hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 4.2.1 Considerations
| The 6G network will introduce new and enhanced services that may lead to new charging business models. To enable 6G, it is essential to support new capabilities and services, engage new ecosystem stakeholders, and evaluate the associated business models. Therefore, the following are considered in the 6G business model:
- 6G Services
- Target Customers: Charged party, e.g., individual customers, industry/verticals customers
- Charging Model: Extend charging metrics beyond the volume and time (e.g., AI token, AI task for AI services); new charging scenarios support the customized charging and billing package plan.
- Stakeholders: MVNO, industry/vertical partners, service/content providers, subscriber.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 4.2.2 Business roles
| This clause analyzes the business roles, including charging party (who to charge) and charged party (who to be charged).
Table 4.2.2-1: Description and Examples of Business roles in 6G
Business Role
Description
Examples
Charged party
The entity that is charged for the consumed 6G service or resource.
Individual customers, industry/vertical customers, MVNO
Charging party
The entity that is responsible for providing 6G service or resource and charge the charged party.
MNO, MVNO, service/content providers, subscriber
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 4.2.3 Business models
| This clause aims to explore innovative business models required to monetize the new capabilities and services introduced by the 6G system. The potential models may move beyond the traditional volume/time/event-based charging of 5G to incorporate value, quality and specific resource utilization.
Table 4.2.3-1: Description and Examples of Business Models from View of Commercial Relationship in 6G
Business Model
Description
Examples
B2C (Business-to-Consumer)
The model where a business entity provides and charges a customer for a 6G service or resource.
MNO, MVNO, service/content providers charges an individual customer for a 6G service.
B2B (Business-to-Business)
The model where a business entity provides and charges another business entity for wholesale 6G service or resources.
MNO charges an industry/vertical customer for the consumed wholesale 6G service.
Service/content providers charges MNO for consume service/ content.
B2X2X (Business-to-X-to-X)
The model involving multi-party charging where a business entity partners with an intermediary business entity to deliver a 6G service or resource to the ultimate consumer.
A service/provider charges an MNO for usage of 6G service/content, and the MNO then charges an individual customer for the 6G service.
NOTE: The business entity (e.g., MNO) can provide 6G services or resources directly or with assistance from UEs.
Editor’s Note: Business model C2X is ffs.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5 Topics
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1 Topic 1: Charging Architecture
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.1 General description
| This topic focuses on the 6G charging architecture which defines the charging network functions and interfaces. The 6G charging architecture will need to handle increased traffic and data with diverse value generated by new services, and to be in line with the overall 6G system architecture studied in TR 23.801-01 [4]. The charging architecture covers the following aspects:
- 6G charging architecture supporting across diverse networks, services and resources
- 6G charging interface
- CDRs transmission
- Interworking
Table 5.1.1-1: Mapping of Use cases, Potential charging requirements, Key issues and Solutions for Topic 1
Use cases
Potential charging requirements
Key issues
Solutions
#1.1
ARC-01
#1.1
Editor’s Note: Addition of service/feature into the table is ffs.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.2 Use cases
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.2.1 Use Case #1.1: Charging for edge applications
| In the 6G era, the MNOs can provide the customized industry/vertical private network services to enterprises/companies (e.g., smart factories, mines, ports). For example, in the low-latency charging scenario, edge applications demand extremely fast response times and low-latency for charging control from 6G charging system.
