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a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.11.3.2.2 AIoT App service response
| Table 7.11.3.2.2-1 describes the information flow from the AIoTApp enabler to the VAL server to respond to the AIoT App service request.
Table 7.11.3.2.2-1: AIoT App service response
Information element
Status
Description
Result
M
Success or failure.
Cause
O
(see NOTE)
Indicates the reason for the failure, e.g., AF ID not supported.
NOTE: The IE is only present if the Result is failure.
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a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.11.3.2.3 AIoT App service notification
| Table 7.11.3.2.3-1 describes the information flow from the AIoTApp enabler to the VAL server to notify the events related to the AIoT App service.
Table 7.11.3.2.3-1: AIoT App service notification
Information element
Status
Description
Event ID
O
(see NOTE)
Identifies event of the AIoTApp enabler interaction status with 5GC for AIoT App services, e.g., device present, location & trajectory tracking, no collected AIoT device info., etc.
VAL service ID
O
Identity of the VAL service.
DL AIoT service request delivery instructions
O
(see NOTE)
Indicates the instructions to the VAL server regarding the DL AIoT App service request
> Collected AIoT device info.
O
Indicates the collected AIoT device information (raw, location, etc.)
> AIoT device tracking info.
O
Indicates tracked trajectory, presence monitoring results of AIoT device info
NOTE: Either Event ID IE or the DL AIoT service request delivery instruction ID is present.
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a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.11.4 Corresponding APIs
| This clause provides the corresponding APIs for supporting the solution.
|
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.11.5 Solution evaluation
| This clause provides an evaluation of the solution. The evaluation should include the descriptions of the impacts to existing architectures.
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a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.12 Solution #12: Support of monitoring requests for AIoT devices
| |
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.12.1 Solution description
| |
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.12.1.1 General
| This solution addresses the KI#2 and KI#3. Some application servers (e.g. a logistics company) may need to regularly track the location of the AIoT devices (e.g. the goods in the truck) and identify the trajectory or the direction for the AIoT devices depending on their locations, and then send warnings to the AIoT devices in case they deviate the right trajectory/direction.
This solution is proposed to fulfil the above scenario and mainly support the following service requests:
- Monitoring the status (e.g. enable, disable) of requested AIoT devices;
- Monitoring the location of requested AIoT devices;
- Report the location trajectory for the target AIoT devices;
- Report to indicate the target AIoT device is deviating or will deviate the right location trajectory.
|
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.12.1.2 Procedure of Monitoring requests for AIoT devices
| Figure 7.12.1.2-1 illustrates the high-level procedure of monitoring requests for AIoT devices.
Pre-condition:
- The AIoT enabler is the new application enabler in the application enablement layer which supports the AIoT related operations and services.
Figure 7.12.1.2-1: Procedure of Monitoring requests for AIoT devices
1. The VAL server sends an AIoT monitoring subscription request to the AIoT enabler, including the monitoring service type (e.g., location), service ID, target area information, target AIoT device information, triggering conditions (e.g., periodic or event triggered reporting), time intervals for periodic reporting, monitoring time duration, AIoT device group member deviation indicator, the group ID for a group of AIoT devices if the AIoT device group member deviation indicator is included, etc.
The AIoT device group member deviation indicator indicates whether and which AIoT device (or type of AIoT devices) is deviating (or will deviate) from other similar devices in a group.
The information about the target AIoT Device(s) may include Filtering Information as described in clause 5.8 of 3GPP TS 23.369[3].
2. The AIoT enabler checks whether the VAL server is authorized to request the AIoT monitoring subscription request, may be based on e.g. the pre-configurations or operator policies.
3. If the request is authorized, the AIoT enabler sends an AIoT monitoring subscription response to the VAL server.
4. The AIoT enabler invokes Nnef_AIoT_Command request to the 3GPP CN periodically as specified in clause 6.2.3 of 3GPP TS 23.369 [3] to obtain the requested AIoT device data including the location information of AIoT devices. The Command type is Read.
5. Upon received the AIoT device data and related location information, the AIoT enabler stores and analyses them based on the AIoT monitoring subscription request. If the subscription request includes the location-related UE group analytics indication, the AIoT enabler may interact with ADAES to obtain the predicated location trajectory and the deviation analytics for the requested AIoT devices as specified in clause 8.15 of 3GPP TS 23.436 [7]. The AIoT enabler will send the obtained AIoT device data to the ADAES and ADAES doesn’t need to sends a data collection subscription request to the Data Producer. Based on the received AIoT device data, the ADAE server sends location-related UE group analytics notifications to the AIoT enabler which may include the predicated location trajectory and the deviation analytics for the group of AIoT devices. The deviation analytics mainly indicate which AIoT device (or type of AIoT devices) is deviating (or will deviate) from other similar devices or the target devices in a group.
6. The AIoT enabler checks if the received location-related analytics in step 5 could meet the service requirements or not. And if not, the step 4 and step 5 may need to be operated repeatedly.
7. The AIoT enabler reports the monitoring results for the requested AIoT device to the VAL server via sending AIoT monitoring notification message. The report may include the AIoT device ID, the location information for the AIoT device, the location trajectory, the predicted location trajectory for the AIoT device, the deviation analytics, the device availability status, etc.
Editor’s note: Whether and how the procedures of AIoT Inventory subscription and AIoT monitoring subscription can be combined or not is FFS.
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a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.12.2 Architecture Impacts
| This solution proposes a new architecture (i.e., new AIoT enabler) to support AIoT services.
For the new architecture, please check the Sol#1 for KI#1 for more details.
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a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.12.3 Corresponding APIs
| This clause provides the corresponding APIs for supporting the solution.
|
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.12.4 Solution evaluation
| This clause provides an evaluation of the solution. The evaluation should include the descriptions of the impacts to existing architectures.
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a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.13 Solution #13: AIoT Data Processing management
| |
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.13.1 Solution description
| This solution address key issue#2, and #4 to introduce a solution for AIoT data processing of the network exposured AIoT inventory/command result.
The inventory results in the notification from 3GPP network is further processed and transformed into the application layer interested service events using the provisioned service data.
The figure 7.13.1-1 shows the high-level procedure of AIoT data processing management and event notification.
Pre-conditions:
1. The AIoT task initiate service has been invoked by the AIoT application layer consumer, and the AIoT enabler has initiated the AIoT service request to the 3GPP core network.
Figure 7.13.1-1: AIoT Data Processing management
1. The AIoT enabler server receives the notification(s) with inventory/command result from the 3GPP core network as described in 3GPP TS 23.369 [3].
2. The AIoT enabler processes the network expoured data from step 1 and transforms them into service event based on the provisioned service data and the AIoT taks initiate request previously received. The AIoT service event contains the information of “what AIoT device ID(s)”, “in which area,” and “what happened”. For “what happened”, there are some examples (not limited to) as below:
Type1: AIoT device appearance, the AIoT device is being reported at the service region for the first time;
Type2: AIoT device disappearance, the AIoT device is not being reported during the limited time;
Type3: AIoT device stay, the AIoT device is continuously reported at the same service region;
Type4: AIoT device moving, the AIoT device is reported from different regions.
The reported AIoT device ID is transformed back to the application layer object ID.
Further the AIoT enabler server processes the network expoured data per AIoT service scenario type indicated in the AIoT task initiate service request.
- Inbound or Outbound type: for all the AIoT devices appearance events during the task execution period, compare the objects ID(s) reported from 3GPP network and the objects ID lists from the AIoT tasks. If the ID(s) can match, then, the application objects can be successfully inbound or outbound; otherwise, it is considered an illegal operation and an alert information is triggered.
- Inventory type: for all the AIoT devices appearance and stay events, the corresponding objects can be seen as the normal inventory information. However, for the AIoT devices disappearance event, an alert or other method such as specific AIoT device ID inventory should be initiated.
- Monitor type: for all the AIoT devices appearance, disappearance, moving events, the AIoT device state changed, the AIoT enable layer should record and report.
Editor’s note: The potential overapping between inbound/outbound type and inventory type and how to resolve it is FFS.
