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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| To bound the PSK with a specific MA PDU session, it is proposed to use an identity which can uniquely identify the MA PDU session on both the UE side and network side as an input parameter for PSK derivation. It can be the PDU session ID or IP address of the MA PDU session, given that both the UE and the SMF have the PDU session ID and IP address of the MA PDU session.
When deriving a PSK in the SMF or the AMF and the UE, the following parameters are used to form the input S to the KDF:
- FC = TBD
- P0 = ID of the MA PDU Session or IP address of the MA PDU Session
- L0 = Length of P0
- P1 = SUPI
- L1 = Length of P1
The input key KEY could be the KAMF or KSEAF or an intermediate key derived from KAMF or KSEAF.
Editor’s Note: The impact on the SMF for key handling is to be captured in the evaluation clause.
The intermediate key derived from KAMF or KSEAF could be the KSMF, which is derived using the following parameters to form the input S to the KDF:
- FC = TBD
- P0 = SMF instance ID
- L0 = Length of P0
The input key KEY could be the KAMF or KSEAF.
Editor’s Note: The use of KSEAF requires the storage of KSEAF. The impact on the legacy handling of KSEAF is to be captured in the evaluation clause.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the pros and cons of the solution, e.g. whether the threats are addressed totally, how the existing 5G system is impacted, whether there is any leftover issues exists, etc.
|
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.3 Solution #3: PSK delivery during MA PDU session establishment
| |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| According to TS 23.502 [9] clause 4.22.2, when receiving the UE requested PDU session establishment request with Request Type as "MA PDU Request", the AMF supporting MA PDU sessions selects an SMF supporting MA PDU sessions. It is proposed that:
- When selecting an SMF supporting MA PDU, the AMF sends a key to the SMF for PSK derivation.
The SMF determines to use MPQUIC for the new PDU session based on TS 23.502 [9] clause 4.22.2, then selects and configures the selected UPF supporting MPQUIC. It is proposed that:
- When determining that MPQUIC is to be used for the PDU session, the SMF derives the PSK;
- When configuring the UPF, the SMF provides the derived PSK to the UPF.
On the UE side, when the UE receives a PDU Session Establishment Accept message indicating that the requested MA PDU session was successfully established, the message will include the ATSSS rules for the MA PDU session derived by SMF. If MPQUIC functionality is supported for the MA PDU Session, the SMF will include the "MPQUIC link-specific multipath" addresses/prefixes of the UE and the MPQUIC proxy information that corresponds to the activated MPQUIC-based steering functionality in the ATSSS rules. It is proposed that:
- The UE derives the PSK when receiving the ATSSS rules from the SMF containing the "MPQUIC link-specific multipath" addresses/prefixes of the UE and the MPQUIC proxy information.
- The UE then uses the derived PSK to authenticate with the UPF using MPQUIC/TLS protocol.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| The detailed procedure is shown in Figure 6.3.2-1.
Figure 6.3.2-1: MPQUIC/TLS Security Establishment during MA PDU session establishment
1. The UE provides Request Type as "MA PDU Request" in UL NAS Transport message and its ATSSS capabilities in PDU Session Establishment Request message.
2. Based on Request Type as "MA PDU Request" received from the UE, if the AMF supports MA PDU sessions, the AMF selects an SMF which supports MA PDU sessions. The AMF informs the SMF that the request is for a MA PDU Session by including "MA PDU Request" indication.
In addition, the AMF may send a derived PSK to the SMF or send a root key to the SMF for PSK derivation.
The root key could be the KSMF derived from KAMF or KSEAF.
3. The SMF retrieves, via Session Management subscription data, the information whether the MA PDU session is allowed or not.
4. The SMF returns a Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext Response to the AMF.
5. The SMF determines the ATSSS capabilities supported for the MA PDU Session taking into consideration the ATSSS capabilities provided by the UE and per DNN configuration on SMF. The SMF initiates an N4 Session Establishment/Modification procedure with the selected UPF. If the MPQUIC functionalities are supported for the MA PDU Session, the SMF instructs the UPF to activate the corresponding functionalities for this MA PDU Session. The SMF receives the UE IP address of the MA PDU session from the UPF.
6. Upon receiving a positive N4 Session Establishment/Modification Response, the SMF derives the PSK from the root key if received from the AMF.
Alternatively, the SMF can also decide to derive the PSK at step #12 after receiving positive PDU session response from the AMF.
If the AMF does not send a root key in step #2, the SMF sends a key request to the AMF/SEAF to acquire the PSK derived by the AMF/SEAF or retrieve the root key before deriving the PSK.
The PSK derivation refers to solution #2.
7. The SMF sends the Namf_Communication_N1N2MessageTransfer message to the AMF.
8. The AMF sends the PDU Session Request message to the gNB.
9. The gNB issues AN specific signalling exchange with the UE that is related with the NAS information received from SMF.
10a. Upon receiving the ATSSS rule in the NAS message from the AMF, if ATSSS rule contains the "MPQUIC link-specific multipath" addresses/prefixes of the UE and the MPQUIC proxy information, the UE determines to derive the PSK from the root key in the same way as the AMF or SMF.
10b. After AN specific signalling exchange with the UE, the gNB returns the PDU Session Response message to the AMF.
11. The AMF sends the Nsmf_PDUSession_UpdateSMContext Request to forward the N2 SM information received from gNB to the SMF.
12. The SMF derives the PSK if not received in step #2 or not derived in step #6.
13. The SMF sends the PSK to the UPF in the N4 Session Modification Request.
14. The UE and UPF perform authenticate using MPQUIC/TLS based on the PSK.
15. The UPF returns the N4 Session Modification Response to the SMF.
Editor’s Note: Key update for reauthentication is FFS.
