hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.14.3 Assessment
| The attack is applicable to Implicit grant type and this grant type is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.15 BSP#15: Cross-Site Request Forgery
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.15.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential Cross-Site Request Forgery, as described in clause 4.7 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.15.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.15.3 Assessment
| Redirection URI is not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.16 BSP#16: PKCE Downgrade Attack
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.16.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses PKCE downgrade attacks, as described in clause 4.8 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.16.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is security no related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.16.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.17 BSP#17 Preventing Leakage via Metadata
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.17.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice is for preventing leakage via Metadata, as described in clause 4.10.3 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.17.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.17.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.18 BSP#18: Open Redirection
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.18.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses open redirection, as described in clause 4.11 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.18.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.18.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.19 BSP#19: 307 Redirect
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.19.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses 307 redirect, as described in clause 4.12 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.19.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.19.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.20 BSP#20: TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.20.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice is for TLS terminating reverse proxies, as described in clause 4.13 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.20.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
Editor’s Note: Further usage analysis is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.20.3 Assessment
|
Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.21 BSP#21: Refresh Token Protection
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.21.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice is for Refresh Token Protection, as described in clause 4.14 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.21.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.21.3 Assessment
| Refresh token are not applied in 5G SBA as the tokens are expected to be short-lived already. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.22 BSP#22: Client Impersonating Resource Owner
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.22.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses scenarios of clients impersonating resource owners, as described in clause 4.15 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.22.2 Usage in 5G SBA
|
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.22.3 Assessment
| This practice is applicable to only implicit or authorization code grant types which is not applied in 5G SBA Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.23 BSP#23: Clickjacking
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.23.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential clickjacking, as described in clause 4.16 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.23.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.23.3 Assessment
| User interfaces and their usages are not applied in 5G SBA. Therefore, no further investigation is required.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.24 BSP#24: Attacks on In-Browser Communication Flows
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.24.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses potential attacks on in-browser communication flows, as described in clause 4.17 of RFC 9700 [2].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.24.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.24.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.25 BSP #25: Use Appropriate Algorithms
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.25.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses use of appropriate algorithm as described in clause 3.2 of RFC 8725 [5].
Applications are required to accept strong and up to date cryptographic algorithms for JWTs. If an algorithm is weak or not allowed, the JWT are treated as invalid.
Editor’s Note: Further analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.25.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: 6.3.3 of TS 33.210 [6]
Use of "none" algorithm is not supported as specified in clause 6.3.3 of 33.210 [6] already.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.25.3 Assessment
|
Editor’s Note: Further assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.26 BSP #26: Do Not Trust Received Claims
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.26.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the trust of received claims as specified in clause 3.10 of RFC 8725 [5].
• The "kid" (key ID) header is used by the relying application to perform key lookup. Applications ensures validation of the received KID.
• Similarly, blindly following a "jku" (JWK set URL) or "x5u" (X.509 URL) header, which may contain an arbitrary URL, could result in server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks. Applications are to be protect against such attacks, e.g., by validating the URL or to whitelist of allowed locations.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.26.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: 13.3.8.2 of TS 33.501[z]
In 5G SBA, specifically with in the use of CCA tokens 13.3.8.2 of TS 33.501[3] where the use of x5u is pertinent, the x5u URL are not public or arbitrary and are assumed to be trusted via operator managed PKI, though the possibility of the CCA token bypass still exist.
Reference: 6.3.3.3 of TS 33.210[6]
In the aforementioned specification, the usage and support of x5u is available but without mentioning further details on the validation of the x5u URL.
Reference: 6.3.3.1 of TS 33.210[6]
In the aforementioned specification, the usage and support of “kid” header is available with further check made by the end point that the indicated "alg" in the JWT matches the “alg” pointed by the “kid” parameter.