3. Report the interested application events to the application layer and the AIoT task is completed.
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a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.13.2 Architecture Impacts
| This solution introduces AIoT service event notification capability to the AIoT enabler server.
|
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.13.3 Corresponding APIs
| The AIoT service event notification service is introduced.
|
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 7.13.4 Solution evaluation
| |
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 8 Overall evaluation
| This clause will provide evaluation of different solutions.
|
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 9 Conclusions
| |
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 9.1 General conclusions
| This clause will provide general conclusions for the study.
|
a4787e77ad46014e6b67fb22e3452dda | 23.700-26 | 9.2 Conclusions of key issue #x
| This clause will provide conclusions for the specific key issue.
Annex A (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA6#68
Skeleton
0.0.0
2025-08
SA6#68
Implementation of the following pCRs approved by SA6:
S6-253714，S6-253636，S6-253751，S6-253638，S6-253639，S6-253752.
0.1.0
2025-10
SA6#69
Implementation of the following pCRs approved by SA6:
S6-254523，S6-254525，S6-254526，S6-254527，S6-254664，S6-254667, S6-254669, S6-254670, S6-254725, S6-254747, S6-254748, S6-254749, S6-254750, S6-254751, S6-254770.
0.2.0
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 1 Scope
| The present document is a technical report which analyses and proposes solutions for the application user (app-user) consent.
The study work is performed in a phased approach. In the first phase, the study identifies and analyse the use cases, it clarifies the related terminology, analyses related industry solutions (e.g., GSMA OPG, CAMARA), it explores the relevant business relationships with a potential impact on the app-user consent end to end solutions.
In the second phase, the technical report provides an analysis of the app-user consent use cases, identifies the key issues, gaps and overlaps for an end-to-end app-user consent 3GPP solution. It covers different possible scenarios with user service experience impacts (up-front, in-flow, etc.), it provides solutions to the identified key issues, evaluates them and concludes on recommended solutions, as well as proposing requirements.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] GSMA PRD OPG.02, "Operator Platform: Requirements and Architecture".
[3] CAMARA API "Access and Consent Management", IdentityAndConsentManagement/documentation/CAMARA-API-access-and-user-consent.md at r3.3 · camaraproject/IdentityAndConsentManagement · GitHub.
[4] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System architecture for the 5G System (5GS)"
[5] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System (5GS)"
[6] 3GPP TS 23.273: "5G System (5GS) Location Services (LCS)"
[7] 3GPP TS 23.271: "Functional stage 2 description of Location Services (LCS)"
[8] 3GPP TS 23.288: " Architecture enhancements for 5G System (5GS) to support network data analytics services"
[9] 3GPP TS 33.501: " Security architecture and procedures for 5G system "
[10] 3GPP TS 33.558: "Security aspects of enhancement of support for enabling edge applications"
[11] 3GPP TS 29.503: "5G System; Unified Data Management Services"
[12] 3GPP TS 23.558: "Architecture for enabling Edge Applications"
[13] 3GPP TS 23.222: "Functional architecture and information flows to support Common API Framework for 3GPP Northbound APIs"
[14] 3GPP TS 33.122: " Security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) for 3GPP northbound APIs"
[15] “General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)”, https://gdpr.eu/tag/gdpr/
…
[x] <doctype> <#>[ ([up to and including]{yyyy[-mm]|V<a[.b[.c]]>}[onwards])]: "<Title>".
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Application user consent: The agreement of a user/subscriber provided to the API Provider, to allow the API Provider to expose the user’s personal data (subjected to regulations) to the application.
NOTE: The subscriber can be the end-user.
Editor's Note: The terms used in the definition user/subscriber, personal data need further clarification.
Exposure platform: implementation consisting of a set of functions supporting a controlled exposure to API consumers of certain underlying capabilities offered by API Provider(s).
NOTE: An exposure platform can be developed leveraging a standardized exposure framework (e.g., CAPIF CCF).
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
Symbol format (EW)
<symbol> <Explanation>
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
AEF API Exposing Function
ASP Application Service Provider
CSP Communications Service Provider
E-W East West
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4 Use Cases
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.1 General
| This clause describes relevant use cases where different aspects of app-user consent need to be considered.
It is assumed in all cases that an exposure platform provider is aware of the regulation, and therefore it has internal knowledge (via internal policies, provisioning, etc) which applications and possibly also purposes, require checks on app-user consent data, as part of the overall application authorization process.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.2 Use Case #1: End-to-end basic scenario
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.2.1 Use Case Description
| Preconditions:
- The API provider (PLMN A) is the owner and manager of Alice’s subscription in the API Provider (PLMN A) domain.
- Alice is an app-user (e.g., for Netflix).
- The API provider (PLMN A) has a service agreement with the provider B of the Exposure Platform.
- Netflix application has an agreement with the Exposure Platform provider B,
- Provider A has an app-user consent management solution for the users that have a subscription with the API Provider, including Alice.
Summary:
An application (e.g., Netflix) requests to access some of the app-user data such as for example location, to determine if the app-user Alice, who is accessing the Netflix application, is allowed to use the Netflix service at her current location.
Description:
- The use case implies an app-user consent check for this specific application context: Application: e.g., Netflix, stated purpose(s): e.g., confirm conditions for providing the service, and the app-user data requested: e.g., app-user’s location data from API Provider domain.
- Assuming the basic scenario, i.e., the app-user consent was already provided by Alice for the above application context, then the response from the Consent Manager of API Provider of Alice (PLMN A) to the Exposure Platform is positive.
- The Exposure Platform provides authorization to Netflix application request, which the application uses further in its service request to the API Provider (PLMN A) to obtain app-user’s location data.
- Once the API Provider (PLMN A) receives the Service Request for Alice’s location data, it can validate with the Exposure Platform of provider B the received authorization data from the Netflix application
- The API Provider (PLMN A) processes the request, but as internal requests in PLMN A’s Core Network get performed in view of obtaining the app-user’s location data, it can be determined (via mechanisms outside the scope of this specification) if a check on the PLMN A’s user consent is required in order to provide the location data between NFs of the Core Network.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.2.2 Use Case Analysis
| As the Exposure platform and the Consent management entity belong to different domains, the interactions for the app-user consent check between the Exposure platform and the Consent management entity require an interoperable, standard interaction.
The app-user consent enabler needs to expose the capability to perform consent check for a given application, stated purpose and the indicated user data.
There can be different scopes for the user consent: the app-user consent for specific user data exposure to applications, and the user consent intended for internal consumption of data by Core Network NFs.
The application user consent capture is defined under the "Consent Capture" term in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2] and is not the subject of this study.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.3 Use Case #2: Add app-user consent
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.3.1 Use Case Description
| Preconditions:
- The API provider (PLMN A) is the owner and manager of Alice’s subscription in the API Provider (PLMN A) domain.
- Alice is an app-user for several applications.
- The API provider (PLMN A) has a service agreement with the provider B of the Exposure Platform.
- The ASPs for the applications used by Alice have an agreement with the Exposure Platform provider B.
- API Provider (PLMN A) has an app-user Consent management solution for the users that have a subscription with the API Provider, including Alice. The Consent management solution can be inside or outside the API Provider (PLMN A) domain.
- There is no app-user consent data for Alice in the Consent management of API Provider (PLMN A) for an application that Alice wants to use.
Summary:
Alice was prompted to provide her app-user consent to the API Provider (PLMN A) and she has provided the data.
The Consent Management entity receives the app-user consent data for Alice and for the specific application and persists it for further use.
Description:
- The Consent Capture methods are out of scope.
- The app-user consent data can vary depending on the regional regulations which govern the API Provider (PLMN A) and Alice’s subscription.
- Once Alice has provided her app-user consent data, the Consent Management entity receives the request to add the app-user consent data for the specific app.
- The app-user consent is provided by Alice per application, and optionally subject to API Provider’s policies, also some context for the app-user consent, such as purpose of use by the application and per Alice’s user data to be exposed from API Provider (PLMN A) domain.
- Once the Consent Management entity receives the app-user consent data for Alice, it persists it for further use and until Alice decides to change her app-user consent for that application.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.3.2 Use Case Analysis
| The Consent Management entity has to have the capability to receive for each app-user, their app-user consent data per application, and additional app-user consent context data such as purpose and the user data that is allowed to be exposed to the application.
