hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2.2.2 Internal Configuration Manager
| Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-CONFIG
Attacker Name: Internal Configuration Manager
Attacker Description:
This internal actor has control over or visibility into network and service configuration interfaces, such as provisioning databases, orchestration tools, or infrastructure-as-code systems. While they may not intent... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2.2.3 Internal Infrastructure/Platform Administrator
| Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-INFRA
Attacker Name: Internal Infrastructure/Platform Administrator
Attacker Description:
An infrastructure administrator manages underlying compute, storage, and networking resources. They typically have root-level access to virtual machines, containers, or Kubernetes clusters where LI fu... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2.2.4 Internal Analytics or Monitoring Observer
| Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-OBSERVE
Attacker Name: Internal Analytics or Monitoring Observer
Attacker Description:
This attacker uses monitoring dashboards, telemetry pipelines, or data visualization tools to analyse network performance and user behavior. Although not involved in LI, they may observe outliers, such a... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2.2.5 Internal Facilities or Data Center Operator
| Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-DATACENTER
Attacker Name: Internal Facilities or Data Center Operator
Attacker Description:
This role includes physical or environmental access, such as rack technicians, cabling engineers, or maintenance personnel. Though easily overlooked, data center operators may intercept or observe p... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2.3 External Agent
| Attacker Code: AT-EXTERNAL
Attacker Name: External Agent
Attacker Description:
An external agent is a threat actor entirely outside the administrative domain of the Communication Service Provider (CSP). This entity lacks any legitimate access to internal network functions or LI systems, but may attempt to exploit pu... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2.4 Automated or AI Agent
| Attacker Code: AT-AUTO-AI
Attacker Name: Automated or AI Agent
Attacker Description:
An automated or AI-driven attacker is a non-human agent capable of processing vast quantities of data in real time or near-real time. These agents leverage machine learning, pattern recognition, or inference engines to discover anom... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2.5 Passive Observer
| Attacker Code: AT-PASSIVE
Attacker Name: Passive Observer
Attacker Description:
A passive observer is an attacker who does not interfere with live operations but gains access to historical data, telemetry, or pre/post-state snapshots. This actor may compare logs, traces, or service states before and after suspected ... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2.6 Compromised Network Function
| Attacker Code: AT-COMPROMISED-NF
Attacker Name: Compromised Network Function (NF)
Attacker Description:
This attacker class represents a network function that has been overtaken, either fully or partially, by an adversary. The compromised NF operates under the control of the attacker and can serve as a pivot point t... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3 Threats
| |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.1 Threats Overview
| The following table contains named threat types. Each SCAS test can point to one or more.
Table 5.3.1-1: Threat definitions
Code
Name
Description
T-LOG
Log leak
LI activity generates logging artifacts observable by non-LI authorized parties.
T-CONFIG
Config leak
LI activity is inferred by analysing config fi... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2 Detailed Threat Descriptions
| |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.1 Log Leak
| Threat Code: T-LOG
Threat Name: Log Leak
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Certain system or network logs may unintentionally record details of Lawful Interception (LI) operations, such as interface initialization, provisioning events, or errors specific to LI services. If such logs are acc... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.2 Config Leak
| Threat Code: T-CONFIG
Threat Name: Config Leak
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Configuration files or system state snapshots taken before and after LI provisioning may reveal changes indicative of interception functionality, such as new interfaces, active LI modules, or altered routing be... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.3 LI Leak via CPU Side Channel 1
| Threat Code: T-RES-CPU
Threat Name: LI Leak via CPU Side Channel (Pattern A)
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: LI operations may cause observable variations in CPU utilization due to additional processing, packet duplication, or encryption tasks. If an attacker monitors CPU resource usage p... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.4 LI Leak via CPU Side Channel 2
| Threat Code: T-RES-CPU
Threat Name: LI Leak via CPU Side Channel (Pattern B)
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: A refined side-channel analysis leveraging advanced statistical or machine learning methods may identify LI-related process signatures at a lower resolution or across virtualized e... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.5 LI Leak via Network Flow Side Channel
| Threat Code: T-RES-NET