Editor’s Note: Further analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.26.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.27 BSP #27: Use Explicit Typing
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.27.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the Use of Explicit Typing as specified in clause 3.11 of RFC 8725 [5].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.27.2 Usage in 5G SBA
|
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.27.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.28 BSP #28: Validate Issuer and Subject
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.28.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the Validate Issuer and Subject as specified in clause 3.8 of RFC 8725 [5].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.28.2 Usage in 5G SBA
|
Editor’s Note: Analysis on usage is FFS.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.28.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.29 BSP #29: Use and Validate Audience
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.29.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses the Use and Validate Audience as specified in clause 3.9 of RFC 8725 [5].
Editor’s Note: Further description is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.29.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| Reference: 13.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.501 [3]:
In 5G SBA, "aud" claim (e.g NF type of the NF Service Producer) is currently applied.
Editor’s Note : Further analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.29.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.30 BSP#30: Validate Cryptographic Inputs
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.30.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Validate Cryptographic Inputs, as described in clause 3.4 of RFC 8725 [5]. While using Elliptic Curve cryptography (like ECDH-ES) for key exchange, it’s important to make sure that the input keys or points are valid, meaning they actually belong to the correct curve and aren’t maliciously crafted.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.30.2 Usage in 5G SBA
|
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.30.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.31 BSP#31: Ensure Cryptographic Keys Have Sufficient Entropy
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.31.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Ensure Cryptographic Keys Have Sufficient Entropy, as described in clause 3.5 of RFC 8725 [5]. Cryptographic keys must be truly random and strong and not predictable.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.31.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| The security related usage exists in 5G SBA but it is implementation specific.
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.31.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.32 BSP#32: Avoid Compression of Encryption Inputs
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.32.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Avoid Compression of Encryption Inputs, as described in clause 3.6 of RFC 8725 [5]. Avoid Compression of Encryption Inputs means do not compress data before encrypting it, because compression can create patterns that attackers can exploit to recover secret information from the encrypted data.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.32.2 Usage in 5G SBA
|
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.32.3 Assessment
|
Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.33 BSP#33: Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different Kinds of JWTs
| |
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.33.1 Description of best practice
| This best practice addresses Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different Kinds of JWTs, as described in clause 3.12 of RFC 8725 [5].
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.33.2 Usage in 5G SBA
| There is no security related usage in 5G SBA.
Editor’s Note: Analysis on the usage is FFS
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 5.33.3 Assessment
| Editor’s Note: Assessment is FFS
5.X BSP#X: <Title>
5.X.1 Description of best practice
Editor’s Note: This clause identifies and documents the target measure/practice and includes the precise reference from RFC 9700 and RFC 8725. The intention is not to copy content but a condense summary of the exact practice/measure captured from the RFCs.
5.X.2 Usage in 5G SBA
Editor’s Note: This clause discusses for the security related mechanism that are outlined in the RFC 9700 and RFC 8725 whether and how those are being applied in current 3GPP specifications, e.g., token replay, token validation, JWT signature bypass, etc. References to the specification clause in 33.501 will be given.
Reference:
A summary of the TS text reference
Reference:
A summary of the TS text reference
5.X.3 Assessment
Editor’s Note: Short info on whether controls/measures in SBA are optional and mandatory / applied or not applied. reference to the suggestion from RFC on mitigation for controls not applied.
|
254f23373f86c36e3e0d9caffefce736 | 33.755 | 6 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause provides a conclusion for relevant assessment results. Whether the best practice is relevant in 5G and whether it has been applied? Statement on what to do with relevant best practices that are not applied in 5G?
Editor’s Note: Provide a statement on whether future steps are envisioned.
Annex A (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10-17
SA3#124
S3-253778
Skeleton
0.0.1
2025-10-20
SA3#124
S3-253736
Incorporate pCR’s S3-253498, S3-253499
0.1.0
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 1 Scope
| The scope of this document is to study the security aspects of the solutions provided in TR 29.867 [2].
NOTE 1: The potential solutions are assumed to not weaken the IMS security.