Consent Management entity has the capability to persist each user’s app-user consent data, until such time when app-user decides to change their current consent data for an application (update of app-user consent data is handled in clause 4.4).
The application user consent capture is defined under the "Consent Capture" term in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2] and is not the subject of this study.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.4 Use Case #3: Update app-user consent (includes revoke)
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.4.1 Use Case Description
| Preconditions:
- The API provider (PLMN A) is the owner and manager of Alice’s subscription in the API Provider (PLMN A) domain.
- Alice is an app-user for several applications.
- The API provider (PLMN A) has a service agreement with the provider B of the Exposure Platform.
- The ASP for the applications used by Alice have an agreement with the Exposure Platform provider B.
- API Provider (PLMN A) has an app-user consent management solution for the users that have a subscription with the API Provider, including Alice.
- The app-user consent data for Alice was provisioned in the Consent management entity of API Provider (PLMN A) for an application X that Alice wants to use.
Summary:
Alice decided to change her app-user consent for application X.
The Consent Management entity receives the updates to the app-user consent data for Alice and for the specific application X and persists it.
Description:
- The Consent Capture methods are out of scope.
The app-user consent data can vary depending on the regional regulations which govern the API Provider (PLMN A) and Alice’s subscription.
- Once Alice has provided the updates to her app-user consent data for application X, the Consent Management entity receives the updated data and performs the updates of the app-user consent data for the specific app X accordingly. The updates to Alice’s app-user consent data for application X can change the existing data to either provide access, or to revoke it.
- Once the Consent Management entity receives the updated app-user consent data for Alice, it persists it for further use and until Alice decides to change her app-user consent for that application.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.4.2 Use Case Analysis
| The Consent Management enabler has to be able to receive updates of the app-user consent data at any time, whenever the app-user decides to change their current consent data for an application.
The application user consent capture is defined under the “Consent Capture” term in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2] and is not the subject of this study.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.5 Use Case #4: App-user consent handled by exposure platform
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.5.1 General
| This section describes use case where the applications require app-user consent and the app-user consent is handled by exposure platform.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.5.2 Use Case Description
| This use case illustrates the case of app-user consent data delegated to service providers like exposure platforms. When the API provider is responsible for the user data shared via the exposed APIs, the API provider can delegate the app-user consent capture and management to trusted exposure platforms. The exposure platform provider that exposes the services of the API provider will determine the authorization of the service API invocation based on the app-user consent information available at exposure platform.
An example can be, exposure platforms leveraging CAPIF, can capture and maintain for their API invokers, the app-user consent data for access to specific user data from the API provider, including MSISDN, location data and history, etc.
Certain API providers also expose service APIs where there is dependency on other consents (e.g., from Core network). So, for a given service API exposure, app-user consent and consent from core network might need to be considered for fulfilment of the service API request.
For example, there are multiple such use cases for NEF service exposure, where multiple consents (CAPIF RNAA and consent information from core network) are specified as part of the application authorization flow and then again as part of the API invocation.
An example is the case of EDGEAPP, where for a service invocation (such as UE location information), the EES is expected to check the user consent in UDM for the EDGEAPP purpose. Upon service invocation to NEF, the NEF also is expected to check another value of the user consent in UDM for the NW_CAP_EXPOSURE purpose. If CAPIF RNAA would be used to authorize the access of the EAS or the EES (depending on the case) to the UE location information API exposed by the NEF, then the RO authorization for that EAS/EES is also checked in the Authorization Function (of the CCF) for the specific edge application.
The use case needs to be studied further:
- The flows for the app-user consent checks integrated with exposure platform need to be further clarified, for the different consent scopes and purposes to analyse if any gaps exist as part of the application enablement and exposure platform leveraging flows.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.5.3 Use Case Analysis
| Study the gaps, where multiple consent information are required for exposure to applications (e.g., EDGEAPP case) and how this can be addressed with one or both of CAPIF RNAA (using RO authorization for EDGEAPP) and/or with the application user consent management, consent in UDM.
Editor's Note: The consent in UDM is subject for further coordination with SA3 and SA2.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 5 Business Relationships
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 5.1 General
| The business relationships between main exposure actors impact on the approach and solutions for handling the application user consent (app-user consent) is not determined. Typical business relationships models used by service and capabilities providers that are considered in the app-user consent analysis are:
- Federation model,
- Aggregator model.
Some common aspects of the federation and aggregator models are:
- allowing an Application Service Provider to use one common interface to access capabilities exposed by multiple service and capabilities providers, subject to an agreement between the ASP and the service and capabilities providers involved,
- providing continuation of use, for application purposes, of the services enabled by the service and capabilities providers, when UEs are moving between mobile networks.
The general assumption is that the ownership and management responsibility for the app-user consent data belongs to the API Provider that owns the subscription under which the user consumes services in the API provider domain.
The business relationships between different exposure partners and the open issues related to their implications on app-user consent are described in the next clauses.
While the exposure platforms and the API Provider can belong to the same or different PLMN domains, the exposure platforms can leverage standardized exposure frameworks (e.g., CAPIF).
Editor's note: The business models may be updated based on use cases and their main actors.
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263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 5.2 Business relationship: Federation model
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 5.2.1 Description
| The federation business model enables different service and capabilities providers to efficiently leverage exposure platforms from other service and capabilities providers (API providers), establishing an exposure ecosystem partnership.
In the federated model described in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2], an exposure platform (such as the Operator Platform (OP)):
- facilitates access to the edge networks and other capabilities of an API Provider (PLMN operator), or federation of PLMN operators and exposure partners (per clause 1.1.3 in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2]),
- allows one exposure partner to access services offered by another exposure partner (subject to a federation agreement between the exposure partners), on behalf of the Application Service Providers that it serves (per clause 2.2.5 in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2]).
- enables continuation of a UE’s use of the services and capabilities exposed via the exposure platform, such as when moving into a visited PLMN (per clause 2.2.5 in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2]).
There are different cases of federation, such as:
- federated platforms interworking in an East-West approach (CAPIF interconnect is an example). This case is depicted in figure 4.2-2 below.
Figure 5.2-1: Business relationships in Federation model B (interconnect)
Editor's Note: Additional federation business relationships to be considered.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 5.3 Business relationship: Aggregator model
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 5.3.1 Description
| ASPs target simplification not only at API level, but also in eliminating the need to implement variations and customizations to multiple exposure platform (e.g., Operator Platform (OP)) providers and to API providers, as well as to establishing many individual business relationships.
To simplify their business relationships model, the ASPs establish a business relationship with an aggregator, and in turn the aggregator sets up all the necessary individual business relationships with multiple exposure platform providers and API providers (e.g., PLMN operators).
In this model, the ASP reaches applications users across many API providers and countries, transparently, via the aggregator. The exposure platform providers need to provide enough information to the aggregator, so that the aggregator can identify the right home PLMN for a user, as well as a target network e.g., when roaming.
Figure 5.3-1: Business relationships in Aggregator model
An exposure platform provider, same as the API provider, can establish business relationships with multiple aggregators to widen their exposure and reach to more ASPs.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 6 Terminology
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 6.1 Background
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 6.2 Related industry specifications
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 6.2.1 General
| Various specifications tackling the consent obtained or provided by a subscriber have used specific terminology to refer to the subscriber consent, provided to a network service provider. This clause collects the different terms used and studies the differences in meaning, with the goal to clarify what the terms refer to in their industry documentation contexts.
6.2.2 Industry group #1: GSMA OPG
The GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2] defines the term "Consent" as "The agreement of a Subscriber to allow the usage of their personal data. This agreement can be revoked at any time", with the clarification in Annex F "Privacy Management considerations" that the terms "Consent" and "Application-related Consent" are interchangeable in the PRD.
- In clause 4.3.6.1.3 "Managing Consent" of GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2] the Operator Platform (OP) shall be able to "receive notifications when a Subscriber revokes Consent via NBI". This implies that some capabilities are expected, such as providing subscription and notification mechanisms for app-user consent data changes.
