hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4 Possible solutions
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.1 Solution #1.1: Handling of the charging session between V-CHF and H-CHF when V-CHF detected failure of charging session with CTF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
When the V-CHF detects that an expected charging data request for a particular session has not been received within a period of time, the charging session between the V-CHF and CTF may be maintained or released based on local configuration.
- In the case of the charging session between the V-CHF and CTF is released, the V-CHF sends a Charging Data Request [Termination] to H-CHF to release the charging session between the V-CHF and H-CHF.
Figure 5.1.4.1-1: V-CHF terminates the charging session with H-CHF
- In the case of the charging session between the V-CHF and CTF is maintained, the V-CHF maintains the charging session between the V-CHF and H-CHF.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.3 Solution #1.3: CTF detected failure
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF. This solution only applicable on application level failure handling.
When the V-CHF is determined not reachable by V-SMF(CTF), V-SMF(CTF) uses application level failure handling (Terminate, Continue, Retry_and_terminate) as specified in clause 5.5.1.1 of 3GPP TS 32.290 [3].
When failure handling is set to 'Continue' and a failover procedure is supported in the V-CHF and the V-SMF(CTF), the V-SMF(CTF) re-sends the request with the ‘Remote CHF resource’ to an alternative V-CHF, then the alternative V-CHF replaces the original V-CHF to interact with the H-CHF.
Figure 5.1.4.3-1: V-CHF re-sends the request to an alternative V-CHF
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.4 Solution #1.4: V-CHF release the charging session with CTF when V-CHF detected failure of charging session with H-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #2 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF.
When the V-CHF, acting as an NF consumer, detects a failure of the H-CHF, it determines how to handle the charging session with the NF (CTF) based on the operator's agreement.
In the case of V-CHF decides to release the charging session between the V-CHF and CTF, the V-CHF sends a Charging Data Response or Charging Notify Request to CTF to indicate that the charging session should be released.
Figure 5.1.4.4-1: V-CHF terminates the charging session with CTF
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.5 Solution #1.5: V-CHF suspend quota management when V-CHF detected failure of charging session with H-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #2 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF. This solution only applicable for online charging.
When the V-CHF, acting as an NF consumer, detects a failure of the H-CHF, it determines how to handle the charging session with the NF (CTF) based on the operator's agreement.
In the case of V-CHF decides to continue the charging session between the V-CHF and CTF in online charging scenario, the V-CHF instructs the NF consumer (CTF) to suspend quota management as specified in clause 5.3.2.5 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3], and stores the Charging Data Request(s) or charging information marked with ‘QUOTA_MANAGEMENT_SUSPENDED’ from the NF consumer (CTF).
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.6 Solution #1.6: Handling of abnormal messages received by H-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #2 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF.
When a Charging Data Request [Initial] is received by the H-CHF, which can be associated to an existing charging session, the H-CHF handles the Charging Data Request as specified in clause 5.5.1.2 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3].
When a Charging Data Request [Update or Termination] is received by the H-CHF, which cannot be associated to any existing charging session, the H-CHF handles the Charging Data Request as specified in clause 5.5.1.2 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3].
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.7 Solution #1.7: Handling of messages received by H-CHF from alternative V-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #2 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF. This solution only applicable for application level failure handling.
When the V-CHF is determined not reachable by V-SMF(CTF), the V-SMF(CTF) may re-sends the request to an alternative V-CHF when a failover procedure is supported in the V-CHF and the V-SMF(CTF).
In the scenario of switching from V-CHF to an alternative V-CHF, when a Charging Data Request is received by the H-CHF from alternative V-CHF, which can be associated to an existing charging session (i.e., resource in CHF), but the associated NF consumer identification in the Charging Data Request is changed, should be handled as a valid request, with Charging Data Response including the charging session id (i.e., resource id).
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.5 Evaluation
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.6 Conclusion
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2 Topic 2: Home Routed charging scenario
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.1 Use cases
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.1.1 Use case #1: Failure of one charging session
| In the HR roaming charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, there are two charging sessions simultaneously. When a failure is detected in one of the charging sessions, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.2.1.1-1: An example of the failure between H-SMF and H-CHF in HR roaming
The potential charging requirements for this UC are: REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-01.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.2 Potential charging requirements
| REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-01: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Home Routed charging scenario in which a failure is detected in one of the charging sessions.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.3 Key issues
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.3.1 Key issue #1: Failure is detected in one of the charging sessions
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-01. This investigation covers the following:
- Whether and how to handle when failure is detected in one of the charging sessions;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.4 Possible solutions
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.4.1 Solution #2.1: Failures detected between the H-CHF and the H-CTF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-1, failure is detected in one of the charging sessions. This solution only applicable for application level failure handling.