Threat Name: LI Leak via Network Flow Side Channel
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: LI systems typically duplicate or redirect traffic to an MDF or mediation device. This may introduce subtle, but detectable changes in bandwidth utilization, jitter, or packet duplica... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.6 LI Detection via Timing Anomalies
| Threat Code: T-TIMING
Threat Name: LI Detection via Timing Anomalies
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: The addition of LI processing steps (e.g. duplication, filtering, routing to MDF) can result in increased latency or jitter during communication sessions. An attacker may detect the presen... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.7 MDF–LEMF LI Product Flow Detection
| Threat Code: T-TIMING
Threat Name: MDF–LEMF LI Product Flow Detection via Timing
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: The flow of intercepted traffic (IRI or CC) from the MDF to the LEMF may generate detectable timing patterns, especially if LI sessions are rare or traffic volume fluctuates. O... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.8 POI–MDF Link Failure
| Threat Code: T-INTERRUPTION
Threat Name: POI–MDF Link Failure
Threat Category: Denial of Service
Threat Description: A network or logical interruption between the Point of Interception (POI) and the MDF may unintentionally reveal the existence of LI. If LI sessions degrade differently from normal user sessions under... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.9 Session Count
| Threat Code: T-SESSION-COUNT-09
Threat Name: LI Detection via Session Count
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Provisioning of LI may introduce additional sessions (e.g. replicated flows, internal signalling) that appear in session monitoring tools or access logs. If the session count increa... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.10 Interface Security
| Threat Code: T-INTERFACE-SEC
Threat Name: Interface Security Misconfiguration
Threat Category: Tampering / Information Disclosure
Threat Description: If LI-related interfaces (e.g. between POI, MDF and LEMF) are not properly secured using cryptographic protocols such as TLS, an attacker may eavesdrop on or manipulat... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.11 Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Features
| Threat Code: T-FEATURE
Threat Name: Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Features
Threat Category: Information Disclosure / Misuse of Resources
Threat Description: Default-enabled but unnecessary software or hardware features may remain active after installation or commissioning. Attackers may exploit these dormant featu... |
a8e35547135823fb19e74805f967dfe3 | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.12 Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Services
| Threat Code: T-SERVICE
Threat Name: Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Services
Threat Category: Information Disclosure / Misuse of Resources
Threat Description: After installation, supplier-preset, local, or network-accessible services may remain active that are not required for the LI system's intended operation. Att... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 1 Scope
| This permanent document describes the principle and the working method of the Inter Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs), the scope, reference and output of each individual IGC and the overall time plan.
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 2 Working method of the technical Inter-Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs)
| TSG-SA has a responsibility of technical co-ordination within 3GPP. TSG-S2 has been allocated a task to divide the feature descriptions defined by TSG-S1 to a Building blocks or Work packages based on System architecture and elaborate a project plan.
Therefore Inter Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs) are created. The ... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 3 List of IGCs
| 0 General
Coordinator: Alain Sultan, MCC (alain.sultan@etsi.fr)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC
1 Bearer Services and QoS
Chair: Oscar Lopez-Torres, T-Mobil (Oscar.Lopez@t-mobil.de)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC/Bearer&QoS
reflector address: 3GPP_TSG_SA_IGC_Bearer&QoS@list.etsi.fr
... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4 Scope of the IGCs
| |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.1 Bearer Services and QoS
| [editor's note: the scope has to be revised to reflect more clearly that the IGC is only supervising the groups and not providing the actual technical work]
The scope is to provide a consistent definition of the Services and Bearer Services mapping throughout the system: UMTS bearers, bearer management in the contro... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.2 GSM/UMTS Interoperation and Mobility Management
| [editor's note: to be further elaborated by the IGC chairman]
Consistent UMTS/GSM interoperation
Mobility handling within the system, RRC and MM interaction, MAP, consistent mobility management
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.3 Location based services (LCS) and Cell Broadcasting Services(CBS)
| The UMTS LCS and CBS inter group co-ordination ad hoc group shall co-ordinate the work on location services in UMTS and ensure that all 3GPP groups relevant for location services get involved in a timely manner. The ongoing work in T1P1.5 on GSM LCS Phase II shall be taken in account as well.