- The process of Consent Capture is also described in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2], which specifies that the mechanism for interacting with the end-user for consent capture are left to the CSP.
6.2.3 Industry group #2: CAMARA
The CAMARA API Access and User Consent Management have been published with following terms in the API documentation:
- "Consent: an explicit opt-in action that the User takes to allow processing of personal data. Consent grants a Legal Entity (e.g. the Operator or ASP) access to a set of Scopes related to the Resource Owner, for a specific Purpose. "
- "Purpose: The reason for which Personal Data will be processed by an Application. For example, an Application might want to create a movie recommendation for an End-User using their Personal Data, such as age or gender. CAMARA defines a standard set of Purposes which can be used by Applications to specify the reason for their intended Personal Data processing. "
- "Scope: the OpenID Connect scope which maps one or more protected resources, some scopes may require processing of Personal Data."
There are several distinct procedure flows for the consent management interactions in CAMARA API "Access and User Consent Management" [3], all describing interface interactions between two entities called "API Explosure Platform" and the "Consent Master" to allow the "API Explosure Platform" to perform a "check consent" with the "Consent Master".
While the term definition for Consent is generically worded and it does not explicitly state its focus on applications, the flows depict always an Application making the authentication and authorization requests. Based on this, it can be inferred that the scope of the CAMARA API "Access and User Consent Management” apply to the user consent provided for applications.
Based on the flow interactions, the "check consent" is a required operation to be supported.
6.2.4 Industry group #3: 3GPP
No term definition for user consent, or for consent, was found in the 3GPP specifications studied.
In SA3, there are two related terms that are used for different purposes:
- User consent:
- covers Core Network data shared to NFs or to the Edge applications.
- Requirements and procedures are defined in Annex V of 3GPP TS 33.501 [9]. User consent data is managed and stored in UDM.
- Requirements are defined on the NFs that are an enforcement point for the user consent in Annex V.3 of [9], as well as additional requirements on NWDAF in Annex X.7 of [9].
- For edge applications, 3GPP TS 33.558 [10] reuses the same procedures by referencing 3GPP TS 33.501 [9] (Annex V). Either EES or the NEF act as the consent enforcing entity of the user consent for the edge applications.
- RO authorization:
- has a definition in 3GPP TS 33.122 [14] in context of RNAA:
"Resource owner authorization: The permission provided by the resource owner to allow the API invoker to access the resource owner’s resource via the northbound API."
- It covers the resource owner (subscriber) agreement, to expose over northbound APIs, specific user data from API Provider domain to applications.
Several SA2 specifications mention user consent, but no definition of the term is provided. In the procedures, the user consent data is in UDM/UDR and is accessed and enforced by Core Network NFs: EIF in 3GPP TS 23.501 [4], NEF in 3GPP TS 23.502 [5], LMF, NWDAF in 3GPP TS 23.288 [8], and Location functions in 3GPP TS 23.273 [6] and 3GPP TS 23.271 [7].
The CT4 specification 3GPP TS 29.503 [11] defined in clause 6.1.6.3.20 “Enumeration: UcPurpose” the user consent ennumeration values that are stored in UDM, which can be consumed by e.g., NFs and trusted AF:
- "ANALYTICS": User consent for analytics
- "MODEL_TRAINING": User consent for model training
- "NW_CAP_EXPOSURE": User consent for network capability exposure.
- "EDGEAPP_UE_LOCATION": User consent for the manipulation of UE information for the purpose of UE Location retrieval by the EDGEAPP EAS entity.
SA6 specifications have introduced user consent aspects in:
- CAPIF 3GPP TS 23.222 [13] under RNAA, which includes the user consent for applications under the term RO authorization defined in 3GPP TS 33.122 [14].
Also in CAPIF 3GPP TS 23.222 [13] it is stated in clause 6.2.3. in NOTE 4:
"The authorization information from the resource owner used by CCF (described in 3GPP TS 33.122 "[14] ") is independent from the user consent information used from user subscription data at UDM/UDR (described in Annex V of 3GPP TS 33.501"[9] "). In the current release of 3GPP specifications, no synergy between CCF and UDM is specified."
- EDGEAPP 3GPP TS 23.558 [12] has user consent for edge applications, referencing 3GPP TS 33.558 [10] and 3GPP TS 33.501 [9] (Annex V). A summary of the user consent for edge applications is provided in Table 6.2-2 below.
For reference, a summary of the user consent purpose and specifications indicating consent handling in the above 3GPP SA6 EDGEAPP specification is in Table 6.2-1 below.
Table 6.2-1: SA6 EDGEAPP user consent summary
User Consent purpose
(per 3GPP TS 23.558 [12])
User Data
(subjected to consent)
Enforcer
User Consent management
Generally per each AF/ app
UE Location
- clause 8.14.2.3
LMF, NEF (via enforcing the OAuth token scope)
UDM
(referred in SA3 3GPP TS 33.558 [10] and 3GPP TS 33.501 [9])
EDGEAPP (per app/AF)
GPSI (MSISDN)
- clause 7.2.6
EES
(clauses 6.3.2; 8.5.2.2)
UDM
EDGEAPP (per app/AF)
UE tunnel e2e info (security) – clause 8.3.3.2.2
EES
(clauses 6.3.2; 8.5.2.2)
UDM
EDGEAPP (per app/AF)
AF specific UE identifier (MSISDN) – clause 8.6.5.2
EES
(clauses 6.3.2; 8.5.2.2)
UDM
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 6.3 Analysis
| There are some differences in the terminology used in GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2] captured in clause 6.2.2, CAMARA [3] captured in clause 6.2.3 and in 3GPP captured in clause 6.2.4, and the assumptions used.
While in 3GPP the user consent and RO authorization are considered forms of user authorization, in GSMA OPG and CAMARA the term user consent is considered an agreement between two parties: the subscriber and the Service API provider.
The approaches have also some differences, as in GSMA OPG and CAMARA the Consent Manager/Master is a standalone enabler under the responsibility of the Service provider, while in 3GPP the user consent for applications is inconsistently handled either in UDM/UDR in a global manner (undistinguishing between different applications), or is embedded inside the CAPIF’s Authorization Function (in CAPIF provider’s domain).
In conclusion, the “user consent” in 3GPP does not cover consistently and completely the application purposed user consent. The “RO authorization” term is connected to the authorization procedure over northbound APIs and is only used when CAPIF is used. RO authorization is explicit permission given by the resource owner.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 7 Key issues
| 7.1 Key issue #1: Application user consent management
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 7.1.1 Description
| This KI brings up the gap of the missing architecture for the application user consent management. Based on the use cases and business relationships studied in the present document, there are certain aspects that need to be studied to fulfil an architecture for the application user consent.
According to different regional regulations, for sharing some of the user data to applications, it is required to obtain the user’s agreement provided to a data controller (e.g., PLMN operator). One of the most commonly referenced, the GDRP [15] indicates that the user consent must be obtained per application targetted for user data sharing, per purpose of the application and per user’s data that is being shared.
In addition to the regulations, it is acknowledged that there is operational data that needs to be maintained by the data controllers (e.g., PLMN operator). The Annex G.4.2 of the GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2] provides a description of these data records, which can be used as reference.
Per some of the regional regulations (e.g., GDPR) the application user consent solutions must allow the user to update the application user consent data (change his/her mind) at any time.
The solution to this KI will need to handle the architecture aspects including the considerations above.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 7.1.2 Open issues
| The architecture for application user consent management needs to be studied, considering aspects derived from the use cases and business relationships. These include gaps and open issues indicated in the use case analysis in clauses 4.2.2, 4.3.2 and 4.4.2.
7.2 Key issue #2: E2E clarification of the consent needed for applications
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 7.2.1 Description
| This KI proposes to study the end to end flow that clarifies what user consent is needed for applications.
Based on the use case in clause 4.2 "Use Case #1: End-to-end basic scenario", for an application to be able to access the application user’s data from the API Provider (e.g. PLMN operator), a check on the application user consent may be involved (depending on applicable regulations). In addition, inside the API Provider domain (e.g., PLMN operator) there may be another user consent check for the internal access of user data by Core Network entities. As some of the user consent checked internally in the Core Network is ambiguously connected to potential application related consent, clarity on the end to end flow is needed.