The potential charging requirements for this UC is: REQ-3GPP6GCH-ARC-01.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.3 Potential charging requirements
| The following are potential charging requirements for Use Case #1.1:
- REQ-3GPP6GCH-ARC-01: The 6G charging system may support charging for edge applications.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.4 Key issues
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.4.1 Key Issue #1.1: Charging for edge applications
| This key issue addresses the REQ-3GPP6GCH-ARC-01, to investigate charging for edge applications, including
- The interaction and coordination for low-latency charging scenario;
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.5 Solutions
| 5.1.5.Y Solution #1.Y: <Solution Title>
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.6 Evaluation
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.1.7 Conclusion
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2 Topic 2: Charging Mechanism
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.1 General Description
| This topic focuses on the necessary enhancements to the charging mechanisms which are used for charging services. This is specifically driven by the need to support requirements of the charging mechanism, and to enable the introduction of 6G services. The charging mechanism covers the following aspects:
- Charging services
- Reliability
- Charging data management
Table 5.2.1-1: Mapping of Use cases, Potential charging requirements, Key issues and Solutions for Topic 2
Use cases
Potential charging requirements
Key issues
Solutions
#2.1
DAT-01
#2.1
#2.1
#2.2
DOC-01
#2.2
#2.3
DOC-02
#2.3
Editor's note: A new column may be added to address the relationship with the services/features.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.2 Use cases
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.2.1 Use Case #2.1: Unified Charging Data
| A MNO has a service that relies on the combined functionality and resources of both 6G NFs and existing 5G NFs within the core network. The MNO wants the charging mechanism to ensure that all service charging information generated across the coexisting 5G and 6G domains is uniformly collected, correlated and processed.
The potential charging requirements for this UC is REQ-3GPP6GCH-DAT-01.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.2.2 Use Case #2.2: Organization and structuring of OpenAPI
| Precondition is that OpenAPI will be used for 6G.
The stage 2 definitions of the Information Elements for the domains, subsystem, and services are described in the 5G service charging specifications (e.g., TS 32.254 [5], TS 32.255 [6], and TS 32.256 [7]) and stage 3 definitions of the OpenAPI resource attributes in the TS 32.291 [8], together with Forge.
The handler of the specifications needs to keep the definitions consistent.
The potential charging requirements for this use case is REQ-3GPP6GCH-DOC-01.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.2.3 Use Case #2.3: Organization and structuring of ASN.1
| Precondition is that ASN.1 will be used for 6G.
The stage 2 definitions of the Information Elements for the domains, subsystem, and services are described in the 5G service charging specifications (e.g., TS 32.254 [5], TS 32.255 [6], and TS 32.256 [7]) and stage 3 definitions of the ASN.1 attributes in the TS 32.298 [9], together with Forge.
The handler of the specifications needs to keep the definitions consistent.
The potential charging requirements for this use case is REQ-3GPP6GCH-DOC-02.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.3 Potential charging requirements
| The following are potential charging requirements for Use Case #2.1:
- REQ-3GPP6GCH-DAT-01: The 6G charging system shall support unified charging data that are interoperable for 5G and 6G.
The following are potential charging requirements for Use Case #2.2:
- REQ-3GPP6GCH-DOC-01: The OpenAPI specification shall support keeping the stage 2 definitions of domains, subsystem, and services information element consistent with the stage 3 definition of OpenAPI resource attributes.
The following are potential charging requirements for Use Case #2.3:
- REQ-3GPP6GCH-DOC-02: The specifications shall support keeping the stage 2 definitions of domains, subsystem, and services information element consistent with the stage 3 definition of ASN.1 attributes.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.4 Key issues
| |
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.4.1 Key Issue #2.1: Charging Data Interoperability
| This key issue is for investigating on how to support unified charging data to address REQ-3GPP6GCH-DAT-01.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.4.2 Key Issue #2.2: Optimize the handling of the OpenAPI resource attributes
| This key issue addresses REQ-3GPP6GCH-DOC-01.
Optimize the handling of the information elements and OpenAPI resource attributes for domains, subsystem, and service in specifications.
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 5.2.4.3 Key Issue #2.3: Optimize the handling of the ASN.1 attributes
| This key issue addresses REQ-3GPP6GCH-DOC-02.
Optimize the handling of the information elements and ASN.1 attributes for domains, subsystem, and service in specifications.
5.2.5 Solutions
5.2.5.1 Solution #2.1: Enhanced CHF for Unified Charging Data
This solution addresses Key Issue #2.1 and proposes enhancing the existing CHF to natively support 6G charging service interfaces while maintaining backward compatibility with 5G charging messages. This enhanced CHF will process and correlate cross-generation charging data uniformly.
