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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
ANSSI Agence Natio... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4 Overview
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4.1 Background Information
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.1.1 General
| The security protocols that use symmetric and/or asymmetric cryptography in 3GPP systems are listed in TR 33.938 [2]. Particularly, 3GPP heavily depends on IETF standards for the usages of public-key cryptography. All the security protocols using traditional asymmetric cryptography are vulnerable to attacks using a Cry... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.1.2 Transition Timeline
| Editor’s Note: More timeline information from other organizations is ffs.
Countries and agencies around the world are generally aligned on the need to migrate to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The common recommendation is to complete migration for high priority systems by around 2030 and for all systems by approxima... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.1.3 PQ and PQT Algorithm Standards
| There are three principal alternatives to traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithms which have progressed furthest in relevant standards bodies. These are ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for digital signature [21–23]. These are standards designed by cryptograp... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.1.4 Summary of cybersecurity organisations’ recommendations
| NOTE: Details of the meanings of Level 3 and Level 5 are found in clause 5.1.
Advice and recommendations for parameter choices is provided in e.g. NIST [21], NCSC [27], BSI [79], NSA [13], ANSSI [28], and AIVD [19] which is summarised below:
1. Level 3 is accepted for general use (i.e. situations where AES-128 is... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 4.2 General Assumptions
| In the present document, PQC is referred to as cryptographic algorithms that are deemed to be secure against attacks from both classical and quantum computing.
All traditional public key cryptographic algorithms used in 3GPP systems need to be migrated to PQC algorithms. If suitable PQC options are not available, the... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 5.1 PQC security level
| The NIST use the concept of security levels/security strength categories to group algorithms, keys, and protocols related to PQC [37]. Security is defined as a function of resources comparable to or greater than those required to break AES and SHA2/SHA3 algorithms, i.e., key search on block cipher for AES and collision... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 5.2 Hybrid and standalone schemes
| Post-Quantum Traditional (PQT) hybrid scheme as defined in RFC 9794 [7] is a multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional algorithm. Both the PQT hybrid scheme and the standalone PQC scheme are considered in the present document.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 5.3 Cryptographic agility
| Cryptographic agility [40, 41] refers to the capabilities needed to replace and adapt cryptographic algorithms while preserving security and ongoing operations. The 3GPP systems need to consider cryptographic agility.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 5.4 PQC algorithm types and cryptographic diversity
| PQC algorithms can be categorized based on different mathematical foundations. The following are a few typical types of PQC algorithms [38, 5]: Lattice-based cryptography, Hash-based cryptography, Multivariate cryptography, Code-based cryptography, and Isogeny-based cryptography.
NOTE: The types for NIST selected algo... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.1 General
|
According to the inventory in TR 33.938 [2], many security protocols and algorithms used in 3GPP (e.g. (D)TLS, IKEv2, JWE, JWS, etc.) are specified in other standard organizations (e.g. IETF). They are expected to be updated using PQC in the corresponding organizations.
In this clause, the progress of the post-quan... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.2 COSE
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.2.1 General
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.2.2 Current Work in IETF
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.2.2.1 IETF RFCs
| No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in COSE are published yet.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.2.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| The IETF is developing support for PQC algorithms in COSE. The following drafts are relevant:
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-03, "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE" [67], describes the conventions for using Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEMs) within JOSE and CO... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3 IKEv2
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3.1 General
| IKEv2 specified in IETF RFC 7296 [80] provides mutual authentication and establishes Security Associations (SA) for IPsec tunnels. The IKEv2 is also used by MOBIKE specified in IETF RFC 4555 [81].
The IETF IPSECME group has introduced multiple RFCs and Drafts to enable a smooth PQC transition for the Internet Key Exch... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3.2 Current Work in IETF
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3.2.1 IETF RFCs
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3.2.1.1 Key Exchange
| KEM-based Key Exchange
• IETF RFC 9242 [43] introduces a new exchange, called "Intermediate Exchange" for IKEv2 to avoid IP fragmentation of large IKE messages and enable transferring large amounts of data during Security Association (SA) establishment expected for some PQC key exchanges.