The UMTS LCS and CBS int... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.4 Packet Architecture and Circuit Architecture
| The technical scope of the “packet and circuit architecture IGC” is to work on the architecture of the packet and circuit domain and protocols.
It contains the following main areas:
1. The identification of new entities and interfaces of the overall system architecture
2. The determination of the principle p... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.5 Security
| This ad hoc group is intended to produce, maintain and monitor the work plan for the delivery of a consistent security specifications for release 99.
The work items being progressed in TSG-S3 are listed in the table below. Each work item addresses a particular security issue and is assigned a particular priority wh... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.6 Services and Service platforms
| The 3GPP Services and Service Platforms IGC is responsible for the following activities:
• establish a common understanding in 3GPP of the VHE and OSA work to be carried out for stage2 and 3 in 3GPP Release99;
• identify the appropriate working groups for carrying out the VHE and OSA work and ensure these gro... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 5 Overall time plan
| [Ed. note: scope to be provided by the rapporteur]
Meeting
Date
Activity
SA2#9
October 25-29, 1999
Define overall workplan. Start work on identifying requirements and issues related to architectural and functional aspects as compared to R99 (TR 23.ywz)
SA2#10
Nov 29 –Dec 3, 1999
Identify additional requiremen... |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 6 Change history
|
Version
Date
Subject/Comments
0.0.0
July 1999
Creation of document
0.1.0
August 1999
Inclusion of comments from SA2#7
0.2.0
September, 4th 1999
Inclusion of results from SA2#8: addition of scope of IGC Security, Bearer and QoS, PS and CS architecture, Services and Service Platform, LCS.
0.3.0
September, ... |
c3e756be2cf10e873aefa14b6b740064 | 30.504 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification;
2 Introduction
The present document shall provide a work plan and study items as agreed... |
27beca56e63e2e84b7c4306bba73a041 | 25.831 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification.
1 Scope
The scope of this Technical Report is to list technical features and functions of... |
fd9931b60fc241f651706643f1ed6e48 | 33.900 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification;
2 Introduction
This document is intended to offer security guidance to those involved in 3G... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies additional architecture support of Ambient IoT for the support of Rel-19 AIoT Devices defined in TS 23.369 [3] in Topology 2 based on the RRC-based option as described in clause 8.1.3.3 of TR 23.700‑13 [7] and support for new AIoT Devices that will support the DO-A traffic type as described... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Definition format (Normal)
<defined term>: <definition>.
example: text used to clarify abstract r... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 3.2 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Abbreviation format (EW)
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 4 Architectural Assumptions and Requirements
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 4.1 Architectural Assumptions
| The following traffic types for AIoT Device are to be studied:
- DT: Device-terminated;
- DO-DTT: Device-originated - device-terminated triggered; and
- DO-A: Device-originated - autonomous.
Common architectural assumptions:
- Architecture reference models defined in TS 23.369 [3] are used as the baseline architec... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 4.2 Architectural Requirements
| The following architectural requirements are applicable to this study:
- Solutions shall build on the 5G System architectural principles as in TS 23.501 [4], including flexibility and modularity for newly introduced functionalities.
- The enhancements to support topology 2 shall not impact Rel-19 AIoT devices.
- Sol... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 5 Key Issues
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: support AIoT services under the RRC-based option for UE Reader connectivity
| NOTE 1: Only CM-CONNECTED with RRC_CONNECTED UE Reader is in the scope.
Only the following aspects will be included:
- How to perform and revoke authorization of UE Readers.
NOTE 2: Rel-19 interim conclusion in TR 23.700-13 [7] should be used as basis for UE Reader authorization.
- Potential impact from how the NG-... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
| This key issue will study the system architecture to support DO-A capable Ambient IoT Devices in Topology 1 and Topology 2.