5.2.6 Evaluation
5.2.7 Conclusion
|
96f8bdc68da73f6fda85234415019d6f | 32.801-02 | 6 Conclusions and Recommendations
|
Annex <X> :
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5#163
S5‑254357
Initial skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA5#163
S5‑254818
S5‑254816
S5‑254817
S5‑254819
S5‑254820
S5‑254821
Update of the skeleton
Update of the Scope
Add background for the 6G Charging
Introduce a topic of new charging business models and charging metrics for 6G
Study structure 6G charging architecture
Add the new topic for the charging mechanism
0.1.0
2025-11
SA5#164
S5-255443
S5-255444
S5-255445
S5-255447
S5-255448
S5-255450
S5-255451
S5-255452
S5-255453
Add SA1 requirements to background for the 6G Charging
Update of Business Model for 6G Charging
Add business model for UE assisted services
Add General description for Topic 1 Charging Architecture
Add General description for Topic 2 Charging Mechanism
Add Use Case for Distributed Charging Architecture
Add content on interworking of 6G charging system
Structuring of OpenAPI
Structuring of ASN.1
0.2.0
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 1 Scope
| The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the NR Femto network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases. It also specifies the requirements and test cases unique to the NR Femto network product class.…
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.545, “Security aspects of NR Femto”.
[5] 3GPP TS 33.320: "Security of Home Node B (HNB) / Home evolved Node B (HeNB)".
[6] 3GPP TS 33.511: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next generation Node B (gNodeB) network product class".
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 3.2 Symbols
| Void.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
Void.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4 NR Femto-specific security requirements and related test cases
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.1 Introduction
| NR Femto-specific security requirements include both requirements derived from NR Femto-specific security functional requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to NR Femto as described in TR 33.926 [2]. Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network product classes have been captured in TS 33.117 [3] and are not repeated in the present document.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2 NR Femto-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains NR Femto-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the NR Femto deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.2.0 General
| The general approach in TS 33.117 [3] clause 4.2.2.1 applies to the NR Femto network product class.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.2.1 NR Femto Device Authentication failure
| Requirement Name: NR Femto device authentication failure
Requirement Reference: TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.21
Requirement Description: Device mutual authentication between NR Femto and SeGW shallis expected to be performed using IKEv2 certificate-based authentication as specified in TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.21 and in TS 33.320 [5], clause 5.2.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [2], Annex Y, Assets and threats specific to the NR Femto
Test Case:
Test Name: TC_NR_ Femto_ device_ authentication_FAILURE
Purpose:
Verify that the mutual authentication between NR Femto and SeGW is supported.
Pre-Conditions:
- Test environment with NR Femto and SeGW.
- Both NR Femto and SeGW network product are connected in emulated/real network environment.
- The NR Femto is provisioned with correct device certificate.
- The SeGW is not configured with the root CA certificate of NR Femto.
Execution Steps
1) Test A:
2) The NR Femto sends an IKE_SA_INIT request to the SeGW, then the SeGW sends IKE_SA_INIT response.
3) The SeGW mutually exchanges the certificate with the NR Femto, and both verify the identity with each other in IKE_AUTH phase.
4) Configure the root CA certificate of NR Femto in SeGW.
5) NR Femto authenticate with SeGW again.
Expected Results:
In step 2, device mutual authentication fails. The communication between NR Femto and SeGW cannot be established. SeGW sends out IKE notification with authentication failure cause.