As there can be many types of applications, there is a need for clarification on the applicability of the application user consent:
- applications provided by the network (e.g., MNO, deployed within MNO domain) for the network (e.g., support with network analytics, network optimizations).
- applications that offer services to the end-users, including the case of applications used for addressing legal obligations (e.g., a person’s life protection).
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 7.2.2 Open issues
| Clarifications of the end to end aspects related to what application user consent and user consent checks are needed throughout E2E flow for exposure to applications, such as:
- Whether and how to fulfil the application authorization flow with application user consent check, and how it is enforced upon service invocations from an authorized application, as well as additional user consent checks in the Core Network (CN), for the consumption of the user data by CN Network Functions.
Study to determine criteria/principles for applicability of the application user consent.to different types of applications.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8 Solutions
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Table 6.1-1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
KI #1
KI #2
…
Sol #1
x
Sol #2
x
Sol #...
8.12 Solution #1: Standalone Application user consent management function
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.2.1 General
| This solution relates to KI #1 on the architecture of application user consent management. The open issues to be studied from this KI are described in clause 7.1.2.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.2.2 Architecture impacts
| This solution proposes a standalone application user consent function. The following aspects, indicated in the use cases analysis in clauses 4.2.2, 4.3.2 and 4.4.2 and in the business relationships, are covered in this solution for the architecture of the application user consent management function:
- The exposure of interfaces to allow the consumers (e.g., Exposure platforms) to check the application user consent for an user, or to subscribe to be notified of application user consent data changes.
- The support for the management of the data needed for the application user consent, covering application user consent per application and additional data (subject to the applicable regional regulation, such as purpose and user data to be made available for user data scope).
- While additional operational data is expected to be also recorded by the application user consent management, the extent and composition of operational data can vary based on regional and provider specific needs, and therefore is not studied and addressed in the present document. An example for reference is available in Annex G.4.2 of the GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2].
- As the storage of the application user consent data and of any additional operational data are handled by the application user consent function, no specific interfaces need to be standardized for the actual storage as these are internal to the application user consent function.
- The support for operating immediately application user consent data changes, at any time the user chooses to change his/her application user consent for an application. This can include update/revocation of application user consent for the indicated application and application context (e.g., purposes), notifying the subscribed entities to the application user consent data chnages (so they can apply the change to the authorization result for ongoing and new application traffic for that user).
Figure 8.1.2-1: Standalone Application user consent management function
Editor's Note: The architecture will be updated to address further use cases and updates to requirements.
The APCOT-1 is exposed by the Application user consent management function and supports application user consent check requests and responses, as well as subscribe/notify to application user consent data changes and queries for consent data. Consumers of APCOT-1 include Exposure platforms.
The APCOT-2 supports application user consent data management operations (application user consent create, updates/revocation, removal). The Consent capture solutions are specific to each data controllers (e.g., PLMN operator) and are not in scope of the study.
Editor's Note: The security aspects for the APCOT-1 and APCOT-2 are handled by SA3.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.2.3 Solution description
| An example of interaction between the consumer of APCOT-1 interface (an Exposure platform) and the application user consent management function is described below.
Figure 8.1.3-1: Application user consent check over APCOT-1
1. The Consumer (Exposure platform) requests the application user consent check for the specific user and application context information over APCOT-1.
2. The Application user consent management function checks the available application user consent data for the received request to determine whether the consent was granted or not.
3. The Application user consent management function provides the check result back to the Exposure platform, indicating if the application user consent was granted or not.
NOTE: When the Exposure platform and the application user consent management function are collocated, the steps 1 and 3 are internal and do not require use of a standard interface (an example is CAPIF Authorization Function).
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.2.4 Solution evaluation
| This section provides solution evaluation based on the open issues specified in the related key issue(s).
8.3 Solution #2: End to end consent for applications
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.3.1 General
| This solution relates to KI #2. on the E2E clarifications on user consent for applications. The open issues to be studied from this KI are described in clause 7.2.2.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.3.2 Architecture impacts
| There are no additional architecture impacts for this solution.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.3.3 Solution description
| As indicated in the end-to-end use case described in clause 4.2 and in KI#2, the overall consent needs for an application request may involve two different types of checks on user consent. This solution addresses clarifications of the end-to-end aspects related to what application user consent and user consent checks are needed for applications, such as:
1. the application user consent check done in an application authorization flow, related to sharing of user data from the API provider (e.g., PLMN operator) to the application.
2. upon the service invocation request from an authorized application:
- part of the CN processing of the received northbound service invocation, additional user consent checks can be done in the Core Network (CN) for the internal consumption of the user data.
As per 3GPP TS 29.503 [11] there are two values defined in the CN (UDM) which appear related to exposure to applications, defined as follows:
- "NW_CAP_EXPOSURE": User consent for network capability exposure.
- "EDGEAPP_UE_LOCATION": User consent for the manipulation of UE information for the purpose of UE. Location retrieval by the EDGEAPP EAS entity.
Any needed application user consent for an application request is checked as part of the application authorization flow, in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements (e.g., per application, purpose, user data, etc). and it is a pre-requisite for a successful service invocation by the application. This aproach is aligned in both CAPIF RNAA and in GSMA OPG.
So once the application authorization including the application user consent check is successful, then when the respective service invocation is received by the CN from the authorized application, in this solution there is no need for a duplicate user consent check in the CN (UDM) for application purposes. In addition, the values for user consent purpose in UDM: "NW_CAP_EXPOSURE" and "EDGEAPP_UE_LOCATION do not provide any distinction per application, per application purpose and shared user data, so they do not address the needs of the application user consent management. Therefore these two user consent purpose values in UDM are considered insufficient for the purposes of application-related user consent.
Since in the API Provider domain (e.g., PLMN operator) there is a 3GPP user consent solution specified in Annex V of TS 33.501 [9], which is ambiguously connected to potential application related consent for the applications deployed at the edge (EDGEAPP) in 3GPP TS 33.558 [10], further clarity on the applicability of the EDGEAPP specific user consent solution, as well as on the end to end flow is needed.
This issue was also highlighted in 3GPP TS 23.222 [13] : “The authorization information from the resource owner used by CCF (described in 3GPP TS 33.122) is independent from the user consent information used from user subscription data at UDM/UDR (described in Annex V of 3GPP TS 33.501). In the current release of 3GPP specifications, synergy between CCF and UDM is not specified.”
NOTE: While these user consent purpose values in UDM: "NW_CAP_EXPOSURE" and "EDGEAPP_UE_LOCATION” are not necessary in this solution for application user consent purposes, they might apply in other scenarios and this needs to be assessed by the respective WGs (SA3, CT4).
The application user consent is not required for all applications. In some cases, there is no application user consent required such as the case when the service provided by the application is required by law (e.g., for a person’s life protection), or when it is covered by a general/subscription agreement with the API Provider (PLMN operator) for example apps for network optimizations, measurements.
As a general principle, the application user consent is needed for an application access to user’s data when that user data and application purposes are subject to regulations.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.3.4 Solution evaluation
| This section provides solution evaluation based on the open issues specified in the related key issue(s).
8.x Solution #x: <Solution Title>
8.x.1 General
This solution relates to KI #N.
This section describes the high-level principle of the solution.
8.x.2 Architecture requirements and impacts
This section describes any architectural requirements and architecture impacts based on the proposed solution.
8.x.1 Solution description
8.x.1.1 General
This section describes the solution in detail.
8.x.1.2 Information flows
This section describes the information flow tables required for this solution.
8.x.4 Solution evaluation
This section provides solution evaluation based on the open issues specified in the related key issue(s).
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 9 Overall evaluation
| 9.x Evaluation of key issue #x
This section evaluates all solutions related to key issue #x.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 10 Conclusions
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 10.1 Architectural conclusions
| This section provides conclusion and suggestion for normative work for the architecture options studied in this TR.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 10.2 Key issues conclusions
| 10.2.x Conclusions of key issue #x
This section provides conclusion and suggestion for normative work for the solutions related to key issue #x.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 11 Recommended requirements
| |
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 11.1 General
| Subject to applicable regional regulations, different type of data is required to be obtained from the user as part of user’s agreement provided to a data controller (e.g., PLMN operator) to share his/her data to applications.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 11.2 Description
| [APCOT-11.2-1] The Application user consent management shall expose an interface to support the application user consent check requests.
