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8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 25 | https://www.dw.com/en/yemens-president-hadi-declares-new-temporary-capital/a-18332197 | en | Yemen has new 'temporary capital' – DW – 03 | [
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"Deutsche Welle"
] | 2015-03-21T16:40:19+00:00 | Yemen's leader has used a televised speech to declare a new 'temporary capital.' The president, who fled house arrest last month, also called on the Huthi rebels to abandon control of government ministries in Sanaa. | en | /images/icons/favicon-16x16.png | dw.com | https://www.dw.com/en/yemens-president-hadi-declares-new-temporary-capital/a-18332197 | In a televised speech on Saturday, Yemen's President Raboo Mansour Hadi pledged to fight Iran's influence on his violence-ridden country.
Hadi, who was under rebel imposed house arrest until last month when he fled to Aden in the south of the country, accused Shiite Huthi militia of importing Tehran's ideology into Yemen.
In the broadcast, Hadi said he would "ensure the Yemeni republic flag will fly on the Marran Mountain instead of the Iranian flag."
In September, the Houthis overtook Yemen's capital, Sanaa, inluding Marran Mountain, seizing many state institutions. Since then they have also taken over nine of the country's 21 provinces.
Temporary capital
Locked in a power struggle with Houthi rebels, Hadi Saturday declared the port city of Aden Yemen's temporary capital.
"My move to Aden was not a step towards separation," despite claims to this effect from the "coup plotters," Hadi said in the address broadcast on official Aden TV. "My aim is to safeguard the legitimate state institutions."
"Aden is an economic and temporary capital," he added.
Hadi's televised address comes one day after suicide bombers killed more than 130 people in twin-attacks on mosques in Sanaa.
The bombers blew themselves up during noon prayers at the Badr and Al-Hashahush mosques, situated on opposite sides of the city, witnesses and officials said Friday. The self-styled "Islamic State" claimed responsibility for the attack.
The mosques are frequented by Shiite Houthi rebels, allied with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who have control of the capital.
Meanwhile, US broadcaster CNN reported Saturday that Washington was evacuating 100 Special Forces troops from Yemen because of the unstable political situation in the country. This came after al Qaeda fighters reportedly seized the southern city of al-Houta, not far from the Al Anad air base where the US troops are stationed. Howerver, Reuters on Saturday reported, citing local officials and residents, that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had been driven back out of the southern city on Saturday.
Al-Houta is only around 30 kilometers (roughly 20 miles) from the "temporary capital" of Aden declared as President Hadi's interim headquarters.
jlw/msh (Reuters, dpa, AFP, AP) | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 86 | http://www.us-iran.org/news/2015/10/12/expanding-us-iran-cooperation-to-forge-a-power-sharing-deal-in-yemen | en | Sharing Deal in Yemen — American Iranian Council | http://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c70db5e4b0c75c07d5cbc5/54c71083e4b02ad05e8989de/561c106ae4b05e01980c1898/1444705762125/?format=1500w | http://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c70db5e4b0c75c07d5cbc5/54c71083e4b02ad05e8989de/561c106ae4b05e01980c1898/1444705762125/?format=1500w | [
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"Kayvon Afshari"
] | 2015-10-12T00:00:00 | By Arastoo Taslim, AIC Research Associate During the “Arab Spring” of 2011, protests across Yemen called for President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation. After 33 years in office, Saleh abdicated power in February 2012 to his vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, via a single candidate election. | en | https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/54c70db5e4b0c75c07d5cbc5/1427070551944-VF0MY3GOOJZ3Z3LNPQ72/favicon.ico?format=100w | American Iranian Council | http://www.us-iran.org/news/2015/10/12/expanding-us-iran-cooperation-to-forge-a-power-sharing-deal-in-yemen | AIC Policy Paper: Expanding U.S.-Iran Cooperation to Forge a Power-Sharing Deal in Yemen
By Arastoo Taslim, AIC Research Associate
BACKGROUND
During the “Arab Spring” of 2011, protests across Yemen called for President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation. After 33 years in office, Saleh abdicated power in February 2012 to his vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, via a single candidate election. One of the groups both supporting the ouster of Saleh and rejecting his replacement were the Houthis.
Control over Yemen, March 2015
WHO ARE THE HOUTHIS?
The Houthis are a Zaidi Shia group which make up approximately one-third of Yemen’s population. Although the sect is defined as Shia, the beliefs of Zaidis are more in line with Sunni Islamic thought than Twelver Shi’ism found in Iran. For example, Shiites believe in the hidden Imam, the Mahdi, while Zaidis - like Sunnis - do not. This fundamental distinction dispels the notion of a deep-rooted religious connection between the Iranians and Houthis.
The founder and leader of the Houthis, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, was an important figure in 2004 in uprisings against the Yemeni government. He died in 2004 and the Houthi movement took its name after him. Having ruled for approximately 1000 years, the Zaidi rule in North Yemen came to an end in 1962 after an eight-year civil war. Since then, especially in 1994, 2004 and now, the Houthis have been fighting "for things that all Yemenis crave: government accountability, the end to corruption, regular utilities, fair fuel prices, job opportunities for ordinary Yemenis and the end of Western influence.” The primary objective of the Houthi opposition is to establish a government with fair representation that is inclusive of Houthi leadership. The Yemeni government has accused the Houthis of trying to overthrow the government and the republican system in favor of an Iranian-style, theocratic government.
HOW DID THE CURRENT CONFLICT START?
After Saleh resigned in 2012, there was a power vacuum that was intensified with rising fuel prices as a result of Hadi’s cut to subsidies. The Houthis used this to mobilize support and, ultimately, as a casus belli. In 2014, violence erupted between the Houthis and the Yemeni army, and the Houthis seized control of Sana’a. They gained influence because of this and were able to establish an agreement with Hadi’s government that would include the government’s resignation, a reduction in fuel prices, and new elections. The Houthis also attempted to establish a new constitution which included a Peace and National Partnership Agreement. This new government consisted mostly of technocrats, lead by Khaled Bahah, a widely-respected former prime minister and independent. That this new government was technocratic in nature rather than partisan was lauded and promoted by the Houthis. In January 2015, the Houthis descended on the presidential compound in Sana’a with a list of demands. Surprisingly, Hadi’s administration quit, and the Houthis issued a constitutional declaration, placing power mostly in the hands of the Houthis. In February 2015, Hadi fled house arrest to Aden, declared it the new capital, invited embassies to reopen there, and retracted his resignation. The Houthis have since allied themselves with supporters of former president Saleh. The Saudi-led coalition has rejected the Houthis’ rise to power, and has led their aerial campaign in support of Hadi.
IRAN’S ROLE
Iran’s role in the Yemeni conflict has been exaggerated. This is due in part to the false perception of a conflict fueled by sectarianism. While the Houthis are of the Zaidi Shia branch of Islam, the conflict is directly related to a perceived disparity in political representation. Ali Abdullah Saleh is a descendant of the Zaidi branch of Islam, but the Houthis were in favor of his resignation in 2011 during the protests. They have since allied with Saleh and his supporters in order to gain political traction. These maneuvers are politically, not religiously, driven. Moreover, Houthi ambitions are dictated by local concerns aimed at increasing their representation within the country. They are not currently driven, and have not been historically driven, by an Iranian agenda. Adam Baron of the European Council on Foreign Relations further clarifies the role of Iran:
“The Houthis are glad to have Iran's political support. They're glad to have some financial and military support. But when it comes down to it, it's not as if the Houthis were created by Iran, and further, it's not as if the Houthis are being controlled by Iran. This is a group that is rooted in local Yemeni issues, and its actions are fundamentally rooted in the decisions of its local Yemeni leaders.”
Even Ali Abdullah Saleh complained of Iranian meddling in Yemeni affairs while in office, but was not able to substantiate his claims with evidence. A leaked cable from Wikileaks reveals that, in 2009, Ambassador Stephen Seche informed the State Department that “Tehran's reach to date [in Yemen] is limited.” Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs Hossein Amir-Abadollahian stated the official position of the Islamic Republic in April 2015:
“Iran is not interfering in Yemen at all and has no military forces or even military advisers for training affairs in Yemen. And what defense tactic the Yemenis adopt against the Saudi aggression is a completely internal issue.”
At the same time however, Iran is likely aware of its exaggerated role in the Yemeni conflict and is using it as a way to propagate its own strength. As political analyst Shahir ShahidSaless explains:
“Iran, then, is exaggerating its regional power and military reach to create a mystical stature aimed at solidifying the confidence of its grassroots supporters within and outside its borders — in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon — while muscle-flexing, and discouraging and pushing its domestic and international opponents onto the defensive.”
While Iran may benefit from this misperception of its role and influence in Yemen, Javad Zarif also proposed a four-point peace plan in April 2015 in hopes of putting an end to the conflict. The plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of foreign military attacks, humanitarian assistance, a resumption of national dialogue, and the establishment of an inclusive national unity government. The proposal was swiftly rejected by the Yemeni government, which labelled the plan a “political maneuver.” Western and Arab diplomats have also dismissed the Iranian plan, citing a need for a neutral peace broker.
Although Iran’s role in Yemen is exaggerated, it may have the leverage necessary with the Houthis - through limited funding and arms - to steer them towards an agreement. While their direct involvement in Yemen is limited, the Iranians are well aware of the influence that Hezbollah has had on the political aspirations of the Houthis. The Iranians have acknowledged this. In January, Hojjat al-Eslam Ali Shirazi of the IRGC stated:
“Years ago, Hezbollah in Lebanon was formed, followed in Iraq and Syria. Today in Yemen, too, we are witnessing the formation of Ansarollah [the Houthis], and in the future, all of these groups will be to enter the battlefield against the enemies of Islam and Muslims.”
Another member of the IRGC, General Hossein Salami, said “Ansarollah is a similar copy of [Lebanese] Hezbollah in a strategic area.”
SAUDI ARABIA'S ROLE
Saudi Arabia is especially concerned with Iran’s involvement in Middle East regional affairs, particularly in light of the recent nuclear deal. Leaked files from WikiLeaks from earlier this year suggest that the Saudis are willing to go to great lengths to spread their Sunni ideology and undermine Iran to a point of “obsession”. The ongoing aerial intervention in Yemen which started in 2015 - led by the Saudis at the behest of President Hadi with support from almost every GCC member state - substantiates that claim. The true objective of this Saudi-led campaign is to undermine Iranian influence. Unfortunately, by asserting their power against the perceived Iranian proxy, the Saudis are exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world, with 61% of Yemenis - roughly 16 million people - requiring some form of humanitarian assistance before the current conflict had even started. Moreover, almost half of the population suffers from food insecurity and malnutrition. Safe drinking and proper sanitation facilities are scarce, and 8.4 million people lack access to basic healthcare. Mohamed Elmontassir Hossein, Country Director of Yemen at the International Rescue Committee, described the exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis in April 2015:
“In a country that imports 90 percent of its staples, the closure and targeting by belligerents of airports, restrictions on seaport access, and a prevailing climate of banditry have seen local food prices leap four-fold in some parts, and pushed the number of food insecure people up to over 12 million.”
As noted above, Saleh made claims of Iranian meddling while in office. According to leaked documents from WikiLeaks, Saleh’s battles against the Houthis were described by the US to be “dangerous and delusional”. He also sought Saudi support for countering the Houthis. In 2009, the US was concerned with Saudi and Emirati support for Saleh which they believed would aggravate sectarian and regional tensions. The US has likely decided to publicly laud the Gulf coalition against the Houthis so as to not alienate their Arab allies further than the nuclear deal has. However, based on the aforementioned US apprehension vis-a-vis aggression against the Houthis, the United States is likely more concerned about the coalition’s actions and its goals than it publicly admits.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Immediate Ceasefire: With hopes that the dire situation in Yemen is once again ripe for negotiations to restart, there should be an immediate cessation of hostilities from all sides. This will help to establish trust at the outset of the negotiations which will follow the ceasefire.
Power-Sharing Deal: Yemen is in need of a power-sharing deal. The National Dialogue Conference which concluded in January 2014 established a power-sharing agreement, but was eventually boycotted by Houthi leaders due to a stipulation in the agreement that divided Yemen into federal regions, as well as the assassination of one of their representatives. According to Jamal Benomar, the former UN envoy who mediated talks between the different major political Yemeni factions, there was substantial progress being made towards another viable power-sharing deal until March 2015, when the Saudi-led coalition began its aerial campaign. Benomar resigned the next month. To have seemingly fruitful negotiations spoiled at the eleventh hour is extremely frustrating for all parties. A neutral location in the region, like Oman, should host. Hadi needs to have a seat at the table as well as the Houthis. The major regional stakeholders - Saudi Arabia and Iran - should also be present. Iran and Saudi Arabia should also work with the United States, as an intermediary, to help keep hostilities at bay while negotiations proceed.
US-Iran Cooperation: Since the United States and Iran have negotiated a nuclear deal, now is the time to further this cooperation into other aspects of Middle East security. The United States needs to reassure its Arab allies that the US still values its relationship with them. Moreover, the US also needs to make it clear that the Iranians could help to steer the Houthis toward the negotiating table. The Iranians can and should embrace the opportunity to do just this.
The United States’ Role: The United States needs to keep boots off the ground, and planes out of the air. The US should help shape the diplomatic process by liaising between the Saudis and Iranians (and other parties), but it’s time for the major regional players to step up and take responsibility for regional security. ISIS and al-Qaeda pose a threat to Yemen and risk further destabilization of the region. Before these groups have the chance to capitalize on a fractured and impoverished nation and political structure, Saudi Arabia and Iran should encourage the establishment of a fair framework whereby all major parties gain representation, stability is restored, and national security is built to defend against extremist forces. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia need to have a sense of urgency when it comes to centralizing Yemen’s government and power structure. Battling extremist elements that will inevitably undermine any forthcoming agreement should and could be a point of cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The United States should help catalyze this.
European Encouragement: The Europeans should also encourage a power-sharing deal, given the current level of mistrust felt towards the United States by the Saudis. Given the significant influx of refugees in Europe as of late, the Europeans should see this as a hopeful opportunity to mitigate another potential migration crisis. | ||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 69 | https://catalyst-journal.com/2022/06/yemen-in-purgatory | en | Yemen in Purgatory | [
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] | null | [] | null | In Yemen, hopes of a 2011 protest movement during the Arab Spring gave way to civil war and a brutal Saudi-led invasion. Thousands have been killed, and millions are close to starvation. A peace agreement could help Yemenis recover the frustrated hopes of the 2011 uprising — if Saudi Arabia stops demanding victory for its allies. | en | /static/apple-touch-icon.png | https://catalyst-journal.com/2022/06/yemen-in-purgatory | Daniel Finn
For the last thirty years, Yemen has been formally united in a single state, although the conflict of the last decade has broken up that political unity in practice. Previously, however, Yemen had been divided into two states. What were the origins of that divide?
Helen Lackner
The military coup is known in Yemen as the revolution rather than as a coup, although, objectively, it was a coup. But it was generally described by most people in the country and is perceived today as the overthrow of the imamate and the beginning of a republic. It came about after decades of frustration against the imam.
The imams ruled very autocratically and oppressively — particularly the penultimate one, Ahmad bin Yahya. There had been a large number of uprisings, the most famous being the ones in 1948 and 1955, when groups of educated elites opposed the imam and tried to overthrow him militarily. They were very severely repressed: a lot of heads were cut off and put on display to the public in various locations.
You had a regime that many describe as retrograde and comparable to the one that existed in Oman prior to 1970. The characteristics of that regime included heavy taxation throughout the country, which made life difficult for the population at large, and very limited investment in any of the modern aspects of life that people were interested in, such as health and education. The imam had also sent a number of officers for training to Iraq. They came back with Arab nationalist ideology, and therefore with anti-monarchical sentiments that made them ready to get rid of the imam.
Ahmad bin Yahya died in his bed. His successor, his son Muhammad al-Badr, was quite progressive in certain senses and was expected to operate much more within an Arab nationalist framework, but he was in power for barely ten days before he was overthrown. The reason it became a civil war was that the revolutionaries failed to kill him. He escaped and went north, where he rallied tribespeople and was supported by the Saudi regime and others to fight back.
The revolutionaries were immediately supported by the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, who sent significant numbers of troops to Yemen. At times, there were up to seventy thousand Egyptians in the country, as well as a lot of administrators and political advisers who were really more than advisers. It was a civil war but with significant international involvement, just like the civil war today.
The Egyptians supported the republican side, while the Saudis and the British supported the monarchist side. The British were a bit less open about their involvement, but you could call it an open secret. They sent some Special Air Service (SAS) units, and there was even some Israeli support for the monarchists.
The civil war had basically reached a stalemate by late 1967 or early 1968. After Nasser withdrew his troops, there was an attempt by the royalists to take over the city of Sana’a, with a seventy-day siege that remains very famous in the memories of Yemenis. But that siege failed to oust the republicans. In 1967–9, there was a process whereby the most extreme royalists were defeated or marginalized, while on the other hand, the left wing of the republican movement was also marginalized. In some cases, people were killed.
That made possible the deal that was reached in 1970. Those who signed it agreed to retain the republic. However, it was a “republic” of right-wing republicans and the less extreme supporters of the imamate. None of the imam’s family were allowed to come back, but at the same time, the left wing of the movement was also eliminated.
Daniel Finn
How did Ali Abdullah Saleh come to be the leader of North Yemen by the end of the 1970s?
Helen Lackner
Ali Abdullah Saleh was an army officer from a small tribe called the Sanhan, a minor branch of the most important tribal confederation in Yemen, the Hashid. In 1977–8, three Yemeni presidents were assassinated, including two in the North. The first was Ibrahim al-Hamdi, who is still remembered and revered all over the country as the great hope of Yemenis. He was assassinated in October 1977, just as he was about to go to Aden to sign a unity agreement with the president of the South, Salim Rubai Ali, known as Salmine.
After al-Hamdi’s assassination, another officer, Ahmad al-Ghashmi, became president in Sana’a. He in turn was assassinated in June 1978, supposedly by an envoy from Salmine. There’s some debate about whether that is really what happened — that is to say, the identity of his assassin is clear, because they died together, but whether it was on Salmine’s orders is another question. In any case, the southern leaders used that as an opportunity to kill Salmine, and that’s how Yemen lost three presidents by the end of June 1978.
At that point, several maneuvers took place in Sana’a. I suspect that Saleh was appointed as president on the assumption that he would essentially take orders from various figures. When I first went to Sana’a in 1980, throughout that period and for many years afterward, all of us expected there would be a coup tomorrow morning. We expected to wake up and find that Saleh had been assassinated.
The saying was that nobody would sell him a life insurance policy for a million dollars, because it would have to be paid so quickly. History has shown, of course, that this was a mistaken assumption. He lasted for thirty-three years as president.
Daniel Finn
What was the nature of the struggle against British colonial rule in Aden in the 1960s? And what was the outcome of that struggle?
Helen Lackner
Aden was a different situation. After the revolution in Sana’a in 1962, there was an incentive for the southern nationalists to seriously challenge British colonial rule. There had been challenges to British rule throughout the period, of greater or lesser significance. But they were very localized: southern Yemeni society was already very fragmented at that time.
After 1962, you had the influence of Nasserism, on the one hand, as well as the rise of the trade union movement in Aden, on the other. The unions were a very important element of left-wing politics in that region that had been emerging since the early to mid-1950s. Ever since the refinery had been built, there was a strong trade union movement in Aden.
A number of people who had been sent to study at the American University of Beirut came back very much influenced by the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN), established in 1958. The MAN was the ancestor of many left-wing movements in the Arab world, such as the two main Palestinian left-wing organizations, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), as well as the movement in Oman, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).
You had the combination of two movements, one primarily rural, which was connected with the MAN, and one urban, which stemmed from the trade union movement. That is why you ended up with a struggle as much between two rival liberation movements as against the British: the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), which was aligned with the trade unions and very Nasserist in its political orientation, and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The NLF included MAN people, as well as those who had an even clearer left-wing ideology, and others who had a more tribal approach. It was a much more diverse movement than FLOSY.
Before Britain left, in the summer of 1967, there was more fighting going on between these two groups than between either of them and the British. The NLF effectively defeated FLOSY in August of that year, which is one of the reasons why the British negotiated independence with the NLF rather than with FLOSY.
Another reason was that FLOSY was, in British eyes and in reality, closely associated with Nasserism, and the British in that period considered Nasser to be barely an improvement on the devil. A third factor was that they knew extremely little about the NLF. When you read documents or memoirs that British officials have written on the period, they often recognize that they basically had no idea what the NLF was.
Daniel Finn
After the British withdrawal, why did South Yemen come under the rule of the NLF and then become the only Arab country with a formal commitment to Soviet-style Marxism? Behind the rhetoric, what did that system actually mean for the people over whom it ruled?
Helen Lackner
The second part of your question is the easier one. What it meant for the people was a very reasonable standard of living — indeed, a standard of living above and beyond the financial capacities of the state, given its economic circumstances and limited natural resources. It is important to remember that the two main economic resources of that part of Yemen were the Aden port, whose activities collapsed with the closure of the Suez Canal after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the British base, which of course closed when the British left.
One of the major assets of the PDRY regime was its ability to provide good education, health services, infrastructure, and jobs throughout the country. Most people had incomes that were not particularly fantastic but that were sufficient to maintain their families, thanks to food subsidies and other basic supports.
That’s the aspect of the regime that people look back on even today as containing elements of “the good old days.” Others now look back at the British colonial period as “the good old days.” But the PDRY is certainly remembered positively by those who remember it, and by their children and now grandchildren, for having provided adequate living standards without corruption and without major differentials. That was true in both urban and rural areas — the majority of people were rural, even in that period — despite the fact that the agrarian reform and the rural systems were not entirely satisfactory by any standards.
As to the first part of the question: Why did it become the only country committed to Marxism in any shape or form? They didn’t call it Marxism, by the way — they called it “scientific socialism.” You have to look at the whole historical period that you’re dealing with. We’re talking about the 1970s and the 1980s, after the formal end of the Sino-Soviet dispute. We’re also talking about the remains of the impact of the Cultural Revolution in China. There had been a strong influence from China early on: the debates within the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) reflected those problems.
I think it’s largely because of the overall international situation that this was possible. From 1967 onward, you saw the defeat of Nasserism and Arab nationalism, at a time when Ba’athism in Iraq and Syria was also largely discredited for those who had any familiarity with those regimes. Therefore, the forms of socialism that appeared to offer a possible or reasonable future were Eastern European, Chinese, or Cuban. There was a big Cuban medical mission in Aden — the Cubans trained and developed the medical school there. That had a strong impact ideologically.
We have to remember as well that we were in the context of the Cold War, and the Soviet Union thus found it very convenient to have access to Aden as a naval position and to have a kind of foothold in the region, particularly since the rest of the Arabian Peninsula was run by autocratic monarchies, as it is today. Although that’s not the complete answer, I think the factors that I’ve mentioned contributed significantly to it.
Daniel Finn
Why did the ruling party in South Yemen then descend into quite bloody power struggles between rival factions in the 1970s and ’80s?
Helen Lackner
The short answer is, I wish I knew! I lived there for five years, which is a significant percentage of the time that the regime existed. It’s one of the things that I would ask leaders when I came across them. The main question I kept asking them, which I never got an answer to, was: Why were they using external models rather than developing their own Marxist analysis based on the social and economic realities of the country?
The factionalism at an early stage clearly had a connection with what I’ve just talked about. For example, of the top leaders, Salmine was considered to be a populist following the Chinese line, whereas Abdul Fattah Ismail was seen as a sort of bureaucrat following a very straightforward Soviet bureaucratic approach. Ali Nasir Muhammad was seen as an in-between pragmatist. You could say that these differences between them were one element.
Many people say that it was merely a tribal struggle. I don’t accept that. What happened in 1986, which was the bloodiest of all the struggles, deteriorated and did become a tribal struggle. After the initial fighting on January 13, people were attacked and killed because of their identity cards and where they came from. It degenerated into a tribal struggle, or a regional struggle, but that’s not what it was at first.
The 1986 struggle, in my view, was initially nothing more than a power struggle: “I want to be in your seat.” A few months after it happened, I went back to Yemen. I had just published my book on the PDRY a few months earlier in October 1985, and many people wanted me to write an analysis of the events of 1986 for an Arabic edition, although that never happened. I spent a month traveling around both the PDRY and Sana’a, where the defeated faction had taken refuge, interviewing as many leaders as I could get hold of and taking piles and piles of notes, which I still have.
I had a number of questions for them: What are your differences in foreign policy? What are your differences with respect to social policies, economic policies, and particularly rural policies? The answers eventually made pages of nonsense. My conclusion was that the only thing they were fighting about was getting the top seat. That’s certainly true for 1986.
The earlier power struggle in 1969 was a much more straightforward left-right clash over different policies. The one in 1978 was mainly perceived to be an anti-populist move, against those who were pro-Chinese, with the success of the more directly pro-Soviet side. I’m not sure to what extent that answers the question, but I certainly thought at the time, and I still think today, that these struggles were largely counterproductive.
Another element one has to remember is the support and sponsorship for opposition to the PDRY regime from the Saudis, the British, and all kinds of sources, who clearly egged them on. The regime had to contend with armed incursions and fighting enemies across the board, including the people who had been defeated when British colonialism ended, and then later after the struggles in 1969, 1978, and 1986.
They certainly had real enemies, and it was obvious that these enemies would use both direct and indirect means to foster division and dissent among the leadership. But they could have responded to those provocations by having more of a united front, which obviously they didn’t do.
Daniel Finn
How did unification come about between the two parts of Yemen in the early 1990s? What kind of system took shape in the new state after unification?
Helen Lackner
Unification took place in 1990 as a result of several factors. Yemeni unity had long been the most popular political slogan among the official ones in both parts of the country. In Yemeni schools every morning, the children would stand up and declaim the standard national slogans. Of the three elements, Yemeni unity was the most popular; the other two were “defense of the Yemeni revolution” and “implementation of the Five-Year Plan.” That was very ingrained.
People also tended to have relatives in the other part of the country. An enormous number of South Yemenis migrated to work in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states via the North, because the YAR had a special agreement with the Saudis, which meant that its citizens didn’t have to go through the usual regulations for foreign workers and could come and go as they wished and work without a sponsor. Going in with a North Yemeni passport was very convenient for anybody, so many southerners went to Sana’a to claim a YAR passport, which was allowed.
There is, in my view, a Yemeni nation, even though there are differences between somebody from the far east and somebody from the far north. There are certain common features that most Yemenis share. For decades, when people talked about Arab unity, I considered it a joke — I never thought it could happen — whereas I always felt that Yemeni unity was a real possibility, because there was this cultural and historical connection of people within the country from one end of it to the other — including a few bits that are currently not part of it.
Of course, there were a number of political elements. On the one hand, internally, both the PDRY and the YAR were going into crises. By that time, Ali Abdullah Saleh had been in power for ten years. His regime was consolidating, and it was causing considerable dissatisfaction among the people. Oil income had only just started in 1986–7. There was an uprising in a central region against his regime. Saleh had his problems to deal with.
The PDRY regime after 1986 was basically discredited for the population, because the January 13 struggle was perceived by everybody as nothing more than a murderous power struggle, during which at least five thousand people were killed. There had been massive emigration of the succession of defeated factions since 1969. That regime failed to reestablish credibility among the population, despite a number of very positive efforts that it made — for example, allowing much more freedom of expression and allowing other parties to exist.
One of the things that triggered unity was the discovery of oil at a particular location, which was on the border between both the Yemeni states and Saudi Arabia. It was perceived, I think rightly, that if the two Yemens started fighting each other on this one, the Saudis would just take the lot. Forming a unified state was certainly a better option.
Saleh was in favor of it. He thought — and I think history has proved him right — that he would manipulate it and be the stronger element. At the time of unification, you had about nine million Yemenis from the YAR and about two million from the PDRY, so the balance of population was very much in favor of the northern element.
There’s still a lot of debate today about what the unity agreement was, because the Yemeni Socialist Party believed that they had agreed on a federal system, and that their then leader, Ali Salem al Beidh, had been tricked by Saleh to go for full unity. That is the widespread story, and it may be true — I have no idea.
Unity was greeted at the time by Yemenis everywhere with great enthusiasm, as it was something that people had aspired to: being able to travel around freely, and for the southerners to be able to access the material goods available in the North. A lot of people had two main hopes for unity that are still worth recalling.
Qat, as you may know, is a mild drug that is widely consumed in Yemen. In the PDRY, there were regulations, according to which it could only be consumed on weekends and holidays. In the YAR, it was permitted all the time and had spread enormously — and it has spread even more since then. Many people in both parts of Yemen were hoping that the southern rules on qat would be imposed throughout the country.
Another element that many women were certainly hoping for was that the PDRY’s family law would prevail. That gave women a much better position. It officially granted them full rights, by comparison with the situation in the YAR.
Of course, what happened was the opposite. Sana’a’s qat laws spread to all of Yemen, and you now see people chewing afternoon and night, everywhere in the country. The family law of the North was imposed. Southern women, and indeed women throughout Yemen, found that their circumstances deteriorated considerably after that.
There was a brief civil war in 1994, when some southerners tried to reassert their independence. They were militarily defeated by Saleh’s forces, with support not only from a number of Islamists and “Afghans,” as they were known — people who had come back from the jihad in Afghanistan — but also from those who had been defeated in 1986. That is relevant today when you look at the situation with respect to the Southern Transitional Council and southern separatism, as the pro-Saleh forces included the man who later became Saleh’s successor as president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had been on the losing side in 1986.
After 1994, the regime that Saleh had been operating in the YAR spread throughout Yemen. That was a regime where you had formal democracy and the presence of other parties, but decisions were essentially made by a small military clique, and benefits accrued to a similarly small clique of kleptocrats. That caused a lot of dissatisfaction, of course, in the South. It wasn’t particularly appreciated in the North, either, but they were used to it.
Daniel Finn
What would you say were the main factors behind the uprising that eventually ousted Saleh from 2011 onward? How much do you think Yemen had in common with other Arab countries that ousted their own rulers at the same time?
Helen Lackner
The points I’ve just made about frustration at Saleh’s type of rule were certainly major elements that led to the uprising. That frustration was particularly the result of increased poverty throughout the country.
I saw poverty in Yemen in the early 2000s that I had seen in places like Pakistan or West Africa and never thought I would see in Yemen. That was because there were no jobs, the population was increasing by 3 percent every year while resources were not, and the kleptocrats were grabbing everything they could, leaving very little for anybody else. You saw more people in poverty, begging in the streets, every year.
You had rising political tensions. Saleh’s divide-and-rule policy affected everybody, but it was very much focused on the far north, where the Houthi movement emerged. Between 2004 and 2010, there were six wars between the Houthis and the Saleh regime. In the South, it emerged in late 2006 through the southern separatist movement, which started among the thousands of military officers and security people who had been dismissed after 1994 and were left without any income.
Corruption made people angry everywhere. Young people were perhaps getting educated but not finding any jobs. In 2009–10, Saleh tried to change the constitution so that he would be able to stand for election yet again, and he was preparing his son to inherit the presidency.
This brings us to the other half of your question. Saleh was hoping to end up with a “republican monarchy,” following the model that Hafez al-Assad had successfully implemented in Syria and that Hosni Mubarak failed to implement in Egypt, which involved passing on power to their sons. In other aspects, too, the frustration in Yemen was very similar to that in other countries: economic problems, poverty, lack of democracy and freedom.
You did have much more freedom in Yemen in terms of saying what you wanted. Saleh had realized that you could let people speak and say what they wanted, so long as they didn’t have any influence. That was not the case in Syria, for example, and less so in Egypt and Tunisia. But in terms of economic, social, and political demands, I think it was largely the same everywhere. Similar demands were also made in Algeria and Sudan ten years later.
Daniel Finn
From that moment of opening or hope, however tentative, in 2011 and 2012, how did the country then descend into civil war? What role did outside powers have to play in what happened?
Helen Lackner
In 2011, Saleh was forced out of power. The Yemeni military split. A number of Saleh’s supporters joined the protest movement, including a major military unit. You then had a series of military confrontations between the Saleh loyalists and the supposed supporters of the revolution.
This led to international intervention. There was a group of states called the Friends of Yemen, composed of most major states in the world and including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. They supported what was known as the GCC initiative, which later, after November 2011, became the GCC agreement.
Its terms included the departure of Saleh from the presidency. However, because Saleh remained politically strong, he was neither forced out of the country nor forced out of its politics. He retained control of the General People’s Congress, which was his political creation and which remains one of the major political institutions or parties in the country.
The GCC agreement created a transitional state that was supposed to last for two years. Its president was Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had been Saleh’s vice president. He was elected in an unopposed, uncontested election. Hadi’s background was in the PDRY, as a leading member of the faction that was defeated in the 1986 conflict, so he became the first southern president of Yemen.
From 2012 to 2014, there was supposed to be a transitional state, which would include a number of elements: a government of national unity, security sector reform, and something called the National Dialogue Conference, which was designed to bring about a new constitution, if necessary, and solve the fundamental political problems of the country. These initiatives all failed.
The government of national unity had 50 percent representation for Saleh’s supporters. The other 50 percent was meant to be shared between the formal political opposition in parliament, composed of the Islah party, which is a combination of northern tribespeople and Islamists, and a whole range of other parties, including the Ba’athists, the socialists, and the Nasserists, plus what were known as the new forces emerging from the uprising — youth, women, and civil society.
This government gained the reputation of being the most corrupt one that had ever existed in Yemen. It was paralyzed in terms of doing anything. The security sector reform failed, for a host of reasons, but particularly because it was unable to transform the loyalty of the main security units away from Saleh to the state. The National Dialogue Conference failed for another host of reasons. It was badly managed by the United Nations. It had nine working parties to address various questions, including the Houthis, the southern issue, and the new form the state should take. They couldn’t agree on any of the major issues.
During this conference, which lasted for eleven months in 2013–14, the Houthis increased their control in their home area and expanded into other, surrounding areas. They were also beginning to build an alliance with Saleh: he had previously been their number-one enemy, but the Houthis and Saleh both opposed federalism, which was one of the main proposals of the transitional regime, and they opposed that regime’s existence. They had a common enemy, so they got together and drove out the government in early 2015. They worked together in an alliance that became increasingly tense until the Houthis killed Saleh in December 2017.
The full-scale war really started in 2015. Primarily, this war is an internal Yemeni conflict between a whole range of different factions, with different social groups and regional aspects involved. The international role is an additional, worsening factor. The direct intervention of Saudi Arabia and the coalition of ten states that it led — of whom only two were really significant, the Saudis themselves and the United Arab Emirates — merely worsened the level of killings and the dire humanitarian situation.
Daniel Finn
Do you see any cause for tentative optimism about whether the conflict can be resolved and the country can move back to a more peaceful and stable situation?
Helen Lackner
A deal between the Houthis and their opponents is possible, on the proviso that there is a significant change to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 of April 14, 2015, which has been the determining UN element for action in Yemen. It effectively demands complete Houthi surrender.
Between 2015, when that resolution was voted through, and today, the Houthis have been gaining ground. They now control 70 percent of the country’s population, and they have a functioning government in the area they control. It may be a horrible government. It may be highly oppressive. It may be fundamentalist. But it’s operational.
On the other hand, the people who are against them, and particularly the internationally recognized government, are increasingly weak. That government has barely any footing in the country at all. It only represents a small group of the people opposing the Houthis.
A deal between the Houthis and the Saudis, who the Houthis consider to be the main party to negotiate with, is possible, because the Saudis have essentially lost this war after seven years. It’s costing them a lot of money, and it’s also caused them enormous reputational damage, along with other factors, such as the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi. I think Mohammed bin Salman is ready for a deal.
The question is whether a deal can be achieved with the Houthis. They are kind of stuck with their current offensive, but they’ve been making slow progress, and there are certainly factions among them who want to pursue it, while other factions might want to reach an agreement. But a deal of that nature is possible.
Even if there is a deal, all the other issues will remain, from the separatist movement in the South to the divisions among the southern separatists themselves and the various political factions in the North. Those conflicts will go on until there is an entirely new approach to politics in Yemen, starting at the grassroots, which would help develop a new political class who are not a bunch of self-interested thieves.
We must also remember that Yemen is in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Saudis will continue to have massive influence. The Emiratis have also been building up their influence, which is by no means a positive one. There is an Iranian influence on the Houthis, although it is not determining in the sense that many people tend to claim it is. External involvement in one form or another will continue, even if there is a formal end to the fighting.
As well as this, the country’s economy has completely collapsed, so there will be a massive need for financial support for reconstruction. I fear the prospect of neoliberal policies, of Western consultancy firms using Saudi and Emirati funds to promote their own interests and to create development programs that would turn Yemen into an imitation, low-quality version of the worst of the Emirates — I’m talking about the poor Emirates, not Dubai and Abu Dhabi. That is not a prospect to be relished.
Daniel Finn
The new UN special envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, announced a two-month truce agreement on April 1. How did this agreement come about, and what are its long-term implications for Yemen?
Helen Lackner
As the first successful attempt to halt the fighting in Yemen for six years, the truce is clearly a significant event in itself. It also involves some important measures that will improve living conditions for the Yemeni people. One likely reason for the truce was a belated recognition by leaders on all sides that no breakthrough was possible in the military stalemate in the Marib region.
Marib is of particular importance as the internationally recognized government’s (IRG) last real stronghold. Two years of Houthi offensives have failed to dislodge IRG forces despite extremely heavy loss of life. In late 2021, when the Houthis appeared to be on the verge of success, the coalition showed its determination to defend Marib by bringing in reinforcements from elsewhere in Yemen.
A second reason has been the growing frustration of international actors — the Saudis and Emiratis in particular — at the failure of their Yemeni partners to function as a unit and seriously seek a solution. There was a very limited response to the UN Humanitarian Response Plan’s appeal in early March, which raised less than a third of the amount it had been seeking. Third, Grundberg displayed skill and determination in his role as envoy after his appointment in August 2021, initiating a process of discussions with the different parties. Hopefully these discussions will bear fruit in the coming period.
In a separate development, the Gulf Cooperation Council organized what was presented as a ten-day intra-Yemeni dialogue in Riyadh. Predictably, the Houthis refused to take part in a meeting convened in the capital of the state responsible for launching the air war in Yemen. It became a meeting of the anti-Houthi forces, whose various factions are mutually hostile if not actually engaged in military conflict with one another.
Although it was expected to produce some changes in the leadership of the IRG, the outcome was a surprise and had little to do with the actual meeting. On April 7, Hadi announced his own withdrawal and that of his vice president, to be replaced by a presidential leadership council (PLC) of eight men (and no women). He read from a prepared script in a way that was reminiscent of the Lebanese premier Saad Hariri’s forced resignation in 2017, also under Saudi pressure.
The PLC is tasked with negotiating peace with the Houthis, among other things. This body, imposed by the Saudi and Emirati regimes without having consulted with Yemenis themselves, is composed of individuals whose enmity is notorious. It has now met in Aden, but it remains to be seen whether it will be able to operate effectively and fulfill its responsibilities.
Grundberg is proceeding with wide consultations of the relevant Yemeni parties. The UN envoy will probably try to expand participation in the talks to improve the gender balance and include influential figures from civil society. This is essential if a genuinely sustainable peace is to be achieved, responding to the needs of Yemenis for rights, opportunities, and acceptable living standards. Whether the newly established PLC will facilitate Grundberg’s tasks or complicate them is an open question.
An agreement to end the fighting now seems more likely, as most leaders recognize that the current stalemate is unlikely to be breached. However, it will take a lot more than negotiations between the current factions to achieve a sustainable peace and a government focused on addressing the problems of the population at large. Those problems are enormous, with more than 80 percent of the population below the poverty line and seven years of destruction of Yemen’s infrastructure, both physical and social. | |||||
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8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 1 | https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/internationally-recognized-government/ | en | Actor Profile: Internationally Recognized Government | [
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] | null | [] | 2023-11-20T17:43:13+00:00 | The Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) refers to the institutions of the Yemeni state that are recognized by the international community. | en | ACLED | https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/internationally-recognized-government/ | Historical Background
After a presidency that lasted more than 30 years, President Ali Abdullah Saleh relinquished power as the head of the Republic of Yemen in 2011. Pressured by the Youth Uprising and an assassination attempt, Ali Abdullah Saleh ceded power for immunity through an agreement brokered by the GCC. Authority was passed to then-Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was later elected president in a single-candidate election in February 2012. Between 2013 and 2014, Hadi led Yemen’s political transition, chairing the NDC, the outcomes of which were intended to shape Yemen’s political roadmap and contribute to the drafting of a new constitution. However, in September 2014, the alliance of forces loyal to the Houthis and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh took over Yemen’s capital Sanaa, putting Hadi under house arrest in January 2015. One month later, Hadi managed to escape and tried to resume the IRG’s functions in the port city of Aden, retracting the resignation he previously tendered while under arrest.
In March, Houthi-Saleh forces advanced south, capturing Aden and prompting Hadi’s retreat to Riyadh. At this stage, the IRG held nominal control over the Yemeni armed forces, which, however, were either disbanded or had pledged loyalty to Ali Abdullah Saleh. Hence, opposition to the Houthis emerged spontaneously, through the Southern and Popular Resistance Forces. Furthermore, a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen on 26 March 2015, to support the IRG and reinstate Hadi. The Coalition’s intervention was retrospectively legitimated by the UN Security Council with resolution 2216, issued in April 2015.
During the conflict, the IRG faced internal tensions, divided among a weakened faction aligned with the GPC, forces loyal to the Islah party, and southern secessionist groups. In April 2016, before peace talks in Kuwait with the Houthi-Saleh camp, Hadi removed Prime Minister Khalid Bahah, appointing the Islah-leaning military commander Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. This move solidified Islah’s control over the Yemeni army and the Marib and Taizz provinces, ultimately eclipsing its historical GPC rival.
The rise of Islah within the IRG prompted the United Arab Emirates to train paramilitary units and support secessionist forces in southern Yemen, aiming to counter Islah’s increasing influence. Between 2018 and 2019, UAE-backed forces aligned with the STC clashed with pro-Hadi and pro-Islah units, consolidating their control over Aden, al-Dali, Lahij, and other southern areas. In December 2020, the establishment of a power-sharing cabinet succeeded in reducing tensions within the IRG camp, materializing an agreement reached in Riyadh in November 2019.
In April 2022, days after a UN-mediated truce came into effect, President Hadi, under pressure from the Saudi-led Coalition, transferred his powers and those of Vice President Ali Muhsin to an eight-member PLC, in a further attempt at unifying ranks. Nevertheless, significant tensions persist within the PLC, with the strongest faultline existing around pro-unity and southern secessionist aspirations. In August 2022, just four months after the creation of the PLC, STC-affiliated forces took control of Shabwa governorate following days of clashes with pro-unity forces aligned with the Islah party. In a further blow to unity within the anti-Houthi camp, two members of the PLC – leader of the Southern Giants Brigades Abdulrahman al-Muharrami and former Hadramawt governor Faraj al-Bahsani – have joined the secessionist STC in May 2023. In addition to its internal fragmentation, the IRG also grapples with financial reliance on the Coalition.
In late 2023, amidst ongoing bilateral talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, the PLC committed to UN-brokered measures to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Yemen. On 5 January 2024, PLC chairman al-Alimi decreed the establishment of a new central intelligence agency, thus merging government services and other UAE-backed agencies. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 31 | https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/spectre-divided-yemen | en | The spectre of a divided Yemen | [
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] | null | Throughout the last year, Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s control over the south deteriorated. | en | /themes/custom/lowy/favicons/interpreter-apple-touch-icon.png | https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/spectre-divided-yemen | After the Houthi–Saleh coalition collapsed and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed in December, it didn’t seem as though the conflict in Yemen could get any more complicated. Barely two months later, however, another one of Yemen’s coalitions has imploded.
On 27 January, intense fighting broke out between units loyal to Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and those backing the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a political body dedicated to the re-emergence of an independent South Yemen. This followed the STC’s 21 January demand that Hadi replace his prime minister and cabinet. By 1 February it was clear the separatists had gained the upper hand – most of the forces loyal to Hadi had either surrendered or were confined to a small strip of territory surrounding the Presidential Palace.
The recent fighting marks the latest escalation in a political struggle that has raged between the STC, led by Aidarous al-Zubaidi, and the government of President Hadi.
The driving force behind the STC is the Southern Movement, known colloquially as al-Hirak, a disparate yet popular separatist movement in south Yemen. Originally formed in 2007, the Southern Movement has gained significant momentum due to its role in driving Houthi forces out of Aden in 2015. Since then, a complex and competing array of security forces have coexisted in Aden. These include the UAE-backed Security Belt forces, many which are loyal to the Southern Movement, as well as the Presidential Protection units, largely loyal to President Hadi.
Over the past two years, tensions between these groups has escalated. In February last year, fighting broke out at Aden airport. Another escalation occurred in late April when President Hadi sacked Zubaidi, the governor of Aden at the time, as well as Minister of State Hani bin Breik. In May, in response to the sacking, Zubaidi and bin Breik announced the formation of the STC, whose purpose was to prepare the ground for the eventual independence of South Yemen. Throughout 2017, Hadi’s control over the south continued to deteriorate.
The borders of North Yemen and South Yemen prior to unifcation in 1990 (Map: Wikimedia)
The role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia is important to understanding these recent events. While the UAE is the junior partner in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, it has been busy consolidating what it considers its strategic interests in the southern Yemeni coastal governorates. This includes the setting up of parallel security institutions outside the framework of the Yemeni state. Because of this, many Yemenis have come to view the recent events in Aden as part of UAE-led efforts to divide Yemen, and of divisions within the Saudi-led coalition itself.
Although it has empowered southern actors, the UAE is unlikely to have risked playing a direct role in the recent events for fear of angering Saudi Arabia. Rather, the UAE’s support of armed groups functioning outside the Hadi government should be viewed as motivated by a pragmatic understanding of the limitations of that government, rather than as a clear intention to divide Yemen in two.
For its part, Saudi Arabia is likely to be extremely unhappy with recent events, despite reportedly losing patience with the Hadi government. At the very least, the events in Aden completely eclipsed a recent PR push on Yemen based on a US$2 billion deposit into its central bank, as well as a US$1.5 billion commitment of humanitarian aid.
Reducing these events to geopolitical manoeuvring does a disservice to the genuine anger many Yemenis in the south hold against the Hadi government. Despite its liberation from the Houthis in 2015, Aden continues to be plagued by a poor security environment; the presence of terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Islamic State; and a non-functional judicial system dominated by armed groups.
In addition, public services, most notably the energy and health sectors, have been consistently degraded. Many blame high fuel prices on the corruption of businessmen close to Hadi himself. A large number of public sector wages have not been paid in months, and the Yemeni rial has continued to depreciate, damaging the purchasing power of Yemenis in a country that imports the vast majority of its food.
The recent events have made clear the extent to which the legitimacy of the Hadi government has been eroded. This is no better emphasised than by the fact Hadi has not visited Yemen since February 2017. Although it is unclear what the full ramifications of events in Aden will be, they will mark a major setback for the Saudi-led coalition campaign against the Houthis, and play into the Houthi leadership’s perception that to triumph they only need to continue to fight a war of attrition.
One thing is evident: the spectre of a divided Yemen is one step closer. Less clear is whether this would improve the well-being of Yemenis currently enduring the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
Alexander Harper | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 28 | https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/YEM | en | BTI 2024 Yemen Country Report | [
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] | null | [] | null | “So far, the various political factions in Yemen have failed to understand that they need each other to build a viable state.” | en | /typo3conf/ext/bti2020/Resources/Public/assets/favicon.ico | BTI 2024 | https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report | The internationally recognized government (IRG) lost control of the majority of the population of the Republic of Yemen years ago. Numerous political groups, as well as militant Islamist organizations and militias – some of which are sponsored by members of the Saudi-led coalition (SLC) that former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi requested assistance from in 2015 – have assumed control.
Fragmentation of the state apparatus is progressing. Institutions such as the government administration, parliament, central bank and even the currency are being duplicated or divided between Ansar Allah (Partisans of God, led by the Huthi family), the IRG and its formal component, the Southern Transitional Council (STC).
Ansar Allah’s attempts to gain control of the oil and gas fields in Marib in 2021 led to heavy fighting and the displacement of several thousand people, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) who had sought refuge in Marib. Without access to the country’s hydrocarbon resources, Ansar Allah resorted to highly creative methods of taxation, confiscation and embezzlement of humanitarian aid to finance its operations. Ironically, Ansar Allah implemented several reforms that the International Financial Institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund, IFIs) had long demanded: the abolition of subsidies, expansion of the tax base and stabilization of the currency. Despite claiming the moral high ground in Yemen and internationally, Ansar Allah’s leadership increasingly faces allegations of extortion, kidnapping and sexual violence perpetrated by its leaders and supporters.
While the IRG, Ansar Allah and the STC play the blame game, 24.3 million people (out of 34 million) need humanitarian assistance, and 4.3 million have been displaced since 2015. Despite a Saudi-sponsored formal agreement between several parties to the conflict to form a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in April 2022, infighting within the anti-Ansar Allah alliance continued. The head of the PLC, Rashad al-Alimi, has started to organize yet another military force, the Nation Shield Forces. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah attacked oil installations and launched missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The World Bank estimated reconstruction costs at $20 to $25 billion in 2020. GDP growth is negative, inflation is high and poverty is rampant. Political violence, malnutrition and diseases such as malaria, cholera and dengue fever plague the Yemeni population, with only half of the country’s health facilities operational.
Despite substantial civic engagement and donor-funded trainings for NGOs (mostly pre-2015), the capacity of civil society remains low due to the suffocating political and security contexts and weak cross-regional networks. While human rights violations are widespread and sexualized violence is increasing, the U.N. Human Rights Council refused to extend the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts (GEE) in 2021.
On the positive side, some U.N. interventions have yielded positive results. The prisoners exchange, which was agreed upon in Stockholm in 2018, was successfully implemented, and preparations are underway for another exchange. The two-month truce that began in April 2022 was extended until October 2022, and even afterward, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSEGY) noted the “absence of large-scale fighting.” Negotiations for another truce were ongoing in early 2023. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) formed a delicate alliance with the internationally recognized government (IRG) by signing the Riyadh Agreement in 2019. As part of this agreement, the STC joined the cabinet and the Presidential Leadership Council, although it did not disarm its militias. Furthermore, efforts are underway to address the urgent issue of the ailing Safer oil tanker, which contains over a million barrels of crude oil that could potentially spill into the Red Sea at any moment.
Governance in Yemen mostly relies on commitments among individuals and on agreements between social and political actors rather than state institutions. While this has contributed to the current crisis, it also makes Yemeni society more resilient during periods without a government.
The Republic of Yemen (RoY) emerged in 1990 from the unification of the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South Yemen). The initial years of the RoY were marked by previously unseen freedom of the press, a constitutional referendum, a multiparty system and elections. However, economic pressure and power struggles between the Yemeni Socialist Party – South (YSP) and the General People’s Congress – North (GPC) as well as the newly formed conservative-Islamist Yemeni Congregation for Reform (YCR), also known as al-Islah, increasingly threatened the nascent democratic framework.
In May 1994, the two former state leaders entered into open warfare, with the northern one emerging victorious in July 1994. The postwar coalition government of the GPC and al-Islah immediately amended the constitution, erasing many political and personal freedoms.
The YSP boycotted the 1997 elections, which gave the GPC an absolute majority. Al-Islah thus became the dominant opposition party but rarely challenged the GPC. Incumbent President Ali Abdullah Salih, who had been in office as the north’s president since 1978, overwhelmingly won the first direct presidential election in 1999.
After the GPC had further consolidated its absolute power with a sweeping victory in the 2003 (and last) parliamentary elections, the Huthi family in northern Sa’dah started an on-and-off rebellion. This rebellion was triggered by economic and political marginalization, as well as the spread of Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism. The spread of this ideology threatened the social status of families claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Meanwhile, the opposition (al-Islah, YSP and some smaller parties) succeeded in developing a common platform. This limited the regime’s ability to play these groups against each other.
The opposition negotiated with the government, after Salih’s re-election as president in 2006, to postpone parliamentary elections until April 2011. However, by January 2011, this dialogue had officially failed as the GPC once again submitted wide-ranging constitutional amendments to parliament.
Sluggish political and economic transformations contributed to the Yemeni Youth protests that began in January 2011 and put immense pressure on Salih. His heavy-handedness with protesters and his efforts to outwit his opponents and the international community backfired. After the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2014, Salih formally accepted the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, which was supposed to steer the transition period. After being granted legal immunity, Salif handed over presidential powers to Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi on November 22, 2011. The GPC formed a coalition government with al-Islah, which had joined, manipulated and then hijacked the popular protests.
While the first phase (90 days) of the transition ran relatively smoothly, the second phase, which was supposed to conclude with elections in February 2014, experienced delays. A National Dialogue Conference (NDC), lasting for a period of 10 months, generated a total of 1,800 recommendations. However, influential members of the southern Hirak movement boycotted the NDC and refused to accept a six-region federation – as opposed to a separate southern state or a two-region federal system. The Ansar Allah movement, led by the Huthi family, also rejected the six-region model due to its potential for severing their access to the port of Hudaidah. Without a mandate, the NDC extended President Hadi’s term when elections had to be postponed.
In September 2014, aligned with Salih, Ansar Allah invaded Sana’a. In January 2015, Hadi eventually escaped to Saudi Arabia, leaving behind a political mess and inviting the Saudi government to intervene militarily. On March 26, 2015, a Saudi-led coalition (SLC) launched its Decisive Storm operation, renamed Restoring Hope shortly thereafter, with the aim of reinstalling Hadi. The ensuing developments quickly resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe for the population as the Yemeni state, society and economy went into a tailspin. The war also amounted to an economic and reputational disaster for Saudi Arabia because there were thousands of civilian victims of SLC airstrikes.
Salih’s alliance with Ansar Allah was short-lived. When Salih allegedly entered negotiations with the SLC in late 2017, Ansar killed him in an ambush.
By the end of 2021, the United Nations estimated that 377,000 Yemenis had been killed by combat operations and the lack of food and health care. International efforts to solve the complex set of conflicts have had only limited effects, including consultation rounds under the auspices of the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen in Geneva and Biel in 2015, Kuwait in 2016 and Stockholm in 2018. However, in April 2022, Hadi was replaced by a Presidential Leadership Council, and a truce was implemented that lasted until October 2022.
Airstrikes, land and sea blockades by the Saudi-led coalition and the existence of militias armed by Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (and maybe others) clearly show that the state has no monopoly on the use of force.
It is not the state but Ansar Allah that controls the majority of the population and about one-quarter of the territory, employing force and the “supervision” of the state apparatus.
However, the governors of Marib and Hadramaut, leaders of the Joint Forces (including a relative of former President Salih) in control of the southern part of the Tihama/west coast, and representatives of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), who used to oppose the internationally recognized government (IRG) and control large parts of the south, including the “temporary capital” Aden, have at least formally joined the Presidential Leadership Council. Therefore, it can be said that, as of early 2023, an anti-Huthi alliance linked to Saudi Arabia and the UAE controls about three-quarters of Yemeni territory, that is, more than the internationally recognized government of ex-President Hadi did after 2015.
On the ground, however, nothing has changed. The constitution does not provide for collective leadership, and the PLC’s performance has not met expectations. As of January 2023, the discussion of internal regulations was still ongoing. Moreover, the various militias and other irregular forces in PLC territory have not been disarmed and sometimes fight each other. Ansar Allah keeps smuggling arms and materials via the Arabian Sea and even through regions nominally under the control of the IRG. While the SLC has mostly stopped engaging in aerial attacks, it still controls Yemeni airspace to a large extent. Hence, there is no state monopoly on the use of force. Rather, a range of de facto authorities have emerged.
Religious dogmas have been part of the legal and political spheres for centuries, and the Shariah has officially remained the sole source of legislation except in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1967 – 1990) and in the Republic of Yemen (1990 – 1994). The draft constitution of 2015 avoids the term “only source of legislation” but still makes Shariah “the source of legislation,” leaving interpretation to the legislative authority. In practice, religious, customary and state laws of varied origin coexist.
The new draft constitution of 2015 had the potential to reduce the influence of religious dogmas on legal and political institutions. But, even without the war, its enforcement would have been very limited. While the state could function as a secular order with modern institutions, the combination of Islamist radicalization (Zaydi or Sunni) and Saudi Arabia’s political influence has strengthened the position of religious dogmas.
Islamic scholars have shaped public opinion on crucial questions such as women’s rights, form of the state (federal/central) and the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) where many religious leaders were among the deputies. Preachers influenced by Saudi-type Wahhabism claim that the Qur’an and Sunna are above the constitution. Initially, and unlike Sunni hard-liners, Ansar Allah did not oppose the concept of secularism or federalism. This changed after Ansar Allah gained control of most of northwest Yemen in 2014. Its leaders (and affiliated media) promote hate speech against Jews and Baha’is and persecute and deport members of those tiny religious minorities (and seize their property). Moreover, Ansar Allah’s interpretation of zakat, their claims that descendants of Prophet Muhammad (ahl al-bait) are superior to other citizens, and the changes they introduced to school curricula violate the principle of equality.
Gender segregation and travel bans on unaccompanied women (including aid workers), for example, are increasingly enforced in regions under the control of Ansar Allah or Sunni Islamists.
Hence, a rise in intolerance, justified in religious terms, impacts the daily lives of people.
Already deficient prior to the war, basic administrative structures are under severe stress.
That said, taxes are still being collected on the national as well as on the local level, though they do not necessarily reach Yemen’s central bank (CBY). The governors of Marib, Hadhramaut and Shabwah keep a percentage of taxes and fees, and at least some of these funds are used to finance basic administration and local investment. Ansar Allah diverts (illegal) taxes and fees to their own coffers to finance their operations and – ostensibly – to pay some public sector salaries. In spring 2020, Ansar Allah reinterpreted the zakat law and introduced a new 20% tax on some businesses (seemingly not applied before 2023). The Huthis and other families claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad are among the beneficiaries of this additional revenue, which is termed “Hashemite tax.” It “institutionalizes hereditary discrimination and racism and is an affront to the values of equal citizenship enshrined in the republic’s constitution,” according to the SCSS (2020).
Provision of electricity and water is limited, although some improvement was seen during the truce (Yemen Policy Center/YPC 2023). According to World Bank data (2020), only 60% of the population has access to some kind of water source, only half the population has access to basic sanitation, with a mere 20% having access to safe sanitation.
Clinics, hospitals and schools are either closed or function at a very low level due to import restrictions, logistical challenges, unpaid salaries, internal displacement, mines, airstrikes, targeted attacks and an unknown number of COVID-19 cases. If they do provide services, they are often dependent on national and international NGOs and humanitarian organizations or the donor-funded Social Development Fund (SDF). According to UNDP’s Human Development Report 2020, there are seven hospital beds per 10,000 Yemenis. Although about one-quarter of the telecommunication assets have been damaged or destroyed, mobile phone and internet services still function on a basic level. However, the sector is becoming increasingly fragile, not least due to double taxation and import restrictions.
Remarkably, public institutions like ministries or local administration still function to some extent – in spite of war and irregular salaries paid to public servants, no matter who the government is (or claims to be, like Ansar Allah-appointed “supervisors” or STC representatives).
Since the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Implementation Agreement of 2011 bypassed the constitution, separation of powers – never fully implemented – has been de facto abolished.
There are no longer any legitimate state powers that could be subject to the law. Parliament and the judiciary are split between the combating parties and unable to control the various “executives.” However, the rump-parliament in Sana’a is reported to have refused to pass the new Zakat Law in 2018, thus forcing Ansar Allah to introduce the desired changes as bylaws (Berghof 2020).
Ansar Allah issued a Constitutional Declaration in early 2015 and has since developed a parallel system consisting of a Supreme Political Council (roughly equivalent to a presidential council and replacing the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, officially abolished in 2019), a “National Salvation Government,” and a network of “supervisors” to control formal state institutions on the national and local levels, the private sector and civil society organizations. Without the cooperation of the security apparatus groomed under ex-President Salih, it would be hard to achieve such extensive control. Ansar Allah’s continuous reference to “the aggression” (the SLC) seems to appeal to the security apparatus. Ansar Allah hence not only copies Salih’s system, but it also perfects it.
The newly established PLC is dominated by military and militia leaders and has yet to prove that it has added value. In IRG areas, several de facto authorities have emerged as well. While this has prevented the emergence of one authoritarian regime in those areas, a separation of powers has not yet occurred.
The judiciary is institutionally differentiated but not independent.
The sheer amount of human rights violations indicates that in many regions the judiciary cannot fulfill its role. The few recent reports about the judiciary in Yemen suggest that like other state institutions it has fallen prey to conflict parties. Courts cannot function independently of whatever group holds power in the respective area, and sometimes militias assume the role of the judiciary. Courts and judges are dismissed, bypassed, replaced or even targeted (intimidated, kidnapped and even killed, as in the case of Supreme Court Justice Muhammad Humran in 2022).
While at least some courts in the capital and provincial capitals still function, to what extent the trials are fair or fulfill a minimum standard is a completely different matter. Specialized courts issue an increasing number of death sentences, though such rulings do not always seem to be implemented.
In areas under Ansar Allah’s control, courts have enforced measures against female lawyers and media offices or ordered confiscation of private property and bank accounts. In areas not under the control of Ansar Allah, the judiciary is considered “weak, dysfunctional and mostly ignored by the security forces” (PoE 2022). Judges have repeatedly gone on strike to protest intimidation and interference by the various militias and security forces.
If any kind of law and order is upheld, then this occurs on the local level or in governorates that have not been overrun by Ansar Allah or STC militias.
Remnants of institutions elected in the 2000s (for example, the parliament and local councils on the governorate and district levels) still exist. However, they are subject to (sometimes extensive) intervention and manipulation and have a number of shortcomings, including expired terms, inadequate funding and a lack of qualified personnel. On the national level, democratic institutions have degenerated into mere tools of the conflict parties.
Parliament was last elected in 2003 for six years (elections were postponed to 2011 but never held). Its performance was always limited by subnational interests and clientelism. It was rendered completely powerless by the GCC initiative. Unless parliament (and the cabinet) reach a consensus, decisions rest with the president. Hadi did not even try to secure a vote of confidence from his last cabinets.
As the General People’s Congress (GPC, formerly dubbed Salih’s party) holds a two-thirds majority since the last elections, parliament was still able to reach a quorum until 2015, even though the majority of southern parliamentarians has boycotted the sessions for years (north-south population ratio 1:5). With the GPC split again after Salih was killed by Ansar Allah in December 2017, and with many GPC leaders having fled abroad or been arrested, parliament is unlikely to reach a quorum. Still, Ansar Allah and the IRG both orchestrate parliamentary sessions – without ever announcing the number of parliamentarians present.
Despite some positive developments prior to the war, the topography of interest groups is limited and important social interests are not represented. Prior to the war, NGOs, in particular those concerned with human rights and anti-corruption, flourished and were increasingly organized and differentiated. Since 2015, many of them have shifted their focus from governance to humanitarian aid, often on behalf of international donors. There are very few human rights organizations that have been able to move beyond their ties to the conflict parties. Those that have are subject to harassment, most notably prominent U.N.-supported initiatives, such as those supporting Yemen women and representing civil society and political parties. Unions are generally weak, mainly as a result of successful co-optation under previous regimes, the small and decreasing size of the formal sector, and political polarization within organizations in recent years.
The Southern Movement (al-Hirak) is fragmented in terms of objectives, leadership and means. Objectives range from demands for a two-region federal system to separation from the north.
Initiatives like the Tihama Movement, which originally attempted to draw attention to local grievances, struggle to maintain independence from the various regional “de facto authorities” in the Tihama, either Ansar Allah or Tarik Salih (nephew of former President Salih, commander of the Republican Guards, a leader of the West Coast forces with political ambitions and member of the PLC).
In the past, there was a heterogeneous and fragmented set of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations. However, self-organization was rarely formalized and usually restricted to members of the same family, village, tribe or region. In recent decades, increasing numbers of Yemenis have migrated from rural areas to the cities or from Aden, Taiz or Marib to Sana’a. And more recently, thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have settled in the governorate of Marib. Nevertheless, many IDPs have found refuge with their relatives or friends in other regions, which can be taken as an indicator of solidarity, at least on the level of the extended family. Charities and other NGOs are still active, most of all in the humanitarian sector.
Results of the 2017 Yemen Polling Center Survey on perceptions of the Yemeni public regarding living conditions and security-related issues indicate that neither state authorities, tribal sheiks, neighborhood Aqils (community elders) nor Ansar Allah were considered conducive to security. Hence, citizens’ self-reliance has become a necessity, and future governments will find it extremely difficult to be accepted.
More worrying, however, is the rising political polarization and the increasing tendency of conflict parties to frame political antagonisms in religious terminology and sectarian narratives. The longer the war lasts, the harder it will be to overcome such divisions. In addition, the fault line between north and south continues to deepen. The fact that the number of attacks on “northerners” living in the south, first reported in 2010, seems to have decreased is likely the result of many people of northern origin having left the south.
On the positive side, local communities increasingly make use of the social capital that can be generated in rural areas and urban neighborhoods. Supported by SFD, UNDP, the European Union and bilateral development partners, hundreds of local communities have established (often elected) committees of male and female members and planned and implemented their own projects.
Yemen ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1987, which guarantees equal access to public services. Although the state has never been able to adequately provide those services, in many areas they are now completely unavailable. After reaching a rank of 154th (out of 187 countries) in the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2014, Yemen fell back to rank 160th (out of 188) in 2015 and further to 183rd (out of 191) in 2021/22.
Even before the war, social exclusion was widespread and deeply embedded in the structure of society. This exclusion was primarily caused by factors such as poverty, lack of education, income inequality based on gender, and various other social barriers faced by marginalized groups, such as the Muhammashin. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah is actively attempting to revive the social structure that existed before the revolution, a structure characterized by inequality.
In 2016, the World Bank estimated that approximately three-fourths of the Yemeni workforce were employed in the informal sector, and the number is likely to have risen since. Remittances and foreign aid are significant sources of income. However, remittances declined, donor funding is insufficient and Ansar Allah – despite collecting more fees from imports since the beginning of the truce – refuses to pay regular salaries to public sector employees in areas under its control (PoE 2023).
While the majority of the population was excluded from market-based socioeconomic development in the past, no positive development can be expected when public sector salaries are unpaid and the formal economy is in freefall. The crisis of the banking sector and rising world market prices resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine further increased food prices.
Yemen remains the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. According to U.N. organizations, at least 80% of the population needs humanitarian aid, with most experiencing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above). The estimated number of individuals in IPC Phase 5 exceeds 160,000. Additionally, despite the 2022 truce resulting in reduced fatalities and internally displaced persons (IDPs), a staggering 4.3 million Yemenis were internally displaced between 2015 and 2022, as reported by OCHA.