In step 4, device mutual authentication succeeds. The communication between NR Femto and SeGW is established.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interfaces for each step, between NR Femto and SeGW, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of screenshot/screen-capture or pcap traces or IKEv2 traces.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.2.2 Hosting Party Mutual Authentication
| Requirement Name: Hosting party mutual authentication
Requirement Reference: TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.32
Requirement Description: The hosting party mutual authentication is optionally performed by the operator’s network following successful device mutual authentication between NR Femto and SeGW.The authentication of the hosting party is based on credentials contained in a separate Hosting Party Module (HPM) in NR Femto as specified in TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.32 and in TS 33.320 [5], clause 5.3.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [2], Annex Y, Assets and threats specific to the NR Femto
Test Case:
Test Name: TC_Hosting_ party_ mutual_ authentication
Purpose:
Verify that the mutual authentication between Hosting Party Module in NR Femto and SeGW is optionally supported .
Pre-Conditions:
- Test environment with NR Femto with Hosting Party Module, SeGW and AAA server.
- The secret key (K) used for HP authentication is stored in the HPM.
- Hosting Party Authentication is activated.
- Both NR Femto, SeGW and AAA server network product are connected in emulated/real network environment.
Execution Steps
Test A:
1) NR Femto establishes IPSec connection with SeGW.
Expected Results:
The IPSec connection succeeds, NR Femto can communicate with the network. In the Access Request/response message between SeGW and AAA server, there is EAP-request/response. In final EAP message, EAP-succeed/EAP-fail is returned.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interfaces for each step, between NR Femto and SeGW, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of screenshot/screen-capture or pcap traces or IKEv2 traces.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3 Technical Baseline
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.1 Introduction
| The present clause provides baseline technical requirements.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.2 Protecting data and information
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.2.1 Protecting data and information – general
| There are no NR Femto-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.1 of TS 33.511[6]
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.2.2 Protecting data and information – unauthorized viewing
| There are no NR Femto-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.2 of TS 33.511[6]
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.2.3 Protecting data and information in storage
| There are no NR Femto-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.3 of TS 33.511[6]
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.2.4 Protecting data and information in transfer
| There are no NR Femto-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.511[6]
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.2.5 Logging access to personal data
| There are no NR Femto-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.5 of TS 33.511[6]
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.3 Protecting availability and integrity
| There are no NR Femto-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.3 of TS 33.511[6]
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.4 Authentication and authorization
| Editor’s Note: This clause is FFS.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.5 Protecting sessions
| There are no NR Femto-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.5 of TS 33.511[6]
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.3.6 Logging
| Editor’s Note: This clause is FFS.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.4 Operating systems
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.5 Web servers
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.2.6 Network devices
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.3 NR Femto-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.3.1 Introduction
| The present clause contains NR Femto-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
|
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.3.2 Technical Baseline
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.3.3 Operating Systems
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.3.4 Web Servers
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.3.5 Network Devices
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture
| |
73bbea4dcc9f984a76108dc2c2f9575d | 33.546 | 4.4 NR Femto-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases
| Annex <X> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
TS skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253766
Incorporated accepted contributions: S3-253765, S3-253440
0.1.0
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 1 Scope
| The present document specifies general requirements for security related events handling and collection as well as the general requirements to transfer or communicate the security related events occurring at the SBA layer of the 5G system. The protection mechanisms to be applied for configuration and delivery of the events are also specified.
In addition, the present document specifies the events that need to be reported, including how the event is detected and the elements that needs to be included in the reporting.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 29.500 "Technical Realization of Service Based Architecture; Stage 3"
[3] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G System"
[4] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)"
[5] 3GPP TS 33.210: "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security"
Editor’s Note: All instances of stage 3 protocol design will be replaced with a reference to the TS number when available.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 3.2 Symbols
| Void.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 4 Overview of Security related Events handling
| The Service Based Architecture (SBA) is the dominant method for control plane as well as the Service Based Management Architecture (SBMA) is for management communications. In addition to the many benefits of using SBA, e.g. agility to increase and decrease the number of service instances in coordination with demand, potential attacks may still appear for network, service and/or APIs.
The 5G system includes heterogeneous and varied Network Functions (NF) deployments, where each and every Network Function has a specified behaviour according to 3GPP specifications. If any NF runs into errors, e.g. a violation of the normal behaviour, or abnormal access or unauthorised request, then the NF needs to be evaluated from security perspective. Collection of data related to abnormal events needs to be performed for the evaluation of the NF behaviour, with related data being transmitted towards a security entity that will execute the evaluation.