When the H-CHF detects that an expected charging data request for a particular session has not been received within a period of time, the H-CHF handles as specified in clause 5.5.1.2 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3].
When the H-CHF is determined not reachable by H-SMF (CTF), the H-SMF (CTF) uses application level failure handling (Terminate, Continue, Retry_and_terminate) and may store Charging Data Request(s) or charging information as specified in clause 5.5.1.1 of 3GPP TS 32.290 [3]. if the failure handling indicates 'Terminate', the service will be terminated, and the associated charging sessions will be terminated accordingly.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.4.2 Solution #2.2: Failures detected between the V-CHF and the V-CTF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-1, failure is detected in one of the charging sessions. This solution only applicable for application level failure handling.
When the V-CHF detects that an expected charging data request for a particular session has not been received within a period of time, the V-CHF handles as specified in clause 5.5.1.2 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3].
When the V-CHF is determined not reachable by V-SMF (CTF), the V-SMF (CTF) uses application level failure handling (Terminate, Continue, Retry_and_terminate) and may store Charging Data Request(s) or charging information as specified in clause 5.5.1.1 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3]. if the failure handling indicates 'Terminate', the service will be terminated, and the associated charging sessions will be terminated accordingly.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.5 Evaluation
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.2.6 Conclusion
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3 Topic 3: Local Breakout V-SMF to H-CHF scenario
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.1 Use cases
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.1.1 Use case #1: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N47 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF and a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF is to be initiated, updated or terminated. When a failure detected between V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.3.1.1-1: Failure detected between V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF
The failure can happen at any time in a session, bellow are two cases described either when the V-SMF cannot reach the V-CHF or when the V-CHF cannot reach V-SMF. If the V-SMF (CTF) trigger the H-CHF in the case of V-CHF failure, should be studied.
Figure 5.3.1.1-2: Failure at request from V-SMF(CTF) to V-CHF
Figure 5.3.1.1-3: Failure at response from V-CHF to V-SMF(CTF)
The potential charging requirements for this UC are: REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-1.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.1.2 Use case #2: Failures detected between the CTF and the H-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N47 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and V-CHF and a charging session between the V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF is to be initiated, updated or terminated. When a failure detected between V-SMF (CTF) and H-CHF. How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.3.1.2-1: Failure detected between V-SMF(CTF) and H-CHF
The failure can happen at any time in a session, bellow are two cases described either when the V-SMF cannot reach the H-CHF or when the H-CHF cannot reach V-SMF.
Figure 5.3.1.2-2: Failure at request from V-SMF(CTF) to H-CHF
Figure 5.3.1.2-3: Failure at request from V-SMF(CTF) to H-CHF
The potential charging requirements for this UC are: REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-2.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.2 Potential charging requirements
| REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-1: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-2: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the H-CHF.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3 Key issues
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3.1 Key issue #1: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-1. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement, if any, for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.3.1 Key issue #2: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the H-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBHC-2. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement, if any, for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the H-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.4 Possible solutions
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.5 Evaluation
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.3.6 Conclusion
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 6 Conclusions and recommendations
|
Annex <A> (informative):
PlantUML
A.1 Figures
A.1.1 Figure 5.1.4.1-1
@startuml
participant "V-SMF(CTF)" as CTF
participant "V-CHF" as VCHF
participant "H-CHF" as HCHF
CTF <--> VCHF : 1. Failures detected between the V-SMF(CTF) and the V-CHF
rnote over VCHF #white
2. V-CHF releases the resources between V-SMF(CTF)
endrnote
VCHF -> HCHF : 3. V-CHF sends a Charging Data Request [Termination] to H-CHF
@enduml
A.1.2 Figure 5.1.4.3-1
@startuml
participant "V-SMF(CTF)" as CTF