• IETF RFC 9370 [44]... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3.2.1.2 Authentication and Signature
| - IETF RFC 9593 [46] defines a mechanism that allows implementations of IKEv2 to indicate the list of supported authentication methods to their peers while establishing IKEv2 SAs. This mechanism improves interoperability when IKEv2 partners are configured with multiple credentials of different types (for example, ECC-b... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3.2.2.1 Key Exchange
| KEM-based Key Exchange
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-03, "Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)" [45] proposes to use the ML-KEM [21] as an additional key exchange in IKEv2 along with traditional key exchanges.
• IETF Draft draft-iet... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.3.2.2.2 Authentication and Signatures
| - IETF Draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-04, "Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC" [48] outlines how Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures (ML-DSA) [22] and Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signatures (SLH-DSA) [23], can be employed as authentication methods within the ... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.4.1 General
| The IETF JOSE Working Group has specified the JSON Web Signatures (JWS) [83] and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [84] that are being used in OAuth 2.0 and other procedures in 3GPP systems. For PQC migration, a few Working Group Adopted Drafts are being developed, as described below.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.4.2 Current Work in IETF
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.4.2.1 IETF RFCs
| No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in JWE or JWS are published yet.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.4.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| The IETF is developing support for PQC algorithms in JOSE. The following drafts are relevant:
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-03, "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE" [67], describes the conventions for using Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEMs) within JOSE and CO... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.5 PKI certificate
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.5.1 General
| The Internet X.509 (PKIX) Certificate is being used in 3GPP PKI systems [82] and the OCSP protocol listed in the TR 33.938 [2]. The IETF LAMPS Working Group has introduced multiple Drafts to enable a smooth transition to PQC in PKIX to provide quantum-resistant security for PKIX.
6.5.2 Current Work in IETF
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.5.2.1 IETF RFCs
| • IETF RFC 9802 [51] has specified algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding format for several stateful Hash-Based Signature (HBS) schemes: Hierarchical Signature System (HSS), eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), and a multi-tree variant of XMSS, XMSS^MT. These schemes are applicable to the Internet X.509 Publ... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.5.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| • IETF Draft draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-11 "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)" [52] specifies the conventions for using the ML-KEM [21] in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure.
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-lamps-x... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.6 TLS 1.2
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.6.1 General
| The TLS 1.2 handshake in IETF RFC 5246 [57] is used in TLS 1.2, DTLS 1.2, EAP-TLS 1.2, EAP-TTLS, and OAuth 2.0. The DTLS handshake is also applied in DTLS over SCTP and can be used in DTLS-SRTP.
The 3GPP TLS profile is defined in clause 6.2 of 3GPP TS 33.210 [59]. Since Release 15, TLS 1.3 has been mandatory for all 3... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.6.2 Current Work in IETF
| TLS 1.2 has been obsoleted since 2018, as superseded by TLS 1.3 in IETF RFC 8446 [58]. The IETF will no longer approve any additions or updates to TLS 1.2, including PQC support (IETF draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-08 [60]).
6.6.3 3GPP Considerations
Since TLS 1.2 will not be updated any further, 3GPP will consider pha... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.7 TLS 1.3
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.7.1 General
| The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol as defined in clause 4 of IETF RFC 8446 [58] is used in TLS 1.3, EAP-TLS 1.3, EAP-TTLS 1.3, OAuth 2.0, DTLS 1.3, and QUIC, and it can also be used in DTLS-SRTP. Since Release 15, TLS 1.3 has been mandatory to implement for the core network (cf. Annex E in TS 33.310 v15.0.0), and starting ... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.7.2 Current Work in IETF
| The IETF has prioritized post-quantum migration in TLS as follows [61]:
• Now (Hybrid + Pure ML-KEM)
• Later (signatures)
• Much later (dual certificates/composite signatures)
The IETF TLS Working Group has planned not to adopt work on hybrid signatures until "much later" [61].