The following figure shows an example of trust domains in the overall architecture for the collection and transmission of the Security related Events detected by NFs.
Figure 4-1 Example of trust domains in the Security related Events Handling architecture
The NF gets configuration of security related events from the Management entity and delivers security related events through the Event transmitter. The Event transmitter could be an independent function or part of the NF. The Event transmitter is recommended to be part of an NF. Whether the Event transmitter is inside the NF, outside the NF and inside the 5GC, or outside the 5GC, as depicted in Figure 4-1, is based on operator implementation.
The Event transmitter, Management Entity and Security related event collecting entity are the end points of the related configuration and collection interfaces. The interfaces for collection of security related events are in scope of the present document. Requirements on the configuration of security related events are in scope of the present document. The interfaces between the Event transmitter and the NFs are out of the scope of 3GPP.
NOTE 1: Operators will define the relationship between trust zones.
NOTE 2: The Security related events collecting entity is under operator control (e.g. through business agreements, policy, managed service, directly managed, etc) and it is out of the scope of 3GPP.
NOTE 3: Whether the security collecting entity is the same as the management entity is an operator decision.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 5 Security related events requirements
| Editor’s Note: This clause addresses the general requirements to secure the procedures to configure, collect and deliver security related events.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 5.1 General Requirements
| The NFs in the 5G system shall support the generation of security related events.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 5.2 Requirements on events storage
| Security related events data shall be securely stored with confidentiality and integrity protection.
Access to security related events data shall be authorized.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 5.3 Requirements on configuration for security related events
| The capability to configure the NFs shall be supported.
The Management entity in charge of configuring the NFs shall support configuring the security related events for event detection and for events delivery.
The Management entity in charge of configuring the NFs shall support activating and deactivating the security related events detection and delivery.
NOTE1: The security related events to be configured are specified in clause 6.
NOTE 2: The structure of the information elements included in the configuration is part of stage 3 protocol design.
It shall be possible to configure the NF to stop sending events in case of overload at the Security related events collection entity.
NOTE 3: There is a risk that there is a DoS attack to the Security release event collections entity which can be mitigated by throttling or disabling event reporting.
The 5G system shall support mutual authentication between the 5GC NF (for configuration/activation of the functionality) and the Management Entity in charge of the configuration/activation of the events.
Authorization to the Management Entity in charge of the configuration/activation of the events shall be supported.
The 5G system shall support integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection for communication between the 5GC NF and the Management Entity in charge of the configuration/activation of the events.
Editor’s Note: Separation of the configuration for security related events from other management related configurations is for further discussion.
Editor’s Note: These requirements and whether additional requirements are needed is FFS.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 5.4 Requirements on delivery of security related events
| The delivery of security related events shall be protected against unauthorized parties. Mutual authentication shall be supported between the end entities of such a delivery.
The delivery of security related events shall be confidentiality, integrity and replay protected.
The delivery of the security related events should be separate from other 5G system traffic.
NOTE: The separation of the delivery depends on regional constraints and/or operator needs. How the separation is achieved is part of the stage 3 work.
Editor’s Note: How to deliver the security events is to be defined by SA5 and/or CT groups.
5.5 Other requirements
The security related events collection entity shall have access to overload related information of the NF.
NOTE 1: Overload related information of the NF can be available through the O&M FM/PM (Fault Management / Performance Management) northbound interfaces.
The security related events collection entity shall have access to configuration related information of the NF.
Editor’s Note: The above requirement needs to be refined.
NOTE 2: Configuration related information of the NF can be available through the O&M CM (Configuration Management) northbound interfaces.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 6 Security related Events
| Editor’s Note: This clause addresses the list and description of the events as well as naming convention for the events.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 6.1 General
| The security related event consists of two parts: common information elements, and specific information elements. The common information elements are specified in section 6.2, and specific information elements are specified in separated clauses.