In the case of home-routed roaming as specified in TS 23.502 [9] clause 4.22.2.2, the PSK can also be delivered during MA PDU session establishment procedure. However, if the root key for PSK derivation is from the serving network, while the PSK is used in the home network (H-UPF), key separation between different PLMNs needs to be ensured. There are two options to achieve key separation in two PLMNs:
1. No key delivery from serving network to home network by using a key in home network as the root key
For this option, the NF in serving network (V-AMF/V-SMF) does not deliver the PSK to the home network (H-SMF). The H-SMF requests the PSK from the AUSF, which is derived from KAUSF using the same KDF in solution #2. Then the H-SMF delivers the PSK to the H-UPF.
The H-SMF also needs to send an indication to the UE to inform the UE of home-routed roaming, so that the UE is able to determine to derive the PSK using KAUSF rather than KAMF/KSEAF.
2. Key delivered from serving network to home network and refreshed by the home network for key separation
For this option, the AMF derives the PSK or an intermediate key (KHSMF) and delivers the key to the H-SMF via the V-SMF. In order to achieve key separation, the H-SMF derives a new PSK based on the key received from the V-SMF. The parameter for new PSK derivation is a parameter shared only between the UE and the home network (e.g. a parameter preconfigured in the UE and home network). With such parameter, the new PSK in the home network cannot be derived by the serving network, hence the key separation is achieved.
The H-SMF also needs to send an indication to the UE to inform the UE of home-routed roaming case, so that the UE is able to determine to derive a new PSK in the same way as the H-SMF using the preconfigured parameter shared with the home network.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| The solution also addresses the home-routed roaming scenario, while ensuring key separation between serving and home networks.
Option 1 requires new procedure and messages initiated by the SMF towards the AUSF for key retrieval. An additional impact on the AUSF is that it is required to store KAUSF and derive PSK from KAUSF. An additional impact on the SMF is that it needs to send an indication to inform the UE of the home-routed case or the correct root key for PSK derivation. The limitation of this option is that it does not work in the case that the UE is authenticated in 4G network.
Option 2 does not require new procedure and messages, but has an impact on the SMF and the UE, which are required to derive a new PSK using the key from the serving network. The SMF also needs to send an indication to inform the UE of the home-routed case or additional round of derivation for a new PSK. In addition, both the UE and the SMF in home network are required to be preconfigured with a shared parameter for deriving the new PSK. The limitation of this option is that it depends on the visited network supporting the relevant functionality of this solution.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.4 Solution #4: Using 5G security context to derive authentication pre-shared key for MPQUIC
| |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #1 “PSK support for MPQUIC TLS”.
This solution proposes to derive authentication pre-shared key from the 5G security context to establish the security of MPQUIC for UE and UPF.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.4.2.1 The procedure for PSK retrieval
| Considering UE and network already generated shared security context during the registration procedure, a sub-level shared key can be generated, and be used as a pre-shared key for MPQUIC.
AMF derives the KUPF from KAMF during the PDU session establishment procedure as shown in the following procedure (Figure 6.4.2.1).
Figure 6.4.2.1 MA PDU session using MPQUIC functionality establishment procedure
1. UE sends PDU session request to AMF which carries an MA PDU request type, PDU session ID and ATSSS capability for the UE as defined in TS 23.502[9].
2-3. AMF selects MA PDU session enabled SMF and forwards PDU session request to SMF as defined in TS 23.502[9].
4. The SMF determines whether the MA PDU session is allowed or not based on operator policy and subscription data, and selects ATSSS enabled UPF as defined in TS 23.502[9]. If the SMF activates MPQUIC functionality, it will derive ATSSS rules and N4 rules for the MA-PDU session as defined in TS 23.502[9].
In home-routed scenario, according to TS 23.502[9], the AMF may select a V-SMF and a H-SMF that support MA PDU sessions. Then SMF in this step and the followings are the H-SMF, the UPF in this step and the followings are H-UPF and the communication between V-AMF and H-SMF is forwarded by the V-SMF.
5. SMF send key request to AMF which carries the UE’s SUPI and PDU session ID,
6. AMF derives KUPF for the UE according to the PDU session ID, generates a KID from PDU session ID and the corresponding UE ID (i.e. SUPI), and sends the KUPF and KID to SMF.
7. Then the SMF initiates the N4 Session Establishment procedure with the selected UPF and sends the KUPF and KID to UPF.
8. The UPF stores the KUPF and the KID for the KUPF.
9. The UPF sends the N4 Session Establishment response message to the SMF.
10-11. Since the UE and the UPF can use certificate or pre-shared key to establish MPQUIC connection. The SMF sends the Using_PSK_indication to the UE in order to inform UE to use PSK for MPQUIC connection establishment.
12. UE derives the key KUPF used for authentication of MPQUIC between UE and UPF according to the Using_PSK_indication and generates KID for KUPF using PDU session ID and its own identifier as defined in clause 6.4.2.4.
13. The UE starts the MPQUIC Establishment procedure to the UPF, and uses KUPF as pre-shared key and KID as the pre-shared key identifier to do the TLS handshake and authentication procedure.
Editor’s Note: Key update for reauthentication is FFS.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.4.2.2 Key hierarchy
| The key hierarchy defined in TS 33.501[2] for this scenario can be extended as follows:
Figure 6.4.2.2 Key hierarchy for KUPF retrieval
A new key KUPF is derived from KAMF as depicted in Figure 6. 4.2.2.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.4.2.3 KUPF generation
| The KUPF is generated by KAMF using the following input parameters.
