 SBMA framework definitions
| For 5G, 3GPP adopted SBMA, which enable MnS Producer to provide as MnS. This model introduces a consistent use of YANG-based data definitions to represent NRMs and their associated behaviour, improving flexibility, programmability, and interoperability.
The following tables summarize the main SBMA specifications defin... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.2.3 Observations
| The comparison between 4G and 5G specification sets reveals a clear continuity in structure but a major divergence in modelling technology and representation. The 4G NRMs define the necessary information objects and relationships for E-UTRAN management but do so under the IRP paradigm and with XML-based Solution Sets. ... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5 Use cases
| |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1 Use case #1: Management support for co-management of 4G nodes and 5G nodes
| |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.1 Description
| This section focuses on how legacy 4G NRMs can be represented within the SBMA. SBMA enables the exposure of management capabilities as standardized MnS, allowing NFs from different generations to interoperate under common architectural principles.
3GPP TS 28.530 [2] defines the overall structure of SBMA and its relati... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.2 Example
| To illustrate the practical implications of the gaps between IRP and SBMA models, a useful starting point is the examination of 3GPP TS 28.541 [4]. Since this specification focuses on 5G management, the content related to 4G is imported from previous releases. In particular, clause 4.1.1 of 3GPP TS 28.541 [4] lists the... |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.3 Potential requirements
| TBD
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.4 Potential solutions
| TBD
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.5 Evaluation of potential solutions
| TBD
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 6 Conclusions and recommendations
| Editor's Note: This clause captures the conclusions and the recommendations of the study.
Annex X (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5#163
S5-254377
Initial skeleton
0.0.1
S5-254730
Scope
2025-11
SA5#164
... |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 1 Scope
| The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the NR Femto Security Gateway (SeGW) network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptations of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requi... |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 3.2 Symbols
| Void.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
SeGW Security Gateway
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4 SeGW-specific security requirements and related test cases
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.1 Introduction
| NR Femto SeGW-specific security requirements include both requirements derived from NR Femto SeGW-specific security functional requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to NR Femto SeGW as described in TR 33.926 [3]. Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network ... |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2 SeGW-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains SeGW-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the SeGW deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.2.0 General
| The general approach in TS 33.117 [2] clause 4.2.2.1 applies to the SeGW network product class.
4.2.2.1. Location verification
Requirement Name: TC_LOCATION_VERIFICATION
Requirement Reference: TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.4.1
Requirement Description:
The SeGW can act as the verifying node to perform the location veri... |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.3 Technical Baseline
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.4 Operating systems
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.5 Web servers
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.6 Network devices
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3 SeGW-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains SeGW-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.2 Technical Baseline
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.3 Operating Systems
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.4 Web Servers
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.5 Network Devices
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.4 SeGW-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases
| Annex <X> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253632
TS skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253768
S3-253767, S3-253442, S3-253425, S3-253771
0.1.0
2025-11
SA3#125
S3-254533
S3-254637,S3-254734 ... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 1 Scope
| The present document investigates the following security enhancement for CAPIF:
• New possible security requirements for new functionalities in CAPIF introduced in TR 23.700-43[4];
• Whether and how to address open security issue specified in TS 23.222[2] during Rel-19 and not yet analysed in TS 33.122[3]. Sp... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 4 High-level architectures
| TS 33.122[3] provides security architecture for CAPIF based on the architecture specified in TS 23.222[2]. The security architecture in TS 33.122 [3] is the baseline of the present document. The procedures of section 8.34 and 8.38 of TS 23.222[2] are the basis for the solutions of this document.
Editor’s note: New pos... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5 Key issues
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.1 Key issue #1: Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| The procedure specified in clause 8.34 of TS 23.222 [2] enable a UE-hosted API invoker accessing network-hosted resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group. According to clause 8.34.2 of TS 23.222 [2], the security aspect of that procedure is left with the following note:
"NOTE: The security aspects of ... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.1.2 Threats
| Without proper authorization mechanism, an unauthorized API invoker can claim membership in a privileged group to access resources of UEs within that group, resulting in information leakage and unauthorized modification to the resources of the resource owner.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The CCF should support authorization of a UE-hosted API invoker accessing resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.2 Key issue #2: Security for open discover service API
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| As specified in TS 23.222[2], the requestor which doesn’t register to the CAPIF can discover service API from CCF. There is a NOTE:
NOTE: The security aspects of this procedure are unspecified in this release of the specification.
The existing security mechanism specified in TS 33.122[3] does not discuss the security... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.2.2 Threats
| Without proper protection mechanism, the API invoker may obtain sensitive service API information beyond its permission.
An attacker impersonating the CCF can send wrong information to the Requestor about the service APIs.
An attacker between the CCF and the Requestor can access to the information about the service ... |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| CAPIF should support authentication of CCF by the requestor.
CAPIF should support authorization for the requestor not recognized by CAPIF to discover sensitive API information through service API from CCF.
CAPIF should support confidentiality, integrity protection, and replay protection for the secure communication b... |
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