6.2 Common information elements
The common information elements for all security related events shall consist of the following:
• Event number: A number identifying the event;
• Event name: The name of the event in a human-readable format; e.g., "malformed message"
• Event code: A machine-readable name for the event
• Event Source: Identification of the NF generating the event;
• Event timestamp.
NOTE: The identification of events and the format of the information elements is part of the stage 3 design.
6.3 Security events related to malformed messages
The NF collects information on the SBA layer about malformed messages it receives that deviate from the 3GPP specified messages or are considered invalid according to the protocol specification and network state.
In addition to the information elements of clause 6.2, this type of events shall include the following:
• Message: Security related information about the malformed message which triggers event.
NOTE 1: Including the whole malformed message could lead to DoS at the Security related events collection entity if the malformed message is very large.
• Message type: The type of message represents service operation.
• NF Consumer (optional): Identification of the NF where such malformed message originated.
NOTE 2: The message source and intermediaries are contained in the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header (specified in TS 29.500 [2]) when included in the full message. If the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header is not included, the NF Consumer information is potentially not available. In this case, including the NF Consumer information is left to implementation.
6.4 Security events related to Authorization Failure
The NF collects information about failed authorization attempts from inbound connections on the SBA layer.
In addition to the information elements of clause 6.2, this type of events shall include the following:
• Message: Security related information about the full message which fails to pass authorization.
NOTE 1: Including the whole unauthorized message could lead to DoS at the Security related events collection entity if the unauthorized message is very large.
• NF Consumer (optional): Identification of the NF where the unauthorized message originated.
NOTE 2: The message source and intermediaries are contained in the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header (specified in TS 29.500 [2]) when included in the full message. If the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header is not included, the NF Consumer information is potentially not available. In this case, including the NF Consumer information is left to implementation.
6.5 Security events related to Authentication Failure
The NF collects information about failed authentication attempts from inbound connections on the SBA layer.
When the failed authentication attempt is at the TLS layer, in addition to the information elements of clause 6.2, this type of events should include the following:
- Error details: Additional information about the authentication failure if available, e.g. error message received from the TLS stack or vendor specific information.
When the indirect NF communication mode is used, and when CCA (clause 13.3.8 in TS 33.501[3]) is used, an NF can detect an authentication failure at application layer and can reply with an HTTP status code 403 including the cause "CCA_VERIFICATION_FAILURE" or "TOKEN_CCA_MISMATCH ". Along with the reply, the NF can generate an authentication failure event with the following additional information apart from the common information elements in clause 6.2:
- Message: Full message which fails to pass authentication at application layer.
- NF Consumer (optional): Identification of the NF where the unauthenticated message originated
Editor's Note: Details of the security related event for the CCA verification are FFS.
Editor's Note: How the NF Consumer is determined when the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header is not included is FFS.
NOTE: The message source and intermediaries are contained in the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header (specified in TS 29.500 [2]) when included in the full message. If the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header is not included , the NF Consumer information is potentially not available. In this case, including the NF Consumer information is left to implementation.
6.6 Security events related to massive number of incoming messages
The massive number of incoming messages event may be detected when an NF, including SCP and SEPP, issues a number of HTTP status code 429 or HTTP status code 503 responses to a requesting/notifying NF, or includes the OCI header in a response to a requesting or notifying NF.
Editor’s Note: The security event using HTTP related error codes are FFS
NOTE 1: The event can be detected after a number of overload conditions have been reported (with HTTP 429, 503 or including OCI) during a predefined period of time. The behaviour of NF producers on overload condition is implementation specific so, this event generation is left to implementation and operator policy.
• In addition to the information elements of clause 6.2, this type of events shall include the following: Message: The incoming request message which triggered status code 429, 503, or Overload Control Information.
• Message type: NF service operation that originated the overload response
• Event Source Response: The response generated by the NF Service Producer with problem details (e.g. status code 429, 503, or Overload Control Information).