- FC = 0xXX
- P0 = PDU session ID
- L0 = length of PDU session ID
- P1 = NAS Uplink COUNT value
- L1 = length of NAS Uplink COUNT value
The input key KEY is KAMF.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.4.2.4 Key ID generation
| The Key ID is generated from the PDU session ID and UE ID (i.e. SUPI) as follows:
KID = H(SUPI)|| PDU session ID
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| This solution proposes a solution of deriving authentication pre-shared key from the 5G security context to establish the security of MPQUIC for UE and UPF.
AMF has to derive a key for UPF after SMF determines that MPQUIC functionality will be used and send a request to AMF. UPF has to store the key and the corresponding key identifier in order to use it in the following TLS handshake procedure. For the UE side, KUPF will be derived after the UE receives an Using_PSK_indication indicator from the SMF.
This solution can be used in home-routed roaming scenario. The communication between V-AMF and H-SMF is forwarded by V-SMF as what has been defined in Day one of 5GS.
Editor’s Note: further evaluation is FFS.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5 Solution #5: two layer PSK generation method
| |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes a two layer key generation. The AMF will use KAMF generates a Key KSMF and send the KSMF to the selected SMF. The SMF will further generate KUPF using KSMF, and then deliver the key KUPF to the UPF. Meanwhile, the SMF also generates a key ID, and the Key ID is also sent to the UPF together with the KUPF.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.1 The procedure for PSK retrieval
|
Figure 6.5.2-1 Procedure to get a PSK between UE and UPF for MPQUIC
1. UE sends PDU Session Establishment Request message to the AMF. The message contains the MAP PDU session information defined in TS 23.502[9] and a PSK capability indication. The PSK capability indication is to indicate that the UE supports to generate a PSK for the MPQUIC/TLS between UE and UPF.
2. The AMF selects a SMF that supports MA PDU as described in TS 23.502[9].
3. The AMF sends Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext Request. The message includes the MA PDU session information and the PSK capability indication.
4. The SMF decides MPQUIC may be used based on the decision as defined in TS 23.502[9], and knows the UE supporting to generate a PSK based on the PSK capability indication.
5. The SMF request the KSMF by sending a request message to the AMF. The message includes the SUPI of the UE.
6. The AMF generates the KSMF, and sends the KSMF to the SMF in the response message.
NOTE: this solution will not address the message name in step 5 and step6.
7. The SMF uses the KSMF to generate a KUPF and a Key ID.
8. the SMF sends a N4 Session Establishment/modification Response to the UPF. In addition to what is defined in TS 23.502[9], the message further includes the KUPF and a Key ID.
10 – 12. As defined in TS 23.502[9].
13. The UE generates the KSMF, the KUPF and the Key ID the same way as AMF and SMF before the UE starts to use MPQUIC.
14. The UE sends a Client Hello message to the UPF, the message contains the Key ID.
15. The UPF uses the Key ID to retrieve the KUPF. The KUPF is used as the PSK for MPQUIC/TLS.
16. The UPF replies a Server Hello message to the UE.
17. The rest of MPQUIC procedure.
Editor’s Note: roaming scenario is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Key update for reauthentication is FFS.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.2 Key hierarchy
|
Figure 6.9.2-2 Key hierarchy for KUPF retrieval
Based on the procedure in clause 6.9.2.1, the AMF generates the KSMF by using the KAMF and deliver it to the SMF, and then the SMF uses the KSMF to generate the KUPF that will be further delivered to the UPF.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.3 KSMF generation method
| The KSMF is generated by KAMF reusing the method in A.13 of TS 33.501[2] with the following updated:
- Set the P0 input parameter DIRECTION to the value 0x02.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.4 KUPF generation method
| The KUPF is generated by KSMF using the method in A.13 of TS 33.501[2] with the following updated:
- Set the input KEY to KSMF.
- Set the P0 DIRECTION to 0x01.
- Set the COUNT value is set to the value of PDU session ID.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5.2.5 Key ID generation method
| The Key ID is generated by KSMF using the method in A.3 of TS 33.535[10] with the following updated:
- Set the input key KAUSF to KSMF.
- Set the P0 = "A-TID" to P0 = "UPF Key ID”.
- Set the L0 = length of "A-TID"; (i.e. 0x00 0x05) to L0 = length of " UPF Key ID "; (i.e. 0x00 0x05).
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| The solution considers the backward compatible issue to let the SMF knows whether the UE is upgraded to support generating PSK.
In 3GPP system, all PSKs in the key hierarchy are delivered in one hop only. Thus deliver the PSK to the UPF from SMF is not fully comply with the principle. In case that no new interface is introduced directly between AMF and UPF, it is better the AMF generate a middle key for SMF, and then the SMF generates the key for UPF. The less nodes know the PSK, the better.
The key generation method is based on existing method, the solution proposes to reuse the existing key generation as much as possible. If a parameter can be updated to achieve the goal, then no need to introduce a fully new key generation scheme.
A Key ID is used for UPF to find the right PSK.
This solution needs to change SMF to support storage of KSMF and generation of KUPF and a key ID.