The IETF TLS Working Group has intro... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.7.2.1 IETF RFCs
| No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in TLS 1.3 are published yet.
Editor's Note: several of the adopted drafts are in the final stages and may be published before this document is finalised.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 6.7.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
| - draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16, "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3" [63], specifies combining multiple key exchange algorithms (e.g., classical ECDHE with a PQ KEM) so that session security holds if at least one component remains secure.
- draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-04, "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3" [64],... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.1 Threats
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.1.1 General
| Most of security protocols used in 3GPP systems are specified in other standards development organizations (SDOs). In case that these protocols are not updated to use PQC in other SDOs, the 3GPP system may be vulnerable to attacks based on quantum computation. The clauses 7.1.2, 7.1.3, and 7.2 contain all of these prot... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.1.2 SUCI calculation
| Editor’s Note: If only SUCI calculation is considered, this subclause may be removed. If other protocol, e.g. MIKEY-SAKKE is studied, this subclause is used for each of such protocol identified.
As per TS 33.501 [4] and Table 4.3.2-1 of 3GPP Cryptographic inventory 3GPP TR 33.938 [2], the SUCI calculation is done base... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.1.3 MIKEY-SAKKE key exchange
| MIKEY-SAKKE is a key exchange method specified in the IETF RFC 6509 [6]. As described in TR 33.938 [2], it is used in the 3GPP system to securely transport cryptographic keys for Mission Critical Services [3]. It employs asymmetric cryptography for key distribution.
Assuming MIKEY-SAKKE will not be updated by IETF wi... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains solutions to update 3GPP defined security protocols (for example SUCI calculation) to use the appropriate PQC algorithm, if those protocols are not expected to be updated by other SDOs to use PQC algorithms.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1 Solutions to SUCI calculation
| Editor’s Note: If only SUCI calculation is considered, this subclause may be removed. If other protocol, e.g. MIKEY-SAKKE is studied, this subclause is used for each of such protocol identified.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.1 Solution #1 to SUCI calculation: SUCI calculation with PQC enhancement
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.1.1 Introduction
| It is proposed to introduce new SUCI calculation mechanism. The solution is applicable for SUCI calculation in ME.
Preassumption:
• ME supports PQC algorithms
• USIM indicates the SUCI calculation is done in ME
• USIM contains new public key for calculating SUCI with PQC
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.1.2 Solution details
| If the indication in USIM is the SUCI calculation should be done in ME, and operator’s decision is to use PQC to calculate the SUCI, then the public key for calculating SUCI using PQC shall be available in USIM. The ME read the SUPI, the SUPI Type, the Routing Indicator, the Home Network Public Key Identifier for PQC, ... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.1.3 Evaluation
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.2 Solution #2 to SUCI calculation: Solution on PQC for SUCI protection
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.2.1 Introduction
| The ECIES procedure as depicted by the 5G system architecture [21] is the basis for the development of the PQC solution.
For the transition to PQC the relevant functional blocks will have to replace the existing/corresponding ECIES functional blocks.
The following Figure depicts the Encryption based on ECIES at the U... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.2.2 Solution details
| Editor’s Note: Details on the KDF are FFS
Editor’s Note: Details on how this solution could be used for hybrid PQC are FFS
Editor’s Note: Why is MAC verification after decryption is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Whether and how to support hybrid scheme is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Why relevant functional blocks have to replace exi... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.2.3 Evaluation
| TBD
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.3 Solution #3 to SUCI calculation: SUCI calculation with hybrid KEMs
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.3.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes a hybrid encryption approach with both PQC and traditional cryptography for SUCI calculation. The proposed solution uses two different KEM algorithms for key derivation.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.3.2 Solution details
| Editor’s Note: What is the advantage for presenting classical algorithm ECDH-KEM is ffs.
Editor’s Note: it is ffs whether there is no freshness aspect anymore as the stored key will be reused.
Editor’s Note: it is ffs how will the HN identify which key is used if there is no identifier.