[APCOT-11.2-2] The Application user consent management shall expose an interface to support the subscription requests for application user consent data changes and shall send the due notifications to the subscribed entities.
[APCOT-11.2-3] The Application user consent management shall expose an interface to support the application user consent management operations (create, update/revoke, delete) on the application user consent data, at any time the user wishes to change his/her application user consent for an application.
[APCOT-11.2-4] The application user consent management function shall manage the application user consent provided to a data controller (e.g., PLMN operator). The application user consent is per application targeted for user data sharing, per purpose of the application and per user’s data that is being shared.
Editor's Note: requirements will be updated during study conclusion phase.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-09
SA6#68
S6-253383
FS_APCOT_pCR_TR skeleton
v0.0.0
2025-09
SA6#68
S6-253384, S6-253385, S6-253142, S6-253772, S6-253773, S6-253774
Incorporates approved pCRs:
S6-253384, S6-253385, S6-253142, S6-253772, S6-253773, S6-253774
v0.1.0
2025-10
SA6#69
S6-254127
S6-254757
S6-254697
S6-254698
S6-254699
S6-254777
S6-254701
S6-254702
S6-254703
S6-254383
Incorporates approved pCRs:
S6-254127, S6-254757, S6-254697, S6-254698, S6-254699, S6-254777, S6-254701, S6-254702, S6-254703, S6-254383
Editorial updates:
• Formatting of ENs
• Fixed numbering of phase 2 clauses
• Replaced curly quotes
v.0.2.0
2025-10
SA6#69
Editorial
Editorial fixes (incorporation of S6-254697)
v.0.2.1
2025-11
SA#70
S6-255659
S6-255663
S6-255572
S6-255690
S6-255691
Incorporates approved pCRs:
S6-255659, S6-255663, S6-255572, S6-255690, S6-255691
v.0.3.0
2025-12
SA#110
SP-251461
Presentation for information at SA#110
1.0.0
2026-01
Editorial
Editorial fix of duplicate clause numbering under 4.5 and 8
1.0.1
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.5.12 Use Case Description
| This use case illustrates the case of app-user consent data delegated to service providers like exposure platforms. When the API provider is responsible for the user data shared via the exposed APIs, the API provider can delegate the app-user consent capture and management to trusted exposure platforms. The exposure platform provider that exposes the services of the API provider will determine the authorization of the service API invocation based on the app-user consent information available at exposure platform.
An example can be, exposure platforms leveraging CAPIF, can capture and maintain for their API invokers, the app-user consent data for access to specific user data from the API provider, including MSISDN, location data and history, etc.
Certain API providers also expose service APIs where there is dependency on other consents (e.g., from Core network). So, for a given service API exposure, app-user consent and consent from core network might need to be considered for fulfilment of the service API request.
For example, there are multiple such use cases for NEF service exposure, where multiple consents (CAPIF RNAA and consent information from core network) are specified as part of the application authorization flow and then again as part of the API invocation.
An example is the case of EDGEAPP, where for a service invocation (such as UE location information), the EES is expected to check the user consent in UDM for the EDGEAPP purpose. Upon service invocation to NEF, the NEF also is expected to check another value of the user consent in UDM for the NW_CAP_EXPOSURE purpose. If CAPIF RNAA would be used to authorize the access of the EAS or the EES (depending on the case) to the UE location information API exposed by the NEF, then the RO authorization for that EAS/EES is also checked in the Authorization Function (of the CCF) for the specific edge application.
The use case needs to be studied further:
- The flows for the app-user consent checks integrated with exposure platform need to be further clarified, for the different consent scopes and purposes to analyse if any gaps exist as part of the application enablement and exposure platform leveraging flows.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 4.5.23 Use Case Analysis
| Study the gaps, where multiple consent information are required for exposure to applications (e.g., EDGEAPP case) and how this can be addressed with one or both of CAPIF RNAA (using RO authorization for EDGEAPP) and/or with the application user consent management, consent in UDM.
Editor's Note: The consent in UDM is subject for further coordination with SA3 and SA2.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.12.1 General
| This solution relates to KI #1 on the architecture of application user consent management. The open issues to be studied from this KI are described in clause 7.1.2.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.12.2 Architecture impacts
| This solution proposes a standalone application user consent function. The following aspects, indicated in the use cases analysis in clauses 4.2.2, 4.3.2 and 4.4.2 and in the business relationships, are covered in this solution for the architecture of the application user consent management function:
- The exposure of interfaces to allow the consumers (e.g., Exposure platforms) to check the application user consent for an user, or to subscribe to be notified of application user consent data changes.
- The support for the management of the data needed for the application user consent, covering application user consent per application and additional data (subject to the applicable regional regulation, such as purpose and user data to be made available for user data scope).
- While additional operational data is expected to be also recorded by the application user consent management, the extent and composition of operational data can vary based on regional and provider specific needs, and therefore is not studied and addressed in the present document. An example for reference is available in Annex G.4.2 of the GSMA PRD OPG.02 [2].
- As the storage of the application user consent data and of any additional operational data are handled by the application user consent function, no specific interfaces need to be standardized for the actual storage as these are internal to the application user consent function.
- The support for operating immediately application user consent data changes, at any time the user chooses to change his/her application user consent for an application. This can include update/revocation of application user consent for the indicated application and application context (e.g., purposes), notifying the subscribed entities to the application user consent data chnages (so they can apply the change to the authorization result for ongoing and new application traffic for that user).
Figure 8.1.2-1: Standalone Application user consent management function
Editor's Note: The architecture will be updated to address further use cases and updates to requirements.
The APCOT-1 is exposed by the Application user consent management function and supports application user consent check requests and responses, as well as subscribe/notify to application user consent data changes and queries for consent data. Consumers of APCOT-1 include Exposure platforms.
The APCOT-2 supports application user consent data management operations (application user consent create, updates/revocation, removal). The Consent capture solutions are specific to each data controllers (e.g., PLMN operator) and are not in scope of the study.
Editor's Note: The security aspects for the APCOT-1 and APCOT-2 are handled by SA3.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.12.3 Solution description
| An example of interaction between the consumer of APCOT-1 interface (an Exposure platform) and the application user consent management function is described below.
Figure 8.1.3-1: Application user consent check over APCOT-1
1. The Consumer (Exposure platform) requests the application user consent check for the specific user and application context information over APCOT-1.
2. The Application user consent management function checks the available application user consent data for the received request to determine whether the consent was granted or not.
3. The Application user consent management function provides the check result back to the Exposure platform, indicating if the application user consent was granted or not.
NOTE: When the Exposure platform and the application user consent management function are collocated, the steps 1 and 3 are internal and do not require use of a standard interface (an example is CAPIF Authorization Function).
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.12.4 Solution evaluation
| This section provides solution evaluation based on the open issues specified in the related key issue(s).
8.23 Solution #2: End to end consent for applications
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.23.1 General
| This solution relates to KI #2. on the E2E clarifications on user consent for applications. The open issues to be studied from this KI are described in clause 7.2.2.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.23.2 Architecture impacts
| There are no additional architecture impacts for this solution.
|
263d42674c1a3a0559086815e5da4aa3 | 23.700-42 | 8.23.3 Solution description
| As indicated in the end-to-end use case described in clause 4.2 and in KI#2, the overall consent needs for an application request may involve two different types of checks on user consent. This solution addresses clarifications of the end-to-end aspects related to what application user consent and user consent checks are needed for applications, such as:
1. the application user consent check done in an application authorization flow, related to sharing of user data from the API provider (e.g., PLMN operator) to the application.
2. upon the service invocation request from an authorized application:
- part of the CN processing of the received northbound service invocation, additional user consent checks can be done in the Core Network (CN) for the internal consumption of the user data.
As per 3GPP TS 29.503 [11] there are two values defined in the CN (UDM) which appear related to exposure to applications, defined as follows:
- "NW_CAP_EXPOSURE": User consent for network capability exposure.