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation is FFS.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.6 Solution #6: Key derivation and delivery to UE and UPF
| |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| The following solutions addresses KI#1 by proposing a mechanism to derive the key inside the 5G core and distribute it to both UE and UPF. Additionally, it proposes a mechanism to initiate re-authentication by deriving and delivering new keys to UE and UPF.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.6.2.1 Key derivation and distribution
|
1. A Multi-Access PDU session is established and one or more ATSSS rules require the use of MPQUIC.
2. The UPF request SMF the pre-shared secret for the session with the UE.
3. SMF forwards the Key request to AMF.
4. AMF generates the new key by deriving it from KAMF. The following parameters should be use as input to the KDF:
- FC= 0xWX
- P0= Random Number
- L0= P0 length
5.a. AMF sends a response to SMF containing the generated key.
5.b. AMF send the key and PDU session ID to UE to identify where the correct session to use the key.
6. SMF forwards the response, along with the Key and an identifier of the UE to UPF.
7. UE and UPF authenticate each other and initiate the MPQUIC connection as supported in ATSSS based on the pre-shared secret, i.e., the key.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.6.2.2 Re-Keying mechanism
|
1. MPQUIC connection has been set up through PSK.
2. Based on internal policies, either the UE or 5G core can require to renew the pre-shared secret. This could include 5G security policy for re-authentication, such as in the case of inter-system mobility.
3. AMF generates a new key through the same protocol described in step 4 of section 6.6.2.1 used during the initial key derivation, but with different input parameters.
4.a. AMF sends notification of the new Key to UE.
4.b. AMF replies to SMF with the new key.
5. SMF provides the new key to UPF.
6. UE and UPF gracefully terminate the current MPQUIC session.
7. UE and UPF establish a new one based on the pre-shared key.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| The solution completely addresses the problem highlighted by KI#1 both for initial authentication of the connection and for update of the key in case of a compromise. The security is achieved by deriving a new dedicated key for each MPQUIC connection, ensuring that each connection is independently secured, and the compromise of one key will not impact the security of the overall system.
The solution impacts AMF by enhancing its key derivation capabilities to support the new use case. Additionally, it defines a delivery mechanism which impact SMF, as both initiator of the procedure and intermediate layer between AMF and UPF, and UPF in the 5G core and the connection towards the UE.
The solution relies on AS security to ensure the confidentiality of the PSK, deactivating the AS security will impact the security of the solution.
The solution supports the re-authentication of UE and UPF based on policy triggers, either on the UE side or general 5G security policy.
The solution is not applicable to home routed roaming use cases.
6.X Mapping of solutions to key issues
Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture mapping between key issues and solutions. If there is only one key issue in this study, this clause will be removed.
6.Y Solution #Y: solution names
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the abstract of the solution to address one or more key issues. Which requirements of the key issue shall be included, and what is the key point of the solution is recommended to be listed here as a guidance for the solution details.
6.Y.2 Solution details
Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the details of the whole solution, figures and flows are recommended to be used for better understanding the core of the solution.
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the pros and cons of the solution, e.g. whether the threats are addressed totally, how the existing 5G system is impacted, whether there is any leftover issues exists, etc.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the conclusions of this study.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025.10
SA3#124
S3-253745
The merger of S3-253753,711,712,713,714,715,717,718,415
0.1.0
2025.11
SA3#125
S3-254536
The merger of S3‑254639, 4041, 4640, 4276, 4641,4644
0.2.0
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7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 23.700-04: "Study on Core Network Enhanced Support for Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML)".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.535: "Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (5GS)".
[5] 3GPP TS 33.210: "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security".
[6] IETF RFC 4279: "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)".
[7] IETF RFC 8446: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
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7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
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7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 4 Overview
| TR 23.700-04 [2] studies transfer of standardized data over UP for UE data collection to meet requirements for AI/ML for NR air interface operation with UE-side model training, all the architecture assumptions and architecture requirements defined in TR 23.700-04 [2] are also applicable to the present document, and any security impact is documented in the present document.
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7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| The architecture requirement in clause 4.2 of TR 23.700-04 [2] is that MNO has full controllability and visibility for standardized data and a UP path is used between the UE and a data collection network function for transferring standardized collected data from the UE using PDU connectivity service provided by a PDU session as described in clause 7.1.1 of TR 23.700-04 [2]. That means the training data between UE and the 5G core will be standardized and it is visible to 5G core and MNO will be data controller.
The key issue aims to address the security issues, such as authentication and authorization for the UE during the connection setup with the data collection network function (Naming and role of data collection function is TBD and subject to progress of TR 23.700-04 [2]). This will ensure only legit and authorized UE are able to share its data towards the Data collection NF.
Another aspect is to address the security issues, ensuring integrity and confidentiality of the UE related data between UE towards the 5GC Data collection NF as studied in KI#1 of TR 23.700-04 [2] to meet requirements for AI/ML for NR air interface operation with UE-side model training.
So, the focus is to identify the means to authenticate and authorize the UP connection setup between UE and NF before the data transmission take place and to study security of the UP communication between UE and data collection NF during data transmission.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| Lack of authentication and authorization may lead to unauthorized access to network services.
Lack of confidentiality, integrity protection in collecting UE related data can lead to disclosure and tampering of UE related information.
Tampering of UE related data in transit can also impact the quality of training data towards 5GC data collection NF and subsequently to external OTT servers.
Lack of user consent may lead to inadvertent UE data disclosure.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS should support authentication and authorization between UE and data collection NF before data transmission takes place.
Editor’s note: Authentication and authorization between UE and data collection NF is ffs depending on progress on the architecture aspects by SA2.
The 5GS should support confidentiality, integrity and replay protection for data in transit between UE and data collection NF.
The 5GS should support user consent mechanism for data collection by the network depending on the local regulations and operator policies.