NOTE 2: It is assumed that the same PLMN has control of both the IMS system and 5GC.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 29.867: "Study on IMS resiliency".
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 4 Overview
| Editor’s Note: This clause includes the overview applicable for the study.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#X
KI#Y
KI#Z
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31 | 33.768 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex <X>: Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253609
Skeleton for TR 33.768
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253724
S3‑253754
0.1.0
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the complexities involved with the introduction of standalone and/or hybrid Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms in existing security protocols used by 5G specifications. These security protocols and their associated algorithms have been listed in TR 33.938 [2] “3GPP Cryptographic Inventory”. Specifically,
• Studies principles and attributes of PQC relevant to use in 3GPP procedures.
- Studies the impact of using hybrid and standalone PQC algorithms in 3GPP procedures
- Impact to 3GPP procedures due to larger length of PQC key, signature, and message compared to the length of those in traditional cryptography.
- Determines security levels (I-V) required to align with existing 3GPP procedures level of assurance.
- Studies the suitability of classes of post-quantum signature algorithms (e.g., lattice-based, hash-based) to 3GPP procedures.
• Identifies the protocols with asymmetric cryptography listed in TR 33.938 [2] that are not expected to be updated by other Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) in a near future to use PQC, e.g., MIKEY-SAKKE and SUCI calculation
• Studies security threats and alternative solutions for the 3GPP procedures if they are not updated to use PQC.
• Documents the expected timeline for when security protocols defined by other SDOs will include PQC algorithms and be available for inclusion into 3GPP procedures. The timeline includes the availability of stable protocols.
• Studies solutions to update 3GPP defined security protocols (for example SUCI calculation) to use the appropriate PQC algorithm, if those protocols are not expected to be updated by other SDOs to use PQC algorithms.
The present document is Generation agnostic.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 33.938: "3GPP Cryptographic Inventory".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.180: "Security of the Mission Critical (MC) service".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G System".
[5] PQUIP draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers: "Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers".
[6] IETF RFC 6509: ''MIKEY-SAKKE: Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)''.
[7] IETF RFC 9794: "Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes".
[8] NIST IR 8547: "Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards".
[9] SECG SEC 1: "Recommended Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, 2009. Available at http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf.
[10] SECG SEC 2: "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", Version 2.0, 2010. Available at http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf.
[11] EU, Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/eu-reinforces-its-cybersecurity-post-quantum-cryptography
[12] UK NCSC, Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines
[13] NSA, The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF
[14] ANSSI, Guide des Mécanismes cryptoraphiques
https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2021/03/anssi-guide-mecanismes_crypto-2.04.pdf
[15] ASD, Guidelines for cryptography
https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/asds-cyber-security-frameworks/ism/cybersecurity-guidelines/guidelines-for-cryptography
[16] Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Roadmap for the migration to post-quantum cryptography
https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/roadmap-migration-post-quantum-cryptography-government-canada-itsm40001
[17] Swedish NCSC, Kvantsäker kryptografi
https://www.ncsc.se/sv/aktuellt/kvantsaker-kryptografi/
[18] NSM Cryptographic Recommendations
https://nsm.no/getfile.php/1314334-1742808614/NSM/Filer/Dokumenter/Veiledere/NSM%20Cryptographic%20Recommendations%202025.pdf
[19] AIVD, The PQC Migration Handbook
https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documenten/publications/2024/12/3/the-pqc-migration-handbook/The+PQC+Migration+Handbook+.pdf
[20] 3GPP, Release Timeline
https://www.3gpp.org/specifications-technologies/releases/release-20
[21] NIST FIPS 203: "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard"
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203
[22] NIST FIPS 204: "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard"
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204
[23] NIST FIPS 205: "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard"
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205
[24] OpenSSH 10.0 Introduces Default Post-Quantum Key Exchange Algorithm https://quantumcomputingreport.com/openssh-10-0-introduces-default-post-quantum-key-exchange-algorithm
[25] Cloudflare Radar https://radar.cloudflare.com/adoption-and-usage#post-quantum-encryption-adoption
[26] A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/coordinated-implementation-roadmap-transition-post-quantum-cryptography
[27] NCSC (UK): Next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/next-steps-preparing-for-post-quantum-cryptography
[28] PQC Transition in France ANSSI Views https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document/pqc-transition-in-france.pdf
[29] ANSSI plan for post-quantum transition https://pkic.org/events/2023/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/pkic-pqcc_jerome-plut_anssi_anssi-plan-for-post-quantum-transition.pdf
[30] ETSI TS 103 744: "Quantum-safe Hybrid Key Establishment". https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103700_103799/103744/01.02.01_60/ts_103744v010201p.pdf
[31] FIPS 202: "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions". https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf
[32] SP 800-185: "~SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash". https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf
[33] GSMA: "Post Quantum Cryptography – Guidelines for Telecom Use Cases - v2.0"
[34] IETF RFC 5869 "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
[35] IETF RFC 7748: "Elliptic Curves for Security".