The following aspects will be studied:
- How the AIoT Device informs the network of its presence autonomously (e.g. an AIoT Device initiated registration-like procedure) and what are the trigger... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6 Solutions
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.0 Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
Key Issues
Solutions
Key Issue #1
Key Issue #2
#1
X
#2
X
#3
X
#4
X
#5
X
#6
X
#7
X
#8
X
#9
X
#10
X
#11
X
#12
X
#13
X
#14
X
#15
X
#16
X
#17
X
#18
X
#19
X
|
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.1 Solution #1: Enable 5G delivery AIoT device initiated traffic
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.1.0 High-level solution principles
| The key technical principles proposed in this solution are summarized below:
1. AIoT Device Profile Enhancement: The AIoT Device Profile is extended to include additional information, such as AF/NEF associations and the device's registration status.
2. Device Registration Requirement: Each AIoT Device must be registe... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.1.1 Description
| The introduction of Device Oriented-Autonomous (DO-A) traffic type addresses a significant gap in AIoT networks, where devices initiate communication autonomously based on available energy resources. This capability was not supported in previous releases and is now within the scope of this Release. The proposed solutio... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.1.2 Procedures
|
Figure 6.1.2-1: Procedure for Enable 5G delivery AIoT device initiated traffic
0. The AIoT device profile per an AIoT device is provisioned in the ADM (AIoT specific UDM). The AIoT device profile includes the following parameters:
- AIoT Device Permanent ID: Uniquely identifies the AIoT Device.
- Last known AIOTF ... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.1.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| AIoT Device:
- Energy Management: The AIoT device autonomously initiates communication based on its energy harvesting capabilities.
- Timestamp support: The AIoT device provides time information indicating when the DO-A message was sent.
AIoT Reader:
- The AIoT reader forwards DO-A messages.
- It may provide energ... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.2 Solution #2: AIoT services support for DO-A capable AIoT Devices
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.2.0 High-level Solution Principles
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 "Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices".
The solution combines registration-like procedure and data transfer procedure and is based on the following general principles to support AIoT services for DO-A capable AIoT Devices:
- The DO-A capable AIoT Device initiates registration-like... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.2.1 Description
| This solution is applicable to both the Direct Connectivity and the Indirect Connectivity architectures as defined in TS 23.369 [3].
For a DO-A (Device-originated - autonomous) capable AIoT Device, the device originated traffic is triggered by the AIoT Device itself for, e.g. sending data to the network.
The principl... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.2.2 Procedures
| Figure 6.2.2-1 describes the DO-A Procedure.
Figure 6.2.2-1: DO-A Procedure
0. AIoT Device obtains radio resource for D2R message.
Editor's note: How AIoT Device obtains radio resource for D2R message is FFS and is to be decided by RAN WGs.
1. The AIoT Device sends the AS D2R message (Registration Request) to the... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.2.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| Editor's note: This clause captures impacts on existing services, entities and interfaces.
|
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.3 Solution #3: Support of Sensor Data Collection
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.3.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution addresses KI #2. It includes a Service Request from AF to 5GS, Parameter Configuration for the service and Data Transfer for the service
|
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.3.1 Description
| The solution is based on the following assumptions:
- Sensor Data Collection Service utilizes Periodic DO-A Sensor Data Collection Service from Device including AF, AIOTF and AIoT Device. It uses Read/Write command type with the parameter Period or separate command types.
- Sensor Data Collection Service utilizes Per... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.3.2 Procedures
| The procedure is shown in Figure 6.3.2-1. It includes Service Request from AF to 5GS, Parameter Configuration for the Service and Data Transfer for the Service.
Figure 6.3.2-1: Sensor Data Collection Procedure
1. Step 1 to step 6 of Procedure for Command in clause 6.2.3 of TS 23.369 [3] with additional parameters.... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.3.3 Impacts on services, entities and interfaces
| Impacts on existing entities:
AIOTF:
- Receives AIoT Command Request for Sensor Data Collection Service from AF through NEF.
- Performs Inventory procedure and then sends Read Command Request with Period and Sensing Parameters.