Editor’s Note: it is ffs, for... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.3.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s note: Evaluation is FFS.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.4 Solution #4 to SUCI calculation: SUPI Pseudonym
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.4.1 Introduction
| This contribution proposes SUPI concealment using pseudonym instead of asymmetric encryption for SUPI.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.4.2 Solution details
| The Figure 7.2.1.4.2-1 illustrates the procedure:
Figure 7.2.1.4.2-1 procedure of using random number to do SUPI concealment
0. The UE and the UDM are pre-configured with the UE’s SUPI and a pseudonym, i.e., a random value RAND.
1. During registration, the UE uses the preconfigured pseudonym RAND as the UE's SUC... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.4.3 Evaluation
| TBD
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5 Solution #5 to SUCI calculation: Enhancement on SUCI calculations using quantum key
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.1 Introduction
| This solution provides enhancement for SUCI calculations to resolve post-quantum threats to existing ECIES scheme.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.2 Solution details
| This solution describes SUCI calculations using Quantum Channel. The UE can provision Public key of HN and Quantum Public Key. Based on ECIES scheme, the ephemeral public key, cipher text, and MAC tag can be generated as an output. Additionally, using the Quantum Public Key, the cipher text can be encapsulated. The enc... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The steps shown Figure 7.2.X.Y.2.1 are described as below:
0. As a prerequisite, the UE provisions both Public key of HN and Quantum Public key.
1. The UE generates Ephemeral key pair consisting of Ephemeral Public Key and Ephemeral Private Key.
2. Based on the generated Ephemeral Private Key and the Pub... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The steps shown Figure 7.2.1.5.2.2 are described as below:
1. By decapsulating the encapsulated cipher-text using Quantum Private Key, the Home Network generates the cipher-text.
2. Based on the received Ephemeral Public Key, the Home Network generates Ephemeral Shared Key.
3. Using ECIES scheme, Ephemer... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.5.3 Evaluation
| TBD
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6 Solution #6 to SUCI calculation: Enhancement on SUCI calculations using quantum encapsulated key
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.1 Introduction
| This solution provides enhancement for SUCI calculations to resolve post-quantum threats to existing ECIES scheme.
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.2 Solution details
| This solution describes SUCI calculations using Quantum Channel. The UE can provision Public key of HN and Quantum Public Key. Based on ECIES scheme, the ephemeral public key and MAC tag can be generated as a part of output. To cipher plain text, The Ephemeral Encryption key is encapsulated using Quantum Public Key. Us... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The steps shown Figure 7.2.1.6.2.1 are described as below:
7. As a prerequisite, the UE provisions both Public key of HN and Quantum Public key.
8. The UE generates Ephemeral key pair consisting of Ephemeral Public Key and Ephemeral Private Key.
9. Based on the generated Ephemeral Private Key and the Pub... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The steps shown Figure 7.2.1.6.2.2 are described as below:
6. Based on the received Ephemeral Public Key, the Home Network generates Ephemeral Shared Key.
7. Using ECIES scheme, Ephemeral Decryption Key and Ephemeral MAC Key are generated.
8. The Home Network decapsulates the received Quantum-ciphered te... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.6.3 Evaluation
| TBD
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7 Solution #7 to SUCI calculation: SUCI calculations
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.1 Introduction
| Annex C of TS 33.501 [4] specifies two protection schemes for concealing a SUPI into a SUCI. The protection schemes are called Profile A and Profile B. These two profiles use SECG ECIES [9], which is a so called KEM-DEM scheme — combining a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and a Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM). SEC... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2 Solution details
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.1 General
| PQC migration for SUCI calculations can be done by introducing new SUCI profiles, and the new SUCI profiles can be created by extending the existing SUCI profiles with simple algorithm updates. Using such extensions is not a new thing to do. It was also the case when 5G was specified — following recommendations from ET... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.2 ML-KEM is the Most Suitable Option
| ML-KEM is already standardized, and its implementations are widely available. During the specification of SUCI protection in 33.501 [4], SA3 had considered the future need for PQC and therefore specified a maximum SUCI length of 3000 bytes to allow the introduction of quantum-resistant protection schemes. NIST has now ... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.3 Considerations for Hybrid KEM
| When using a hybridized PQC KEM with ML-KEM, it is essential to use a standardized key combiner that preserves the IND-CCA2 security of ML-KEM, hybridization must not weaken the security properties. While ML-KEM is currently the only practical option, the key combiner should be designed in a general way so that the sam... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.4 KDF, MAC, and Encryption
| Any implementation of ML-KEM [21] already support of SHA3-256, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, and SHAKE256, which ML-KEM uses natively — therefore, using SHA-3 for key derivation and MAC in PQC SUCI is a natural choice. Also, SEC1 standard [9], specifying ECIES, published in 2009, says that future versions of the standard are lik... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.2.5 New SUCI Profiles
| This solution proposes that the 3GPP SUCI profiles in TS 33.501 [4] should be updated to include profiles for both standalone ML-KEM and ML-KEM hybridized with X25519 — both fit into the designed length limit (3000 bytes). These profiles should use algorithms from the SHA-3 family (e.g., SHA3-256, KMAC256) [31, 32], bo... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.7.3 Evaluation
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8 Solution #8 to SUCI calculation: GSMA-based solution
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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.1 Introduction
| GSMA published guidelines "Post Quantum Cryptography – Guidelines for Telecom Use Cases – v2.0" [33] to support the planning, setup and execution of a quantum safe cryptography journey for telco industry. This GSMA report contains a detailed analysis of an initial set of Telcom use cases that are impacted by Post Quant... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.2 Solution details
| The solution for concealment of the Subscriber Public Identifier is based on the hybridization between ML-KEM (Level 3) and classic ECC based key exchanged algorithms that is described in clause 5.8 of GSMA guidelines [33].
GSMA solution is enhanced thanks to the addition of Post Quantum ciphertext as input to the Ke... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.2.1 Profile A’ (update of Profile A to support PQC algorithm)
| The ME and SIDF shall implement this profile. The parameters for this profile shall be the following:
- KEM domain parameters : ML-KEM-768 [21]
- EC domain parameters : Curve25519
- KEM primitive : ML-KEM-768 [21]
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitive : X25519
- point compression : N/A
- K... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.2.2 Profile B’ (update of Profile B to support PQC algorithm)
| The ME and SIDF shall implement this profile. The parameters for this profile shall be the following:
- KEM domain parameters : ML-KEM-768 [21]
- EC domain parameters : secp256r1
- KEM primitive : ML-KEM-768 [21]
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitive : Elliptic Curve Cofactor Diffie-Hellman Primitiv... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.8.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9 Solution #9 to SUCI calculation: SUPI Concealment using PQC Shared Key
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.1 Introduction
| To counter the threat of quantum computing to asymmetric cryptography used in ECIES scheme it is necessary to replace existing algorithms with new, quantum-resistant Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) ML-KEM algorithms proposed by NIST [21].
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2 Solution details
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The PQC shared key generation scheme is implemented such that for computing a fresh SUCI, the UE uses the provisioned PQC-based public key of the home network, and PQC-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) according to the parameters provisioned by home network. The processing on UE side is done as mentioned below.
... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The PQC shared key generation scheme is implemented such that for deconcealing a SUCI, the home network uses the received encrypted PQC shared key, and the PQC-based private key of the home network.
1. Home network (HN) decapsulates the encrypted PQC shared key to derive the ephemeral shared key.
2. HN generates ep... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2.2 Sample profile for SUCI Calculation
| Profile C uses ML-KEM as defined in [21] to generate shared key Z1 integrated with AES encryption scheme.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.2.2.1 Profile C (PQC only)
| The ME and SIDF implement this profile. The parameters for this profile are the following:
- ML KEM parameters : Level 3 (k, lattice dimension 3)
- KDF : ANSI-X9.63-KDF [9]
- Hash : SHA-256
- Shared secret key Z1 : Shared secret field from ML-KEM
- MAC : HMAC–SHA-256... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.9.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
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