Editor’s note: whether user consent is applicable or not will be decided by SA3 based on SA2 progress.
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7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security and Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| As studied in TR 23.700-04 [2], training data for AI/ML-based NR air interface operation with UE-side model training may be transferred via the 5G Core (5GC) and then exposed to external OTT servers. The exposure of such UE-related data outside the 3GPP domain introduces security risks that need to be addressed at the exposure interface (e.g., via NEF).
The exposure interface requires mechanisms to:
- Authenticate OTT servers before any data exposure.
- Authorize and apply access control to restrict exposed data to what is necessary for the OTT server.
- Provide confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection of the exposed data during transport.
- Ensure that exposure of UE-related data complies with user consent.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| Unauthenticated or impersonating OTT servers could obtain sensitive UE-related data.
Without authorization, OTT servers can abuse UE-related data exposure services.
Leakage, tampering, or replay of UE-related data at the NEF and OTT/AF interface could compromise integrity, confidentiality.
Exposure of UE information without proper consent may violate regulations and create liabilities for the MNO.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5GS shall support mutual authentication between the NEF and OTT/AF servers handling UE-related data.
The 5GS shall support authorization mechanisms for services related to exposure of UE-related data to the OTT server.
The 5GS shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection for UE-related data during transfer between NEF and OTT/AF.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause captures mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Key Issues
Solutions
#1
#2
#1
X
#2
X
#3
X
#4
X
#5
X
#6
X
#7
X
#8
X
#9
X
#10
X
#11
X
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7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.2 Solution #1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses requirements of key issue #1.
For authorization and user consent check between UE and data collection NF, it proposes that the entity who selects UE for data collection is deemed as enforcement point. Especially for user consent check, the existing mechanism can be reused.
For authentication and communication protection, it proposes that 3GPP network sends security parameters (e.g. PSK) to the UE in protected RRC/NAS message and the UE uses the security parameters to establish secure connection (e.g. TLS) with the DCF for UP data transferring.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.2.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.2.2-1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
1. Data consumer (e.g. UE model training entity server) requests UE data collection to DCF.
2. DCF retrieves UE subscription data from UDM. The subscription data includes:
a) User consent data: existing user consent parameters can be reused.
b) Authorization profile: whether UE is allowed for exposing specific data to specific data consumer.
The DCF can be enforcement point for authorization and user consent check if it decides that DCF is used for UE selection for data collection.
3. The DCF sends security parameters (e.g. PSK) to the RAN/AMF. The DCF may also send UE subscription data to the RAN/AMF to enforce the authorization and user consent check if it decides that RAN/AMF is used for UE selection for data collection.
4. The RAN/AMF sends security parameters to the UE. The security parameters are protected by RRC/NAS mechanism.
5. The UE establishes a PDU session as depicted in clause 7.1.1 of TR 23.700-04 [2].
6. The UE establishes a secure connection using the security parameters to the DCF, e.g. the UE uses PSK to establish a secure TLS connection with the DCF.
7. The UE reports UP data in the secure connection to the DCF.
8. The DCF reports UP data to the Data consumer.
One alternative of PSK generation is that
• UE and Network (AUSF or AMF) derive the PSK independently via the root key (KAUSF or KAMF). For this network sends the random value as a salt to UE; and UE and Network uses the same salt to drive the same PSK.
• Rest of the details of the key derivation is not defined in this solution.
Editor's note: Aspect related to user consent its application and enforcement in any form for UE data collection is FFS.
Editor's note: Applicability and distribution of related security parameter (i.e. PSK) for the purpose of secure channel establishment or applicability of UE subscription data and its distribution to AMF/RAN in any form is FFS.
Editor's note: The need for UE authentication is FFS.
Editor’s note: How the network sends the random value as salt to UE and how it is used for PSK generation is FFS.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| TBA
Editor's note: The evaluation is made based on SA2 conclusion.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.3 Solution #2: Security for Data Collection using a DCF
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1.
This solution builds on TR 23.700-04 (for the standardized transfer of standardized data over UP for UE-side data collection) and introduces security enhancements in the 5GS for secure UE connection setup and data transfer with a Data Collection Function (DCF).
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| Architecture scope and roles
- DCF in the MNO domain manages Data Collection Profiles (DCPs) and orchestrates UE data collection and transfer,
Security functions
1) Authentication and session protection between UE and DCF
- The UE establishes a secure association with the DCF using shared key derived from network credentials. Transport security (e.g., TLS) is bound to the shared key. Options for shared key derivation are:
- Option #1: AKMA-based keys (TS 33.535 [4]). DCF acts as a trusted AF, and obtains KAF from the AAnF over SBI.
Editor's note: The role of DCF acting as AF is FFS needs alignment with SA2.
- Option #2: KAMF derived shared key. DCF obtains the shared key from AMF over SBI.
UE sends its 5G-GUTI to the DCF in the ClientHello message. DCF requests a PSK for the UE from the AMF, providing 5G-GUTI. UE and AMF derive PSK using KAMF as input KEY, and parameters including SUPI, FQDN/IP address of DCF.
Editor's note: It is FFS whether TLS implementations allow exporting 5G-GUTI in the ClientHello to the SBA layer.
2) UE authorization and policy enforcement
- The DCF authorizes a UE to participate per DCP, using subscription, consent, and operator policy.
Editor's note: Whether and how DCP is applicable is FFS and depends on SA2.
3) Consent enforcement inside the Core Network
- The DCF acts as the consent enforcement point for data collection from the UE, i.e., checks consent from UDM/UDR for permissions, as per TS 33.501 [3], Annex V.