• NF consumer (optional): Identification of the NF where the message originates.
NOTE 2: The message source and intermediaries are contained in the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header (specified in TS 29.500 [2]) when included in the full message. If the 3gpp-Sbi-NF-Peer-Info header is not included, the NF Consumer information is potentially not available. In this case, including the NF Consumer information is left to implementation.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 6.7 Security events related to SBA parameters configuration
| An NF configuration is received in which related SBA level parameters are changed/updated.
Editor’s Note: This event including its details is for FFS.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 7 Protection of Security related events
| |
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 7.1 Protection for the configuration and enabling/disabling detection of security related events
| TLS shall be supported and used to provide mutual authentication, integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection for the interface handling the configuration and the enabling/disabling of events collection.
NOTE 1: If the interface is trusted (e.g. physically protected), it is for the PLMN-operator to decide whether to use cryptographic protection.
Security profiles for TLS implementation and usage shall follow the TLS profile given in clause 6.2 of TS 33.210 [5] and the certificate profile given in clause 6.1.3a of TS 33.310 [4]. The identities in the end entity certificates shall be used for authentication and policy checks.
NOTE 2: A PLMN-operator policy can use dedicated certificates for this secure communication.
|
24c1742a2173dbd2ae075b250ab714cd | 33.502 | 7.2 Protection for the delivery of security related events
| The protection mechanism to provide mutual authentication, integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection is to be implemented at transport layer.
When UDP is used as transport protocol for the delivery of security related events, DTLS shall be supported to provide mutual authentication, integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection between the Events transmitter and the Security collecting entity. When TCP is used as transport protocol for the delivery of security related events, TLS shall be supported to provide mutual authentication, integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection between the Events transmitter and the Security collecting entity.
NOTE 1: If the interface is trusted (e.g. physically protected), it is for the PLMN-operator to decide whether to use cryptographic protection.
Security profiles for DTLS and TLS implementations and usage shall follow the TLS profile given in clause 6.2 of TS 33.210 [5] and the certificate profile given in clause 6.1.3a of TS 33.310 [4]. The identities in the end entity certificates shall be used for authentication and policy checks.
NOTE 2: A PLMN-operator policy can use dedicated certificates for this secure communication.
Annex <X> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
08/2025
SA3#123
S3-252547
Initial draft
0.0.1
08/2025
SA3#123
S3-252991
Includes agreed tdocs S3-252547, S3-252992, S3-252993, S3-252994 and S3-252995
0.1.0
10/2025
SA3#124
S3-253792
Includes agreed tdocs S3-253790, S3-253791, S3-253793, S3-253794, S3-253795
0.2.0
11/2025
SA3#125
S3-254021
Includes agreed tdocs S3-254125, S3-254672, S3-254673, S3-254674, S3-254675, S3-254676, S3-254677, S3-254679, S3-254680, S3-254681, S3-254682
0.3.0
2025-12
SA#110
SP-251520
Presented for information
1.0.0
3GPP TSG-SA Meeting #110 Tdoc SP-251520
Baltimore, US , 9 – 12 December 2025
Title: Presentation of Specification to TSG:
TS 33.502, Version 1.0.0
Source: TSG SA WG3
Agenda item: 7.1.3
Release: Rel-20
Work Item: SECHAND
Rapporteur: Susana Sabater, susana.sabater@vodafone.com
Document for: Information
Abstract of document:
TS 33.502 specifies general requirements for security related events handling and collection as well as the general requirements to transfer or communicate the security related events occurring at the SBA layer of the 5G system. The protection mechanisms to be applied for configuration and delivery of the events are also part of the TS.
Additionally, TS 33.502 specifies the events that need to be reported, including how the event is detected and the elements that needs to be included in the reporting.
Changes since last presentation:
This is the first presentation to TSG SA
Outstanding Issues:
A number of notes are still indicating further discussion is needed with regards to stage 3 implementations and capabilities from the 5GC NFs to detect and deliver the events.