Life expectancy at birth is 65 years. The Gini coefficient for Yemen was 36.7 in 2014 (no recent data is available). On the Gender Inequality Index, Yemen can be continuously found in last place. In 2017 (latest data), only 27% of the population had access to the internet.
However, the private sector provides clean water, food, education, health services and energy – to those few who can afford it.
While large parts of the public sector are paralyzed by the war and the private sector is suffering – by late 2015, half of the private sector companies had already laid off staff or reduced salaries – the regulatory framework in place before the war is still intact. Decree 19 of 1999 regulates market competition, monopoly prevention and commercial deception. Law 1/2008 abolished the legal requirement for a foreign business to have a Yemeni partner, as well as other legal constraints. Investment capital and profits could be transferred without limitations on amount or currency – as long as banks could provide such services. The investment law (2010) allowed all investors full ownership (100%) of an investment project, as well as freedom to transfer foreign currency and employ foreign nationals (in principle).
In theory, private companies can operate freely. In practice, however, the private sector – dominated by a few large family businesses – has to cope with interference from various political factions and the emergence of two different types of economies. Smaller businesses can often barely survive because 40% of households purchase food or medicine on credit, according to Oxfam. Nevertheless, private companies have shown remarkable resilience, thus qualifying as partner organizations for international donors.
Despite efforts by the Saudi-led coalition to control Yemen’s airspace, borders and ports, smuggling goods – including weapons – humans and money into the country has become more profitable than ever. The large informal sector, where about three-quarters of the workforce were employed in 2014 (ILO), is likely to have grown further. Goods that are transported from Aden to Sana’a, for example, are likely to be “taxed” several times and hence become exorbitantly expensive. Also, there are reports that import and export licenses are only granted to those who are “loyal” to the respective powerholders, providing some companies with the chance to dominate the market.
Prior to the war, foreign trade had been significantly liberalized. After nearly 15 years of negotiations, Yemen officially joined the World Trade Organization as its 160th member in June 2014. Despite this, Yemen continues to boycott goods and services originating in Israel. Until at least 2013, importing goods was restricted to Yemeni nationals. Importing alcohol, explosives, hazardous waste (Yemen became a signatory to the Basel Convention in 1996), and specific food items such as pork are prohibited.
Between 2015 and 2022, the SLC, not the Yemeni state, controlled foreign trade. It blocked commercial flights and controlled – and sometimes delayed and prevented – imports, such as fuel, equipment for the telecommunication sector or solar energy systems, via air, sea and land. This sometimes included goods that had been cleared by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which was established in 2016. These measures isolated Yemen’s formal economy from the world market and provided fertile ground for smuggling.
Import conditions improved in 2022 (Yemen imports 100% of its medicine, 90% of its wheat and rice, and 70% of its fuel) after the Saudi-led coalition eased its air, land and maritime blockade. Yet, the IRG has no capacity to further liberalize or even control foreign trade. Other priorities dominate the agenda of the various “de facto governments.” The Ansar Allah-controlled government in Sana’a is attempting to mitigate the shortage of food imports by seeking ways to enhance self-reliance, and the Omani Mazunah Free Trade Zone, located in the Oman-Yemen border area, has acquired importance for Yemeni merchants and investors.
The regulatory system is weak, fragmented and outdated, and credit risk management is insufficient. The underdeveloped banking sector was already burdened with non-performing loans in 2014 (almost 25%) and has been hit hard by economic warfare. In 2015, Yemeni banks temporarily suspended withdrawals of foreign currency deposits. However, until September 2016, Yemen’s central bank (CBY) was perceived as relatively independent in political, economic and financial terms, especially when compared to other central banks in the region. It was also seen as one of the few national institutions that, despite the war, managed to fulfill its tasks, including paying salaries to public sector employees, providing debt service, issuing letters of credit and the maintaining a stable Yemeni riyal. The badly managed CBY relocation in 2016, Hadi’s selection of CBY governors, and their erratic decision-making contributed to currency instability and import restrictions.
Meanwhile, the CBY branches in Sana’a and Aden operate with competing regulations. While the Aden branch has been readmitted to the SWIFT system, most of the competent CBY staff and many files have remained in Sana’a, where most banks have their headquarters. However, banks may relocate because Ansar Allah started an initiative to ban “usurious transactions” (interest) in late 2022 (PoE 2023).
As a result, the sector is highly fragmented. Yemen is classified as a high-risk area, and private exchange companies have taken over banking sector tasks. The fact that Ansar Allah openly engaged in extorting banks in Sana’a and threatening their staff (for example, at the Tadhamon Bank in an attempt to confiscate Hadi’s accounts) and the STC – sometimes forcefully – seized public funds has not helped the situation (PoE 2021 and 2022).
The number of banks (state-run, Islamic and microfinance) operating in Yemen has remained relatively stable, with 17 according to the YSEU in 2015 and 18 according to ACAPS/YAT in 2022. Additionally, the Yemeni NGO SEMC counted 1,350 exchange offices, most of them operating without a license from the CBY, in 2018.
In 2007, the first microfinance bank was established, and a leasing law was introduced. The establishment of a stock exchange had been under discussion for some time but has not occurred. The introduction of e-riyal in Ansar Allah-controlled territories in 2020 was intended to address the liquidity crisis but has not had a measurable impact.
The ongoing liquidity crisis, the increasing amount of currency in circulation outside banks, and a population that mostly has no access to or refuses to use e-payment mechanisms all indicate that trust in the banking sector is low. According to World Development Indicators, only 64 out of every 1,000 Yemenis above the age of 14 had an account in a commercial bank in 2014 (latest data available). Almost all private sector companies pay their staff and suppliers in cash or via cash transfer. Moreover, transferring money between areas controlled by different parties to the conflict has become very difficult due to Ansar Allah’s ban on newly printed banknotes from Aden, extremely high transfer fees and the risk posed by checkpoints staffed with various militias looking for funds.
Importers turn to the informal currency market to acquire hard currency, particularly for fuel and food imports. According to the World Bank’s initial Yemen Economic Brief for 2019, currency circulating outside of banks has surged by over 100% since 2014.
The IRG has been unable to pursue monetary stabilization. Neither part of the CBY is independent of its respective powerholder. Even worse, the split of the CBY has contributed to the establishment of two separate political entities within the Republic of Yemen, turning monetary policy into a weapon of war (SEMC 2020). Throughout Yemen, there is a severe shortage of foreign currency, so currency speculation has become a lucrative business. Both branches of the CBY have attempted various measures to control private exchange companies, including forming networks under the control of their respective branches (SEMC/ERT 2021). However, it has been reported that the IRG keeps income from oil exports in the al-Ahli bank in Riyadh instead of in the CBY (see Q11.1).
Exchange and inflation rates – extremely volatile – caused several large businesses to temporarily close in 2018, as they were unable to determine the prices of their commodities.
The riyal’s value in January 2015 was YER 215 to $1. However, since 2021, the U.S. dollar trades for up to YER 1,700 (in early December 2021) in IRG-controlled territory. In Ansar Allah-controlled areas, where the newly printed IRG banknotes were banned in 2020, the exchange rate is considerably lower and more stable. In summer 2022, one U.S. dollar cost over 1,000 riyals in Aden, but only half that much in Sana’a.
Food prices rose by 20% to 30% in 2021, while the overall inflation rate was estimated at more than 40% in 2021 and 2022, with higher rates in IRG-controlled territories (IMF, PoE 2022, WB YEM 2022/1).
Overall, the Ansar Allah-controlled government, which established a “Payments and Foreign Currency Committee” in 2017, more effectively controls inflation and exchange rates than the IRG.
In late 2021, the IRG appointed a new CBY management and established a new mechanism to control the exchange rate. A few months later, in April 2022, KSA and UAE announced their intention to provide an additional $3 billion. However, although this measure helped stabilize the riyal, food prices continued to remain high due to international developments. Yemen relies on imports from Ukraine and Russia for approximately half of its wheat supply.
Some observers have already noted that the bifurcation of institutions now includes the Yemeni currency. Old and (distinguishable) new banknotes are treated as two different currencies.
The government cannot protect private property. Militias confiscate private property and bank deposits, raid banks and impose “taxes” at will.
Prior to the war, the system was already deficient. Although the law defined property rights and regulated the acquisition and registration of property, both of which were rather easy, there were severe problems with lack of documentation, fraud and constant struggles over land ownership. This not only harmed the country’s investment climate but also had strong political implications. One issue that led to the rise of the southern al-Hirak movement was the arbitrary confiscation of land by Salih loyalists. This mainly occurred in the south, but there were also poorly publicized cases in Sana’a and al-Hudaidah, for example. The problem is exacerbated by judicial corruption, which often renders efforts to settle disputes over property rights futile. The concept of intellectual property rights (Investment Law No. 15/2010 and Intellectual Property Rights Law No. 19/1994) is generally unknown.
Apart from Ansar Allah’s general demands directed at Saudi Arabia, there are no strategies detailing if and how citizens will be compensated for the loss of family members or injuries and for their homes, farms, shops or factories destroyed by shelling or airstrikes.
However, Yemen has signed several international and bilateral agreements on settling commercial and investment disputes that, in peacetime, might substitute for the shortcomings of the judiciary.
De jure, private companies can act freely, though some special regulations for international companies exist – such as a ban on engaging in the weapons and explosives industry and specific rules in vital sectors.
Enterprises in the public and mixed sectors, such as the Yemeni Economic Corporation, are estimated to constitute approximately one-fourth of the country’s large firms. These enterprises occasionally played an opaque role, particularly those that were under the control of relatives or in-laws of former President Salih.
However, even prior to the war, there were massive economic, political and social barriers to business development. Key issues included deficiencies in infrastructure, corruption and a shortage of qualified workers. According to a 2019 World Bank report, 20% of private sector companies closed, more than half shrank and another 20% relocated their main offices since the beginning of the war. Established private businesses are not protected from blackmail by various “officials,” have to pay extra fees, cope with dysfunctional financial and judicial systems, be subject to a volatile exchange rate in the financial (money exchange) and real estate sectors, and have to compete with militias engaged in imports of oil derivatives, medicine or food. International contracts in the hydrocarbon sector are managed by the Yemen General Corporation for Oil and Minerals, which reports to the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources. However, in 2015, production stopped due to the security situation. The Austrian company OMV was the first international oil company to restart exports in 2018. Cal Valley, with shareholders Medco Energi and Hood Oil, followed in 2019, but declared force majeure after Ansar Allah’s attacks on its facilities in 2022. Gas liquidation operated by Yemen LNG, with shareholders TOTAL, HUNT OIL and others, in Belhaf (Shabwah) has been suspended since 2015. In 2017, UAE forces occupied parts of the facilities and used them as a military base and detention center.
Support for the elderly, the ill, the unemployed and the internally displaced is primarily provided by family, tribe and village structures, private welfare organizations, and other NGOs – if and where they exist. The severe hardship the population has endured since 2015 limits people’s ability to provide for themselves, let alone for others. For example, Marib, a city of less than 20,000 inhabitants before the war, was hosting approximately one million IDPs in 2021.
Remittances, another lifeline for many families, have been declining since summer 2020, according to Oxfam. Fees for transferring remittances to Yemen have risen, sometimes up to 50% of the transfer amount, leading to a further reduction in funds. Additionally, social structures have weakened in certain areas due to internal displacement and migration.
Since 2016, around 1.2 million Yemenis employed in the public sector have not received their full salaries, which – when including dependents – has affected at least six million people. The Social Welfare Fund, primarily financed by international donors, exhausted its funds by the end of 2014. In 2017, the General Authority for Insurance and Pensions (GAIP) was unable to pay pensions to approximately one-third of the recipients (Yemen Socioeconomic Update/YSEU 30).
The only public institutions that continue to provide a minimum level of welfare throughout the war are the largely donor-funded Social Development Fund (SDF) and the Public Works Projects (PWP), established in the 1990s.
Though the population in need continues to grow, donors are becoming increasingly reluctant to fund the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). This reluctance arises primarily from the institutional weaknesses of implementation partners on both sides, the effects of COVID-19, restrictions imposed by local power-holders, high operational costs and rising violence against aid workers (YSEU 60). In 2022, the HRP faced a funding gap of approximately 50% (OCHA 2023).
Nevertheless, international donor organizations – often in cooperation with local NGOs and the private sector – play a major role in staving off the worst consequences of the war for the civilian population. Moreover, local private sector companies often provide food for free and even run their own charities.
Before the war, there were few institutions to compensate for Yemen’s significant social disparities rooted in poverty, gender and social status. The Muhammashin, as a marginalized group, are primarily engaged in menial labor and have extremely restricted access to essential public services.
Violent conflicts, destruction of educational facilities, politicization of curricula by Ansar Allah, internal displacement and rampant poverty have further reduced the quality of and access to education for all. According to the Gender Development Index (GDI) 2022, boys have a mean of 5.1 years of schooling, while girls have 2.9 years. Boys, perceived as less vulnerable and as “future breadwinners,” are more likely to be sent to school and attend school for more years, although their enrollment rates are still insufficient. Girls’ school enrollment, traditionally low, had increased until 2015. However, many parents are now concerned about the security situation or are unable to afford school supplies for all their children. The ratio of female-to-male enrollment in primary schools is 0.9, 0.7 in secondary schools and 0.4 at the tertiary level, according to the WDI 2022. While boys face the risk of being recruited into various militias, girls face the risk of child marriage.
Half of Yemen’s population aged between 15 and 24 was not in education, employment or training in 2014, according to the World Bank. However, the group most in need of improved access to opportunities are women. The estimated GNI per woman was $176, while it was $2,428 per man. Yemen ranked 183rd out of 191 countries, according to the GDI 2022.
Women are under-represented in all sectors, particularly in high government offices. The situation seemed to improve when a female quota was applied to the National Dialogue Conference. Four women were among the 17 members of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, and, in principle, a female quota was included in the draft constitution of 2015. However, only about 10% of the delegates who participated in the 2015 to 2016 peace negotiations were female. In late 2018, during consultations held in Stockholm, the U.N. special envoy established an eight-member Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group. Nonetheless, there was only one woman representing the conflict parties. The Presidential Leadership Council of 2022 is entirely male, and there are only five women among the 50 members of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission. Videos of the PLC members taking the oath illustrate this.
Overall, patriarchal structures and informal decision-making, in combination with gender segregation, often lead to the exclusion of women from decision-making and the labor market and sometimes even prevent them from traveling. This is unlikely to be changed by Articles 76 and 128 of the 2015 draft constitution or Decree 75/2019, which details a National Action Plan to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
Hydrocarbon production and exports from IRG territory increased temporarily before Ansar Allah, demanding a share, attacked oil installations there in late 2022. Officially, the attack served as a warning to national and international companies to stop “looting” Yemeni crude oil, as the revenues “do not reach the Yemeni people [and are] not listed in any local bank” (Sabanet). In reality, according to SCSS in 2022, the revenues are paid to the al-Ahli Bank in Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia announced it would deposit more than $2 billion in the CBY in 2018, of which the final installment of $174 million was paid only in 2022 (Reuters, 2022). However, the CBY in Aden may have “lost” a large amount on foreign exchange transactions (PoE, 2021). By 2019, CBY reserves were down to $1.4 billion – or 1.6 months of imports.
In April 2022, Saudi Arabia, which had extended its 2018 installment, and the UAE announced another $3 billion aid package to stabilize the economy and fund the IRG. Disbursement was tied to substantial reforms of the CBY. The IMF and the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) also announced additional funds. However, some experts argue that international aid is fostering dependency and fueling the war economy.
Nevertheless, Yemen’s trade balance and foreign direct investment (FDI) continue to be negative. Public debt rose from 45.7% to 69.7% between 2011 and 2021, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2022). The IMF predicts an inflation rate of over 17% compared to GDP growth of just over 3% for 2023, while the World Bank estimates a persistent contraction in GDP and GDP per capita (down 50% over the last decade).
Yemen issued its first environmental protection law in 1995, signed the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1996, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 and issued a National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) in 2009. In late 2012, the government renewed its efforts to at least provide a framework for environmental protection. Laws 21 and 22 ratified the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC), as well as the OPRC-Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) Protocol. Yemen set up an environmental protection strategy and an Environmental Protection Agency.
On the ground, mismanagement of resources and land-grabbing prevails all over the country – from Sana’a (Ansar Allah) to the World Heritage Site Socotra Archipelago, with its unique biodiversity, where the UAE has established control via the STC. There are reports that the UAE even sells land located in the protected areas of Socotra (YPC 2021).
Despite their importance for healthy and livable habitats, environmental concerns rarely play a role in national strategy. The awareness of the fundamental problem of water scarcity has been overshadowed by the need to ensure the provision of clean drinking water to as many people as possible. There have been instances of shortages of diesel and spare parts for water pumps. The conflict parties have targeted desalination plants, water pipelines and other relevant infrastructure. Despite these challenges, qat (a leaf with stimulant effects) is still produced and marketed, while only half the population has access to clean drinking water.
Apart from environmental and health problems arising from locust infestations, floods, garbage, illegal extraction of water, leaking sewage and oil pipelines, deforestation, poaching and hazardous waste (ammunition), Yemen’s most urgent environmental problem is the 45-year-old Safer oil tanker, moored close to the port of Hudaidah. It has been used for storage and offloading for 30 years and contains more than one million barrels of oil. The tanker is “at risk of leaking, exploding, or catching fire,” according to the United Nations. Despite potentially devastating ecological and economic effects for all states bordering the Red Sea, Ansar Allah blocked a U.N. expert team from inspecting the tanker for years. Only in 2022 did the United Nations collect the funds needed to transfer the oil cargo. As of early 2023, preparations seem to still be underway, although the United Nations reached a new agreement with the IRG and Ansar Allah in 2022. Without access to oil and gas fields, Ansar Allah might still consider one million barrels of oil a major economic asset and political bargaining chip. That Ansar Allah has no environmental concerns became obvious when they attacked oil facilities in October and November 2022, including a terminal in Hadhramaut, as an oil tanker was offloading.
While governmental agencies are largely defunct or unable to coordinate their activities, there are still some civil society organizations spread over several governorates that attempt to address the multitude of problems contributing to local distribution conflicts. These conflicts are likely to worsen due to the further depletion of water resources and climate change (CARPO, YPC 2021).
Because public power grids are unreliable and diesel for generators is scarce, there has been an increased use of solar power. In December 2022, the IRG signed an agreement with Masdar (Abu Dhabi) to construct a solar power plant in Aden. Any progress made by such positive developments is overshadowed by a general lack of concern for environmental issues.
In the face of Yemen’s declining but still high population growth (estimated at more than 2% for 2023), educational institutions at all levels – despite substantial investments in the past – are hopelessly overburdened. According to UNICEF (2018), only 17% of Yemenis have a birth certificate, making enrollment data potentially unreliable. Nevertheless, the World Bank reports that primary school enrollment rates are on the decline. They reached 97.5% in 2013 but fell to 92.5% by 2016. Enrollment rates for secondary education were 51% in 2016, and for tertiary education, they were almost 10% in 2011 (latest available data). Yemen’s score on the U.N. Education Index as of 2021 was 0.359.
According to UNICEF, the number of children unable to attend school rose to two million by March 2018 because approximately 2,500 schools were damaged, occupied by IDPs or combatants, or simply lacked teachers due to unpaid salaries. By late 2020, additional schools had closed, with dozens converted into COVID-19 centers. According to the HDR 2015, only 4.6% of GDP was allocated to education, a decrease from the previous year. It is reasonable to assume that expenditures have further decreased since then (recent data is unavailable). According to Yemen’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, only 4.4% of aid was allocated to the education sector in 2021.
While there is statistically one teacher per 27 students (HDI 2020), salaries for teachers are low or unpaid, and many teachers need a second job to support their families. However, most schools and universities remain open. In certain instances, parents may bear the cost of schooling. Donors fund specific groups of public servants in the health and education sector. Nevertheless, this is not a sustainable solution.
By late 2019, the conflict parties had attacked 380 schools or their vicinities. In 2020, the World Bank estimated that approximately $500 million would be needed to recover and reconstruct only the schools in the 16 cities it surveyed. According to the Ministry of Planning, in 2020, one-third of Yemeni girls and one-quarter of Yemeni boys do not attend school regularly. And even at school, children are not safe, as schools under the supervision of Ansar Allah are used for recruitment and indoctrination, teaching social and gender inequality (PoE 2022; YPC 2023).
Prior to the war, the number of private education institutions was on the rise. In 2014, there were 101 private universities and colleges, with 83,177 out of a total of 310,340 tertiary-level students enrolled in private institutions. Out of a total of 16,730 primary and secondary schools, 899 were private in 2016. Nevertheless, research and development facilities are almost nonexistent. Data on public research and technology expenditures is unavailable.
The violent conflicts that have plagued the country for years have exacerbated the high structural constraints on governance. Air raids and landmines further damage the country’s rather poor infrastructure (power grids, airports, harbors, roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, factories). Yemen’s internet almost exclusively depends on the FALCON submarine cable. When it broke down for more than a month in early 2020, this added another layer to the already existing constraints. Many roads are destroyed or blocked by militias (Ta’izz), harbors have been blocked (Hudaidah) and Sana’a airport, closed by the SLC since 2015, reopened only in 2022 with a limited number of flights.
Suffering from a shortage of water and energy – and already being the poorest Arab country before the war – Yemen’s population has been pushed into extreme poverty. In 2022, 23.4 million people needed some kind of humanitarian assistance, more than four million people were internally displaced and two million children were out of school. Leadership struggles, large-scale corruption, a lack of strategy and a shortage of funds have bled the public sector dry.
Moreover, about one million Yemenis have left the country in the course of the war. With many well-educated middle-class Yemenis among them, this brain drain affects state institutions as well as the private sector and civil society. Meanwhile – and in spite of severe abuses – the migration of Africans through Yemen to the rich Arab Gulf states continues unabated. IOM estimated their number at more than 40,000 in 2022.
Given the high rate of malnutrition and the prevalence of infectious diseases like cholera, malaria, diphtheria, measles, dengue fever and even a polio outbreak (in Saada in August 2020), authorities did not pay much attention to COVID-19. Statistics show a low number of approx. 12,000 COVID-19 cases (Johns Hopkins, January 2023), which is extremely unlikely to reflect the real number of infections. Nevertheless, some (donor-funded) COVID-19 centers were set up, and schools were temporarily closed or (ab)used as COVID-19 centers.
The state has always been rather absent in many areas of Yemen. Therefore, most Yemenis are quite capable of organizing their lives without a functioning government. Yemen has civil society traditions that go back to labor migrants’ self-help organizations in the 1940s or a 1970s cooperative movement that was absorbed into the local administration and the GPC in the early 1980s. Still, tribal councils come together on occasion, usually at times of high political tension. Some tribal mediators have the capacity to broker local cease-fires or arrange prisoner exchanges.
Most of the several thousand registered NGOs are charities with a limited geographical scope, but prior to the war, there were also several hundred, mainly urban, NGOs focusing on governance issues such as combating corruption and educating the public about human rights, women’s rights and press freedom. Unlike political parties, NGOs are characterized by a strong representation of women among leaders and activists.
The Social Development Fund (SDF) and some donor organizations ran training programs for NGOs. But still, many NGOs have limited or no appeal to the general public, weak networks and internal structures, and generally lack a broad funding base. Some NGOs should be considered enterprises, are subject to manipulation by powerful individuals and political parties or were founded to communicate human rights violations of their sponsors’ political opponents to the international community. However, many civil society activists are highly committed. Several NGOs were among the groups of protesters who finally ousted Ali Abdallah Salih in 2011.
The war has further exposed the weakness of civil society. Caught between a rock and a hard place, very few NGOs were in a position to maintain independence and stay operational without in-country donors. Under the current circumstances, many NGOs have either become dormant or shifted their activities toward distributing humanitarian aid on behalf of the donor community. In other cases, activists have emigrated to escape persecution. Nevertheless, civil society has the potential to promote political and economic development. Some NGOs still organize workshops, trainings, art exhibitions and public debates. Moreover, networks of local mediators and of Yemeni academics and professionals have been set up.
Though the civil war is based on social and political differences and fueled by regional powers, it is framed as a religious or sectarian conflict by some conflict parties (AQAP, Ansar Allah). In any case, untangling the different conflict lines on the regional, national and local levels seems almost impossible. Conflict intensity peaked in 2011 with the ouster of Ali Abdallah Salih and in 2014, when Ansar Allah started an offensive against those they held responsible for spreading Saudi-sponsored Salafism and the six wars in Sa’dah between 2004 and 2010. Ansar Allah took control of the capital Sana’a in summer 2014, looted or destroyed property belonging to its enemies, persecuted members of al-Islah (affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood) and directly attacked AQAP and its affiliates in several governorates.
Ansar Allah’s temporary occupation of Aden in 2015 was followed by years of fighting between Ansar Allah militias and forces fighting in the name of the “legitimate government” (without necessarily supporting it), particularly in and around Taiz and al-Hudaidah.
There have been hundreds of assassinations and attempted assassinations of members of the security forces, high-ranking politicians, political activists, journalists and intellectuals. The Southern Movement has gained strength but is split between UAE-supported groups demanding independence and activists who refuse external intervention and/or would settle with a “southern state in Yemen.”
UAE-trained militias, fighting AQAP and Ansar Allah, function as the military arm of the Southern Transitional Council. Meanwhile, AQAP bombed civilian and military targets, even controlling villages and cities in the south temporarily, and tried to create a base among some southern tribes but was more or less pushed back. SLC air raids since March 2015 and fighting between the various military units and militias have killed tens of thousands and displaced millions.
In 2021, the level of conflict peaked again with Ansar Allah intensifying drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and trying to advance to the oil-rich governorate of Marib. The IRG responded by designating Ansar Allah as a terrorist organization, hoping other states would follow. At the end of 2021, the United Nations estimated the number of (direct and indirect) victims of the war at 377,000.
In April 2022, the United Nations brokered a two-month truce that was officially extended until October 2022 and has contributed to an easing in violence since then. Hostilities declined, imports of oil derivatives via the Hudaidah seaport increased and Sana’a’s airport reopened. Even after the truce had expired, Yemen sustained a decrease in hostilities. However, the Ta’izz road (controlled by Ansar Allah) remained closed, and, in October 2022, Ansar Allah started attacking oil facilities in the south.
After making substantial progress prior to 2012, the emerging anti-corruption regime was severely diminished. In 2014, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) expired. A renewal was discussed by the main stakeholders in Amman but never materialized. One of the main players, the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC), was already handicapped by ex-President Hadi’s (illegal) decisions concerning the board in 2013. Also in 2013, the government ordered the media not to cover SNACC activities any longer. Nevertheless, at least until March 2015, the revision of Yemen’s anti-corruption legislation (UNCAC gap analysis) was underway.
The Ansar Allah-controlled government officially made “Improving the degree of integrity, transparency and combating corruption” a strategic goal in its National Vision in 2019. Hence, the SNACC (under the Ansar Allah-controlled government in Sana’a) processes the financial disclosure files of high-ranking public officeholders. It also implemented its new anti-corruption strategy (2022 – 2026) and submitted an annual report in January 2023. The IRG, however, has not taken any such steps.
Other relevant public institutions, like the Central Authority for Control and Auditing (COCA) and the High Authority for Tender Control (HATC), managed to continue working at a reduced capacity despite war damage, a lack of electricity and “supervision” by representatives of Ansar Allah.
No matter how good the initial intentions are, under the current circumstances the above organizations are likely to be used to cover up illicit property confiscations and as political weapons. The COCA president, appointed by Hadi in 2012, fled to Aden in early 2018, reportedly taking several sensitive files with him. The declarations in the Riyadh Agreement that address transparency and accountability, like strengthening the COCA but not the SNACC, await implementation.
Meanwhile, Ansar Allah started the introduction of e-payment for government transactions and to “modernize the central bank’s digital infrastructure” in 2019 (World Bank 2020). This move might at least reduce the privatization of public offices in Ansar Allah-controlled regions and could indicate contradictory objectives and strategies within Ansar Allah’s leadership.
Civil society organizations have very limited space for action. Hence, on the ground, there is no auditing of public spending. The PoE concluded in 2021 that “those in the top political leadership compete to enrich themselves from limited state and public resources,” while the World Bank’s “control of corruption” indicator scored Yemen 1.4 (out of 100) in 2021.
Yemen signed and ratified the U.N. Convention against Corruption, UNCAC. Still, there has been no attempt to recover the assets (estimated to be $30 to 60 billion) former President Salih and others diverted (AWTAD, UNCAC Chapters II & V, 2022).
Prior to 2015, there was some consensus on the formal level – between government parties and NGOs – as to the value of a market economy and democracy. The final documents of the National Dialog Conference (NDC), especially those of the working groups on state-building, good governance, independent institutions, rights and freedoms, as well as transitional justice and sustainable development, clearly reflect the ambitions of the 565 delegates.
The IRG keeps referring to the NDC recommendations as one of the three core documents (the others being U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 and the GCC initiative and its implementation mechanism). The Ansar Allah-controlled government only pays lip service to NDC outcomes in documents like the National Vision for the Modern Yemen (2019).
According to the draft constitution, “the national economy is a free social economy.” Other available documents suggest that the IRG aims to diversify the economy, strengthen the role of the private sector and improve the business environment while, at the same time, ensuring justice, employment, sustainability and social welfare. The programmatic documents of the government in Sana’a address similar issues but are more focused on creating revenues and reducing dependence on external funds and imports.
The two regions are developing different characteristics. While Ansar Allah finances its version of governance mainly through taxes and fees, President Hadi and his government remain dependent on oil and political rents.
On the ground, followers of all the conflict parties can be found among the beneficiaries of the war economy, which has emerged as an additional obstacle for (re-)establishing a formal market economy.
The GCC Implementation Mechanism requires the government to take the input of civil society actors into consideration. NGOs were represented in the National Dialog Conference (40 out of 565 seats), and influential civil society actors have played a significant role before, during and after the NDC. However, the understanding that civil society has a role in governance is still limited, even among otherwise rather reform-minded high-ranking officials. With several civil society activists appointed as ministers in the 2014 government, civil society was primed to acquire a strong position when it came to agenda-setting, as well as monitoring NDC outcomes. This cannot be said about subsequent governments.
Although the weakness of the government(s) and the risk of total breakdown of public services stress the importance of civil society, the political and security situation combined with repression limit its potential. As in the Salih era, civil society is kept in a constant state of alert and increasingly restricted. Many activists have left Yemen or aligned with the conflict parties, while others have shifted their activity to humanitarian aid or activities tolerated by the respective authorities and their external patrons, thus trying to avoid arrest or assassination. Nevertheless, many NGOs and civil society activists are still working on subjects related to peacebuilding or conflict management.
The presidential declaration transferring power to a Presidential Leadership Council (April 2022) provided for a Commission for Reconciliation and Consultation (CRC), comprised of well-known members of Yemeni civil society, predominantly male (five women among the 50 members). The CRC had not been noticeably active by early 2023.
Before the war, many political and social forces claimed that they were victims of past injustice, and most demanded compensation or at least recognition. These include Ansar Allah (“Sa’dah issue”), the Southern Movement Hirak (“southern issue”), the victims of 2011 and their families, as well as former elites who spent the last decades in exile. The government, as bound by the GCC Implementation Mechanism, at least officially recognized the need to deal with these claims. And while the Sa’dah issue and the southern issue, as well as the victims of 2011, have been officially acknowledged, the transitional justice law recommended by the NDC has not been issued because there was no consensus about the period to be covered and hence the victims who are eligible for compensation.
The transitional justice and looted funds draft laws were presented to the cabinet in June/July 2014 but never issued. In 2013, a fund was to be set up, with Qatar allegedly promising $350 million of the required $1.2 billion. The Commission on the Forcibly Retired in the Southern Governorates and the Commission on Land-Related Disputes, set up with UNDP support in 2014, suspended work in 2015. According to a CARPO report from 2016, about $1 billion would be required to compensate just those who lost their jobs in the public sector or their property in the southern part of the country between 1994 and 2011. In Aden, a Committee of Dismissed Southerner Employees had registered 126,000 applications by 2018.
However, fighting in recent years has produced scores of more victims of injustice, thus adding another layer to a complicated issue. The fact that war crimes might involve governments of other states makes reconciliation decidedly difficult. As OCHA put it in 2020, “There are no clean hands in this conflict…violations have been committed by the government of Yemen, the Houthis, the Southern Transitional Council, as well as members of the Coalition” (led by the KSA and UAE).
Ansar Allah prefers to ignore the IRG as much as possible. Rather, it addresses its demands (including for compensation) directly to the Saudi leadership, which has openly started direct negotiations. The STC, by contrast, uses past injustices to justify its demands for an independent southern state.
As a result, the “mechanisms so far set up by the Saudi and UAE-led Coalition, the internationally recognized government of Yemen, and the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group are wholly inadequate to accomplish the task of ensuring reparations to civilian victims” (Mwatana for Human Rights, 2022).
If national reconciliation is addressed again, the overall situation will require careful consideration since attempts to compensate for historic injustices could trigger further conflict and more corruption.
The IRG as well as Ansar Allah seek international support to finance immediate needs (for example, public sector salaries, military assistance, humanitarian aid). Equally important, all parties to the conflict are eager to receive international recognition as legitimate representatives of the Yemeni population or parts thereof. This may also be the reason Ansar Allah gave up its demand to officially tax international aid in 2020. Even so, it did not give up its claims to control (and at times impede) humanitarian aid through the Supreme Council for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA), established in November 2019. Regarding a long-term development strategy, the Ansar Allah-controlled government can clearly draw on more technical expertise than can the IRG.
However, seeking international assistance to end the conflict has been fairly limited. The U.N. sponsored peace talks in Geneva/Biel (2015), Kuwait (2016) and Stockholm (2018), but the meeting in Stockholm in December 2018, facilitated by U.N. Special Envoy Martin Griffith, was the first to produce results. At that time, Ansar Allah had cut itself off from former President Salih’s funds, while the SLC had advanced on Hudaidah. Simultaneously, international pressure increased against the IRG’s main sponsor, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, in the aftermath of the killing of prominent Saudi journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi. So far, the Hudaidah seaport has been kept operational. A major prisoner exchange (one of the main elements of the agreement) took place between Ansar Allah and the IRC/SLC in October 2020, and another one was underway in early 2023. However, fighting in and around Ta’izz has not come to an end.
A truce, brokered by the United Nations in 2022, turned out to be rather effective. It was extended until October 2022 and may be followed by another, more comprehensive arrangement in 2023. However, Ansar Allah and the Saudi government simultaneously seek a separate settlement, which could derail the U.N. process (ICG 2022).
The conflict parties show no respect for Yemen’s international human rights obligations – most seriously, children’s rights – and little enthusiasm for international cooperation efforts, especially during the time of the first two U.N. special envoys. Beginning in 2018, the main conflict parties adopted a slightly more cooperative attitude toward the United Nations. However, they claim the United Nations is biased, disrespect U.N. staff, ignore agreements concerning registering the redeployment of troops, withhold money or withdraw money from CBY branches at will (Ansar Allah and Joint Forces/Tihama), impede international humanitarian support for Yemeni people, and are neither credible nor reliable. Ansar Allah members even threaten and intimidate U.N. staff and try to sideline U.N. mediation efforts (PoE, ICG).
Ansar Allah frames the conflict as external aggression (by KSA, UAE, the United States, Israel, etc.), has attacked Saudi and UAE territory with drones and rockets, and was consequently designated a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the outgoing Trump administration in January 2021. The Biden administration recalled the designation a month later because it would have blocked humanitarian aid.
The STC finally signed the Riyadh Agreement in November 2019, joined the cabinet in December 2020 and the PLC in April 2022. This may reflect pressure from regional allies and an increasing need among the main sponsors of the anti-Ansar Allah alliance to develop an exit strategy.
The Yemeni government stopped serving its international debts – except debts owed to the IMF and the International Development Association – in 2016. However, in August 2022, the IMF allocated Special Drawing Rights worth $650 billion to the IRG.
Knowing perfectly well that Yemen’s future depends on the financial support of GCC members and on the political development of states in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the country’s past leaderships tried to promote regional and international integration. For example, Yemen is a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and a signatory to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, a regional initiative to tackle piracy around the Horn of Africa. Efforts to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a dominant regional free trade area started in 2005 but went nowhere. Currently, there is no coherent approach to cooperation with neighboring countries, and each conflict party attacks the others for their connections with regional allies.
For Saudi Arabia, poor and populous Yemen is primarily a security issue. In the recent past, security cooperation seemed generally good (an extradition agreement in 2014). Due to the absence of a comprehensive arrangement concerning the legal entry of Yemeni labor migrants into GCC states, illegal migration (especially to Saudi Arabia) continuously causes problems for both sides. In 2013, Saudi Arabia tightened the visa regulations for migrant workers and deported up to 200,000 Yemeni workers, increasing pressure on the Yemeni government and tainting its own reputation because many of the returnees reported human rights violations. Meanwhile, a (rather expensive) solution for the remaining Yemenis in Saudi Arabia has been found.
After years characterized by a mix of providing and withholding financial and in-kind support to the Yemeni government, the Saudi government started Operation Decisive Storm in 2015. It thus not only further destabilized Yemen but also provoked retaliation in the form of border skirmishes and attacks on Saudi and UAE territory.
Ansar Allah has a record of being unreliable and uncooperative – whether in negotiations about peace agreements or the recovery of the Safer Tanker. Various Yemeni and international governments and experts have accused Iran of supporting Ansar Allah (as well as southern separatism). Ansar Allah’s activities (such as attacking United States, UAE and Saudi naval ships, and Saudi and UAE territory) certainly serve Iran’s agenda, and in particular that of its Revolutionary Guards, but simultaneously could also harm Iran’s international standing. Despite Iran serving as a role model and Iranian (and Lebanese Hezbollah) military experts and hardware, Iranian influence on Ansar Allah’s decisions seems to be limited when compared to the dependence of the IRG on its regional allies. This dependence is not restricted to financial and military aid. It also includes political aspects, such as Saudi Arabia’s successful campaign to the Human Rights Council not to extend the GEE’s mandate in 2021.
The previously highly centralized Yemeni state is undergoing major changes. At least two different economic systems have emerged: one mainly tax-based (north) and the other rent-based (south). There are at least two governments, central banks and monetary policies, etc.
So far, the various political factions have failed to understand that they need each other to build a viable Yemeni state. All of them lack legitimacy. None of the regions they control have all the necessary ingredients to function as a state: financial and natural resources (oil and gas), infrastructure (harbors) and human capital (technical expertise).
Even if the international community supported a separation along the current major frontlines – thus giving in to STC demands and leaving Ansar Allah without access to the country’s oil and gas resources – peace would not come any closer than it is. First, there are major political forces that insist on Yemen’s unity and are likely to react violently. Second, the northern part is not economically viable unless it includes Marib and receives a share of the oil rents coming from Shabwa and Hadhramaut. Ansar Allah has made it very clear that it strives to rule all Yemen and will not allow international companies to “loot” Yemeni oil and gas resources. Third, the new entities might fragment even further. In the long run, a federal state, or at least a confederation, is the most promising option.
The Saudi government is openly trying to disentangle itself from its client, the IRG, and has intensified direct negotiations with Ansar Allah. If the Saudi government – stepping in for the IRG – hands over the money to pay outstanding public sector salaries for Ansar Allah, the consequences could range from violent in-fighting among Ansar Allah factions to skyrocketing prices for food and energy. If the transfer is managed badly, the benefit to the Yemeni population is likely to be short-lived.
What is beyond doubt is that significant investment is needed to fund the recovery of Yemen’s infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, water and sewage systems, power grids, the oil and gas sector, and telecommunications. The increasing popularity of solar power in Yemen provides a promising starting point for further development. In general, the private sector has taken on many services that were previously provided by the state. However, logistical and security concerns are suffocating the private sector and may compel commercial banks, which are primarily still based in Sana’a, to close or relocate. This, in turn, would further hinder imports, including food and fuel, and have a devastating impact on the humanitarian situation. Therefore, investment in Yemen is not enticing unless companies adopt a long-term strategy, similar to that of some state-owned UAE companies.
A decade of violent conflict has left Yemeni youth without knowledge of alternative political settings, with children and young people subject to massive manipulation through state and social media, and, more worryingly, at school. The sooner Yemeni youth are given the chance to compare what they are being taught with the realities outside the propagandistic bubbles of the respective de facto authorities, the greater the chances for civil society to act in a coordinated way toward sustainable peace.
With the international community focusing on violent conflicts and the humanitarian situation, attention to environmental issues – including illegal land seizure in environmentally protected areas – and support for civic engagement to build networks that crosscut the various conflict lines is largely lacking. Both topics deserve more consideration due to their role in peacebuilding at the local, regional and national levels. | ||||
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Situated on the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen has long been the poorest country in the Arab world. Today it is the site of a horrific, internationalized civil war, and the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
According to the United Nations, 14 million Yemenis — half of the country’s pre-war population — are facing extreme food insecurity, bordering on famine. Thousands of people are starving to death and dying from preventable diseases, while an average of eight civilians die from bombs and bullets every day.
For 33 years until the Arab Spring revolution of 2011, Yemen was ruled by the dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh and his party, the General People’s Congress (GPC). In November 2011 Saleh stepped down, but remained in control of a large portion of Yemen’s military and several billion dollars in stolen wealth.
The post-revolution transition process was hailed by world leaders as an example to be replicated. But in reality it was undermined by the machinations of the pre-revolution elite, as well as Yemen’s powerful Gulf neighbors, and a group called Ansar Allah — popularly known as the “Houthis” — a militant political and social movement from Yemen’s far north.
The Houthis had clashed with the government for several years before the revolution in a series of wars that destroyed much of the infrastructure in Yemen’s northwest provinces and displaced more than 250,000 people. Following Saleh’s removal from power, the former ruler and his wing of the GPC allied with the Houthis to stage a coup against Yemen’s fragile transitional government, which was headed by Saleh’s former deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.
After seizing control of the capital San’a in September 2014 and officially dissolving the government in February 2015, the Houthi-Saleh forces swept across much of the country. President Hadi fled to the southern city of Aden, which he declared the provisional capital. When the Houthis took Aden, Hadi fled again – this time to Saudi Arabia.
On March 26 2015, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and a coalition of several other countries launched a military intervention at Hadi’s request. The ostensible goal was to restore Yemen’s “legitimate” government to power and remove the Houthis from San’a.
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE also want to shape whatever state emerges in Yemen. Iran, which supports the Houthis, is mainly interested in weakening the Saudis and the UAE financially and militarily by keeping them bogged down in Yemen.
The Saudi and UAE-led coalition’s intervention — dubbed Operation Decisive Storm — started with a relentless campaign of airstrikes on Houthi positions across the country. From the outset this air campaign has been characterized by indiscriminate attacks on alleged military sites in the midst of populated areas.
While no official figures are available, total civilian deaths from violence number well over 10,000. Monthly fatalities have increased by 164% since June 2018, when UAE and pro-government forces launched a disastrous new offensive on the city of al-Hudaydah, home to Yemen’s most vital sea port.
The Houthis have lagged behind the coalition in terms of civilian casualties inflicted, but not for lack of trying. The UN has estimated that coalition airstrikes are responsible for at least 60% of civilian casualties. Though they lack an air force, the Houthis have routinely shelled civilian neighborhoods, laid hundreds of thousands of landmines throughout the territory they’ve ceded since 2015, and detained, disappeared, or tortured thousands of innocent people.
The main cause of suffering in Yemen has not been the violence itself. Instead, the extreme humanitarian crisis is largely the result of disastrous economic decisions by Yemen’s legitimate government in exile, and of an illegal blockade on humanitarian and commercial traffic imposed by Saudi Arabia.
Due to those factors — as well as the Houthis’ appropriation of state wealth and manipulation of the black market — the price of food, fuel, and other necessities has skyrocketed, while Yemen’s currency has plummeted to roughly a third of its pre-war value. This means that even in parts of the country where staple goods are not in short supply, they are far too expensive for most Yemenis.
01
Since the start of the Saudi-led intervention the U.S. has provided logistical and intelligence assistance to the coalition’s air campaign. The U.S. has also sold billions of dollars’ worth of ordnance, aircraft, and weapons systems to Saudi Arabia and the UAE since 2014. U.S. involvement stems in part from the longstanding security partnership between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, and partly from concern over Iran’s influence in the region.
In October 2016, after a year and a half of reckless airstrikes and civilian casualties — some of which were carried out with U.S.-made bombs — the Obama administration began to reconsider its blank-check support for the coalition. President Obama halted the delivery of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) that had already been sold to Saudi Arabia, and announced that the U.S. was “reevaluating” its other forms of assistance. But U.S. refueling for coalition warplanes continued, and there were more than enough bombs already in the coalition’s arsenals to keep the air campaign going. Meanwhile, the administration consistently refused to address the devastating Saudi blockade of Yemen.
One of President Trump’s first foreign policy decisions upon taking office in January 2017 was to unfreeze the PGM delivery, and restart negotiations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE on additional arms sales.
Spurred by pro-peace activists and human rights advocates, a group of U.S. senators led by Chris Murphy of Connecticut introduced a “resolution of disapproval” to stop the PGM delivery. The measure came close to passing, with 47 out of 100 senators voting in favor, but the sale went ahead.
Since then, the Trump administration has quietly increased U.S. support for coalition operations while refusing to provide Congress or the public with information about the specific parameters of that assistance. In the spring of 2018, it became known that U.S. Army special forces were operating inside Saudi Arabia, assisting in the effort to locate and neutralize Houthi ballistic missiles. The administration had deliberately withheld this from Congress until the story was broken by news outlets.
04
The war has affected every aspect of life for Yemenis across the country — even in places far from the front lines. Some of the ways in which war disrupts people’s lives are obvious: in addition to the many tens (or perhaps hundreds) of thousands of Yemenis who have been killed, roughly four million people have been displaced from their homes since the fighting began, with around half a million people forced to flee the city of al-Hudaydah and surrounding areas between June and November 2018.
The war affects people in slightly less obvious ways as well. Shortly after the war began, the Yemeni government moved the headquarters of Yemen’s Central Bank to Aden, and fired or replaced much of the Bank’s management, which contributed significantly to the economic crisis in Yemen. The government also froze salary payments to government employees inside Houthi-controlled territory, and stopped paying salaries for many civil servants in “liberated” areas as well. By some estimates, nearly a third of the population depends directly or indirectly on government salaries.
The Saudi-led coalition’s air campaign has deliberately targeted all elements of Yemen’s food supply. The coalition has bombed farms, killed fishermen, destroyed factories, mills, and markets. The Saudis and Emiratis have even bombed food warehouses operated by international aid organizations. They have also targeted water treatment plants, depriving millions of people of clean water. This has led to the largest cholera outbreak in recorded history, and accelerated the spread of other diseases.
In contested areas and areas under their control, the Houthis have established countless checkpoints with which they restrict the movement of goods, and extort businesses, aid organizations, and ordinary citizens. The Houthis have also built a brutal system of surveillance and repression, forcing Yemenis in Houthi-controlled areas to live in constant fear of violence from the forces that claim to be defending Yemen from external aggression. The Houthis even subject civil servants and other citizens to re-education programs. | ||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 47 | https://www.nplusonemag.com/issue-43/essays/what-happened-wasnt-fate-at-all/ | en | What Happened Wasn’t Fate at All | [
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At that time, I was convinced the so-called civilized world wouldn’t leave us to the foolishness of politicians and generals, that it wouldn’t stand idly by and watch the impending wreckage. I thought someone would inevitably intervene — the following day, or maybe the day after, stopping us from wandering off a cliff like an unknowing flock of sheep. Hadi fled the country on March 25. That same day, a military coalition organized by Saudi Arabia in support of Hadi and against the Houthi and Saleh uprising began air strikes. (The coalition also included the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt, Senegal, Sudan, Qatar, and Morocco.) At 2 AM on Thursday, March 26, Arab Coalition fighter planes suddenly cut through the Sanaa sky and war became a reality. What’s engraved in my mind from that morning isn’t the roar of the explosions, or the horrifying thunder of planes piercing the sound barrier, or my anxiety over the trajectory of missiles hitting targets farther than I could see, or the sounds of war that I had grown accustomed to. Rather, it is the shock of how war was conjured, how life collapsed in one fell swoop — civil infighting, the humiliation of hunger, the indignity of it all, our generation’s lost dreams.
We have returned to pre-civilization. All cities are without electricity; we live by candlelight and the gas lanterns our ancestors used. When the gas runs out at home, families resort to cutting down trees to burn in woodstoves. There’s no clean water to drink; every day children and the elderly line up with empty pots at tankers donated by some doer of good. You see poverty wherever you turn: citizens have lost their jobs and livelihoods, impoverished to the point where they don’t even question the meaning of war. Women and children fight over scraps from rubbish piles. Families sleep outside. People are relocated to miserable camps on the outskirts of cities and left there, abandoned by the world, forgotten. | |||||
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] | 2024-07-29T22:27:06+00:00 | Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi (‘Abdrabbuh Manṣūr Hādī; Arabic language: عبدربه منصور هادي Yemeni pronunciation: [ˈʕæbdˈrɑb.bu mænˈsˤuːr ˈhæːdi]; born 1 September 1945) is a Yemeni politician and former Field Marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces. He has been the President of Yemen since 27 February... | en | /skins-ucp/mw139/common/favicon.ico | Military Wiki | https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi | Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi (‘Abdrabbuh Manṣūr Hādī; Arabic language: عبدربه منصور هادي Yemeni pronunciation: [ˈʕæbdˈrɑb.bu mænˈsˤuːr ˈhæːdi]; born 1 September 1945) is a Yemeni politician and former Field Marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces. He has been the President of Yemen since 27 February 2012, and was Vice President from 1994 to 2012.[2]
Between 4 June and 23 September 2011, Hadi was the acting President of Yemen while Ali Abdullah Saleh was undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia following an attack on the presidential palace during the 2011 Yemeni uprising.[3] On 23 November, he became Acting President again, after Saleh moved into a non-active role pending the presidential election "in return for immunity from prosecution". Hadi was "expected to form a national unity government and also call for early presidential elections within 90 days" while Saleh continued to serve as President in name only.[4] Mansour Hadi was chosen as a president for a two-year transitional period on February 21, 2012, in an election in which he was the only candidate. His mandate was extended for another year in January 2014.[5] However, he remained in power after the expiration of his mandate.[6]
On 22 January 2015, he was forced to resign by the Houthis after a mass protest against his decision to raise the fuel subsidies and due to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 2011 Revolution. Subsequently, the Houthis and the supporters of Saleh seized the presidential palace and placed Hadi under house arrest. A month later, he escaped to his hometown of Aden, rescinded his resignation, and denounced the Houthi takeover as an unconstitutional coup d'état. The Houthis named a Revolutionary Committee to assume the powers of the presidency, as well as the General People's Congress, Hadi's own political party.[7] On 25 March 2015, after the beginning of the Yemeni Civil War, Hadi fled Yemen in a boat as Houthi forces advanced on Aden.[8] He arrived in Riyadh the next day, as Saudi Arabia began a bombing campaign in support of his government.[9] He returned to Aden in September 2015, as Saudi-backed government forces recaptured the city.[10] In late 2017, he was reportedly residing in Riyadh under house arrest.[11]
Early life and education[]
Hadi was born in 1945 in Thukain, Abyan, a southern Yemeni governorate.[12] He graduated from a military academy in the Federation of South Arabia in 1964.[13] In 1966 he graduated after receiving a military scholarship to study in Britain, but does not speak English.[12]
In 1970, he received another military scholarship to study tanks in Egypt for six years. Hadi spent the following four years in the Soviet Union studying military leadership. He occupied several military posts in the army of South Yemen until 1986, when he fled to North Yemen with Ali Nasser Mohammed, president of South Yemen, after Ali Nasser's faction of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party lost the 1986 civil war.[14]
Career[]
Hadi played a low-profile role during the Aden Emergency. Following the independence of South Yemen, he rose to prominence in the new military, reaching the rank of Major General.[13]
He remained loyal to President Ali Nasser Mohammed during the South Yemen Civil War, and followed him into exile in neighboring North Yemen. During the 1994 civil war in Yemen, Hadi sided with the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and was appointed as Minister of Defense.[13] In this role he led the military campaign against the Democratic Republic of Yemen.[15] Following the war he was promoted to Vice President on 3 October 1994, replacing Ali Salim Al-Beidh, who had resigned and fought against the government during the civil war.[citation needed]
President of Yemen[]
[]
Main article: Yemeni presidential election, 2012
Hadi was the sole candidate in the presidential election that was held on 21 February 2012. His candidacy was backed by the ruling party, as well as by the parliamentary opposition. The Electoral Commission reported that 65 percent of registered voters in Yemen voted during the election. Hadi won with 100% of the vote and took the oath of office in Yemen's parliament on 25 February 2012.[16] He was formally inaugurated as the president of Yemen on 27 February 2012, when Saleh resigned from the presidency and formally ceded power to Hadi.[17]
Political reform[]
In March 2013 the National Dialogue Conference was conceived as a core part of the transition process and is intended to bring together Yemen's diverse political and demographic groups to address critical issues.[18] In January 2014, Hadi pushed delegates at the conference to break a deadlock on key issues and bring the talks to an overdue close. When those in attendance finally agreed on a final few points, he launched into an impassioned speech that led to a spike in his popularity. It was agreed that Yemen would shift to a federal model of government in the future, a move which have been proposed and forcefully backed by Hadi.[19] For many Yemenis, particularly in northwestern Yemen, this decentralization was less attractive. This mountainous region is the poorest of Yemen and decentralization would mean that it would receive less money from the central government. Relevant here is that the overwhelming majority of Yemen's population has resided in this area for many years.[20] Indeed, the 'decentralization' of Yemen along the lines proposed by the Saudi-imposed Hadi regime threatened Yemen's long-term economic and political independence; scholar Isa Blumi points out that "To any rational observer, the idea of developing Yemen into six disproportionate regions with enormous autonomy was a blatant effort to benefit foreign interests and subdue the rebellious populations through poverty and administrative obscurity."[20] Indeed, if the Saudi-American decentralization 'road map to peace' is implemented, Yemen's oil wealth would be confined almost entirely to the provinces of Hadhramawt and Saba', Yemen's two least populated provinces.[21] Blumi goes on to point out that "This would make bribing the few thousands of eligible 'residents' with a tiny portion of the oil revenue (no longer flowing to the central state) easy, while creating an enormous windfall for those hoping to steal Yemen's wealth."[21] They also didn't like that the new regional borders would rob them of access to the sea.
Military[]
In a move to unify the Armed Forces of Yemen which suffered from split since the Yemeni Revolution, Hadi began reforming the Military. He issued Presidential decree No.104 of December 2012 reorganizing the Military into 5 main branches: Air Force, Army (Ground Force), Navy and Coastal Defence, Border Troops and Strategic Reserve Forces, which includes the Special Operation Command, the Missile Defence Command and the Presidential Protective Forces. The Strategic Reserve Forces replaces the Republican Guard.[22]
Security issues[]
See also: 2012 Sana'a bombing
From his early days at office, Hadi advocated fighting Al-Qaida as an important goal. In a meeting with British Foreign Secretary, William Hague in his first days at office Hadi said "We intend to confront terrorism with full force and whatever the matter we will pursue it to the very last hiding place".[23]
The Yemeni military has suffered from sharp divisions since Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar defected in late March 2011 amid protests demanding the ouster of Hadi's predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The military protests extended to the Republican Guard based in the south of Sana'a when dozens from the Fourth Brigade closed down southern entrances to the capital city and demanded the firing of the brigade's commander, Mohammad Al-Arar, and his general staff.[23]
In an interview in September 2012 to the Washington Post, Hadi warned that his country, still reeling from the popular uprising that ousted Saleh, risks a descent into a civil war "worse than Afghanistan" should an upcoming months-long national dialogue fail to resolve the state's deep political and societal rifts. He also said that Yemen was facing "three undeclared wars" conducted by al Qaeda, pirates in the Gulf of Aden, and Houthi rebels in the north, and that Iran was supporting these adversaries indirectly without giving further details.[24]
Houthis, on their side, complained of murder attacks on their delegates to the NDC.[25]
Rebel takeover and civil war[]
Hadi was forced to agree to a power-sharing deal after the fall of Sana'a to the rebel umbrella organization Ansar Allah in September 2014. Also known as the Houthis, these revolutionaries refused to participate in the "unity government", although they continued to occupy key positions and buildings in Sana'a and hold territory throughout northern Yemen. Hadi was further humiliated when the General People's Congress ousted him as its leader and rejected his cabinet choices on 8 November 2014.[26] It is important to note that the Houthis' pretext for entering Sana'a' and deposing Hadi was to reverse an apparent breach of the Hadi government's mandate by unilaterally declaring an extension of its power beyond the two-year intermediary period actually set by the GCC and the United States.[27] They also accused the president of seeking to bypass a power-sharing deal signed when they seized Sanaa in September, and say they are also working to protect state institutions from corrupt civil servants and officers trying to plunder state property.[28]
Three days after Hadi's resignation (21 January 2015), the Houthis took over the presidential palace.[29] Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah tendered their resignations to parliament which reportedly refused to accept them.[30] Then the Yemeni cabinet was dissolved.[31] Hadi and his former ministers remained under virtual house arrest since their resignations.[32] United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for Hadi to be restored as president after the Houthis installed themselves as the interim government in February 2015.[32][33] According to Houthi-controlled state media, Hadi reaffirmed on 8 February that his resignation was "final" and could not be withdrawn.[34]
However, after leaving Sana'a and traveling to his hometown of Aden on 21 February, Hadi gave a speech in which he presented himself as Yemen's president and said the actions taken by the Houthis since 21 September were unconstitutional and invalid.[35][36]
On 26 March 2015 Saudi state TV Al Ekhbariya reported that Hadi arrived at a Riyadh airbase and was met by Saudi Arabia Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud as Saudi Arabia and its allies launched airstrikes in Yemen against the Houthis in the 2015 military intervention in Yemen. His route from Aden to Riyadh was not immediately known.[37]
On 25 March 2017 a court in the Houthi-controlled Sana'a sentenced Hadi and six other government officials to death in absentia for "high treason", which meant "incitement and assistance" to Saudi Arabia and its allies".[38][39] The sentence was announced by the Houthi-controlled Saba News Agency.[38]
References[]
[] | ||
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] | 2022-04-07T19:17:12+00:00 | Yemen’s exiled president has stepped aside and transferred his powers to a presidential council. Thursday's development comes as international and regional efforts to end the country’s long-running civil war recently gained momentum with a two-month truce. | en | /apple-touch-icon.png | AP News | https://apnews.com/article/houthis-yemen-middle-east-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-272f0f343116c4a9f0224af96f2169e7 | SANAA, Yemen (AP) — Yemen’s exiled president stepped aside and transferred his powers to a presidential council Thursday, as international and regional efforts to end the country’s long-running civil war gained momentum with a two-month truce.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, major players in the war, appear to have had a role in President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s decision, quickly welcoming it with a pledge of $3 billion in aid. The head of the new council has close ties to Riyadh.
It remains to be seen how the development will impact Yemen’s grinding conflict. A Saudi-led coalition of which the UAE is a member has for years been fighting the Iran-backed Houthi rebels to restore Hadi’s government to power.
So far, U.N. mediation efforts have yielded little fruit, and fighting, airstrikes and missile attacks had been escalating in the war until the cease-fire took effect.
Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Salam dismissed any significance of the new council. The rebels have in the past benefited from squabbles among their rivals.
“Our Yemeni people are not concerned with any illegitimate decisions made by illegitimate parties beyond their borders,” Abdul-Salam tweeted.
Peter Salisbury, Yemen expert at the International Crisis Group, described the power transfer as the “most consequential shift in the inner workings of the anti-Houthi bloc since war began.”
Hadi, 76, said the newly established council will run the government and lead negotiations with the Houthis, according to a statement aired on state-run media.
The development, which could unify the anti-Houthi camp after years of infighting and disputes, was almost certainly orchestrated in Riyadh where Yemen’s pro-government and pro-Saudi factions have been meeting over the past week to discuss efforts to end the war.
“I irreversibly delegate to the Presidential Leadership Council my full powers,” Hadi declared on Yemen’s state-run TV. He also sacked Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a powerful military figure, and delegated al-Ahmar’s powers to the presidential council.
The council is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an advisor to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of late strongman President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Al-Alimi enjoys close ties with Saudi Arabia and the powerful Islah party — Yemen’s branch of the transnational Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood.
Yemen’s civil war started in 2014, when the Houthis seized the capital of Sanaa, forcing Hadi and his government into exile in Saudi Arabia. Months later, the Saudi-led coalition entered the war to try to restore Hadi’s government to power — but the war over the years turned into a stalemated proxy conflict with neither side winning.
Hadi’s exile distanced him from events on the ground, with his Saudi backers preventing him from returning to Yemen and the southern port city of Aden — the new seat of the exiled government — allegedly over safety issues. His administration was accused of gross mismanagement and government employees largely went without salaries.
Separately, Aden became the scene of infighting among the coalition when UAE-backed separatists briefly overtook the city in 2019. A Riyadh-brokered deal later that year attempted to reconcile the separatists and Hadi’s forces but power struggles have persisted.
Hadi’s rule was also undermined by the UAE’s influence in the territories nominally under his control. The UAE trained, financed and armed militias in Yemen and set up prisons.
Yemen’s war has killed more than 150,000 people, including over 14.500 civilians, and created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. This month, the warring sides announced a two-month cease-fire — the first nationwide truce in Yemen in six years — starting with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Saudi Arabia welcomed Hadi’s move and urged the presidential council to embark upon U.N.-led negotiations with the Houthis to find a “political, final and comprehensive” settlement to the conflict, according to the state-run Saudi Press Agency. Powerful Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has also met with the council head and its members, Saudi state-run TV reported.
The council has seven other members, including Aydarous al-Zubaidi, head of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council — an umbrella group of heavily armed militias propped up by the UAE since 2015. Also in the council are Sheikh Sultan al-Aradah, the powerful governor of energy-rich Marib province, and Tariq Saleh, a militia leader and nephew of the late president with close ties to the UAE.
Another member is Abdel-Rahman Abu Zarah, commander of UAE-backed Giants Brigades, which played a crucial role recently in repelling the Houthi offensive on the central city of Marib.
Hadi was named president of Yemen in 2012 with a mission to oversee a democratic transition following its Arab Spring uprising that ended Saleh’s longtime rule.
Separately, talks hosted by the Saudi-based Gulf Cooperation Council over the Yemeni war entered their final day on Thursday. The Houthis have boycotted the GCC efforts because they were taking place in Saudi Arabia, their adversary’s territory.
A number of countries welcomed the change in Yemen’s leadership, with Egypt, Jordan and France expressing support for the presidential council. The Arab League and the European Union both said they hoped it could help the country further towards peace.
At the United Nations, spokesman Stephane Dujarric thanked Saudi Arabia and the UAE for their $3 billion in aid to Yemen and expressed U.N.'s readiness to work with the presidential council, “as well all the Yemeni parties, to reach a lasting truce and a sustainable, inclusive and negotiated settlement to the Yemen conflict.”
___
Magdy reported from Cairo. Associated Press writers Noha ElHennawy in Cairo and Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations contributed to this report. | ||
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This article is about the country in West Asia. For other uses, see Yemen (disambiguation).
Yemen ( ; Arabic: ٱلْيَمَنْ, romanized: al-Yaman), officially the Republic of Yemen,[b] is a sovereign state in West Asia.[11] Located in the southern Arabian Peninsula, it borders Saudi Arabia to the north, Oman to the northeast, and the Indian Ocean to the south, sharing maritime borders with Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia across the Horn of Africa. Covering roughly 528,000 square kilometres (203,861 square miles),[12] with a coastline of approximately 2,000 kilometres (1,200 miles), Yemen is the second largest country on the Arabian Peninsula.[13] Sanaa is its constitutional capital and largest city. Yemen's estimated population is 34.7 million, mostly Arab Muslims.[14] It is a member of the Arab League, the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
Owing to its geographic location, Yemen has been at the crossroads of many civilisations for over 7,000 years. In 1200 BCE, the Sabaeans formed a thriving commercial kingdom that included parts of modern Ethiopia and Eritrea.[15][16][17] In 275 CE, it was succeeded by the Himyarite Kingdom, which spanned much of Yemen's present-day territory and was heavily influenced by Judaism.[18] Christianity arrived in the fourth century, followed by the rapid spread of Islam in the seventh century. Yemenite troops playing a crucial role in early Islamic conquests.[19] Various dynasties emerged between the 9th and 16th centuries.[20] During the 19th century, the country was divided between the Ottoman and British empires. After World War I, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen was established, which in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) following a coup. In 1967, the British Aden Protectorate became the independent People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), the first and only officially socialist state in the Arab world. In 1990, the two Yemeni states united to form the modern Republic of Yemen (al-Jumhūrīyah al-Yamanīyah), with Ali Abdullah Saleh serving as the first president until his resignation in 2012 in the wake of the Arab Spring.[21][22]
Since 2011, Yemen has been enduring a political crisis, marked by street protests against poverty, unemployment, corruption, and President Saleh's plan to amend Yemen's constitution and eliminate the presidential term limit.[23] By 2015, the country became engulfed by an ongoing civil war with multiple entities vying for governance, including the Presidential Leadership Council of the internationally recognized government, the Houthi movement's Supreme Political Council, and the separatist Southern Movement's Southern Transitional Council. This conflict, which has escalated to involve various foreign powers, has led to a severe humanitarian crisis.[24][25][26][27][28][29]
Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the world,[30] facing significant obstacles to sustainable development,[31] and is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Africa.[32] In 2019, the United Nations reported that Yemen had the highest number of people in need of humanitarian aid, amounting to about 24 million individuals, or nearly 75% of its population.[33] As of 2020, Yemen ranked highest on the Fragile States Index[34] and second-worst on the Global Hunger Index, surpassed only by the Central African Republic.[34] Additionally, it has the lowest Human Development Index out of all non-African countries.
Etymology
Further information: Arabia Felix and South Arabia
The term Yamnat was first mentioned in the Old South Arabian inscriptions on the title of one of the kings of the second Himyarite Kingdom known as Shammar Yahri'sh. The term probably referred to the southwestern coastline of the Arabian Peninsula and the southern coastline between Aden and Hadhramaut.[35][36] The historical Yemen included much greater territory than the current nation, stretching from northern 'Asir in southwestern Saudi Arabia to Dhofar in southern Oman.[37][38]
One etymology derives Yemen from ymnt, meaning literally "South [of the Arabian Peninsula]", and significantly plays on the notion of the land to the right (𐩺𐩣𐩬).[39] Other sources claim that Yemen is related to yamn or yumn, meaning "felicity" or "blessed", as much of the country is fertile, in contrast to the barren land of most of Arabia.[40][41] The Romans called it Arabia Felix ("happy" or "fortunate" Arabia"), as opposed to Arabia Deserta ("deserted Arabia"). Latin and Greek writers referred to ancient Yemen as "India", which arose from the Persians calling the Abyssinians whom they came into contact with in South Arabia by the name of the black-skinned people who lived next to them.[42][43]
History
Main article: History of Yemen
Yemen has existed at the crossroads of its civilisations for more than 7,000 years. The country was home to figures such as the Queen of Sheba who brought a caravan of gifts for King Solomon. For centuries, it became a primary producer of coffee exported in the port of Mocha. From its conversion to Islam in the 7th century, Yemen became a center of Islamic learning, and much of its architecture survived until modern times.