[36] FN-DSA: Falcon is a cryptographic signature algorithm submitted to NIST, Refer to https://falcon-sign.info/falcon.pdf
[37] NIST: “Submission Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process “,
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/documents/call-for-proposals-final-dec-2016.pdf
[38] Bernstein, D.J. (2009): "Introduction to post-quantum cryptography ", 2009. Available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88702-7_1
[39] NIST IR 8545: “Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process”, 2025. Available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8545/final
[40] NIST, "Considerations for Achieving Cryptographic Agility: Strategies and Practices," CSWP 39, Jul. 2025. [Online]. Available: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/cswp/39/considerations-for-achieving-cryptographic-agility/2pd
[41] IETF RFC 7696: “Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms”.
[42] IETF: “About RFCs”. Available at https://www.ietf.org/process/rfcs/.
[43] IETF RFC 9242: "Intermediate Exchange in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) "
[44] IETF RFC 9370: "Multiple Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) "
[45] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) ", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem/.
[46] IETF RFC 9593: "Announcing Supported Authentication Methods in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"
[47] IETF RFC 8784: "Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security"
[48] IETF Draft (Standards Track): " Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC ", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth/.
[49] IETF RFC 7383: "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Message Fragmentation". https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7383
[50] IETF RFC 9763: "Related Certificates for Use in Multiple Authentications within a Protocol "
[51] IETF RFC 9802: "Use of the HSS and XMSS Hash-Based Signature Algorithms in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure"
[52] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) ", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates/.
[53] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-DSA", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa/.
[54] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates/https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa/.
[55] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Composite ML-KEM for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem/https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa/.
[56] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "A Mechanism for X.509 Certificate Discovery", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-certdiscovery/https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa/.
[57] IETF RFC 5246: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"
[58] IETF RFC 8446: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3"
[59] 3GPP TS 33.210: "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security"
[60] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-08: "TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze "
[61] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/123/materials/slides-123-tls-wg-status-00
[62] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2058/
[63] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16: "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3". https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/.
[64] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-04: "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3". https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-mlkem/.
[65] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-01: "Post-quantum hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key Agreement for TLSv1.3". https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/.
[66] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-mldsa-01: "Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-mldsa/
[67] IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-03: "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE"
[68] IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-08: "ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE"
[69] IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus-05: "SLH-DSA for JOSE and COSE"
[70] IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-falcon-01: "JOSE and COSE Encoding for Falcon"
[71] IETF Draft (Standards Track): “Use of Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) with JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)”, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/.
[72] IETF Draft (Standards Track): “Use of Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)”, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-hpke/.
[73] NIST SP 800-227 Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, url: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/227/ipd
[74] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification".