- "EDGEAPP_UE_LOCATION": User consent for the manipulation of UE information for the purpose of UE. Location retrieval by the EDGEAPP EAS entity.
Any needed application user consent for an application request is checked as part of the application authorization flow, in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements (e.g., per application, purpose, user data, etc). and it is a pre-requisite for a successful service invocation by the application. This aproach is aligned in both CAPIF RNAA and in GSMA OPG.
So once the application authorization including the application user consent check is successful, then when the respective service invocation is received by the CN from the authorized application, in this solution there is no need for a duplicate user consent check in the CN (UDM) for application purposes. In addition, the values for user consent purpose in UDM: "NW_CAP_EXPOSURE" and "EDGEAPP_UE_LOCATION do not provide any distinction per application, per application purpose and shared user data, so they do not address the needs of the application user consent management. Therefore these two user consent purpose values in UDM are considered insufficient for the purposes of application-related user consent.
Since in the API Provider domain (e.g., PLMN operator) there is a 3GPP user consent solution specified in Annex V of TS 33.501 [9], which is ambiguously connected to potential application related consent for the applications deployed at the edge (EDGEAPP) in 3GPP TS 33.558 [10], further clarity on the applicability of the EDGEAPP specific user consent solution, as well as on the end to end flow is needed.
This issue was also highlighted in 3GPP TS 23.222 [13] : “The authorization information from the resource owner used by CCF (described in 3GPP TS 33.122) is independent from the user consent information used from user subscription data at UDM/UDR (described in Annex V of 3GPP TS 33.501). In the current release of 3GPP specifications, synergy between CCF and UDM is not specified.”
NOTE: While these user consent purpose values in UDM: "NW_CAP_EXPOSURE" and "EDGEAPP_UE_LOCATION” are not necessary in this solution for application user consent purposes, they might apply in other scenarios and this needs to be assessed by the respective WGs (SA3, CT4).
The application user consent is not required for all applications. In some cases, there is no application user consent required such as the case when the service provided by the application is required by law (e.g., for a person’s life protection), or when it is covered by a general/subscription agreement with the API Provider (PLMN operator) for example apps for network optimizations, measurements.
As a general principle, the application user consent is needed for an application access to user’s data when that user data and application purposes are subject to regulations.
8.x3.4 Solution evaluation
This section provides solution evaluation based on the open issues specified in the related key issue(s).
8.x Solution #x: <Solution Title>
8.x.1 General
This solution relates to KI #N.
This section describes the high-level principle of the solution.
8.x.2 Architecture requirements and impacts
This section describes any architectural requirements and architecture impacts based on the proposed solution.
8.x.1 Solution description
8.x.1.1 General
This section describes the solution in detail.
8.x.1.2 Information flows
This section describes the information flow tables required for this solution.
8.x.4 Solution evaluation
This section provides solution evaluation based on the open issues specified in the related key issue(s).
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the potential enhancements to CAPIF (as specified in 3GPP TS 23.222 [2]) to support potential requirements addressing e.g. handling of AEF unavailability, location granularity, use cases related to CAPIF administrator emerging from practical field experiences e.g. in management of API provider domain functions, new potential CAPIF enhancements identified from MSED support, charging, and exposure framework requirements from SDOs/industry forums such as GSMA, ETSI OpenCAPIF, etc.
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 23.222: "Common API Framework for 3GPP Northbound APIs".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.122: "Security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) for 3GPP northbound APIs".
[4] 3GPP TS 23.558: "Architecture for enabling Edge Applications".
[5] 3GPP TS 22.261: "Service requirements for the 5G system; Stage 1".
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Definition format (Normal)
<defined term>: <definition>.
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.API provider administrator: An authorized user with special permissions for API provider domain operations.
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
Symbol format (EW)
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Abbreviation format (EW)
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
BSS Business Support System
CA Certificate Authority
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4 Key issues
| 4.1 Key issue #1: Enhancements to API provider function to handle API invoker status change
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.1.1 Description
| Background: As specified in the clause 6.1 of 3GPP TS 33.122 [3], the API invoker obtains onboarding enrolment information from the API provider domain. Without onboarding enrolment information provided by the API provider domain, the API invoker would not be able to perform onboarding to CCF. The API provider domain (for example, Gaming server) will provide the onboarding enrolment information to the API invoker (for example, Gamin client on the UE) for example if the user has subscribed to (or paid for) the service provided by the API provider domain (for example, Gaming service). So, API provider domain can play a role in enabling API invoker onboarding.
Use cases:
1) In certain scenario, the user of the UE (on which the API invoker is available) could decide to not continue receiving service from the AEF, and the API invoker would like e.g. to unsubscribe the service (e.g. to not pay for the service). In such scenario, the API provider domain would need to ensure that the API invoker cannot access any service APIs exposed by the AEF of the API provider domain after unsubscription.
2) Out of band service unsubscription: Service subscription/unsubscription is often a business process that might involve multiple "elementary" services and that is coordinated by a BSS entity. Currently, the API provider domain can support the creation of onboarding credentials which can be used by the subscriber during onboarding the client on the UE (i.e. API invoker). However, the API provider domain currently does not support scenarios related to out of band service unsubscription.
3) Blocking rogue API invokers: API invokers can prove to be rogue (e.g. invoking APIs even after rejected or expired authorization or even after the maximum invocation rate limit is crossed), or cannot be eligible anymore for API usage (e.g. due to unpaid bills). In such scenario, the API provider domain would need to ensure that the API invoker cannot access any service APIs exposed by the AEF of the API provider domain
Possible gap: Currently, in clause 8.23.3 of 3GPP TS 23.222 [r23222], AEF revokes the authorization of the API invoker to access specific service API based on a limited set of use cases, e.g. access control. However, there is no provision for API providing function to handle scenarios where e.g. the API invoker unsubsribes or became rogue.
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.1.2 Open issues
| The following open issues are required to study:
1) whether and how to handle the scenario where API invoker whose status has changed in the API provider domain, e.g. the API invoker has unsubscribed the services from the API provider domain or being rogue?
4.2 Key issue #2: Enhancements to API administrationprovider administrator rolein CAPIF domain and API provider domain
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.2.1 Description
| 3GPP SA1 has specified the service requirements for exposure in 3GPP TS 22.261 [5] including service exposure, information exposure, etc. And 3GPP SA6 has already specified many APIs in various SEAL specifications, EDGEAPP specification etc. And 3GPP SA6 has defined CAPIF as a framework to support the management of such APIs exposure.
API provider administrator: An authorized user with special permissions for the API provider to perform administration of the service APIs.
Below updated definition for API management function in 3GPP TS 23.222 [2] shows the relationship of the API provider administrator and the API management function:
API management function: The entity which enables the API provider administrator at the API provider domain to perform administration (e.g. minimizing downtime, ensuring high availability and performance, identifying potential threats) of the service APIs.
API provider administrator (leveraging API management function) and CAPIF administrator plays a pivotal role (leveraging API management function) in managing and overseeing the CAPIF operations, ensuring smooth deployment, maintenance, and updates, and monitoring performance to meet service level agreements (SLAs). As an API provider administrator and CAPIF administrator, tracking and analysing API usage is crucial for ensuring optimal performance, security, and user satisfaction. However, currently in the CAPIF 3GPP TS 23.222 [2] there is limited support for administrator role via API management function. That is, API management function can Monitor service API invocation and Query service API log for auditing purpose. Hence, going by emerging trends the current support to administrator needs enhancement e.g. via analytics data.
Some key types of API analytics that would be useful for an API provider administrator and CAPIF administrator are Usage Metrics, Error Tracking, User Behaviour Analysis, Security Monitoring, Performance Optimization, Business Insights, Compliance and Auditing.
By leveraging these analytics, API provider administrators and CAPIF administrator can ensure that their APIs are reliable, secure, and aligned with business objectives.
NOTE: When the CAPIF provider and the service API provider are the same, then the API provider administrators and CAPIF administrator can be the same adminstratoradministrator.
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.2.2 Open issues
| To support the enhancements to API administrator role, the following aspects need to be studied:
- What are the key types of API analytics that would be useful for an API provider administrator?