Ancient history
With its long sea border between eastern and western civilizations, Yemen has long existed at a crossroads of cultures with a strategic location in terms of trade on the west of the Arabian Peninsula. Large settlements for their era existed in the mountains of northern Yemen as early as 5000 BC.[44] The Sabaean Kingdom came into existence in at least the 12th century BC.[45] The four major kingdoms or tribal confederations in South Arabia were Saba, Hadhramaut, Qataban, and Ma'in.
Sabaʾ (Arabic: سَـبَـأ)[46][47] is thought to be biblical Sheba and was the most prominent federation.[48] The Sabaean rulers adopted the title Mukarrib generally thought to mean unifier,[49] or a priest-king,[50] or the head of the confederation of South Arabian kingdoms, the "king of the kings".[51] The role of the Mukarrib was to bring the various tribes under the kingdom and preside over them all.[52] The Sabaeans built the Great Dam of Marib around 940 BC.[53] The dam was built to withstand the seasonal flash floods surging down the valley.
By the third century BC, Qataban, Hadhramaut, and Ma'in became independent from Saba and established themselves in the Yemeni arena. Minaean rule stretched as far as Dedan,[54] with their capital at Baraqish. The Sabaeans regained their control over Ma'in after the collapse of Qataban in 50 BC. By the time of the Roman expedition to Arabia Felix in 25 BC, the Sabaeans were once again the dominating power in Southern Arabia.[55] Aelius Gallus was ordered to lead a military campaign to establish Roman dominance over the Sabaeans.[56]
The Romans had a vague and contradictory geographical knowledge about Arabia Felix. A Roman army of 10,000 men was defeated before Marib.[57] Strabo's close relationship with Aelius Gallus led him to attempt to justify his friend's defeat in his writings. It took the Romans six months to reach Marib and 60 days to return to Egypt. The Romans blamed their Nabataean guide and executed him for treachery.[58] No direct mention in Sabaean inscriptions of the Roman expedition has yet been found.
After the Roman expedition (perhaps earlier) the country fell into chaos, and two clans, namely Hamdan and Himyar, claimed kingship, assuming the title King of Sheba and Dhu Raydan.[59] Dhu Raydan, i.e., Himyarites, allied themselves with Aksum in Ethiopia against the Sabaeans.[60] The chief of Bakil and king of Saba and Dhu Raydan, El Sharih Yahdhib, launched successful campaigns against the Himyarites and Habashat, i.e., Aksum. El Sharih took pride in his campaigns and added the title Yahdhib to his name, which means "suppressor"; he used to kill his enemies by cutting them to pieces.[61] Sana'a came into prominence during his reign, as he built the Ghumdan Palace as his place of residence.
The Himyarite annexed Sana'a from Hamdan around 100 AD.[62] Hashdi tribesmen rebelled against them and regained Sana'a around 180.[63] Shammar Yahri'sh had conquered Hadhramaut, Najran, and Tihamah by 275, thus unifying Yemen and consolidating Himyarite rule.[64][65] The Himyarites rejected polytheism and adhered to a consensual form of monotheism called Rahmanism.[66]
In 354, Roman Emperor Constantius II sent an embassy headed by Theophilos the Indian to convert the Himyarites to Christianity.[67] According to Philostorgius, the mission was resisted by local Jews.[68] Several inscriptions have been found in Hebrew and Sabaean praising the ruling house in Jewish terms for "...helping and empowering the People of Israel."[69]
According to Islamic traditions, King As'ad the Perfect mounted a military expedition to support the Jews of Yathrib.[70] Abu Kariba As'ad, as known from the inscriptions, led a military campaign to central Arabia or Najd to support the vassal Kingdom of Kinda against the Lakhmids.[71] However, no direct reference to Judaism or Yathrib was discovered from his lengthy reign. Abu Kariba died in 445, having reigned for almost 50 years.[72] By 515, Himyar became increasingly divided along religious lines and a bitter conflict between different factions paved the way for an Aksumite intervention. The last Himyarite king Ma'adikarib Ya'fur was supported by Aksum against his Jewish rivals. Ma'adikarib was Christian and launched a campaign against the Lakhmids in southern Iraq, with the support of other Arab allies of Byzantium.[73] The Lakhmids were a bulwark of Persia, which was intolerant to a proselytizing religion like Christianity.[74]
After the death of Ma'adikarib Ya'fur around 521, a Himyarite Jewish warlord called Dhu Nuwas rose to power. Emperor Justinian I sent an embassy to Yemen. He wanted the officially Christian Himyarites to use their influence on the tribes in inner Arabia to launch military operations against Persia. Justinian I bestowed the "dignity of king" upon the Arab sheikhs of Kindah and Ghassan in central and northern Arabia.[75] From early on, Roman and Byzantine policy was to develop close links with the powers of the coast of the Red Sea. They were successful in converting[clarification needed] Aksum and influencing their culture. The results concerning to Yemen were rather disappointing.[75]
A Kendite prince called Yazid bin Kabshat rebelled against Abraha and his Arab Christian allies. A truce was reached once the Great Dam of Marib had suffered a breach.[76] Abraha died around 570. The Sasanid Empire annexed Aden around 570. Under their rule, most of Yemen enjoyed great autonomy except for Aden and Sana'a. This era marked the collapse of ancient South Arabian civilization, since the greater part of the country was under several independent clans until the arrival of Islam in 630.[77]
Middle Ages
See also: Islamic history of Yemen
Advent of Islam and the three dynasties
Muhammad sent his cousin Ali to Sana'a and its surroundings around 630. At the time, Yemen was the most advanced region in Arabia.[78] The Banu Hamdan confederation was among the first to accept Islam. Muhammad sent Muadh ibn Jabal, as well to Al-Janad, in present-day Taiz, and dispatched letters to various tribal leaders.[79] Major tribes, including Himyar, sent delegations to Medina during the "year of delegations" around 630–631. Several Yemenis accepted Islam before 630, such as Ammar ibn Yasir, Al-Ala'a Al-Hadrami, Miqdad ibn Aswad, Abu Musa Ashaari, and Sharhabeel ibn Hasana. A man named 'Abhala ibn Ka'ab Al-Ansi expelled the remaining Persians and claimed he was a prophet of Rahman. He was assassinated by a Yemeni of Persian origin called Fayruz al-Daylami. Christians, who were mainly staying in Najran along with Jews, agreed to pay jizyah (Arabic: جِـزْيَـة), although some Jews converted to Islam, such as Wahb ibn Munabbih and Ka'ab al-Ahbar.
Yemen was stable during the Rashidun Caliphate. Yemeni tribes played a pivotal role in the Islamic expansion into Egypt, Iraq, Persia, the Levant, Anatolia, North Africa, Sicily, and Andalusia.[80][81][82] Yemeni tribes who settled in Syria contributed significantly to the solidification of Umayyad rule, especially during the reign of Marwan I. Powerful Yemenite tribes such as Kinda were on his side during the Battle of Marj Rahit.[83][84]
Muhammad ibn Abdullah ibn Ziyad founded the Ziyadid dynasty in Tihamah around 818. The state stretched from Haly (in present-day Saudi Arabia) to Aden. They nominally recognized the Abbasid Caliphate but ruled independently from Zabid.[85] By virtue of its location, they developed a special relationship with Abyssinia. The chief of the Dahlak islands exported slaves, as well as amber and leopard hides, to the ruler of Yemen.[86] They controlled only a small portion of the coastal strip in Tihamah along the Red Sea, and never exercised control over the highlands and Hadhramaut.[87] A Himyarite clan called the Yufirids established their rule over the highlands from Saada to Taiz, while Hadhramaut was an Ibadi stronghold and rejected all allegiance to the Abbasids in Baghdad.[85]
The first Zaidi imam, Yahya ibn al-Husayn, arrived in Yemen in 893. He was a religious cleric and judge who was invited to come to Saada from Medina to arbitrate tribal disputes.[88] Yahya persuaded local tribesmen to follow his teachings. The sect slowly spread across the highlands, as the tribes of Hashid and Bakil, later known as "the twin wings of the imamate", accepted his authority.[89] He founded the Zaidi imamate in 897. Yahya established his influence in Saada and Najran. He also tried to capture Sana'a from the Yufirids in 901 but failed miserably.
Sulayhid dynasty (1047–1138)
The Sulayhid dynasty was founded in the northern highlands around 1040; at the time, Yemen was ruled by different local dynasties. In 1060, Ali ibn Muhammad Al-Sulayhi conquered Zabid and killed its ruler Al-Najah, founder of the Najahid dynasty. His sons were forced to flee to Dahlak.[90] Hadhramaut fell into Sulayhid hands after their capture of Aden in 1162.[91]
By 1063, Ali had subjugated Greater Yemen.[92] He then marched toward Hejaz and occupied Makkah.[93] Ali was married to Asma bint Shihab, who governed Yemen with her husband.[94] The Khutba during Friday prayers was proclaimed in both her husband's name and hers. No other Arab woman had this honor since the advent of Islam.[94]
Ali al-Sulayhi was killed by Najah's sons on his way to Mecca in 1084. His son Ahmed Al-Mukarram led an army to Zabid and killed 8,000 of its inhabitants.[95] He later installed the Zurayids to govern Aden. al-Mukarram, who had been afflicted with facial paralysis resulting from war injuries, retired in 1087 and handed over power to his wife Arwa al-Sulayhi.[96] Queen Arwa moved the seat of the Sulayhid dynasty from Sana'a to Jibla, a small town in central Yemen near Ibb. She sent Ismaili missionaries to India, where a significant Ismaili community was formed that exists to this day.[97]
Queen Arwa continued to rule securely until her death in 1138.[97] She is still remembered as a great and much-loved sovereign, as attested in Yemeni historiography, literature, and popular lore, where she is referred to as Balqis al-sughra ("the junior queen of Sheba").[98] Shortly after Arwa's death, the country was split between five competing petty dynasties along religious lines.[99] The Ayyubid dynasty overthrew the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt. A few years after their rise to power, Saladin dispatched his brother Turan Shah to conquer Yemen in 1174.[100]
Ayyubid conquest (1171–1260)
Main article: Ayyubid dynasty
Turan Shah conquered Zabid from the Mahdids in 1174, then marched toward Aden in June and captured it from the Zurayids.[101] The Hamdanid sultans of Sana'a resisted the Ayyubid in 1175, and the Ayyubids did not manage to secure Sana'a until 1189.[102] The Ayyubid rule was stable in southern and central Yemen, where they succeeded in eliminating the ministates of that region, while Ismaili and Zaidi tribesmen continued to hold out in several fortresses.[102]
The Ayyubids failed to capture the Zaydis stronghold in northern Yemen.[103] In 1191, Zaydis of Shibam Kawkaban rebelled and killed 700 Ayyubid soldiers.[104] Imam Abdullah bin Hamza proclaimed the imamate in 1197 and fought al-Mu'izz Ismail, the Ayyubid Sultan of Yemen. Imam Abdullah was defeated at first but was able to conquer Sana'a and Dhamar in 1198,[105] and al-Mu'izz Ismail was assassinated in 1202.[106]
Abdullah bin Hamza carried on the struggle against the Ayyubid until his death in 1217. After his demise, the Zaidi community was split between two rival imams. The Zaydis were dispersed, and a truce was signed with the Ayyubid in 1219.[107] The Ayyubid army was defeated in Dhamar in 1226.[107] Ayyubid Sultan Mas'ud Yusuf left for Mecca in 1228, never to return.[108] Other sources suggest that he was forced to leave for Egypt instead in 1223.[109]
Rasulid dynasty (1229–1454)
The Rasulid dynasty was established in 1229 by Umar ibn Rasul, who was appointed deputy governor by the Ayyubids in 1223. When the last Ayyubid ruler left Yemen in 1229, Umar stayed in the country as caretaker. He subsequently declared himself an independent king by assuming the title "al-Malik Al-Mansur" (the king assisted by Allah).[109]
Umar first established himself at Zabid, then moved into the mountainous interior, taking the important highland centre Sana'a. However, the Rasulid capitals were Zabid and Taiz. He was assassinated by his nephew in 1249.[108] Omar's son Yousef defeated the faction led by his father's assassins and crushed several counterattacks by the Zaydi imams who still held on in the northern highland. Mainly because of the victories he scored over his rivals, he assumed the honorific title "al-Muzaffar" (the victorious).[110]
After the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258, al-Muzaffar Yusuf I appropriated the title of caliph.[110] He chose the city of Taiz to become the political capital of the kingdom because of its strategic location and proximity to Aden.[111] The Rasulid sultans built numerous Madrasas to solidify the Shafi'i school of thought, which is still the dominant school of jurisprudence amongst Yemenis today.[112] Under their rule, Taiz and Zabid became major international centres of Islamic learning.[113] The kings were educated men in their own right, who not only had important libraries but also wrote treatises on a wide array of subjects, ranging from astrology and medicine to agriculture and genealogy.[111]
They had a difficult relationship with the Mamluks of Egypt because the latter considered them a vassal state.[111] Their competition centred over the Hejaz and the right to provide kiswa of the Ka'aba in Mecca.[111] The dynasty became increasingly threatened by disgruntled family members over the problem of succession, combined with periodic tribal revolts, as they were locked in a war of attrition with the Zaydi imams in the northern highlands.[113] During the last 12 years of Rasulid rule, the country was torn between several contenders for the kingdom. The weakening of the Rasulid provided an opportunity for the Banu Taher clan to take over and establish themselves as the new rulers of Yemen in 1454 AD.[112]
Tahirid dynasty (1454–1517)
The Tahirids were a local clan based in Rada'a. They built schools, mosques, and irrigation channels, as well as water cisterns and bridges in Zabid, Aden, Rada'a, and Juban. Their best-known monument is the Amiriya Madrasa in Rada' District, which was built in 1504.[114] The Tahirids were too weak either to contain the Zaydi imams or to defend themselves against foreign attacks.
Realizing how rich the Tahirid realm was, the Mamluks decided to conquer it.[115] The Mamluk army, with the support of forces loyal to Zaydi Imam Al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf ad-Din, conquered the entire Tahirid realm but failed to capture Aden in 1517. The Mamluk victory was short-lived. The Ottoman Empire conquered Egypt, hanging the last Mamluk Sultan in Cairo.[115] The Ottomans had not decided to conquer Yemen until 1538. The Zaydi highland tribes emerged as national heroes[116] by offering stiff, vigorous resistance to the Turkish occupation.[117] The Mamluks tried to attach Yemen to Egypt and the Portuguese led by Afonso de Albuquerque, occupied the island of Socotra and made an unsuccessful attack on Aden in 1513.[118]
Portuguese
Starting in the 15th century, Portugal intervened, dominating the port of Aden for about 20 years and maintaining a fortified enclave on the island of Socotra during this period. From the 16th century, the Portuguese posed an immediate threat to Indian Ocean trade. The Mamluks therefore sent an army under Hussein al-Kurdi to fight the intruders [119] The Mamluk sultan went to Zabid in 1515 and entered into diplomatic talks with the Tahiri sultan 'Amir bin Abdulwahab for money that would be needed for the jihad against the Portuguese. Instead of confronting them, the Mamluks, who were running out of food and water, landed on the coast of Yemen and began harassing the villagers of Tihamah to obtain the supplies they needed.
The interest of Portugal on the Red Sea consisted on the one hand of guaranteeing contacts with a Christian ally in Ethiopia and on the other of being able to attack Mecca and the Arab territories from the rear, while still having absolute dominance over trade of spices, the main intention was to dominate the commerce of the cities on the coast of Africa and Arabia.[120] To this end, Portugal sought to influence and dominate by force or persuasion all the ports and kingdoms that fought among themselves. It was common for Portugal to keep under its influence the Arab allies that were interested in maintaining independence from other Arab states in the region.[121]
Modern history
See also: Modern history of Yemen
The Zaydis and Ottomans
See also: Yemen Eyalet and Yemeni Zaidi State
The Ottomans had two fundamental interests to safeguard in Yemen: The Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and the trade route with India in spices and textiles—both threatened, and the latter virtually eclipsed, by the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in the early 16th century.[122] Hadım Suleiman Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, was ordered to command a fleet of 90 ships to conquer Yemen. The country was in a state of incessant anarchy and discord as Pasha described it by saying:[123]
Yemen is a land with no lord, an empty province. It would be not only possible but easy to capture, and should it be captured, it would be master of the lands of India and send every year a great amount of gold and jewels to Constantinople.
Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf ad-Din ruled over the northern highlands including Sana'a, while Aden was held by the last Tahiride Sultan 'Amir ibn Dauod. Pasha stormed Aden in 1538, killing its ruler, and extended Ottoman authority to include Zabid in 1539 and eventually Tihamah in its entirety.[124] Zabid became the administrative headquarters of Yemen Eyalet.[124] The Ottoman governors did not exercise much control over the highlands. They held sway mainly in the southern coastal region, particularly around Zabid, Mocha, and Aden.[125] Of 80,000 soldiers sent to Yemen from Egypt between 1539 and 1547, only 7,000 survived.[126] The Ottoman accountant-general in Egypt remarked:[126]
We have seen no foundry like Yemen for our soldiers. Each time we have sent an expeditionary force there, it has melted away like salt dissolved in water.
The Ottomans sent yet another expeditionary force to Zabid in 1547, while Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf ad-Din was ruling the highlands independently. Yahya chose his son Ali to succeed him, a decision that infuriated his other son al-Mutahhar ibn Yahya.[127] Al-Mutahhar was lame, so he was not qualified for the imamate.[127] He urged Oais Pasha, the Ottoman colonial governor in Zabid, to attack his father.[128] Indeed, Ottoman troops supported by tribal forces loyal to Imam al-Mutahhar stormed Taiz and marched north toward Sana'a in August 1547. The Turks officially made Imam al-Mutahhar a Sanjak-bey with authority over 'Amran. Imam al-Mutahhar assassinated the Ottoman colonial governor and recaptured Sana'a, but the Ottomans, led by Özdemir Pasha, forced al-Mutahhar to retreat to his fortress in Thula. Özdemir Pasha effectively put Yemen under Ottoman rule between 1552 and 1560. Özdemir died in Sana'a in 1561 and was succeeded by Mahmud Pasha.
Mahmud Pasha was described by other Ottoman officials as a corrupt and unscrupulous governor, and he was displaced by Ridvan Pasha in 1564. By 1565, Yemen was split into two provinces, the highlands under the command of Ridvan Pasha and Tihamah under Murad Pasha. Imam al-Mutahhar launched a propaganda campaign in which he claimed that the prophet Mohammed came to him in a dream and advised him to wage jihad against the Ottomans.[129] Al-Mutahhar led the tribes to capture Sana'a from Ridvan Pasha in 1567. When Murad tried to relieve Sana'a, highland tribesmen ambushed his unit and slaughtered all of them.[130] Over 80 battles were fought. The last decisive encounter took place in Dhamar around 1568, in which Murad Pasha was beheaded and his head sent to al-Mutahhar in Sana'a.[130][131] By 1568, only Zabid remained under the possession of the Turks.[131]
In 1632, Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad sent an expeditionary force of 1,000 men to conquer Mecca.[132] The army entered the city in triumph and killed its governor.[132] The Ottomans sent an army from Egypt to fight the Yemenites.[132] Seeing that the Turkish army was too numerous to overcome, the Yemeni army retreated to a valley outside Mecca.[133] Ottoman troops attacked the Yemenis by hiding at the wells that supplied them with water. This plan proceeded successfully, causing the Yemenis over 200 casualties, most from thirst.[133] The tribesmen eventually surrendered and returned to Yemen.[134] Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad died in 1644. He was succeeded by Al-Mutawakkil Isma'il, another son of al-Mansur al-Qasim, who conquered Yemen in its entirety.[135][136][137][138]
Yemen became the sole coffee producer in the world.[139] The country established diplomatic relations with the Safavid dynasty of Persia, Ottomans of Hejaz, Mughal Empire in India, and Ethiopia, as well. In the first half of the 18th century, the Europeans broke Yemen's monopoly on coffee by smuggling coffee trees and cultivating them in their own colonies in the East Indies, East Africa, the West Indies, and Latin America.[140] The imamate did not follow a cohesive mechanism for succession, and family quarrels and tribal insubordination led to the political decline of the Qasimi dynasty in the 18th century.[141]
Great Britain and the nine regions
See also: Aden Protectorate and Sultanate of Lahej
The British were looking for a coal depot to service their steamers en route to India. It took 700 tons of coal for a round-trip from Suez to Bombay. East India Company officials decided on Aden. The British Empire tried to reach an agreement with the Zaydi imam of Sana'a, permitting them a foothold in Mocha, and when unable to secure their position, they extracted a similar agreement from the Sultan of Lahej, enabling them to consolidate a position in Aden.[142] The British managed to occupy Aden and evicted the Sultan of Lahej from Aden and forced him to accept their "protection".[142] In November 1839, 5,000 tribesmen tried to retake the town but were repulsed and 200 were killed.
With emigrants from India, East Africa, and Southeast Asia, Aden grew into a world city. In 1850, only 980 Arabs were registered as original inhabitants of the city.[143] The English presence in Aden put them at odds with the Ottomans. The Turks asserted to the British that they held sovereignty over the whole of Arabia, including Yemen as the successor of Mohammed and the Chief of the Universal Caliphate.[144]
Ottoman return
The Ottomans were concerned about the British expansion from the British ruled subcontinent to the Red Sea and Arabia. They returned to the Tihamah in 1849 after an absence of two centuries.[145] Rivalries and disturbances continued among the Zaydi imams, between them and their deputies, with the ulema, with the heads of tribes, as well as with those who belonged to other sects. Some citizens of Sana'a were desperate to return law and order to Yemen and asked the Ottoman Pasha in Tihamah to pacify the country.[146] The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 strengthened the Ottoman decision to remain in Yemen.[147] By 1873, the Ottomans succeeded in conquering the northern highlands. Sana'a became the administrative capital of Yemen Vilayet.
The Ottomans learned from their previous experience and worked on the disempowerment of local lords in the highland regions. They even attempted to secularize the Yemeni society, while Yemenite Jews came to perceive themselves in Yemeni nationalist terms.[148] The Ottomans appeased the tribes by forgiving their rebellious chiefs and appointing them to administrative posts. They introduced a series of reforms to enhance the country's economic welfare. However, corruption was widespread in the Ottoman administration in Yemen. This was because only the worst of the officials were appointed because those who could avoid serving in Yemen did so.[149] The Ottomans had reasserted control over the highlands for a temporary duration.[145] The so-called Tanzimat reforms were considered heretic by the Zaydi tribes. In 1876, the Hashid and Bakil tribes rebelled against the Ottomans; the Turks had to appease them with gifts to end the uprising.[150]
The tribal chiefs were difficult to appease and an endless cycle of violence curbed Ottoman efforts to pacify the land. Ahmed Izzet Pasha proposed that the Ottoman army evacuate the highlands and confine itself to Tihamah, and not unnecessarily burden itself with continuing military operation against the Zaydi tribes.[149] Imam Yahya Hamidaddin led a rebellion against the Turks in 1904; the rebels disrupted the Ottoman ability to govern.[151] The revolts between 1904 and 1911 were especially damaging to the Ottomans, costing them as many as 10,000 soldiers and as much as 500,000 pounds per year.[152] The Ottomans signed a treaty with imam Yahya Hamidaddin in 1911. Under the treaty, Imam Yahya was recognized as an autonomous leader of the Zaydi northern highlands. The Ottomans continued to rule Shafi'i areas in the mid-south until their departure in 1918.
Mutawakkilite Kingdom
Main article: Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen
Imam Yahya hamid ed-Din al-Mutawakkil was ruling the northern highlands independently from 1911, from which he began a conquest of the Yemen lands. In 1925 Yahya captured al-Hudaydah from the Idrisids.[153] In 1927, Yahya's forces were about 50 km (30 mi) away from Aden, Taiz, and Ibb, and were bombed by the British for five days; the imam had to pull back.[154] Small Bedouin forces, mainly from the Madh'hij confederation of Marib, attacked Shabwah but were bombed by the British and had to retreat.
The Italian Empire was the first to recognize Yahya as the king of Yemen in 1926. This created a great deal of anxiety for the British, who interpreted it as recognition of Imam Yahya's claim to sovereignty over Greater Yemen, which included the Aden protectorate and Asir.[155] The Idrisis turned to Ibn Saud seeking his protection from Yahya. However, in 1932, the Idrisis broke their accord with Ibn Saud and went back to Yahya seeking help against Ibn Saud, who had begun liquidating their authority and expressed his desire to annex those territories into his own Saudi domain.[156][157] Yahya demanded the return of all Idrisi dominion.[156]
Negotiations between Yahya and Ibn Saud proved fruitless. After the 1934 Saudi-Yemeni war, Ibn Saud announced a ceasefire in May 1934.[158] Imam Yahya agreed to release Saudi hostages and the surrender of the Idrisis to Saudi custody. Imam Yahya ceded the three provinces of Najran, Asir, and Jazan for 20 years.[159] and signed another treaty with the British government in 1934. The imam recognized the British sovereignty over Aden protectorate for 40 years.[160] Out of fear for Hudaydah, Yahya did submit to these demands.
Colonial Aden
Starting in 1890, hundreds of Yemeni people from Hajz, Al-Baetha, and Taiz migrated to Aden to work at ports, and as labourers. This helped the population of Aden once again become predominantly Arab after, having been declared a free zone, it had become mostly foreigners. During World War II, Aden had increasing economic growth and became the second-busiest port in the world after New York City.[161] After the rise of labour unions, a rift was apparent between the sectors of workers and the first signs of resistance to the occupation started in 1943.[161] Muhammad Ali Luqman founded the first Arabic club and school in Aden, and was the first to start working towards a union.[162]
The Colony of Aden was divided into an eastern colony and a western colony. Those were further divided into 23 sultanates and emirates, and several independent tribes that had no relationships with the sultanates. The deal between the sultanates and Britain detailed protection and complete control of foreign relations by the British. The Sultanate of Lahej was the only one in which the sultan was referred to as His Highness.[163] The Federation of South Arabia was created by the British to counter Arab nationalism by giving more freedom to the rulers of the nations.[164]
The North Yemen Civil War inspired many in the south to rise against the British rule. The National Liberation Front (NLF) of Yemen was formed with the leadership of Qahtan Muhammad Al-Shaabi. The NLF hoped to destroy all the sultanates and eventually unite with the Yemen Arab Republic. Most of the support for the NLF came from Radfan and Yafa, so the British launched Operation Nutcracker, which completely burned Radfan in January 1964.[165]
Two states
Main articles: Yemen Arab Republic and South Yemen
Arab nationalism had an influence in some circles who opposed the lack of modernization efforts in the Mutawakkilite monarchy. This became apparent when Imam Ahmad bin Yahya died in 1962. He was succeeded by his son, but army officers attempted to seize power, sparking the North Yemen Civil War.[166] The Hamidaddin royalists were supported by Saudi Arabia, Britain, and Jordan (mostly with weapons and financial aid, but also with small military forces), whilst the military rebels were backed by Egypt. Egypt provided the rebels with weapons and financial assistance, but also sent a large military force to participate in the fighting. Israel covertly supplied weapons to the royalists to keep the Egyptian military busy in Yemen and make Nasser less likely to initiate a conflict in the Sinai. After six years of civil war, the military rebels formed the Yemen Arab Republic.[167]
The revolution in the north coincided with the Aden Emergency, which hastened the end of British rule in the south. On 30 November 1967, the state of South Yemen was formed, comprising Aden and the former Protectorate of South Arabia. This socialist state was later officially known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and a programme of nationalisation was begun.[168]
Relations between the two Yemeni states fluctuated between peaceful and hostile. The South was supported by the Eastern bloc. The North, however, was not able to get the same connections. In 1972, the two states fought a war. The war was resolved with a ceasefire and negotiations brokered by the Arab League, where it was declared that unification would eventually occur. In 1978, Ali Abdullah Saleh was named as president of the Yemen Arab Republic.[169] After the war, the North complained about the South's help from foreign countries. This included Saudi Arabia.[170]
In 1979, fresh fighting between the two states resumed and efforts were renewed to bring about unification.[169] Thousands were killed in 1986 in the South Yemen Civil War. President Ali Nasser Muhammad fled to the north and was later sentenced to death for treason. A new government formed.[169]
Unification and civil war
Main articles: Yemeni unification and Yemeni Civil War (1994)
In 1990, the two governments reached a full agreement on the joint governing of Yemen, and the countries were merged on 22 May 1990, with Saleh as president.[169] The president of South Yemen, Ali Salim al-Beidh, became vice president.[169] A unified parliament was formed and a unity constitution was agreed upon.[169] In the 1993 parliamentary election, the first held after unification, the General People's Congress won 122 of 301 seats.[171]: 309
After the invasion of Kuwait crisis in 1990, Yemen's president opposed military intervention from non-Arab states.[172] As a member of the United Nations Security Council for 1990 and 1991, Yemen abstained on a number of UNSC resolutions concerning Iraq and Kuwait[173] and voted against the "...use of force resolution." The vote outraged the U.S.,[174] and Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemenis in 1990 and 1991 to punish Yemen for its opposition to the intervention.[175]
In the absence of strong state institutions, elite politics in Yemen constituted a de facto form of collaborative governance, where competing tribal, regional, religious, and political interests agreed to hold themselves in check through tacit acceptance of the balance it produced.[176] The informal political settlement was held together by a power-sharing deal among three men: President Saleh, who controlled the state; major general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who controlled the largest share of the Republic of Yemen Armed Forces; and Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, figurehead of the Islamist al-Islah party and Saudi Arabia's chosen broker of transnational patronage payments to various political players,[177] including tribal sheikhs.[178][179][180][181] The Saudi payments have been intended to facilitate the tribes' autonomy from the Yemeni government and to give the Saudi government a mechanism with which to weigh in on Yemen's political decision-making.[182]
Following food riots in major towns in 1992, a new coalition government made up of the ruling parties from both the former Yemeni states was formed in 1993. However, Vice President al-Beidh withdrew to Aden in August 1993 and said he would not return to the government until his grievances were addressed. These included northern violence against his Yemeni Socialist Party, as well as the economic marginalization of the south.[183] Negotiations to end the political deadlock dragged on into 1994. The government of Prime Minister Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas became ineffective due to political infighting.[184]
An accord between northern and southern leaders was signed in Amman, Jordan on 20 February 1994, but this could not stop the civil war.[185] During these tensions, both the northern and southern armies (which had never integrated) gathered on their respective frontiers.[186]
Contemporary Yemen
Ali Abdullah Saleh became Yemen's first directly elected president in the 1999 presidential election, winning 96% of the vote.[171]: 310 The only other candidate, Najeeb Qahtan Al-Sha'abi, was the son of Qahtan Muhammad al-Sha'abi, a former president of South Yemen. Though a member of Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) party, Najeeb ran as an independent.[188]
In October 2000, 17 U.S. personnel died after an al-Qaeda suicide attack on the U.S. naval vessel USS Cole in Aden. After the September 11 attacks on the United States, President Saleh assured U.S. President George W. Bush that Yemen was a partner in his War on Terror. In 2001, violence surrounded a referendum, which apparently supported extending Saleh's rule and powers.
The Shia insurgency in Yemen began in June 2004 when dissident cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, head of the Zaidi Shia sect, launched an uprising against the Yemeni government. The Yemeni government alleged that the Houthis were seeking to overthrow it and to implement Shī'ite religious law. The rebels countered that they were "defending their community against discrimination" and government aggression.[189] In 2005, at least 36 people were killed in clashes across the country between police and protesters over rising fuel prices. In the 2006 presidential election, Saleh won with 77% of the vote. His main rival, Faisal bin Shamlan, received 22%.[190][191] Saleh was sworn in for another term on 27 September.[192]
A suicide bomber killed eight Spanish tourists and two Yemenis in the province of Marib in July 2007. A series of bomb attacks occurred on police, official, diplomatic, foreign business, and tourism targets in 2008. Car bombings outside the U.S. embassy in Sana'a killed 18 people, including six of the assailants in September 2008. In 2008, an opposition rally in Sana'a demanding electoral reform was met with police gunfire.[193]
Social hierarchy
There is a system of social stratification in Yemen that was officially abolished at the creation of the Republic of Yemen in 1962, but in practice this system has not disappeared and Yemeni society is still organized around hierarchical ranks. The difference between ranks is manifested by descent and occupation and is consolidated by marriages between people of the same ranks.
There are five status groups. At the top of hierarchy, there are the religious elites, also called sada. These are then followed by the strata of judges (quad). The third hierarchical status is the qaba’il, who are the peasants who belong to tribes and who live mainly from agriculture and trading. The fourth group is called the mazayanah. This group is composed of people who had no land and provide different kinds of services such as butchers and craftsmen. Finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy are the slaves (a’bid) and even further below them Al-Akhdam, which means servants.[194]
Al-Qaeda
In January 2009, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni al-Qaeda branches merged to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is based in Yemen, and many of its members were Saudi nationals who had been released from Guantanamo Bay detention camp.[195] Saleh released 176 al-Qaeda suspects on condition of good behaviour, but terrorist activities continued.
The Yemeni army launched a fresh offensive against the Shia insurgents in 2009, assisted by Saudi forces. Tens of thousands of people were displaced by the fighting. A ceasefire was agreed upon in February 2010. However, by the end of the year, Yemen claimed that 3,000 soldiers had been killed in renewed fighting. The Shia rebels accused Saudi Arabia of providing support to salafi groups to suppress Zaidism in Yemen.[196]
On orders from U.S. President Barack Obama, U.S. warplanes fired cruise missiles at what officials in Washington claimed were Al Qaeda training camps in the provinces of Sana'a and Abyan on 17 December 2009.[197] Instead of hitting Al-Qaeda operatives, it hit a village, killing 55 civilians.[198] Officials in Yemen said that the attacks claimed the lives of more than 60 civilians, 28 of them children. Another airstrike was carried out on 24 December.[199]
The U.S. launched a series of drone attacks in Yemen to curb a perceived growing terror threat due to political chaos in Yemen.[200] Controversy over U.S. policy for drone attacks swelled after a September 2011 drone strike in Yemen killed Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, both U.S. citizens.[201] Another drone strike in October 2011 killed Anwar's teenage son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki. In 2010, the Obama administration policy allowed targeting of people whose names are not known. The U.S. government increased military aid to $140 million in 2010.[202] U.S. drone strikes continued after the ousting of President Saleh.[203]
As of 2015 , Shi'a Houthis are fighting against the Islamic State,[204] Al Qaeda,[205] and Saudi Arabia.[206] The U.S. supports the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen against the Houthis,[207] but many in US SOCOM reportedly favor Houthis, as they have been an effective force to roll back al-Qaeda and recently ISIL in Yemen.[208] The Guardian reported that "The only groups poised to benefit from the war dragging on are the jihadis of Islamic State (ISIL) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the latter's most powerful franchise, who are likely to gain influence amid the chaos. ISIL has claimed recent, bloody suicide bombings in Houthi mosques and Sana'a when it once had no known presence in the country, while AQAP has continued to seize territory in eastern Yemen unhindered by American drone strikes."[209] In February 2016 Al-Qaeda forces and Saudi-led coalition forces were both seen fighting Houthi rebels in the same battle.[210]
Revolution and aftermath
The 2011 Yemeni revolution followed other Arab Spring mass protests in early 2011. The uprising was initially against unemployment, economic conditions, and corruption, as well as against the government's proposals to modify the constitution of Yemen so that Saleh's son could inherit the presidency.
In March 2011, police snipers opened fire on a pro-democracy camp in Sana'a, killing more than 50 people. In May, dozens were killed in clashes between troops and tribal fighters in Sana'a. By this point, Saleh began to lose international support. In October 2011, Yemeni human rights activist Tawakul Karman won the Nobel Peace Prize, and the UN Security Council condemned the violence and called for a transfer of power. On 23 November 2011, Saleh flew to Riyadh, in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, to sign the Gulf Co-operation Council plan for political transition, which he had previously spurned. Upon signing the document, he agreed to legally transfer the office and powers of the presidency to his deputy, Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.[211]
Hadi took office for a two-year term upon winning the uncontested presidential elections in February 2012.[212] A unity government—including a prime minister from the opposition—was formed. Al-Hadi would oversee the drafting of a new constitution, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014. Saleh returned in February 2012. In the face of objections from thousands of street protesters, parliament granted him full immunity from prosecution. Saleh's son, General Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, continues to exercise a strong hold on sections of the military and security forces.
AQAP claimed responsibility for a February 2012 suicide attack on the presidential palace that killed 26 Republican Guards on the day that President Hadi was sworn in. AQAP was also behind a suicide bombing that killed 96 soldiers in Sana'a three months later. In September 2012, a car bomb attack in Sana'a killed 11 people, a day after a local al-Qaeda leader Said al-Shihri was reported killed in the south.
By 2012, there was a "small contingent of U.S. special-operations troops"—in addition to CIA and "unofficially acknowledged" U.S. military presence—in response to increasing terror attacks by AQAP on Yemeni citizens.[213] Many analysts have pointed out the former Yemeni government role in cultivating terrorist activity in the country.[214] Following the election of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the Yemeni military was able to push Ansar al-Sharia back and recapture the Shabwah Governorate.
The central government in Sana'a remained weak, staving off challenges from southern separatists and Houthis as well as AQAP. The Houthi insurgency intensified after Hadi took power, escalating in September 2014 as anti-government forces led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi swept into the capital and forced Hadi to agree to a "unity" government.[215] The Houthis then refused to participate in the government,[216] although they continued to apply pressure on Hadi and his ministers, even shelling the president's private residence and placing him under house arrest,[217] until the government's mass resignation in January 2015.[218] The following month, the Houthis dissolved parliament and declared that a Revolutionary Committee under Mohammed Ali al-Houthi was the interim authority in Yemen. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, a cousin of the acting president, called the takeover a "glorious revolution". However, the "constitutional declaration" of 6 February 2015 was widely rejected by opposition politicians and foreign governments, including the United Nations.[27]
Hadi managed to flee from Sana'a to Aden, his hometown and stronghold in the south, on 21 February 2015. He promptly gave a televised speech rescinding his resignation, condemning the coup, and calling for recognition as the constitutional president of Yemen.[219] The following month, Hadi declared Aden Yemen's "temporary" capital.[220][221] The Houthis, however, rebuffed an initiative by the Gulf Cooperation Council and continued to move south toward Aden. All U.S. personnel were evacuated, and President Hadi was forced to flee the country to Saudi Arabia. On 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia announced Operation Decisive Storm and began airstrikes and announced its intentions to lead a military coalition against the Houthis, whom they claimed were being aided by Iran and began a force buildup along the Yemeni border. The coalition included the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, and Pakistan. The United States announced that it was assisting with intelligence, targeting, and logistics. After Hadi troops took control of Aden from Houthis, jihadist groups became active in the city, and some terrorist incidents were linked to them such as Missionaries of Charity attack in Aden on 4 March 2016. In February 2018, Aden was seized by the UAE-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council.[222]
Yemen has been suffering from a famine since 2016 as a result of the civil war. More than 50,000 children in Yemen died from starvation in 2017.[223][224] Numerous commentators have condemned the Saudi-led coalition's military campaign, including its blockade of Yemen, as genocide.[225][226][227] The famine is being compounded by an outbreak of cholera that has affected more than one million people.[228] The Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen and blockade of Yemen have contributed to the famine and cholera epidemic.[229][230] The UN estimated that by the end of 2021, the war in Yemen would have caused over 377,000 deaths, and roughly 70% of deaths were children under age 5.[231][232]
On 4 December 2017, deposed strongman and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, accused of treason, was assassinated by Houthis whilst attempting to flee clashes near rebel-held Sana'a between Houthi and pro-Saleh forces.[233] After losing the support of the Saudi-led coalition, Yemen's President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi resigned, and the Presidential Leadership Council took power in April 2022.[234]
Following the outbreak of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war, the Houthis began to fire missiles at Israel and attack ships off Yemen's coast in the Red Sea, which they say is in solidarity with the Palestinians and aiming to facilitate entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[235][236]
In June 2024, the UAE-backed STC were putting pressure to lease the Aden International Port to Abu Dhabi Ports. The move was opposed by the Parliament and the public. A joint statement by 24 members of Shura Council expressed categorical rejection of the lease agreement. Economists said the Emirates was attempting to control the Aden Port and limit its activities, in order to keep its own ports active. Governor of Aden, Tariq Salam also said the lease attempt aims to devalue the Aden Port and take its international maritime status.[237] [238] [239] Aden International Port had ended its agreement to manage two container terminals with Dubai Ports World in 2012, due to economic decline and failure to fulfill commitments.[240]
Geography
Main article: Geography of Yemen
Yemen covers 530,000 km2 (204,634 sq mi) and is located at the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula.[241] It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Gulf of Aden and Guardafui Channel to the south, and Oman to the east.
Several Red Sea islands, including the Hanish Islands, Kamaran, and Perim, as well as Socotra in the Arabian Sea, belong to Yemen; the largest of these is Socotra. Many of the islands are volcanic; Jabal al-Tair Island had volcanic eruptions in 1883 and 2007. Although mainland Yemen is in the southern Arabian Peninsula and thus part of Asia, and its Hanish Islands and Perim in the Red Sea are associated with Asia, the archipelago of Socotra, which lies east of the horn of Somalia and is much closer to Africa than to Asia, is geographically and biogeographically associated with Africa.[242]
Regions and climate
Yemen can be divided geographically into four main regions: the coastal plains in the west, the western highlands, the eastern highlands, and the Rub' al Khali in the east. The Tihamah ("hot lands" or "hot earth") form a very arid and flat coastal plain along Yemen's entire Red Sea coastline. Despite the aridity, the presence of many lagoons makes this region very marshy and a suitable breeding ground for malaria-borne mosquitos. Extensive crescent-shaped sand dunes are present. The evaporation in the Tihamah is so great that streams from the highlands never reach the sea, but they do contribute to extensive groundwater reserves. Today, these are heavily exploited for agricultural use.
Near the village of Madar about 50 km (30 mi) north of Sana'a, dinosaur footprints were found, indicating that the area was once a muddy flat. The Tihamah ends abruptly at the escarpment of the western highlands. This area, now heavily terraced to meet the demand for food, receives the highest rainfall in Arabia, rapidly increasing from 100 mm (3.9 in) per year to about 760 mm (29.9 in) in Taiz and over 1,000 mm (39.4 in) in Ibb. Temperatures are warm in the day but fall dramatically at night.
The central highlands are an extensive high plateau over 2,000 m (6,562 ft) in elevation. This area is drier than the western highlands because of rain-shadow influences, but still receives sufficient rain in wet years for extensive cropping. Water storage allows for irrigation and the growing of wheat and barley. Sana'a is in this region. The highest point in Yemen and Arabia is Jabal An-Nabi Shu'ayb, at about 3,666 m (12,028 ft).[241]
Yemen's portion of the Rub al Khali desert in the east is much lower, generally below 1,000 m (3,281 ft), and receives almost no rain. It is populated only by Bedouin herders of camels.
Biodiversity
Main article: Wildlife of Yemen
Yemen contains six terrestrial ecoregions: Arabian Peninsula coastal fog desert, Socotra Island xeric shrublands, Southwestern Arabian foothills savanna, Southwestern Arabian montane woodlands, Arabian Desert, and Red Sea Nubo-Sindian tropical desert and semi-desert.[245] The flora is a mixture of the tropical African, Sudanian plant geographical region and the Saharo-Arabian region. The Sudanian element—characterized by relatively high rainfall—dominates the western mountains and parts of the highland plains. The Saharo-Arabian element dominates in the coastal plains, eastern mountain, and the eastern and northern desert plains.
A high percentage of Yemen plants belong to tropical African plants of Sudanian regions. Among the Sudanian element species, the following may be mentioned: Ficus spp., Acacia mellifera, Grewia villosa, Commiphora spp., Rosa abyssinica, Cadaba farinosa and others.[246] Among the Saharo-Arabian species, these may be mentioned: Panicum turgidum, Aerva javanica, Zygophyllum simplex, Fagonia indica, Salsola spp., Acacia tortilis, A. hamulos, A. ehrenbergiana, Phoenix dactylifera, Hyphaene thebaica, Capparis decidua, Salvadora persica, Balanites aegyptiaca, and many others. Many of the Saharo-Arabian species are endemic to the extensive sandy coastal plain (the Tihamah).[247]
Among the fauna, the Arabian leopard, which would inhabit the mountains, is considered rare here.[248]
Politics
Main article: Politics of Yemen
Yemen is a republic with a bicameral legislature. Under the 1991 constitution, an elected president, an elected 301-seat Assembly of Representatives, and an appointed 111-member Shura Council share power. The president is the head of state, and the prime minister is the head of government. In Sana'a, a Supreme Political Council (not recognized internationally) forms the government.
The 1991 constitution provides that the president be elected by popular vote from at least two candidates endorsed by at least 15 members of the Parliament. The prime minister, in turn, is appointed by the president and must be approved by two-thirds of the Parliament. The presidential term of office is seven years, and the parliamentary term of elected office is six years. Suffrage is universal for people aged 18 and older, but only Muslims may hold elected office.[249]
President Ali Abdullah Saleh became the first elected president in reunified Yemen in 1999 (though he had been president of unified Yemen since 1990 and president of North Yemen since 1978). He was re-elected to office in September 2006. Saleh's victory was marked by an election that international observers judged was "partly free", though the election was accompanied by violence, violations of press freedoms, and allegations of fraud.[250] Parliamentary elections were held in April 2003, and the General People's Congress maintained an absolute majority. Saleh remained almost uncontested in his seat of power until 2011, when local frustration at his refusal to hold another round of elections, as combined with the consequences of the 2011 Arab Spring, resulted in mass protests.[212] In 2012, he was forced to resign from power, though he remained an important factor in Yemeni politics, allying with the Houthis during their takeover in the mid-2010s.[251]
The constitution calls for an independent judiciary. The former northern and southern legal codes have been unified. The legal system includes separate commercial courts and a Supreme Court based in Sana'a. Sharia is the main source of laws, with many court cases being debated according to the religious basis of law and many judges being religious scholars as well as legal authorities. The Prison Authority Organization Act, Republican decree no. 48 (1981), and Prison Act regulations, provide the legal framework for management of the country's prison system.[252]
Foreign relations
Main article: Foreign relations of Yemen
Yemen is a member of the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and also participates in the nonaligned movement. Yemen has acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Since the end of the 1994 civil war, tangible progress has been made on the diplomatic front in restoring normal relations with Yemen's neighbors. In the summer of 2000, Yemen and Saudi Arabia signed an International Border Treaty settling a 50-year-old dispute over the location of the border between the two countries.[253] Yemen's northern border had been undefined; the Arabian Desert prevented any human habitation there. The Saudi – Yemen barrier was constructed by Saudi Arabia against an influx of illegal immigrants and against the smuggling of drugs and weapons.[254] The Independent headed an article with "Saudi Arabia, one of the most vocal critics in the Arab world of Israel's "security fence" in the West Bank, is quietly emulating the Israeli example by erecting a barrier along its porous border with Yemen."[255][unreliable source?]
In March 2020, the Trump administration and key U.S. allies, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, cut off tens of millions of dollars for health care programs and other aid to the United Nations' appeal for Yemen. As a result of funding cuts, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that the UN agencies were forced to either close or reduce more than 75 per cent of its programs that year alone, affecting more than 8 million people. Saudi Arabia had been leading a Western-backed military coalition, including the United Arab Emirates as a key member, which intervened in Yemen in 2015, in a bid to restore the government ousted from power by the Houthi movement. The United Nations described the situation in Yemen, where the war killed tens of thousands of people and left millions on the brink of famine, as the world's worst humanitarian crisis.[256]
In January 2024, President Joe Biden announced that the United States, Britain and allies Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands had launched a military assault on Houthi militant targets in Yemen.[257]
Military
The armed forces of Yemen include the Yemen Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Marines), Yemeni Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Yamaniya; includes Air Defense Force). A major reorganization of the armed forces continues. The unified air forces and air defenses are now under one command. The navy has concentration in Aden. Total armed forces manning numbers about 401,000 active personnel, including moreover especially conscripts.
The number of military personnel is relatively high; in sum, Yemen has the second largest military force on the Arabian Peninsula after Saudi Arabia. In 2012, total active troops were estimated as follows: army, 390,000; navy, 7,000; and air force, 5,000. In September 2007, the government announced the reinstatement of compulsory military service. Yemen's defense budget, which in 2006 represented approximately 40 percent of the total government budget, is expected to remain high for the near term, as the military draft takes effect and internal security threats continue to escalate. By 2012, Yemen had 401,000 active personnel.
Human rights
Main article: Human rights in Yemen
Corruption in Yemen is such that it ranked 176 out of 180 countries in the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index.[258] The government and its security forces have been responsible for torture, inhumane treatment, and extrajudicial executions. There are arbitrary arrests of citizens, especially in the south, as well as arbitrary searches of homes. Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem, and judicial corruption, inefficiency, and executive interference undermine due process. Freedom of speech, the press, and religion are all restricted.[259] Journalists critical of the government are often harassed and threatened by the police.[173] Homosexuality is illegal, punishable by death.[260]
Yemen is ranked last of 135 countries in the 2012 Global Gender Gap Report.[261] Human Rights Watch reported on discrimination and violence against women as well as on the abolition of the minimum marriage age of 15 for women. The onset of puberty (interpreted by some to be as low as the age of nine) was set as a requirement for marriage instead.[262] Publicity about the case of ten-year-old Yemeni divorcee Nujood Ali brought the child marriage issue to the forefront worldwide.[263][264][265]
In 2017, the UN Human Rights Council voted to create a team of experts to investigate suspected breaches of humanitarian law and human rights in Yemen.[266] In December 2021, The Guardian revealed, Saudi Arabia used "incentives and threats" as part of a pressure campaign to end a UN inquiry into human rights infringements in Yemen.[267] In June 2020, a human rights group revealed the scale of torture and deaths in Yemen's unofficial detention centres. UAE and Saudi forces were responsible for some of the most shocking treatment of prisoners, including being hung upside down for hours and sexual torture such as the burning of genitals.[268]
According to 2020 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates, 6.1 million girls and women were in need of gender-based violence services. The UNFPA also reported a rise in gender-based violence cases amid COVID-19 pandemic, increase in rate of child marriages, most acutely among internally displaced persons (IDPs). One in five girls aged 10 to 19 were married in IDP camps, compared to 1 in 8 in host communities.[269]
The United States Department of State 2013 Trafficking in Persons report classified Yemen as a Tier 3 country,[270] meaning that its government does not fully comply with the minimum standards against human trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.[271] Yemen officially abolished slavery in Yemen in 1962,[272] but it is still being practiced.[273] On 22 June 2020, Human Rights Watch wrote an open letter to the UN Secretary-General on "Children and Armed Conflict" report to improve the protection of children in Yemen and in Myanmar.[274] Amnesty said, United Nations Security Council must urgently fix its monitoring and reporting mechanism for children affected by armed conflict.[275] On 14 September 2020, Human Rights Watch demanded an end to the interference caused by Houthi rebels and other authorities in Yemen aid operations, as millions of lives dependent on the aid operations were being put at risk.[276]
Administrative divisions
Main articles: Governorates of Yemen and Federalization of Yemen
Yemen is divided into twenty-one governorates (muhafazat) plus one municipality called "Amanat Al-Asemah" (the latter containing the constitutional capital, Sana'a).[277] An additional governorate (Soqatra Governorate) was created in December 2013 comprising Socotra Island, previously part of Hadramaut Governorate.[278] The governorates are subdivided into 333 districts (muderiah), which are subdivided into 2,210 sub-districts, and then into 38,284 villages (as of 2001).
In 2014, a constitutional panel decided to divide the country into six regions—four in the north, two in the south, and capital Sana'a outside of any region—creating a federalist model of governance.[279] This federal proposal was a contributing factor toward the Houthis' subsequent coup d'état against the government.[280][281][282]
Economy
Main article: Economy of Yemen
Since its unification in 1990, Yemen has been one of the poorest countries in the Middle East.[283] As of 2013 Yemen had a GDP (PPP) of US$61.63 billion, with an income per capita of $2,500. Services are the largest economic sector (61.4% of GDP), followed by the industrial sector (30.9%), and agriculture (7.7%). Of these, petroleum production represents around 25% of GDP and 63% of the government's revenue.[4] After the start of the civil war in 2014, its GDP dropped rapidly by over 50%,[284][285] thanks to the blockade led by Saudi Arabia and an effective embargo on oil exports imposed by the Houthis.[286]
Agriculture
Principal agricultural commodities produced include grain, vegetables, fruits, pulses, qat, coffee, cotton, dairy products, fish, livestock (sheep, goats, cattle, camels), and poultry.[4] Most Yemenis are employed in agriculture. However, the role of agricultural sector is limited by the relatively low share of the sector in GDP and the large share of net food-buying households (97%).[287] Sorghum is the most common crop. Cotton and many fruit trees are also grown, with mangoes being the most valuable.
A big problem in Yemen is the cultivation of Khat (or qat), a psychoactive plant that releases a stimulant when chewed, and accounts for up to 40 percent of the water drawn from the Sana'a Basin each year, and that figure is rising. Some agricultural practices are drying the Sana'a Basin and displaced vital crops, which has resulted in increasing food prices. Rising food prices, in turn, pushed an additional six percent of the country into poverty in 2008 alone,[288] and led to food riots starting in 2008 in poorer cities.[289] Efforts are being made by the government and Dawoodi Bohra community at northern governorates to replace qat with coffee plantations.[290]
Industry
The industrial sector is centred on crude oil production and petroleum refining, food processing, handicrafts, small-scale production of cotton textiles and leather goods, aluminum products, commercial ship repair, cement, and natural gas production. In 2013, Yemen had an industrial production growth rate of 4.8%.[4] It also has large proven reserves of natural gas.[291] Yemen's first liquified natural gas plant began production in October 2009.
Export and import
In 2013, exports totaled $6.694 billion. The main export commodities are crude oil, coffee, dried and salted fish, liquefied natural gas. These products were mainly sent to China (41%), Thailand (19.2%), India (11.4%), and South Korea (4.4%). Imports totaled $10.97 billion. The main imported commodities are machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, livestock, and chemicals. These products were mainly imported from the EU (48.8%), UAE (9.8%), Switzerland (8.8%), China (7.4%), and India (5.8%).[4]
State budget
As of 2013 , the government's budget consisted of $7.769 billion in revenues and $12.31 billion in expenditures. Taxes and other revenues constituted roughly 17.7% of the GDP, with a budget deficit of 10.3%. The public debt was 47.1% of GDP. Yemen had reserves of foreign exchange and gold of around $5.538 billion in 2013. Its inflation rate over the same period based on consumer prices was 11.8%. The external debt totaled $7.806 billion.[4]
Water supply and sanitation
A key challenge is severe water scarcity, especially in the Highlands, prompting The Times, in 2009, to write "Yemen could become first nation to run out of water."[292] A second key challenge is a high level of poverty, making it difficult to recover the costs of service provision. Access to water supply sanitation is low. Yemen is both the poorest country and the most water-scarce country in the Arab world. Third, the capacity of sector institutions to plan, build, operate and maintain infrastructure remains limited. Last but not least the security situation makes it even more difficult to improve or even maintain existing levels of service.
The average Yemeni has access to only 140 cubic meters of water per year (101 gallons per day) for all uses, while the Middle Eastern average is 1,000 m3/yr, and the internationally defined threshold for water stress is 1,700 cubic meters per year.[293] Groundwater is the main source of water in the country, but the water tables have dropped severely leaving Yemen without a viable source of water. For example, in Sana'a, the water table was 30 metres (98 feet) below surface in the 1970s but had dropped to 1,200 metres (3,900 feet) below the surface by 2012. The groundwater has not been regulated by Yemen's governments.[294]
Even before the revolution, Yemen's water situation had been described as increasingly dire by experts who worried that Yemen would be the first country to run out of water.[295] In part due to the 2015 Yemeni civil war, the infrastructure required to build better access to water has been delayed in construction. It is estimated that as many as 80% of the population struggles to access water to drink and bathe. Bombing has forced many Yemenis to leave their homes for other areas, leaving wells in the new areas under increasing demands.[296]
Together with partners, UNICEF has advanced its efforts and provided access to safe and sustained drinking water to 8.8 million people (5.3 million children). It scaled up its emergency WASH assistance in Yemen to ensure sustainable WASH services through capacity building of local WASH authorities, solarisation of water systems and rainwater harvesting.[297]
Demographics
Main article: Demographics of Yemen
Yemen's population is 33 million by 2021 estimates,[298][299] with 46% of the population being under 15 years old and 2.7% above 65 years. In 1950, it was 4.3 million.[300][301] By 2050, the population is estimated to increase to about 60 million.[302] Yemen has a high total fertility rate, at 4.45 children per woman.[303] Sana'a's population has increased rapidly, from roughly 55,000 in 1978[304] to nearly 1 million in the early 21st century.[305]
People
When the states of North and South Yemen were established, most resident minority groups departed.[306] Yemen is a largely tribal society.[307] There are also hereditary caste groups in urban areas such as Al-Akhdam.[308] There are also Yemenis of Persian origin. According to Muqaddasi, Persians formed the majority of Aden's population in the 10th century.[309][310]
Yemenite Jews once formed a sizable minority with a distinct culture from other Jewish communities in the world.[311] Most emigrated to Israel in the mid-20th century, following the Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries and Operation Magic Carpet. An estimated 100,000 people of Indian origin are concentrated in the southern part of the country, around Aden, Mukalla, Shihr, Lahaj, Mokha and Hodeidah.[312]
Most of the prominent Indonesians, Malaysians, and Singaporeans of Arab descent are Hadhrami people with origins in southern Yemen in the Hadhramaut coastal region.[313] Today there are almost 10,000 Hadramis in Singapore.[314] The Hadramis migrated to Southeast Asia, East Africa and the Indian subcontinent.[315]
The Maqil were a collection of Arab Bedouin tribes of Yemeni origin who migrated westwards via Egypt. Several groups of Yemeni Arabs turned south to Mauritania, and by the end of the 17th century, they dominated the entire country. They can also be found throughout Morocco and in Algeria as well as in other North African countries.[316]
Yemen is the birthplace of the Arabs and the language; Qahtanite Arabs —the original Arabs — originated in Yemen. According to Arab tradition, Ishmael son of Abraham married a woman from the Jurhum tribe.[317]
Yemen is the only country in the Arabian Peninsula that is signatory to two international accords dating back to 1951 and 1967 governing the protection of refugees.[318] Yemen hosted a population of refugees and asylum seekers numbering approximately 124,600 in 2007. Refugees and asylum seekers were predominantly from Somalia (110,600), Iraq (11,000), Ethiopia (2,000),[319] and Syria.[320] Additionally, more than 334,000 Yemenis have been internally displaced by conflict.[318] The Yemeni diaspora is largely concentrated in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, where between 800,000 and 1 million Yemenis reside,[321] and the United Kingdom, home to between 70,000 and 80,000 Yemenis.[322]
Languages
Modern Standard Arabic is the official language, while Yemeni Arabic is used as the vernacular. In al Mahrah Governorate in the far east and the island of Socotra, several non-Arabic languages are spoken.[323][324] Yemeni Sign Language is used by the deaf community.
Yemen is part of the homeland of the South Semitic languages. Mehri is the largest South Semitic language spoken in the nation, with more than 70,000 speakers. The ethnic group is called Mahra. Soqotri is another South Semitic language, with speakers on the island of Socotra isolated from the pressures of Arabic on the Yemeni mainland. According to the 1990 census, the number of speakers was 57,000.[325] Yemen was home of the Old South Arabian languages. The Razihi language appears to be the only remaining Old South Arabian language.
English is the most important foreign language, being widely taught and spoken mostly in the south, a former British protectorate.[326]
Religion
Islam is the state religion. Religion in Yemen consists primarily of two Islamic religious groups. According to a UNHCR report, the Shia "Zaydis make up about 45 percent of the population, Sunnis 53 percent and there are also tiny minorities of other Shia groups—the Ismaili and Twelver communities."[328] Sunnis are primarily Shafi'i but also include significant groups of Malikis and Hanbalis. Shias are primarily Zaydi and also have significant minorities of Ismaili[329] and Twelver[329][330] Shias.
The Sunnis are predominantly in the south and southeast which traditionally have less population. The Zaidis/Shias are predominantly in the north and northwest where the vast majority of the Yemeni population traditionally lives whilst the Ismailis are in the main centres such as Sana'a and Ma'rib. There are mixed communities in the larger cities.[331][332] According to WIN/Gallup International polls, Yemen has the highest share of the population identifying as religious among Arab countries, and one of the highest in the world.[333]
About .05 percent of Yemenis are non-Muslim—adhering to Christianity, Judaism, or Hinduism or having no religious affiliation. Yemen is number five on Open Doors' 2022 World Watch List, an annual ranking of the 50 countries where Christians face the most extreme persecution.[334] Estimates of the number of Christians in Yemen range from 25,000[335] to 41,000.[336] A 2015 study estimates 400 Christians from a Muslim background reside in the country.[337] There are approximately 50 or fewer Jews left in Yemen. Some 200 Yemeni Jews were brought to Israel by the Jewish Agency c. 2016.[338] According to a 2020 estimate, as few as 26 Jews remain in Yemen.[339] However, in 2022 it was estimated that only one Yemeni Jew remained according to a United Nations report about the treatment of religious minorities in conflict zones; however, there are reportedly a handful of "hidden Jews" who have converted to Islam but secretly continue to practice Judaism.[340]
Education
Main article: Education in Yemen
The adult literacy rate in 2010 was 64%.[341] The government has committed to reduce illiteracy to less than 10% by 2025.[342] Although the government provides for universal, compulsory, free education for children ages six through 15, the U.S. Department of State reports that compulsory attendance is not enforced. The government developed the National Basic Education Development Strategy in 2003 that aimed at providing education to 95% of children between the ages of six and 14 years and also at decreasing the gap between males and females in urban and rural areas.[343]
A seven-year project to improve gender equity and the quality and efficiency of secondary education, focusing on girls in rural areas, was approved by the World Bank in March 2008. Following this, Yemen has increased its education spending from 5% of GDP in 1995 to 10% in 2005.[173]
According to the Webometrics Ranking of World Universities, the top-ranking universities in the country are the Yemeni University of Science & Technology (6532nd worldwide), Al Ahgaff University (8930th) and Sanaa University (11043rd).[344] Yemen was ranked 131st in the Global Innovation Index in 2021, down from 129th in 2019.[345][346][347][348]
Health
Main article: Health in Yemen
Despite the significant progress the government has made to expand and improve its health care system over the past decade, the system remains severely underdeveloped. Total expenditures on health care in 2002 constituted 3.7 percent of GDP.[349] In that same year, the per capita expenditure for health care was very low, as compared with other Middle Eastern countries—US$58 according to United Nations statistics and US$23 according to the World Health Organization.
According to the World Bank, the number of doctors rose by an average of more than 7 percent between 1995 and 2000, but as of 2004, there were still only three doctors per 10,000 persons. In 2003, Yemen had only 0.6 hospital beds available per 1,000 persons.[349] Health care services are particularly scarce in rural areas. Only 25 percent of rural areas are covered by health services, as compared with 80 percent of urban areas. Emergency services, such as ambulance service and blood banks, are non-existent.[349]
Culture
Main article: Culture of Yemen
Media
Main article: Media of Yemen
Radio broadcasting in Yemen began in the 1940s.[350] After unification in 1990, the government reformed its corporations and founded some additional radio stations that broadcast locally. However, it drew back after 1994, due to destroyed infrastructure resulting from the 1994 civil war.
Television is the most significant media platform. Given the low literacy rate in the country, television is the main source of news. There are six free-to-air channels currently headquartered in Yemen, of which four are state-owned.[351] The Yemeni film industry is in its early stages; only eight Yemeni films have been released as of 2023 .
Theatre
Yemeni theatre dates to the early 20th century. Both amateur and professional (government-sponsored) theatre troupes perform in the country's major urban centres. Many significant poets and authors, like Ali Ahmed Ba Kathir, Muhammad al-Sharafi, and Wajdi al-Ahdal, have written dramatic works; poems, novels, and short stories by Yemeni authors like Mohammad Abdul-Wali and Abdulaziz Al-Maqaleh have also been adapted for the stage.
There have been Yemeni productions of plays by Arab authors such as Tawfiq al-Hakim and Saadallah Wannous and by Western authors, including Shakespeare, Pirandello, Brecht, and Tennessee Williams. Historically speaking, Aden is the cradle of Yemeni theatre; in recent decades Sana'a has hosted numerous theatre festivals, often in conjunction with World Theatre Day.
Sport
Football is the most popular sport. The Yemen Football Association is a member of FIFA and AFC. The Yemeni national football team participates internationally. The country also hosts many football clubs. They compete in the national and international leagues.
Yemen's mountains provide many opportunities for outdoor sports, such as biking, rock climbing, trekking, hiking, and other more challenging sports, including mountain climbing. Mountain climbing and hiking tours to the Sarawat Mountains, including peaks of 3,000 m (9,800 ft) and above, particularly that of An-Nabi Shu'ayb,[241] are seasonally organized by local and international alpine agencies. The coastal areas and Socotra provide many opportunities for water sports, such as surfing, bodyboarding, sailing, swimming, and scuba diving. Socotra is home to some of the best surfing destinations in the world.
Camel jumping is a traditional sport that is becoming increasingly popular among the Zaraniq tribe on the west coast. Camels are placed side to side and victory goes to the competitor who leaps, from a running start, over the most camels. Tribesmen (women may not compete) tuck their robes around their waists for freedom of movement while running and leaping.[352]
Yemen's biggest sports event was hosting the 20th Arabian Gulf Cup in Aden and Abyan in 2010. Yemen was defeated in the first three matches of the tournament.[353]
World Heritage sites
Main article: Tourism in Yemen
See also: Architecture of Yemen
Among its natural and cultural attractions are four World Heritage sites.[354][355] The Old Walled City of Shibam in Wadi Hadhramaut, inscribed by UNESCO in 1982, two years after Yemen joined the World Heritage Committee, is nicknamed "Manhattan of the Desert" because of its skyscrapers. Surrounded by a fortified wall made of mud and straw, the 16th-century city is one of the oldest examples of urban planning based on the principle of vertical construction.[356]
The Old City of Sana'a, at an altitude of more than 2,100 metres (7,000 ft), has been inhabited for over two and a half millennia, and was inscribed in 1986. Sana'a became a major Islamic centre in the seventh century, and the 103 mosques, 14 hammams (traditional bathhouses), and more than 6,000 houses that survive all date from before the 11th century.[357]
Close to the Red Sea coast, the historic town of Zabid, inscribed in 1993, was Yemen's capital from the 13th to the 15th century, and is an archaeological and historical site. It played an important role for many centuries because of its university, which was a centre of learning for the whole Arab and Islamic world.[358]
The latest addition to Yemen's list of World Heritage Sites is the Socotra Archipelago. Mentioned by Marco Polo in the 13th century, this remote and isolated archipelago consists of four islands and two rocky islets delineating the southern limit of the Gulf of Aden. The site has a rich biodiversity. Nowhere else in the world do 37% of Socotra's 825 plants, 90% of its reptiles and 95% of its snails occur. It is home to 192 bird species, 253 species of coral, 730 species of coastal fish, and 300 species of crab and lobster,[359] as well as the Dragon's Blood Tree (Dracaena cinnabari).[360] The cultural heritage of Socotra includes the unique Soqotri language.