Editor's note: Whether and how user consent exposure applies will be decided by SA3 based on SA6 progress.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| Editor's note: The need for UE authentication is FFS
Editor's note: Further evaluation is FFS.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.4 Solution #3: Security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#1 Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF by reusing the existing TLS based mechanism.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| The UE establishes the user plane connection to the Data Collection NF, to protect the interface, the TLS based mechanism is supported. AKMA specified in TS 33.535 [x] or GBA specified in TS 33.220[y] could be reused to secure the end-to-end connection between the UE and the Data collection NF. The Data collection NF takes the role of AF in case AKMA is used, or NAF in case GBA is used.
Editor’s note: How to perform AKMA is FFS.
Editor’s bote: DCF acting as an AF and its role is subject to the SA2 progress.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| TBA.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.5 Solution #4: New solution for Security of UE connection setup with Data collection NF
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses requirements of key issue #1: "Security of UE connection setup with Data collection NF", particularly by hop-by-hop security. For authorization and user consent check between UE and data collection NF, it proposes detailed authorization checks against UE subscription data and operator policies at the data collection NF (DCF).
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.5.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.5.2-1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
1. The UE model training entity/server sends a request to the DCF to collect UE data for UE side model training.
2. The DCF checks subscription data for UE data collection and transfer from the UDM.
3. After successful authorization and user consent check, UE and UPF, DCF sends a request to SMF to establish a secure UP connection.
4. The procedure of secure UP connection shall reuse existing UP security mechanisms from TS 33.501 [3] between UE and gNB, reuse exiting NDS/IP specified in TS 33.210 [5] between gNB and DCF.
Editor's note: The authentication between UE and data collection NF is FFS.
Editor's note: Aspect related to user consent its application and enforcement in any form for UE data collection is FFS.
Editor's note: How the solution covers all the requirements of KI#1 is FFS.
Editor's note: How the UE perform data collection and its dependency on the solution is subject to SA2 progress.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.6 Solution #5: Secure communication between UE and the data collection function
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses part of KI#1, i.e. secure communication and mutual authentication between UE and the data collection function.
Secure connection is required between the UE and the data collection function, the connection between the UE and the data collection function can be secured by the TLS or NDS/IP and UP security in this solution.
The generation of shared key depends on other solutions in this document.
According to RFC 4279 [6], to enable data collection function to identify the shared key, UE needs to send the PSK identity to the data collection function via ClientKeyExchange message.
According to RFC 8446 [7], to enable the data collection function to identify the shared key, UE needs to send the PSK identity to the data collection function via pre_shared_key extension.
In this solution, the PSK identity is set as SUCI to enable the data collection function to identify the correct shared key.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| For connection between UE and the data collection function located in home network, the TLS connection between the UE and the data collection function can be used for protecting the UE data. The TLS can be established based on key shared between the UE and the data collection function.
The shared key is generated based on mechanisms defined in other solutions in this document (e.g., data collection function generates the shared key, the AKMA based mechanism).
Since the PSK identity is delivered in an insecure environment (i.e., the TLS tunnel between UE and the data collection function is not established yet), the PSK identity is set as the SUCI of the UE when the AKMA/GBA based mechanism is not used.
After receiving the PSK identity (i.e., the SUCI), the data collection function interacts with the UDM/UDR/ADRF to retrieve the SUPI and uses the SUPI to identify the shared key.
Editor’s note: Whether TLS implementations support exporting PSK identity for retrieving PSK is FFS
Editor's note: How the shared key is generated is FFS.
Editor’s note: how SUCI and other user identifiers are used to identify PSK and how and if those are utilized for key derivation are FFS.
For connection between UE and the data collection function located in home network, the connection between the UE and base station, the connection between base station and the UPF, the connection between the UPF and the data collection function will be secured. Then the following mechanisms can be reused.
- The connection between UE and base station can be secured based on user plane related security algorithms defined in clause 6.6 of TS 33.501[3].
- The connection between base station and UPF can be secured based on existing NDS/IP as specified in clause 9.3 of TS 33.501 [3].
- The connection between UPF and the data collection function can be secured based on existing NDS/IP as specified in clause 9.3 of TS 33.501 [3].
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| Editor's note: Further evaluation is needed.
Editor's note: How the UE perform data collection and its dependency on the solution is subject to SA2 progress.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.7 Solution #6: UE-side Data Collection Exposure
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2.
This solution builds on TR 23.700-04 [2] (for the standardized transfer of standardized data over UP for UE-side data collection) for the secure, authorized, and privacy-preserving exposure of UE-related data towards OTT servers via the 5GC exposure function (e.g., NEF).
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.7.2 Solution details
| Architecture scope and roles
- DCF in the MNO domain manages Data Collection Profiles (DCPs) and orchestrates UE data collection and transfer towards the OTT server via NEF. The NEF exposes authorized subsets of collected data with any applicable post-processing done by DCF prior to being forwarded to OTT servers.
Security functions
1) OTT server authentication and authorization and policy enforcement
- The NEF authenticates and authorizes the OTT server using existing mechanisms, to transfer data collected from the UE based on subscription information and operator policy.
2) Data access control
- DCF enforces access control and visibility of collected data and UE information before exposure outside the MNO domain, with the following:
- DCF applies per parameter access control (e.g., filtering) based on DCP visibility configuration. For example, DCF may replace or filter identifiers not authorized for external exposure.
Editor's note: aspects related to DCP, post processing, enforcement of access control and visibility is FFS.