participant "V-CHF" as VCHF
participant "alternative V-CHF" as ACHF
participant "H-CHF" as HCHF
CTF --> VCHF : 1. V-CHF is determined not reachable
CTF -> ACHF : 2. NF consumer (CTF) re-sends the request with the ‘Remote CHF resource’ to an alternative V-CHF
ACHF <-> HCHF : 3. alternative V-CHF interact with the H-CHF
@enduml
A.1.3 Figure 5.1.4.4-1
@startuml
participant "V-SMF(CTF)" as CTF
participant "V-CHF" as VCHF
participant "H-CHF" as HCHF
VCHF <--> HCHF : 1. Failures detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF
rnote over VCHF #white
2. V-CHF decides to release the charging session with V-SMF(CTF)
endrnote
VCHF -> CTF : 3. V-CHF sends a Charging Notify Request to V-SMF(CTF)
@enduml
A.1.4 Figure 5.3.1.1-1
@startuml
<style>
element {
BackGroundColor: white;
}
</style>
rectangle "VPLMN" {
rectangle "Converged\nCharging\nSystem" as VCCS {
rectangle "V-CHF" as VCHF
}
rectangle "V-SMF\n(CTF)" as CTF
}
rectangle "HPLMN" {
rectangle "Converged\nCharging\nSystem" as HCCS {
rectangle "H-CHF" as HCHF
}
}
VCHF -- CTF : "N40"
HCHF -- CTF : "N47"
@enduml
A.1.5 Figure 5.3.1.1-2
@startuml
<style>
element {
BackGroundColor: white;
}
</style>
hide footbox
participant CTF as "V-SMF\n(CTF)"
participant VCHF as "V-CHF"
participant HCHF as "H-CHF"
CTF ->x VCHF : 1. Charging Data request [Initial/Update/Termination]
CTF -> HCHF : 2. Charging Data request [Initial/Update/Termination]
rnote over HCHF: 3. Account, Rating,\nReservation Control
rnote over HCHF: 4. Open/Update/\nClose CDR
CTF <- HCHF : 5. Charging Data response [Initial/Update/Termination]
@enduml
A.1.6 Figure 5.3.1.1-3
@startuml
<style>
element {
BackGroundColor: white;
}
</style>
hide footbox
participant CTF as "V-SMF\n(CTF)"
participant VCHF as "V-CHF"
participant HCHF as "H-CHF"
CTF -> VCHF : 1. Charging Data request [Initial/Update/Termination]
rnote over VCHF: 2. Open/Update/\nClose CDR
CTF x<- VCHF : 3. Charging Data response [Initial/Update/Termination]
CTF -> HCHF : 4. Charging Data request [Initial/Update/Termination]
rnote over HCHF: 5. Account, Rating,\nReservation Control
rnote over HCHF: 6. Open/Update/\nClose CDR
CTF <- HCHF : 7. Charging Data response [Initial/Update/Termination]
@enduml
A.1.7 Figure 5.3.1.2-1
@startuml
<style>
element {
BackGroundColor: white;
}
</style>
rectangle "VPLMN" {
rectangle "Converged\nCharging\nSystem" as VCCS {
rectangle "V-CHF" as VCHF
}
rectangle "V-SMF\n(CTF)" as CTF
}
rectangle "HPLMN" {
rectangle "Converged\nCharging\nSystem" as HCCS {
rectangle "H-CHF" as HCHF
}
}
VCHF -- CTF : "N40"
HCHF -- CTF : "N47"
@enduml
A.1.8 Figure 5.3.1.2-2
@startuml
<style>
element {
BackGroundColor: white;
}
</style>
hide footbox
participant CTF as "V-SMF\n(CTF)"
participant VCHF as "V-CHF"
participant HCHF as "H-CHF"
CTF -> VCHF : 1. Charging Data request [Initial/Update/Termination]
rnote over VCHF: 3. Open/Update/\nClose CDR
CTF <- VCHF : 4. Charging Data response [Initial/Update/Termination]
CTF ->x HCHF : 5. Charging Data request [Initial/Update/Termination]
@enduml
A.1.9 Figure 5.3.1.2-3
@startuml
<style>
element {
BackGroundColor: white;
}
</style>
hide footbox
participant CTF as "V-SMF\n(CTF)"
participant VCHF as "V-CHF"
participant HCHF as "H-CHF"
CTF -> VCHF : 1. Charging Data request [Initial/Update/Termination]
rnote over VCHF: 2. Open/Update/\nClose CDR
CTF <- VCHF : 3. Charging Data response [Initial/Update/Termination]
CTF -> HCHF : 4. Charging Data request [Initial/Update/Termination]
rnote over HCHF: 5. Account, Rating,\nReservation Control
rnote over HCHF: 6. Open/Update/\nClose CDR
CTF x<- HCHF : 7. Charging Data response [Initial/Update/Termination]
@enduml
Annex <B>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5#163
Initial skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA5#163
S5-254381
S5-254488
S5-254490
S5-254489
S5-254491
S5-254812
S5-254813
S5-254815
Skeleton update
Add definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
Add scope
Add reference
Introduce the background for roaming charging
Introduce the usecase1 on Local Breakout Inter CHFs scenario
Introduce the usecase2 on Local Breakout Inter CHFs scenario
Introduce the usecase on Home Routed scenario
0.1.0
2025-11
SA5#164
S5-255178
S5-255434
S5-255435
S5-255436
S5-255437
S5-255438
S5-255439
S5-255440
S5-255441
Introduce the KI for the UC in HR scenario
Failure handling of V-CHF when failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
Failure handling of CTF when failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
Failure handling of V-CHF when V-CHF detected failure of charging session with H-CHF
Failure handling of H-CHF when H-CHF detected failure of charging session with V-CHF
Introduce the solution#1 on HR scenario Key issue #1
Introduce the solution#2 on HR scenario Key issue #1
Use case LBO VSMF to HCHF N40 failure scenario
Use case LBO VSMF to HCHF N47 failure scenario
0.2.0
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.4.2 Solution #1.2: Handling of abnormal messages received by V-CHF
| A possible solution for key issue #1 covering requirements REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1, enhanced failure handling for scenarios where a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
When a Charging Data Request [Update, or Termination] received by the V-CHF, which cannot be associated to any existing charging session (i.e., resource in V-CHF), should be handled as specified in clause 5.5.1.2 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3].