- Performs Inventory procedure and then sends Write Command Request with Sensing Paramet... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.4 Solution #4: Architecture enhancements to support DO-A capable devices
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.4.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution proposes call flows to support registration and handling of DO-A capable devices. The solution builds upon an AF request that is to be carried out more than once. The core network uses legacy inventory procedure to find Ambient IoT devices. The Ambient IoT devices indicates their support for registration ... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.4.1 Description
| The Ambient IoT devices of type 2b/c may be able to initiate communication independently with the help of DO-A traffic. This solution builds on the principle that the Ambient IoT device indicates support for registration in response to an AIoT paging message. The support for registration may also be seen as an indicati... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2 Procedures
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2.1 Ambient IoT device registration and DO-A execution
|
Figure 6.4.2.1-1: Ambient IoT device registration and DO-A execution
1. The AF sends Nnef_AIoT_Inventory/Command Request (DO-A dependent service request) to the NEF with a service request that is dependent on DO-A. For example, regular reporting of temperature, etc.
2. NEF selects AIOTF as specified in TS 23.369 [3... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2.2 AIoT device capability syncronization
| Editor's note: It is FFS whether this procedure is needed.
Figure 6.4.2.2-1: AIoT device capability synchronization
1. The AIOTF sends NGAP Command Request message (Command request transfer (RAN A-IoT Device NGAP ID, first A-IoT NAS PDU (Command (AIoT device capability request indication)))) to the reader. The AIOT... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.4.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| AIOTF:
- Support registration of AIoT devices.
- Support AIoT capabilities.
Reader:
- Context handling for DO-A devices.
ADM:
- Registration.
- AIOT device capabilities.
AIoT device:
- Registration.
- AIOT device capabilities.
- DO-A.
|
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.5 Solution #5: DO-A procedure with configured routing information
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.5.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution aims to resolve KI#2 to support DO-A Capable AIoT Devices, the following principles are followed in this solution:
- This solution has reused the architecture defined in clause 4.2.2 of TS 23.369 [3]. This solution is applied to both direct connectivity and indirect connectivity for Topology 1.
- The AI... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.5.1 Description
| This solution resolves KI#2 for support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices.
This solution has the following assumptions:
1) AIoT Device is pre-configured or configured by the network with DO-A routing information.
2) AIoT Device sends the DO-A routing information along with the DO-A message for AIOTF to find the proper AF... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2 Procedures
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2.1 DO-A data subscribe procedure
|
Figure 6.5.2-1: Figure for DO-A data subscribe procedure
1. The AF sends the DO-A data subscribe request to NEF with AF ID and target AIoT device information to subscribe for the notification of the DoA data.
2. NEF performs AIOTF selection based on the target AIoT device information.
3. The NEF sends the DO-A dat... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2.2 DO-A data transfer procedure
|
Figure 6.5.2-2: Procedure for DO-A procedure with configured routing information
0. DoA routing information (e.g. AF ID or AIOTF allocated DO-A association ID) at the AIoT device side or configured by the network as defined in clause 6.5.2.1. Security information for DO-A traffic may also be pre-configured or config... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.5.3 Impacts on services, entities and interfaces
| The solution has impacts on the following entities:
AIoT Device:
- Support to initiate DO-A message transfer procedure and send routing information along with the DO-A data.
AIOTF:
- Support to route the DO-A message to proper NEF/AF according to the routing information.
NG-RAN:
- Support to select the AIOTF base... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.6 Solution #6: Support Reporting operator triggered by events without registration for DO-A capable AIoT Devices
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.6.0 High-level Solution Principles
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 "Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices".
AIoT device sends report message when triggered by events, includes pending data, power on, device specific events (e.g. temperature higher than a threshold). The information for the device specific events can be provisioned by AF via Command... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.6.1 Description
| This solution is applicable to both the Direct Connectivity and the Indirect Connectivity architectures as defined of TS 23.369 [3].
For a DO-A capable AIoT Device, the device is triggered by events to report its presence and/or send data to the network.
The principles of this solution are as follows:
- No registrat... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.6.2 Procedures
| Figure 6.6.2-1 describes the Reporting procedure from DO-A capable AIoT Device.