See also
Yemen portal
Countries portal
List of Yemen-related topics
Outline of Yemen
Index of Yemen-related articles
Notes
References | ||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 44 | https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2015/05/the-gulfs-failure-in-yemen | en | The Gulf’s Failure in Yemen | [
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Since late March, a Saudi Arabia-led military coalition has been bombing Yemen extensively in an attempt to push back the Houthis, an insurgent Shia group, and their ally, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The coalition’s goal is to force the Houthis to retreat and to weaken Saleh’s hold on power. But so far, the only definitive outcome of the war is civilian devastation: At least a thousand Yemenis have died, thousands more have been injured, and hundreds of thousands have been forced to flee their homes.
Even if the Gulf countries do eventually succeed in driving out the Houthis, their intervention in Yemen is actually a sign of their failure, particularly Saudi Arabia’s. In effect, the richest country in the Arab world has had to bomb the poorest one to change its political dynamics. One might even go as far as to say that the current crisis in Yemen is a direct result of regional inaction over the last few years, if not decades.
In 2011, the Arab Spring pushed the country to the brink of civil war as protestors sought to oust a stubborn Saleh. The United Nations intervened by crafting a model for a peaceful transition with the support of six countries from the regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The initiative led to a successful handover of presidency from Saleh to interim leader Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, but at that time, the Gulf States were not deeply invested in the process and only played a limited role in the power turnover. They had other preoccupations. Saudi Arabia, for example, was consumed with supporting Egypt’s own leadership change, and other Gulf countries were attempting to topple President Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria.
These same countries watched from the sidelines as this UN-administered GCC project unraveled. After Saleh’s exit, the gradual power transition focused on building consensus among Yemen’s elites. Hadi proved an incompetent leader, unable to provide either physical or economic security to an unstable country. Over the years, while Hadi and the UN envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar led the peace process, busying themselves with meetings in the capital’s five star hotels, armed groups like the Houthis began to take over large swaths of the country. Here, the international community is also to blame. Last year, in attempt to stop the Houthis’ violent spread across Yemen, the UN Security Council sanctioned the group’s leaders with travel bans and asset freezes. But since the targeted figures never travelled outside Yemen and dealt strictly in cash, the sanction was a joke.
Although the Gulf countries backed Egypt with billions of dollars in both aid and investment during its own transition, they took an aloof, supervisory role in Yemen. Technically, the Gulf States saw Yemen drowning long before the Arab Spring, but never sought to toss it a life preserver. For decades, Yemen had made requests to join the GCC because inclusion would end the restrictions on Yemeni laborers in the Gulf and thus, provide its youth with labor opportunities. However, Yemen’s Gulf neighbors dismissed its appeals for membership. Although they did not give a formal reason for the rejection, it is quite obvious that Yemen is much poorer than the GCC members and further, is the only republic in this club of monarchies.
The Gulf countries are not just guilty of turning a blind eye to the needs of their less-affluent, southern neighbor. Historically, they have also punished the Yemeni people for the decisions of their leaders. In 1990, Saleh supported former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait. Instead of trying to push Saleh out of power, Saudi Arabia retaliated by kicking out more than one million Yemeni migrant laborers from its soil on the second day of Saddam’s intrusion into Kuwait. This move was a shock to Yemen’s already weak economy since it was unable to absorb all of the returnees. Moreover, Yemen lost billions of dollars from the wire transfers that its laborers once sent back home. The country is still suffering from the effects of that exodus. Saudi Arabia also suspended the aid to Yemen that it was using to build crucial infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, universities, and roads.
Even today, Saudi Arabia continues to show its disapproval of the elites’ decisions by punishing the people of Yemen. Instead of directly punishing the Houthis (the blockades are preventing the flow of food to the country and causing a silent and slow massacre of the Yemeni people) or attempting to address the issues that brought them to power (such as Yemen’s lack of skilled leaders), Saudi Arabia embarked on military campaign without a clear, long-term vision for getting Yemen out of this new conflict.
Now, to help Yemen find its way out of the hole, regional and international communities need to reconsider their methods of brokering peace in the beleaguered country. Neither the current draft constitution nor the proposed federal division of Yemen’s regions enjoy any sort of consensus approval or popularity in Yemen. In fact, the Houthis’ opposition to these so-called political solutions helped them rise to power. Further, creating a new Yemen—through a fresh constitution or federalism—will not work until state institutions are functioning again. A peace plan must stay grounded in the present reality, not balloon into an overly ambitious plan for the future.
More importantly, regional powers, especially the Gulf countries, need to reevaluate their policies toward Yemen. Clearly, even if the Houthis are militarily defeated in this battle, the reason for their political and military rise—living standards, political marginalization, and weak government will not have been addressed. Therefore, the standards to evaluate success in Yemen should not be military ones. Instead of creating a new regional order that is narrowly focused on countering Iran, the GCC can be a model for regional cooperation. But this cannot happen while Yemen is left out of the GCC. And it most certainly cannot happen if the GCC policy toward Yemen is driven by sectarian motives. The Houthis must be punished for their actions, not for their sect.
Above all, more neutral actors, such as Oman and the European Union, should be involved in both regional and international peace plans. They could demand an immediate ceasefire and also ensure that there is an adequate flow of food and medical supplies to the country. These neutral players could also renew their commitment toward Yemen by placing economic and local priorities before regional rivalries. Yemen’s most critical issue at the moment is that more than half of its population is starving. Therefore, the priority should not be twisting Tehran’s arm via Sanaa.
The recent appointment of Khaled Mahfouth Bahah as Yemen’s vice president should be viewed as a chance to shift the power tide away from the current president, Hadi, and to eventually replace him. It is also an opportunity for the Gulf countries to express their commitment to Yemen’s economic and political growth rather than use the country as a battleground for regional rivalries.
If the international community and regional countries do not act to save Yemen, it’s difficult to predict how the country will end up. It may follow the fates of Syria, Libya, or Iraq, or even worse, devolve into a twisted amalgamation of the three. | |||||
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The history, culture, economy, and population of Yemen have all been influenced by the country’s strategic location at the southern entrance of the Red Sea—a crossroads of both ancient and modern trade and communications routes. In the ancient world, the states that occupied the area known today as Yemen controlled the supply of such important commodities as frankincense and myrrh and dominated the trade in many other valuable items, such as the spices and aromatics of Asia. Because of its fertility as well as its commercial prosperity, Yemen was the location of a number of ancient kingdoms; for that same reason, it was known to the ancient Romans as Arabia Felix (Latin: “Fortunate Arabia”) to distinguish it from the vast forbidding reaches of Arabia Deserta (“Desert Arabia”). Later, Yemen was the place where coffee (Arabic: qahwah) was first cultivated commercially, and, before the introduction of coffee plants to other parts of the world, it was long the sole source of that precious bean.
The present Republic of Yemen came into being in May 1990, when the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) merged with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). By stipulation of the unification agreement, Sanaa, formerly the capital of North Yemen, functions as the political capital of the country, while Aden, formerly the capital of South Yemen, functions as the economic centre. The two components of Yemen underwent strikingly different histories: whereas North Yemen never experienced any period of colonial administration at the hands of a European power, South Yemen was a part of the British Empire from 1839 to 1967. The contemporary borders are largely a product of the foreign policy goals and actions of Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Saudi Arabia. Postunification Yemen has been burdened by chronic corruption and economic hardship. Divisions based on religion, tribalism, and geography continue to play an important role in Yemeni politics, sometimes leading to violence.
Even during the age of colonial hegemony, Yemen remained for the most part one of the most secluded regions of the world. Much the same can be said today; few outsiders travel Yemen’s rugged hinterland, many parts of which have been little influenced by central government authority. It is perhaps this splendid isolation that has captivated the imagination of many from abroad. For all its remoteness, Yemen is likewise a country of great physical beauty, photogenic and picturesque, with a life and verdancy in the highlands unlike that found elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula. Walter B. Harris, a journalist and traveler, visited Yemen in 1892. One of the first Westerners to see many parts of the country, he recounted his impressions in the book A Journey Through the Yemen, in which he says:
Nothing can be imagined more beautiful than the scenery of the mountains of the Yemen. Torn into all manner of fantastic peaks, the rocky crags add a wildness to a view that otherwise possesses the most peaceful charms. Rich green valleys, well timbered in places, and threaded by silvery streams of dancing water; sloping fields, gay with crops and wildflowers; the terraced or jungle-covered slopes,—all are so luxuriant, so verdant, that one’s ideas as to the nature of Arabia are entirely upset. Well known as is, and always has been, the fertility of this region, its extent is almost startling, and it can little be wondered at that Alexander the Great intended, after his conquest of India, to take up his abode in the Yemen. | ||||
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The history, culture, economy, and population of Yemen have all been influenced by the country’s strategic location at the southern entrance of the Red Sea—a crossroads of both ancient and modern trade and communications routes. In the ancient world, the states that occupied the area known today as Yemen controlled the supply of such important commodities as frankincense and myrrh and dominated the trade in many other valuable items, such as the spices and aromatics of Asia. Because of its fertility as well as its commercial prosperity, Yemen was the location of a number of ancient kingdoms; for that same reason, it was known to the ancient Romans as Arabia Felix (Latin: “Fortunate Arabia”) to distinguish it from the vast forbidding reaches of Arabia Deserta (“Desert Arabia”). Later, Yemen was the place where coffee (Arabic: qahwah) was first cultivated commercially, and, before the introduction of coffee plants to other parts of the world, it was long the sole source of that precious bean.
The present Republic of Yemen came into being in May 1990, when the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) merged with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). By stipulation of the unification agreement, Sanaa, formerly the capital of North Yemen, functions as the political capital of the country, while Aden, formerly the capital of South Yemen, functions as the economic centre. The two components of Yemen underwent strikingly different histories: whereas North Yemen never experienced any period of colonial administration at the hands of a European power, South Yemen was a part of the British Empire from 1839 to 1967. The contemporary borders are largely a product of the foreign policy goals and actions of Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Saudi Arabia. Postunification Yemen has been burdened by chronic corruption and economic hardship. Divisions based on religion, tribalism, and geography continue to play an important role in Yemeni politics, sometimes leading to violence.
Even during the age of colonial hegemony, Yemen remained for the most part one of the most secluded regions of the world. Much the same can be said today; few outsiders travel Yemen’s rugged hinterland, many parts of which have been little influenced by central government authority. It is perhaps this splendid isolation that has captivated the imagination of many from abroad. For all its remoteness, Yemen is likewise a country of great physical beauty, photogenic and picturesque, with a life and verdancy in the highlands unlike that found elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula. Walter B. Harris, a journalist and traveler, visited Yemen in 1892. One of the first Westerners to see many parts of the country, he recounted his impressions in the book A Journey Through the Yemen, in which he says:
Nothing can be imagined more beautiful than the scenery of the mountains of the Yemen. Torn into all manner of fantastic peaks, the rocky crags add a wildness to a view that otherwise possesses the most peaceful charms. Rich green valleys, well timbered in places, and threaded by silvery streams of dancing water; sloping fields, gay with crops and wildflowers; the terraced or jungle-covered slopes,—all are so luxuriant, so verdant, that one’s ideas as to the nature of Arabia are entirely upset. Well known as is, and always has been, the fertility of this region, its extent is almost startling, and it can little be wondered at that Alexander the Great intended, after his conquest of India, to take up his abode in the Yemen. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 9 | https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/yemeni-president-abdrabbuh-hadi-steps-down-under-saudi-pressure-report-122041800076_1.html | en | Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Hadi steps down under Saudi pressure: Report | [
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] | 2022-04-18T09:13:00+05:30 | Prince Mohammed told Hadi that other Yemeni leaders had agreed that it was time for him to relinquish power, according to the Saudi and Yemeni officials | en | https://www.business-standard.com/favicon.ico | https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/yemeni-president-abdrabbuh-hadi-steps-down-under-saudi-pressure-report-122041800076_1.html | (Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.) | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 46 | https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis | en | Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering | [
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] | 2015-04-29T12:12:55-04:00 | Yemen’s internal divisions and a Saudi-led military intervention have spawned an intractable political, military, and humanitarian crisis. | en | //cdn.cfr.org/themes/custom/cfr_theme/favicon-32x32.png | Council on Foreign Relations | https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis | Introduction
Yemen, a small country on the Arabian Peninsula, has become the site of grievous civilian suffering amid an intractable civil war. Many analysts say the fighting, now seven years old, has turned into a proxy war: Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who overthrew the Yemeni government, are pitted against a multinational coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The involvement of other combatants, including militant Islamist groups and separatists backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has complicated the picture.
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The conflict has displaced more than four million people and given rise to cholera outbreaks, medicine shortages, and threats of famine. The warring parties observed a monthslong cease-fire in 2022, raising hopes for a political solution to the conflict, but that October, they failed to extend the truce.
What are Yemen’s divisions?
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Yemen has long struggled with religious and cultural differences between its north and south and the legacy of European colonialism. The modern Yemeni state was formed in 1990 with the unification of the U.S.- and Saudi-backed Yemeni Arab Republic, in the north, and the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, in the south. Ali Abdullah Saleh, a military officer who had ruled North Yemen since 1978, assumed leadership of the new country.
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However, just four years after unification, southern separatists seceded for several months and reemerged in 2007 as the Southern Movement, which has continued to press for greater autonomy within Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an Islamist militant group, and the related Ansar al-Sharia insurgent group have captured territory in the south and east. The Houthi movement, whose base is among the Zaydi Shiites of northern Yemen, rose up against Saleh’s government six times between 2004 and 2010.
The United States lent its support to Saleh beginning in the early 2000s, when counterterrorism cooperation against al-Qaeda and affiliate groups became Washington’s overriding regional concern. In 2000, al-Qaeda in Yemen, a group that would later become AQAP, conducted a suicide attack on a U.S. Navy warship, the USS Cole, in the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen U.S. service members were killed in the bombing. Since then, the United States has provided Yemen more than $850 million in military aid, according to the online database Security Assistance Monitor.
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Rights groups persistently charged [PDF] that Saleh ran a corrupt and autocratic government. As the popular protests of the 2011 Arab Spring spread to Yemen, the president’s political and military rivals jockeyed to oust him. While Yemeni security forces focused on putting down protests in urban areas, AQAP made gains in outlying regions.
Under escalating domestic and international pressure [PDF], Saleh stepped aside in 2012 after receiving assurances of immunity from prosecution. His vice president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, assumed office as interim president in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional organization based in Saudi Arabia, and backed by the United States. As part of the GCC’s timetable for a transition, the UN-sponsored National Dialogue Conference (NDC) convened 565 delegates in 2013 to formulate a new constitution agreeable to Yemen’s many factions. But the NDC ended with delegates unable to resolve disputes over the distribution of power.
More on:
Middle East and North Africa
Yemen
Saudi Arabia
Wars and Conflict
Humanitarian Crises
What caused the current crisis?
Several factors widened these political divisions and led to full-scale military conflict.
Fuel price hikes. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which had extended to Yemen a $550 million loan premised on promises of economic reforms, Hadi’s government lifted fuel subsidies in 2014. The Houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base with its criticisms of the UN transition, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. Hadi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated party al-Islah held counterrallies.
Houthi takeover. The Houthis captured much of Sanaa by late 2014. Reneging on a UN peace deal, they consolidated control of the capital and continued their southward advance. Hadi’s government resigned under pressure in January 2015 and Hadi later fled to Saudi Arabia.
Military division. Military units loyal to Saleh aligned themselves with the Houthis, contributing to their battlefield success. Other militias mobilized against the Houthi-Saleh forces, aligning with those in the military who had remained loyal to the Hadi government. Southern separatists ramped up their calls for secession.
Saudi intervention. In 2015, with Hadi in exile, Riyadh launched a military campaign—primarily fought from the air—to roll back the Houthis and restore the Hadi administration to Sanaa.
Who are the parties involved?
The Houthi movement, named for a religious leader from the Houthi clan and officially known as Ansar Allah, emerged in the late 1980s as a vehicle for religious and cultural revivalism among Zaydi Shiites in northern Yemen. The Zaydis are a minority in the Sunni Muslim–majority country but predominant in the northern highlands along the Saudi border.
The Houthis became politically active after 2003, opposing Saleh for backing the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq but later allying with him after his resignation as president. This alliance was a tactical one: Saleh’s loyalists opposed Hadi’s UN-backed government and, feeling marginalized in the transition process, sought to regain a leading role in Yemen. Saleh won the allegiance of some members of Yemen’s security forces, tribal networks, and political establishment. But in 2017, after Saleh shifted his support to the Saudi-led coalition, he was killed by Houthi forces.
Iran is the Houthis’ primary international backer and has reportedly provided them with military support, including weapons. Hadi’s government also accused Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese ally, of aiding the Houthis. Saudi Arabia’s perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy rather than an indigenous movement has driven Riyadh’s military intervention. But many regional specialists say that Tehran’s influence is likely limited, especially given that Iranians and Houthis adhere to different schools of Shiite Islam. Experts also say Iran’s sway could shrink as Saudi-Iranian relations warm following a China-mediated rapprochement in early 2023. Some analysts expect Iranian weapons transfers to the Houthis to decline.
At Hadi’s behest in 2015, Saudi Arabia cobbled together a coalition of Sunni-majority Arab states: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). By 2018, the coalition had expanded to include forces from Eritrea and Pakistan. They launched an air campaign against the Houthis with the aim of reinstating Hadi’s government. For Riyadh, accepting Houthi control of Yemen would mean allowing a hostile neighbor to reside on its southern border, and it would mark a setback in its long-standing contest with Tehran.
After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most significant military role in the coalition, contributing some ten thousand ground troops, mostly in Yemen’s south. However, the UAE removed most of them after entering into conflict with its coalition allies in 2019, when it backed the separatist Southern Transitional Government (STC), which captured Aden. That November, Hadi and the STC president signed the Riyadh Agreement, which affirms that the factions will share power equally in a postwar Yemeni government. The separatists reneged on the deal for several months in 2020, but eventually they joined a unity government with equal representation of northerners and southerners. Though the formation of a government signaled progress in bridging Yemen’s internal divisions, it did little to accelerate peace talks. In April 2022, Hadi ceded power to a governing council and fired a deputy scorned by the Houthis in hopes that the rebels would return to the negotiating table.
Although the U.S. Congress has been divided on the matter [PDF], the United States has backed the Saudi-led coalition, as have France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. U.S. interests include security of Saudi borders; free passage in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the choke point between the Arabian and Red Seas and a vital artery for the global transport of oil; and a government in Sanaa that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism programs. But uproar over civilian deaths in coalition air campaigns, which often use U.S.-made weapons, and Saudi Arabia’s role in the 2018 killing of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi led the United States and other Western powers to limit some weapons sales and refueling of coalition aircraft. Lawmakers have also raised concerns that U.S.-made weapons are falling into the hands of AQAP and Houthi fighters. Still, the United States is Saudi Arabia’s largest arms supplier, and President Donald Trump thrice vetoed bills that would have halted arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
President Joe Biden said he would end U.S. support for the coalition’s military offensive, including the sale of weapons, and signaled a shift to diplomacy by appointing a special envoy to Yemen. Yet, U.S. defense contractors still oversee the servicing of Saudi aircraft that carry out offensive operations, and the administration has approved the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia for defense purposes. Shortly after taking office, Biden reversed the Trump administration’s last-minute designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group, citing the move’s potential damage to aid deliveries in Yemen.
What is the role of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
AQAP, in Yemen since the early 1990s, has benefited from the more recent chaos. In 2015, it captured the coastal city of Mukalla and released three hundred inmates, many believed to be AQAP members, from the city’s prison. The militant group expanded its control westward to Aden and seized parts of the city before coalition forces recovered much of the region in 2016. AQAP has also provided Yemenis in some areas with security and public services unfulfilled by the state, which has strengthened support for the group.
The U.S. State Department warns that Yemen’s instability has weakened long-running counterterrorism efforts [PDF], which rely heavily on air strikes. The Barack Obama administration conducted an estimated 185 strikes over eight years, while the Trump administration launched nearly 200 in its four years. These air strikes have killed several high-level AQAP members, including former leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi and top official Jamal al-Badawi, who was allegedly involved in the USS Cole bombing. But the U.S. strikes have also resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred civilians, watchdog groups say.
For years, AQAP vied for influence with the Houthis and the self-declared Islamic State, especially in the central al-Bayda Governorate. The Islamic State marked its 2015 entrance into Yemen with suicide attacks on two Zaydi mosques in Sanaa, which killed close to 140 worshippers. Though the group has claimed other high-profile attacks, including the assassination of Aden’s governor in late 2015, its following lags behind that of AQAP. In 2021, the United Nations estimated that the Islamic State had hundreds of fighters [PDF] in Yemen, while AQAP had around seven thousand [PDF] as of mid-2020. Opposition from the Houthis has reportedly debilitated both groups, but experts warn against discounting their possible resurgence.
What has the humanitarian impact been?
With around three-quarters of its population living in poverty, Yemen has long been the Arab world’s poorest country, and its humanitarian crisis has been called one of the worst in the world. Disease runs rampant; suspected cholera cases passed two hundred thousand [PDF] in 2020. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is harder to assess, since there is no comprehensive caseload data. Some twelve thousand cases have been reported to the World Health Organization, but health analysts say the actual count is likely much higher. Moreover, many countries cut back on critical aid to Yemen amid the crush of the pandemic, leading the United Nations to reduce food rations for some eight million Yemenis in January 2022. Three out of four Yemenis require humanitarian aid and protection, and four million are internally displaced [PDF], according to the UN refugee agency.
The situation has worsened under a yearslong de facto land, sea, and air blockade imposed by coalition forces, which has obstructed the flow of vital supplies of food and medicine and helped drive up prices of essential goods. Under the 2022 cease-fire, prices dropped significantly, but with the expiration of the truce, many Yemenis fear that high costs will return. The UN Development Program estimates that more than 370,000 people have died as a result of the war, with indirect causes such as lack of food, water, and health services causing almost 60 percent of deaths.
In addition, the United Nations has found [PDF] that both Houthi and coalition forces have knowingly attacked civilian targets in violation of international law. This includes the destruction of a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders in 2015. Torture, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances are among the other alleged war crimes perpetrated by both sides.
What are the prospects for a solution to the crisis?
UN-backed peace negotiations have made limited progress. The 2018 Stockholm Agreement averted a battle in the port city of Hodeidah, a vital hub for aid; but there has been little success in implementing the accord’s provisions, which includes the exchange of more than fifteen thousand prisoners and the creation of a joint committee to de-escalate violence in the city of Taiz.
Observers worry that friction among regional actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is prolonging the war. Conditions deteriorated in late 2019, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for a missile attack on Saudi oil facilities. UN monitors concluded that the Houthis did not carry out the attack, while the Saudi-led coalition blamed Iran. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 49 | https://www.isdb.org/yemen | en | Republic of Yemen | [] | [] | [] | [
""
] | null | [] | 1975-07-28T12:00:00+00:00 | The Republic of Yemen is located in Western Asia, occupying the southwestern to southern end of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea to the south, and Oman to the east. Yemen's territory includes over 200 islands, the largest of which is Socotra, about 354 km to the south of mainland Yemen. It is the only state in the Arabian Peninsula to have a purely republican form of government. Yemeni unification took place on… | en | /favicon.ico | https://www.isdb.org/yemen | The Republic of Yemen is located in Western Asia, occupying the southwestern to southern end of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea to the south, and Oman to the east. Yemen's territory includes over 200 islands, the largest of which is Socotra, about 354 km to the south of mainland Yemen. It is the only state in the Arabian Peninsula to have a purely republican form of government. Yemeni unification took place on 22 May 1990, when North Yemen was united with South Yemen, forming the Republic of Yemen. The population of Yemen is estimated at 29.1 million in 2016. According to UNDP's latest Human Development Report 2016, Yemen's HD index was ranked 168 out of 188 countries in 2015.
During 2011, the widespread violence in Yemen led the UN Security Council to adopt a Resolution No. 2014 on 21 October 2011 which called for immediate cessation of violence, and political engagement and peacebuilding. The GCC facilitated the political reconciliation process which led to the signing of an agreement on 23 November 2011. The reconciliation process led to a GCC- supported transition agreement and a Government of National Reconciliation was formed. The transition Government is entrusted with fostering political reconciliation, framing of the new constitution, implementing short-term economic stabilization measures, and laying foundations for a medium-term economic recovery program. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 52 | https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/03/ending-war-yemen-qa-abdulghani-al-iryani/ | en | Ending the War in Yemen: Q&A with Abdulghani al-Iryani | [
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] | 2020-03-10T19:38:28-04:00 | Abdulghani al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, on why the war in Yemen continues and whether there is a way for it to end. | en | IPI Global Observatory | https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/03/ending-war-yemen-qa-abdulghani-al-iryani/ | Almost exactly four years ago, the war in Yemen significantly escalated when President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi was forced to flee Sana’a after opposition forces attempted to take control of the entire country. In the years since, hundreds of thousands of lives have been impacted or lost, a humanitarian crisis unfolded, and the conflict became far more complex with the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Despite efforts to bring parties together and negotiate a resolution—including the Stockholm Agreement—the conflict continues. To better understand why and whether there is a way for the war to end, the Global Observatory spoke with Abdulghani al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, where he focuses on the peace process, conflict analysis, and transformations of the Yemeni state.
This interview has been edited for clarity and length.
What would you say is the state of the conflict? How would you describe it, and would you say there is any room for a resolution?
Mr. Al-Iryani: We have basically come towards the end of the conflict, and the question should be “why is it still going?” It is continuing for two reasons mostly. One is the war economy. People from all sides are making lots of money out of this conflict, including some front-line officials of the Arab Coalition. They have no interest in bringing this conflict to an end.
The second reason is because the Saudis and the Houthis—Ansar Allah—have not been able to come to an agreement on the kind of long-term relationship they should have.
Clearly, none of the stated goals of the international armed coalition at the beginning of the conflict have been achieved. On the one hand, Ansar Allah has been able to withstand all the pressure and take over the state institutions. On the other hand, the internationally-recognized government has been able to make itself irrelevant both by its incompetence, corruption, and by its inability to respond to the needs of its people.
In this context it is hard for me to see the benefit or purpose of renewed sanctions, which usually affect the population more than they do those who control the population. In my view, it is useless. It serves no apparent interest if that interest is to bring this war to an end.
How has the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran changed over time?
Al-Iryani: For the Saudis, clearly they are fully involved. They are actually fighting and I think that, while they were interested in ending the conflict early on, since the failure of the Kuwait negotiations and peace talks in 2016, they have kept the war at a low level and made no effort to bring it to an end. In the meantime, they have used it to mobilize and agitate against Iran. Of course, Ansar Allah were the main beneficiary of this strategy.
As far as Iran is concerned, I think their role in Yemen is very limited. It was very limited in the beginning, and it remains limited now. But as the conflict continues, Ansar Allah is being pushed against their will to the side of the Iranians because of their need for new defense technology.
Ansar Allah has made an effort to stay away from Iran because they realize that their long-term interest is in having good relations with Saudi Arabia. They come from a part of Yemen which has always been connected to the Saudi economy. All their produce was sold in Saudi Arabia, all the imports that came to them came from Saudi Arabia. The currency of trade in their areas is the Saudi riyal not the Yemeni riyal. Their social relations are more connected to the Saudi side than they are to the Yemeni side.
A normal situation for Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia is good neighborly relations. This situation of antagonism is an aberration. I think they both realize that they need to work out a cooperative relationship. As long they don’t, Iran benefits. Iran did not actively seek to establish a foothold in Yemen. It was the mismanagement of the Saada conflict from 2004 onwards that gave Iran that foothold with minimum investment on their part.
Over all these years I believe that Iranians were willing to trade in their card in Yemen, which they know cannot survive, for something more sustainable elsewhere. They have offered time and time again to help resolve the conflict in Yemen and both the United States and Saudi Arabia have said no. Their persistent offer tells me that they realize that they cannot sustain their position in Yemen and they would like to trade it for something that is more sustainable in another area.
Where does the Stockholm Agreement fit in? Has there been progress in implementing it?
Al-Iryani: The Stockholm Agreement is an entry point to a larger national ceasefire and return to peace. It would be useful for all the articles of the Stockholm Agreement to be implemented, but it is not necessary. What we’ve got so far out of the Stockholm Agreement is that fighting in Hodeidah stopped. The ceasefire still holds with the usual violations. The port is open, it has not been destroyed, the fighting has not gone into the middle of the city, and the roads to transport humanitarian and commercial commodities are open.
The humanitarian crisis was averted by the Stockholm Agreement and that is in itself a success. The fact that the Stockholm Agreement is still alive is also a success. To expect that all of the articles of the Stockholm Agreement will be implemented in the context of the agreement itself is unrealistic. Most of the articles of the agreement will be implemented in the context of a national ceasefire or national agreement.
Given that many are benefiting from the war economy, what can be done to disincentivize participation in it?
Al-Iryani: To be realistic, this is a conversation that we had two or three years ago, and now it would make no difference because the way parties benefit from war has been institutionalized. We cannot waste our time and energy in dealing with these issues if we have the opportunity to reach a national ceasefire. If we focus on that, then all these other issues will be solved.
Mind you, corruption and profiteering existed in the Yemeni political system before the war, during the war, and will remain after the war. Saudi Arabia also has a serious profiteering problem, so we should not expect that the war economy will go away anytime soon. If you want to solve the problem, you should focus on what can be achieved in a short period of time. That is political agreement between Ansar Allah and the Saudis.
What is needed to make that agreement happen?
Al-Iryani: I think both the Saudis and the Ansar Allah know exactly how this needs to be done. They are talking, and when they started talking they told the United Nations they do not need any help. As I explained earlier, relations between the Saudi and Yemeni side on the border area are so close that they do not need a mediator to talk to each other. Now that they are talking I think they will get there.
One obstacle that stands in the way is that the Saudis are still clinging to the objective of bringing [President Abdrabbuh Mansur] Hadi back to Sana’a. It is clear that this is not going to happen and the Saudis are hesitant to appear as if they have failed to achieve their objectives. They need a face-saving exit, one where they agree with the Ansar Allah in a way that makes them look better.
Another factor is that Ansar Allah is factionalized. There is a militant faction that would not like to see this war come to an end. I’m sure within the Saudi system there are similar considerations, but other than that, I think the international community is unanimous in supporting an end to this war. I think that it is in the interest of Saudi Arabia, it is the interest of Ansar Allah, and it is in the interest of the Yemeni people. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 29 | https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/21/yemen-houthi-rebels-president-hadi-fled-capital | en | Yemen's Houthi rebels say former president has fled capital | [
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] | 2015-02-21T00:00:00 | Rebels’ spokesperson plays down significance of<strong> </strong>Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi’s escape, giving no detail about how he got past tight security | en | the Guardian | https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/21/yemen-houthi-rebels-president-hadi-fled-capital | The powerful Houthi movement in Yemen has said the former president Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi fled his house disguised in women’s clothes and headed to the southern port city of Aden.
Ali al-Gohoum, a spokesperson for the Houthi rebels, speaking from the movement’s stronghold in the northern province of Saada, downplayed the significance of Hadi’s escape from the capital Sana’a.
He gave no details on when and how Hadi broke tightened security measures around his house. Little information is available about Hadi’s next plan.
The Houthis sealed their control of the Yemeni capital in January when they stormed the presidential palace and president’s house, forcing Hadi and his prime minister to resign in the same day.
Hadi and some resigned ministers had been put under house arrest for nearly a month. Officials who visited the former president during his custody said Hadi was in need of urgent medical treatment overseas as he was suffering from health problems.
Nadia al-Sakkaf, the former minister of information who recently visited Hadi in his house, told the Guardian the former president was suffering from cardiovascular disease.
“He has a heart condition, he has already had bypass sugary in the USA before and he do regular checkups. He is over 70 years old and with the stress and being under siege and the coup and the bad treatment he has been receiving his health got worse,” Sakkaf said.
Hadi regularly visited cardiology hospitals in the US when he was vice-president.
‘Legitimate’ president
Despite offering his resignation, Hadi’s supporters took to the streets of many Yemeni cities condemning the Houthis’ “coup” and calling for reinstallation of the former president.
On Wednesday, large rallies were held in Sana’a, Dhamar, Ibb and Taiz calling for the Houthis to withdraw from the capital and other areas that they have controlled since late September.
Mohammed al-Sabri, a leading figure in the opposition’s Nasserist party, said that Hadi was still a legitimate president.
“Hadi did not flee the capital. He left an occupied city into Aden. His legitimacy stems from the nationwide protests that denounce the Houthis’ occupation of the capital.”
The Houthis jumped to the political panorama of the troubled country in September when they quickly gained control of key government and military institutes and subsequently expanded influence into new provinces in northern Yemen.
Hadi came to power in 2012 after unchallenged election following the departure of the country’s long-serving president Ali Abdullah Saleh. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 0 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi | en | Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi | [
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] | 2010-11-04T06:01:57+00:00 | en | /static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi | President of Yemen from 2012 to 2022
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (Arabic: عبدربه منصور هادي, romanized: ʿAbd Rabbih Manṣūr Hādī Yemeni pronunciation: [ˈʕæb.də ˈrɑb.bu mɑnˈsˤuːr ˈhæːdi];[3][4] born 1 September 1945) is a Yemeni politician and former field marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces who served as the president of Yemen from 2012 until 2022, when he stepped down and transferred executive authority to the Presidential Leadership Council, with Rashad al-Alimi as its chairman.[5] He was the vice president to Ali Abdullah Saleh from 1994 to 2012.
Between 4 June and 23 September 2011, Hadi was the acting president of Yemen while Ali Abdullah Saleh was undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia following an attack on the presidential palace during the 2011 Yemeni uprising.[6] On 23 November, he became Acting President again, after Saleh moved into a non-active role pending the presidential election "in return for immunity from prosecution". Hadi was "expected to form a national unity government and also call for early presidential elections within 90 days" while Saleh continued to serve as president in name only.[7] Mansour Hadi was chosen as a president for a two-year transitional period on 21 February by Yemen's political factions, in an election where he was the sole consensus candidate, although the election was boycotted by Houthis in the north and Southern Secessionists in the south of the country. Hadi's mandate was extended for another year in January 2014.[8] According to pro-Houthi media outlet SABA, Hadi remained in power after the expiration of his mandate.[9]
On 22 January 2015, he was forced to resign by the Houthis in the midst of mass protest against his decision to raise the fuel subsidies and due to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 2011 Revolution. Subsequently, the Houthis and the supporters of Saleh seized the presidential palace and placed Hadi under house arrest. The Houthis named a Revolutionary Committee to assume the powers of the presidency, as well as unify with the General People's Congress, Hadi's own political party.[10][11][12] A month later, Hadi escaped to his hometown of Aden, rescinded his resignation, and denounced the Houthi takeover. He arrived in Riyadh the next day, as a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia intervened in support of his government.[13] He returned to Aden in September 2015, as Saudi-backed government forces recaptured the city.[14] In late 2017, he was reportedly residing in Riyadh under house arrest.[15]
In 2022, Hadi transferred his powers to a newly formed Presidential Leadership Council led by Rashad al-Alimi which would seek a political solution to Yemen's civil war.[5] This came amid a broader push for peace with Saudi Arabia.[16] Multiple sources in the Saudi and Yemeni governments alleged that he had been forced to cede power by the Saudis.[17][18][19]
Early life and education
[edit]
Hadi was born on 1 September 1945 in Thukain, Al Wade'a District, Abyan, a southern Yemeni governorate.[20] He graduated from a military academy in the Federation of South Arabia in 1966.[21] In 1966 he graduated after receiving a military scholarship to study in Britain, but was not able to attend, as he did not speak English.[20]
In 1970, he received another military scholarship to study tanks in Egypt. Hadi spent the following four years in the Soviet Union studying military leadership. He occupied several military posts in the army of South Yemen until 1986, when he fled to North Yemen with Ali Nasser Mohammed, president of South Yemen, after Ali Nasser's faction of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party lost the 1986 civil war.[21]
Career
[edit]
Hadi played a low-profile role during the Aden Emergency. Following the independence of South Yemen, he rose to prominence in the new military, reaching the rank of Major General.[21]
He remained loyal to President Ali Nasser Mohammed during the South Yemen Civil War, and followed him into exile in neighboring North Yemen. During the 1994 civil war in Yemen, Hadi sided with the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and was appointed as Minister of Defense.[21] In this role he led the military campaign against the Democratic Republic of Yemen.[22] Following the war he was promoted to vice president on 3 October 1994, replacing Ali Salim Al-Beidh, who had resigned and fought against the government during the civil war.[citation needed]
President of Yemen
[edit]
Main article: 2012 Yemeni presidential election
Hadi was the sole candidate in the presidential election that was held on 21 February 2012. His candidacy was backed by the ruling party, as well as by the parliamentary opposition. The Electoral Commission reported that 65 percent of registered voters in Yemen voted during the election. Hadi won with 100% of the vote and took the oath of office in Yemen's parliament on 25 February 2012.[23] He was formally inaugurated as the president of Yemen on 27 February 2012, when Saleh resigned from the presidency and formally ceded power to Hadi.[24]
Political reform
[edit]
In March 2013 the National Dialogue Conference was conceived as a core part of the transition process and is intended to bring together Yemen's diverse political and demographic groups to address critical issues.[25] In January 2014, Hadi pushed delegates at the conference to break a deadlock on key issues and bring the talks to an overdue close. When those in attendance finally agreed on a final few points, he launched into an impassioned speech that led to a spike in his popularity. It was agreed that Yemen would shift to a federal model of government in the future, a move which has been proposed and forcefully backed by Hadi.[26] For many Yemenis, particularly in northwestern Yemen, this decentralization was less attractive. This mountainous region is the poorest of Yemen and decentralization would mean that it would receive less money from the central government. Relevant here is that the overwhelming majority of Yemen's population has resided in this area for many years.[27] Indeed, the 'decentralization' of Yemen along the lines proposed by the Saudi-imposed Hadi regime threatened Yemen's long-term economic and political independence; scholar Isa Blumi points out that "To any rational observer, the idea of developing Yemen into six disproportionate regions with enormous autonomy was a blatant effort to benefit foreign interests and subdue the rebellious populations through poverty and administrative obscurity."[27] Indeed, if the Saudi-American decentralization 'road map to peace' is implemented, Yemen's oil wealth would be confined almost entirely to the provinces of Hadhramawt and Saba', Yemen's two least populated provinces.[28] Blumi goes on to point out that "This would make bribing the few thousands of eligible 'residents' with a tiny portion of the oil revenue (no longer flowing to the central state) easy, while creating an enormous windfall for those hoping to steal Yemen's wealth."[28] They also didn't like that the new regional borders would rob them of access to the sea.
Military
[edit]
In a move to unify the Armed Forces of Yemen which suffered from split since the Yemeni Revolution, Hadi began reforming the Military. He issued Presidential decree No.104 December 2012 reorganizing the Military into five main branches: Air Force, Army (Ground Force), Navy and Coastal Defence, Border Troops and Strategic Reserve Forces, which includes the Special Operation Command, the Missile Defence Command and the Presidential Protective Forces. The Strategic Reserve Forces replaces the Republican Guard.[29]
Security issues
[edit]
See also: 2012 Sanaʽa bombing
From his early days at office, Hadi advocated fighting Al-Qaida as an important goal. In a meeting with British Foreign Secretary, William Hague in his first days in office Hadi said "We intend to confront terrorism with full force and whatever the matter we will pursue it to the very last hiding place".[30]
The Yemeni military had suffered from sharp divisions since Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar defected in late March 2011 amid protests demanding the ouster of Hadi's predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The military protests extended to the Republican Guard based in the south of Sana'a when dozens from the Fourth Brigade closed down southern entrances to the capital city and demanded the firing of the brigade's commander, Mohammad Al-Arar, and his general staff.[30]
In an interview in September 2012 given to The Washington Post, Hadi warned that his country, still reeling from the popular uprising that ousted Saleh, risked a descent into a civil war "worse than Afghanistan" should an upcoming months-long national dialogue fail to resolve the state's deep political and societal rifts. He also said that Yemen was facing "three undeclared wars" conducted by al Qaeda, pirates in the Gulf of Aden, and Houthi rebels in the north, and that Iran was supporting these adversaries indirectly without giving further details.[31]
Houthis, on their side, complained of murder attacks on their delegates to the NDC.[32]
In response to the murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi after visiting a Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Hadi said that the "cheap political and media targeting of Saudi Arabia will not deter it from continuing its leading role in the Arab and Islamic worlds."[33]
Rebel takeover and civil war
[edit]
Hadi was forced to agree to a power-sharing deal after the fall of Sana'a to the rebel umbrella organization Ansar Allah in September 2014. Also known as the Houthis, these revolutionaries refused to participate in the "unity government", although they continued to occupy key positions and buildings in Sana'a and hold territory throughout northern Yemen. Hadi was further humiliated when the General People's Congress ousted him as its leader and rejected his cabinet choices on 8 November 2014.[34] It is important to note that the Houthis' pretext for entering Sana'a and deposing Hadi was to reverse an apparent breach of the Hadi government's mandate by unilaterally declaring an extension of its power beyond the two-year intermediary period actually set by the GCC and the United States.[35] They also accused the president of seeking to bypass a power-sharing deal signed when they seized Sana'a in September, and say they are also working to protect state institutions from corrupt civil servants and officers trying to plunder state property.[36]
Three days after Hadi's resignation (21 January 2015), the Houthis took over the presidential palace.[37] Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah tendered their resignations to parliament which reportedly refused to accept them.[38] Then the Yemeni cabinet was dissolved.[39] Hadi and his former ministers remained under virtual house arrest since their resignations.[40]
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for Hadi to be restored as president after the Houthis installed themselves as the interim government in February 2015.[40][41] According to Houthi-controlled state media, Hadi reaffirmed on 8 February that his resignation was "final" and could not be withdrawn.[42] However, after leaving Sana'a and traveling to his hometown of Aden on 21 February, Hadi gave a speech in which he presented himself as Yemen's president and said the actions taken by the Houthis since 21 September were unconstitutional and invalid.[43][44]
On 26 March 2015 Saudi state TV Al Ekhbariya reported that Hadi arrived at a Riyadh airbase and was met by Saudi Arabia Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud as Saudi Arabia and its allies launched airstrikes in Yemen against the Houthis in the 2015 military intervention in Yemen. His route from Aden to Riyadh was not immediately known.[45]
On 25 March 2017 a court in the Houthi-controlled Sana'a sentenced Hadi and six other government officials to death in absentia for "high treason", which meant "incitement and assistance" to Saudi Arabia and its allies."[46][47] The sentence was announced by the Houthi-controlled Saba News Agency.[46]
Resignation
[edit]
On April 7, 2022, Hadi announced in a televised speech that he is resigning from office, dismissing vice president Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and transfers both office's powers to the newly formed eight member Presidential Leadership Council chaired by Rashad al-Alimi. He also said that the council was tasked with negotiating with the Houthi rebels to agree to a permanent ceasefire.[48][49] The presidential council's leader had close ties with Saudi Arabia, and some of Yemen's other political groups, including the Islah party.[50] Officials from Saudi Arabia and Yemen claimed that Hadi was pushed by Riyadh to give up his power to the presidential council. Hadi received a written decree from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to transfer his authority to the council. According to Prince Mohammed the decision was approved by other Yemeni leaders. Hadi was also threatened by Saudi officials using the evidence of corruption allegedly committed by him. Following his decision to step down, he was kept under a house arrest in his Riyadh residence and was not allowed to communicate with anyone. All these claims were denied by Saudi Arabia.[51]
References
[edit]
Media related to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi at Wikimedia Commons | ||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 65 | http://www.news.cn/english/2021-01/02/c_139636216_3.htm | en | Daily life in Sanaa, capital of Yemen - Xinhua | [
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] | null | [] | 2021-01-02T00:00:00 | null | Photo taken on Jan. 1, 2021 shows girls in traditional festival costumes playing at the Yemeni historical Dar Al-Hajar (Rock Palace) in Sanaa, capital of Yemen. (Photo by Mohammed Mohammed/Xinhua) | ||||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 91 | https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-attacks-show-war-in-yemen-could-escalate-further/ | en | New attacks show war in Yemen could escalate further | [
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] | 2022-01-24T19:00:48+00:00 | The Yemen conflict is now a decade old. It keeps taking on a wider dimension, with no relief in sight for the suffering Yemeni people. All peace-brokering efforts have failed to produce any tangible results, ... | en | https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/wp-content/themes/aspi/assets/img/icons/favicon.ico | The Strategist | https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-attacks-show-war-in-yemen-could-escalate-further/ | The Yemen conflict is now a decade old. It keeps taking on a wider dimension, with no relief in sight for the suffering Yemeni people. All peace-brokering efforts have failed to produce any tangible results, and this is likely to remain the case for as long as no regional consensus exists between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as between Iran and the United States.
The recent attacks by Iran-backed Houthis on Abu Dhabi that killed three people and the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s retaliatory strikes on Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, that killed scores, underline not only the intractable nature of the Yemen war but also its potential to become a regional fireball.
The conflict commenced as an internal power struggle among the multi-ethnic, tribal and sectarian Yemeni population following the ousting of dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ or pro-democracy uprisings in the Arab world. Saleh had ruled North Yemen from 1978 until 1990 and then a united Yemen from 1990 until 2012.
However, Saleh’s toppling opened the way for the two Persian Gulf powers to intensify their sectarian and geopolitical rivalry for regional influence. The predominantly Shia Islamic Republic of Iran threw its weight behind the friendly sectarian Houthis. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, backed by its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council, most importantly the United Arab Emirates (as well as the US, which has sought to eliminate al-Qaeda cells in Yemen), supported Saleh’s Sunni replacement, President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The Houthis’ success in driving Hadi out of Sanaa in 2014 posed a formidable security challenge to the new Saudi king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, who succeeded his politically nuanced half-brother, Abdullah, in January 2015.
The king’s powerful young son, Mohammad bin Salman, who rapidly emerged as the kingdom’s de facto ruler, decided to tackle Iran’s expanding influence in Saudi Arabia’s backyard (Yemen) and indeed in the region. Within less than three months of his father’s assumption of the throne, he commenced, with the UAE’s full participation, a Saudi-led Arab coalition military operation against the Houthis.
The war has devastated the Yemeni people. It has generated an unspeakable humanitarian crisis. Close to 400,000 people have so far been killed because of direct combat operations, involving relentless Saudi-led coalition air raids, and related indirect causes, such as hunger and preventable diseases. A United Nations Development Programme report released in November estimated that by the end of 2021, a good percentage of the civilians killed would have been children under the age of five. The UNDP’s administrator, Achim Steiner, said ‘we believe that the number of people who have actually died as a consequence [of the] conflict exceeds the numbers who have died in the battlefield’. More than half of Yemen’s some 30 million people have become destitute.
Upon assuming office in 2021, US President Joe Biden made a number of policy announcements in relation to the Middle East. Among them, he declared a halt to US support for the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, which his predecessor, Donald Trump, had backed to the hilt, as well as the stopping of the sale of American offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He called for an end to the Yemen war, removed the Houthis from the US list of terrorist organisations, and undertook to revive the July 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA. He also committed his administration to the promotion of human rights and democratic values as a priority in the region.
However, one year on, Biden has not followed through with any of these measures, except seeking the JCPOA’s resurrection. Faced with mounting domestic problems and the strategic consideration to confront America’s adversarial powers, Russia and China, and with Middle Eastern regional complexities, he has found it expedient to pursue America’s traditional policy approach to maintain close ties with oil-rich Saudi Arabia and its Arab partners, and its strategic partnership with Israel. US arms sales have continued, as have the Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen. Biden’s initial emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion has also subsided in favour of sustaining the status quo.
The only area where he has made a push is that of the JCPOA, but without any substantial progress so far. The indirect US–Iran negotiations in Vienna have become bogged down over whether Washington should first lift all the JCPOA-related sanctions on Iran or the latter should first fully comply with the agreement. A failure to reach a compromise in the next few weeks could spell the end of diplomacy, potentially opening the arena for use of force by the US or Israel, both of which have repeatedly said that they will never allow Iran to become a military nuclear power.
The Houthis’ claim of the recent attacks on Abu Dhabi has resulted in intensified Saudi-led retaliatory bombardments, including the targeting of a Houthi prison at the cost of dozens of lives. The UAE has now asked the Biden administration to reinstate classification of the Houthis as a terrorist organisation. As the situation stands, the prospects for an end to the Yemeni carnage and devastation look very bleak. Yet, for humanity’s sake, there is a need for consistency in the American approach and serious international effort to urgently move all the parties in the conflict towards a viable political settlement of the Yemeni crisis. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 88 | https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-13/yemen-parliament-members-loyal-to-hadi-convene-for-first-meeting | en | Yemen Parliament Members Loyal to Hadi Hold First Meeting | [
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] | 2019-04-13T00:00:00 | Members of Yemen’s parliament loyal to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi convened Saturday for the first time since a civil war broke out in 2015. | en | Bloomberg.com | https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-13/yemen-parliament-members-loyal-to-hadi-convene-for-first-meeting | President urges Shiite Houthi rebels to work toward peace
Meeting held under heavy security in town in southeast Yemen
Members of Yemen’s parliament loyal to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi convened Saturday for the first time since a civil war broke out in 2015.
The session, held in the southeastern province of Hadramaut, was described in a speech by the president as “historic.” | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 68 | https://www.futureuae.com/o.rar/Mainpage/Item/7247/legitimacy-united-the-formation-of-new-leadership-council-in-yemen | en | The formation of new leadership council in Yemen | [
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] | null | Future for advanced research and studies | ar | /assets/img/favicon.png | Futureuae | null | In the early hours of Thursday April 7, Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi ceded his power to a new council in a major shake-up to the country’s political form. The decision came five days after the start of a two-month nationwide truce and as a result of local as well as regional and international circumstance. President Hadi said in a televised statement that the new body, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), shall manage Yemen’s political, military and security affairs during what he called a “transitional period”.
The main aim of announcing the PLC is to unify all the political, tribal, social, military, and security factions of Yemen under one umbrella. The Houthis militia have been among the country’s most vicious belligerents since the outbreak of civil war in 2011. Many other and often smaller rebel groups joined the Houthis, fuelling the war and worsening the situation. The Houthis and their supporter militias managed to oust the major political groups and usurp the legitimate government in large parts of the country, leading President Hadi to call upon the Gulf countries for military support. This lead the Arab Coalition campaign against the Houthis, targeting insurgency infrastructure and forces. Nevertheless, friction and power conflict within the legitimate government have led to its weakening and current state of deterioration.
The above circumstances have led the national coalition, supported by the Arab Coalition, to forge a new strategy for dealing with the Houthi’s intransigence and their avoiding accountability to agreements during the past period.
Forming the PLC
The new presidential council is headed by Rashad Muhammed Al-Alimi, and comprised of seven members, which are: Sultan Ali Al-Arada, Tariq Mohammed Saleh, Abdulrahman Abu Zara’a, Abdullah Bawazeer, Othman Hussein Megally, Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, and Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi. The council members represent the wide political and military influences across the country and brings together Yemini divisions under one political body. The ambition for this council is to facilitate peace dialogues and promote seize fire in entire Yemen. Looking closer, several observations can be made about the newly formed council:
1.Politically:
The head of the PLC, Rashad Al-Alimi, has been elected by all Yemeni partisans across the spectrum. Al-Alimi is a leader of the Popular Congress Party, an experienced politician, and an academic and military expert.
Member of the council, Sultan Ali Al-Arada, is a leader of the revolutionary forces in south of Yemen. He was instrumental in defeating the Houthi militias in the strategic city of Marib, which became emblematic of Yemen’s republicanism and defending the legitimacy against the insurgency. Both Al-Arada and Abdullah Bawazeer are members of Al Islah party, and Bawazeer has also been the chief of staff of the president of Yemen for nearly 6 years.
Aidarous Al-Zubaidi has been the leader of one of the most influential factions in the south of Yemen, namely the Southern Transitional Council. It was founded in 2017 as sentiments of political isolation have germinated since 1994. As for Tariq Abdulla Saleh, a prominent military commander in the army with the rank of brigadier general. He is nephew of the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and currently heads the National Resistance Forces based in the strategic city of Mocha near the Bab al-Mandab Strait. In the case of Abdulrahman Abu Zara’a, he known for his participation in many battles against the Houthis across Yemen. Abu Zara’a also leads the Giants Brigades, a militia which managed in early 2022 to capture the southern oil province of Shabwa from the Houthis. He is also known to be a Salafist, one of the Muslim religious orientations.
Othman Megally is a lawmaker and one of the tribal leaders in Yemen’s southwest Saada province, the main stronghold of the Houthis. In 2003, he joined the General People's Congress and held several political positions, most notably Minister of Agriculture. And finally, Faraj Al-Bahsani, currently the governor of Hadhramaut and is also a major general commanding the second military region that operates in the province.
2.Geographically:
It is noted that the council is representative of all Yemeni regions outlined in the constitution and the National Dialogue Conference, with Tahama being the only exception. Each of the council members represent a Yemeni region: for Azan, Othman Megally and Triq Abdulla Saleh; the Janad region is represented by Rashad Al-Alimi; the region of Aden is represented by Aidarous Al-Zubaidi and Abdulrahman Abu Zara’a; Sultan Ali Al-Arada represent the region of Saba; and Faraj Al-Bahsani and Abdullah Bawazeer represent the region of Hadhramaut.
3. Militarily:
Most council members have extensive military and security experience and have engaged in direct combat against Houthi and rebel groups. This may indicate a strategic willingness to fight and liberate Yemen from Houthis rebel groups, which is a key priority for the council, either through political dialogue or direct combat of necessary.
Reasons for Change
There are different reasons behind the formation of the PLC. As mentioned above, the current state of the legitimate government, coupled with international and regional circumstances, have created the need for new strategic approach that address those challenges, which can be summarised as follows:
1.Division within the legitimate government due to internal and external factors, which have compromised the unity of the legitimate front, and weakened its ability to effectively face the Houthi rebel groups.
2.Conflicting priorities as a result of new and emerging geopolitical factors. Such disagreements, even sometimes opposition within the government, have resulted in the its inability to control the entire liberated regions.
3.Crumbling economic conditions, lived by all Yemenis as the result of the ongoing war, instigated by the Houthi’s overturning of the legitimate government. Sky high commodity prices and hyperinflation have been mainly caused by oil and gas exports coming to a near-complete halt.
4.Government operating from abraod has affected its ability to influence and take effective control of Yemeni regions.
5.Yemeni groups having external links has driven the rift among the national factions, negatively affecting the legitimacy of the government.
Aims of Legitimacy
For reasons outlined so far, new strategic solutions had to be sought. The new council, therefore, aims to overcome these difficulties, by achieving the following goals:
1.Unifying anti-Houthi groups in one front, to take capture back Yemeni regions that fell to the Houthi militias, and to restore peace.
2.To expand the institution of presidency, by including all political and military factions to take equal part in the legitimate government, under a unified Yemen, guided by the Gulf initiative and its execution mechanisms, and the auspices of the United Nations.
3.Prioritising dialogue for sustainable peace, if the Houthi militias opt to join the negotiation table; otherwise, the PLC would be effective in its unity in countering the Houthi insurgency.
4.Delaying other political agenda for the time being, legitimate or otherwise, until the full restoration of legitimacy over Yemen. Such political disagreements would be addressed through negotiations that aim to set final and sustainable resolution.
Duties of the PLC
The presidential council faces immense challenges in the following period. To be successful, the council must keep in sight a number of goals, which are:
1.Re-establishing government institutions based in Aden as a temporary capital, and ensuring the normal resumption of all government functions, including security, political, economic, and civil services, across the entire liberated regions.
2.Reaching an agreement on who would assume the roles of minister of defence and minister of interior, for these two ministerial positions are key to unifying all militant factions under one banner. The various brigades and militias would be merged into the institutional military and would no longer be influenced by conflicting political or tribal loyalties. This goal is key to the success of the PLC’s upcoming mission.
3.Coordinating with coalition countries supporting the legitimate government to ensure all factions adhere by agreements signed, and in line with the objectives announced in 2015 when the coalition was formed. This would help the newly formed council avoid any past shortcomings.
4.The members of the council carry big responsibilities for the success of the council. Both the president as well as each of the members must play an active role in driving the unifying vision of the council, away from tribal, political, or personal affiliations.
5.Advancing Yemen’s economy, by re-opening oil and gas ports, and all fields, to drive fresh hard currency into the economy, and recovering the purchasing power of the Yemen Rial.
6.Fixing fiscal shortcomings, by invigorating the Yemeni central bank, capturing national revenue into the sovereign reserves, and setting up a national budget.
7.Restoring Yemenis’ trust in national institutions, by establishing security and providing basic civil services, including water, electricity, fuel, services, and commodities.
8.Re-organising Houthi counterinsurgency, and addressing past shortcomings, which led to losing key strategic regions to the rebel groups. This objective requires immediately capacity improvement of government forces, which have been weakened in the previous period. | ||||
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] | null | [] | null | en | https://static.newworldencyclopedia.org/favicon.ico | https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Yemen | The Republic of Yemen is a country on the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, bordering the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden on the south and the Red Sea on the west. It borders only two other countries, Oman to the northeast and Saudi Arabia to the north, and its shape bears a resemblance to a forearm lying prone with a raised clenched fist. Yemen's territory includes the remote island of Socotra, about 350 km to the south off the Horn of Africa.
Because the border with the Saudi kingdom is simply a line on the map and not strictly defined as to where in the shifting desert sands it actually runs, the area of Yemen can only be estimated rather than exactly determined. It is somewhere in excess of 500,000 km², making it the second-largest nation on the Arabian Peninsula and about the size of Colorado and Wyoming combined. Yemen's population is close to 21 million, ranking it second again on the peninsula and approaching that of Texas.
The name Yemen is not of certain origin but probably derives from the Arabic word meaning "south," signifying its location on the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen's relative poverty compared to all other nations on the peninsula may partly be due to its having been a country divided in two for the better part of three centuries.
Geography
The landscape of Yemen changes dramatically in the transition from its shorelines toward the great Rub al-Khali desert. The coastal area, often called the "hot land," is a desert-like plain 30 to 40 km wide. Reefs protect the coastline and there are many beautiful beaches.
The most spectacular geographical feature of Yemen is the western mountain slopes. Rising steeply to 2000 m, they are lined with tens of thousands of intricately fashioned terraces. These are part of an age-old but highly sophisticated system of water and soil management that enabled an agriculture-based society to flourish in an otherwise hostile environment. Deep wadis (valleys) divide the mountains and move heavy seasonal rainfall toward the sea. The terraces are used to cultivate coffee and various grain crops.
Farther inland, the central highlands have several large basins, one of which encloses the capital, Sana'a, at an altitude of 2,350 m. They also boast the highest mountain on the peninsula, Nabi Shu'aib (3,650 m). Large-scale agriculture is practiced here, particularly of grapes, grain, fruits, and vegetables.
To the east, the mountains range mostly between 1000 m and 2000 m and are barren and rugged, but agriculture exists in the occasional wadi. In the area where the mountains meet the desert, or Empty Quarter, only grass and shrubs grow and Bedouin graze cattle, but further east, signs of life cease and sand dunes rule the landscape.
The rest of the country, extending to the Omani border, is almost completely desert, with less than 1 percent of the land under cultivation. Vast areas separate a few scattered settlements.
Yemen's easternmost and southernmost points lie on the distant island of Socotra, which lies closer to Somalia than to Yemen and is nearly the size of Rhode Island. Like many remote islands, Socotra has some unique flora and fauna; its name likely derives from a Sanskrit phrase meaning "island of bliss."
Besides the two countries that Yemen borders, it has near neighbors in Djibouti and Eritrea, African nations across the narrow Bab el Mandeb Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea.
History
Ancient kingdoms
Yemen is one of the oldest centers of civilization in the Middle East. Various ancient kingdoms developed between the ninth century B.C.E. and the fifth century C.E. in the rugged valleys between the central highlands and the desert. The famed Queen of Sheba is said to have ruled there, though other locations outside Yemen make the same claim. The source of these kingdoms' wealth and power was the spice trade, which also moved incense and gold overland by camel caravan to Mediterranean markets. The land centering on Yemen was known as Arabia Felix ("Fortunate Arabia") by the Roman Empire, which believed it held fabulous riches. The Romans made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer the area under Augustus Caesar, but later managed to break the Arabian control of the trade routes by finding sources for merchandise farther afield, mainly in India, and using waterways to get to them, which eventually brought the decline of the overland passage.
Arrival of Islam
Ethiopian Christians ruled the area for a short period in the 6th century C.E., but they were expelled by a Persian army that remained in power until the arrival of Islam in 628, the same year Muhammad re-entered Mecca in triumph. The emergence of Islam sparked an unprecedented spiritual revival in the region, profoundly changing and reshaping Yemen. The Persian governor was among the first to embrace Islam. Missionaries sent by Muhammad built Yemen's first mosques. In the next two centuries, Yemenis constituted a large part of the Islamic forces that swept through the Middle East and westward to Spain. They tended to excel as architects, administrators, and merchants even when they settled down far from their homeland.
Distant caliphates ruled over Yemen at times; at other times local Shi’a imamates held sway for centuries. The whole country, as it is known today, seldom remained united since different caliphs and imams often exerted control in the northern and southern areas.
Colonial period
With the European discovery of the sea route around Africa to India, Yemen quickly gained strategic importance to the European powers, first the Portuguese, later the British. The interests of the Europeans frequently clashed with Islamic rulers, including the emerging superpower of the Middle East, the Ottoman Turks, who occupied Yemen for nearly a century, beginning in 1538, until they were expelled.
During this period, Yemen again experienced a prosperous period with the world's discovery of coffee, the cultivation of which some believe began in southern Arabia. Yemen held a global monopoly on coffee production and trade and in time allowed British, Dutch, French, and later American trade missions and factories to be established on the Red Sea coast. Local coffee production declined steeply, though, after the colonial powers established plantations in other locations overseas.
Division into north and south
In 1729, a sultan precipitated the split between northern and southern Yemen that would last 260 years by gaining independence from the ruling imam. In an attempt to secure the trade route to India, the British occupied the port of Aden, overlooking the gulf of the same name, in 1839. This prompted the Turks to safeguard their interests along the Red Sea by retaking the northern part of Yemen in 1848. The border between the two regions of Yemen was fixed by the two powers in 1905.
The Turks withdrew with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The xenophobic imams that succeeded them in the north kept the area in civil war and dodged various assassination attempts even after rebel forces backed by Egypt drove the ruling dynasty into exile in 1962. In the south, centering on Aden, the British initially made peace with the tribes and created a protectorate. But in time, they found themselves fighting multiple liberation groups and hastily withdrew their forces in 1967, leaving power in the hands of a communist front. The resulting people's republic was the only declared communist state in the Arab world, which left it isolated from most other Arab countries.
Unification
Unification of the two republics had been the declared goal of the two Yemens since the beginning. Ideological differences as well as the conflicting interests of Saudi Arabia (which backed the north) and the Soviet Union (which supported the south), however, made such a union seem impossible. A series of border clashes in the 1970s was followed in the 1980s with attempts on paper at unification, but no real developments came about until the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989. Before the end of that year, an agreement for a unity constitution was signed. In 1990, the Republic of Yemen was declared, with Sana'a as the capital and the north's President Ali Abdullah Saleh as the new head of state.
Difficulties persisted, however, between the regions of the new country. In 1994, open civil war erupted between north and south, a conflict that was won by the central government, which sent the southern leadership into exile.
In the twenty-first century, Yemen has been in the news mainly with the rise there of fundamentalist Islam, particularly in the south. This glaringly came to the world's attention with the suicide bombing attack on an American navy ship, the USS Cole, in Aden's harbor in 2000 by Al-Qaeda followers.
Economy
Development in a country where virtually no modern structures existed until the 1960s is a formidable task. The British had brought development to the area around Aden, but the rest of the country had no schools, administrative service, local currency or banking system, or health services. Electricity, modern communications, and water and sanitation systems were virtually non-existent. Goods in Yemen were transported on the backs of laborers and animals, and 90 percent of the people were engaged in subsistence agriculture.
The difficult terrain and lack of educated, qualified, and experienced personnel remain the main obstacles to Yemen's development. Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis found low-status employment in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states during the late 1970s and 1980s. The Gulf War forced the return home of at least 850,000 of them. Remittances from Yemenis working abroad have long contributed heavily to the country's economy. Substantial Yemeni communities exist in many areas of the globe, including the nation's Arab neighbors, Indonesia, India, East Africa, and also the U.K. and the U.S.
The western mountain slopes are the natural habitat of coffee, a crop that probably began its world career in Yemen. Other areas are also agriculturally productive. Large papaya, mango, and banana groves are found in the highland valleys, and citrus and watermelon plantations dot the countryside farther east. Where irrigation is available, dates and cotton grow well in the coastal region.
Yet Yemen imports more than 60 percent of its food, and about one out of five Yemenis suffer from malnutrition. Agriculture employs more than half the labor force, but only about 6 percent of the land is capable of cultivation.
Modest amounts of oil have been found in Yemeni territory since 1984, mainly in the desert east of Sana'a, enough not only to make the country an exporter of the resource but to account for nearly 90 percent of all exports in value. Pipelines run from the oilfields to ports on both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. There are also natural gas reserves believed to be even larger than the oilfields they lie adjacent to.
Demographics
Unlike other people of the Arabian Peninsula who have historically been nomads or semi-nomads, Yemenis outside the cities live in small villages and towns and tend to stay put.
Most Yemenis belong to one of two principal Islamic religious groups: the Shi’a, found in the north and northwest, and the Sunni, who live predominately in the south and southeast. Many minority groups have departed over the decades and centuries, the best known being the "Yemenite Jews" who once formed a sizable community with a distinct culture and long history. Soon after the establishment of Israel, a massive airlift transported practically all Jews in Yemen, nearly 50,000, to their ancestral homeland in 1949 and 1950.