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies management aspects, with emphasis on the NRM definitions, required to provide a unified multi-RAT management interface (netconf/yang) for 4G and 5G.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 28.530: "Management and orchestration; 5G Network Resource Model (NRM); Stage 2 and stage 3"
[3] 3GPP TS 28.540: "Management and orchestration; 5G Network Resource Model (NRM); Stage 1"
[4] 3GPP TS 28.541: "Management and orchestration; 5G Network Resource Model (NRM); Stage 2 and stage 3"
[5] 3GPP TS 28.621: "Telecommunication management; Generic Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements "
[6] 3GPP TS 28.622: "Telecommunication management; Generic Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Information Service (IS) "
[7] 3GPP TS 28.623: "Telecommunication management; Generic Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Solution Set (SS) definitions "
[8] 3GPP TS 28.657: "Telecommunication management; Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements"
[9] 3GPP TS 28.658: "Telecommunication management; Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Information Service (IS)"
[10] 3GPP TS 28.659: "Telecommunication management; Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Solution Set (SS) definitions"
[11] 3GPP TS 28.661: "Telecommunication management; Generic Radio Access Network (RAN) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements"
[12] 3GPP TS 28.662: "Telecommunication management; Generic Radio Access Network (RAN) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Information Service (IS)"
[13] 3GPP TS 28.663: "Telecommunication management; Generic Radio Access Network (RAN) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Solution Set (SS) definitions"
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
CM Configuration Management
DM Domain Manager
IOC Information Object Classes
IS Information Services
MnS Management Services
NF Network Function
SBMA Service-Based Management Architecture
SS Solution Sets
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4 Concepts and background
| |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.1 IRP and SBMA overview
| The 3GPP management architecture has evolved across generations, reflecting a transition from interface-oriented to model-driven and service-based paradigms. Two main frameworks are currently defined in 3GPP specifications: IRP and SBMA.
The IRP framework, introduced and widely applied in legacy systems such as 4G/E-UTRAN, defines management through standardized NRMs specified using XML-based schemas. IRP also standardizes the Itf-N interface, while the direct interface between the DM/EM and the network elements remains proprietary. This model provides a mature and reliable foundation for multiple network domains. It includes standardised interface operations, such as basic and bulk CM, and can support NETCONF for Component A.
With the introduction of 5G, the SBMA model was specified to enable a more flexible, service-oriented, and model-driven approach to network management. SBMA is characterized by the definition of MnS, which expose standardized management capabilities through service-based interfaces and NRMs specified using YANG and OpenAPI. The SBMA interfaces towards the NFs are standardized, in contrast to the proprietary element interfaces in IRP. SBMA management operations follow a CRUD paradigm, in contrast to the basic and bulk CM operations in IRP. This approach enhances automation, interoperability, and alignment with cloud-native network principles.
While 5G management fully adopts the SBMA model with YANG and OpenAPI based NRMs, 4G management remains entirely IRP-based, lacking a corresponding YANG and OpenAPI representation. The two frameworks also differ in management capabilities and protocols because IRP relies on Itf-N, XML schemas, and may use NETCONF, whereas SBMA uses service-based interfaces with CRUD operations, supporting automation and programmability. This creates a gap that prevents the consistent use of a unified management framework across generations.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.2 NRM in 4G and 5G
| The management specifications of 3GPP have evolved over successive generations, transitioning from the IRP–based framework used in 4G systems towards the SBMA adopted for 5G. This evolution reflects the shift from a traditional, interface-oriented management paradigm to a service-oriented and model-driven approach aligned with automation and virtualization principles.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.2.1 IRP framework definitions
| The 4G management model is defined using the IRP framework, which specifies the exchange of management information between an IRPManager and an IRPAgent through standardized ISs and corresponding SS. Each managed entity is represented by an NRM, consisting of IOCs, their attributes, relationships, and behaviour.