[75] NIST.SP.800-56 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography. url: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
[76] Galois Counter Mode with Strong Secure Tags (GCM-SST). https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mattsson-cfrg-aes-gcm-sst
[77] Ericssons comments on NIST SP 800-227 (Initial Public Draft). https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/sp/800/227/ipd/docs/sp800-227-ipd-public-comments-received.pdf
[78] IETF Draft (Standards Track): " Mixing Preshared Keys in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE and in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges of IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt/.
[79] BSI: "Cryptographic Mechanisms", https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Standards-und-Zertifizierung/Technische-Richtlinien/TR-nach-Thema-sortiert/tr02102/tr02102_node.html
[80] IETF RFC 7296: " Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)".
[81] IETF RFC 4555: "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE)".[82] 3GPP TS 33.310: " Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)".
[83] IETF RFC 7515: "JSON Web Signature (JWS)".
[84] IETF RFC 7516: "JSON Web Encryption".
[85] 3GPP TS 23.501: “System architecture for the 5G System (5GS)”[86] NIST SP-800-90A
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
ANSSI Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
CA Certification Authority
CBOR Concise Binary Object Representation
COSE CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
CRL Certificate Revocation Lists
CRQC Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman key Exchange
ECIES Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
FN-DSA Fast-Fourier Transform over NTRU-Lattice-Based DSA
GCI Global Cable Identifier
GLI Global Line Identifier
HBS Hash-Based Signature
HQC Hamming Quasi-Cyclic
HSS Hierarchical Signature System
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identifier
JOSE Javascript Object Signing and Encryption
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
JWE JSON Web Encryption
JWS JSON Web Signature
KEM Key Encapsulation Mechanism
MAC Message Authentication Code
MCC Mobile Country Code
LTS Long Term Stable
MIKEY-SAKKE Multimedia Internet KEYing – Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption
ML-DSA Module-Lattice-Based DSA
ML-KEM Module Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
MNC Mobile Network Code
NAI Network Access Identifier
NCSC National Cyber Security Centre
NSA National Security Agency
NSI Network Specific Identifier
NSM National Security Memorandum
NTRU Nth-degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Units
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX Public Key Infrastructure X.509
PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
PQC Post-Quantum Cryptography
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
SA Security Association
SDO Standards Development Organizations
SECG Security Engineering & Consulting Group
SLH-DSA Stateless Hash-Based DSA
SUCI Subscription Concealed Identifier
SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier
TLS 1.2 Transport Layer Security Version 1.2
TLS 1.3 Transport Layer Security Version 1.3
UDM Unified Data Management
XMSS eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4 Overview
|
4.1 Background Information
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.1.1 General
| The security protocols that use symmetric and/or asymmetric cryptography in 3GPP systems are listed in TR 33.938 [2]. Particularly, 3GPP heavily depends on IETF standards for the usages of public-key cryptography. All the security protocols using traditional asymmetric cryptography are vulnerable to attacks using a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC).
Given the wide variation in requirements, specifications, technical capabilities, and implementation maturity across protocols, this study is organized by security protocols. Each major protocol (such as COSE, IKEv2, JWE, JWS, MIKEY-SAKKE, SUCI, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3) is covered in a separate clause.
This study does not focus on any particular generation of mobile networks and analyses various aspects that will be useful for PQC migration.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.1.2 Transition Timeline
| Editor’s Note: More timeline information from other organizations is ffs.
Countries and agencies around the world are generally aligned on the need to migrate to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The common recommendation is to complete migration for high priority systems by around 2030 and for all systems by approximately 2035. Examples of government-issued PQC migration timelines can be found in [8, 11–19]. Whether a system is high priority or not is determined by a variety of factors such as how long the data needs to remain confidentiality protected and what level of risk is the data owner willing to bear. Some parts of telecommunications systems may be assessed by the network operator to be of high priority.