Approval is expected by TSG SA#111.
Contentious Issues:
None
Change history of this document:
1999-11-17: original issue
2007-09-06: removal of references to Working Groups; bring names of TSGs up to date; correction of typo
2015-01-06: adds tdoc header & removes redundant information below
2024-11-23: aligns RAN and SA/CT templates by adding information to the header
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 1 Scope
| The present document focuses on the roaming charging aspects related to the reliability and recoverability enhancement of roaming charging interactions, including Local Breakout roaming and Home Routed roaming.
The following items are studied:
- Identify the roaming charging reliability enhancement scenarios and requirements.
- Investigate the potential solutions to support the scenarios and requirements.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 32.255: "5G data connectivity domain charging stage 2".
[3] 3GPP TS 32.290: "5G system; Services, operations and procedures of charging using Service Based Interface (SBI)".
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
N40 Reference point between SMF and the CHF.
N16 Reference point between two SMFs.
N47 Reference point between V-SMF and H-CHF.
N107 Reference point between V-CHF and H-CHF.
N42 Reference point between AMF and the CHF in the same PLMN.
N41 Reference point between AMF and the -CHF in different PLMNs.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
AMF Access and Mobility Management Function
CHF Charging Function
CTF Charging Trigger Function
NF Network Function
SMF Session Management Function
URLLC Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communication
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 4 Background
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 4.1 General
| 5G roaming charging are specified in middle tier charging specifications. Take data connectivity as an example, the home routed roaming charging, LBO roaming charging with N47 and LBO roaming charging with N107 are specified in 3GPP TS 32.255[2]. The common failure handling includes CTF detected failure, CHF detected failure, CHF as NF Consumer detected failure, Retry handling and Response code handling are specified in clause 5.5 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3]. In order to support more failure handling scenarios in roaming, the enhancement of failure handling will be studied.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 4.2 Home routed Roaming charging
| Figure 4.2-1 illustrates the Home Routed roaming charging architecture depicted in clause 4.2 of 3GPP TS 32.255[2]. The N40 reference point is defined for the interactions between H-SMF and H-CHF and between V-SMF and V-CHF in the reference point representation.
Figure 4.2-1: 5G data connectivity converged charging architecture in roaming Home Routed reference point representation
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 4.3 Local Breakout Roaming charging
| Figure 4.3-1 illustrates the Local Breakout roaming charging with N47 architecture, as specified in clause 4.2.6 of 3GPP TS 32.255[2]. The N47 reference point is defined for the interactions between V-SMF and H-CHF.
Figure 4.3-1: 5G data connectivity converged charging architecture in Local Breakout V-SMF to H-CHF scenario reference point representation
Figure 4.3-2 illustrates the Local Breakout roaming charging with N107 architecture, as specified in clause 4.2.6a of 3GPP TS 32.255[2]. The N107 reference point is defined for the interactions between V-CHF and H-CHF.
Figure 4.3-2: 5G data connectivity converged charging architecture in Local Breakout Inter-CHF scenario reference point representation
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5 Scenarios and key issues
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1 Topic 1: Local Breakout inter CHFs scenario
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.1 Use cases
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.1.1 Use case #1: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N107 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, there is a charging session between the V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, and there is also a charging session between the V-CHF and H-CHF. When a failure detected between V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.1.1.1-1: An example of failure detected between V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF
The potential charging requirements for this UC are: REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.1.2 Use case #2: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| In the LBO N40+N107 architecture, for a specific PDU session, there is a charging session between the V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, and there is also a charging session between the V-CHF and H-CHF. When a failure detected between V-CHF and H-CHF, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.1.1.2-1: An example of failure detected between V-CHF and H-CHF
The potential charging requirements for this UC are: REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.2 Potential charging requirements
| REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2: charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF.
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.3 Key issues
| |
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.3.1 Key issue #1: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF;
|
0fef1d486bbb01c68f1249794e896413 | 32.872 | 5.1.3.2 Key issue #2: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF
| This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF;
|
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