To provide a clearer view of how the IRP framework defines NRM across 4G domains, the relevant IRP specifications are listed in the following tables.
Table 4.2.1-1 summarizes the Generic RAN NRM IRP specifications, which define the common requirements, information model, and solution set applicable across all RAN technologies.
Table 4.2.1-1: Generic RAN NRM IRP Specifications
Specification
Scope
Description
3GPP TS 28.661 [11]
Generic RAN NRM IRP – Requirements
Defines general requirements for RAN management under the IRP framework.
3GPP TS 28.662 [12]
Generic RAN NRM IRP – Information Service (IS)
Specifies semantics and behaviour of generic RAN information objects in a protocol-neutral way.
3GPP TS 28.663 [13]
Generic RAN NRM IRP – Solution Set (SS)
Provides encoding and protocol-specific solution sets for the generic RAN NRM.
Table 4.2.1-2 presents the E-UTRAN-specific NRM IRP specifications, which build upon the Generic RAN model by introducing management requirements and information objects unique to E-UTRAN.
Table 4.2.1-2: E-UTRAN NRM IRP Specifications
Specification
Scope
Description
3GPP TS 28.657 [8]
E-UTRAN NRM IRP – Requirements
Defines requirements specific to the management of E-UTRAN nodes (eNB).
3GPP TS 28.658 [9]
E-UTRAN NRM IRP – Information Service (IS)
Specifies E-UTRAN-specific IOCs and their relations, reusing elements from the Generic RAN NRM.
3GPP TS 28.659 [10]
E-UTRAN NRM IRP – Solution Set (SS)
Provides the protocol-specific representation for the E-UTRAN NRM.
Beyond the RAN-specific NRMs, 3GPP also defines a Generic NRM applicable across both RAN and Core. The table 4.2.1-3 summarizes the Generic NRM specifications that provide common requirements, information models, and YANG and OpenAPI based solution sets reusable across both IRP and SBMA management architectures.
Table 4.2.1-3. Generic NRM IRP Specifications
Specification
Scope
Description
3GPP TS 28.621 [5]
Generic NRM IRP – Requirements
Defines general requirements for network management applicable to multiple domains (RAN and Core).
3GPP TS 28.622 [6]
Generic NRM IRP – Information Service (IS)
Specifies semantics of information object classes for both IRP and SBMA deployment scenarios, enabling reuse of common classes across technologies.
3GPP TS 28.623 [7]
Generic NRM IRP – Solution Set (SS)
Provides solution sets and encoding formats applicable to the Generic NRM, supporting YANG solution set representation.
The 4G IRP-based framework provides a complete and well-established management model. However, it is not aligned with the SBMA paradigm and does not include YANG and OpenAPI based definitions. The model syntax and semantics are designed around XML schemas and protocol mappings defined in earlier 3GPP management frameworks.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.2.2 SBMA framework definitions
| For 5G, 3GPP adopted SBMA, which enable MnS Producer to provide as MnS. This model introduces a consistent use of YANG-based data definitions to represent NRMs and their associated behaviour, improving flexibility, programmability, and interoperability.
The following tables summarize the main SBMA specifications defining 5G network management.
The set of specifications from tables 4.2.1-1 and 4.2.1-3 and are also used in 5G, providing a common foundation across 4G and 5G management frameworks.
Table 4.2.2-1 presents the specifications defining the 5G NRM under the SBMA framework, including stage-1 management requirements and the corresponding information models and YANG solution sets for 5G networks.
Table 4.2.2-1: Management and Orchestration of 5G Networks specifications
Specification
Scope
Description
3GPP TS 28.540 [3]
Management and Orchestration of 5G Networks – Stage 1 (Requirements)
Defines high-level functional requirements for 5G network management, including NR, NG-RAN, 5GC and network slicing.
3GPP TS 28.541 [4]
Management and Orchestration of 5G Networks – Stage 2 and Stage 3 (Information Model and Solution Set)
Specifies the 5G NRM, including information models and YANG-based solution sets, fulfilling the requirements from 3GPP TS 28.540.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 4.2.3 Observations
| The comparison between 4G and 5G specification sets reveals a clear continuity in structure but a major divergence in modelling technology and representation. The 4G NRMs define the necessary information objects and relationships for E-UTRAN management but do so under the IRP paradigm and with XML-based Solution Sets. Conversely, 5G introduces a service-based representation, replacing XML with YANG modules.