- How to provide API analytics for the CAPIF entities in the API provider domain?
- whether and what are the key types of API analytics that would be useful for an CAPIF administrator?
- whether and how to provide API analytics to the CAPIF administrator?
Editor's note: Whether and how to provide API analytics to the CAPIF administrator is FFS.
4.3 Key issue #3: Certificate unavailability
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.3.1 Description
| As described in clause 6.1 of 3GPP TS 33.122 [3], a prerequisite to onboarding an API invoker to CAPIF, an API invoker is required to obtain onboarding enrolment information from the API provider domain (see step 1 of the referenced clause). This information is necessary to enable the API invoker to authenticate with the CAPIF core function (CCF) and establish secure communication over which to perform the onboarding process. The enrolment information must include details of the CCF (i.e., its address in the form of a URI and root certificate authority (CA) certificate) and includes an onboarding credential (i.e., an access token). With this information the API invoker can request to onboard to the CCF (clause 8.1 of 3GPP TS 23.222 [2]) and, if successful, receives its onboarding information in the response, which also includes the CCF assigned API invoker ID. A key attribute of the onboarding information response is the certificate assigned to the API invoker, which is signed e.g., by the CCF CA. API providers are also assigned signed certificates when registering to the CCF.
The problem identified is that an entity (API Invoker or API Provider) can no longer manage their resources at the CCF if they lose access to a valid certificate e.g., certificate expiry). This means for example:
- The API Provider can not update/delete/create new AEFs, APFs or update/delete AMF.
- The API Invoker entity cannot perform any operation with CCF (update/delete onboarding information, request security context, …).
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.3.2 Open issues
| This key issue will study approaches to managing entities (i.e., API Invoker or API Provider) without a valid CCF issued and signed certificate, specifically how such entities can be deleted from the CCF including associated resources to the entities like Security_Context associated to API Invokers and API resources published by APFs served by AEFs.
NOTE: Coordination will be required with SA3 for the identification of the aspects of certificate lifecycle management. that can affect the CAPIF framework
4.4 Key Issue #4: Service API and AEF operational status
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.4.1 Description
| Currently, the CCF obtains the service API status (e.g., active, inactive) via the API management function as described in clause 6.3.6 and 6.4.8 of 3GPP TS 23.222, or via the APF publish and publish updated procedure.
However, in some scenarios the API Provider Domain is unable to provide the status of Service APIs as the connection between the CAPIF core function and the API provider domain functions is disrupted due to e.g., network issues. In other scenarios, The key issue is that CCF cannot be aware whether an AEF is operational or not where AEFs can be disconnected/unreachable or do not work properly. The consequence is that there are scenarios in which the CCF can be unaware of whether an AEF and the API(s) it offers are active and able to offer service. Of note, registration of AEF does not include time-to-live (TTL) information, so an AEF can be registered indefinitely whether they are up or not. This can lead to a CCF providing erroneous information to API Invokers regarding AEFs that are no longer active.
The implementation and deployment of API provider domain functions may impact the service API status availability to the CCF via APF or API management function when considering the connectivity. The AEF, APF, API management functions in the API provider domain can be implemented in different entities and deployed in different locations. E.g., multiple AEF function instance is distributed deployed and the APF and the API management function instance are individually deployed in a centralized location. In this case, the network connectivity between the CCF and the AEF is different from the network connectivity between the CCF and the APF or API management function. In another example, the AEF and APF may be implemented and deployed together but the API management function is deployed in different locations. In this case, the network connectivity between the CCF and the AEF+APF is different from the network connectivity between the CCF and API management function.
In clause 8.6.2.1 of 3GPP TS 23.222 [2] specifying the contents of the service API update request sent from the APF to CCF there is a note stating that "how to monitor service API status when the APF is unable to update service API status is not specified in this release".
Examples of how this issue has been solved in other SA6 specifications include implementation of a heartbeat mechanism between servers, which is further specified by SA5 in their specification. as indicated for example through the EAS Availability Reporting Period information element as part of the EAS Profile in clause 8.2.4 of 3GPP TS 23.558 [4].There are some similar mechanisms:
- For the AEF is the NEF instance, the NEF Function IOC includes the managedNFProfile, where a heartBeatTimer is included indicating the time between two consecutive heart-beat messages from an NF Instance to the NRF defined in seconds.
- For AEF is the the EES/EAS/ECS case, similarly, the EAS Function in SA5 specification contains the EASProfile, where an eASAvailabilityReportingPeriod indicates to the EES how often it needs to check the EAS's availability after a successful registration (See EAS Availability Reporting Period defined in clause 8.2.4 in TS 23.558 [2]).
Now the CAPIF supports the dynamic routing of service API invocation and topology hiding. In those cases, the API invocation is firstly received and handled by one AEF (AEF#1) acting as service communication entry point, then AEF#1 will forward it to the destination AEF (AEF#2) for handling service API invocation. During service API invocation stage, if the AEF(AEF#2) does not work well, then the problem becomes how to route the service API invocation to an AEF providing such service API and work well. i.e., the service API status on this AEF is in active status.
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.4.2 Open issues
| - This key issue will study approaches to address scenarios in which the API Provider Domain is unable to provide the status of its AEFs with associated Service APIs and whether and how to enhance the architecture and related functions to handle the scenarios in which the connection between the CAPIF core function and the API provider domain functions is disrupted due to network issues.
- During service API invocation stage, if the one AEF does not work well, how to route the service API invocation to another AEF providing such service API and work well. i.e., the service API status on this AEF is in active status.
4.5 Key issue #5: Roaming Considerations for Service API Invocation
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.5.1 Description
| One existing gap in current deployments, detected by field experiences, is how to avoid in a controlled way that a service API invocation is served when, e.g., the UE is roaming and no exposure related roaming agreements with the visiting network exists in the home network or indicates that the service should not be delivered over a visiting network.
E.g., a QoS boost is not enforced in a roaming network:
PLMN A may define a strict QoS policy for inbound roamers, to ensure the network capacity is mainly enjoyed by home users. PLMN B, based on the service agreement with the Application Provider X about QoS boost, knows beforehand whether the QoS boost can be applied for its outbound roamers in PLMN A. If PLMN B does not apply roaming control for the QoS boost service API invocation by Application Provider X, the QoS request will be rejected by PLMN A, wasting unnecessarily network resources, having useless inter-PLMN signaling, and having KPIs degradation in both PLMN-A&B since the requests are eventually rejected.
Another problem exists when, e.g., the application invoker preferences to access a service API depends on whether the UE is roaming.
To ensure the correct handling of a Service API invocation, knowledge of whether the UE is roaming or not is necessary for evaluating roaming policies and application constraints. To reduce barriers in the usage of service APIs by applications, the API invoker should not be aware and should not be forced to be aware of the serving PLMN of the UE. To avoid increased complexity in the API Provider domain exposed service APIs and fragmentation derived from different solutions for roaming handling (e.g. per API Provider domain), the service API should not be forced either to become aware of the serving PLMN of the UE.
A solution in this area would enhance CAPIF to enable the control of service API invocations when the UE is roaming. The solution should consider efficient retrieval of roaming information from the Core Network (e.g. avoiding separated interactions with Core Network per service API invocation) and should keep CAPIF agnostic of the access network (i.e., agnostic of whether the access network is 5G, 4G, etc).
|
ab60f309d592db459e2be3eea4e94a12 | 23.700-43 | 4.5.2 Open issues
| To support the control of service API invocations when the UE is roaming, the following aspects need to be studied:
- How to determine and ensure correct handling on Service API invocations, based on:
- whether roaming agreements and policies between CSPs needed for exposure; and
- whether application preferences related to roaming of the UE.
NOTE: This KI ensures to keep CAPIF agnostic of the access network (i.e., agnostic of whether the access network is 5G, 4G, etc.).
Editor's nNote: Whether and how handle local access to service APIs in the VPLMN is FFS.
Editor's Note: Core network roaming aspects in this key issue needs to be updated with the application roaming aspects.
4.6 Key issue #6: Serving Area Considerations for Service API Invocation
|
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