3) Data exposure toward OTT servers (NEF-facing)
- Exposure is constrained to authorized datasets as provided by DCF.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| Editor's note: evaluation is FFS.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.8 Solution #7: Security and Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This clause outlines the security considerations for AF authentication, communication security between NEF and AF and authorization for data collection procedure between both AFs and DCF utilizing NRF token-based approach. General mechanism to utilise the token-based authorization is specified in clause 13.4.1 of TS 33.501 [3].
As specified in clause 12.2 of TS 33.501 [3] for authentication between NEF and an AF that resides outside the 3GPP operator domain, mutual authentication based on client and server certificates shall be performed between the NEF and AF using TLS.
As specified in clause 12.3 of TS 33.501 [3] TLS shall be used to provide integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection for the interface between the NEF and the AF to secure the communication data.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.8.2 Solution details
| Editor's note: Whether the DCF is a new NF or the existing one is FFS and is depending on SA2 progress.
Figure 6.8.2-1: Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
1a. In case of untrusted AF OTT server, the NEF registers its NF profile at the NRF with AF’s related parameters that includes AF ID, data context ID(s), and Filter info (e.g. AoI(s)).
1b. DCF registers its NF profile at the NRF that consists of allowed list which contains AF ID, data context ID(s), Filter info (e.g. AoI(s)) that indicates whether the specific AF is allowed to access specific set of UE.
Editor’s note: What constitutes the allowed list during the DCF profile registration how this is implemented is FFS.
2. The OTT server sends Service Request towards NEF. The Service request shall contain the AF ID, and data context ID(s), Filter info (e.g. AoI(s)).
3. The NEF requests an access token from the NRF. The access token request shall contain AF ID, data context ID(s), Filter info (e.g. AoI(s)).
Editor’s note: Which input parameters are mandatory is FFS
4. The NRF checks whether NEF on behalf of OTT Server is authorized to access DCF services by comparing the allowed list parameters that contains AF ID, data context ID(s) and Filter info (e.g. AoI(s)) received in step 1b and the one received in step 3.
5. If the NEF is authorized, the NRF will issue an access token(s) in response. The token claim shall include parameters as part of the allowed list i.e. AF ID, data context ID(s) and Filter info (e.g. AoI(s)).
Editor’s note: What constitute the access token claims is FFS.
6. The NEF sends service request with parameters as received in step 2 and the access token claims received in step 5 to DCF.
7. The DCF verifies the received access token as specified in clause 13.4.1 and checks for the token claims. The DCF extracts the allowed list parameters i.e. AF ID, data context ID(s) and Filter info (e.g. AoI(s)), and checks whether it matches the one received in step 6.
8. In case of successful access token verification, the DCF returns the requested data collected to the NEF and that is subsequently returned to the OTT server.
Editor’s note: Utilizing specific authorization parameters and overall solution alignment, e.g. data collection procedure is subject to SA2 progress.
Editor’s note: NRF based OTT server authorization is FFS.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.9 Solution #8: Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.9.1 Introduction
| As studied in TR 23.700-04 [2], the CN may exposure the data to the OTT Servers. These data are collected by the CN from various UEs which may belong to different Vendors or TACs. And some vendors or chipsets vendors may have concern to exposure the data of its product (e.g., UE or chipset) to other vendors. The CN needs to consider the concerns of equipment vendors when exposure data to the OTT Servers by verify the vendor ID of AF is in the allowed vendors of vendors for the request data.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.9.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.9.2-1: Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
0. The OTT servers register the data exposure concerns to the CN. The data exposure concerns include: UE information (e.g., Vendor ID, TAC) and its allowed vendor list. The OTT server agree to exposure the data collected from the UE in the UE information to the vendor in the allowed vendors.
1. OTT server as the data consumer send data request to the CN, including Vendor ID of the OTT server.
2. The CN determines the data and checks whether the vendor ID of the data consumer is in the allowed vendor list corresponding to the UE information for the data.
3. The CN return the requested data to the OTT server.
Editor’s note: The overall solution alignment is subject to SA2 progress.
Editor’s note: How the CN NF determines the UE vendor ID of the UE that provided the data is FFS.
Editor’s note: How the CN NF verifies the vendor ID of the OTT server is FFS.
Editor’s note: using vendor ID for authorization is FFS.
Editor’s note: Whether the use case of delegation of authorization among OTTs is in scope is FFS and depends on RAN2 and SA2.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.9.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.10 Solution #9: Secure mechanism for NEF and OTT/AF interaction
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.10.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#2.
Specifically, existing mechanisms defined in TS 33.501 [3] are reused to address the issue.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.10.2 Solution details
| TLS based mechanism defined in clause 12.2 of TS 33.501 [3] is reused for mutual authentication between the NEF and the OTT/AF servers handling UE-related data.
Authorization mechanism defined in clause 12.4 or 12.5 of TS 33.501 [3] is reused for authorizing services related to exposure of UE-related data to the OTT server.
Editor’s note: Authorization part is FFS.
TLS based mechanism defined in clause 12.3 of TS 33.501[3] is reused for protecting UE-related data transferred between the NEF and the OTT/AF servers handling UE-related data.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.10.3 Evaluation
| Existing TLS based mechanism defined in clause 12 of TS 33.501 [3] can be reused for mutual authentication and communication protection between NEF and the OTT/AF servers handling UE-related data.
Editor’s note: Further evaluation is FFS.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.11 Solution #10: Granular authorization for OTT/AF
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.11.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses requirements of key issue #2.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.11.2 Solution details
| When AF or OTT requests UE-side model training data from DCF via NEF, the exposure of such UE data outside the 3GPP domain introduces security risks requiring control at the exposure interface, particularly for authorization.