While the underlying management concepts remain compatible, the absence of a YANG-based NRM for 4G nodes prevents consistent implementation of unified management functions across technologies. Introducing YANG and OpenAPI based NRMs for 4G elements, derived from the existing IRP specifications, would therefore ensure continuity, facilitate multi-RAT management, and align future network evolution under a common management architectural framework.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5 Use cases
| |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1 Use case #1: Management support for co-management of 4G nodes and 5G nodes
| |
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.1 Description
| This section focuses on how legacy 4G NRMs can be represented within the SBMA. SBMA enables the exposure of management capabilities as standardized MnS, allowing NFs from different generations to interoperate under common architectural principles.
3GPP TS 28.530 [2] defines the overall structure of SBMA and its relationship to legacy management frameworks. In particular, clause 6.6 describes the integration of IRP-based and SBMA-based domains and identifies several options for achieving interoperability between them. Among these, Option B outlines a migration approach that allows legacy domains, such as those managing E-UTRAN or EPC, to remain functionally unchanged while being represented within the SBMA environment.
Under this approach, the existing NRM of the legacy domain is treated as an MnS component type B, corresponding to the managed domain model in SBMA, allowing its information and management functions to be accessed through service-based interfaces. To achieve this integration, the NRM must be expressed using the same data modelling principles applied in SBMA, which rely on model-driven, YANG and OpenAPI based definitions instead of the XML representations used in the IRP framework.
While 5G NRMs defined in 3GPP TS 28.540 [3] and 3GPP TS 28.541 [4] already comply with these principles and include full YANG and OpenAPI based representations, the 4G NRMs are limited to XML-based Solution Sets under the IRP framework.
This inconsistency prevents 4G network elements from being managed within the SBMA model, thus creating a structural gap in the realization of multi-generation management consistency.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.2 Example
| To illustrate the practical implications of the gaps between IRP and SBMA models, a useful starting point is the examination of 3GPP TS 28.541 [4]. Since this specification focuses on 5G management, the content related to 4G is imported from previous releases. In particular, clause 4.1.1 of 3GPP TS 28.541 [4] lists the imported information entities and their local labels for the NR NRM.
EUtranCellFDD and EUtranCellTDD:
Clause 4.1.1 in 3GPP TS 28.541 [4] indicates that the IOCs EUtranCellFDD and EUtranCellTDD are further described in 3GPP TS 28.658 [9]. This is a positive indication, as 3GPP TS 28.658 [9] is one of the E-UTRAN specifications identified in section 5.1.1 when defining the 4G management model.
However, in 3GPP TS 28.658 [9], EUtranCellFDD and EUtranCellTDD are only described textually, in clauses 4.3.5 and 4.3.7, respectively, without any associated data model or mapping to a YANG structure. Within their descriptions, the same three parameters appear: earfcn, sfAssignment and specialSfPatterns, defined in radio interface specifications, which are outside the scope of management data modelling.
Returning to 3GPP TS 28.541 [4], a search across all YANG and YAML files included in the official archive (28541-k00.zip) shows no match for either EUtranCellFDD or EUtranCellTDD.
This confirms that, although these 4G IOCs are referenced in the 5G NRM, they are not defined in any YANG model.
AdjacentCell:
A similar situation occurs with the AdjacentCell entity. Clause 4.1.1 of 3GPP TS 28.541 [4] also points to 3GPP TS 28.658 [9] for its definition. Indeed, in 3GPP TS 28.658 [9] clause 4.3.9, AdjacentCell appears as an attribute of EUtranRelation. Consequently, it does appear in the YANG module “3gpp-nr-nrm-eutrancellrelation.yang” within the “28541-k00.zip” archive, where the following code is defined:
leaf adjacentCell {
description "Reference to an EUtranCellFDD/TDD or
ExternalEUtranCellFDD/TDD instance.";
mandatory true;
type types3gpp:DistinguishedName;
}
This snippet clearly references EUtranCellFDD and EUtranCellTDD, but only as external objects. Their definitions are missing in YANG form. The model therefore depends on entities that are not formally defined within the SBMA-compliant representation.
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.3 Potential requirements
| TBD
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.4 Potential solutions
| TBD
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 5.1.5 Evaluation of potential solutions
| TBD
|
eb6d97653baaa5d64e88264f0c10f61c | 28.892 | 6 Conclusions and recommendations
| Editor's Note: This clause captures the conclusions and the recommendations of the study.
Annex X (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5#163
S5-254377
Initial skeleton
0.0.1
S5-254730
Scope
2025-11
SA5#164
S5-255606
Introduction
0.1.0
S5-255607
Section in concepts and background
S5-255608
Section in concepts and background and description of use case 1
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 1 Scope
| The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the NR Femto Security Gateway (SeGW) network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptations of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the SeGW network product class.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements"
[3] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.545: "Security aspects of NR Femto".