Arabic is the official language, although English is increasingly spoken, particularly in the two main cities. Other Semitic dialects rarely heard elsewhere are spoken in scattered sections of the country. One is Soqotri, the main language spoken on the outlying island of Socotra; it is most closely related to a tongue spoken in a small eastern area of the mainland and another in a remote area of Oman.
Socotra is the one part of Yemen where people of African descent are a majority of the populace. They tend to live near the coastline while those of Arab ancestry reside inland. There are more than 60,000 people living on the island.
Yemen has one of the world's highest birth rates; the average woman bears seven children. Although this is similar to the rates in nearby East Africa, it is roughly twice as high as that of Saudi Arabia and nearly three times higher than those in the more modernized Gulf states. More than half of Yemen's population is under 16 years of age.
Culture
One of Yemen's most prized art forms is the recitation of poetry in classical and colloquial styles. For centuries poetry has been spoken, sung, and also improvised during social events, at special performances, and in competition. Poetry events are also recognized as occasions where topics normally left untouched can be safely broached.
The chewing of khat, or qat, the leaves of a flowering shrub that grows locally, is practically a national pastime among the male population. The use of khat predates that of coffee and is used in similar social contexts. The juices of the leaves bring users slowly to a state of euphoria, stimulation, and sometimes sleeplessness. Khat-chewing sessions can last for hours after meals or in open forums where issues of the day are discussed. In sharp contrast to the opinions of the Saudi clergy, who strictly ban the substance, Yemeni authorities believe that it brings no harm to health or society. Only in Somalia is the use of the leaves more prevalent than in Yemen.
Yemen is basically a poor country, perhaps not as poor as its African neighbors but definitely not as prosperous as its fellow Arab nations. Part of the reason is that a rigid caste-like system rules the Yemeni social hierarchy, especially in areas of work. Those occupying the highest levels can all trace their lineage back to Muhammad. Those in the lower strata are poorly educated and have an indefinite genealogy. They engage in low-status occupations that in most cases are hereditary. Long-term male labor migration within and outside the peninsula has resulted in some changes in the traditional division of labor, since women have had to take over some male tasks, particularly in agriculture. | ||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 48 | https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/russia-is-friendly-with-the-houthis-in-yemen-but-its-complicated/ | en | Russia is friendly with the Houthis in Yemen. But it’s complicated. | [
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"Holly Dagres"
] | 2021-04-09T13:06:26+00:00 | Even though Moscow may not be militarily involved in Yemen does not mean that Russia is uninvolved. | en | Atlantic Council | https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/russia-is-friendly-with-the-houthis-in-yemen-but-its-complicated/ | By Mark N. Katz
Russia has played a very different role in the conflict in Yemen than it has in Syria and Libya. In Syria, Moscow has joined forces with Iran and its various Shia militia allies to defend the Bashar al-Assad regime against its opponents. In Libya—a conflict that Iran appears to be largely uninvolved in—Moscow has sent private military forces from the Wagner Group to support groups backed by Iran’s rivals—Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—in eastern Libya. By contrast, Russia has not become militarily involved in the conflict in Yemen where Iran is supporting one group—the Houthi rebels—while Iran’s adversaries—Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are supporting their opponents. However, even though Moscow may not be militarily involved in Yemen does not mean that Russia is uninvolved.
Yemen was riven by internal conflict even before its 2011 uprising that resulted in the country’s longtime president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, handing power to his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, in a Gulf Cooperation Council-sponsored transition in February 2012. A multi-sided civil war soon erupted, involving the Saudi-backed Hadi government, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen’s far north, former president Saleh, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council—seeking the restoration of South Yemen’s independence, which had lasted from 1967 to 1990—al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. With the exception of the two Sunni jihadist groups, Moscow has engaged with all the internal protagonists and the three main regional powers involved in the conflict: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran. Indeed, Moscow’s engagement with the various Yemeni factions supported by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Tehran can be seen as part of Russia’s broader effort to build and maintain good relations with the Kingdom and the UAE on the one hand and the Islamic Republic—despite their mutual antagonism.
Russia has long called for an internal Yemeni dialogue to bring about an end to the conflict and has offered its services as a mediator. The Russian Foreign Ministry has also received Yemenis from different factions in Moscow. Russian observers like to point out the relative success of Moscow’s intervention in Syria compared to Riyadh’s in Yemen while portraying Russia as playing an even-handed, peace-seeking role in Yemen. Despite this, the United States, as well as Arab Gulf governments, are concerned about Moscow’s friendly ties with the Iran-backed Houthis.
The US, United Kingdom, France, and several other countries withdrew their embassies from Sanaa in 2015 after the Houthis took over the Yemeni capital in September 2014. By contrast, Russia maintained its embassy there until December 2017. In April 2015, Russia was the only member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to abstain on Resolution 2216, which imposed an arms embargo on the Houthis and a travel ban on its leader. Three years later, in February 2018, Russia vetoed a UNSC resolution extending the arms embargo against the Houthis, which blamed Iran for violating it. Moscow also opposed the Donald Trump administration’s designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization and has instead called for an inclusive intra-Yemeni peace process like Tehran has done. Russia also reportedly toned-down criticism of the Houthis in the March 18 UNSC press statement on Yemen.
Despite all this, Moscow has shown a lack of support and even disagreed with the Houthis on several occasions. In December 2017, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticized the rebels for having killed former President Saleh—who had allied with them after his ouster only to break ties with the group in December 2017, days before his death—and described the Houthis as having become “radicalized.” After vetoing the UNSC resolution that extended the arms embargo against the Houthis and was critical of Iran, Moscow proposed another resolution which passed (UNSC Resolution 2402) that extended the arms embargo against the Houthis but did not criticize Iran for arming them. In other words, Moscow was more interested in protecting Iran than the Houthis. In addition, as Dr. Samuel Ramani of Oxford University has pointed out, “Russia has repeatedly refused to establish commercial relations with the Houthis and ignored their petitions for a diplomatic intervention on their behalf.” In March, Lavrov described Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities as “unacceptable” at a joint press conference in Riyadh with the Saudi foreign minister.
Unlike in Syria, where Russia and Iran support the Assad regime, Moscow is not backing the Houthis to the same extent that Iran is in Yemen. On the other hand, Russia’s actions also indicate that it does not see a resolution to the conflict in Yemen if it does not include the Houthis either. But beyond proposing intra-Yemeni dialogue, Moscow does not seem to have any concrete plan for ending the civil war. Instead, Moscow’s treatment of the Houthis as a legitimate Yemeni actor—and its criticism of the movement and support for the continued arms embargo against it—seems designed to keep all internal and external actors guessing about what the Kremlin might do next, thus, providing them all with an incentive to court Moscow in the hope of gaining its favor. In other words, what Moscow seems to want is to remain on good terms with all external and non-jihadi internal parties as long as the Yemen conflict continues and for Russia to be in a position to influence its resolution, however unlikely that prospect appears to be at present.
Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is also a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.
Image: Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (R) and Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh meet in Moscow for talks February 24, 2009. REUTERS/Alexander Natruskin | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 5 | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/now-that-yemeni-president-hadi-is-out-whats-next-for-yemen | en | What lies ahead for Yemen after President Hadi’s exit? | [
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"Abubakr Al-Shamahi"
] | 2022-04-08T00:00:00 | Lack of alternatives and international legitimacy kept Hadi in power regardless of being in exile and unpopular. | en | /favicon_aje.ico | Al Jazeera | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/now-that-yemeni-president-hadi-is-out-whats-next-for-yemen | The end of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s period in power is not being mourned by many Yemenis.
That says a lot about the presidency of a man seen as an “accidental” leader who has been unable to lead government forces effectively during a now almost-eight-year civil war that has decimated the country.
Hadi, former vice president of 33-year leader Ali Abdullah Saleh, was parachuted into the presidency in 2012 when Saleh was forced out after a year of Arab Spring protests.
He was supposed to be in power for two years and serve as a transition to full, inclusive Yemeni democracy.
Instead, Hadi turned a blind eye to the rising power of the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in the north, who eventually took the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, and forced Hadi to flee in 2015.
Hadi failed to rise to the challenge of being a wartime leader.
Stuck in Riyadh, he appeared subservient to Saudi Arabia, which was now fighting the Houthis on his behalf.
Yemenis had a silent president, one who spoke to his people on camera only a handful of times over the past few years. As war raged, salaries were unpaid and a humanitarian disaster spread.
So what kept Hadi, despite his exile and unpopularity, as president for so long?
A lack of an alternative that could be accepted by the divided anti-Houthi coalition, along with Hadi’s “legitimacy” as the internationally recognised president.
It appears now, however, that the Saudis have had enough, and decided that the alternative is in fact to group representatives from the different anti-Houthi groups into one presidential council, in the hope that it keeps them all happy.
Observers should not presume that this group of eight, announced on Thursday, will remain united.
One of them, Aidarous al-Zubaydi, believes in the secession of southern Yemen from the state and labels himself as the southern president.
The interests represented on the presidential council are bound to clash. The question is whether they will be able to stay on message and put their divisions to one side, for now.
The departure of Vice President Ali Muhsin, a powerful military man who has been influential and divisive for more than 40 years, will be welcomed by many, in particular the United Arab Emirates-backed factions in Yemen.
Muhsin has long been associated with Islah, Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood-influenced party, which is deeply opposed by Zubaydi’s Southern Transitional Council, and other UAE-backed groups.
However, Islah will be placated by the inclusion on the presidential council of Sultan al-Aradah, the popular governor of Marib who is close to him, and the president of the council, Rashad al-Alimi, who has good relations with the party leadership.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have quickly shown their support for the presidential council to the tune of $3bn to prop up the Yemeni economy.
The reluctance over the past few years to give much in the way of economic aid and weapons to the Yemeni government, which the Saudi-led coalition was fighting on behalf of, clearly showed the coalition’s dissatisfaction with Hadi and those around him.
It was a key reason for the Houthis’ military expansion in that period.
Is this now a government that Saudi Arabia and the UAE feel they can deal with? If it is, will they now ramp up their support? And what does it mean for Yemeni sovereignty when neighbouring powers have such a hold over its government and its very makeup?
The elephant (not) in the room is of course the Houthis, who refused to attend the Riyadh talks that preceded the announcement of the presidential council.
Houthi leaders immediately denounced the presidential council, labelling it as imposed by foreigners and not representative of Yemen. The group has also argued that this further undermines the claim that the Yemeni government is legitimate.
In reality, negotiations between the Saudis and the Houthis have been ongoing for months. A two-month ceasefire went into effect this month and is a sign that there is a push, at least temporarily, for de-escalation.
This was augmented further when, speaking after the formation of the presidential council, Yemen’s Saudi-backed Prime Minister Maeen Abdel Malik said the military solution in Yemen had “failed”.
That acknowledgement means that the public narrative coming from the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni government is that political negotiations are the only solution to the war and that is the task of the presidential council.
The question now is whether Yemen’s elites are willing to give a seat at the table to the Houthis, and whether the Houthis can even be trusted to share rule at all.
If those talks fail once again, a transformation of this political presidential council into a war council may be seen quickly – together with a continuation of this devastating conflict. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 10 | https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q57480 | en | Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi | [
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] | null | [] | null | President of Yemen from 2012 to 2022 | en | /static/apple-touch/wikidata.png | https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q57480 | President of Yemen from 2012 to 2022
Mansour Hadi
President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi
Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi
Abdorabuh Mansour Hadi
edit | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 25 | https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30936940 | en | Yemen crisis: President resigns as rebels tighten hold | [
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"BBC News",
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] | 2015-01-22T17:15:50+00:00 | The president of Yemen resigns in protest at the takeover of the capital Sanaa by Shia Houthi rebels, creating a dangerous political vacuum. | en | BBC News | https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30936940 | The president of Yemen has resigned along with his prime minister in protest at the takeover of the capital Sanaa by Shia Houthi rebels, creating a dangerous political vacuum.
President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi said he could not continue after the Houthis failed to honour a peace deal.
Parliament has reportedly refused to accept the resignations.
Security sources have told the BBC that Yemen's intelligence chief, Ali Hassan al-Ahmedi, has also stepped down.
There are reports of explosions in the southern port city of Aden, where President Hadi has a strong following.
Houthi rebel figures publicly welcomed the resignation of the president with one proposing the creation of a ruling council.
The council would include Houthi-led groups, Abu al-Malek Yousef al-Fishi was quoted as saying by Reuters news agency.
Houthi leaders had previously committed themselves to withdrawing from key positions around the presidential palace and the home of President Hadi.
The US, which is helping fight al-Qaeda militants in Yemen, said it was still assessing the implications of President Hadi's move.
The resignation of the Yemeni president and his government is likely to plunge an already unstable country into uncharted territory.
Mr Hadi has been surrounded in his home in the capital, Sanaa, by rebels for several days. His resignation may be the last card he had left to play after being pushed to the brink.
The rebels have publicly welcomed his resignation but it is not what they wanted. As minority Shias from the north, their authority will not be accepted in the south, where many want to return to having their own state.
With no president and no government, there is also a fear that al-Qaeda's powerful branch in Yemen could make new gains from the political vacuum.
Local officials in Aden told Reuters news agency that unidentified gunmen had attacked two military vehicles in the city early on Friday, local time.
Three explosions were heard during the attack, which was followed by the clashes, said one of the officials, who declined to be identified.
Explosions and clashes were also reported by Qatar-based broadcaster al-Jazeera, which said they were happening on the city's Martyrs' Square.
In his letter of resignation, seen by the Associated Press news agency, Mr Hadi said the parties had reached a "deadlock".
"We found out that we are unable to achieve the goal, for which we bear a lot of pain and disappointment," he said. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 72 | https://www.wgbh.org/news/2017-12-04/yemeni-ex-president-ali-abdullah-saleh-apparently-killed-in-houthi-attack | en | Yemeni Ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh Apparently Killed In Houthi Attack | https://cdn.grove.wgbh.org/dims4/default/353448a/2147483647/strip/true/crop/2566x1347+0+288/resize/1200x630!/quality/90/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fk1-prod-gbh.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fbrightspot%2F68%2Fa9%2Fd347507a3a39d7c13c720b5d87ae%2Fgettyimages-885277262-4f4100ec24329b23e44a7bccfdfbdcae246449e8.jpg | https://cdn.grove.wgbh.org/dims4/default/353448a/2147483647/strip/true/crop/2566x1347+0+288/resize/1200x630!/quality/90/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fk1-prod-gbh.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fbrightspot%2F68%2Fa9%2Fd347507a3a39d7c13c720b5d87ae%2Fgettyimages-885277262-4f4100ec24329b23e44a7bccfdfbdcae246449e8.jpg | [
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"Colin Dwyer",
"www.wgbh.org",
"colin-dwyer"
] | 2017-12-04T00:00:00 | Updated at 12:32 p.m. ETAli Abdullah Saleh, the former Yemeni president who spent more than three decades in power before he stepped down in 2012, appears… | en | /apple-touch-icon.png | GBH | https://www.wgbh.org/news/2017-12-04/yemeni-ex-president-ali-abdullah-saleh-apparently-killed-in-houthi-attack | Updated at 12:32 p.m. ET
Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former Yemeni president who spent more than three decades in power before he stepped down in 2012, appears to have been killed after violence consumed the country's capital over the weekend. A member of Saleh's own party told NPR that Saleh had died, even as graphic video purporting to show his body circulated on social media Monday.
Houthi rebels, Saleh's erstwhile allies, claim to have killed him during a rocket-propelled grenade attack on his vehicle.
NPR's Ruth Sherlock describes the images apparently recorded in the attack's aftermath: "A video shows the body of a man who resembles Ali Abdallah Saleh being lifted onto a pickup truck. The back of his skull is crushed, and there's blood on his shirt."
Until recently, the Iran-backed Houthis observed an uneasy pact with Saleh's supporters — united against both Saleh's successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, as well as the Saudi-led coalition that has backed Hadi with an airstrike campaign since 2015. But that tenuous alliance appeared to snap in recent days after Saleh made gestures of reconciliation toward the Saudis, a move the Houthis called "a coup against our alliance and partnership."
The relationship has devolved into door-to-door clashes on the streets of Yemen's capital, Sanaa, where at least 75 people reportedly have been killed in the past week. The Associated Press explains:
The Houthis celebrated Saleh's apparent death as a significant victory amid the fighting. For that reason, Monday marked a "historic, exceptional and great day in which the conspiracy of betrayal and treason failed, this black day for the forces of the aggression," said Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi, according to Reuters.
It likely also marks a further slide deeper into the violent chaos that has engulfed Yemen for years and — in the words of three major international aid agencies — turned it into "the worst humanitarian crisis in the world."
Amid the civil war fought by Saleh and the Houthis against Hadi's internationally recognized government and the Saudi coalition supporting him, more than 20 million civilians in Yemen now need urgent humanitarian aid — including more than 900,000 who are believed to have contracted cholera. A weeks-long Saudi blockade of Yemen's major points of entry — implemented last month in retaliation for an attempted Houthi missile strike on Riyadh — did nothing to help the crisis before that blockade was eased last week.
In many ways, Saleh's death also marks the end of an era for Yemen. For years, he led Northern Yemen, back when the country was divided in two. And he was the first president under a newly unified Yemen in 1990. It was not until late 2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring, that Saleh finally bowed to public pressure and agreed to leave office under a transfer-of-power agreement.
"He wasn't the classic dictator who ruled with the iron fist," Greg Johnsen, a Yemen scholar, told NPR's Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson. "He did much better at sort of gauging the opposition ... and then trying to create fractures and fissures among them instead of being centered on him, rather."
Many of those fractures persisted after his presidency ended. And now, the Yemen he leaves behind is also riven by the interests — and support — of competing regional rivals, the predominantly Sunni Saudis and Shiite Iran.
Peter Salisbury, senior researcher for the Middle East and North Africa for the Chatham House think tank, told Ruth he expects Saleh's death to intensify a conflict that's ground to a bloody stalemate. He said that with the Houthis in control of Yemen's northwest, right on the Saudi border, "I expect that the Saudis will take the gloves off in the way they fight the war."
For a war that has already left more than 10,000 people dead, any escalation on either side would prove significant. At the same time, Salisbury said it remains unclear exactly what's to come.
"Anyone who makes solid predictions about who's going to step in what's going to happen next, I think it is speaking to too soon," he said. "But what I can say with a relative degree of assurance is that the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the near future looks looks increasingly unlikely."
Johnsen echoed that assessment in a tweet Monday. | ||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 7 | https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/internationally-recognized-government/ | en | Actor Profile: Internationally Recognized Government | [
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] | null | [] | 2023-11-20T17:43:13+00:00 | The Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) refers to the institutions of the Yemeni state that are recognized by the international community. | en | ACLED | https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/internationally-recognized-government/ | Historical Background
After a presidency that lasted more than 30 years, President Ali Abdullah Saleh relinquished power as the head of the Republic of Yemen in 2011. Pressured by the Youth Uprising and an assassination attempt, Ali Abdullah Saleh ceded power for immunity through an agreement brokered by the GCC. Authority was passed to then-Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was later elected president in a single-candidate election in February 2012. Between 2013 and 2014, Hadi led Yemen’s political transition, chairing the NDC, the outcomes of which were intended to shape Yemen’s political roadmap and contribute to the drafting of a new constitution. However, in September 2014, the alliance of forces loyal to the Houthis and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh took over Yemen’s capital Sanaa, putting Hadi under house arrest in January 2015. One month later, Hadi managed to escape and tried to resume the IRG’s functions in the port city of Aden, retracting the resignation he previously tendered while under arrest.
In March, Houthi-Saleh forces advanced south, capturing Aden and prompting Hadi’s retreat to Riyadh. At this stage, the IRG held nominal control over the Yemeni armed forces, which, however, were either disbanded or had pledged loyalty to Ali Abdullah Saleh. Hence, opposition to the Houthis emerged spontaneously, through the Southern and Popular Resistance Forces. Furthermore, a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen on 26 March 2015, to support the IRG and reinstate Hadi. The Coalition’s intervention was retrospectively legitimated by the UN Security Council with resolution 2216, issued in April 2015.
During the conflict, the IRG faced internal tensions, divided among a weakened faction aligned with the GPC, forces loyal to the Islah party, and southern secessionist groups. In April 2016, before peace talks in Kuwait with the Houthi-Saleh camp, Hadi removed Prime Minister Khalid Bahah, appointing the Islah-leaning military commander Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. This move solidified Islah’s control over the Yemeni army and the Marib and Taizz provinces, ultimately eclipsing its historical GPC rival.
The rise of Islah within the IRG prompted the United Arab Emirates to train paramilitary units and support secessionist forces in southern Yemen, aiming to counter Islah’s increasing influence. Between 2018 and 2019, UAE-backed forces aligned with the STC clashed with pro-Hadi and pro-Islah units, consolidating their control over Aden, al-Dali, Lahij, and other southern areas. In December 2020, the establishment of a power-sharing cabinet succeeded in reducing tensions within the IRG camp, materializing an agreement reached in Riyadh in November 2019.
In April 2022, days after a UN-mediated truce came into effect, President Hadi, under pressure from the Saudi-led Coalition, transferred his powers and those of Vice President Ali Muhsin to an eight-member PLC, in a further attempt at unifying ranks. Nevertheless, significant tensions persist within the PLC, with the strongest faultline existing around pro-unity and southern secessionist aspirations. In August 2022, just four months after the creation of the PLC, STC-affiliated forces took control of Shabwa governorate following days of clashes with pro-unity forces aligned with the Islah party. In a further blow to unity within the anti-Houthi camp, two members of the PLC – leader of the Southern Giants Brigades Abdulrahman al-Muharrami and former Hadramawt governor Faraj al-Bahsani – have joined the secessionist STC in May 2023. In addition to its internal fragmentation, the IRG also grapples with financial reliance on the Coalition.
In late 2023, amidst ongoing bilateral talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, the PLC committed to UN-brokered measures to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Yemen. On 5 January 2024, PLC chairman al-Alimi decreed the establishment of a new central intelligence agency, thus merging government services and other UAE-backed agencies. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 31 | https://www.mei.edu/publications/president-hadi-and-future-legitimacy-yemen | en | President Hadi and the future of legitimacy in Yemen | [
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] | null | [] | 2020-05-14T12:38:00 | What is the future of legitimacy in Yemen? The question of what would happen if President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi were to die has been an unspoken concern for the past several years. It is important to address the question of legitimacy after Hadi because the constitutional rules on how to transfer his authority to a successor and how to avoid a presidential vacuum are impractical given the ongoing conflict. | en | /themes/mei/favicon.ico | Middle East Institute | https://www.mei.edu/publications/president-hadi-and-future-legitimacy-yemen | What is the future of legitimacy in Yemen? The question of what would happen if President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi were to die has been an unspoken concern for the past several years. Hadi has been in exile since 2015 and he rarely appears in public. Rumors about his health abound, as does speculation that he is under house arrest in Saudi Arabia. Where does legitimacy lie in a country that has been divided, so far, between three separate actors: the Houthi movement (officially known as Ansarallah), backed by Iran, in Sanaa and the North; the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the UAE, in Aden; and President Hadi’s legitimate government, backed by Saudi Arabia, in some of the western governorates, Marib, and Shabwa.
It is important to address the question of legitimacy after Hadi because the constitutional rules on how to transfer his authority to a successor and how to avoid a presidential vacuum are impractical given the ongoing conflict. It is impossible to hold presidential and parliamentary elections at the moment. Hadi came to power as a result of a unique combination of events: a political agreement, constitutional rules, and a public referendum. Even those who challenge his legitimacy have recognized it at some point. Therefore, Hadi is still the only internationally recognized president and represents what is left of legitimacy in Yemen. Hadi’s successor would not have the same credentials.
This is not only about Hadi passing away, but also about legality and the rule of law more broadly. It is unacceptable to grant Hadi or his successor a blank check to remain in office as president for an unspecified period of time without any accountability under the justification of war. Insisting on maintaining this situation and ignoring the legal questions simply drives another nail into the coffin of government legitimacy in Yemen.
Legitimacy as the cornerstone
Legitimacy is the cornerstone of any political system. It enables government institutions to rule, enforce the law, and have a representative at the UN. Therefore, each side in the Yemeni conflict declares themselves to be the only legitimate authority and attacks the others in order to have moral and legal cover for their movement and gain more support. Hadi and the Saudis, on the one hand, have referred to this war as the “battle of legitimacy” to restore the state’s legitimate institutions captured by the Houthis in 2014. The Houthis, on the other hand, have referred to their “revolutionary legitimacy” in the face of aggression from the Saudi-led coalition and the STC’s efforts to restore the southern state.
In Yemen Hadi is the keystone of the legitimate government. He has more legitimate credentials compared to the legislative and judicial institutions: the Parliament has long since exceeded its constitutional term and may not have a quorum; the Supreme Judiciary Council has also been divided and derives its legitimacy from the president as its members are appointed by him according to Yemeni law.[1] Hadi was endorsed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, the UN, the political agreement between the Yemeni parties, and the 2012 public referendum. The president is the most powerful authority, according to the Article 119 of the Yemeni constitution, and nominates his deputy, the prime minister, and senior government officials, including high military commanders.
Legitimacy framework
Legitimacy is a very complicated concept comprising legal, political, and social aspects.[2] It is impossible to analyze legitimacy in Yemen without understanding the local and historical context. The Republic of Yemen is a representative democracy where the people are the source of legitimacy. The people directly elect the president and the Parliament (Majlis al-Nuwaab). According to Article 4 of the constitution, “The people of Yemen are the possessor and the source of power, which they exercise directly through public referendums and elections, or indirectly through the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, as well as through elected local councils.” Moreover, Article 5 states, “The political system of the Republic of Yemen is based on political and partisan pluralism.” Even the Houthis don’t question the democratic system, at least not publicly.
Following its signing in 2011, the GCC Initiative — a political agreement between then President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Yemen’s opposition parties that transferred power to Vice President Hadi and laid out a roadmap for a political transition — became, alongside the Constitution of Yemen, the country’s legal framework. Article 4 of the GCC Initiative states, “The GCC Initiative and the Mechanism shall supersede any current constitutional or legal arrangements. They may not be challenged before the institutions of the State.”[3] The GCC Initiative gave itself preeminence over the constitution by stipulating the authority of the president, his government, and the Parliament. It included a four-step political transition: the national dialogue, the drafting of a new constitution, a constitutional referendum, and a general election. The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was formed of 565 members representing most of the political and social spectrum. It was meant to draw a roadmap for a new social contract that was to be based on the rule of law, justice, and democracy.Since Parliament’s term in office was first extended in 2009, political actors in Yemen have promoted the idea of “consensual legitimacy” — a new political term — as an alternative to constitutional legitimacy.
Sole candidate
The 2011 GCC Initiative, endorsed by the UN, was designed to transfer presidential power to the vice president according to the constitution. In the 2012 election, however, Hadi was the sole presidential candidate as the GCC Initiative prevented the political parties from nominating anyone else.[4] The absence of a competitive presidential election was counter to democratic norms and the provisions of the 2001 constitution. However, on Feb. 21, 2012, nearly 7 million out of the 10 million registered voters voted for Hadi for president. Although the Yemeni people knew it was not a genuine election, they voted for Hadi based on a short-term transitional period and in the hopes of avoiding a civil war. According to the GCC Initiative, Hadi’s presidential term was set to run for two years, ending in 2014. However, the interim government and the NDC could not fulfill the requirements of the GCC Initiative on time.
The UN secretary-general’s special envoy to Yemen at the time, Jamal Benomar, had his own interpretation, which was that the GCC Initiative was based on “a mission rather than a time period.”[5] Ultimately, the General People’s Congress (GPC) party and Yemen’s opposition alliance, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), including the Houthis, reached a settlement and agreed to grant Hadi one more year in office. However, Hadi's opponents, former President Saleh and the Houthis, questioned the legitimacy of the move, ignoring the fact that they were responsible for the failure of the interim government and the delay in the implementation of the GCC Initiative. Because the extension of Hadi’s presidency went against what was laid out in the GCC Initiative, Hadi and the interim government began a campaign to promote their concept of “consensual legitimacy” on television, billboards, and newspapers.
On Sept. 21, 2014, the Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. On the evening of Jan. 22, 2015, Hadi, who had been put under house arrest by the Houthis, resigned. The Houthis preferred to retain him as president to legitimize their own actions and to avoid the perception of a coup, but within a month, Hadi had fled to Aden, withdrew his resignation, and nullified any decrees or appointments issued by the Houthis. The following day, Saleh held a meeting with the GPC and said Hadi could not withdraw his resignation. It had been argued that for Hadi’s resignation to be valid, the majority of the Parliament, according to Article 115 of the constitution, had to accept it. If they did not, he could resubmit his resignation within three months, at which point the Parliament would be obliged to accept it. Because of the instability, the Parliament could not hold any such session, so Hadi’s resignation was neither formally accepted, nor resubmitted, as laid out in the constitution. Therefore, Hadi still retains a thin thread of political legitimacy based on the 2012 election, consensual legitimacy in the period after, and international recognition of his government.
Longest parliament in Yemen’s history
The last parliamentary elections in Yemen were held in 2003, which resulted in a comfortable majority of 238 seats for the GPC, out of a total of 301 seats, leaving only 59 seats for all opposition parties (and four for non-partisans). Disputes over the register of voters maintained by Yemen’s Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendums delayed the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2009. Saleh was accused by his opponents of manipulating voter records. In the end, Saleh and the opposition agreed to reform the register of voters, and together they passed a bill to extend the term of current members of Parliament for two years. This political agreement to extend parliamentary terms rather than hold new elections was referred to locally as “consensual legitimacy.” In 2011, parliamentary elections were again delayed pursuant to the GCC Initiative, for another two years. All political parties participated to undermine legitimacy by going beyond the constitution. Moreover, the GCC Initiative bypassed Parliament’s authority and the body was retained only to maintain a veneer of legitimacy for the initiative. The last majority session was held on Dec. 18, 2014, after the Houthis took over the capital, to unanimously give a vote of confidence to the new cabinet formed by then Prime Minister Khaled Bahah. In February 2015, the Houthis issued a constitutional declaration and dismissed the body.[6] They later resumed parliamentary sessions in 2016.
The conflict has divided the legislative institution and created two parallel parliamentary entities, one in Sanaa under the Houthis’ de facto authority, and one in exile supporting the legitimate government. It took five years after the war broke out in 2014 for the legitimate government to convene the first parliamentary session. The session was held in Seyun, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, in April 2019 and elected Sultan al- Barakani as speaker.[7] Both Parliaments are facing legal challenges, including having the required quorum,[8] as about 35 members have already passed away.[9] According to Article 72 of the constitution, “For the meetings of the Parliament to be valid, it is necessary for more than half of its members to attend, excluding those whose seats were declared vacant.”
Constitutional scenarios
According to the Constitution of Yemen, Article 116 establishes legal procedures for several possible scenarios in the event that the presidency becomes vacant or the president is permanently incapacitated. In the first scenario, the vice president would temporarily take over the functions of president for a period of no more than 60 days. In the second scenario, if both the positions of president and vice president become vacant, then the Presiding Board of the Parliament shall temporarily take over the functions of the president. In the third scenario, if the positions of president and vice president become vacant and the Parliament is dissolved, then the government shall temporarily take over the functions of the president. The election of the president shall take place within no more than 60 days from the first session of the new Parliament.
According to these constitutional scenarios, there are three current possible people who could serve as the acting interim president, respectively: Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the vice president; Sultan al-Barakani, the speaker of the Parliament; and Dr. Maeen AbdulMalik, the prime minister. In all these scenarios, the acting president should not serve for more than 60 days. Then what? According to Article 114, an exception can be made "if the country is in a state of war or suffering a natural disaster or another emergency situation." However, the article not clear if that requires parliamentary approval. The Parliament, regardless of the issues with its legitimacy, is divided and may not have enough voting members.
Consensual legitimacy
The main political actors justified bypassing the constitution for the sake of maintaining political consensus and avoiding armed conflict. Unfortunately, that did not succeed. From a practical perspective, those same political forces may not agree to any one of the three officials mentioned in the constitution. There is an unwritten formula of political power in Yemen that is more complicated. It considers the North-South representation, well as political and tribal alliances and regional support, mainly by Saudi Arabia.
However, this time around it would be even more challenging to reach a political consensus. The country is already divided, facing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and a bloody, five-year-long war. The Houthis are not the only challenge for the internationally recognized government: there is also the STC, backed by the UAE. Though the STC signed the Saudi-brokered Riyadh Agreement in November 2019 to prevent future confrontations, there are no signs that the deal has been a success. Most recently, on April 26, the STC declared a state of emergency and self-rule over the South. Saudi Arabia rejected the declaration.[10] It should be noted that the existing framework for legitimacy is based on both a consensual political agreement and the constitution.
What can be done?
Facing this constitutional dilemma, the legitimate government must study the political options for post-Hadi scenarios to avoid a potential presidential vacuum. This issue should be discussed now while Hadi is still alive, and the discussion should consider the legal aspects.
The biggest problem with Hadi’s legitimacy is the fact that it is derived from the actions of the political elites and lacks popular support. From the perspective of ordinary people, his government has performed poorly and been unable to carry out even the minimum of its responsibilities. As a result, they may see legitimacy differently. A legitimate authority may be one that can provide salaries, basic services, and security, not one acting from exile for a long period of time. The legitimate government also depends for its survival to a great extent on international recognition and support, mainly from Saudi Arabia, which comes at the expense of its sovereignty.
The question of legitimacy in Yemen is not only about what would happen if Hadi passed away, but also how to restore legitimacy while he is still alive. The war may well drag on and a mechanism for transferring power and ensuring the rule of law needs to be found. It is important to emphasize that the legitimacy of a government is linked to the extent to which it is law-abiding.[11] Every time Hadi and his government bypass the law they undermine their own legitimacy. The legitimate government should explore the legal options for power sharing — such as a presidential council, for example — even while Hadi is still alive.[12] A basic principle of the law is that it does not depend on personal authority, but rather on the “impersonal norm.”[13]
Being an internationally recognized president gave Hadi the authority under international law, namely Article 51 of the UN Charter, to call for a foreign military intervention.[14] However, international recognition is not a blank check. Following the crisis from the beginning until today, there has been a clear decline in international support as the government’s legitimacy at home has ebbed and it has proven unable to win the conflict. It should be noted that the legal criticism of the internationally recognized government does not in any way strengthen the legitimacy of the Houthis’ de facto authority in Sanaa, nor that of the STC in Aden.
Hadi and his government must return to exercise their authorities and carry out their duties from inside Yemen, in any of the growing number of stable governates — Marib and Shabwa, for instance, if not Aden — and involve more local communities.
Legitimacy is the ultimate foundation of authority that confers on the government the right to enforce the law.[15] If Hadi and his government continue on their current path, their legitimacy will vanish. Were that to happen, the people of Yemen would find themselves in a very complicated situation, facing the dilemma of how to agree on a new framework for legitimacy and plunging the country into yet more conflict.
Mohammed Alshuwaiter is a legal consultant specialized in international law, human rights, and Yemeni law. The views expressed in this piece are his own. | ||||
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Tue, 05 Dec 2017 - 03:05 GMT
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi met Tuesday with Member of the British House of Commons Keith Vaz.
Yemen allies fight on in Sanaa as mediation efforts collapse
Sat, 02 Dec 2017 - 09:10 GMT
Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s supporters battled Iran-aligned Houthis for a fourth day on Saturday in the capital Sanaa, residents said. | ||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 38 | https://kids.kiddle.co/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi | en | Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi facts for kids | [
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] | null | [] | null | Learn Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi facts for kids | en | /images/wk/favicon-16x16.png | https://kids.kiddle.co/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi | Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (Arabic: عبدربه منصور هادي, romanized: ʿAbd Rabbih Manṣūr Hādī Yemeni pronunciation: [ˈʕæb.də ˈrɑb.bu mɑnˈsˤuːr ˈhæːdi]; born 1 September 1945) is a Yemeni politician and former field marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces who served as the president of Yemen from 2012 until 2022, when he stepped down and transferred executive authority to the Presidential Leadership Council, with Rashad al-Alimi as its chairman. He was the vice president to Ali Abdullah Saleh from 1994 to 2012.
Between 4 June and 23 September 2011, Hadi was the acting president of Yemen while Ali Abdullah Saleh was undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia following an attack on the presidential palace during the 2011 Yemeni uprising. On 23 November, he became Acting President again, after Saleh moved into a non-active role pending the presidential election "in return for immunity from prosecution". Hadi was "expected to form a national unity government and also call for early presidential elections within 90 days" while Saleh continued to serve as president in name only. Mansour Hadi was chosen as a president for a two-year transitional period on 21 February by Yemen's political factions, in an election where he was the sole consensus candidate, although the election was boycotted by Houthis in the north and Southern Secessionists in the south of the country. Hadi's mandate was extended for another year in January 2014. According to pro-Houthi media outlet SABA, Hadi remained in power after the expiration of his mandate.
On 22 January 2015, he was forced to resign by the Houthis in the midst of mass protest against his decision to raise the fuel subsidies and due to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 2011 Revolution. Subsequently, the Houthis and the supporters of Saleh seized the presidential palace and placed Hadi under house arrest. The Houthis named a Revolutionary Committee to assume the powers of the presidency, as well as unify with the General People's Congress, Hadi's own political party. A month later, Hadi escaped to his hometown of Aden, rescinded his resignation, and denounced the Houthi takeover. He arrived in Riyadh the next day, as a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia intervened in support of his government. He returned to Aden in September 2015, as Saudi-backed government forces recaptured the city. In late 2017, he was reportedly residing in Riyadh under house arrest.
In 2022, Hadi transferred his powers to a newly formed Presidential Leadership Council led by Rashad al-Alimi which would seek a political solution to Yemen's civil war. This came amid a broader push for peace with Saudi Arabia. Multiple sources in the Saudi and Yemeni governments alleged that he had been forced to cede power by the Saudis.
Early life and education
Hadi was born on 1 September 1945 in Thukain, Al Wade'a District, Abyan, a southern Yemeni governorate. He graduated from a military academy in the Federation of South Arabia in 1966. In 1966 he graduated after receiving a military scholarship to study in Britain, but was not able to attend, as he did not speak English.
In 1970, he received another military scholarship to study tanks in Egypt. Hadi spent the following four years in the Soviet Union studying military leadership. He occupied several military posts in the army of South Yemen until 1986, when he fled to North Yemen with Ali Nasser Mohammed, president of South Yemen, after Ali Nasser's faction of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party lost the 1986 civil war.
Career
Hadi played a low-profile role during the Aden Emergency. Following the independence of South Yemen, he rose to prominence in the new military, reaching the rank of Major General.
He remained loyal to President Ali Nasser Mohammed during the South Yemen Civil War, and followed him into exile in neighboring North Yemen. During the 1994 civil war in Yemen, Hadi sided with the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and was appointed as Minister of Defense. In this role he led the military campaign against the Democratic Republic of Yemen. Following the war he was promoted to vice president on 3 October 1994, replacing Ali Salim Al-Beidh, who had resigned and fought against the government during the civil war.
President of Yemen
Main article: 2012 Yemeni presidential election
Hadi was the sole candidate in the presidential election that was held on 21 February 2012. His candidacy was backed by the ruling party, as well as by the parliamentary opposition. The Electoral Commission reported that 65 percent of registered voters in Yemen voted during the election. Hadi won with 100% of the vote and took the oath of office in Yemen's parliament on 25 February 2012. He was formally inaugurated as the president of Yemen on 27 February 2012, when Saleh resigned from the presidency and formally ceded power to Hadi.
Political reform
In March 2013 the National Dialogue Conference was conceived as a core part of the transition process and is intended to bring together Yemen's diverse political and demographic groups to address critical issues. In January 2014, Hadi pushed delegates at the conference to break a deadlock on key issues and bring the talks to an overdue close. When those in attendance finally agreed on a final few points, he launched into an impassioned speech that led to a spike in his popularity. It was agreed that Yemen would shift to a federal model of government in the future, a move which has been proposed and forcefully backed by Hadi. For many Yemenis, particularly in northwestern Yemen, this decentralization was less attractive. This mountainous region is the poorest of Yemen and decentralization would mean that it would receive less money from the central government. Relevant here is that the overwhelming majority of Yemen's population has resided in this area for many years. Indeed, the 'decentralization' of Yemen along the lines proposed by the Saudi-imposed Hadi regime threatened Yemen's long-term economic and political independence; scholar Isa Blumi points out that "To any rational observer, the idea of developing Yemen into six disproportionate regions with enormous autonomy was a blatant effort to benefit foreign interests and subdue the rebellious populations through poverty and administrative obscurity." Indeed, if the Saudi-American decentralization 'road map to peace' is implemented, Yemen's oil wealth would be confined almost entirely to the provinces of Hadhramawt and Saba', Yemen's two least populated provinces. Blumi goes on to point out that "This would make bribing the few thousands of eligible 'residents' with a tiny portion of the oil revenue (no longer flowing to the central state) easy, while creating an enormous windfall for those hoping to steal Yemen's wealth." They also didn't like that the new regional borders would rob them of access to the sea.
Military
In a move to unify the Armed Forces of Yemen which suffered from split since the Yemeni Revolution, Hadi began reforming the Military. He issued Presidential decree No.104 December 2012 reorganizing the Military into five main branches: Air Force, Army (Ground Force), Navy and Coastal Defence, Border Troops and Strategic Reserve Forces, which includes the Special Operation Command, the Missile Defence Command and the Presidential Protective Forces. The Strategic Reserve Forces replaces the Republican Guard.
Security issues
See also: 2012 Sanaʽa bombing
From his early days at office, Hadi advocated fighting Al-Qaida as an important goal. In a meeting with British Foreign Secretary, William Hague in his first days in office Hadi said "We intend to confront terrorism with full force and whatever the matter we will pursue it to the very last hiding place".
The Yemeni military had suffered from sharp divisions since Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar defected in late March 2011 amid protests demanding the ouster of Hadi's predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The military protests extended to the Republican Guard based in the south of Sana'a when dozens from the Fourth Brigade closed down southern entrances to the capital city and demanded the firing of the brigade's commander, Mohammad Al-Arar, and his general staff.
In an interview in September 2012 given to The Washington Post, Hadi warned that his country, still reeling from the popular uprising that ousted Saleh, risked a descent into a civil war "worse than Afghanistan" should an upcoming months-long national dialogue fail to resolve the state's deep political and societal rifts. He also said that Yemen was facing "three undeclared wars" conducted by al Qaeda, pirates in the Gulf of Aden, and Houthi rebels in the north, and that Iran was supporting these adversaries indirectly without giving further details.
Houthis, on their side, complained of murder attacks on their delegates to the NDC.
In response to the murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi after visiting a Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Hadi said that the "cheap political and media targeting of Saudi Arabia will not deter it from continuing its leading role in the Arab and Islamic worlds."
Rebel takeover and civil war
Hadi was forced to agree to a power-sharing deal after the fall of Sana'a to the rebel umbrella organization Ansar Allah in September 2014. Also known as the Houthis, these revolutionaries refused to participate in the "unity government", although they continued to occupy key positions and buildings in Sana'a and hold territory throughout northern Yemen. Hadi was further humiliated when the General People's Congress ousted him as its leader and rejected his cabinet choices on 8 November 2014. It is important to note that the Houthis' pretext for entering Sana'a and deposing Hadi was to reverse an apparent breach of the Hadi government's mandate by unilaterally declaring an extension of its power beyond the two-year intermediary period actually set by the GCC and the United States. They also accused the president of seeking to bypass a power-sharing deal signed when they seized Sana'a in September, and say they are also working to protect state institutions from corrupt civil servants and officers trying to plunder state property.
Three days after Hadi's resignation (21 January 2015), the Houthis took over the presidential palace. Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah tendered their resignations to parliament which reportedly refused to accept them. Then the Yemeni cabinet was dissolved. Hadi and his former ministers remained under virtual house arrest since their resignations.
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for Hadi to be restored as president after the Houthis installed themselves as the interim government in February 2015. According to Houthi-controlled state media, Hadi reaffirmed on 8 February that his resignation was "final" and could not be withdrawn. However, after leaving Sana'a and traveling to his hometown of Aden on 21 February, Hadi gave a speech in which he presented himself as Yemen's president and said the actions taken by the Houthis since 21 September were unconstitutional and invalid.
On 26 March 2015 Saudi state TV Al Ekhbariya reported that Hadi arrived at a Riyadh airbase and was met by Saudi Arabia Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud as Saudi Arabia and its allies launched airstrikes in Yemen against the Houthis in the 2015 military intervention in Yemen. His route from Aden to Riyadh was not immediately known.
On 25 March 2017 a court in the Houthi-controlled Sana'a sentenced Hadi and six other government officials to death in absentia for "high treason", which meant "incitement and assistance" to Saudi Arabia and its allies." The sentence was announced by the Houthi-controlled Saba News Agency.
Resignation
On April 7, 2022, Hadi announced in a televised speech that he is resigning from office, dismissing vice president Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and transfers both office's powers to the newly formed eight member Presidential Leadership Council chaired by Rashad al-Alimi. He also said that the council was tasked with negotiating with the Houthi rebels to agree to a permanent ceasefire. The presidential council's leader had close ties with Saudi Arabia, and some of Yemen's other political groups, including the Islah party. Officials from Saudi Arabia and Yemen claimed that Hadi was pushed by Riyadh to give up his power to the presidential council. Hadi received a written decree from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to transfer his authority to the council. According to Prince Mohammed the decision was approved by other Yemeni leaders. Hadi was also threatened by Saudi officials using the evidence of corruption allegedly committed by him. Following his decision to step down, he was kept under a house arrest in his Riyadh residence and was not allowed to communicate with anyone. All these claims were denied by Saudi Arabia.
See also | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 23 | https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/385/ | en | Old City of Sana'a | [
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Brief synthesis
Situated in a mountain valley at an altitude of 2,200 m, the Old City of Sana'a is defined by an extraordinary density of rammed earth and burnt brick towers rising several stories above stone-built ground floors, strikingly decorated with geometric patterns of fired bricks and white gypsum. The ochre of the buildings blends into the bistre-colored earth of the nearby mountains. Within the city, minarets pierce the skyline and spacious green bustans (gardens) are scattered between the densely packed houses, mosques, bath buildings and caravanserais.
Inhabited for more than 2,500 years, the city was given official status in the second century BC when it was an outpost of the Yemenite kingdoms. By the first century AD it emerged as a centre of the inland trade route. The site of the cathedral and the martyrium constructed during the period of Abyssinian domination (525-75) bear witness to Christian influence whose apogee coincided with the reign of Justinian. The remains of the pre-Islamic period were largely destroyed as a result of profound changes in the city from the 7th century onwards when Sana'a became a major centre for the spread of the Islamic faith as demonstrated by the archaeological remains within the Great Mosque, said to have been constructed while the Prophet was still living. Successive reconstructions of Sana'a under Ottoman domination beginning in the 16th century respected the organization of space characteristic of the early centuries of Islam while changing the appearance of the city and expanding it with a second city to the west. The houses in the old city are of relatively recent construction and have a traditional structure.
As an outstanding example of a homogeneous architectural ensemble reflecting the spatial characteristics of the early years of Islam, the city in its landscape has an extraordinary artistic and pictorial quality. Its many-storied buildings represent an outstanding response to defensive needs in providing spacious living quarters for the maximum number of residents within defensible city walls. The buildings demonstrate exceptional craftsmanship in the use of local materials and techniques. The houses and public buildings of Sana'a, which have become vulnerable as a result of contemporary social changes, are an outstanding example of a traditional, Islamic human settlement.
Described by historians, geographers and scholars of the early Islamic and medieval eras, Sana'a is associated with the civilizations of the Bible and the Koran.
Criterion (iv):Within its partially preserved wall, it offers an outstanding example of a homogeneous architectural ensemble, which design and detail translate an organization of space characteristic of the early centuries of Islam which has been respected over time.
Criterion (v): The houses of Sana'a, which have become vulnerable as a result of contemporary social changes, are an outstanding example of an extraordinary masterpiece, traditional human settlement.
Criterion (vi): Sana'a is directly and tangibly associated with the history of the spread of Islam in the early years of the Hegira. The Great mosque of Sana'a, built in year 6 of Hegira, is known as the first mosque built outside Mecca and Medina.The Old City of Sana'a has contributed to and played a major role in Yemeni, Arab and Islamic World history through the contributions of historical Yemeni figures including Al Hassan B. Ahmed Al Hamdany, Ahamed Al Razy and Al Shawkany.
Integrity (2011)
A significant proportion of all the attributes that express the Outstanding Universal Value are within the property. However, in certain quarters of the city, acceleration of new development is eroding its character. The visual integrity of the property is threatened by an increase in new modern hotels and telecommunication towers in the surrounding landscape.
The disappearance of the traditional juridical system or the application of new and supplementary ones, the accelerated social and economical changes, the rapid urban development within and around the city and the disappearance of open space as the bustans are gradually built over, are creating various unbearable pressures on the city and its inhabitants.
Authenticity (2011)
The attributes that carry Outstanding Universal Value are the overall design of the city and its buildings with their decorated façades, traditional building materials, and the open spaces (bustans, maqashe and sarah'at ) considered as part of the city's urban environment, together with the visual appearance of the city surrounded by mountains. The authenticity of these attributes is vulnerable to incorrect conservation practices and development. Associated intangible values relating to traditional socio-economic activities, including the very high percentage of home ownership, continue to be demonstrated.
Protection and management requirements (2011)
The protection of the Old City of Sana'a is ensured by the Antiquities Law of 1997 as well as the Building Law of 2002. Protection will be improved when the Historical Cities Preservation Law comes into force. The preparation of a Conservation Plan, and of an exhaustive inventory of buildings of the city and its surroundings have been completed. The General Organization for the Preservation of the Historic Cities of Yemen (GOPHCY) aims to develop the Conservation Plan in the next few years. It is also proposed to establish a Conservation Unit to involve all stakeholders, who will be encouraged to participate in the preparation of the city Management Plan process. GOPHCY, established in 1990, is an independent body set up to create an appropriate strategy for sustainable development. After the new Law enters into force, it will become the overall authority for management of the World Heritage property.
In its decision concerning inscription, the World Heritage Committee "recommended that an adequate buffer zone should be established around the old city." This recommendation should be implemented in order to improve the protection of the property which also needs clearly defined boundaries.
In the long term, it is intended to adopt a clear strategy for sustainable preservation and development of the Old City and to reach a better control of the setting as well as ensuring the balance between commercial and residential activities. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 80 | https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/yemen/ | en | The World Factbook | [
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The Kingdom of Yemen (colloquially known as North Yemen) became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic. The British, who had set up a protectorate area around the southern port of Aden in the 19th century, withdrew in 1967 from what became the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (colloquially known as South Yemen). Three years later, the southern government adopted a Marxist orientation and changed the country's name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributed to two decades of hostility between the states, which were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A southern secessionist movement and brief civil war in 1994 was quickly subdued. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed to delineate their border. Fighting in the northwest between the government and the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010, and then again from 2014 to the present. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2007.
Public rallies in Sana'a against then President Ali Abdallah SALIH -- inspired by similar Arab Spring demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt -- slowly gained momentum in 2011, fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. Some protests resulted in violence, and the demonstrations spread to other major cities. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) mediated the crisis with the GCC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH eventually agreed to step down and transfer some powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. After HADI's uncontested election victory in 2012, SALIH formally transferred all presidential powers. In accordance with the GCC Initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. HADI concluded the NDC in 2014 and planned to proceed with constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections.
The Houthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces with SALIH and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen, which culminated in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabled their forces to overrun the capital, Sana'a, in 2014. In 2015, the Houthis surrounded key government facilities, prompting HADI and the cabinet to resign. HADI fled first to Aden -- where he rescinded his resignation -- and then to Oman before moving to Saudi Arabia and asking the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen. Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes, and ground fighting continued through 2016. In 2016, the UN initiated peace talks that ended without agreement. Rising tensions between the Houthis and SALIH culminated in Houthi forces killing SALIH. In 2018, the Houthis and the Yemeni Government participated in UN-brokered peace talks, agreeing to a limited cease-fire and the establishment of a UN mission.
In 2019, Yemenâs parliament convened for the first time since the conflict broke out in 2014. Violence then erupted between HADI's government and the pro-secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in southern Yemen. HADI's government and the STC signed a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting, and in 2020, the signatories formed a new cabinet. In 2020 and 2021, fighting continued as the Houthis gained territory and also conducted regular UAV and missile attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia. In 2022, the UN brokered a temporary truce between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. HADI and his vice-president resigned and were replaced by an eight-person Presidential Leadership Council. Although the truce formally expired in 2022, the parties nonetheless refrained from large-scale conflict through the end of 2023. Saudi Arabia, after the truce expired, continued to negotiate with the Yemeni Government and Houthis on a roadmap agreement that would include a permanent ceasefire and a peace process under UN auspices.
Telecommunication systems
general assessment: Yemen continues to provide an exceptionally challenging market for telcos; civil unrest has caused havoc and devastation across most parts of the country, while the threat of sanctions has also made it a challenging environment in which to operate; a large proportion of the population requires humanitarian assistance, and there is little disposable income for services upon which telcos can generate revenue; essential telecom infrastructure, such as mobile towers and fiber cabling, has often been targeted, destroyed, or damaged by the opposing sides in the ongoing conflict; these difficulties have proved to be a disincentive to telcos investing in infrastructure, with the result that the country lacks basic fixed-line infrastructure, and mobile services are based on outdated GSM; this has prevented the development of a mobile broadband sector, or the evolution of mobile data services; the ownership of telecommunication services, and the scrutiny of associated revenues and taxes, have become a political issue in Yemen; until telecom infrastructure can be improved across Yemen, and until civil unrest eases, there will be little progress for the sector (2022)
domestic: fixed-line teledensity is 4 per 100 but mobile cellular is 46 per 100 (2021)
international: country code - 967; landing points for the FALCON, SeaMeWe-5, Aden-Djibouti, and the AAE-1 international submarine cable connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2020)
Military - note
government forces under the Yemeni Ministry of Defense are responsible for territorial defense, but also have internal security functions; their main focus is on the Houthi rebels and protecting Yemenâs maritime borders, which are susceptible to smuggling of arms, fighters, and other material support for the Houthis and terrorist groups operating in Yemen, including al-Qaâida in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Yemen; the National Army is organized into brigades of armored, border guard, infantry, mechanized, presidential protection, and special forces; the brigades vary significantly in size, structure, and capabilities; the Air Force has small numbers of mostly Soviet-era aircraft while the Navy and Coast Guard have a few patrol boats
in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states (UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt) intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Houthis; Saudi military forces conducted operations in Yemen and raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border; UAE's participation in 2015 included several thousand ground troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a smaller military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); UAE has recruited, trained, and equipped tens of thousands of Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units
Houthi (aka Ansarallah) forces are organized into combat, presidential protection, special forces, and tribal/militia/paramilitary brigades and independent battalions; the Houthis also have UAV and missile units, as well as naval forces (mines, anti-ship missiles, and some boats); Iran has provided military and political support to the Houthis; in January 2024, the US Government designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group; the designation came after the Houthis began launching attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, as well as military forces positioned in the area to defend the safety and security of commercial shipping (2024) | |||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 35 | https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Yemen.html | en | Yemen | [
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Al-Jumhuriyah al-Yamaniyah
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
POPULATION.
With a population of 18,078,035 (est. July 2001), Yemen is one of the most populous countries on the Arabian Peninsula. The 1990 population estimate was only 11.88 million. The population growth rate in 2000 was estimated at 3.36 percent, but is expected to drop significantly in the coming decade. With a projected growth rate of 2.8 percent between 2000 and 2015, the population is expected to reach 36 million by the year 2029. The majority of the population are Muslims of the Sunni Shaf'i and the Shi'ite Zaydi traditions. There is also a small minority of Jews and Christians.
Yemen's population growth is very high by world standards, and the highest in the Middle East. The population is generally young, with some 50 percent below the age of 15. About 25 percent of the population live below the poverty line, up from 19 percent in 1992, and the average annual income is less than US$400. Widespread malnutrition and diseases make the infant mortality rate in Yemen one of the highest in the region. An estimated 38 percent of Yemenis age 15 or older could read and write in 1990. Among women, the rate was only 26 percent.
FISHING.
Though Yemen's location would suggest a booming fishing industry, actual fishing production remains low, largely due to under-exploitation. Most fishing activity continues to center around small boats and family-owned businesses. The sector employs some 41,000 people and produced over 127,000 tons of fish catch in 1998. Yemeni fishing would likely benefit from regulation and effective enforcement to avoid the over-fishing of some species.
INDUSTRY
MINING.
Oil is a significant source of revenue for the government and of export earnings. Yemen's oil reserves, however, are small by regional standards. Oil reserves, proven and unproven, are estimated to be about 4 billion barrels, in comparison to Saudi Arabia, which has over 260 billion barrels of proven and unproven reserves. Most of the oil production is concentrated in the country's 2 largest fields at Ma'rib and Masila. There are also significant oil fields in Jannah, East Shabwa, and Iyad. Unlike neighboring Arab oil producing states, oil production is dominated by foreign companies. Several foreign companies, such as Hunt Oil Company (U.S.) and Canadian Occidental, enjoy production-sharing agreements, but Yemen's uncertain political atmosphere and dim oil prospects have limited the number of foreign companies interested in the oil sector. The sector's future lies in the successful exploration of new fields.
In addition to oil, Yemen's Ma'rib region is home to natural gas reserves estimated at 16.9 trillion cubic feet. Although small by regional standards, the gas is produced in commercial quantities, but competition and the lack of potential clients have thus far hindered the development of this endeavor. Other minerals include gypsum, salt, and gold.
MANUFACTURING.
The manufacturing sector is an important and growing contributor to the Yemeni economy, accounting for about 12 percent of GDP in 1998. The sector has grown steadily in the last decade, but its growth is hindered by competition from imported goods and the lack of funding. Oil refining accounts for half of manufacturing activity. Refining activities are mostly concentrated in Aden and Ma'rib.
Yemen's small industrial base is built around small-sized, family-owned enterprises. Yemen has some 33,284 industrial establishments employing 1 to 4 workers. All large-and medium-sized establishments account for 5 percent of the total number of industrial enterprises. The bulk of Yemen's industrial base is centered on food processing and beverages, but production of cooking oil and flour has increased in recent years. The production of mixed metal products, such as water storage tanks, doors, and windows is the second largest industry, followed by the production of non-metallic products.
SERVICES
TOURISM.
Tourism is not a significant contributor to Yemen's economy, despite the government's continuous effort to promote the country as a tourist destination. The sector suffers from a number of problems, foremost among which are political instability and the absence of modern facilities and infrastructure. Furthermore, at least 100 foreigners were reported kidnapped in 1999. Western countries have been advising their nationals against travel to Yemen since the 1998 abduction and killing of 18 foreigners. The number of tourists visiting the country dropped significantly after the 1998 incident, from 87,000 in 1987 to 45,000 in 1999.
FINANCIAL SERVICES.
Yemen's banking system is poor and suffers from a number of problems, including a poor loan collection record, low bank monetary assets, and questionable policies regarding the extension of loans to clients. Despite government efforts to reform the financial sector by setting new standards for local banks in 1997, the sector continues to suffer from poor enforcement and compliance, a weak judicial system to ensure collection, and a general lack of public trust in the banking system as a whole. Furthermore, the government's efforts to sell its 2 major commercial banks have been rather slow, mainly due to the long preparation time required to bring these banks up to standard for sale.
Both public and private banks operate in Yemen. Both state-owned commercial banks and 3 of the 12 private banks follow Islamic banking practices, which includes not charging interest on loans. There are also 4 foreign-operated banks. Banking facilities are virtually absent in rural areas, and most loans are extended to well-known businessmen or on the basis of personal connections, making it hard for independent entrepreneurs to access funding.
RETAIL.
Yemen lacks well-developed commercial centers —even in the larger coastal cities—and, therefore, has a poorly developed retail sector. The majority of shops in major cities are small and family-owned and run. Small family shops and temporary road stands characterize this sector in the majority of inland towns.
DEPENDENCIES
Yemen has no territories or colonies.
CAPITAL:
Sanaa.
MONETARY UNIT:
Yemeni riyal (YR). One riyal equals 100 fils. There are coins of 1, 5, 10, 25, and 50 fils riyals, and notes of 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 riyals.
CHIEF EXPORTS:
Crude oil, cotton, coffee, and dried and salted fish.
CHIEF IMPORTS:
Food, live animals, machinery and equipment, and manufactured goods. | |||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 7 | https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/21/yemen-houthi-rebels-president-hadi-fled-capital | en | Yemen's Houthi rebels say former president has fled capital | [
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] | 2015-02-21T00:00:00 | Rebels’ spokesperson plays down significance of<strong> </strong>Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi’s escape, giving no detail about how he got past tight security | en | the Guardian | https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/21/yemen-houthi-rebels-president-hadi-fled-capital | The powerful Houthi movement in Yemen has said the former president Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi fled his house disguised in women’s clothes and headed to the southern port city of Aden.
Ali al-Gohoum, a spokesperson for the Houthi rebels, speaking from the movement’s stronghold in the northern province of Saada, downplayed the significance of Hadi’s escape from the capital Sana’a.
He gave no details on when and how Hadi broke tightened security measures around his house. Little information is available about Hadi’s next plan.
The Houthis sealed their control of the Yemeni capital in January when they stormed the presidential palace and president’s house, forcing Hadi and his prime minister to resign in the same day.
Hadi and some resigned ministers had been put under house arrest for nearly a month. Officials who visited the former president during his custody said Hadi was in need of urgent medical treatment overseas as he was suffering from health problems.
Nadia al-Sakkaf, the former minister of information who recently visited Hadi in his house, told the Guardian the former president was suffering from cardiovascular disease.
“He has a heart condition, he has already had bypass sugary in the USA before and he do regular checkups. He is over 70 years old and with the stress and being under siege and the coup and the bad treatment he has been receiving his health got worse,” Sakkaf said.
Hadi regularly visited cardiology hospitals in the US when he was vice-president.
‘Legitimate’ president
Despite offering his resignation, Hadi’s supporters took to the streets of many Yemeni cities condemning the Houthis’ “coup” and calling for reinstallation of the former president.
On Wednesday, large rallies were held in Sana’a, Dhamar, Ibb and Taiz calling for the Houthis to withdraw from the capital and other areas that they have controlled since late September.
Mohammed al-Sabri, a leading figure in the opposition’s Nasserist party, said that Hadi was still a legitimate president.
“Hadi did not flee the capital. He left an occupied city into Aden. His legitimacy stems from the nationwide protests that denounce the Houthis’ occupation of the capital.”
The Houthis jumped to the political panorama of the troubled country in September when they quickly gained control of key government and military institutes and subsequently expanded influence into new provinces in northern Yemen.
Hadi came to power in 2012 after unchallenged election following the departure of the country’s long-serving president Ali Abdullah Saleh. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 55 | https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/saudi-led-coalition/ | en | Actor Profile: Saudi-led Coalition | [
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] | null | [] | 2023-11-20T17:49:58+00:00 | In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of other Arab allies launched a military intervention to restore the authority of Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The intervention largely consisted of air and naval operations in support of the Yemeni government and resistance troops. | en | ACLED | https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/saudi-led-coalition/ | Historical background
The Coalition consisting of 10 countries spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE began military operations in Yemen on 26 March 2015. The decision came at the request of Yemeni President Hadi, who called upon the GCC to prevent Yemen from falling into the hands of the Houthis. The Coalition achieved immediate air superiority through the systematic destruction of Yemen’s air bases and air defenses. A land, sea, and air blockade began in April 2015 to enforce an arms embargo imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216. The Coalition also committed to train Yemeni resistance forces and deploy ground troops, including Saudi border guards, the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, and the Emirati elite forces.
The Coalition’s military support was critical in order to bolster Yemeni resistance to the advancing Houthi-Saleh forces. Airstrikes severely hampered military capacity, forcing Houthi-Saleh forces into the defensive. Saudi forces regularly engaged in cross-border shelling, targeting Houthi forces and civilian sites in Yemen’s north. Emirati elite brigades played a decisive role in the retaking of Aden in 2015 and Mukalla in 2016, and spearheaded the military offensives that led Coalition-backed Yemeni troops to encircle the western port city of al-Hudayda (for more, see the section on Joint Forces). The UAE also orchestrated the training of several southern armed groups, which starting in 2017 formed the backbone of the STC (for more, see the section on Southern Transitional Council). In March 2023, the Coalition announced a unilateral suspension of its military operations in Yemen.
The Coalition’s military operations also resulted in severe humanitarian consequences. Airstrikes frequently hit civilian targets and populated areas, including medical facilities, schools, and markets. According to ACLED data, over 9,200 civilians are estimated to have been killed as a result of Coalition operations in Yemen between March 2015 and July 2023 – although this number is likely to be higher as it does not include those killed in the targeting of military sites. Approximately 90% of all airstrikes against civilian targets and related fatalities occurred between 2015 and 2018. The blockade has also exacerbated the plight of the Yemeni population, preventing the entry of fuel, medicine, and other essential goods into the country. UN experts stated that the Coalition may have been responsible for “war crimes” due to their failure to protect Yemeni civilians.
Saudi and Emirati interests have increasingly diverged in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is largely concerned with securing its 800-mile border with Yemen and has committed to support the IRG and its major military and political stakeholder, the Islamist Islah party, in the war against the Houthis. The UAE has instead focused on containing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis, securing its commercial interests, and consolidating local alliances. To achieve these goals, the UAE has supported the separatist STC, Islah’s arch-enemy in southern Yemen. On several occasions, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have consequently found themselves at odds. In August 2019, at the height of the clashes between the IRG and the STC in Aden, the UAE reportedly bombed pro-government troops in neighboring Abyan governorate. Other rivalries have emerged in southeastern Yemen, where UAE-backed groups have occasionally locked horns with the Saudi-backed IRG. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 5 | https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704852 | en | Yemen country profile | [
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"BBC News",
"www.facebook.com"
] | 2011-08-28T21:14:36+00:00 | Provides an overview of Yemen, including key dates and facts about this Middle Eastern country. | en | BBC News | https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704852 | Despite its ancient roots as the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the modern Republic of Yemen is a relatively new state.
It was created after communist South Yemen merged with North Yemen in 1990, following years of strife, but tensions have never been far below the surface.
Yemen has been in state of political crisis since 2011, when a fresh wave of protests in 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, forced President Ali Abdallah Saleh to resign.
In the ensuing turmoil, the Houthis seized much of the north and west of the country, while Saudi-led forces intervened to support the internationally-recognised government based initially in Aden in the south. The multi-sided fighting has also seen activity by al-Qaeda and Islamic State jihadist groups.
In 2018, Aden was seized by the separatist Southern Transitional Council, which is supported by the United Arab Emirates. The internationally-recognised government - the Presidential Leadership Council - is now based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The continuing civil war in Yemen has reportedly left more than 150,000 people dead and triggered one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with more than 23 million people - three quarters of the population - in need of some form of aid.