Figure 6.6.2-1: DO-A device reporting procedure
0. The AIoT device is pre-configured with target AF information, e.g. FQDN, by the owner of the AIoT device for routing the information in the Report Request. Allowed AF(s) may be pre-conf... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.6.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| Editor's note: This clause captures impacts on existing services, entities and interfaces.
AIoT Device:
- Support initiate Report Request procedure triggered by events.
NG-RAN:
- Support AIOTF selection.
AIOTF:
- Support Report Request authorization.
- Support sending Device ID, location information and optional... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.7 Solution #7: DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.7.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution is for Key Issue #2, corresponding to bullet 3: How an AIoT Device sends data to the AIOTF autonomously. It includes DO-A procedure to send data to the AIOTF, get network resource/assistance information to initial DO-A procedure and DO-A policy information which describe when will perform the DO-A procedu... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.7.1 Description
| This solution is for Key Issue #2, corresponding to bullet 3: How an AIoT Device sends data to the AIOTF autonomously.
This solution is to support for an DO-A Capable AIoT Device autonomously originated DO-A procedure to send data to the AIOTF and support for routing the received data by AIOTF to AF.
The main points ... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.7.2 Procedures
| The following figure presents a DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices for Topology 1 and Topology 2.
Figure 6.7.2-1: DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
0-a. DO-A Capable AIoT Devices may be pre-configured with network resource/assistance information(e.g. frequency, QoS, Resource Expiration Date, et... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.7.3 Impacts on services, entities and interfaces
| NEF:
- Supports AF to provide DO-A policy information;
AIOTF:
- Supports to receive DO-A data from DO-A capable AIoT Device and route for AF.
- Supports to provide network resource/assistance information(e.g. frequency, Resource Expiration Date, etc) for AIoT Device DO-A procedure.
RAN Reader or UE Reader:
- Supp... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.8 Solution #8: Service Procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.8.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 "Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices", especially the following aspects:
- How the AIoT Device informs the network of its presence autonomously (e.g. an AIoT Device initiated registration-like procedure) and what are the triggers for the DO-A capable device to inform the network o... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.8.1 Description
| The Ambient IoT devices of type 2b/c may initiate communication independently with DO-A traffic. This solution is applicable to both the Direct Connectivity and the Indirect Connectivity architectures for Topology 1.
The principles of this solution are as follows:
- Two types of DO-A messages sent from the AIoT Devic... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.8.2 Procedures
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.8.2.1 Initiating message and data transfer procedure
|
Figure 6.8.2.1-1: Initiating message and data transfer procedure
0. The AIoT Device decides to trigger an initiating message based on some conditions, e.g. the AIoT Device needs to report AIoT data such as sensing data detected, the time for periodic reporting arrives, or the AIoT Device moves to a new position. In ... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.8.2.2 AF subscription procedure
|
Figure 6.8.2.2-1: AF subscription procedure
1. If an AF decides to subscribe the AIoT data from a specific AIoT Device, the AF sends a subscription request to the NEF. The subscription request includes the AIoT Device ID, AF ID.
2. The NEF discovers an ADM based on the AIoT Device ID and interacts with the selected... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.8.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| AIOTF:
- Handle the AIoT data of AIoT Devices.
- Interact with the ADM to store the AIoT Device information.
- Store the subscription information.
NG-RAN:
- Select the AIOTF serving the AIoT Device.
- Route the messages between the AIoT Device and the AIOTF.
ADM:
- Store the AIoT Device information.
- Optional... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.9 Solution #9: Autonomous registration and data transfer from AIoT Device
| |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.9.0 High-level solution Principles
| The following principles apply:
- The Reader broadcasts system information that defines contention-based uplink resources for initial access of AIoT Device.
- An AIoT Device, upon power-on or sensing an event to report, uses the broadcasted information to autonomously register and once registered to the network, it c... |
3b819e7ca101098dd228a1012035e8ae | 23.700-30 | 6.9.1 Description
| This solution addresses Key Issues #2 by defining the procedure for the DO-A capable AIoT Device applicable to both Topology 1 (using RAN Readers) and Topology 2 (using UE Readers). It enables a DO-A capable AIoT Device to trigger its own registration with the network to autonomously inform the network of its presence ... |
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