[5] 3 GPP TS 33.320: "Security of Home Node B (HNB) / Home evolved Node B (HeNB)"
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 3.2 Symbols
| Void.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
SeGW Security Gateway
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4 SeGW-specific security requirements and related test cases
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.1 Introduction
| NR Femto SeGW-specific security requirements include both requirements derived from NR Femto SeGW-specific security functional requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to NR Femto SeGW as described in TR 33.926 [3]. Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network product classes have been captured in TS 33.117 [2] and are not repeated in the present document.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2 SeGW-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains SeGW-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the SeGW deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.2.0 General
| The general approach in TS 33.117 [2] clause 4.2.2.1 applies to the SeGW network product class.
4.2.2.1. Location verification
Requirement Name: TC_LOCATION_VERIFICATION
Requirement Reference: TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.4.1
Requirement Description:
The SeGW can act as the verifying node to perform the location verification for the NR Femto node. The location verification is performed during or after the device authentication process. If the location verification fails, the connection from the NR Femto node to 5GC should be blocked as early as possible.
Threat References: failed location verification
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LOCATION_VERIFICATION
Purpose:
Verify that the SeGW blocks connection after failed location verification.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Conditions:
- Location information and verification policy are configured in the SeGW.
- A SeGW is connected in emulated/real network environment.
- A NR Femto whose location information is not within the permitted range is connected in emulated/real network environment.
Execution Steps
1. The tester triggers the NR Femto to initiate an mutual authentication between the NR Femto and the SeGW.
2. the NR Femto sends its location information in the Notify Payload with a Notification Type of LOCATION_INFO in the IKE_AUTH request .
3. The SeGW processes the Notify payload of the IKE_AUTH request and verify the location of the NR Femto based on the verification policy.
Expected Results:
The SeGW blocks the connection between the NR Femto and the SeGW.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., pcap file or screenshot containing the operational results.
4.2.2.2. Unauthenticated traffic filtering
Requirement Name: Unauthenticated traffic filtering
Requirement Reference: TS 33.320 [5], clause 4.4.3, TS 33.545 [4], clause 4.2.3
Requirement Description:
Any unauthenticated traffic from the H(e)NB is filtered out at the SeGW.
The Security Requirements and Principles defined in clause 4.4 of TS 33.320[1] are reused with the following modifications: H(e)NB replaced with NR Femto etc.
Threat References: Traffic from unauthenticated NR Femtos
Test case:
Test Name: TC_UNAUTHENTICATED_TRAFFIC_FILTERING
Purpose:
Verify that the SeGW filters out traffic from the unauthenticated NR Femto.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Conditions:
- A SeGW is connected in emulated/real network environment.
- A NR Femto is connected in emulated/real network environment.
- Mutual authentication is not performed between the SeGW and the NR Femto.
Execution Steps
1. The tester initiates any message other than the initial authentication message from the NR Femto to the SeGW.
Expected Results:
the SeGW filters out the message.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., pcap file or screenshot containing the operational results.
4.2.2.3. Topology hiding
Requirement Name: Topology hiding
Requirement Reference: TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.7
Requirement Description:
The SeGW shall hide the 5GC topology so that the core network topology information is not inadvertently exposed to the NR Femto.
Threat References: Failed topology hiding
Test case:
Test Name: TC_TOPOLOGY_HIDING
Purpose:
Verify that the SeGW hide the topology information of the core network.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Conditions:
- A SeGW is connected in emulated/real network environment.
- A NR Femto and an AAA-server are connected in emulated/real network environment.
- Address mapping information is configured in the SeGW.
Execution Steps
1. The tester triggers the NR Femto to initiate a hosting party authentication between the NR Femto and the core network.
2. The SeGW under test receives the AAA protocol message from the AAA-server, hides the address information of the core network entities and sends the AAA protocol message to the NR Femto.