Figure 6.11.2-1: Granular authorization for OTT/AF
1: An AF/OTT server requests UE-side model training data from the DCF via the NEF, including the Type Allocation Code (TAC). This request optionally includes UEs of interest, and/or areas of interest from which UE data needs to be collected.
NEF authenticate and authorize the AF/OTT via mTLS and authorization procedure defined in TS 33.501 [3], section 12. NEF and AF/OTT data exchange is integrity, confidentiality and replay protected via existing means.
Note 1: AF/OTT server can access data from UEs primarily when the UE's TAC matches the TAC specified by the AF/OTT, or from other TACs if permitted by operator policy/configuration in UDM.
Note 2: The Type Allocation Code (TAC) is the first 8 digits of the 15-digit International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number. It uniquely identifies the make and model of a mobile device.
2: The DCF queries the UDM to obtain UE’s TAC and optionally retrieves authorization data from the UDM. This authorization data includes
- allowed geographical area for data collection, (e.g. UE1 is allowed to collect data at certain location)
- allowed IEs for UE-side model training data
- applicable post processing on IEs before exposure
This authorization data can also be configured locally.
3: Based the information received from the UDM (or locally configured), the DCF authorizes the AF/OTT for data collection for selected UEs. E.g., If TAC does not match, then DCF rejects the request. If UE area does not fall into allowed geographical area, then reject the request. DCF also uses this information from the UDM to select the authorized list of UEs.
If there is a policy to apply post processing on the IE before the exposure, e.g. anonymization, the DCF shall apply the same.
Editor’s note: Whether UDM is the right NF to store these granular information is FFS.
Editor’s note: Aspect related to allowed IEs for UE-side model training data and applicable post processing on IEs before exposure is FFS
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.11.3 Evaluation
| FFS.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.12 Solution #11: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF using TLS
| |
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.12.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1 "Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF".
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.12.2 Solution details
| This solution proposes that the security between the UE and the Data Collection NF is based on TLS. TLS is a well-established security protocol at the transport layer and provides authentication, confidentiality, integrity and replay protection.
Authentication of the Data Collection NF towards the UE can be based on server-side certificates. This requires the provisioning of the root certificate at the UE by the operator of the network where the Data Collection NF is located.
Editor's note: Whether server-side only authentication is sufficient is FFS.
Editor's note: Solution of client cert provisioning is FFS.
For authentication of the UE towards the Data Collection NF there are several options. The operator of the network where the Data Collection NF could provision client-side certificates to the UE. It is also possible to use AKMA or to decide that only server-side authentication is required. This decision needs to be done by the operator of the network where the Data Collection NF is located.
Editor's note: AKMA solution details are FFS.
The TLS protocol profiles for secure support and usage of TLS in 3GPP TS 33.210 [5], clause 6.2, need to be followed. This implies that TLS 1.1 and earlier versions of TLS are not to be supported.
This solution also proposes that authorization at UE and Data Collection NF is based on local policy.
Editor's note: Authorization details are FFS.
If the underlying transport protocol is datagram-based, e.g. UDP, instead of TLS the DTLS or QUIC protocol could be used.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 6.12.3 Evaluation
| Editor's note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
7e61f3f3ff87235057f609e496a8620d | 33.785 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s note: This clause captures the conclusions of this study.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-253064
S3-252564, S3-252988, S3-252990 for endorsed TR skeleton, overview and new key issue
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253259
Create TR 33.785 based on S3-253064
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253703
S3-253702, S3-253704, S3-253706, S3-253707, S3-253708, S3-253709, S3-253710 for new key issue and new solutions
0.2.0
2025-11
SA3#125
S3-254537
S3-254576, S3-254577, S3-254578, S3-254579, S3-254580, S3-254581 for new solutions; S3-254582, S3-254583, S3-254584, S3-254585 for solution update; S3-254586 for key issue update
0.3.0
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 1 Scope
|
The present document has the following objectives:
• Identify and study the authentication and authorization aspects for AIMLE services specified in TS 23.482 [3].
• Study the solutions to address the identified scenarios to support AIMLE service security.
NOTE 1: For the above objectives existing SEAL security aspects [2] need to be taken into account as SEAL architecture is used as baseline for the AIMLE architecture. As the AIMLE phase 2 study progress in SA6 [4], related progress can be taken into account when stable conclusion in SA6 is available if any security aspects need to be considered additionally for this security study.
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.434, "Security aspects of Service Enabler Architecture Layer (SEAL) for verticals".
[3] 3GPP TS 23.482, "Functional architecture and information flows for AIML Enablement Service".
[4] 3GPP TR 23.700-83, "Study on application layer support for AI/ML services Phase 2".
[5] 3GPP TS 23.434: "Service Enabler Architecture Layer for Verticals (SEAL); Functional architecture and information flows".
…
[x] <doctype> <#>[ ([up to and including]{yyyy[-mm]|V<a[.b[.c]]>}[onwards])]: "<Title>".
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 4 Security Assumptions
| The AIMLE security should use authorization aspects specified in TS 33.434 [2] as baseline.
The AIMLE server is deployed as a SEAL server, hence SEAL architecture is enhanced to incorporate the AIMLE service as shown below, where Figure 4-1 illustrates the service-based representation including AIMLE server as part of the SEAL framework as described in TS 23.482 Clause 5.2.1.1 [3].
Figure 4-1: SEAL functional model representation using service-based interfaces and including AIMLE function
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5 Key Issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
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