Rashad al-Alimi became chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council when President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi transferred his powers to the council in April 2022.
It is tasked with negotiating with the Houthis to agree a permanent ceasefire and a political solution to the war.
The other seven members include Aidrous al-Zubaidi, head of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) that wants an independent South Yemen; Tareq Saleh, a military commander and nephew of late former president Ali Abdullah Saleh; and Sheikh Sultan al-Arada, governor of the oil-rich province of Marib and a key battleground in the conflict.
Announcing the transfer of power, President Hadi said the council would manage Yemen's political, military and security affairs during what he called the "transitional period". It would also "negotiate with the Houthis to reach a ceasefire all over Yemen and sit at the negotiating table to reach a final political solution".
Some key dates in Yemen's history:
1500s - Ottomans absorb part of Yemen into their empire but are expelled in the 1600s.
1839 - Aden in South Yemen comes under British rule. When the Suez Canal opens in 1869, it serves as a refuelling port of strategic importance to the British empire.
1918 - Ottoman Empire dissolves, North Yemen gains independence and is ruled by Imam Yahya.
1948 - Yahya assassinated, but his son Ahmad fights off opponents of feudal rule and succeeds his father.
1962 - Imam Ahmad dies and is succeeded by his son, but army officers seize power and set up the Yemen Arab Republic, sparking civil war between royalists supported by Saudi Arabia and republicans backed by Egypt.
1967 - Britain withdraws from the south after years of a pro-independence insurgency, and its former territories unite as the People's Republic of Yemen.
1969 - A communist coup renames the south the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and reorients it towards the Soviet bloc.
1990 - The two Yemens unite as the Republic of Yemen with Ali Abdallah Saleh as president, as the Soviet bloc implodes. Tension between former states endures.
1994 - Brief war of secession ends in defeat of southern separatist forces.
2000 - Al-Qaeda gains prominence in Yemen, ushering in a period of terrorist attacks.
2004 - Troops battle Shia insurgency led by Hussein al-Houthi in the north.
2009 - Yemeni army launches a fresh offensive against Houthi rebels in the northern Saada province. Tens of thousands of people are displaced by the fighting.
2010 - Thousands flee government offensive against separatists in southern Shabwa province.
2011 - Arab Spring protests spread to Yemen; President Saleh agrees to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.
2014 - Houthi Shia rebels overrun the capital, Sanaa, plunging country into a prolonged civil war.
2015 - Saudi Arabia leads international military coalition against the Houthis, who it says are being aided by Iran.
Islamic State carries out its first major attacks in Yemen - two suicide bombings targeting Shia mosques in Sanaa, in which 137 people are killed.
2018 - Southern Yemeni separatists, the Southern Transitional Council - backed by the United Arab Emirates - seize control of Aden, the main city in the south.
2019 - Separatists and government sign power-sharing agreement to end conflict in southern Yemen.
2022 - President Hadi resigns after losing the support of the Saudi-led coalition and the Presidential Leadership Council takes power. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 34 | https://www.visionofhumanity.org/the-humanitarian-crisis-in-yemen/ | en | The Yemen Humanitarian Crisis: Current Struggles in 2021 | [
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] | 2021-05-18T23:00:00+00:00 | The Yemen humanitarian crisis is likely to be alleviated only by each side and its regional backers treating it as an urgent priority. | en | Vision of Humanity | https://www.visionofhumanity.org/the-humanitarian-crisis-in-yemen/ | Last week, the government of Yemen started to administer the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine. The vaccination campaign has become the latest source of dispute in a country that has been at war since 2014.
The internationally recognised government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi exercises ever-decreasing control over Yemen’s territory. Its principal military opponent is the Houthi rebels who occupy most of the country’s north.
Almost all of the 360,000 doses that Yemen has received through the World Health Organisation, enough to cover only a small fraction of the country’s population, are to be administered in the south.
The Houthi administration does not report COVID-19 cases.
The government claims to have offered 10,000 doses to the Houthis, but accuses the Houthis of refusing to run a vaccination campaign in densely populated areas such as their capital, Sanaa.
The Houthi administration does not report COVID-19 cases. The government does, but testing rates are low and the official figures understate the extent to which the pandemic is affecting the country.
Throughout Yemen, whether in government or Houthi areas, a decrepit public health system is under extraordinary pressure. Médecins Sans Frontières has long described the health system as “broken” and warned in late March of an exponential increase in observed COVID-19 cases.
The health system continues to fail to deal with a cholera pandemic that has affected around two million people since the beginning of the civil war.
Even individual deaths become a source of tit-for-tat allegations in a public relations war. A Houthi leader, Zakaria al-Shami, died in mid-March. Houthi officials claimed that his death was due to COVID-19.
The government briefed Arab media that he was killed in a successful military operation. That narrative, true or not, suits the government and its regional allies, including Saudi Arabia, who are keen to show that they are gaining the upper hand in the conflict.
Most senior Yemeni government officials, including President Hadi, operate from the distant comfort of the Saudi capital, Riyadh.
That betrays the chasm between the government’s leaders and the day-to-day experience of Yemenis, as well as the reality that the government is largely a client of Saudi Arabia.
The Saudis have been active participants in the war since 2015 and lead a regional anti-Houthi military alliance that includes the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.
The Saudi intervention
Saudi Arabia’s enthusiastic participation in Yemen’s civil war has been a project of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the kingdom’s de facto ruler. The Saudi intervention was originally conceived as a short and decisive intervention, but has become an unmitigated failure.
There are finally signs that Saudi Arabia is looking for an exit door, having opened negotiations with the Houthi-supporting Iran and having lost the reliably supportive ear of US President Donald Trump.
But it is not clear whether bin Salman will ultimately be willing to stomach the humiliation of a withdrawal from Yemen that does not come on terms that he can present as favourable.
Yemen Humanitarian Crisis
Many of the parties involved in the conflict have made significant geopolitical miscalculations, but the real disaster is the Yemen humanitarian crisis. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has for the third consecutive year named Yemen the country most at risk of a humanitarian catastrophe.
Multiple disease outbreaks
Food prices continue to skyrocket
Infant malnutrition is at the highest rates ever recorded
One of the principal causes of the food shortages is an air and sea blockade that the government and its regional allies have imposed to try to damage the Houthis. International aid has dried up.
The United Nations raised only half of its intended target in a recent campaign directed at donor countries. The United Kingdom cut its aid to Yemen from £164 million in 2020 to £87 million in 2021, citing budgetary pressures arising from its domestic COVID-19 response.
Sadly it seems as though the mounting humanitarian disaster is unlikely to provoke any of the principal actors in the conflict to seek a genuine the resolution.
Is the crisis is being used as a bargaining chip?
Instead, all signs suggest that the crisis is being used as a bargaining chip. Saudi Arabia offered the Houthis a ceasefire last month. The terms of the offer included a partial lifting of the blockade to lessen the burdens on aid reaching Houthi territory.
The Houthis responded by accusing Saudi Arabia of using the humanitarian crisis as leverage and argued that the blockade must be lifted completely. The Houthis themselves ignore the humanitarian disaster to consolidate their military position.
Their ongoing attempts to wrest control over the Marib region have led tens of thousands of people to flee their homes. If Marib falls, the Hadi government will have little if any foothold in its own country.
The southern secessionist movement, which exercises effective control over much of the south despite being nominally a part of Hadi’s government, will assert the right to negotiate with the Houthis itself.
The Biden administration’s efforts to back away from the Saudi-led alliance have been a positive development.
Riyadh considers the change of US policy to be a cynical effort to appease Iran ahead of negotiations for a revived agreement on nuclear enrichment.
Whatever the motivations of the Biden administration, the change in US policy has been accompanied by a perceptible shift in Saudi Arabia’s attitude to the Yemen conflict.
The fact that Saudi officials are now in direct talks with Iran about Yemen is promising. Less promising is that by all accounts Yemen remains bound up as an element of broader geopolitical negotiations that extend to other proxy conflicts such as Syria.
The Yemen humanitarian crisis is likely to be alleviated only by each side and its regional backers treating it as a discrete and urgent priority, even more urgent than resolving the political conflict. One of the greatest dangers is a hasty, forced, and simplistic settlement that perpetuates further war.
Raihan Ismail is an Australian Research Council DECRA Fellow and a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, ANU.
This article was originally published on Australian Outlook by the Australian Institute of International Affairs under Creative Commons Licence.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vision of Humanity. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 97 | https://simplemaps.com/data/ye-cities | en | Yemen Cities Database | [
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] | [] | [] | [
""
] | null | [] | null | A database of 14 prominent cities in Yemen. Includes a city's latitude, longitude, governorate and other variables of interest. MIT license. CSV, Excel and JSON formats. Comprehensive database available. | en | /static/img/favicon.ico | null | Below is a list of 14 prominent cities in Yemen. Each row includes a city's latitude, longitude, governorate and other variables of interest. This is a subset of all 73,201 places in Yemen (and only some of the fields) that you'll find in our World Cities Database. We're releasing this data subset for free under an MIT license. You're free to use the data below for personal or commercial applications. The data below can be downloaded in .csv, .json, and .xlsx formats.
Notable Cities: The capital of Yemen is Sanaa, which is in the governorate of Amānat al ‘Āşimah. The largest city in Yemen is Sanaa, with an urban population of 2,957,000. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 95 | http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17787/photos | en | Meeting with President of Yemen Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi • President of Russia | http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/photos/medium/4EaVg6Al3XzE4dI1FdYQ1YqPbRXRUOlc.jpeg | http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/photos/medium/4EaVg6Al3XzE4dI1FdYQ1YqPbRXRUOlc.jpeg | [
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""
] | null | [] | 2013-04-02T00:00:00 | Vladimir Putin met with President of Yemen Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. | en | /static/favicon-32x32.png | President of Russia | http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17787 | |||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 63 | https://english.news.cn/20240206/bceeab9834024a2abba59e3e8ff8e08f/c.html | en | Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council names new prime minister: media | [
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"Yemen-PM-Appointment"
] | null | [] | 2024-02-06T00:00:00 | Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council names new prime minister: media- | en | null | SANAA, Feb. 5 (Xinhua) -- Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council on Monday appointed Foreign Minister Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak as the country's new Prime Minister, the state-run Saba news agency reported.
"Today, the decree No. (56) of 2024 was issued by the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, appointing Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak as prime minister," said Saba.
Also, another decree was issued, appointing outgoing Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik as an advisor to the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council.
Bin Mubarak was appointed by then-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi as his chief of staff in 2014. Later the same year, he was offered the position of prime minister but declined the appointment.
Since late 2014, Yemen has been mired in a civil war when the Iran-backed Houthi militia seized control of several northern provinces and forced the Saudi-backed Yemeni government out of the capital Sanaa.
In 2015, Bin Mubarak was kidnapped by the Houthi group for ten days. After being released, he assumed the role of Yemeni Ambassador to the United States.
He was further elevated to the position of foreign minister in 2020. ■ | ||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 36 | https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/07/world/middleeast/yemen-presidential-council.html | en | Yemen’s President Steps Down, Hands Power to Presidential Council | [
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] | null | [
"Ben Hubbard"
] | 2022-04-07T00:00:00 | President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi abdicated days after a two-month cease-fire took effect, signs that his Saudi allies may be looking for a path out of the bloodshed. | en | /vi-assets/static-assets/favicon-d2483f10ef688e6f89e23806b9700298.ico | https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/07/world/middleeast/yemen-presidential-council.html | BEIRUT, Lebanon — Yemen’s exiled president stepped down on Thursday and passed power to a presidential council, a sweeping reshuffle supported by his backers in Saudi Arabia aimed at jump-starting efforts to end the seven-year war that has roiled the Arabian Peninsula.
The president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, announced his abdication days after a two-month cease-fire took effect, another sign that Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf allies may be looking for a path out of the years of bloodshed. Mr. Hadi delegated the new presidential council to run the government and lead peace talks with the Iran-backed Houthi rebels who control Sana, Yemen’s capital, and the country’s northwest.
The move was the most significant effort to reorganize the anti-Houthi forces in Yemen since the war began. But analysts raised questions about how effective it would be at pushing the peace process forward given the divergent positions of the council’s eight members.
“Quite clearly this is an attempt, perhaps a last ditch effort, to reconstitute something resembling unity within the anti-Houthi alliance,” Gregory Johnsen, a former member of United Nations Panel of Experts for Yemen, wrote on Twitter. “The problem is that it is unclear how these various individuals, many of whom have diametrically opposing views, can work together.”
The new push to end the war follows seven years of grinding combat that have shattered the Yemeni state, spawned one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and undermined the security of rich, oil-producing Persian Gulf monarchies allied with the United States.
Yemen’s war began in 2014 when the Houthis seized Sana and the northwest of the country, sending the government, and Mr. Hadi, into exile. Months later, an Arab military coalition led by Saudi Arabia began a vast bombing campaign intended to push the Houthis back and restore the government.
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8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 0 | https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abd-Rabbuh-Mansur-Hadi | en | ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī | president of Yemen | [
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] | null | [] | null | Other articles where ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī is discussed: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: After Saleh’s resignation, his successor ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī launched an offensive to retake the area in 2012 with the support of the United States, which also carried out series of air strikes by unmanned drones targeting suspected militants. By mid-2012 Yemeni forces had retaken many of the areas formerly… | en | /favicon.png | Encyclopedia Britannica | https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abd-Rabbuh-Mansur-Hadi | ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī
president of Yemen
Learn about this topic in these articles:
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
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After Saleh’s resignation, his successor ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī launched an offensive to retake the area in 2012 with the support of the United States, which also carried out series of air strikes by unmanned drones targeting suspected militants. By mid-2012 Yemeni forces had retaken many of the areas formerly…
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history of Yemen
In Yemen: Transfer of power to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi took the position of acting president. In November, about two months after returning to Yemen, Saleh agreed to a deal that would grant him immunity from prosecution if he ceded some of his power to Hadi and stepped down after a…
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…day, leaving his vice president, ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī, to serve as acting president in his absence. Yemeni officials maintained that Ṣāliḥ would quickly return to Yemen and resume his duties, but members of the opposition hailed his absence as an opportunity to negotiate a transition agreement that would formally…
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Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi a decisive advantage against the Shiʿi Houthi insurgency in the north of the country. It was thought that a Houthi victory might give Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main regional rival, a foothold along Saudi Arabia’s southern border. The campaign, however, failed to…
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Yemeni Civil War
In Yemeni Civil War: The rise of the rebels and the fall of Sanaa
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi took the position of acting president. In November, about two months after returning to Yemen, Saleh agreed to a deal that would grant him immunity from prosecution if he ceded some of his power to Hadi and stepped down after a…
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8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 75 | https://www.americansecurityproject.org/yemens-peace-process-peace-at-last-or-doomed-to-fail/ | en | Yemen’s Peace Process: Peace at Last or Doomed to Fail? | [
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] | null | [
"Sarah Nishioka",
"Guillem Colom",
"Courtney Manning",
"American Security Project"
] | 2022-04-22T18:03:27+00:00 | Since April, Yemen's peace process has advanced. The international community must advocate a multi-faceted and inclusive approach that engages society. | en | https://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/themes/asp/images/favicon.ico | American Security Project | https://www.americansecurityproject.org/yemens-peace-process-peace-at-last-or-doomed-to-fail/ | share this
The Civil War in Yemen has resulted in the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and aid operation, with numerous power brokers vying for influence along messy frontlines and exclaves. While mediators have attempted to broker agreements, talks have long stalled on multiple fronts. However, Yemen’s peace process progressed in April with the negotiation of a two-month ceasefire, the resignation of President Hadi, and the creation of a Presidential Council. While these developments move the needle toward peace in Yemen, the international community should measure expectations. The only common thread between council members is their shared distrust of the Houthis. To help build a lasting peace, the international community should encourage a multi-faceted and inclusive peace process that engages all levels of Yemeni society.
The Ceasefire
On April 1, 2022, the UN announced a two-month ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis. Under the terms of the agreement, fuel shipments are allowed to arrive at the Hodeida Port, commercial flights can land at the Sana’a International Airport, and the truce can be renewed past its end date if both parties consent.
The Presidential Council
On April 7, in a surprise move, the internationally recognized President of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, stepped down after ten years as president. Mr. Hadi relinquished all power and authority—including that of his vice president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar—to the newly established Presidential Council. The Council was the culmination of a week’s worth of Yemeni-Yemeni negotiations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, between different anti-Houthi forces. The Council comprises eight members with clashing visions of Yemen’s future because of different priorities, intractable beliefs, and tangled alliances. Groups of complex support lines can be sorted into five broad categories: 1) Anti-Houthi, those who are against the Houthis; 2) Pro-Hadi, those who supported Hadi and the internationally recognized Cabinet of Yemen before he transferred power to the current Presidential Council; 3) those whom the Saudi Coalition supports; 4) those whom the United Arab Emirates (UAE) supports separately; finally, 5) those who have allegiance to the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). Members include:
Rashad Muhammad al-Alimi: The former Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security under President Saleh and advisor to President Hadi, who presides over the Council.
Tareq Mohammed Saleh: Nephew of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and leader of the pro-Hadi National Resistance Forces loyal to the Cabinet of Yemen.
Sultan Ali Al-Arada: A prominent military figure and Governor of the Marib Governorate, where Houthi forces fight pro-Hadi forces in an ongoing military campaign. Control of this Governate is critical as it connects Houthi-controlled Sana’a and the Hadhramaut Governate.
Abdurrahman Abu Zara’a: Leader of the Giants Brigades, a militia that is the largest faction of the Yemeni Joint Forces loyal to the Cabinet of Yemen who took back the southern oil-rich province of Shabwa from the Houthis in 2022—a significant victory.
Abdullah Al-Alimi Bawazeer: Director of Office of the Presidency of the Republic. He is a member of President Hadi’s inner circle.
Faraj Salmin Al-Bahsani: A military commander and Governor of the strategically valuable oil-rich Hadhramaut Governatein Eastern Yemen, where pro-Hadi and the STC are vying for influence.
Aidarous Al-Zubaidi: President of the STC, a secessionist organization in South Yemen that ousted Hadi’s government from Aden in 2018.
Othman Hussein Majali: A Parliamentarian and former Minister of Agriculture, a tribal leader of the Saada province in Southwest Yemen.
The Future of Peace
The recent developments in the peace process in Yemen mirror the partially implemented negotiations of the past. In 2018 the STC successfully removed the Hadi government from Aden. The Saudis intervened, reinstalled Hadi, and created the Riyadh Accords in 2019. The agreement detailed the integration of the STC into a new government; in exchange, its troops would be under Presidential command. However, full implementation of the Accords has yet to occur, signaling the enduring mistrust between partners and the agreement’s limitations—limitations reflected in the Presidential Council. Being united in mutual distaste for the Houthis may be enough in the context of the war, but it will not be enough when peace requires collaboration and a conceptual goal beyond the defeat of a common enemy. A critical factor that remains missing in current peace negotiations besides the Houthis is citizens. The international community’s focus on negotiations between leaders of the principal factions has limited other means of success. Instead, the international community must push for an inclusive and multi-tracked approach to peace that engages with citizens locally and attempts to repair broken trust through restorative justice. Bottom-up approaches such as supporting local peace initiatives and engaging local communities in dialogue can create stability at the regional level, putting pressure on primary actors to consider their people’s interests and providing a greater incentive for stability. While peace negotiations at the national level are gaining traction, peace needs to be viewed and pursued at all levels in Yemen.
Conclusion | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 20 | https://www.visionofhumanity.org/the-humanitarian-crisis-in-yemen/ | en | The Yemen Humanitarian Crisis: Current Struggles in 2021 | [
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] | 2021-05-18T23:00:00+00:00 | The Yemen humanitarian crisis is likely to be alleviated only by each side and its regional backers treating it as an urgent priority. | en | Vision of Humanity | https://www.visionofhumanity.org/the-humanitarian-crisis-in-yemen/ | Last week, the government of Yemen started to administer the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine. The vaccination campaign has become the latest source of dispute in a country that has been at war since 2014.
The internationally recognised government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi exercises ever-decreasing control over Yemen’s territory. Its principal military opponent is the Houthi rebels who occupy most of the country’s north.
Almost all of the 360,000 doses that Yemen has received through the World Health Organisation, enough to cover only a small fraction of the country’s population, are to be administered in the south.
The Houthi administration does not report COVID-19 cases.
The government claims to have offered 10,000 doses to the Houthis, but accuses the Houthis of refusing to run a vaccination campaign in densely populated areas such as their capital, Sanaa.
The Houthi administration does not report COVID-19 cases. The government does, but testing rates are low and the official figures understate the extent to which the pandemic is affecting the country.
Throughout Yemen, whether in government or Houthi areas, a decrepit public health system is under extraordinary pressure. Médecins Sans Frontières has long described the health system as “broken” and warned in late March of an exponential increase in observed COVID-19 cases.
The health system continues to fail to deal with a cholera pandemic that has affected around two million people since the beginning of the civil war.
Even individual deaths become a source of tit-for-tat allegations in a public relations war. A Houthi leader, Zakaria al-Shami, died in mid-March. Houthi officials claimed that his death was due to COVID-19.
The government briefed Arab media that he was killed in a successful military operation. That narrative, true or not, suits the government and its regional allies, including Saudi Arabia, who are keen to show that they are gaining the upper hand in the conflict.
Most senior Yemeni government officials, including President Hadi, operate from the distant comfort of the Saudi capital, Riyadh.
That betrays the chasm between the government’s leaders and the day-to-day experience of Yemenis, as well as the reality that the government is largely a client of Saudi Arabia.
The Saudis have been active participants in the war since 2015 and lead a regional anti-Houthi military alliance that includes the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.
The Saudi intervention
Saudi Arabia’s enthusiastic participation in Yemen’s civil war has been a project of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the kingdom’s de facto ruler. The Saudi intervention was originally conceived as a short and decisive intervention, but has become an unmitigated failure.
There are finally signs that Saudi Arabia is looking for an exit door, having opened negotiations with the Houthi-supporting Iran and having lost the reliably supportive ear of US President Donald Trump.
But it is not clear whether bin Salman will ultimately be willing to stomach the humiliation of a withdrawal from Yemen that does not come on terms that he can present as favourable.
Yemen Humanitarian Crisis
Many of the parties involved in the conflict have made significant geopolitical miscalculations, but the real disaster is the Yemen humanitarian crisis. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has for the third consecutive year named Yemen the country most at risk of a humanitarian catastrophe.
Multiple disease outbreaks
Food prices continue to skyrocket
Infant malnutrition is at the highest rates ever recorded
One of the principal causes of the food shortages is an air and sea blockade that the government and its regional allies have imposed to try to damage the Houthis. International aid has dried up.
The United Nations raised only half of its intended target in a recent campaign directed at donor countries. The United Kingdom cut its aid to Yemen from £164 million in 2020 to £87 million in 2021, citing budgetary pressures arising from its domestic COVID-19 response.
Sadly it seems as though the mounting humanitarian disaster is unlikely to provoke any of the principal actors in the conflict to seek a genuine the resolution.
Is the crisis is being used as a bargaining chip?
Instead, all signs suggest that the crisis is being used as a bargaining chip. Saudi Arabia offered the Houthis a ceasefire last month. The terms of the offer included a partial lifting of the blockade to lessen the burdens on aid reaching Houthi territory.
The Houthis responded by accusing Saudi Arabia of using the humanitarian crisis as leverage and argued that the blockade must be lifted completely. The Houthis themselves ignore the humanitarian disaster to consolidate their military position.
Their ongoing attempts to wrest control over the Marib region have led tens of thousands of people to flee their homes. If Marib falls, the Hadi government will have little if any foothold in its own country.
The southern secessionist movement, which exercises effective control over much of the south despite being nominally a part of Hadi’s government, will assert the right to negotiate with the Houthis itself.
The Biden administration’s efforts to back away from the Saudi-led alliance have been a positive development.
Riyadh considers the change of US policy to be a cynical effort to appease Iran ahead of negotiations for a revived agreement on nuclear enrichment.
Whatever the motivations of the Biden administration, the change in US policy has been accompanied by a perceptible shift in Saudi Arabia’s attitude to the Yemen conflict.
The fact that Saudi officials are now in direct talks with Iran about Yemen is promising. Less promising is that by all accounts Yemen remains bound up as an element of broader geopolitical negotiations that extend to other proxy conflicts such as Syria.
The Yemen humanitarian crisis is likely to be alleviated only by each side and its regional backers treating it as a discrete and urgent priority, even more urgent than resolving the political conflict. One of the greatest dangers is a hasty, forced, and simplistic settlement that perpetuates further war.
Raihan Ismail is an Australian Research Council DECRA Fellow and a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, ANU.
This article was originally published on Australian Outlook by the Australian Institute of International Affairs under Creative Commons Licence.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vision of Humanity. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 40 | https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/ | en | Yemen's Houthi Rebels: Who Are They and What Is Their Goal? | [] | [] | [] | [
""
] | null | [
"Anna Gordon"
] | 2024-01-12T14:20:01+00:00 | The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, in retaliation to the group's Red Sea attacks. | en | /favicon.ico | TIME | https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/ | The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes attacking multiple Houthi rebel targets in Yemen on Thursday, Jan. 11, marking a significant escalation in the broader conflict of the Middle East. In October, shortly after the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis began launching missile attacks at cargo ships passing through the Red Sea, headed towards Israeli ports.
Here’s what you need to know about Yemen’s Houthi rebels and their place in the current conflict.
Who are Yemen’s Houthi rebels?
The Houthi rebels are one of two main factions controlling territory amidst Yemen’s ongoing civil war. Currently, they control the Western coast of the country, including its capital city, Sana’a.
The Houthis initially began as a cultural revivalist movement in the 1990s for the Zaydi sect of Islam which, as of 2022, was practiced by approximately 35% of the Yemeni population. According to Stacey Philbrick Yadav, the chair of international relations at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and author of Yemen in the Shadow of Transition, many Zaydi muslims were becoming increasingly frustrated with the growing prominence of Saudi-Arabian Salafi Islam in the country, which they felt repressed their Zaydi cultural and religious heritage.
Additionally, the Houthis resented what they perceived to be widespread corruption and mismanagement in the Yemeni government throughout the 2000s. This led the Houthis to launch several insurgencies against the Yemeni government between 2004 and 2010.
In 2011, during the Arab Spring, the grievances of the Yemeni population reached a boiling point, and mass protests erupted calling for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been ruling the country for over thirty years. After Saleh resigned, Saudi Arabia backed Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi as the new leader of the country. The Houthis resented this choice, and launched a military campaign against the new government, which led to a civil war that is still ongoing.
Their conflict with the Saudi-backed government has led the Houthis to become more closely allied with Iran, from which they receive some support. Nevertheless, some experts say it’s not entirely accurate to call the Houthi rebels a direct proxy.
“They do have a relationship with and support from Iran, but are not a straightforward proxy of Iranian interests. They have their own locally defined interests and so I think that their actions in the past two months have reflected that,” Philbrick Yadav told TIME in December.
Read More: How Congress Is Reacting to Biden’s Military Attack on the Houthis in Yemen
Why are the Houthis attacking ships in the Red Sea?
In the Arab world, the Palestinian cause is extremely popular and often a signifier of progressive values. By attacking Israeli ships, the Houthis may expand their support base across Yemen and the Arab world. Additionally, it is believed the group is hoping to sabotage the Saudi normalization with Israel, which had been in the works.
Why are the U.S and U.K. striking Yemen?
Over 80% of all internationally traded goods are transported via cargo ships, since air travel is a much less cost effective way to transport large items or huge amounts of goods. Ships must travel through the Red Sea in order to access the Suez Canal, which is the only waterway that allows for direct passage between Europe and Asia.
Otherwise, the ships traveling between Europe and Asia must journey around the African continent, which can add over 30 days in travel time. Due to the attacks by Houthi rebels, insurance prices on ships have risen dramatically and many shipping companies have chosen to take the longer routes, as a safety precaution. This is expected to increase the prices of many consumer goods, from clothing to coffee. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 15 | https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/houthis-says-us-uk-carried-out-airstrikes-in-yemeni-capital/3147012 | en | Houthis says US, UK carried out airstrikes in Yemeni capital | [
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] | null | [] | null | Attacks targeted capital city of Sanaa, according to Houthi-affiliated television - Anadolu Ajansı | https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/houthis-says-us-uk-carried-out-airstrikes-in-yemeni-capital/3147012 | SANAA, Yemen
The US and the UK carried out airstrikes Saturday in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, according to the Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah television.
No further details were provided about the attacks.
The Pentagon said in a coordinated effort, the US and the UK, alongside support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand, carried out strikes against military targets in Houthi-controlled areas.
“Coalition forces targeted eight locations, which included Houthi underground weapons storage facilities, missile storage facilities, one-way attack unmanned aerial systems, air defense systems, radars, and a helicopter, to further disrupt and degrade the capabilities of the Iranian-backed Houthi militia to conduct their destabilizing and reckless attacks against U.S. and international vessels lawfully transiting the Red Sea, the Bab AI-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden,” it said.
The Yemeni Houthi group has been targeting cargo ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden owned or operated by Israeli companies or transporting goods to and from Israel in solidarity with the Gaza Strip, which has been under an Israeli onslaught since Oct. 7.
With tensions escalating due to joint strikes by the US and UK against Houthi targets in Yemen, the group declared that it considered all American and British ships legitimate military targets.
* Contributed by Seda Sevencan | |||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 18 | https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/ | en | Yemen's Houthi Rebels: Who Are They and What Is Their Goal? | [] | [] | [] | [
""
] | null | [
"Anna Gordon"
] | 2024-01-12T14:20:01+00:00 | The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, in retaliation to the group's Red Sea attacks. | en | /favicon.ico | TIME | https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/ | The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes attacking multiple Houthi rebel targets in Yemen on Thursday, Jan. 11, marking a significant escalation in the broader conflict of the Middle East. In October, shortly after the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis began launching missile attacks at cargo ships passing through the Red Sea, headed towards Israeli ports.
Here’s what you need to know about Yemen’s Houthi rebels and their place in the current conflict.
Who are Yemen’s Houthi rebels?
The Houthi rebels are one of two main factions controlling territory amidst Yemen’s ongoing civil war. Currently, they control the Western coast of the country, including its capital city, Sana’a.
The Houthis initially began as a cultural revivalist movement in the 1990s for the Zaydi sect of Islam which, as of 2022, was practiced by approximately 35% of the Yemeni population. According to Stacey Philbrick Yadav, the chair of international relations at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and author of Yemen in the Shadow of Transition, many Zaydi muslims were becoming increasingly frustrated with the growing prominence of Saudi-Arabian Salafi Islam in the country, which they felt repressed their Zaydi cultural and religious heritage.
Additionally, the Houthis resented what they perceived to be widespread corruption and mismanagement in the Yemeni government throughout the 2000s. This led the Houthis to launch several insurgencies against the Yemeni government between 2004 and 2010.
In 2011, during the Arab Spring, the grievances of the Yemeni population reached a boiling point, and mass protests erupted calling for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been ruling the country for over thirty years. After Saleh resigned, Saudi Arabia backed Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi as the new leader of the country. The Houthis resented this choice, and launched a military campaign against the new government, which led to a civil war that is still ongoing.
Their conflict with the Saudi-backed government has led the Houthis to become more closely allied with Iran, from which they receive some support. Nevertheless, some experts say it’s not entirely accurate to call the Houthi rebels a direct proxy.
“They do have a relationship with and support from Iran, but are not a straightforward proxy of Iranian interests. They have their own locally defined interests and so I think that their actions in the past two months have reflected that,” Philbrick Yadav told TIME in December.
Read More: How Congress Is Reacting to Biden’s Military Attack on the Houthis in Yemen
Why are the Houthis attacking ships in the Red Sea?
In the Arab world, the Palestinian cause is extremely popular and often a signifier of progressive values. By attacking Israeli ships, the Houthis may expand their support base across Yemen and the Arab world. Additionally, it is believed the group is hoping to sabotage the Saudi normalization with Israel, which had been in the works.
Why are the U.S and U.K. striking Yemen?
Over 80% of all internationally traded goods are transported via cargo ships, since air travel is a much less cost effective way to transport large items or huge amounts of goods. Ships must travel through the Red Sea in order to access the Suez Canal, which is the only waterway that allows for direct passage between Europe and Asia.
Otherwise, the ships traveling between Europe and Asia must journey around the African continent, which can add over 30 days in travel time. Due to the attacks by Houthi rebels, insurance prices on ships have risen dramatically and many shipping companies have chosen to take the longer routes, as a safety precaution. This is expected to increase the prices of many consumer goods, from clothing to coffee. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 9 | https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/20/losing-old-sanaa-historic-city-reels-from-yemen-war | en | ‘Losing Old Sanaa’: Historic city reels from Yemen war | [
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] | 2023-08-20T00:00:00 | A UNESCO World Heritage site for four decades, the Old City has been classified as ‘in danger’ since 2015. | en | /favicon_aje.ico | Al Jazeera | https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/20/losing-old-sanaa-historic-city-reels-from-yemen-war | Doaa al-Waseai remembers being a tour guide in the Old City of Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, spending days walking around and showing people hidden hammams and markets teeming with silver and spices.
“Tourism opened my eyes to my own culture,” said al-Waseai, 40, reflecting on how she gained a deeper appreciation by explaining Yemen to outsiders.
But the Old City, al-Waseai’s childhood home, is reeling after nearly a decade of war, its 1,000-year-old rammed-earth buildings falling apart.
Al-Waseai once spoke English and German comfortably, but her foreign language skills are fading, though she doesn’t see a point in them now.
“There are no words to express our catastrophe in English, or German, or even French. We’re losing Old Sanaa.”
A UNESCO World Heritage site for nearly 40 years, the Old City has been classified as “in danger” since 2015, shortly after Saudi Arabia spearheaded a military intervention on the side of Yemen’s beleaguered government.
Inhabited for more than 2,500 years, the area’s iconic mosques and burned-brick tower houses have faced both direct threats of air raids and indirect threats of lack of upkeep.
Al-Waseai has kept records of the Old City’s decline, her spreadsheets listing collapsed homes and battered hotels. She is pursuing a master’s degree in tourism at Sana’a University, hoping she can one day aid the Old City’s recovery.
Al-Waseai had heard stories of bombing raids during an earlier civil war in the 1960s but never thought she would one day witness them herself.
“Why are they attacking our city?” she recalls thinking. “It’s forbidden to attack our history. They are destroying our history.”
The Old City’s houses, with their distinctive white gypsum trim, “are very fragile and require constant maintenance”, said UNESCO associate project officer Mohammed al-Jaberi.
“Traditionally, the homeowners would carry out the maintenance,” al-Jaberi said. But, “people are making a hard choice between putting food on the table and maintaining the roof over their heads” during the wartime economic crisis.
Fighting has lessened considerably in much of Yemen since a truce took effect in April 2022.
But it expired last October, and the absence of a lasting ceasefire has left many institutions at a standstill, including the public preservation body, which is starved of funds, like other government bodies.
Old City residents still hold out hope its past glories can be revived.
Near the Old City’s historic Yemen Gate, in the shop where he sells traditional healing oils, Salah Aldeen hangs a picture of then-President Francois Mitterrand of France visiting the Old City in the 1990s, a time when foreigners were common.
He said he was confident those days would return. “Sooner or later, it will recover, you know. War is a disease, but we will recover.” | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 8 | https://kids.nationalgeographic.com/geography/countries/article/yemen | en | Yemen | [
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] | null | [
"Aaron Sidder"
] | 2021-05-26T11:40:29.965000+00:00 | This desert country in the Middle East lies on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. | en | Geography | https://kids.nationalgeographic.com/geography/countries/article/yemen | About twice the size of the state of Wyoming, Yemen is located on the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, an area of land in Southwest Asia. It shares the peninsula with the countries of Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. Yemen is bordered by the Red Sea to the west and the Gulf of Aden to the south.
Coastal plains ideal for farming stretch inland from both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The interior of the country gives way to rugged mountains, including the Sarawat Mountains, a mountain range that runs through much of the western part of the Arabian Peninsula. Eastern Yemen is home to part of the fifth-largest desert in the world, the Rub‘ al-Khali. Nicknamed “the Empty Quarter,” the desert has the longest stretch of continuous sand in the world, covering much of the Arabian Peninsula.
The endless sand and arid climate make the desert uninhabitable. Yemen is so dry that it doesn’t have any permanently flowing rivers—only dry river valleys known as wadis.
Most of the Yemeni population are Arab, or originally from the Arabian Peninsula and its neighboring territories. Minority groups living in the country include Somali descendants along the coasts and small Egyptian communities throughout the northern parts of the country.
Most Yemenis are Muslims, or people who practice Islam. Within the religion of Islam, there are two major branches of believers: the Sunnis and the Shiites. Most Yemenis are Sunni Muslims, but a sizeable Shiite population lives in the country as well.
Like in other Middle Eastern countries, Islam strongly influences Yemeni culture. Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of Ramadan (a month-long dawn-to-sunset fasting, or abstaining from food), and the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (the founder of Islam) are two of the traditional Islamic holidays that Yemenis celebrate.
Yemen's ancient architecture is famous for its age and beauty—some buildings are more than 2,000 years old. Sunbaked stone blocks and bricks form structures that reach several stories high. The walled city of Shibam is representative of this architecture.
Yemen’s largest city is its capital, Sanaa, one of the oldest cities in the world. Its Great Mosque, a house of worship used by Muslims, dates back to the time of Muhammad in the early seventh century.
People have lived in Yemen's corner of the Arabian Peninsula since the 12th century B.C. Before the arrival of Islam, wealthy city-states and empires like the Minaean, Sabaean, and Ḥimyarite controlled the region.
These ancient empires lived in Yemen from roughly 1200 B.C. to A.D. 525 and became rich by producing and trading frankincense and myrrh, resins extracted from trees. These spices were among the most valued products in the ancient world. Islam arrived in Yemen around A.D. 630 and transformed the region. The religion spread quickly, and its practices and traditions still dominate Yemen's culture today.
At the beginning of the 15th century, Yemenis were supposedly among the first people to popularize coffee as a beverage. As a result, the country became a source of conflict between the Egyptians, the Ottomans (from what is now Turkey), and various European powers that wanted to control the market for Coffea arabica, believed to be the first species of coffee cultivated in the world. The plant was eventually smuggled out of Yemen and brought to other countries. Yemeni cities that were once major coffee centers shrunk to the size of small villages.
By the 1800s, Yemen was caught in the middle of an imperial tug-of-war. The Ottoman Empire claimed northern Yemen and the British took over Aden, a city in the south. This division eventually created two Yemeni nations, North Yemen and South Yemen.
North Yemen became independent after World War I, following the departure of Ottoman forces in 1918. (The Ottomans fought on the losing side of World War I, alongside Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman Empire ended in 1922.) South Yemen didn’t gain its independence from the British until 1967.
Once the two nations were independent, many people expected them to reunite to form one country. But that wouldn’t happen for about two decades. A few brief border wars took place between the countries during the 1970s and ’80s.
But then in 1990, the discovery of oil and natural gases in both North and South Yemen prompted the two nations to reunite. Neither side wanted to engage in a costly war over these important resources and decided it would be better to share the profits as one country. The constitution of the new republic of Yemen was adopted in 1990.
Though Yemen was now one country, tensions remained between groups from the northern and southern parts of the nation. In 2010, a pro-democracy movement known as the Arab Spring began sweeping through countries in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2011, Arab Spring protesters forced out Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had served as the country’s leader since the 1990 unification.
Following the Arab Spring protests, the country was deeply divided between several groups that supported different government leaders. In 2014, rebels called Houthis took over the capital city of Sanaa. The rebels are Shiite Muslims, part of the minority in Yemen. The Houthis were rebelling against the Sunni Muslim majority and wanted to place some of their fellow Houthis in leadership positions.
The rebellion divided the country along religious lines, and civil war still rages in the Yemen today. It’s created a humanitarian crisis, placing millions of Yemenis at risk of starvation; many people also don’t have access to safe drinking water, sanitation, and medicine. Other countries have attempted to help Yemen, but the COVID-19 pandemic has made it more difficult for help to get to the country. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 3 | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/22/profile-yemens-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi | en | Profile: Yemen’s Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi | [
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] | 2015-02-22T00:00:00 | Yemen’s post-uprising leader had been grappling with a Shia rebel movement and al-Qaeda since he took office in 2012. | en | /favicon_aje.ico | Al Jazeera | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/22/profile-yemens-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi | Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who resigned in January as Yemen’s president amid pressure from Shia Houthi rebels, assumed office in 2012 after spending 17 years as vice-president.
Hadi was elected president after protests lasting nearly a year against former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, but he set about governing a country beset by a host of problems, including a Shia rebel movement and a growing threat from al-Qaeda.
A sole candidate in the referendum-like elections held in 2012, the Sunni politician’s ascendency to power saw Yemen become the first Arab Spring nation where an uprising led to a negotiated settlement.
The vote was a condition of the power-transition deal signed by Saleh in 2011 after mass protests calling for him to step aside.
Under the deal, brokered by the Gulf Co-operation Council made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Saleh transfered constitutional powers to Hadi, who he had appointed as vice-president in 1994.
The 68-year-old former soldier from Yemen’s south was considered by most as the consensus candidate.
But two major opposition groups – the separatist Southern Movement and the Houthi rebels – boycotted the poll.
The uprising’s main proponents had asked Yemenis to support Hadi and posters of the vice-president were plastered on buildings and streets in the capital Sanaa.
Hadi had local, regional and international support and was a respected leader with a vision for the future.
When news of the presidential poll came, crowds in Sanaa chanted “Hadi, take the key, the slaughterer’s rule has ended”, a reference to Saleh’s leadership.
Yemen’s Nobel Peace laureate Tawakkul Karman had urged Yemenis to vote for Hadi, saying his election would mark “the fruit of the popular youth uprising”.
Hadi was expected to launch a national dialogue, the first step in the transitional period that sought to end in legislative and presidential elections within two years.
But many Yemenis had expressed concern over the role of the country’s security forces, a major challenge Hadi had to deal with.
Security forces remained under the control of Saleh’s sons and nephews, and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred during the crackdown on protests.
Hadi was sworn in as Saleh returned home from the US where he received treatment for injuries sustained in an attack on his palace.
Many feared his return would stock tensions but US President Barack Obama had voiced support for Hadi’s new leadership.
Obama said in a letter that he looked forward to deeper relations between the two nations and promised that the US would be “a strong and reliable partner”. He wrote that Yemen would become a symbol of political transformation “when people resist violence and unite under a common cause”.
Saleh’s critics had repeatedly accused the veteran leader of intentionally allowing al-Qaeda to expand its influence in the country’s lawless south and east to demonstrate that only he can fight the spread of terror. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 14 | https://www.partners-popdev.org/mcon/con_prof/cp_yemen.htm | en | Country Profile :: Yemen | [
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] | null | [] | null | null | 0-14 years: 41.7% (male 5,523,744/female 5,336,795)
15-24 years: 21.1% (male 2,789,510/female 2,709,263)
25-54 years: 30.9% (male 4,106,917/female 3,933,852)
55-64 years: 2.6% (male 450,185/female 515,255)
65 years and over: 2.6% (male 320,426/female 367,019) (2014 est.)
at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female
0-14 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
15-24 years: 1.03 male(s)/female
25-54 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
55-64 years: 1.03 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.9 male(s)/female
total population: 1.03 male(s)/female (2014 est.) | ||||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 58 | https://www.yca-sandwell.org.uk/history-of-yemen/ | en | History of Yemen | [
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] | null | [] | 2015-08-10T13:36:09+00:00 | en | YCA Sandwell | https://www.yca-sandwell.org.uk/history-of-yemen/ | In the 11th century BC, land routes through Arabia were greatly improved by using the camel as a beast of burden, and frankincense was carried from its production centre at Qana (now known as Bir 'Ali) to Gaza in Egypt. The camel caravans also carried gold and other precious goods which arrived in Qana by sea from India.
The chief incense traders were the Minaeans, who established their capital at Karna (now known as Sadah), before they were superseded by the Sabaeans in 950 BC. The Sabaean capital was Ma'rib, where a large temple was built. The mighty Sabaean civilisation endured for about 14 centuries and was based not only on the spice trade, but also on agriculture. The impressive dam, built at Ma'rib in the 8th century, provided irrigation for farmland and stood for over a millennium. Some Sabaean carved inscriptions from this period are still extant.
The Himyarites established their capital at Dhafar (now just a small village in the Ibb region) and gradually absorbed the Sabaean kingdom. They were culturally inferior to the Sabaeans and traded from the port of al-Muza on the Red Sea. By the first century BC, the area had been conquered by the Romans.
With the rise of the great ancient civilizations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and along the Mediterranean Sea, historic Yemen became an important overland trade link between these civilizations and the highly prized luxury goods of South Arabia and points east and south. As a result, several pre-Islamic trading kingdoms grew up astride an incense trading route that ran northwest between the foothills and the edge of the desert. First, there was the Minaean kingdom, which lasted from about 1200 to 650 BC, and whose prosperity was due mainly to the trade of frankincense and spices. The large and prosperous kingdom of Saba' (Sheba), founded in the 10th century BC and ruled by Bilqis, the queen of Sheba, among others, was known for its efficient farming and extensive irrigation system built around a large dam constructed at Ma'rib.
Farther south and east, in the region that would later become South Yemen, were the Qataban and Hadhramaut kingdoms, which also participated in the incense trade. The last of the great pre-Islamic kingdoms was that of Himyar, which lasted from about the 1st century BC until the 500s AD. At their heights, the Sabaean and Himyarite kingdoms encompassed most of historic Yemen.
Because of their prominence and prosperity, the states and societies of ancient Yemen were collectively called Arabia Felix in Latin, meaning "Happy Arabia." However, when the Romans occupied Egypt in the 1st century BC they made the Red Sea their primary avenue of commerce. With the decline of the caravan routes, the kingdoms of southern Arabia lost much of their wealth and fell into obscurity. Red Sea traffic sailed past Yemen, and what seaborne commerce Yemen engaged in had little impact on the country's interior.
The Tihamah region, which was hot, humid, swept by sandstorms, and clouded in haze, isolated the comparatively well-watered and populous highlands. The weakened Yemeni regimes that followed the trading kingdoms were unable to prevent the occupation of Yemen by the Christian Abyssinian kingdom (modern Ethiopia) in the 4th and early 6th centuries AD and by the Sassanids of Persia in the later 6th century, just before the rise of Islam.
The Islamic era, which began in the 7th century, contains many events critical to the formation of Yemen and the Yemeni people. The force with which Islam spread from its origins in Mecca and Medina in the nearby region of Al Hijaz (the Hejaz) led to Yemen's rapid and thorough conversion to Islam. Yemenis were well-represented among the first soldiers of Islam who marched north, west, and east of Arabia to expand Muslim territory.
Yemen was ruled by a series of Muslim caliphs, beginning with the Umayyad dynasty, which ruled from Damascus in the latter part of the 7th century; Umayyad rule was followed by the Abbasid caliphs in the early 8th century. The founding of a local Yemeni dynasty in the 9th century effectively ended both Abbasid rule from Baghdad and the authority of the Arab caliphate. This allowed Yemen to develop its own variant of Arab-Islamic culture and society in relative isolation.
In the 10th century, the establishment of the Zaydi imamate, essentially a theocracy, in the far north of Yemen forged a deep, lasting link between the towns and tribes of the northern highlands and the Zaydi Shiite sect of Islam. By contrast, the two-century-long rule of the Rasulids, beginning in the 1200s and initially based in Aden, identified the coastal regions and the southern uplands with Shafi'i Islam. The Rasulids, one of the major dynasties in the history of Yemen, broke from the Egyptian Ayyubid dynasty to rule independently. Their capital, later located at Ta'izz, was famous for its diverse artistic and intellectual achievements.
For the next 44 years North Yemen was ruled by two powerful imams. Imam Yahya ibn Muhammad and his son Ahmad created a king-state there much as the kings of England and France had done centuries earlier. The two imams strengthened the state and secured its borders. They used the imamate to insulate Yemen and revitalize its Islamic culture and society at a time when traditional societies around the world were declining under imperial rule. While Yemen under the two imams seemed almost frozen in time, a small but increasing number of Yemenis became aware of the contrast between an autocratic society they saw as stagnant and the political and economic modernization occurring in other parts of the world. This produced an important chain of events: the birth of the nationalist Free Yemeni Movement in the mid-1940s, an aborted 1948 revolution in which Imam Yahya was killed, a failed 1955 coup against Imam Ahmad, and finally, the 1962 revolution in which the imam was deposed by a group of nationalist officers and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was proclaimed under the leadership of Abdullah al-Sallal.
The first five years of President Al-Sallal's rule, from 1962 to 1967, comprised the first chapter in the history of North Yemen. Marked by the revolution that began it, this period witnessed a lengthy civil war between Yemeni republican forces, based in the cities and supported by Egypt, and the royalist supporters of the deposed imam, backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In 1965 Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser met with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to consider a possible settlement to the civil war. The meeting resulted in an agreement whereby both countries pledged to end their involvement and allow the people of North Yemen to choose their own government. Subsequent peace conferences were ineffectual, however, and fighting flared up again in 1966.
By 1967 the war had reached a stalemate, and the republicans had split into opposing factions concerning relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In late 1967 Al-Sallal's government was overthrown and he was replaced as president by Abdul Rahman al-Iryani. Fighting continued until 1970, when Saudi Arabia halted its aid to royalists and established diplomatic ties with North Yemen. Al-Iryani effected the long-sought truce between republican and royalist forces, and presided over the adoption of a democratic constitution in 1970.
In June 1974 military officers led by Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi staged a bloodless coup, claiming that the government of Al-Iryani had become ineffective. The constitution was suspended, and executive power was vested in a command council, dominated by the military. Al-Hamdi chaired the council and attempted to strengthen and restructure politics in North Yemen. Al-Hamdi was assassinated in 1977, and his successor, former Chief of Staff Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi, was killed in June 1978. The lengthy tenure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled North Yemen from 1978 until it merged with South Yemen in 1990, proved more stable. Saleh strengthened the political system, while an influx of foreign aid and the discovery of oil in North Yemen held out the prospect of economic expansion and development.
The history of South Yemen after the British occupation of Aden in 1839 was quite different. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Aden became a vitally important port along the sea lanes to India. In order to protect Aden from Ottoman takeover, the British signed treaties with tribal leaders in the interior, promising military protection and subsidies in exchange for loyalty; gradually British authority was extended to other mainland areas to the east of Aden. In 1937 the area was designated the Aden Protectorates. In 1958 six small states within the protectorates formed a British-sponsored federation. This federation was later expanded to include Aden and the remaining states of the region, and was renamed the Federation of South Arabia in 1965.
During the 1960s British colonial policy as a whole came under increasing challenge from a nationalist movement centred primarily in Aden. Great Britain finally withdrew from the area in 1967, when the dominant opposition group, the National Liberation Front (NLF), forced the collapse of the federation and assumed political control. South Yemen became independent as the People's Republic of South Yemen in November of that year. The NLF became the only recognized political party and its leader, Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi, was installed as president. In 1969 al-Shaabi was ousted and replaced by Salem Ali Rubayi; until 1978, South Yemen was governed under the co-leadership of Rubayi and his rival, Abdel Fattah Ismail, both of whom made efforts to organize the country according to their versions of Marxism.
In 1970 the country was renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Foreign-owned properties were nationalized, and close ties were established with the USSR. Rubayi was deposed and executed in 1978; under the prevailing authority of Ismail, Soviet influence intensified in South Yemen. Ismail was replaced by Ali Nasser Muhammad al-Hasani in 1980. In 1986 a civil war erupted within the government of South Yemen; the war ended after 12 days, and al-Hasani fled into exile. Former premier Haydar Bakr al-Attas was elected president in October.
Relations between North Yemen and South Yemen grew increasingly conciliatory after 1980. Border wars between the two countries in 1972 and 1979 both had ended surprisingly with agreements for Yemeni unification, though in each case the agreement was quickly shelved. During the 1980s the two countries cooperated increasingly in economic and administrative matters. In December 1989 their respective leaders met and prepared a final unification agreement. On May 22, 1990, North and South Yemen officially merged to become the Republic of Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh, then leader of North Yemen, became president of unified Yemen, while Ali Salem al-Beidh and Haydar Bakr al-Attas of South Yemen became vice president and prime minister, respectively. Sanaa was declared the political capital of the Republic of Yemen, and Aden the economic capital. By the summer of 1990 more than 30 new political parties had formed in Yemen. Rising oil revenues and financial assistance from many foreign countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, brought hope that Yemen could begin to strengthen and expand its economy.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the events that followed in the Persian Gulf took a serious toll on Yemen's economy and newfound political stability. Yemen's critical response to the presence of foreign military forces massed in Saudi Arabia led the Saudi government to expel 850,000 Yemeni workers; the return of the workers and the loss of remittance payments produced widespread unemployment and economic upheaval, which led in turn to domestic political unrest. Bomb attacks, political killings, and violent demonstrations occurred throughout 1991 and 1992, and in December 1992 a rise in consumer prices precipitated riots in several of Yemen's major cities. Concern arose that declining economic and social conditions would give rise to Islamic fundamentalist activities in Yemen.
Political turmoil forced the government to postpone general elections, which were finally held on April 27, 1993, completing the Yemeni unification process begun three years earlier. The General People's Congress (GPC), the former ruling party in North Yemen, won 121 seats in parliament; the Yemen Socialist party (YSP), the former ruling party of South Yemen, won 56 seats; a new Islamic coalition party, al-Islah, won 62 seats; and the remaining 62 seats were won by minor parties and independents. The president and prime minister remained in office after the election, and the three major parties formed a legislative coalition.
The successful elections quickly gave way to political turmoil. In August 1993 Vice President al-Beidh withdrew from Sanaa to Aden and ceased to participate in the political process. This followed his visit to the United States, where he had held talks with Vice President Al Gore, apparently without the consent of President Saleh. From his base at Aden, al-Beidh issued a list of conditions for his return to Sanaa; the conditions centred on the security of the YSP, which, according to the vice president, had been subject to northern-instigated political violence since unification. al-Beidh also protested what he considered the increasing economic marginalization of the south.
The deadlock persisted into the later months of 1993, despite extensive mediation efforts by representatives from several foreign governments. In January 1994 Yemen's principal political parties initialled a Document of Pledge and Agreement, designed to end the six-month feud between Yemen's president and vice president; the document called for a thorough review of the constitution and the country's economic programs and goals. The document was signed by the two leaders in February, but military clashes occurred almost immediately thereafter. In April Oman and Jordan halted mediation efforts aimed at getting the two sides to adhere to their peace agreement. Later that month, heavy fighting broke out between northern and southern forces at 'Amran, north of Sanaa; the fighting signalled the disintegration of the Yemeni union.
Yemen exploded into full-scale civil war in early May. Both sides carried out missile attacks in and around Sanaa and Aden. On May 21 al-Beidh announced the secession of the South from the Republic of Yemen and the formation of a new southern state, the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). The DRY assembled a political structure similar to that of unified Yemen, and al-Beidh was elected president by a five-member Presidential Council. Meanwhile, Saleh dismissed a number of YSP party members from Yemen's government in an attempt to remove the influence of al-Beidh.
Fighting continued throughout June, much of it centred around the port cities of Aden and Al Mukalla. Both sides launched attacks on oil installations, and a great deal of infrastructure was damaged or destroyed. Following the failure of a Russian cease-fire agreement, Saleh's northern forces launched a final drive on Aden and Al Mukalla in early July, ultimately defeating the DRY army. By mid-July all of the former South Yemen was under Saleh's control.
After the collapse of the DRY, Saleh's government was faced with the task of rebuilding Yemen's economy and government. The infrastructure in and around Aden had sustained the most damage, from water systems to oil refineries and communications centres. In July more than 100 cases of cholera were diagnosed in Aden, due in part to water shortages in the city.
In September 1994 the Yemeni legislature approved a number of major reforms to the country's 1990 unification constitution. Saleh was formally re-elected president on October 1, and he appointed AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi as his new vice president. In an attempt to revive the country's economy, Yemeni leaders made efforts to devise and implement an economic austerity program called for by several international economic agencies; this was achieved with a great deal of difficulty in the spring of 1995.
In February 1995 the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia agreed to negotiate a settlement to their long-standing dispute over their shared border. The agreement defused a potentially explosive situation, as Yemen and Saudi Arabia had skirmished in the region only a few months before. As of May 1996 negotiations continued but the two sides had not agreed on a formal border.
In December 1995 Eritrea, which lies across the Red Sea from Yemen, seized Hanish al Kabir (Greater Hanish Island), strategically located at the mouth of the Red Sea, from Yemeni troops stationed there. At least 12 people were killed in the fighting. Both Yemen and recently independent Eritrea claim the Hanish Islands; Yemeni plans for a resort on Hanish al Kabir reportedly sparked the attack. By May 1996 the two countries had reached a truce and agreed to submit the question of sovereignty over the islands to arbitration.
Government: Before unification, North Yemen was governed by a benign authoritarian regime dominated by the military, and South Yemen functioned as a centralized socialist party-state. Politics opened up with the creation of the Republic of Yemen in 1990, and the number of freely functioning parties, lobbying groups, and communications outlets multiplied. During a 30-month transition period, the unification regime was based on equal power sharing between the General People's Congress (GPC) and the Yemeni Socialist party (YSP), the former ruling parties of North Yemen and South Yemen, respectively.
An open, hotly contested national election in April 1993 marked the end of the transition period and yielded a coalition government consisting of the GPC, the YSP, and the conservative Islamic Reform Grouping (al-Islah), with the GPC holding nearly a majority of the cabinet posts. The 1993 election was the first multiparty election on the Arabian Peninsula, and the first in which women could vote; the vast majority of Yemenis participated.
The constitution adopted in 1990, which was similar to North Yemen's 1970 constitution, provided for a 301-member elected legislature, called the Council of Deputies. In addition to its legislative tasks, the council would select a five-member Presidential Council and vote on the composition and program of the cabinet. The Presidential Council would choose from its membership a president and vice president, and also nominate the prime minister.
The members of the Council of Deputies would be selected for five-year terms, as would the president and vice president. In September 1994, at the end of the country's civil war, the Council of Deputies voted to adopt major reforms to the unification constitution. The amended constitution declares Islamic Sharia (basic law) as the basis of all legislation and describes the economy as market-based. The reforms also abolished the five-member Presidential Council, and stipulated that the presidency be decided by universal suffrage, with no one permitted to hold office for more than two terms. | ||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 23 | https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/yemeni-president-abdrabbuh-hadi-steps-down-under-saudi-pressure-report-122041800076_1.html | en | Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Hadi steps down under Saudi pressure: Report | [
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] | 2022-04-18T09:13:00+05:30 | Prince Mohammed told Hadi that other Yemeni leaders had agreed that it was time for him to relinquish power, according to the Saudi and Yemeni officials | en | https://www.business-standard.com/favicon.ico | https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/yemeni-president-abdrabbuh-hadi-steps-down-under-saudi-pressure-report-122041800076_1.html | (Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.) | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 21 | https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30936940 | en | Yemen crisis: President resigns as rebels tighten hold | [
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] | 2015-01-22T17:15:50+00:00 | The president of Yemen resigns in protest at the takeover of the capital Sanaa by Shia Houthi rebels, creating a dangerous political vacuum. | en | BBC News | https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30936940 | The president of Yemen has resigned along with his prime minister in protest at the takeover of the capital Sanaa by Shia Houthi rebels, creating a dangerous political vacuum.
President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi said he could not continue after the Houthis failed to honour a peace deal.
Parliament has reportedly refused to accept the resignations.
Security sources have told the BBC that Yemen's intelligence chief, Ali Hassan al-Ahmedi, has also stepped down.
There are reports of explosions in the southern port city of Aden, where President Hadi has a strong following.
Houthi rebel figures publicly welcomed the resignation of the president with one proposing the creation of a ruling council.
The council would include Houthi-led groups, Abu al-Malek Yousef al-Fishi was quoted as saying by Reuters news agency.
Houthi leaders had previously committed themselves to withdrawing from key positions around the presidential palace and the home of President Hadi.
The US, which is helping fight al-Qaeda militants in Yemen, said it was still assessing the implications of President Hadi's move.
The resignation of the Yemeni president and his government is likely to plunge an already unstable country into uncharted territory.
Mr Hadi has been surrounded in his home in the capital, Sanaa, by rebels for several days. His resignation may be the last card he had left to play after being pushed to the brink.
The rebels have publicly welcomed his resignation but it is not what they wanted. As minority Shias from the north, their authority will not be accepted in the south, where many want to return to having their own state.
With no president and no government, there is also a fear that al-Qaeda's powerful branch in Yemen could make new gains from the political vacuum.
Local officials in Aden told Reuters news agency that unidentified gunmen had attacked two military vehicles in the city early on Friday, local time.
Three explosions were heard during the attack, which was followed by the clashes, said one of the officials, who declined to be identified.
Explosions and clashes were also reported by Qatar-based broadcaster al-Jazeera, which said they were happening on the city's Martyrs' Square.
In his letter of resignation, seen by the Associated Press news agency, Mr Hadi said the parties had reached a "deadlock".
"We found out that we are unable to achieve the goal, for which we bear a lot of pain and disappointment," he said. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 38 | https://www.travelthewholeworld.com/traveling-yemen/sanaa/ | en | Traveling in Sana'a | [
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] | null | [] | 2013-12-03T20:23:47+00:00 | Photoblog of my travels in Sana'a, Yemen, including the Saleh's Mosque, old city, suq, Thula, Wadi Dhar, and more | en | Travel The Whole World | https://www.travelthewholeworld.com/traveling-yemen/sanaa/ | Sana’a
The capital of Yemen is Sana’a located in the western side of the country high up in the mountains. At an altitude of 7,500 feet (2,300 meters), it’s one of the highest capital cities on earth. Sana’a’s history goes way back to the 6th century BC when the city was first founded also making it one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. Above is a photo of one of Sana’a’s districts.
I never really thought of Yemen as mountainous country before I visited. Even from the city though, the views of the mountains are amazing! Above is one of the highest peaks in the country. The highest mountain in Yemen is Jabal an Nabi Shu’ayb at an altitude of 12,028 feet (3,666 meters). It is also the highest mountain in the Arabian Peninsula.
When I visited Yemen, its president was Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh had led this country since the 1970’s going over 33 years. At the time of my visit, the president’s picture was seen in all over the capital like on cars, posted on walls, or framed pictures inside shops. I visited Yemen at an interesting time, the president of Tunisia had just been over thrown, and as the locals told me this is unheard of for an Arabic leader. Support for Saleh seemed to be mixed, but it seems the majority wanted him to move on after over three decades. Outside the capital, it was rare that I saw his picture. Only a month after my trip to Yemen, the ‘Arab Spring’ arrived which led to his fall.
Saleh’s power began with the North Yemen Civil War that took place in the 1960’s and ended in 1970. Royalists of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom fought the Yemen Arab Republic with superior number and equipment. The Yemen Arab Republic, often just called the republicans, received extensive support from other nations in the Middle East and even China. The republicans eventaully were victorious, but not after some serious fighting. The capital of Sana’a was even attacked at one point, and was under what’s known as the 70 day siege. This memorial above is actually dedicated to the siege of Sana’a and is located in Al Sabeen Square. Al Sabeen Square is the main square in Yemen where ceremonies and national events take place.
Something president Saleh did towards the end of his reign was built this enormous mosque below. Known as Saleh's Mosque, it was completed in 2008 and is a massive 294,000 square feet (27,300 meters)! Saleh's Mosque is also located within Al Sabeen Square.
Above is a photo of the main entrance to the King’s mosque, just recently completed in 2008. With a capacity of over 40,000 worshipers, this is the largest mosque in Sana’a and all of Yemen, and from what I saw once I entered, I assume it’s also the most beautiful.
These surrounding photos were all taken from inside the King’s mosque. This is seriously one of the most amazing religious buildings I’ve ever been in. The top photo was taken of the main interior where people gather to pray, below is a photo of one of the ceiling showing one of the domes rising up. I explored this place for a long time and even took some time to sit down and relax. I was enjoying myself until some guy approached me and asked if I was Muslim. I pretended like I didn’t understand and tried to dodge the question, but he was pretty persistent. Once I heard him asking others about my religion I left.
If I had just arrived to Yemen without any prior knowledge about the country, I’d guess this country’s economy was growing at a rate of 10% a year based on some parts of the city. In almost all areas of Sana’a I visited, new buildings seemed to be under construction, brand new roads were in place, and advertisements for future projects were found advertised along the roads. The photo above is of an advertisement of what the new airports in each city will look like. Below was one of many new buildings under construction. Before coming to the US, I had read that the Kuwaitis had funded dozens of construction projects in Yemen putting billions of dollars in investments. It’s sad to think but I’m sure many of these buildings were damaged during the fighting that later came and investments have ceased.
The rest of Sana’a is made up of countless districts, but the most impressive part by far is the old city. Old Sana’a is protected by a city wall that once had seven gates. The gates are over a 1,000 years old, and today only one is still standing. Above is a photo of the old city. This unique architecture you’ll find in Yemen is only found in this part of the world. Below is a photo of one of the city’s ancient minarets.
One of the main streets going through the Old City is River Road photographed above. You can see that both sides of the road are banked upwards with bricks and stones. When it rains hard in Sana’a, River Road becomes just that, and acts as a way to divert water out of the city. Below is a shot of the entrance to the suq, or the old city market. I took this picture while standing right in front of the old city’s gate.
Above and below are two photos from the old city’s suq. The most impressive suq I’ve ever been to was in Omdurman, Sudan. I can’t say that any market in Yemen came even close but they did sell similar items. Above are spices, nuts, and vegetables being sold. In the photo below are cooking utensils and likely some homemade pottery for sale. The market sells all kinds of items from meat, traditional daggers, silvers and gold to pretty much anything else you might need while in Yemen.
You’ll notice that from many of my photos of the Sana’a area most men carry the jambiya, or traditional dagger. In Arabic jambiya literally means dagger. When people use the word jambiya is used in the Middle East, it generally is referring to the Yemeni traditional dagger. I almost never buy souvenirs, but had to pick up two myself to take home with me! Above you can see some jambiyas being sold in the old suq market.
It was easy to get photographs of guys while traveling in Yemen, but for women it was much more difficult. Yemen is one of the most conservative countries I’ve ever visited. Every woman I saw wore a black burqa here in the capital and only a small percent of women had an open faced burqa. I didn’t see any exceptions in other parts of the country, but there were different colors further south with a mix with black and white in the east. A local told me that traditional Yemeni clothing has always been more colorful and the black burqas were introduced only two decades ago from the other gulf countries.