3. The tester checks the topology information in the AAA protocol message sent from the SeGW under test to the NR Femto.
Expected Results:
The SeGW hides the network topology of the core network entities.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., pcap file or screenshot containing the operational results.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.3 Technical Baseline
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.4 Operating systems
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.5 Web servers
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.2.6 Network devices
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3 SeGW-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains SeGW-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
|
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.2 Technical Baseline
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.3 Operating Systems
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.4 Web Servers
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.5 Network Devices
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture
| |
fe371dd58f1a3c9465c490ef7fbcf5ca | 33.547 | 4.4 SeGW-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases
| Annex <X> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253632
TS skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253768
S3-253767, S3-253442, S3-253425, S3-253771
0.1.0
2025-11
SA3#125
S3-254533
S3-254637,S3-254734
0.2.0
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 1 Scope
| The present document investigates the following security enhancement for CAPIF:
• New possible security requirements for new functionalities in CAPIF introduced in TR 23.700-43[4];
• Whether and how to address open security issue specified in TS 23.222[2] during Rel-19 and not yet analysed in TS 33.122[3]. Specifically, it covers the following:
- Group ID Authorization limited to a UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group;
- Open Discover Service APIs procedure.
- Authorization based on purpose information
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 23.222: "Functional architecture and information flows to support Common API Framework for 3GPP Northbound APIs; Stage 2".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.122: "Security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) for 3GPP northbound APIs".
[4] 3GPP TR 23.700-43: "Study on CAPIF Phase 4"
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 4 High-level architectures
| TS 33.122[3] provides security architecture for CAPIF based on the architecture specified in TS 23.222[2]. The security architecture in TS 33.122 [3] is the baseline of the present document. The procedures of section 8.34 and 8.38 of TS 23.222[2] are the basis for the solutions of this document.
Editor’s note: New possible security aspects introduced by the new functionalities studied in 23.700-43[4] will be considered in this document.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5 Key issues
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.1 Key issue #1: Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| The procedure specified in clause 8.34 of TS 23.222 [2] enable a UE-hosted API invoker accessing network-hosted resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group. According to clause 8.34.2 of TS 23.222 [2], the security aspect of that procedure is left with the following note:
"NOTE: The security aspects of this procedure are specified in 3GPP TS 33.122 [y]."
To provide security protection for the procedure of UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group, the key issue studies the potential solutions to mitigate potential security threats.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.1.2 Threats
| Without proper authorization mechanism, an unauthorized API invoker can claim membership in a privileged group to access resources of UEs within that group, resulting in information leakage and unauthorized modification to the resources of the resource owner.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The CCF should support authorization of a UE-hosted API invoker accessing resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.2 Key issue #2: Security for open discover service API
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| As specified in TS 23.222[2], the requestor which doesn’t register to the CAPIF can discover service API from CCF. There is a NOTE:
NOTE: The security aspects of this procedure are unspecified in this release of the specification.
The existing security mechanism specified in TS 33.122[3] does not discuss the security aspects of the new feature of open discover service API, which may cause information leakage. This key issue aims to address the security aspects of open discover service API.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.2.2 Threats
| Without proper protection mechanism, the API invoker may obtain sensitive service API information beyond its permission.
An attacker impersonating the CCF can send wrong information to the Requestor about the service APIs.
An attacker between the CCF and the Requestor can access to the information about the service APIs.
An attacker between the CCF and the Requestor can modify the information about the service APIs.
An attacker between the CCF and the Requestor can replay the outdated information about the service APIs.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| CAPIF should support authentication of CCF by the requestor.
CAPIF should support authorization for the requestor not recognized by CAPIF to discover sensitive API information through service API from CCF.
CAPIF should support confidentiality, integrity protection, and replay protection for the secure communication between the CCF and the Requestor.
Editor’s note: The interface between Requestor and CCF is to be clarified and the potential security impacts are FFS.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.3 Key issue #3: More granular authorization based on purpose information
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| The purpose for data processing has been captured in TS 23.222 [2] in authorization, but it has not been addressed in TS 33.122 [3]. With the lack of more granular authorization based on purpose information, it will not be possible for the resource owner to give permission for data sharing only for some specific purposes. This key issue is not aiming to specify different purpose values, but to specify the usage of purpose information in authorization.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.3.2 Threats
| The API Invoker can access to the resources of the resource owner for any purposes. This can lead to a threat of unauthorized access.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| CAPIF RNAA should support the usage of purpose information in authorization and authorization revocation of the API Invoker to access the resources of the resource owner.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.4 Key Issue #4: Study on security aspects of Credentials unavailability
| |
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| KI#3 in TR 23.700-43 [4] aims to study how to manage entities which do not have access to their CCF provided certificate.
Due to the nature of the study around security credentials and their management, it is proposed to study such aspect in SA3. In particular, this key issue focuses on the unavailability of the API Invoker to use the certificate due to either the loss or corruption of the certificate itself or due to the loss of the corresponding private key.
Additionally, use cases such as certificate expiration management, or the management of API provider certificates are not in scope of 3GPP.
|
837a5602c57c068290b1254827b20390 | 33.700-23 | 5.4.2 Threats
| Editor’s Note: Security threats are FFS.
|
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