Although the migration of signature-based authentication in protocols such as TLS and IPsec is typically not prioritized for transition until 2035, transitioning Public Key Infrastructures (PKI), which are necessary to support signature-based authentication, often takes a decade or more, making it critical to begin their transition almost immediately.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the above timelines apply to deployments. For full PQC adoption in deployed systems, it is essential that standards are updated, and stable implementations are made available well in advance of those deployment milestones. The timelines for different stakeholders in the ecosystem, such as standards development organizations (SDO), equipment vendors, and operators deploying the systems are inherently different. Standards bodies need to finalize specifications early, vendors need sufficient lead time to implement, test, and certify solutions, and only then can large-scale deployments take place.
3GPP Rel-20 specification is expected to be frozen in the mid-2027 [20]. Rel-21 specification can be expected to be completed in the beginning of 2029 at the earliest. It should be considered that some vendors and operators require to meet the 2030 migration timeline for high priority systems.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.1.3 PQ and PQT Algorithm Standards
| There are three principal alternatives to traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithms which have progressed furthest in relevant standards bodies. These are ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for digital signature [21–23]. These are standards designed by cryptographers from all over the world, and they form the basis for recommendations from a number of agencies. These recommendations vary between organisations and include both standalone and hybrid transition paths.
Most governments require use of standardized PQC algorithms, such as the already standardized ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) [21–23]. With the publication of ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has quickly moved from research to implementation and deployment. Some agencies recommend standalone ML-KEM and ML-DSA [13, 27], while others recommend that lattice-based algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) be hybridized [26, 28] with, for example, elliptic curve-based algorithms (ECDHE and ECDSA). The hash-based algorithm (SLH-DSA) doesn’t need to be hybridized as hash algorithms are better understood by the cryptographic research community and have also been cryptanalyzed far longer than lattices, and governments currently do not recommend SLH-DSA to be hybridized [28, 29].
ML-KEM is an algorithm for key encapsulation. It is a replacement for ECDH(E) key exchanges (note that RSA key encipherment has largely been deprecated). Both standalone and hybrid versions have relatively mature implementations available (e.g. OpenSSL 3.5 LTS) and are progressing through other SDOs (e.g. the TLS WG in IETF), with the hybrid version receiving more attention. In TLS, X25519MLKEM has already seen massive implementation support. It has been reported [25] that over 40% of all HTTPS client requests use PQC. OpenSSL 3.5 LTS supports ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA. OpenSSH is now using mlkem768x25519-sha256 as the default key exchange [24]. Many IKEv2 implementations support ML-KEM. See clause 6 for further details broken down by protocol.
ML-DSA is an algorithm for digital signature. While the IETF and real-world deployments have embraced hybrid KEMs, hybrid signatures have not seen similar adoption. SLH-DSA is a special purpose digital signature algorithm, owing to its significantly large key sizes and slow operation times — making it unsuitable for general use cases like short-lived certificates or high-throughput applications, but excellent for specific tasks such as firmware signing and code signing where long signing times and large signature sizes are not prohibitive. Implementations of standalone versions of both ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are also available (e.g. OpenSSL 3.5 LTS). There is more progress to date integrating standalone ML-DSA into protocols than either hybrid ML-DSA or standalone SLH-DSA. See clause 6 for further details broken down by protocol.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.1.4 Summary of cybersecurity organisations’ recommendations
| NOTE: Details of the meanings of Level 3 and Level 5 are found in clause 5.1.
Advice and recommendations for parameter choices is provided in e.g. NIST [21], NCSC [27], BSI [79], NSA [13], ANSSI [28], and AIVD [19] which is summarised below:
1. Level 3 is accepted for general use (i.e. situations where AES-128 is currently used). This is a strict minimum for BSI.
2. NIST only provides recommendations on security levels for ML-KEM
3. NCSC does not consider SLH-DSA appropriate for general use and makes no recommendations for parameter choices.
4. BSI specifically recommends the "hedged" variants of ML-DSA and SLH-DSA to mitigate risks from poor entropy sources.
5. Level 5 is required by NSA for National Security Systems (NSS) and recommended for Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Industrial Base (DIB), and those interacting with these systems.
|
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