Something else about Yemen that has probably been a long tradition; it’s one of the highest countries in the world with armed civilians. On the upper right, a man passes by a market while carrying an AK-47. In all parts of the country this seemed to be consistent, in one market on the eastern side of Yemen, I counted four people with guns within about 5 minutes. One guy in Yemen told me a story about two friends who were arguing, and one guy took his pistol and slammed it on the other guys head accidentally discharging a round into someone standing nearby. Thinking he killed another one of his friends, he fled to the north of the country and went into hiding. When the family somehow got a hold of him and told him that he had shot is friend in the shoulder and everything was fine, he suspected they were lying and wanted him to come back to Sana’a so they could kill him in revenge. He eventually did go back and found out that his other friend he accidentally shot was fine, so to people in Yemen it turned out to be a funny story that had a happy ending.
There was only one art gallery that I stopped by during my entire visit to Yemen. I’m not sure of the name, but it had some paintings created by local Yemenis. I wish I took more photos of the artwork once inside to share but somehow this was the only photo I took. Sadly I was the only one here! Since this place is free there is no reason for anyone not to visit.
Really though, the entire city of Sana’a is a museum. This star of David on the was left behind when Jews lived in large numbers in Yemen. After the creation of Israel, almost all Jews who were living in Yemen moved there. Most Yemenis I came in contact told me that while they disliked Israel, not surprising, they didn’t have any hate for the Jewish religion. In fact many still consider Yemeni Jews living in Israel as their brothers, surprising!
Some other random experiences I had was when I passed by some outdoor cafe. These guys were roughly my age and attempted to start a conversation with me. They invited me to sit with them for some did, which of course I did. Unfortunately my Arabic was about as good as their English, so we weren’t able to have a real conversation. I would have loved to know their story and opinions on the world. I also wonder if they participated in the uprisings that began only weeks later.
After exploring much of Sana’a I did several day trips to areas nearby. This photo above is from outside of Sana’a in a small town called Manakhah. In order to leave Sana’a I was required to take an armed guard. Above is my driver on the left and my armed guard on the right. We had a traditional Yemeni lunch in Manakhah.
In Manakhah I had one of my favorite experiences in Yemen. We came to this small town to see the traditional drums and dancing that Manakhah is known for. These guys put on a good show and even forced me to join in at one point. This kind of music and dancing almost always take place during weddings throughout Yemen. The guy playing the drum on the left was awesome and one of the most curious people I ever met while traveling. He had a million questions for me; how do people go scuba diving? What happens if you hit a rock while skiing? How are homes heated in USA in the winter? I seriously wish I could have taken him with me!
Another impressive town outside Sana’a is Thula, also called Thilla. The town is pretty small but its history and architecture make it worth a visit if you’re in Sana’a. Over a thousand years old, the city has seen a lot in its life time and even was the birth place of a president. The great thing about the town is that it’s so well preserved. Yemen did do some restoration such as rebuilding the fort and watch towers. I spent lots of time hiking up the steep hills and exploring the small town.
Also restored in Thula was this ancient cistern. You can imagine that in a dry desert environment this is the people’s lifeline. While hanging out by the cistern I was approached by some interesting locals. They were pretty young, spoke English well, and had some very strong opinions on the world and Yemen. The leader of the group told me that Yemen had four problems that needed to be resolved. The first and biggest was Al Qaeda, second was the southern movement, third being tribal feuds, and finally the forth, was Yemen’s negative image on the media.
These kids above are from another small nearby town. Located by the desert canyon called Wadi Dhar, both kids had their own falcons. Besides the traditional hunting using falcons, the kids told me they used to show them to tourists and pose for pictures. An older kid who was here had broken glasses and told me his name was Harry Potter. Harry told me that they used to get 50 tourists here a day years back, now you are the only one he said. I regret not taking Harry Potter’s picture, his glasses were shattered because he had just dropped them the day before he told me.
Before coming to Yemen, I saw several pictures of this unique building while researching my trip. I kind of assumed it was just a large and creatively built house, but it’s actually an enormous summer palace. Known as Dar Al Hajar palace, it rises over 160 feet (50 meters) above the surrounding land, and was home to the Imam Yahya in the early 20th century.
The inside of the place has dozens of rooms ranging from a large kitchen, to dining rooms, bedrooms for the king, princesses and for the servants. I took a lot of photos of this place, but since I try to limit my pictures per country to around 100 and I’m closer to 150 for Yemen, I had to remove some. Above is a photo of one of the gathering areas where they would have meetings or dinner. The photo below shows one of the decorated stairwells that takes you to another floor. Today the entire complex is a museum, so you are free to explore every level.
About an hour from Sana’a I visited my final fortress. I came here at the very end of my trip, and to be honest I came across so many old castles while in Yemen that I wasn’t too motivated about visiting this one. Once I arrived though, I was taken away from the fortress itself as well as the amazing views. What was unique about this fortress to me was there were actually people still living here. As I wandered around I figured I had the whole place to myself. It wasn’t until I noticed that there were people eyeing me from their homes that I realized I wasn’t alone. Above is a photo of one of the houses in the lower parts of the fortress. The upper parts were actually locked and I was afraid they were off limits. This old woman photographed below came out and without speaking took me up and unlocked the gate for me.
Above is a photo of the entire Zakati Fortress. Since I was alone here and wasn’t able to speak to the locals I don’t know much about Zakati Fortress. All I know is that it’s ancient and high up in the mountains and I’m glad I didn’t miss it. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 74 | https://amwaj.media/article/houthis-step-up-pressure-on-foreign-organizations-in-yemen | en | Houthis step up pressure on foreign organizations in Yemen | [
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] | null | [] | null | Amid continued British-US airstrikes in Yemen, the Ansarullah movement—better known as the Houthis—has significantly intensified its intimidation tactics in the country. Since May 31, the group has arbitrarily arrested UN staff as well as employees of international and national organizations operating in Sana’a. Moreover, in June, the Houthis declared that they had detained an “American-Israeli” spy cell “directly linked to the CIA”—accusing those arrested of engaging in “espionage and sabotage in both official and unofficial institutions.” They subsequently broadcasted what appeared to be forced confessions from ten former employees of the US embassy, which closed its operations in 2015.
In response, the US Mission to the UN indicated that a total of “50 Yemeni employees of UN agencies, Member State diplomatic... | en | /favicon.ico | Amwaj.media | https://amwaj.media/article/houthis-step-up-pressure-on-foreign-organizations-in-yemen | Amid continued British-US airstrikes in Yemen, the Ansarullah movement—better known as the Houthis—has significantly intensified its intimidation tactics in the country. Since May 31, the group has arbitrarily arrested UN staff as well as employees of international and national organizations operating in Sana’a. Moreover, in June, the Houthis declared that they had detained an “American-Israeli” spy cell “directly linked to the CIA”—accusing those arrested of engaging in “espionage and sabotage in both official and unofficial institutions.” They subsequently broadcasted what appeared to be forced confessions from ten former employees of the US embassy, which closed its operations in 2015.
In response, the US Mission to the UN indicated that a total of “50 Yemeni employees of UN agencies, Member State diplomatic... | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 1 | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/22/profile-yemens-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi | en | Profile: Yemen’s Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi | [
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] | 2015-02-22T00:00:00 | Yemen’s post-uprising leader had been grappling with a Shia rebel movement and al-Qaeda since he took office in 2012. | en | /favicon_aje.ico | Al Jazeera | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/22/profile-yemens-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi | Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who resigned in January as Yemen’s president amid pressure from Shia Houthi rebels, assumed office in 2012 after spending 17 years as vice-president.
Hadi was elected president after protests lasting nearly a year against former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, but he set about governing a country beset by a host of problems, including a Shia rebel movement and a growing threat from al-Qaeda.
A sole candidate in the referendum-like elections held in 2012, the Sunni politician’s ascendency to power saw Yemen become the first Arab Spring nation where an uprising led to a negotiated settlement.
The vote was a condition of the power-transition deal signed by Saleh in 2011 after mass protests calling for him to step aside.
Under the deal, brokered by the Gulf Co-operation Council made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Saleh transfered constitutional powers to Hadi, who he had appointed as vice-president in 1994.
The 68-year-old former soldier from Yemen’s south was considered by most as the consensus candidate.
But two major opposition groups – the separatist Southern Movement and the Houthi rebels – boycotted the poll.
The uprising’s main proponents had asked Yemenis to support Hadi and posters of the vice-president were plastered on buildings and streets in the capital Sanaa.
Hadi had local, regional and international support and was a respected leader with a vision for the future.
When news of the presidential poll came, crowds in Sanaa chanted “Hadi, take the key, the slaughterer’s rule has ended”, a reference to Saleh’s leadership.
Yemen’s Nobel Peace laureate Tawakkul Karman had urged Yemenis to vote for Hadi, saying his election would mark “the fruit of the popular youth uprising”.
Hadi was expected to launch a national dialogue, the first step in the transitional period that sought to end in legislative and presidential elections within two years.
But many Yemenis had expressed concern over the role of the country’s security forces, a major challenge Hadi had to deal with.
Security forces remained under the control of Saleh’s sons and nephews, and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred during the crackdown on protests.
Hadi was sworn in as Saleh returned home from the US where he received treatment for injuries sustained in an attack on his palace.
Many feared his return would stock tensions but US President Barack Obama had voiced support for Hadi’s new leadership.
Obama said in a letter that he looked forward to deeper relations between the two nations and promised that the US would be “a strong and reliable partner”. He wrote that Yemen would become a symbol of political transformation “when people resist violence and unite under a common cause”.
Saleh’s critics had repeatedly accused the veteran leader of intentionally allowing al-Qaeda to expand its influence in the country’s lawless south and east to demonstrate that only he can fight the spread of terror. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 37 | https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-13/yemen-parliament-members-loyal-to-hadi-convene-for-first-meeting | en | Yemen Parliament Members Loyal to Hadi Hold First Meeting | [
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] | 2019-04-13T00:00:00 | Members of Yemen’s parliament loyal to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi convened Saturday for the first time since a civil war broke out in 2015. | en | Bloomberg.com | https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-13/yemen-parliament-members-loyal-to-hadi-convene-for-first-meeting | President urges Shiite Houthi rebels to work toward peace
Meeting held under heavy security in town in southeast Yemen
Members of Yemen’s parliament loyal to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi convened Saturday for the first time since a civil war broke out in 2015.
The session, held in the southeastern province of Hadramaut, was described in a speech by the president as “historic.” | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 1 | 94 | https://globalnews.ca/tag/abdrabbuh-mansur-hadi/ | en | News, Videos & Articles | https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/134ef81f5668dc78080f6bd19ca2310b?s=32 | https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/134ef81f5668dc78080f6bd19ca2310b?s=32 | [
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] | null | [] | null | Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi videos and latest news articles; GlobalNews.ca your source for the latest news on Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi . | en | https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/134ef81f5668dc78080f6bd19ca2310b?s=32 | Global News | https://globalnews.ca/tag/abdrabbuh-mansur-hadi/ | Saudi-led siege of Yemeni port city could spark catastrophic new cholera epidemic: NGO
The resumption of the Saudi-led air strike campaign on Hodeidah could create ideal conditions for a catastrophic new cholera outbreak in Yemen, Save the Children has warned.
Health
Jul 28, 2018
L.A. woman sentenced to 12 years in Russian prison for $50 Ukraine donation
2,907 Read
Mpox is on the rise. What Canadians need to know as the virus spreads
1,677 Read
Grizzly bear and cubs spotted on Vancouver Island for first time
1,155 Read | ||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 62 | https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2022/10/12/preserving-legitimacy-through-transition-lessons-from-the-republic-of-yemen/ | en | Preserving Legitimacy Through Transition: Lessons from the Republic of Yemen | [
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] | 2022-10-12T00:00:00 | Photo credit: Reuters On April 7, 2022, the leader of the internationally recognized government of Yemen, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, announced his abdication and transferred his powers to a presidential council, led by his former advisor, Rashad al-Alimi. Hadi also dismissed his vice president, Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who publicly stated his support for the formation… | en | Georgetown Security Studies Review | https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2022/10/12/preserving-legitimacy-through-transition-lessons-from-the-republic-of-yemen/ | Photo credit: Reuters
On April 7, 2022, the leader of the internationally recognized government of Yemen, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, announced his abdication and transferred his powers to a presidential council, led by his former advisor, Rashad al-Alimi. Hadi also dismissed his vice president, Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who publicly stated his support for the formation of a new presidential council despite being fired the day before. These efforts echoed the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who in 2011 officially handed off his powers to Mansour Hadi, his former deputy, who was to lead the government through a two-year transitional phase. Although the self-removal of a three-decade-long dictator was welcomed, hindsight reveals how the Republic of Yemen (RoY) was unable to preserve its own legitimacy throughout the transition process. This failure left the country vulnerable to insurrectionist forces and ultimately resulted in its current downfall. By analyzing the RoY during this earlier transitional period, this paper will draw out takeaways that can be used to illustrate why Yemen fell to its current situation. First, this paper will provide a brief background of the country to illustrate how a unified Yemen is a historical oddity. Then, it will describe how the RoY lost its power within its own territory and how the subsequent rise of competing internal and external forces led to the ultimate downfall of the former government.
Yemen has had a North-South geopolitical divide since the 9th century, when the Zaydis, a Shia Islamic sect, became dominant in the northern regions. Throughout history, the Zaydis and the Ottomans clashed repeatedly, with the former finding themselves under sporadic Turkish occupation. The Ottoman Empire fell in 1918, and North Yemen regained independence under Zaydi leadership. The rest of Yemen reverted to self-governance under British colonial administration and nominally divided up as the Protectorate of South Arabia and the Federation of South Arabia. During the Cold War period, a series of revolutions split the country into the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. Saudi Arabia and Jordan supported the YAR, while the Soviets supported the PDRY. In 1990, the two sides of Yemen united and reformed as the Republic of Yemen, which was led by the President of the YAR, Ali Abdullah Saleh. North-South Yemen tensions continued to simmer and in 1994, Saleh and the northern forces decisively crushed the Saudi-backed southern secessionists in the Yemeni Civil War.
Saleh had also turned a blind eye to the returning mujahadeen from Afghanistan and allowed an Al-Qaeda (AQAP) power base to develop in Yemen. In October 2000, the U.S. destroyer, USS Cole, was damaged in Aden by an Al-Qaeda suicide attack that killed seventeen U.S. sailors. This led to the beginning of U.S. counterterrorism involvement in Yemen, which became fodder for anti-Saleh sentiment due to his cooperation with the West. Meanwhile, the spread of state-sponsored Sunni Salafism in northern Yemen caused a counter-Shia reaction where the Houthi clan began a movement to revive Zaydi traditions. This eventually led to six rounds of conflict from 2004-2010, in what is known as the Saada Wars. The Saada Wars pitted the RoY military forces, led by Saleh and Ali-Mohsin, against the Houthis. Then, in 2009, Saudi Arabia openly joined the fight against the Houthis. Finally, in 2011, international pressure stemming from the Yemeni protests during the Arab Spring compelled Saleh to resign.
Lesson 1: A strong and apolitical leader who can provide a source of strength is necessary to provide legitimacy to the transition process.
The inconclusive results of the Saada wars, the inflamed youth and southern secessionist passions, and the rise of extremist violence altogether served as potential spoilers of the two-year transition process. However, Hadi had neither strong political allies nor any strong tribal affiliations that he could build a base upon. As Saleh’s vice president for the last 18 years, he remained anonymous and was tasked with following protocol. Hadi was appointed after the Yemeni Civil War of 1994 to appease southern Yemeni elites, but Saleh’s consolidation of power had since completely neutralized them. On one hand, a weak political figurehead is ideal for leading a transitional government due to the ease of removal once new terms and deals are finalized. On the other hand, a weak leader is also unable to prevent spoilers, especially heavily armed militarized actors. In 2011, the Houthis had not yet been subdued and Saleh remained the head of the General People’s Congress. Also, he still possessed a cadre of loyalists throughout the Yemeni government and the military. Furthermore, despite massive U.S. counterterrorism support, some of Yemen’s most horrific terrorist attacks occurred from 2011-2015. Eventually, the absence of a strong leader who kept the various parties in line, as opposed to the presence of a weak leader who encouraged cooperation in spite of, culminated in January 2015 when the Houthis allied with Saleh to storm the capital of Sanaa. Hadi’s failure to control Yemen’s internal security forces and prevent spoilers can be attributed to his inability to provide legitimacy to the transitional government.
Lesson 2: International effort must be unified in support of a single political process.
The international response during this transitional period under Hadi can be characterized as “distracted.” The UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, was left alone to shuttle himself back and forth trying to find a diplomatic compromise among the various Yemeni factions. There were negligible efforts on the parts of involved powers like Saudi Arabia and the United States to interfere and provide tangible support. Saudi Arabia hosted multiple rounds of the Friends of Yemen conference; although they successfully raised eight billion dollars in pledges, there is little to show for it. Furthermore, the outcomes of the conference were not tied to any of the UN diplomatic efforts shouldered by Benomar. Meanwhile, the United States conducted one of its most intense counterterrorism operations in Yemen and flooded the RoY with weapons and training for commando forces. The consideration that the Yemeni transition process might fail and the equipment could fall into the wrong hands seems to have not been a previous topic of concern. The UN diplomatic effort was ultimately handicapped due to a lack of leverage, which could have been provided by a more honest attempt at international coordination among the foreign powers. This ultimately provided time and space for the Houthis to stall, consolidate power, and to strike at their most opportune time. A unified international effort directly linked to the UN-led negotiations would have provided much needed legitimacy and external foreign pressure throughout the transition process.
Lesson 3: Plan and prepare a security contingency so that the legitimate government can maintain monopoly of force in unoccupied areas.
A few days after the fall of Sanaa into Houthi hands, Hadi resigned and was put under house arrest. The Houthis declared their intent to form their own government. Several weeks later, Hadi escaped from Sanaa and resurfaced in the southern city of Aden, where he declared himself to be the president again. The Houthis, their ranks reinforced with Saleh loyalists, and freshly armed with military equipment that once belonged to the RoY, began their conquest towards the south. The capture of Sanaa disabled the RoY military command structure and Ali-Mohsin, the archenemy of the Houthis and the country’s most experienced military commander, was nowhere to be found. The RoY military units outside of the capital were unable to regroup and as a result, the government was unable to enforce its will on its own territory, even in areas not occupied by the Houthi. Stronger foreign support for the political process could have mitigated Hadi’s challenges of ruling through a transitional government, such as by offering security guarantees like providing a UN peacekeeping force throughout the negotiation process. A security succession plan in the event of a national crisis like Yemen would have prevented the quick collapse of the RoY by enabling a rapid response force to maintain rule of law and organize resistance against the Houthis.
Lesson 4: Strategically unaligned coalitions further exacerbate issues of legitimacy and stability.
The threat of a Shia-dominated state is unacceptable to Yemen’s neighbor in the north so a fortuitous letter from Hadi, while he was sheltering in Aden, was sent to the UN Security Council requesting for military intervention. Saudi Arabia built a coalition with neighboring gulf partners and launched Operation Desert Storm, which destroyed Yemen’s air capabilities – a large number of which were provided by the United States in addition to civilian infrastructure such as roads, bridges, supply dumps, ports, and garrisons. They also air-drop supplies and equipment to various “pro-Hadi” forces in the South. Three months later, the Emirati-led Operation Golden Arrow, retook Aden. From the north, Ali-Mohsin led Saudi-trained soldiers and established a foothold in Marib. As the war ground to a stalemate, Saudi Arabia and UAE interests diverged. Saudi Arabia was focused on securing its border from the Houthis and recruiting Yemenis to serve in border units. At the same time, Ali-Mohsen’s forces were unable to break out of Marib. The UAE viewed Ali-Mohsen’s affiliation with Islah as a problem, as the Emiratis consider Islah a terrorist organization. Thus the UAE turned to and supported various southern secessionist elements, while setting the groundwork for future claims on shipping rights along Yemen’s southern coast. Notably, both Saudi Arabia and UAE have provided little direct material support to RoY military forces. Furthermore, UAE-backed southern forces have become dominant political entities such as the Southern Transitional Council and Hadrami Elite Forces. To further compound the issues, AQAP continues to exert undue influence over large swaths of ungoverned Yemeni territory. As the above illustrates, the Republic of Yemen became further sidelined as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates became direct combatants of the war. There is little evidence to prove otherwise that the RoY has little to no decision-making with regards to material foreign funding and support. The deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure by the Saudis, the formation of militarily capable secessionist forces, and the continual suffering of the Yemeni people can be attributed to the RoY, which further damaged its own credibility. The government had been left to rely on the patriotic goodwill of others to willingly self-integrate back into the government. | |||||
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] | null | [] | null | The quick fall of Yemen's capital could push the country toward the Syrian model of sectarian strife, but it also presents an opportunity for reform led by a new political player. | en | /themes/custom/wayah/favicon.ico | The Washington Institute | https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/fast-tracking-arab-spring-yemen | On September 21, Ansar Allah (AA), also known as the Houthis, stunned the world by taking over the Yemeni capital of Sana in a single day. Although largely left out of the international spotlight, this takeover marks an important regional development and could provide Yemen with an historic opportunity.
The northern tribal Zaidi identity is a composite of geography (northern mountains), religion (Zaidism, an offshoot of Shiite Islam), and tribalism, with an imam as its leader. For much of Yemen's history, these imams controlled most of northern Yemen; some powerful imams even extended their control to regions in lower and southern Yemen. However, the 1962 revolution in North Yemen, which established a republican regime, ended their rule, though the dominance of the Zaidi tribal elite remained intact. Yet when Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Zaidi tribal officer, took power in 1978, he ushered in a new era of dominance by the northern military-tribal elite. Saleh favored the Zaidi tribes around Sana, whereas the northern tribes of Sadah province, most loyal to the Zaidi imam, were excluded from development, social services, and job opportunities. Although the near absence of the state allowed the Zaidi imams to continue providing significant spiritual and even temporal leadership, gross incursions of extremist Sunni schools into the heart of Zaidism in Sadah propelled the youth there to resort to other means of resistance in order to voice their grievances.
The establishment of AA is the culmination of these efforts. Despite its traditional ideological roots, AA is a modern political and military organization. It is modeled after Hezbollah in Lebanon, emphasizing discipline, credibility, and effective grassroots work, providing basic services to its community, enforcing rule of law, and delivering swift justice. As such, its governance model stands in sharp contrast to the corrupt and inefficient government in the rest of Yemen.
AA came to prominence after defeating government forces in a series of wars from 2004-2009. Although it participated in the 2011 popular uprising against Saleh, it did not join the opposition coalition or participate in the national consensus government tasked to manage the political transition. Later on, however, AA and the Southern Hirak, a movement demanding the restoration of the Southern Yemeni state, agreed to participate in the National Dialogue Conference and the Constitution Drafting Committee. These positive steps were rebuffed over the last two years as the Sunni military-tribal-political alliance led by the Sunni Islah Party and General Ali Mohsen, the commander who led the wars against Sadah, prevented AA from joining the government. Moreover, the alliance was accused of replacing government officials from the former General People's Congress (GPC) with Islah members.
This systematic exclusion brought the northern Zaidi tribal elite of the GPC and AA into the same camp. In the context of the Arab Spring that ended the Zaidi tribal elite's monopoly of power and called for a more inclusive political system, disaffection with Islah and its allies was rampant among tribal sheikhs around Sana. AA has tapped into this dissatisfaction and attacked Sunni extremist strongholds in Sadah and its neighboring provinces. After an initial failed attempt to stop that advance, the Islah Party decided not to fight AA.
At the military level, the transitional government, led by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, a Sunni southern general who served as Saleh's vice president until 2012, made restructuring the military and security services a priority. Over the following two years, dozens of commanders in both services were replaced with new commanders loyal to him. However, corruption, tribal patronage, and lack of military discipline have kept both services fractured and ineffective, with many mid-level officers, and even some top commanders, still loyal to Saleh or his rival, General Mohsen.
This situation was made clear when a Mohsen loyalist commanding a key unit in Amran, 30 miles north of Sana, disobeyed the commander-in-chief's orders to hand over his command to another officer. This gave AA the opportunity to advance on Amran, kill the commander, and take over the city on July 9. This swift victory showed Hadi that his government, paralyzed by petty partisan politics and weakened by division and corruption, was powerless to stop AA from advancing towards Sana. All that was needed was a pretext.
On July 30, the opportunity presented itself -- the government's decision to remove fuel subsidies sparked a public outcry. AA's alliance with the ousted Saleh led them to mobilize Saleh loyalists (from the GPC, military, and tribes) and other disaffected and heavily armed tribesmen to participate in sit-ins strategically located near major military installations north, south, and west of Sana. These sit-ins fostered friction with military units in the area, and by mid-September they had turned into a full-scale war with Mohsen loyalists in the northern district of Sana. In two days, AA had taken control of the city and looted the armaments of military units that belonged to General Mohsen. On the second day, hostilities were formally ended with the signing of the "Peace and Partnership Agreement," paving the way for a new era of northern Zaidi tribal elite ascendency, this time with a strong sectarian undertone and links to Iran.
As the main Islamist party in Yemen the past two decades, Islah was hurt by these recent developments. But its re-entrenchment in Sunni provinces, including Ibb and Taizz, highlight that Islah was bruised, not broken. The biggest loser is the former ruling party, GPC. Encouraged by Saleh to support AA, members of GPC have no incentive to now abandon this newly crowned political force. It is therefore likely to emerge weaker than Islah.
For the first time in modern history, Yemen is dominated by two sectarian political groups: AA and Islah. If mismanaged, this could lead to serious polarization, fast-tracking Yemen toward the Syrian model of sectarian strife. However, the primacy of an outsider force such as AA is also an opportunity to catalyze reforms. Unlike the traditional Sana-based political elite whose corruption has frustrated reforms and paralyzed the state, AA is still unscathed as a new political player. Their commitment to good governance and to fighting corruption coupled with a strong prime minister, fully supported by the president, can help Yemen carry out true and necessary reforms that could put the country back on a path of economic growth. It is an opportunity that should not be missed. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 35 | https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/yemen-s-hadi-has-no-regrets-about-seeking-saudi-help/1207407 | en | Yemen’s Hadi has no regrets about seeking Saudi help | [
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SANAA
Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi says he has no regrets about requesting help from a Saudi-led coalition cobbled together in 2015 to help his government fight the Houthi rebel group.
In a late Tuesday interview with the BBC, Hadi described the Saudi-led coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm as one of the most “successful” military operations ever undertaken in the Arab world.
“I do not regret this decision at all,” he said. “Otherwise, we would not have liberated parts of the country from Aden to [the eastern province of] Al-Mahra.”
“Without the support of the coalition, these areas would still be under the control of the Houthis,” he added.
Hadi went on to assert: “If Decisive Storm had not happened, it would have been the beginning of a major civil war lasting even longer than the conflict in Somalia [that began in 1991 and remains ongoing].”
Yemen has been wracked by war since 2014, when Shia Houthi rebels overran much of the country, including Sanaa.
The loss of the capital forced Hadi and his government to take up temporary residence in Yemen’s coastal city of Aden.
The conflict escalated in 2015 when Saudi Arabia and its Sunni-Arab allies -- accusing the Houthis of serving as Iranian proxies -- launched a massive air campaign in Yemen aimed at rolling back Houthi gains and shoring up Hadi’s pro-Saudi government.
UN-sponsored peace talks held in Kuwait the following year failed to end the destructive conflict.
The violence has devastated Yemen’s infrastructure, including water and sanitation systems, prompting the UN to describe the situation as “one of the worst humanitarian disasters of modern times”. | |||||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 42 | https://www.cnn.com/2015/01/17/world/yemen-abduction/index.html | en | Gunmen abduct Yemeni President’s chief of staff | [
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] | 2015-01-17T00:00:00 | Shiite Houthi rebels took responsibility Saturday for the abduction of the Yemeni President’s chief of staff in downtown Sanaa. | en | /media/sites/cnn/apple-touch-icon.png | CNN | https://www.cnn.com/2015/01/17/world/yemen-abduction/index.html | Shiite rebels took responsibility Saturday for the abduction of the Yemeni President’s chief of staff in downtown Sanaa.
Ahmed bin Mubarak, top aide to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, was abducted by gunmen Saturday morning, security officials said.
Houthi rebels “were forced to seize Mubarak and this was an important step to cut the way of any coup attempt on the peace and transition deal,” said a statement by the rebels’ political faction, Ansarullah.
Hadi appointed bin Mubarak premier back in October, but the rebels rejected the nomination.
A senior media adviser to the Houthi movement in Yemen, Osama Sari, told CNN that the presidential chief of staff had been detained by the Houthis as a message to the President.
Sari added this was because the President wanted to introduce a new constitution without the approval of the Houthis.
A Yemeni official close to the presidential administration also told CNN that the presidential chief of staff had been detained by armed men linked to the Houthi tribe.
The official said they believed the detention was linked to disagreement over the constitution. “This is force for political gain, a ridiculous show of muscle flexing,” the official said.
The abduction comes amid rising tensions in the Arabian Peninsula country following the rise of Shiite Houthi rebels. Houthis swept into the capital last year, sparking battles that left more than 300 dead in a month.
In September, Houthis signed a ceasefire deal with the government. Since then, its members have installed themselves in key positions in the government and financial institutions.
Adding to Yemen’s turmoil is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a terror group that has been exploiting and stoking the instability.
On Saturday, the Houthi media outlet, Al Maseerah, repeated the group’s claim of responsibility.
The rebels further elaborated on their motives for the abduction in their statement.
“Surely there are series of steps the resistance forces will conduct to stop those powers from negligence and to stop their criminal activities against the people, today and in the future,” the rebels’ statement said, posted on Facebook.
“President Hadi must understand the sensitivity of the current situation and not be an umbrella for corrupt and criminal powers,” the statement added.
The UK ambassador to Yemen and the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa called for bin Mubarak’s immediate release.
“Very concerned about the kidnapping of Dr Ahmed Bin Mubarak. Few have done more to support the 2011 Revolution and ideals,” Jane Marriott, the British ambassador to Yemen, said on Twitter.
The “Revolution” refers to months of demonstrations and crackdowns that led to civilian deaths in 2011. Toward the end of that year, then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh resigned, and powers were transferred to then-Vice President Hadi.
Hadi was elected President in February 2012.. He was the only candidate on the ballot. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 4 | https://www.britannica.com/video/179525/Overview-Yemen-discussion-Sanaa | en | Explore the Unique Landscapes & Traditions of Yemen | [
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In the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula lies the most primordial and enigmatic country in the Middle East: Yemen. Its unique and incomparable landscapes give this country an almost mystical aura. At one time it was the kingdom of the Queen of Sheba, who is supposed to have set out from here to visit King Solomon in Jerusalem a thousand years before Christ was born. Today, most Yemenites lead traditional and reserved lives in very modest conditions. About two-thirds of all Yemenites still live from subsistence farming. It often takes more than two hours to reach larger cities by car. The path there is a bit of an adventure.
A catchment area for large numbers of people, Yemen's capital, Sanaa. Sanaa is renowned the world over for its historic center and unique culture. The old town consists of 6,000 multi-storey buildings, in the typical, and traditional architectural style. The most peculiar thing about them: they are made of clay and are centuries old. They have been UNESCO World Heritage Sites since 1988. Today, about two million people live in this city, which is more than just the cultural and political epicenter of the country. Sanaa has always been and continues to be a center of trade and craftsmanship. The famous curved daggers are made here. They hang from nearly every man's belt and are considered both as jewelry and status symbol.
Visitors who take a closer look will discover many a curious relic of times gone by, like a camel mill. Mustard seeds are ground here.
West of Sanaa, in the port city of Hodeidah, most people earn their living with fish. The coast is full of sea creatures, especially sardines, tuna and sharks. The latter is by far the most requested at the fish markets. Though many species of shark are protected by laws, it doesn't seem to bother anyone here. For many Asians shark fins are a delicacy and high prices are paid for a set of shark teeth.
Whether on the coast or farther inland, Yemen is a country in which traditions are still playing a major role. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 15 | https://fanack.com/faces/features-insights/yemeni-president-hadi~75871/ | en | Yemeni President Hadi, a Reluctant Leader Who Became a Stubborn One | [
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] | 2018-02-05T08:00:37+00:00 | Ever since Hadi took over the presidency, things went wrong. Despite some reshuffles in the leadership of the armed forces, he did not manage to get rid of the remains of the Saleh-clan. Instead, he started appointing his own family members and cronies to strategic positions. It made the Yemeni’s doubt his sincerity and leadership skills. | en | The MENA Chronicle | Fanack | https://fanack.com/faces/features-insights/yemeni-president-hadi~75871/ | Ever since Hadi took over the presidency, things went wrong. Despite some reshuffles in the leadership of the armed forces, he did not manage to get rid of the remains of the Saleh-clan. Instead, he started appointing his own family members and cronies to strategic positions. It made the Yemeni’s doubt his sincerity and leadership skills.
On 21 February 2012 Yemenis went to the ballot boxes. It was a surrealistic scene: people proudly showing their inked thumb, happy to have voted. They were not happy for having voted for their candidate, just happy for having voted. There was only one candidate: Abd- Rabbu Mansour Hadi.
When asked what they knew about him, the answer usually was: nothing. Still, they believed that after 33 years of the reign of Ali Abdollah Saleh, culminating in violent crackdowns of peaceful demonstrators in 2011, anything or anyone would be better than him. So they went for Hadi, Saleh’s longstanding vice-president and fellow member of the ruling General People’s Congress party.
It did not matter much. If the Yemeni’s would not have voted at all on that day, Hadi would still have become president. Such was the power transfer deal that had been brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Some Yemenis indeed abstained from voting. They were suspicious about Hadi’s ability to rule their unruly country for only one reason: he did not have a moustache. To them, this was a sign of weakness, of lacking manhood. Others figured: if this guy does not deliver, at least I did not actively support him.
He did not deliver. In a 2013 meeting with US President Obama he summed up Yemen’s challenges accurately, but did not come across as the strong and inspired leader needed to face them. A year later, not one of the issues was solved, the National Dialogue which was also part of the transition deal, failed and an already bad situation had turned into a worse one, bringing the country to war.
Whether this is because he had an impossible job to start with, or whether he lacked the skills to deal with the international, regional and national snake pit of Yemeni politics is hard to say. Probably a bit of both. Even today, after more than four years in power, the man and his motives remain an enigma.
Born in 1945 in Abyan, in the south of Yemen, he was trained as a soldier in Yemen, the UK, Egypt and Russia. In 1986, after an internal power struggle within the socialist republic of South Yemen, he fled to North Yemen, which made him a traitor to many southerners. After the civil war of 1994 between North and South within the united Republic of Yemen – during which he fought on the Northern side – he was appointed vice-president of Yemen, and nestled quietly for almost twenty years in the shadow of Ali Abdollah Saleh.
Even less is known about his private life – something fairly normal in the region, where privacy is sacrosanct and respected, even for kings or presidents. He is married, and has children. Their whereabouts are unknown.
It seems unlikely that in 2012 Hadi actually had the ambition to leave Saleh’s shadow. It seems more likely that the GCC and United Nations dragged him out of there, not finding a better candidate at the time. It also seems likely that ousted president Saleh was happy enough with the solution, knowing he would not have to fear much from Hadi, who – being a southerner – lacks the tribal support he, Saleh, had (and still has).
And indeed, ever since Hadi took over the presidency, things went wrong. Despite some reshuffles in the leadership of the armed forces, he did not manage to get rid of the remains of the Saleh-clan. Instead, he started appointing his own family members and cronies to strategic positions. It made the Yemeni’s doubt his sincerity and leadership skills. Nevertheless, they gave him a chance, if only for lack of better alternatives.
The Zaydi (Shiite) Houthi rebels in the North of Yemen didn’t though. Angry about their marginalized role during the National Dialogue and smelling weakness, with the support of Saleh and his remaining forces they took over the capital Sanaa and its ministries. They forced Hadi out of office. He eventually resigned (only to be reinstalled later on), fled and sought refuge and support in Saudi Arabia.
To many, Hadi then was no longer just a disappointment, but a coward too. Especially the fact that he hooked up with Saudi Arabia – the neighbour with which Yemen always had a difficult relationship of dependency but not friendship – made them angry. And after the Saudi’s started their military intervention in March 2015 to defeat Houthi’s and restore Hadi’s government to power, he turned from coward into something even worse: the enemy.
This does not seem to bother the diplomats and other parties who have been discussing peace-deal after peace-deal. Hadi’s return to Yemen and to power has so far always been included in the proposals for a solution to the war which has been continuing since March 2015. They cannot or do not want to get rid of him. It is anyone’s guess why. Either they feel some obligation to – reluctantly – stick to the man they brought to power. After all, an UN Security Council resolution demands the return of his government in Sanaa. Or they really believe he is the man who can bring stability to Yemen.
Hadi himself seems to have changed from a reluctant leader to a stubborn one. End of October 2016 the UN – finally – suggested a plan which sidelined Hadi substantially, leaving him only a symbolic role. Only days later, Hadi rejected the plan as it would be too favourable for the Houthi rebels.
Why not give up? Why not step down and give peace a chance? Why this clinging to power he never really had in the first place? Perhaps Hadi’s biggest problem is not with giving the Houthi’s positions in the government – as the latest plan proposes. Perhaps the biggest problem is the feeling that such a deal would mean he would lose out to his former boss and Houthi-ally: Ali Abdollah Saleh.
Contrary to Hadi, Saleh is gaining popularity by the day and elections – ultimately part of the plan too – may very well end in victory for Saleh, or his son. That would not just mean back to the shadows for Hadi, it would mean exit, if not exile. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 40 | https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/ | en | Yemen's Houthi Rebels: Who Are They and What Is Their Goal? | [] | [] | [] | [
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] | 2024-01-12T14:20:01+00:00 | The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, in retaliation to the group's Red Sea attacks. | en | /favicon.ico | TIME | https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/ | The U.S. and U.K. launched strikes attacking multiple Houthi rebel targets in Yemen on Thursday, Jan. 11, marking a significant escalation in the broader conflict of the Middle East. In October, shortly after the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis began launching missile attacks at cargo ships passing through the Red Sea, headed towards Israeli ports.
Here’s what you need to know about Yemen’s Houthi rebels and their place in the current conflict.
Who are Yemen’s Houthi rebels?
The Houthi rebels are one of two main factions controlling territory amidst Yemen’s ongoing civil war. Currently, they control the Western coast of the country, including its capital city, Sana’a.
The Houthis initially began as a cultural revivalist movement in the 1990s for the Zaydi sect of Islam which, as of 2022, was practiced by approximately 35% of the Yemeni population. According to Stacey Philbrick Yadav, the chair of international relations at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and author of Yemen in the Shadow of Transition, many Zaydi muslims were becoming increasingly frustrated with the growing prominence of Saudi-Arabian Salafi Islam in the country, which they felt repressed their Zaydi cultural and religious heritage.
Additionally, the Houthis resented what they perceived to be widespread corruption and mismanagement in the Yemeni government throughout the 2000s. This led the Houthis to launch several insurgencies against the Yemeni government between 2004 and 2010.
In 2011, during the Arab Spring, the grievances of the Yemeni population reached a boiling point, and mass protests erupted calling for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been ruling the country for over thirty years. After Saleh resigned, Saudi Arabia backed Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi as the new leader of the country. The Houthis resented this choice, and launched a military campaign against the new government, which led to a civil war that is still ongoing.
Their conflict with the Saudi-backed government has led the Houthis to become more closely allied with Iran, from which they receive some support. Nevertheless, some experts say it’s not entirely accurate to call the Houthi rebels a direct proxy.
“They do have a relationship with and support from Iran, but are not a straightforward proxy of Iranian interests. They have their own locally defined interests and so I think that their actions in the past two months have reflected that,” Philbrick Yadav told TIME in December.
Read More: How Congress Is Reacting to Biden’s Military Attack on the Houthis in Yemen
Why are the Houthis attacking ships in the Red Sea?
In the Arab world, the Palestinian cause is extremely popular and often a signifier of progressive values. By attacking Israeli ships, the Houthis may expand their support base across Yemen and the Arab world. Additionally, it is believed the group is hoping to sabotage the Saudi normalization with Israel, which had been in the works.
Why are the U.S and U.K. striking Yemen?
Over 80% of all internationally traded goods are transported via cargo ships, since air travel is a much less cost effective way to transport large items or huge amounts of goods. Ships must travel through the Red Sea in order to access the Suez Canal, which is the only waterway that allows for direct passage between Europe and Asia.
Otherwise, the ships traveling between Europe and Asia must journey around the African continent, which can add over 30 days in travel time. Due to the attacks by Houthi rebels, insurance prices on ships have risen dramatically and many shipping companies have chosen to take the longer routes, as a safety precaution. This is expected to increase the prices of many consumer goods, from clothing to coffee. | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 56 | https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/saudi-led-coalition/ | en | Actor Profile: Saudi-led Coalition | [
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] | null | [] | 2023-11-20T17:49:58+00:00 | In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of other Arab allies launched a military intervention to restore the authority of Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The intervention largely consisted of air and naval operations in support of the Yemeni government and resistance troops. | en | ACLED | https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/actor-profiles/saudi-led-coalition/ | Historical background
The Coalition consisting of 10 countries spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE began military operations in Yemen on 26 March 2015. The decision came at the request of Yemeni President Hadi, who called upon the GCC to prevent Yemen from falling into the hands of the Houthis. The Coalition achieved immediate air superiority through the systematic destruction of Yemen’s air bases and air defenses. A land, sea, and air blockade began in April 2015 to enforce an arms embargo imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216. The Coalition also committed to train Yemeni resistance forces and deploy ground troops, including Saudi border guards, the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, and the Emirati elite forces.
The Coalition’s military support was critical in order to bolster Yemeni resistance to the advancing Houthi-Saleh forces. Airstrikes severely hampered military capacity, forcing Houthi-Saleh forces into the defensive. Saudi forces regularly engaged in cross-border shelling, targeting Houthi forces and civilian sites in Yemen’s north. Emirati elite brigades played a decisive role in the retaking of Aden in 2015 and Mukalla in 2016, and spearheaded the military offensives that led Coalition-backed Yemeni troops to encircle the western port city of al-Hudayda (for more, see the section on Joint Forces). The UAE also orchestrated the training of several southern armed groups, which starting in 2017 formed the backbone of the STC (for more, see the section on Southern Transitional Council). In March 2023, the Coalition announced a unilateral suspension of its military operations in Yemen.
The Coalition’s military operations also resulted in severe humanitarian consequences. Airstrikes frequently hit civilian targets and populated areas, including medical facilities, schools, and markets. According to ACLED data, over 9,200 civilians are estimated to have been killed as a result of Coalition operations in Yemen between March 2015 and July 2023 – although this number is likely to be higher as it does not include those killed in the targeting of military sites. Approximately 90% of all airstrikes against civilian targets and related fatalities occurred between 2015 and 2018. The blockade has also exacerbated the plight of the Yemeni population, preventing the entry of fuel, medicine, and other essential goods into the country. UN experts stated that the Coalition may have been responsible for “war crimes” due to their failure to protect Yemeni civilians.
Saudi and Emirati interests have increasingly diverged in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is largely concerned with securing its 800-mile border with Yemen and has committed to support the IRG and its major military and political stakeholder, the Islamist Islah party, in the war against the Houthis. The UAE has instead focused on containing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis, securing its commercial interests, and consolidating local alliances. To achieve these goals, the UAE has supported the separatist STC, Islah’s arch-enemy in southern Yemen. On several occasions, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have consequently found themselves at odds. In August 2019, at the height of the clashes between the IRG and the STC in Aden, the UAE reportedly bombed pro-government troops in neighboring Abyan governorate. Other rivalries have emerged in southeastern Yemen, where UAE-backed groups have occasionally locked horns with the Saudi-backed IRG. | |||||
8955 | dbpedia | 2 | 18 | https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/m0fyc5 | en | Sana'a — Google Arts & Culture | https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/ci/AL18g_QY4Zte7SCjp8vgcxGX5Gif4qVOw4B6iNDm_VIPbR5uZFVlcIzKeEqDcMcfsez9szMPF25cOhY | https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/ci/AL18g_QY4Zte7SCjp8vgcxGX5Gif4qVOw4B6iNDm_VIPbR5uZFVlcIzKeEqDcMcfsez9szMPF25cOhY | [] | [] | [] | [
""
] | null | [] | null | Sanaa, also spelled Sanaʽa or Sana, is the largest city in Yemen and the
centre of Sanaa Governorate. | en | //www.gstatic.com/culturalinstitute/stella/apple-touch-icon-180x180-v1.png | Google Arts & Culture | https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/sana-a/m0fyc5 | Sanaa, also spelled Sanaʽa or Sana, is the largest city in Yemen and the centre of Sanaa Governorate. The city is not part of the Governorate, but forms the separate administrative district of "Amanat Al-Asemah". Under the Yemeni constitution, Sanaʽa is the capital of the country, although the seat of the Yemeni government moved to Aden, the former capital of South Yemen in the aftermath of the Houthi occupation. Aden was declared as the temporary capital by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in March 2015.
At an elevation of 2,300 metres, Sanaa is one of the highest capital cities in the world and is next to the Sarawat Mountains of Jabal An-Nabi Shu'ayb and Jabal Tiyal, considered to be the highest mountains in the country and amongst the highest in the region. Sanaa has a population of approximately 3,937,500, making it Yemen's largest city. As of 2020, the greater Sanaa urban area makes up about 10% of Yemen's total population.
The Old City of Sanaa, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, has a distinctive architectural character, most notably expressed in its multi-storey buildings decorated with geometric patterns.
Show lessRead more
Wikipedia | ||
8955 | dbpedia | 0 | 6 | https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abd-Rabbuh-Mansur-Hadi | en | ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī | president of Yemen | [
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president of Yemen
Learn about this topic in these articles:
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
In al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
After Saleh’s resignation, his successor ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī launched an offensive to retake the area in 2012 with the support of the United States, which also carried out series of air strikes by unmanned drones targeting suspected militants. By mid-2012 Yemeni forces had retaken many of the areas formerly…
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Arab Spring
In Arab Spring: Yemen
…power to the vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. In accordance with the agreement, Hadi took over governing responsibility immediately and formally assumed the presidency after standing as the sole candidate in a presidential election in February 2012. Unable to improve conditions or maintain stability, however, Hadi’s government faced armed…
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association with Ṣāliḥ
In Ali Abdullah Saleh: Challenges to Saleh’s rule
Saleh’s vice president, ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī, took the position of acting president in Saleh’s absence.
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history of Yemen
In Yemen: Transfer of power to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi took the position of acting president. In November, about two months after returning to Yemen, Saleh agreed to a deal that would grant him immunity from prosecution if he ceded some of his power to Hadi and stepped down after a…
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In Yemen Uprising of 2011–12: Uprising
…day, leaving his vice president, ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī, to serve as acting president in his absence. Yemeni officials maintained that Ṣāliḥ would quickly return to Yemen and resume his duties, but members of the opposition hailed his absence as an opportunity to negotiate a transition agreement that would formally…
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Operation Decisive Storm
In Mohammed bin Salman: In charge of defense and economic policy
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi a decisive advantage against the Shiʿi Houthi insurgency in the north of the country. It was thought that a Houthi victory might give Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main regional rival, a foothold along Saudi Arabia’s southern border. The campaign, however, failed to…
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Yemeni Civil War
In Yemeni Civil War: The rise of the rebels and the fall of Sanaa
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi took the position of acting president. In November, about two months after returning to Yemen, Saleh agreed to a deal that would grant him immunity from prosecution if he ceded some of his power to Hadi and stepped down after a…
Read More | ||||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 78 | https://jasoninstitute.com/the-rise-of-the-houthis-transforming-yemens-political-landscape/ | en | The Rise of the Houthis: Transforming Yemen's Political Landscape | http://jasoninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Houthis_protest_against_airstrikes_4.png | http://jasoninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Houthis_protest_against_airstrikes_4.png | [
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] | 2024-06-23T19:12:19+00:00 | Yemen has been plagued by civil war since 2015, leading to a power vacuum filled by the Houthis, a Shiite Zaydi armed movement. | en | Stichting Jason | https://jasoninstitute.com/the-rise-of-the-houthis-transforming-yemens-political-landscape/ | By: Hugo Morrison
Photo credits: Henry Ridgwell (VOA), Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
Yemen’s Descent into Chaos
Yemen’s strategic location at the crossroads of the Middle East has made it a nexus of history, culture and trade for centuries. Yet in recent years the country has become synonymous with turmoil and conflict. Since 2015, Yemen has been embroiled in a devastating civil war, the effects of which have extended far beyond its borders. The conflict has ravaged Yemen’s fragile state institutions and created a power vacuum eagerly sought after by various actors amidst the government’s loss of control over the country. Among these actors, the Houthis, a Shiite Zaydi armed movement from northwest Yemen, have emerged as a pivotal force reshaping Yemen’s political landscape.
Since November, the Houthis have seized, detained and attacked more than 40 container ships in the Red Sea and the wider Indian Ocean, purportedly in retaliation for Israel’s actions in Gaza. These attacks have propelled the Houthis back into the mainstream spotlight, prompting the US to redesignate the Houthis as a global terrorist organisation. However, characterizing the Houthis solely as terrorists overlooks the complexities of their role in Yemen’s political landscape. The Houthis have long challenged traditional notions of statehood in Yemen. They control an area comprising 70% of the country’s population including the capital Sanaa, the Governorates of Dhamar, Al Bayda, Ibb, Raymah, Al Mahwit, Hajjah and Amran, and the strategically important Al-Hudaydah. They provide basic services, have established a parallel government, and contest the state’s monopoly on violence. Yet, alongside their territorial control, the Houthis have imposed a repressive rule and have been accused of human rights abuses including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, instances of torture, and severe restrictions for women.
While the Houthis control much of the country in the north, a secessionist movement has entrenched itself in the south, further complicating the nation’s political dynamics. As the government no longer has control over the country, Yemen has frequently been labelled as a failed state. However, this label merely skims the surface of the intricate transformations underway in Yemen. By exploring the Houthis’ governance, we can move beyond simplistic labels, gain a deeper understanding of Yemen’s complex political dynamics and acknowledge the significant role of both state and non-state actors in shaping Yemen’s future.
Greater attention must be paid to emerging forms of governance amid the growing influence of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) challenging state legitimacy. ANSAs significantly shape the complex political landscape, especially in failed or fragile states, echoing Charles Tilly’s theory of state formation. According to Tilly, “War made the state, and the state made war”. This notion underscores the intricate relationship between modern state formation and interstate violence. Modern state formation is driven by interstate violence as actors vie to establish sovereignty. It also drives conflict between states, as they compete to consolidate or defend their sovereignty. In the 21st century, armed conflicts between non-state and state actors have surpassed traditional interstate wars as the predominant form of conflict. Rival forms of authority are inherent in state-building processes rather than indicative of state failure as illustrated by the rise of the Houthis. This article delves into the ascent of the Houthis and its profound implications for statehood in Yemen.
The Houthis Rising Profile
Yemen’s history is marked by the 1990 unification of North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen) into the Republic of Yemen. From its outset, tribal and sectarian loyalties have long overshadowed nationalist and state allegiances, compounded by historical divisions between the North and South. Consequently, the government struggled to establish a unified national identity and enforce law and order.
The Houthis emerged in the 1990s from the Saada governorate in Northwest Yemen, in response to socioeconomic and political discrimination under President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The central government was largely absent in Saada. They therefore learned to build some experience in local service provision. They also established courts and prisons, resolved tribal disputes and provided security in areas neglected by the government, in return for protection money.
In 2004, anti-government protests in Saada led by Zaydi groups, transformed into a Houthi-led insurgency after the government attempted to arrest their founder, Hussein al-Houthi. Through six rounds of conflict from 2004 to 2010, the Houthis transitioned from a grassroots movement to an insurgent force, garnering increased local support and bolstering their military capabilities.
The Arab Spring reached Yemen in 2011, with the Houthis supporting protests against Saleh’s regime. Clashes broke out between the Houthis and government forces in Saada, leading to the Houthis seizing control of government institutions, checkpoints, and the local army headquarters.
By 2012, President Saleh had resigned, succeeded by his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, whose legitimacy was tainted by his association with the previous corrupt regime. In 2014, widespread protests erupted against Hadi’s administration after the removal of fuel subsidies. The Houthis, seizing an opportunity, allied with former President Saleh and his loyalist troops, and then advanced from their Northern stronghold to capture Sana’a and key government buildings. Establishing a parallel supervisory system alongside formal state institutions, the Houthis deployed loyalists throughout government offices, effectively superseding the authority of official government figures. These Houthi supervisors, initially tasked with administrative oversight, have since consolidated authority in their respective fields, making the formal state hierarchy obsolete.
During negotiations with the government in January 2015, the Houthis rejected a proposed constitution dividing Yemen into six administrative regions, fearing isolation in the North. Instead, they demanded the country to be partitioned into two federal regions, North and South. Subsequently, they seized the presidential palace, prompting President Hadi to flee southward, leading the government to resign en masse. The Houthis dissolved parliament and established a parallel government known as the Supreme Revolutionary Committee. This seizure granted them access to Yemen’s entire arsenal of ballistic missiles and intelligence services, which they utilised to recruit members and forge alliances with local clans, solidifying their grip on power.
Consolidation
In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition launched a military intervention to reinstall Hadi’s government, marking the start of the civil war. The alliance successfully drove the Houthis out of Aden and the surrounding South. However, in 2017, another group, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), emerged. They contested control of the area and advocated for a separate southern state.
Despite facing challenges, the Houthis have consistently solidified their grip on power. In 2016, they dissolved the Supreme Revolutionary Committee and in collaboration with former President Saleh’s party, established the Supreme Political Council in its place. In 2017, the Houthis executed Saleh on charges of treason, replacing his supporters and assuming direct control over state ministries and institutions.
In April 2022, Yemeni factions agreed to a six-month UN-brokered truce. Despite sporadic clashes, there have been no major offences on any fronts. However, the aftermath of the truce saw the Hadi-led government resigning due to the withdrawal of Saudi support. In its place emerged the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), an eight-member coalition of anti-Houthi forces. Internal divisions within the PLC have fuelled significant infighting due to conflicting ambitions and ideologies, threatening its political legitimacy. This instability has empowered the Houthis to control territory and engage in permanent ceasefire negotiations with Saudi Arabia.
The Houthis have entrenched themselves in the country’s Northwest. They control nearly all of former North Yemen, except for the oil-rich Marib governorate, whose capture could sway the war’s outcome. With the STC asserting control in the south, they have effectively established the North-South divide they sought in 2015.
After years of fighting, the Houthis have transformed from a rudimentary force into a sophisticated military power, developing a strong standing army and expanding their naval capabilities. The Houthis role as proxies for Iran gains credence with their ambassadors in Tehran and substantial military backing, including weapons and training from Iran and Hezbollah.
The Houthis have achieved financial independence through various means, including controlling revenue-generating entities, diverting public funds and humanitarian aid, and engaging in illicit activities like kidnappings, smuggling, and extortion. In a significant move, in May 2022, international flights commenced from Houthi-controlled Sana’a, with the Yemeni government recognizing Houthi-issued passports, effectively acknowledging their legitimacy. Having controlled state institutions since late 2014, the Houthis have gained recognition among Yemeni officials and citizens as more effective state representatives than the government.
The Houthis actively seek international recognition as a legitimate political authority in Yemen, primarily through negotiations with Saudi Arabia. They view attacks on container ships as calculated moves to strengthen their bargaining position to achieve their domestic goals. By disrupting maritime trade and posing a threat to Western-led economic interests – of which Saudi Arabia is a part – they aim to compel Riyadh as part of any deal to end its military intervention and acknowledge the Houthis legitimacy. Recent talks exclusively involving the Houthis and Saudi Arabia are interpreted as validation of their authority.
Challenging Conventional Statehood in Yemen
Yemen has experienced the breakdown of central state authority across significant portions of its territory. Repression, marginalisation, and corruption, coupled with the government’s failure to provide basic services, paved the way for alternative sources of political power. The Houthis rose from a small religious revivalist movement in the mountainous north to a political power that controls an area comprising 24 out of Yemen’s 30 million population. War has strengthened the Houthis, similarly to how it did for the modern state. They have ingrained themselves in the Northwest despite contending with rival tribal factions and the Saudi-led coalition. In the territories they govern, the Houthis have maintained control by tightening their grip on key institutions and economic channels, establishing a system of resource extraction to sustain their military operations while monopolising the use of force.
The rise of the Houthis poses fundamental challenges to traditional notions of statehood, including sovereignty, social cohesion, and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, the credibility of Yemen’s PLC has been severely undermined, lacking control and governance over all areas of the country. Even before the war, state authority struggled to enforce rules or assert a monopoly over violence across its territory. However, the Houthis are not the sole challengers to the existing state system; the STC, backed by the UAE, poses another significant challenge. With its advocacy for a separate southern state, the STC further erodes the legitimacy of the nation-state concept in an increasingly fragmented landscape. The group declared self-governance in April 2020 and controls most of Yemen’s five southern governorates, including Aden, the interim capital.
Toward a New Understanding of Governance
Despite the erosion of central state authority, Yemen should not be considered a failed state. The preoccupation with non-state actors in ‘failed states’ often neglects their legitimacy and potential for new forms of governance.
The rise of the Houthis underscores the broader challenge that ANSAs pose to traditional state-centric approaches in international politics. As we grapple with the evolving nature of governance in conflict-ridden regions like Yemen, it becomes increasingly evident that conventional notions of the nation-state no longer exclusively define governance models. ANSAs are occupying voids left by dysfunctional state institutions, as exemplified by the Houthis’ mobilisation of support and establishment of control over institutions and territory. This phenomenon characterises a quasi-state, where an insurgent group “has institutionalised its authority within the borders of a formal state to such a degree that it permanently controls a specific territory and the economic resources within that territory.”
A unified Yemen remains an elusive goal. Acknowledging the power dynamics on the ground is crucial to any future political order. Indeed, it is imperative to recognize that powerful local actors will resist centralised state authority, making it clear that no single party can unilaterally govern Yemen. With the Houthis governing a significant portion of the population and showing no signs of relinquishing control, their inclusion in peace, stability and reunification efforts is key. Yemen’s journey highlights the need for a more comprehensive and adaptable approach to defining and managing statehood. | |||
8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 81 | https://www.gettyimages.com/videos/president-of-yemen-abd-rabbuh-mansur-hadi | en | Getty Images | [
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8955 | dbpedia | 3 | 39 | https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/07/world/middleeast/yemen-presidential-council.html | en | Yemen’s President Steps Down, Hands Power to Presidential Council | [
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] | 2022-04-07T00:00:00 | President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi abdicated days after a two-month cease-fire took effect, signs that his Saudi allies may be looking for a path out of the bloodshed. | en | /vi-assets/static-assets/favicon-d2483f10ef688e6f89e23806b9700298.ico | https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/07/world/middleeast/yemen-presidential-council.html | BEIRUT, Lebanon — Yemen’s exiled president stepped down on Thursday and passed power to a presidential council, a sweeping reshuffle supported by his backers in Saudi Arabia aimed at jump-starting efforts to end the seven-year war that has roiled the Arabian Peninsula.
The president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, announced his abdication days after a two-month cease-fire took effect, another sign that Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf allies may be looking for a path out of the years of bloodshed. Mr. Hadi delegated the new presidential council to run the government and lead peace talks with the Iran-backed Houthi rebels who control Sana, Yemen’s capital, and the country’s northwest.
The move was the most significant effort to reorganize the anti-Houthi forces in Yemen since the war began. But analysts raised questions about how effective it would be at pushing the peace process forward given the divergent positions of the council’s eight members.
“Quite clearly this is an attempt, perhaps a last ditch effort, to reconstitute something resembling unity within the anti-Houthi alliance,” Gregory Johnsen, a former member of United Nations Panel of Experts for Yemen, wrote on Twitter. “The problem is that it is unclear how these various individuals, many of whom have diametrically opposing views, can work together.”
The new push to end the war follows seven years of grinding combat that have shattered the Yemeni state, spawned one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and undermined the security of rich, oil-producing Persian Gulf monarchies allied with the United States.
Yemen’s war began in 2014 when the Houthis seized Sana and the northwest of the country, sending the government, and Mr. Hadi, into exile. Months later, an Arab military coalition led by Saudi Arabia began a vast bombing campaign intended to push the Houthis back and restore the government.
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7121 | dbpedia | 2 | 7 | https://www.delhimetrorail.com/line/LN5 | en | Welcome to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation(DMRC) | [] | [] | [] | [
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] | null | [] | null | Delhi Metro is a world-class metro. To ensure reliability and safety in train operations, it is equipped with the most modern communication and train control system. It has state-of-art air-conditioned coaches. Ticketing and passenger control are through Automatic Fare Collection System, which is introduced in the country for the first time. Travelling in Delhi Metro is a pleasure with trains ultimately available at three minutes frequency. Entries and exits to metro stations are controlled by flap-doors operated by 'smart-cards' and contact less tokens. | en | /apple-icon-120x120.png | null | ||||||
7121 | dbpedia | 1 | 58 | https://www.nmrcnoida.com/PassengerInformation/RouteMap | en | Welcome to Noida Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. | https://www.nmrcnoida.com/Content/img/favicon.ico | https://www.nmrcnoida.com/Content/img/favicon.ico | [
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Noida Metro Rail Corporation Limited(NMRC) is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act 2013, having its registered office at Block-III, 3rd Floor, Ganga Shopping Complex, Sector-29 Noida 201301.
NMRC is a Joint Venture Company of Government of India (GoI) and Government of Uttar Pradesh (GoUP) established for the purpose of planning, building and establishing of Mass transit and other urban transport and people mover systems of all types and disciplines. | ||||
7121 | dbpedia | 1 | 35 | https://timesproperty.com/news/post/delhi-metro-green-line-details-blid5857 | en | Delhi Metro Green Line: Map & Timings | [
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Check Out Some Properties In Delhi
Delhi Metro Line 5, also known as the Green Line, is one of the busiest metro lines in Delhi, connecting the city centre to the northern suburbs and the neighbouring state of Haryana. It is also the first line to be constructed under Delhi Metro's Phase II.
The Green Line has 24 stations, covering a total length of 27.96 km. It runs between Inderlok in Delhi and Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh station in Bahadurgarh, Haryana. The line also has a branch line connecting the line's Ashok Park Main station with Kirti Nagar station.
The Green Line is a popular choice for commuters due to its convenient connectivity to major residential, commercial, and educational hubs. It also intersects with several other metro lines, making it easy for commuters to transfer to other parts of the city.
Latest News On Delhi Metro Green Line
June 2024: Delhi Metro's Green Line is getting a 12.37 km extension to Indraprastha, making New Delhi metro station a triple interchange hub (Yellow, Orange & Green Lines). This will improve connectivity for west Delhi residents (Bahadurgarh, Nangloi etc.) who can now directly access New Delhi Railway Station and reduce traffic congestion. The expansion is part of Delhi Metro Phase 4 which is also building 86 km of new lines across 3 other corridors.
March 2024: Delhi Metro Phase 4 is adding two new corridors to improve traffic and connectivity in the city. The first, an 8km elevated corridor from Lajpat Nagar to Saket G Block, will connect four existing lines. The second, a 12.4km Green Line extension from Inderlok to Indraprastha, will offer interchange facilities with multiple lines and have both underground and elevated sections. These corridors are expected to be operational by 2029, reduce traffic congestion, and offer faster commutes for over 250,000 daily riders. The project will also increase the number of interchange stations from 29 to 48, making travel between different parts of the city much easier.
October 2023:
The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) is planning to extend the Green Line southwards from Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh to the industrial city of Rohtak, adding 24 new stations to the line.
This extension will make the Green Line one of the longest metro lines in India.
The DMRC is planning to construct an interchange station between the Green Line and the Pink Line at Punjabi Bagh to facilitate easier transfers between the two lines.
The completion of four kilometres of viaduct on the Janakpuri West - RK Ashram Marg corridor of Phase 4 will intersect the Green Line at Peeragarhi, providing commuters with a direct connection to the west, northwest, and north Delhi region.
The DMRC is planning to introduce new coaches on the Green Line to meet the increasing demand for travel, featuring air conditioning, comfortable seats, and luggage racks.
These improvements and expansions are set to enhance the convenience and efficiency of the Delhi Metro Green Line for commuters.
Overview Of Delhi Metro Green Line
Delhi Metro: Stations Along The Green Line
#
Station Name
Interchange Connection
1
Kirti Nagar
Blue Line
2
Satguru Ram Singh Marg
3
Inderlok
Red Line
4
Ashok Park Main
5
Punjabi Bagh
6
Punjabi Bagh West
Pink Line
7
Shivaji Park
8
Madipur
9
Paschim Vihar East
10
Paschim Vihar West
11
Peeragarhi
Magenta Line
12
Udyog Nagar
13
Maharaja Surajmal Stadium
14
Nangloi
15
Nangloi Railway Station
16
Rajdhani Park
16
Mundka
18
Mundka Industrial Area (MIA)
19
Ghevra
20
Tikri Kalan
21
Tikri Border
22
Pandit Shree Ram Sharma (Modern Industrial Estate)
23
Bahadurgarh City (Bus Stand)
24
Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh (Bahadurgarh City Park)
Delhi Metro Green Line: Operating Timings And Frequency
Image Source: X/DMRC
Timing: The Delhi Metro Green Line operates from 6:00 AM to 11:00 PM, 7 days a week.
Frequency:
Peak Hours:
Section Weekdays Saturday Sunday Mundka to Ashok Park Main 4 min 10s 5 min 5 min 40s Kirti Nagar-Inder Lok to Ashok Park Main 8 min 20s 10 min 11 min 20s Mundka to Brig. Hoshiyar Singh 6 min 15s 7 min 30s 8 min 37s
Off-Peak Hours:
Section Weekdays Saturday Sunday Mundka to Ashok Park Main 5 min 10s 5 min 10s 5 min 40s Kirti Nagar-Inder Lok to Ashok Park Main 10 min 20s 10 min 20s 11 min 20s Mundka to Brig. Hoshiyar Singh 7 min 45s 7 min 45s 8 min 37s
Delhi Metro Green Line: Fare Structure And Ticketing
Image Source: X/DMRC
The Delhi Metro Green Line fare structure is based on the distance travelled. Fares start from Rs 10 and go up to Rs 50.
Passengers can purchase tickets for the Delhi Metro using a variety of methods, including:
Smart Card: A smart card is a reloadable card that can be used to travel on the Delhi Metro. Smart cards can be purchased at any metro station.
Tokens: Tokens are single-use tickets that can be used to travel on the Delhi Metro. Tokens can be purchased at any metro station.
QR Code: Passengers can also purchase tickets for the Delhi Metro using a QR code. QR codes can be generated on the Delhi Metro website or app.
To board a train, passengers need to tap their smart card or token on the reader at the entry gate. Once you have tapped your smart card or token, the gate will open and you can board the train.
To exit the metro station, you need to tap your smart card or token on the reader at the exit gate. Once you have tapped your smart card or token, the gate will open and you can exit the station.
Delhi Metro Green Line Route Map
Image Source: Delhi Official Website
Infrastructure For A Modern And Accessible Metro System
The Delhi Metro Green Line is one of the most modern and well-equipped metro lines in the world. The stations are designed to be safe, comfortable, and accessible to all passengers.
Station entrances and exits: All Green Line stations have multiple entrances and exits, making it easy for passengers to enter and exit the station. The entrances and exits are also designed to be accessible to passengers with disabilities.
Fare collection: Fare collection at Green Line stations is automated. Passengers can use smart cards, tokens, or QR codes to pay their fares.
Platform screens: All Green Line stations have platform screens, which prevent passengers from falling onto the tracks.
Escalators and elevators: All Green Line stations have escalators and elevators, making it easy for passengers to access the platforms.
Customer information system: All Green Line stations have a customer information system, which provides passengers with real-time information about train arrival and departure times.
Other amenities: Green Line stations also have a variety of other amenities, such as restrooms, ATMs, and food and beverage kiosks.
In addition to the above, the Delhi Metro Green Line stations also have a number of other features that make them unique and innovative. For example, some Green Line stations have solar panels on the roof, which help to generate electricity for the station. Some Green Line stations also have rainwater harvesting systems, which help to conserve water.
Overall, the Delhi Metro Green Line stations are some of the best-equipped metro stations in the world. They are designed to be safe, comfortable, and accessible to all passengers.
Delhi Metro Green Line: Future Expansions And Developments
Image Source: Pinterest
The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) is planning to expand the Green Line in the future. The proposed extensions include:
Inderlok to Barakhamba Road: This extension will connect the Green Line to the Yellow Line and the Blue Line, making it easier for passengers to transfer to other parts of the city.
Bahadurgarh City to Shiv Murti: This extension will extend the Green Line by 2.2 km, connecting it to the proposed Shiv Murti Metro Station.
Ashok Park Main to Dwarka: This extension will connect the Green Line to the Blue Line, making it easier for passengers to transfer to other parts of the city.
The DMRC is also planning to develop a number of new stations on the Green Line. These new stations will improve the connectivity of the line and make it more convenient for passengers to travel. | ||||||
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] | 2019-03-20T03:09:26+00:00 | This detailed Mumbai travel guide will tell you all you need to know to plan your trip like where to stay, what to do, where to eat, and more. | en | Will Fly for Food | https://www.willflyforfood.net/the-first-timers-travel-guide-to-mumbai-india/ | EDITOR’S NOTE: Please be advised that this Mumbai travel guide hasn’t been updated in 2024. Prices and travel guidelines may no longer be accurate so it’s important that you verify any information before proceeding.
Mumbai is a city of contrasts that surprised me in so many ways.
For one, Mumbai is India’s richest city though I was told an estimated half of its population lives in a slum. In fact, a 15-minute subway ride will take you from one of the world’s biggest and most densely populated slums to the world’s most expensive home – a 27-story behemoth valued in upwards of USD 1 billion.
Many tourists stay in South Mumbai which is home to some of the world’s grandest colonial-era buildings and an equally impressive Art Deco heritage. I never expected this, but Mumbai has the second largest collection of Art Deco buildings in the world, behind only Miami.
Walking from the historic Fort and Colaba areas to Marine Drive made me feel like I was going from Cambridge to Miami. At times, it didn’t feel like I was in Asia at all! It was a surreal and unexpected experience, especially after coming from a starkly different city like Kolkata.
Mumbai is my favorite city in India and a place I would love to visit again and again. If you’re making that first-ever trip to Mumbai, then I hope this travel guide can help you plan your trip.
GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS
MUMBAI TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS
Because of the current global situation, travel guidelines change regularly. Our friends at Booking.com have created a website that lists detailed information on travel restrictions around the globe.
Before planning a trip to Mumbai, be sure to check Booking.com for information on travel restrictions to India. If you do decide to visit Mumbai, then you may want to seriously consider getting travel insurance with COVID coverage.
HOW TO APPLY FOR AN E-VISA TO INDIA
Depending on your nationality, you may need an e-visa and other travel documents to visit Mumbai and India. Check out iVisa.com to learn about the requirements and to apply for an e-visa to India (if necessary).
MUMBAI AT A GLANCE
Mumbai, formerly known as Bombay, is the coastal capital of Maharashtra state in west-central India. It’s the country’s financial and commercial capital and its principal port on the Arabian Sea. With an estimated population exceeding 12 million, it’s the most populous city in India that’s home to some of the country’s richest neighborhoods and its biggest slums.
Aside from being India’s economic hub, it’s also the country’s entertainment capital. It’s home to Bollywood which is the most prolific film industry in the world. Bollywood is known to produce well over a thousand feature films each year, more than double its counterpart in Hollywood.
BEST TIME TO VISIT MUMBAI
Mumbai sees fairly dramatic weather conditions. The temperature doesn’t fluctuate as much throughout the year but it experiences dry periods followed by months of intensely heavy rain, much more than what we’re accustomed to in a similarly monsoon-heavy country like the Philippines. For this reason, it’s best to visit Mumbai around mid-October till February when the weather is ideal.
OCT-FEB: Weather-wise, this is the best time to visit Mumbai. There are little to no rainy days and temperatures are at their lowest. If you’re interested in the arts, then February is a great time to go, when the popular Kala Ghoda Arts Festival is held in the first half of the month.
MAR-MAY: This is summer in Mumbai. It’s still the dry season but temperatures climb during these months and reach their peak in May, which is often the hottest time of the year in the city.
JUN-SEPT: This is monsoon season in Mumbai. One of my guides described this stretch as a period of non-stop rain so it’s probably not the best time to go, especially from June till August. I went in mid-September and experienced moments of rain but nothing too bad.
Climate: Annual Monthly Weather in Mumbai
Follow the link for more on the weather in Mumbai. I’ve also created the average temperature and annual rainfall graphs below. Suggested months to visit are colored in orange.
Average Temperature
Annual Rainfall
TRAVELING TO MUMBAI
Mumbai is located on the western coast of India. I flew in from Kolkata but there are many ways to get there depending on where you are.
BY PLANE: People flying in to Mumbai will arrive at Chhatrapati Shivaji Airport. It’s a beautiful airport that’s the second busiest in India, after Indira Gandhi Airport in Delhi. Traveling by air is the fastest way to get around between cities but it’s also the most expensive. I suggest using an airline aggregator like Skyscanner to search for the cheapest flights to Mumbai from wherever you are. I used Skyscanner to search for and book all my flights for this trip to India.
At the airport, you’ll find booths where you can book a prepaid taxi to your hotel. That’s what I did. At the time, I paid INR 675 for a non-aircon taxi to the Fort area, but air-conditioned taxis were also available for INR 810. If you’d like to book a private transfer in advance, then you can do so through Klook.
BY TRAIN: I was on a tight schedule so I flew from city to city in India, but traveling by train is considered by many to be the best way to experience this vast country. They have an extensive rail network that can get you pretty much anywhere you need to go. I rode the train from Delhi to Agra and contrary to the overcrowded trains often portrayed in Hollywood, train travel in India is comfortable and pleasant. It’s considerably cheaper than flights and the scenery is much better too.
The easiest way to book train tickets in India is through Bookaway. It’ll save you the trouble of having to use the IRCTC website which can be very frustrating to deal with. For my Delhi to Agra trip, I tried purchasing my tickets from the IRCTC website but I gave up after I had trouble registering and making payment. It’s a convoluted process so I suggest booking through Bookaway instead.
BY BUS: I haven’t experienced it but another option is to travel by bus. Based on what I’ve read, the cost between trains and sleeper buses is comparable, though buses can sometimes be more convenient because of the location of the bus stations. However, buses are also considered to be less comfortable in general than trains.
OTHER OPTIONS: Depending on where you’re coming from, there may be other ways to get to Mumbai so I suggest checking Bookaway to find route options available to you. You can click on the link or use the widget below.
WHERE TO EXCHANGE CURRENCY
The unit of currency in India is the Indian Rupee (INR).
I don’t normally do this, but I exchanged currency at my hotel because I arrived late at night and wanted to pay for my room in cash. They gave me a decent rate but you’ll likely find much better rates at currency exchange offices.
You can find recommendations for currency exchange offices in Mumbai on Travelvui. They’re scattered throughout the city but if you’re staying in South Mumbai, then the most convenient are UAE Exchange near Indira Dock and Thomas Cook at Dr. D.N. Road.
If you’re uncomfortable bringing too much foreign currency into India, then a better alternative might be to withdraw INR from an ATM. Rates are comparable. Just be sure to let your bank know that you’re planning on using your ATM abroad as it may have to be activated for overseas use. In my experience, my ATM card works in some machines but not in others.
NOTE: Some ATM machines may ask if you want to proceed “with or without conversion”. NEVER proceed with conversion because this usually leads to horrendous exchange rates. I learned this the hard way. Proceeding with conversion allows the foreign bank operating the ATM to do the conversion, usually at rates far less favorable than your local bank’s. According to this article, the difference between rates can be as high as 10%.
BEST AREAS TO STAY IN MUMBAI
Mumbai is a big city with many interesting neighborhoods, but based on my experience, it seems that South Mumbai is the ideal place to stay for first-time visitors.
Surrounded by water, it’s a pleasant area in the historical part of the city that’s home to major landmarks like the Gateway of India, the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus (CSMT), Bombay High Court, and the Prince of Wales Musem, not to mention many restaurants, cafes, shops, and train stations.
South Mumbai extends all the way to Mahim and Sion in the north, but for the purpose of this guide, we’ll focus only on the southernmost areas of Colaba, Fort, and Marine Drive.
To make it easier, I’ve created the color-coded map below to help you see where all these recommended areas are. Click on the link for a live version of the map. (Please note that marked areas are approximations only)
RED – Fort
PURPLE – Colaba
GREEN – Marine Drive
FORT
The Fort area is Mumbai’s business district. It’s home to many of the city’s most important historical buildings like CSMT, Bombay High Court, and the Prince of Wales Museum. It’s also home to the Kala Ghoda art district which is where I stayed.
I loved being in this area because not only was I surrounded by beautiful Gothic buildings that made me feel like I was in England, but I was close to many shops, cafes, street food stalls, and restaurants as well. The area was always buzzing with activity so it felt safe no matter what time of day.
I stayed at Hotel Flora Fountain, a clean and conveniently located boutique hotel about a 10-minute walk from CSMT. You can book a room there on Booking.com or Agoda. If you’d like to stay in the Fort area but don’t think this is the right hotel for you, then you can look for alternate listings on Booking.com.
Check out some of the top-rated hotels in the Fort area:
COLABA
Located in the southernmost part of the city, Colaba is where you’ll find the most iconic structure in Mumbai – the Gateway of India. It’s home to a wealth of historical buildings and tree-lined streets filled with interesting shops, restaurants, and cafes. Like the Fort area, I had a great time exploring Colaba on foot.
Within earshot of the Gateway of India are the Taj Mahal Palace and Taj Mahal Tower, two structures that make up the city’s most iconic hotel. The Taj Mahal Palace is the original hotel while the Taj Mahal Tower is a newer wing built seventy years later. Boasting unparalleled views of the Arabian Sea, you can book a room here for a truly memorable stay in Mumbai.
You can check Booking.com for hotel listings in Colaba. Here are some of the most recommended:
MARINE DRIVE
If you’re a fan of ocean views and/or Art Deco architecture, then this is where you’ll probably want to be. Also known as the Queen’s Necklace, Marine Drive is a scenic 3.6 km stretch of coastal road fronting the Arabian Sea.
Walking along this road, it almost feels like you’re in Miami. As described, Mumbai is known for having the second-most Art Deco buildings in the world, many of which can be found along Marine Drive. You can find accommodations on or around Marine Drive on Booking.com.
You can also book hotels and homestays in Mumbai using the handy map below.
PLACES TO VISIT IN MUMBAI
1. Gateway of India
As described, this arch monument is the most iconic structure in Mumbai. It was built in 1911 to commemorate the landing of King George V and Queen Mary on their visit to India. Like the Eiffel Tower in Paris or the Statue of Liberty in New York City, it’s the city’s most popular attraction and universally considered to be a symbol of Mumbai.
The Gateway is impressive from land, but I’ve read that it looks even more majestic when viewed from the Arabian Sea. The ferry to Elephanta Island leaves from Colaba jetty, so visiting the Elephanta Caves on a day trip is a great opportunity to see the Gateway from the other side.
Get Your Guide offers tours that take you to the Gateway of India and other popular attractions in Mumbai. Many will take you to Elephanta Caves as well.
Facing the Gateway of India are the aforementioned Taj Mahal Palace and Tower, the most famous hotel in Mumbai. My tour guide Dev told me an interesting story about how this iconic hotel came to be.
According to Dev, the hotel was built by a wealthy Indian industrialist named Jamsetji Tata. He built the Taj Mahal Palace after being denied entry into the city’s grandest hotel at the time – Watson’s Hotel. Purported to be for whites only, he built the Taj out of spite and made it open to anyone regardless of skin color or social status. In Dev’s words, it was his “ultimate revenge”.
2. Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus
Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus, or CSMT for short, is one of the grandest and most striking examples of Gothic architecture in Mumbai. A UNESCO World Heritage Site, it’s Mumbai’s main railway station and the heart of its extensive metro system.
If you stay in South Mumbai and plan to get around by train, then chances are you’ll be going through this building at least once or twice a day.
Be sure to visit the CSMT in the morning and evening. The building looks impressive at any time of the day but it looks absolutely magical at night when it’s lit up like this. Many Mumbai city tours will make stops at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus.
3. Dhobi Ghat
Dhobi Ghat is the world’s biggest open-air laundry. An estimated half a million pieces of clothing from homes, hotels, and hospitals throughout the city are brought here to be washed, dried, and ironed every day. I visited Dhobi Ghat on this public transportation tour but Get Your Guide offers plenty of tour options that take you to Dhobi Ghat.
If you’d like to see dhobi ghat on your own, then you can do so by taking the train to Mahalaxmi station. We arrived when most of the washing had already been done so it’s best to get there early – around 6-8AM – if you want to see the dhobis in action. You can watch them from the bridge just a few paces from from Mahalxmi station.
NOTE: You can walk down the stairs from the bridge to get closer to the washing area, though I’m not sure how advisable that is. Read my post on Dhobi Ghat and this Mumbai public transportation tour for more pictures and information.
4. Dharavi Slum
Have you seen the movie Slumdog Millionaire? Some scenes were filmed here in Dharavi, which is known for being one of the world’s largest and densest slums. From what I understand, many tourists have wanted to visit Dharavi since watching that film, mainly to see the extent of the poverty there. If you’re one of those people, then don’t bother because poverty isn’t a tourist attraction.
But if you’d like to see another side to Dharavi, the side that generates up to 1 billion US dollars in annual revenue, then going on a guided tour with a resident may be of interest to you. I went on this Dharavi slum tour and it was one of the most interesting things I did in India. Check out my post on Dharavi for more pictures and information.
A tour of the Dharavi slum is one of the most popular things you can do in Mumbai so there are plenty of guided tours to choose from.
5. Chor Bazaar
Chor Bazaar was another stop on our public transportation tour. It’s one of the largest flea markets in India and where you’ll find all kinds of new and used goods like antiques, mobile phones, clothing overruns, and automobile parts.
Interestingly, Chor Bazaar in Hindi literally means “thieves’ bazaar” and is in reference to a violin that was once allegedly stolen from Queen Victoria.
6. Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya
Formerly known as the Prince of Wales Museum, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya (or CSMVS for short) is Mumbai’s preeminent cultural attraction.
Located in the Kala Ghoda art district in the Fort area, it’s home to a large collection of paintings, sculptures, religious artifacts, weapons, and archaeological finds.
As interesting as the museum’s collection is the building itself, which was designed by the same person who created the Gateway of India. I went to the museum on my own but you can also go on a guided tour.
7. Chowpatty Beach
Chowpatty beach is a pleasant stretch of beach located on one end of Marine Drive. I went on a food tour in Mumbai and we stopped here to have pav bhaji and enjoy the ocean view from one of its many beachside eateries. If you have some time to kill and want to get away from the chaos of Mumbai, then this is a good place to go.
Chowpatty beach is also the final resting place for an estimated 150,000 Lord Ganesh idols during Ganesh Chaturthi, a Hindu festival celebrating the birth of Ganesha. I was lucky to be in Mumbai (and on this beach) for the festival and witnessed many idols being brought to the beach to be immersed in the Arabian Sea.
THINGS TO DO IN MUMBAI
1. Explore the Fort / Colaba Areas
As described, I don’t think there’s a better place to stay for first-time visitors than the Fort and Colaba areas. It’s home to beautiful Gothic buildings the likes of which I haven’t seen anywhere else in Asia.
It’s so interesting to see I found myself walking around with my neck craned most of the time. There are plenty of cool shops and cafes to discover here so if you have the time, then I suggest spending a morning or afternoon just aimlessly exploring the area.
2. Take a Stroll Along the Queen’s Necklace
I was surprised to learn that Mumbai has the second most Art Deco buildings in the world, many of which can be found along scenic Marine Drive. It’s referred as the Queen’s Necklace because of how it looks at night.
From the sky, all the lights from the apartment buildings along crescent-shaped Marine Drive make it look like a woman’s shimmering necklace. If you’re a fan of Art Deco and/or the ocean, then you’re going to enjoy taking a stroll along Marine Drive.
If you’re feeling fit and have the time, then maybe you can walk the entire 3.6 km stretch all the way to Chowpatty Beach.
3. See the Dabbawalas in Action
The dabbawalas are lunchtime heroes. They’ve been delivering home-cooked lunches to Mumbai’s office workers for well over a hundred years. Known for their mind-boggling efficiency, it’s estimated that they make just one mistake in every 16 million deliveries.
The dabbawalas congregate outside Churchgate Station in South Mumbai every day during the workweek before lunch. Churchgate station was the last stop on my public transportation tour, but you can go there on your own to catch them before they disperse to make their deliveries.
4. Eat Your Way Through Mumbai on a Food Tour
This was the main reason why I was in Mumbai, to document this food tour from our friends at A Chef’s Tour. A Chef’s Tour gives some of the best Asian food tours and this one is no exception. You can check out my post on the Mumbai Secret Street Eats tour for more pictures and information.
If you don’t have the time to hunt down the best places to eat on your own, then it’s always a great idea to go on a food tour with a knowledgeable local. You can book this tour through Get Your Guide.
5. Go on a Bollywood Tour
Even if we’ve never seen a Bollywood movie – and Slumdog Millionaire doesn’t count because it’s actually a British film – many of us have at least heard of it. It’s the world’s biggest movie industry in terms of film production and it’s based right here in Mumbai. In fact, “Bollywood” is a portmanteau word for “Bombay” and “Hollywood”.
I don’t know anything about Indian cinema, but even I would have loved to go on a Bollywood tour if I had more time in Mumbai. It’s become such a massive industry that even casual observers like myself would probably find it interesting. Plus, I like all the dancing.
You can book a Bollywood tour on Klook or Get Your Guide. I linked to Get Your Guide’s most highly-rated Bollywood tour but they actually offer a few variations, all of which you can view here.
Photo by Sofia Zhuravetc via Shutterstock
6. Explore the Elephanta Caves
If you have enough time in Mumbai, then going on a day trip to Elephanta Island may be of interest to you. A UNESCO World Heritage Site, the Elephanta Caves are a collection of cave temples mostly dedicated to the Hindu god Shiva. Located about 10 kilometres (6.2 miles) east of Mumbai, it takes around an hour to get there by ferry.
You can easily visit Elephanta Island on your own from Colaba jetty. Visit wikitravel for more details. If you’d rather go on a guided tour, then you can book one through Get Your Guide.
7. Take a Cooking Class
Unfortunately, Ren didn’t come with me to India. When she does join me on a trip, we usually take a cooking class. We’ve taken cooking classes in Bali, Hoi An, Phuket, Chiang Mai, Tokyo, and Marrakech. It’s just a fun, hands-on way of getting to know the local cuisine.
If you have a passion for Indian food like I do, then you may want to take an Indian cooking class. Cookly is an online booking platform that offers cooking classes in many cities around the world, including Mumbai. They’re basically a tour provider that focuses on cooking classes so in my opinion, there’s no better place to look for cooking classes than on Cookly.
Photo by SMDSS via Shutterstock
WHERE TO EAT IN MUMBAI
1. Sanjay Singh Sandwichwala
This interesting veggie sandwich is quintessential Mumbai street food. It’s made with a medley of ingredients like beetroot, boiled potato, bell pepper, cucumber, onion, chaat masala, and mint chutney sandwiched between generously buttered slices of white bread that’s toasted in a metal clamp over coals. The toasted sandwich is drizzled with ketchup and served with a dollop of more chutney before being sliced into finger-friendly pieces.
You can find sandwiches like this one all over the city but in the Fort area, one of the most popular is Sanjay Singh Sandwichwala. He’s been selling sandwiches near the corner of Kaikhushru Dubash Marg and Mahatma Gandhi Road in Kala Ghoda for almost 25 years.
There’s no clear sign so just look for the sandwich stall with all the people around it. He sells hundreds of sandwiches every day so you’re sure to find a crowd gathered no matter what time of day.
2. Ashok Vada Pav
From the Bombay sandwich to the Bombay burger. Like the previous dish, the vada pav is a type of vegetarian sandwich consisting of a bread bun stuffed with an overflowing amount of deep-fried potato fritters, one or more chutneys, and different seasonings. It’s one of the city’s most beloved street food dishes and something I’d be happy to have on any trip to Mumbai.
Ashok Vada Pav near Kirti College in Dadar has a reputation for serving some of the best vada pav in Mumbai. Judging from the pushy crowd gathered around its stall, it looks to be true.
I had to wait over half an hour to get one vada pav simply because there were so many people competing for the next one. And many customers were getting four, five, six burgers to go! If you want to eat here, then you need to elbow some people in the head and be aggressive.
Ashok Vada Pav is in a pleasant tree-lined neighborhood though it’s not that easy to get to. The closest metro stop is Dadar station which is about a 20-minute walk from the stall. Gomantak Boarding House is near here so if you’re planning on having Bombay duck, then you can visit both places on the same trip.
3. Trishna
Mumbai is surrounded by the Arabian Sea so it’s not surprising to find great seafood here. Trishna is the city’s most famous seafood restaurant known for doing one dish exceptionally well – butter garlic crab. If you love crab like I do, then you need to eat here. It was succulent and absolutely delicious, especially when eaten with some freshly baked butter garlic naan.
Trishna is located in the artsy Kala Ghoda neighborhood of Fort, South Mumbai.
4. Hotel Deluxe
This place is located a few doors down from Hotel Flora Fountain so this was where I enjoyed my first meal in Mumbai. Hotel Deluxe isn’t actually a hotel, but a restaurant known for serving excellent Kerala thalis and sadhyas in Mumbai.
Technically, a thali is the round metal platter used to serve food, but the term is also used to refer to the actual meal served on that platter. Popular throughout India, it consists of a selection of various dishes that can be either vegetarian or meat-based, depending on where you are. What I had was the sadhya which is a meal of traditional vegetarian dishes served on a banana leaf.
From what I understand, the main difference between a thali and a sadhya is the vessel on which it’s served – a metal plate vs a banana leaf. A sadhya is also specific to the southwestern state of Kerala and consists exclusively of vegetarian dishes.
Hotel Deluxe is located in an alley about a 10-minute walk from Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus.
5. Gomantak Boarding House
Like Hotel Deluxe, Gomantak Boarding House isn’t actually a place of lodging, but a restaurant known for serving good thali meals. One of the thalis many people come for is the bombil or bombay duck fry thali, which isn’t a duck at all, but a type of lizardfish commonly eaten along the western coast of India. It’s especially popular in the state of Maharashtra so it’s a dish you should definitely try when in Mumbai.
The Bombay duck fry was exactly how I expected it. Crisp on the outside and buttery soft on the inside, it’s like a breaded, deep-fried fish fillet except it’s coated with a rice flour and semolina mixture. The bombil fry thali is served with two types of curry sauces, rice, and couple pieces of flatbread.
As described, Gomantak Boarding House is relatively near Ashok Vada Pav in Dadar so you can visit both places on the same trip. You can take the metro to Dadar station and eat your way to both places.
6. Nariman Point Khau Galli
This last entry isn’t a single restaurant or stall but a collection of street food vendors. The term khau galli roughly translates to “food alley” and refers to any street with a sizeable cluster of street food stalls.
I had this delicious masala dosa thali – which is a type of dosa filled with rice, lentils, potato, methi, and curry leaves – at Nariman Point Khau Galli near the southern end of Marine Drive. If you’re planning on walking the entire length of the Queen’s Necklace, then this khau galli is a good place to fill up your tank.
There are plenty of eateries to choose from at Nariman Point Khau Galli, but I went with the dosa stall because it attracted the biggest crowd of people. When in doubt, always go where the locals go.
INDIAN STREET FOOD GUIDE
I made a few recommendations in the previous section but if you enjoy street food as much as I do, then do check out our guide on Indian street food for a list of 30 must-try street food dishes in India.
POINTS OF INTEREST IN MUMBAI
To make it easier for you to visualize where everything is, I’ve pinned all the places mentioned in this guide on this map. Click on the link for a live version of the map.
HOW TO GET AROUND IN MUMBAI
One of the reasons why Mumbai was my favorite city in India was because of its convenient and efficient railway system. It’s cheap, about INR 10-40 per single journey, and can take you pretty much anywhere you need to go in the city.
Don’t be frightened by those viral social media videos showing hordes of people fighting to get on trains. They’re true but happen mostly at the busiest stations during peak times of the day like rush hour. I took the train often and found it to be very comfortable.
You shouldn’t need any other form of transport in Mumbai but if you need to take a taxi, then you can try ride-sharing apps like Uber or local competitor Ola first. People say they’re reliable but I tried Uber in Kolkata and had a tough time booking rides. Drivers would take forever to show up so I wound up canceling most rides and giving up on it altogether. It may be more reliable in Mumbai.
I’d take a taxi only as an absolute last resort. Not once did I hop into a taxi, tuk-tuk, or rickshaw anywhere in India without the driver trying to cheat me. It wore on me after a while so it’s not something I can recommend.
No matter which mode of transport you choose, I recommend downloading the Google Maps app (iOS|Android). It’ll tell you how to get around any city using public transportation. I use it to navigate on every trip and would never travel anywhere now without it.
HOW MANY DAYS TO STAY / MUMBAI ITINERARY
Based on my experience, two full days should be enough to cover the major sights in Mumbai. Here’s a sample 2D/3N Mumbai itinerary to help you plan your trip.
MUMBAI TRAVEL TIPS
1. Plan your Trip with Sygic Travel
This has been my go-to trip planning app since 2014. It allows me to pin all points of interest on a map so I can see where everything is. If something is too far, then I may take it out. If a bunch of places are within the same area, then I’ll move them all to the same day. That way I can create as efficient an itinerary as possible to maximize our time. Check out my post on the Sygic Travel app for more information.
DOWNLOAD: iOS / Android
2. Rent a Pocket Wifi Device
Having a reliable wifi connection is a must when traveling, especially when you’re in a country that can be as frenzied as India. When I’m in an uncomfortable situation, it gives me great comfort to be able to do research and navigate with Google Maps. It just makes the experience less stressful and much more enjoyable.
This trip to India was unexpected and put together quickly so I wan’t able to rent a pocket wifi device in time. Thankfully, I had my Pokefi which is a global wifi device, but you can rent a wifi device or purchase a sim card through Klook.
3. Exercise Caution with Street Food
I love street food but in India, I had to be more careful than usual. Traveler’s diarrhea or “Delhi Belly” is a very real thing which doesn’t happen only in Delhi. I was being careful but I still got a bout of it in Mumbai. The culprit I believe, was ice cream. Thankfully, my case wasn’t too bad but I’ve heard horror stories about how crippling diarrhea in India can be.
To reduce your chances of getting sick from street food, you can refer to Hippie in Heels’ tips on how to safely eat street food in India. These are the most important things to remember:
4. Go on a Guided Tour
I prefer exploring places on my own so it isn’t often that I go on guided tours, but I did in Mumbai. I went on this Dharavi slum tour and this public transportation tour. I went on these tours because I wasn’t 100% comfortable about visiting Dharavi and Dhobi Ghat on my own. I didn’t know what to expect so I wanted a guide to show me around and explain everything to me.
I was completely satisfied with the Dharavi slum tour and would happily recommend it to anyone. However, I was bit disappointed with the public transportation tour because I was hoping to explore Dhobi Ghat more closely. Instead, we just observed from a distance which is something I could have done on my own.
My guide did explain to me why that was, but if you have a particular interest in Dhobi Ghat and want to see it from up close, then I suggest searching for an alternate tour on Klook. I’m not sure if it exists but it’s worth a try.
Get Your Guide offers more tours in Mumbai but I use Klook more often. I use them to buy vouchers for pocket wifi rental, transfers, discount passes, etc. I find their prices to be the most favorable. Both are reputable tour providers though so you can’t go wrong with either of them.
5. Get Travel Insurance
I talk about weighing the need for travel insurance in all our travel guides. If you plan on doing something physical, then I suggest getting it. But if not, then you may not have to. In India, I think you should get it either way.
India is different so I think getting travel insurance is a must. The very real threat of Delhi belly alone makes it comforting to have. I’ve heard travel bloggers coming down with incapacitating cases of traveler’s diarrhea in India. They describe it as being far worse than any diarrhea they’ve contracted anywhere else in the world. Yikes!
We buy travel insurance from SafetyWing or Heymondo. They’re both popular travel insurance providers used by many digital nomads. Follow the links to get a free quote from SafetyWing or Heymondo. Will Fly for Food readers get 5% off on Heymondo when using our link.
6. Bring the Right Power Adapter
India has Type C, Type D, or Type M electrical outlets so be sure to bring the right power adapters for your devices. Electrical voltage is 230V and the standard frequency is 50Hz.
7. Know Your Terminal
If you’re flying out of Mumbai, then make sure you go to the right terminal because the international (T2) and domestic (T1) terminals are 5 km apart. Since I was flying to Delhi, I naturally assumed I needed to go to Terminal 1. But soon as I got there, I learned that all Jet Airways flights – domestic and international – were operating out of Terminal 2!
Many travelers seem to make this mistake as there are unscrupulous car charters waiting to overcharge you for transfers between terminals. I fell victim to this. Don’t let it happen to you by confirming your terminal in advance. If you do happen to make this mistake, then ignore anyone who offers to take you to the right terminal. Use Uber or Ola if you can.
8. Have Patience and Keep a Cool Head
This brings me to my last and perhaps most important tip – stay cool. People either love or hate India. There doesn’t seem to be any middle ground and there’s a reason for that.
To put it mildly, India is a different animal. It can be challenging at times to travel through this country. Order and discipline can sometimes feel like foreign concepts which can lead to frustration if you let it.
If you’re from the west, then you can’t come here expecting things to work like they do in your country. Things will just annoy you to no end. I come from a similarly undisciplined country like the Philippines and even I found myself on the brink of losing it a couple of times.
When something tries your patience, just take a deep breath, have a look around, and remind yourself where you are. You’re in India. It’s supposed to be like this.
Have Fun!
No way am I an expert on Mumbai but I do hope that you find this guide helpful. I’m only sharing some of the things I learned from our trip. If you have any questions, then please feel free to ask us in the comment section below.
Thanks for stopping by and have a great time exploring Mumbai!
OUR GEAR
These are some of the things we brought with us to Mumbai. To see what other travel essentials we bring on trips, check out our what’s in our backpack post. (NOTE: The following links are Amazon and other affiliate links.)
Disclosure
This Mumbai travel guide contains affiliate links, meaning we’ll get a small commission if you make a booking at no extra cost to you. We only recommend products and services that we use ourselves and firmly believe in. We really appreciate your support as this helps us make more of these free travel guides. Thank you!
Found this article useful? Help us help other travelers by sharing it! | |||||
7121 | dbpedia | 0 | 5 | https://www.delhimetrorail.com/pages/en/pressrelease_details/yearender-for-the-year-2022-3 | en | Welcome to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation(DMRC) | [] | [] | [] | [
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7121 | dbpedia | 1 | 23 | https://yometro.com/kirti-nagar-metro-station-110122 | en | Kirti Nagar Metro Station Route Map | [] | [] | [] | [
""
] | null | [] | null | Lets learn about Kirti Nagar Metro Station, a part of Delhi Metro Blue Main Line and Green Branch Line. Get quick facts like route map, interchange, parking, feeder bus, gate info, ATM, nearby locations, contact number, plan, faqs etc. | en | YoMetro - Route Finder | https://yometro.com/kirti-nagar-metro-station-110122 | 𝒜. Yes. Kirti Nagar metro station is functional and active, you may travel from or to this station.
𝒜. Yes. Kirti Nagar metro station has parking facility based on paid service with various chareges as per hours slots and vehicle.
𝒜. Yes. The facility of feeder bus service is available at Kirti Nagar metro station. But feeder bus service is paid and not included with metro fare, also both have different ticket charges. Generally feeder buses are available from 06:00 AM to 10:00 PM. | |||||
7121 | dbpedia | 1 | 54 | https://www.metrorailnews.in/delhi-metro-finalises-plans-for-dwarka-kirti-nagar-metrolite-service/ | en | Delhi Metro finalises plans for Dwarka-Kirti Nagar Metrolite service | [
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"Kanika Verma"
] | 2019-10-31T19:14:17+05:30 | The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) has planned the Kirti Nagar-Dwarka Sector 25 and the Rithala-Narela sections for setting up the Metrolite corridors. | en | Metro Rail News | https://www.metrorailnews.in/delhi-metro-finalises-plans-for-dwarka-kirti-nagar-metrolite-service/ | New Delhi: Prime Minister Narendra Modi has flagged-off the Delhi-Faridabad Metro Line that would allow hassle free travel for around two lakh daily commuters between the national capital and the industrial hub in Haryana.
The extension of the Delhi Metro connects Badarpur to Escorts Mujesar in Faridabad.
The total cost of the project from Badarpur to Escorts Mujesar is nearly Rs. 2,500 crore. Out of this, Rs. 1,557 crore was borne by the Haryana Government, the Centre contributed Rs. 537 crore, while the Delhi Metro provided Rs. 400 crore.
The nine stations in this section include, Sarai, NHPC Chowk, Mewala Maharajpur, Sector 28, Badkal Mor, Old Faridabad, Neelam Chowk Ajronda, Bata Chowk and Escorts Mujesar.
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All these are elevated and located on either side of the Delhi-Mathura Road (NH-2).
“The nine-station metro corridor which was 95 per cent indigenously built will provide people a safe, affordable, quick, comfortable, reliable, environment-friendly and sustainable transport facility,” a Haryana government spokesperson said.
Haryana Chief Minister ML Khattar, addressing a press conference on Saturday, had thanked the Prime Minister for “gifting” the Metro service which would take the city to “another level of progress” with better connectivity with other NCR towns.
He had also said that the Prime Minister would be announcing the go-ahead for connecting Gurgaon with Faridabad by Metro.
NEW DELHI (Metro Rail News): The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) has planned the Kirti Nagar-Dwarka Sector 25 and the Rithala-Narela sections for setting up the Metrolite corridors.
A DMRC spokesperson told that the Dwarka Sector 25-Kirti Nagar Metrolite project will be planned along the central verge sharing road space with vehicular traffic, similar to the scrapped bus rapid transit (BRT) corridor of South Delhi. However, the 19.09 km long Metrolite corridor will not hinder usual vehicular traffic on the roads and DMRC has addressed all such issues in this project, which earlier plagued the BRT corridor.
According to DMRC, the BRT corridor had to be dismantled as the vehicular traffic on the road was severely affected. Taking this into consideration, DMRC has planned the Dwarka Sector 25-Kirti Nagar Metrolite along the central verge and has also planned to make it elevated wherever necessary, in order to avoid any hindrance with vehicular movement.
Delhi Metro has completed the feasibility study of the Dwarka Sector 25-Kirti Nagar Metrolite and the project has also been approved by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) as well as the DMRC board. MoHUA is backing the Metrolite projects in Delhi as they are less capital intensive.
The Metrolite will ply on dedicated corridors and at major crossings or intersections, it will go underground in order to ensure the smooth movement of trains. DMRC has also planned for smooth passenger movement for reaching the Metrolite stations and subways which will connect the pavements on the roadside with its stations to the center.
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The Metrolite project is basically a smaller metro system with three coaches and has a carrying capacity of 300 passengers. It is a cost-effective project for DMRC as it costs 30-40 percent less than the Delhi Metro trains. The Metrolite corridors are usually effective in areas where large scale metro lines are not required. The Metrolite corridors will have a simple fare collection system inside the trains.
The 19.09 km long Dwarka Sector 25-Kirti Nagar Metrolite corridor will have 21 stations, out of which 16 stations will be at-grade, while five will be elevated. This will make approximately 11.8 km long distance of the corridor to be at grade, while 6.6 km long to be elevated. The corridor will pass through densely populated areas such as Mayapuri, Dabri, Bamnoli and Dhul Siras in the capital. | |||||
7121 | dbpedia | 2 | 56 | https://www.metrotraintimings.in/Delhi/Delhi-Metro-Rail-Timings-from-Kirti_Nagar-to-Mundka.htm | en | Kirti Nagar to Mundka Delhi Metro Train Timings | [] | [] | [] | [
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Delhi Metro Train Timings
Delhi Metro Red Line Station are Dilshad Garden, Jhil Mil, Mansarover Park, Shahdara, Welcome, Seelampur, Shastri Park, Kashmere Gate, Tis Hazari, Pul Bangash, Pratap Nagar, Shastri Nagar, Inder Lok, Kanhaiya Nagar, Keshav Puram, Netaji Subash Place, Kohat Enclave, Pitam Pura, Rohini East, Rohini West, Rithala
Delhi Metro Yellow Line Jahangirpuri, Adarsh Nagar, Azadpur, Model Town, Gtb Nagar, Viswavidyalaya, Vidhan Sabha, Civil Lines, Kashmere Gate, Chandni Chowk, Chawri Bazar, New Delhi, Rajiv Chowk, Patel Chowk, Central Secretariat, Udyog Bhawan, Race Course (LOK KALYAN MARG), Jorbagh, INA, AIIMS, Green Park, Hauz Khas, Malviya Nagar, Saket, Qutab Minar, Chhattarpur, Sultanpur, Ghitorni, Arjan Garh, Guru dronacharya, Sikandarpur, MG Road, IFFCO Chowk, Huda City Centre
Delhi Metro Blue Line Noida City Center, Golf Course, Botanical Garden, Noida Sector 18, Noida Sector 16, Noida Sector 15, New Ashok Nagar, Mavur Vihar Extention, Mayur Vihar Phase 1, Akshardham, Yamuna Bank, Indraprastha, Pragati Maidan, Mandi House, Barakhamba, Rajiv Chowk, RK Ashram Marg, Jhandewalan, Karol Bagh, Rajendra Place, Patel Nagar, Shadi Pur, Kirti Nagar, Moti Nagar, Ramesh Nagar, Rajouri Garden, Tagore Garden, Subash Nagar, Tilak Nagar, Janak Puri East, Janak Puri West, Uttam Nagar East, Uttam Nagar West, Nawada, Dwaraka Mor, Dwarka, Dwarka Sec 14, Dwarka Sec 13, Dwarka Sec 12, Dwarka Sec 11, Dwarka Sec 10, Dwarka Sec 09, Dwarka Sec 08, Dwarka Sec 21, Vaishali, Kaushambi, Anand Vihar, Karkar Duma, Preet Vihar, Nirman Vihar, Laxmi Nagar, Yamuna Bank
Delhi Metro Green Line Inder Lok, Ashok Park Main, Punjabi Bagh, Shivaji Park, Madi Pur, Paschim Vihar East, Paschim Vihar West, Peera Garhi, Udyog Nagar, Surajmal Stadium, Nangloai, Nangloai Rly Station, Rajdhani Park, Mundka, Ashok Park Main, Satguru Ram Singh Marg, Kirti Nagar
Delhi Metro Violet Line ITO, Mandhi House, Janpath, Central Secretariat, Khan Market, Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, Jangpura, Lajpat Nagar, Moolchand, Kailash Colony, Nehru Place, Kalkaji Mandir, Govindpuri, Okhla, Jasola, Sarita Vihar, Mohan Cooperative, Tughlakabad, Badarpur, Sarai, NHPC Chowk, Mewala Maharajpur, Sector-28, Badkal Mor, Old Faridabad, Neelam Chowk Ajronda, Bata Chowk, Escorts Mujesar Airport Express New Delhi Airport Express, Shivaji Stadium, Dhaula Kuan, Delhi Aero City, IGI Airport,
The Delhi Metro has been instrumental in ushering in a new era in the sphere of mass urban transportation in India. The swanky and modern Metro system introduced comfortable, air conditioned and eco-friendly services for the first time in India and completely revolutionized the mass transportation scenario not only in the National Capital Region but the entire country. Having constructed a massive network of 218.17 Km with 164 stations in record time, the DMRC today stands out as a shining example of how a mammoth technically complex infrastructure project can be completed before time and within budgeted cost by a Government agency. The DMRC opened its first corridor between Shahdara and Tis Hazari on 25th December, 2002. Subsequently, the first phase of construction worth 65 kilometres of Metro lines was finished two years and nine months ahead of schedule in 2005. Since then the DMRC has also completed the construction of another 125 kilometres of Metro corridors under the second phase in only four and a half years. The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited (DMRC) was registered on 3rd May 1995 under the Companies Act, 1956 with equal equity participation of the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) and the Central Government to implement the dream of construction and operation of a world- class Mass Rapid Transport System (MRTS). The Airport Express link between the Indira Gandhi International Airport and New Delhi has now propelled Delhi to the league of global cities which have high speed rail connectivity between the city and the airport. Presently, the Delhi Metro network consists of about 218.17 Km with 164 stations along with six more stations of the Airport Express Link. The network has now crossed the boundaries of Delhi to reach NOIDA and Ghaziabad in Uttar Pradesh,Gurgaon and faridabad in Haryana. The Delhi Metro has also contributed tremendously on the environment front by becoming the first ever railway project in the world to claim carbon credits for regenerative braking. DMRC has also been certified by the United Nations (UN) as the first Metro Rail and Rail based system in the world to get carbon Credits for reducing Green House gas emissions as it has helped to reduce pollution levels in the city by 6.3 lakh tons every year thus helping in reducing global warming. It has also set up roof top solar power plants at many of its stations. All stations of the presently under construction corridors are being constructed as green buildings. In the present phase of Delhi Metro’s construction, the DMRC is in the process of building another 160 kilometres of Metro lines which will weave a web of Metro corridors along the city’s Ring Road besides connecting with many other localities in NOIDA, Ghaziabad and Bahadurgarh. Apart from providing Delhites with a comfortable public transport option, the Delhi Metro is also contributing significantly towards controlling pollution as well as reducing vehicular congestion on the roads. According to a study, Delhi Metro has helped in removing about 3.9 lakh vehicles from the streets of Delhi. The DMRC today has 235 train sets of four, six and eight coaches. More than a hundred trains of six coach configuration and over 60 trains of eight coach configuration are currently operational. | ||||||
7121 | dbpedia | 1 | 0 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_Line_(Delhi_Metro) | en | Green Line (Delhi Metro) | [
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Green Line
(Line 5)OverviewStatusPartly OperationalOwnerDMRCLocaleDelhi, BahadurgarhTerminiStations24ServiceTypeRapid transitSystemDelhi MetroOperator(s)Delhi Metro Rail CorporationRolling stockMitsubishi-ROTEM-BEMLHistoryOpened
3 April 2010 (Inderlok – Mundka)
27 August 2011 (Kirti Nagar – Ashok Park Main)
TechnicalLine length28.79 km (17.89 mi)CharacterElevatedTrack gauge1,435 mm (4 ft 8+1⁄2 in) standard gaugeElectrification 25 kV 50 Hz AC overhead catenaryHighest elevation215 m
Route map
Kirti Nagar Satguru Ram Singh Marg Inderlok Ashok Park Main Punjabi Bagh
Ring Road
Punjabi Bagh West Shivaji Park Madipur Paschim Vihar East Paschim Vihar West
Outer Ring Road
Peeragarhi Udyog Nagar Maharaja Surajmal Stadium
Najafgarh Road
Nangloi Nangloi Railway Station Rajdhani Park Mundka Mundka Industrial Area (MIA) Ghevra Tikri Kalan Tikri Border
DelhiHaryana
border
Pandit Shree Ram Sharma Bahadurgarh City Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh
Inderlok Daya Basti Sarai Rohilla Ajmal Khan Park Nabi Karim New Delhi Turkman Gate Delhi Gate
Mahatma Gandhi Marg
Delhi Sachivalaya Indraprastha
[1]
The Green Line (Line 5) is a metro rail line of the Delhi Metro, a rapid transit system in Delhi, India. The line consists of 24 stations covering a total length of 28.79 km. It runs between Inderlok and Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh with a branch line connecting the line's Ashok Park Main station with Kirti Nagar station.[2]
It is almost an elevated line except for Kirti Nagar Metro Station which is At Grade and runs mostly along the busy NH 9 route in North Delhi and North West Delhi, bypassing Tikri Border to enter Bahadurgarh. It is the first Delhi metro line on standard gauge, as opposed to 5 ft 6 in (1,676 mm) broad gauge, prevalent in Red, Yellow and Blue Lines.
A 12.37 km extension of Green Line with ten stations was approved by the Union Government in March 2024. Construction is expected to begin in 2024, as part of the fourth phase of the Delhi Metro's development, and is slated to be completed by 2029.[3][4][5]
History
[edit]
The line was opened in two stages, with the 15.1 km Inderlok – Mundka section opening on 3 April 2010[6] and the 3.5 km Kirti Nagar – Ashok Park Main branch line on 27 August 2011. Though its route is shorter than other lines, the Green Line serves as a lifeline for Delhiites connecting to the Red and Blue Lines, as it covers major commercial and residential areas like Punjabi Bagh, Paschim Vihar, Nangloi and Mundka.
On 6 August 2012, in a step that will improve commuting in National Capital Region, the Union government approved the extension of Delhi Metro from Mundka to Bahadurgarh in Haryana. The 11.18 km metro stretch comprises seven stations with four of them in Delhi and the remaining three in Bahadurgarh -- Mundka Industrial Area, Ghevra, Tikri Kalan, Tikri Border, Pandit Shree Ram Sharma (Modern Industrial Estate), Bahadurgarh City (Bus Stand) and Brigadier Hoshiar Singh (City Park).[7]
Construction work of this extension began in 2013 and was completed by the second half of 2018, as part of the Phase III expansion. Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Mundka – Bahadurgarh stretch via video conferencing on 24 June 2018.
In late October 2019, it was decided to construct steel platforms on the viaduct of Green Line between Punjabi Bagh and Shivaji Park stations that will provide a seamless interchange between Green Line and Pink Line.[8] Construction began in that year itself and the new halt platform of Green Line, named Punjabi Bagh West, was thrown open to the public on 29 March 2022, after multiple delays.[9]
The new halt platform of Green Line is connected by a Foot Over Bridge (FOB), which links with the Punjabi Bagh West station of the Pink Line. The FOB is 212 metres long. The new platforms are 155 metres in length and are connected with the FOB by two extra-large lifts on each platform with a capacity of 26 passengers each as well as staircases.[9]
Stations
[edit]
Main Line
[edit]
Green Line # Station Name Phase Opening Interchange Connection Station Layout Platform Level Type Depot Connection Depot Layout English Hindi 1 Indraprastha इंद्रप्रस्थ 4 2029 Blue Line Underground Island Indraprastha Depot At Grade 2 Delhi Sachivalaya दिल्ली सचिवालय None None 3 Delhi Gate दिल्ली गेट Violet Line 4 LNJP Hospital एलएनजेपी अस्पताल None 5 New Delhi नई दिल्ली Yellow Line
Airport Express
New Delhi railway station 6 Nabi Karim नबी करीम Magenta Line
(Phase 4 - Under Construction) 7 Ajmal Khan Park अजमल ख़ान पार्क None 8 Sarai Rohilla सराय रोहिल्ला Delhi Sarai Rohilla railway station
Vivekanand Puri Halt railway station 9 Daya Basti दया बस्ती Dayabasti railway station 10 Inderlok इंद्रलोक 2 3 April 2010 Red Line Elevated 11 Ashok Park Main अशोक पार्क मेन Green Line Side 12 Punjabi Bagh East पंजाबी बाग़ None 13 Punjabi Bagh West पंजाबी बाग़ पश्चिम Pink Line 14 Shivaji Park शिवाजी पार्क Shakurbasti railway station 15 Madipur मादीपुर 16 Paschim Vihar East पश्चिम विहार पूर्व None 17 Paschim Vihar West पश्चिम विहार पश्चिम 18 Peeragarhi पीरागढ़ी Magenta Line
(Phase 4 - Under Construction) 19 Paschim Vihar West उद्योग नगर None 20 Maharaja Surajmal Stadium महाराजा सूरजमल स्टेडियम 21 Nangloi नांगलोई 22 Nangloi Railway Station नांगलोई रेलवे स्टेशन Nangloi railway station 23 Rajdhani Park राजधानी पार्क None 24 Mundka मुंडका Mundka Depot At Grade 25 Mundka Industrial Area (MIA) मुंडका औद्योगिक क्षेत्र(एमआईए) 3 24 June 2018 None 26 Ghevra घेवरा 27 Tikri Kalan टीकरी कलाँ 28 Tikri Border टीकरी बॉर्डर 29 Pandit Shree Ram Sharma पंडित श्री राम शर्मा Bahadurgarh Depot At Grade 30 Bahadurgarh City बहादुरगढ़ सिटी None 31 Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh ब्रिगेडियर होशियार सिंह
Branch Line
[edit]
Green Line Branch # Station Name Phase Opening Interchange Connection Station Layout Platform Level Type Depot Connection Depot Layout English Hindi 1 Ashok Park Main* अशोक पार्क मेन* 2 3 April 2010 Green Line Elevated Side None 2 Satguru Ram Singh Marg सतगुरु राम सिंह मार्ग 27 August 2011 Patel Nagar Railway station 3 Kirti Nagar कीर्ति नगर Blue Line At Grade
Train Info
[edit]
Green Line Rakes Mitsubishi Hyundai Rotem BEML Train Length 4 Train Gauge 4 ft 8+1⁄2 in (1,435 mm) standard gauge Electrification 25 kV, 50 Hz AC through overhead catenary
OHE Train's Maximum Speed 100 km/h Train Operation Delhi Metro
Infrastructure
[edit]
Green Line is equipped with Bombardier Cityflo 350 signalling.[6]
Rolling stock
[edit]
The Green Line uses standard gauge trains manufactured by a consortium of Mitsubishi, Hyundai Rotem and Bharat Earth Movers (BEML). A total of 196 cars for the Green Line and the Violet Line were ordered for both 4-car configurations (46 trains) and 6-car configurations (2 trains). One train was manufactured in Changwon in South Korea and rest of the trains were manufactured at BEML's facility in Bangalore. Width of these trains is 2.9 meters as compared to 3.2 meters on broad gauge trains.[10]
See also
[edit]
Transport in Delhi
Delhi Suburban Railway
National Capital Region Transport Corporation
Rapid transit in India
List of rapid transit systems
List of metro systems
References
[edit] | ||||||
7121 | dbpedia | 1 | 15 | https://twitter.com/OfficialDMRC/status/1202136901429260288 | en | x.com | [] | [] | [] | [
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7121 | dbpedia | 2 | 17 | https://yometro.com/kirti-nagar-metro-station-110122 | en | Kirti Nagar Metro Station Route Map | [] | [] | [] | [
""
] | null | [] | null | Lets learn about Kirti Nagar Metro Station, a part of Delhi Metro Blue Main Line and Green Branch Line. Get quick facts like route map, interchange, parking, feeder bus, gate info, ATM, nearby locations, contact number, plan, faqs etc. | en | YoMetro - Route Finder | https://yometro.com/kirti-nagar-metro-station-110122 | 𝒜. Yes. Kirti Nagar metro station is functional and active, you may travel from or to this station.
𝒜. Yes. Kirti Nagar metro station has parking facility based on paid service with various chareges as per hours slots and vehicle.
𝒜. Yes. The facility of feeder bus service is available at Kirti Nagar metro station. But feeder bus service is paid and not included with metro fare, also both have different ticket charges. Generally feeder buses are available from 06:00 AM to 10:00 PM. | |||||
7121 | dbpedia | 0 | 9 | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8161715/ | en | Working Women, Delhi Metro and Covid-19: A Case Study in Delhi-NCR | [
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"Deeksha Tayal",
"Aasha Kapur Mehta"
] | 2021-08-17T00:00:00 | Availability of safe, reliable and affordable public transport facilitates access to work opportunities. This relationship between transport and economic independence is not gender neutral. Delhi’s Metro Rail Network marked a milestone in this ... | en | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/coreutils/nwds/img/favicons/favicon.ico | PubMed Central (PMC) | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8161715/ | Indian J Labour Econ. 2021; 64(2): 389–413.
PMCID: PMC8161715
PMID: 34075281
Working Women, Delhi Metro and Covid-19: A Case Study in Delhi-NCR
and
Deeksha Tayal
Centre for Gender Studies, Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, India
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Aasha Kapur Mehta
Centre for Gender Studies, Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, India
Find articles by Aasha Kapur Mehta
Centre for Gender Studies, Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, India
Deeksha Tayal, Email: moc.liamg@5ahskeedlayat.
Corresponding author.
Copyright © Indian Society of Labour Economics 2021
This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic.
Abstract
Availability of safe, reliable and affordable public transport facilitates access to work opportunities. This relationship between transport and economic independence is not gender neutral. Delhi’s Metro Rail Network marked a milestone in this regard as it provided a gender-sensitive means of mass transit with specific facilities for women passengers. However, the onset of Covid-19 pandemic, followed by restrictions on mobility and change in working habits, brought the urban public transport network to a standstill. Given this background, the paper explores the impact of Metro Rail Network on the commuting pattern and preferences of working women in Delhi-NCR region as well as the travel-related challenges faced by women that were magnified during the pandemic.
Keywords: Covid-19, Delhi metro, Domestic duties, Working women, Commuting problems, Safe transport
Introduction
Women’s labour force participation is influenced by several factors, some of which facilitate their entry into the workforce, while others constrain their continuation and growth in the job market. Access to safe, reliable and affordable public transport facilitates women's mobility and is increasingly recognized as a critical determinant of women's economic engagement. A report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) finds that limited access to safe transportation is likely to reduce female labour force participation rate in developing countries by 16.5 percentage points (Kühn et al. 2017). Other studies have highlighted the effect of sex differences in household “roles” in influencing women to work “closer to home” (Fanning 1981). The disproportionate burden of domestic responsibilities at home forces women to shorten their commuting time (MacDonald 1999). The relatively lower wages of women and higher time constraints due to the compulsion of fulfilling multiple demands, increase the opportunity cost of travel time to and from the workplace. The trade-off for time over wages tends to increase for working mothers, especially those with little children (Gutierrez 2018).
Traffic congestion, measured by commuting time, may prevent substitution between work in the home and market (Black et al. 2014; MacDonald and Peters 2000; Agénor and Canuto 2012). Women are often more restricted than men due to safety concerns, inequality in access to personal vehicles (car or bicycle), and cultural disapprovals, all of which make it difficult for them to travel farther away from home. As a result, all over the world, women are more likely than men to be frequent and regular users of public transport (Duchène 2011). Hence, it is important to ensure that access to public transportation is gender sensitive.
The beginning of the Metro Rail Network in Delhi, in December 2002, marked a milestone in laying the foundation for access to a gender-sensitive means of mass transit. Buses and metro rail are the most popular means of transportation for intra-city travel in the National Capital Territory of Delhi (Government of NCT of Delhi 2021: 212). Until 2014–2015, the average daily ridership on buses was two to three times higher than that in the metro. However, this gap has declined substantially since then especially with the massive expansion in areas covered by the metro. While metro ridership is not provided separately for males and females, one estimate is that “33% of Metro commuters are women” (Sengar 2019). Apart from intra-city buses and metro rail, transport needs are met by inter-state bus services, suburban railways, auto-rickshaws, cycle rickshaws, hired cars and personalized modes such as cars and two wheelers (ibid.) (Table ).
Table 1
YearAverage daily ridership in lakhMetroDTC + cluster busesRidership on buses/metro(1)(2)(3)Column 3/22005–200630.522006–200726.772007–20086.2524.043.852008–20097.2222.623.132009–20109.1924.162.632010–201112.5930.322.412011–201216.6044.202.662012–201319.2646.772.432013–201421.9049.832.282014–201523.8648.822.052015–201626.0045.981.772016–201727.61*41.801.512017–201825.37*41.511.642018–201925.97*42.391.632019–202050.65***51.02
The metro has been instrumental in ushering in a new era in the sphere of urban transportation through provisioning of facilities specifically for women passengers. This rapid means of public transport provides a reliable, efficient and safe means of commuting for women. In an ethnographic study of Delhi metro, Sadana (2010) finds that women feel safe while travelling in the Delhi metro.
However, the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic led to a stoppage of urban public transport systems in many parts of the world. The World Health Organization (WHO) recommended that people should avoid closed and crowded places and should maintain a physical distance of at least one metre from others (WHO 2020). In India, a stringent nation-wide lockdown was imposed from 24 March to 31 May 2020. In an effort to stop the spread of the virus, Delhi metro services were suspended for over 5 months from 22 March 2020 to 6 September 2020. Services were resumed with strict guidelines pertaining to physical distancing, mask-wearing, sanitization, no cash transactions and no travel through tokens, but average daily passenger ridership was far lower than pre-Covid-19 levels at 13 lakh (including the Airport Line and Rapid Metro, Gurugram) on November 30, 2020 (Rai 2020; Times of India 2021).
Given this background, this paper explores the impact of Metro Rail Network on the commuting pattern and preferences of working women in Delhi-NCR region. It also draws attention to the travel-related challenges faced by women that were magnified during the pandemic.
Methodology and Sample Description
The paper is a part of a primary survey-based study conducted for an ICSSR-funded project in the Delhi-NCR region. Quantitative and qualitative information was collected from 462 women in the age cohort of 20 - 65 years. While most of the women in our sample belong to middle-income families, a few women from lower income families were also included. We focused on three categories of women:
(i) those who never worked outside the home1;
(ii) those who earlier worked outside the home but left their job due to some reason(s)2;
(iii) those currently working outside the home3.
This paper is based on a subset of the sample comprising 145 women professionals in Delhi-NCR who were employed during the pre-Covid period and retained their employment after the onset of Covid (category (iii) above). However, Section 5 on challenges faced by women while commuting by Delhi metro, is based on the full sample of 462 women respondents.
The survey was conducted in two phases in order to explore the impact of Covid-19 on changes in the working women's metro usage and commuting pattern to their workplace. The first phase of quantitative data collection was completed between April and May 2020, during the lockdown, through administration of a household questionnaire. Since fear of contracting the virus was rampant, it was not possible to use random sampling and approach unknown persons for the survey. Hence, the questionnaires were initially administered to female professionals who were either known to the researchers or were known to those within their networks. Subsequently, those who were interviewed were asked if they could connect us with working women professionals known to them. Thus, a combination of purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques was used for undertaking the survey during the extreme circumstances created by the pandemic and lockdown.
The second phase of the survey was conducted between October and November 2020, when the Indian economy started finding ways of resuming normalcy. In Delhi, the metro, which is the most widely used means of public transport by all working women, resumed its services from September 2020. It was also marked by the re-opening of several offices, which required employees to commute to and from the workplace. In this phase, we selected and requested 30 working women for additional time for detailed personal interviews. The survey was undertaken through an open-ended qualitative questionnaire, asking the participants about the impact of Covid-19 on their challenges of commuting to the workplace.
Several criteria were used to select the women respondents for the survey. The working women must be traveling to their workplace post-lockdown, even if occasionally. We selected participants belonging to diverse industries and occupations like administration, marketing, banking, information technology, academicians, healthcare professionals, service providers, as well as unskilled workers. We also wanted our sample to have women at different stages of their work life. This necessitated the selection of respondents such that they included new entrants into the labour market, women in the middle of their career graph, as well as those at a senior level with ample work experience. The aim was to capture the different dimensions of the commuting preferences, patterns and problems of working women.
Delhi Metro and Working Women
The National Capital Territory of Delhi has made rapid progress in developing urban infrastructure. One such milestone in the transport arena has been achieved by the setting up of the Delhi Metro Rail Network which is globally recognized as an ultra-modern means of public transport capable of alleviating the mobility challenges associated with a rapidly growing population (Siemiatycki 2006). It has changed forever, the way people travel, integrating the NCR towns with the capital city.
Over the nearly two decades since the first metro train connected the 8.5 km distance between Shahdara and Tis Hazari stations, in December 2002, the services have expanded to cover 389 kms. Beyond the boundaries of Delhi, they now reach Noida, Ghaziabad, Gurugram, Faridabad, Bahadurgarh and Ballabhgarh (Delhi Metro Website 2021a). It has ushered in a new era in the sphere of gender-sensitive means of mass transit through specific provisions for safety of women passengers, like reserved seats for women in every coach; women CISF staff for frisking of female passengers; CCTV surveillance at stations, etc. Introduction of an exclusive lady’s coach was an additional important measure which received public applaud (Tara 2011).
In the following paragraphs, we examine the dynamics of metro usage by working women in Delhi.
Usage Pattern of Metro
We study the commuting pattern of women to their workplace on the basis of the frequency of their metro usage, and the extent of their dependence on alternative means of transport.
Women were classified into three categories—those using metro service on a daily basis for commuting to and from the office; those using it occasionally; and those who have never used it for this purpose. We find that 47.6% of the respondents are regular metro riders, while 28.3% used it occasionally (Table ).
Table 2
Metro usageFrequencyPer centRegular6947.6Occasional4128.3Never3524.1Total145100
Almost half the women who were travelling to work (47.6%) regularly used the metro to commute to and from office, while 20.7% usually used their personal vehicle and 11% travelled by auto-rickshaw. Official cab or bus, hired cab and public bus are the other modes of transport that were used by some of them (Fig. ).
Average Commuting Time
Using the average commuting time to office (one-way), as a proxy for the distance between home and workplace, we found a direct positive association between travel time and the frequency of metro usage. Table shows that as the average commuting time increases from less than or equal to 30 min to over an hour, the dependence on metro tends to rise.
Table 3
S. NoAverage commuting time (min)Frequency of metro useRegularlyOccasionallyNever130 min or less17.032.250.9231 min to 60 min58.236.45.5361 min and above87.16.56.5Total47.628.324.1
Eighty-seven per cent of the women who take an hour or more to commute to office, use the metro regularly because it is the only reliable and safe means of transport for reaching a distant location. Women who never used the metro service or used it only occasionally were primarily those who either had an office cab or bus assigned for the purpose, or could afford to use their personal vehicle.
Extent of Metro Connectivity
We tried to examine the extent of respondent’s access to the metro in four different ways. These were:
coverage of the entire route between home and office by the metro combined with access to it within 3 km of the office/home;
partial coverage of route between home and office by the metro combined with access to it within 3 km of the office/home;
those who had metro connectivity, but it was too far (beyond 3 km) from their office and home; and
those who had no metro connectivity near their office and home.
The extent of metro connectivity is a major determinant of the frequency of metro usage by working women. For instance, where the metro covered the entire distance between office and home, as many as 81.1% of women used it regularly. Where the metro covered only part of the distance, 76% of women preferred to use it regularly and 12% used it occasionally. Although regular dependence declined to 3.7%, when the nearest metro station was at a distance of over 3 km, occasional usage was as high as 77.8% (Table ).
For instance, Ms A, is a 26 year old automation engineer who works at the Nehru Place office of an IT company for the past 3 years. She is single and lives with her parents and two younger school going siblings. Though she can afford to use a personal vehicle, she prefers to use the metro for commuting to-and-from office. Only under exceptional situations do her parents allow her to return home by the official cab, if accompanied by office colleagues known to her.
Table 4
S. NoCoverageFrequency of metro useRegularlyOccasionallyNever1Metro covers entire route (within 3 km)81.110.88.12Metro covers partial route (within 3 km)76.012.012.03Metro is too far (beyond 3 km)3.777.818.54No metro connectivity032.367.7Total47.628.324.1
In addition to the commuting time and extent of connectivity, there are some other factors that determine the usage pattern of Delhi metro by working women. We examine them in the following paragraphs.
Age of Women as a Factor in Metro Usage
There was a negative association between the age and frequency of metro usage. The metro is a popular means of transport among young educated women of Delhi-NCR region. Nearly 60% of the women in the age cohort of 20–35 years depend on it regularly (Fig. ). With an increase in age (36–50 years), the frequency of metro usage shifts from regular to occasional. However, women professionals who are above the age of 50, prefer using their personal vehicles (47.6%) rather than depending on the metro (Table ).
Table 5
Age-cohortsE-rickshawAuto-rickshawHired cabMetroOffice busOffice cabPersonal vehiclePublic busWalk20–35 years1.910.22.858.30.94.615.73.71.936–50 years8.314.30.025.00.00.028.80.023.6More than 50 years0.019.19.59.50.00.047.64.89.5Total2.111.03.547.60.73.520.73.57.6
The age-driven differences in metro usage pattern arise because the older adults face a transport disadvantage or have difficulties in travelling as per their requirement (Abe et al. 2020). Age-specific health issues and related physical barriers, restrict them in accessing public transport (Hine 2012). Studies in London, Canada and several other countries indicate that with increase in age, women have a strong preference for using a car rather than public transport, especially if a car is available and they can afford to use it (Schmöcker et al. 2008; Turcotte 2012). This is because they find it more comfortable to use their personal vehicle rather than public transport (Rosenbloom 2001; Schwanen et al. 2001; Mifsud and Attard 2013). The use of a car provides older women the flexibility and autonomy to fulfil their professional requirements together with household responsibilities (Nobis and Lenz 2005). This seems to be applicable in India too. For instance,
Ms M is a 53 year old Assistant Professor of Delhi University. She said that using a car for her daily commute to-and-from office helps her in completing other tasks, like purchasing essential items, on her way back home. She is also able to pick up her children from tuitions or from a friend’s place, etc. Its use for commuting provides her the flexibility and personal space to move and stop at different places, depending upon her requirements.
The Delhi metro has made several provisions for the convenience of elderly and differently abled people in the form of availability of wheelchairs and reservation of seats for them in metro coaches. Nevertheless, they face difficulties due to overcrowding and pushing by fellow passengers during peak office hours. This makes it hard for them to make their way to the desired metro coach after walking long distances up and down the escalators (or lifts). Dependence on other modes of travel like e-rickshaw, auto-rickshaw, etc., for reaching the metro station adds to the problems of elderly women, particularly those suffering from ill health. A similar concern was shared by some women in our primary survey.
Ms C is a 55 year old married woman residing in Najafgarh who teaches at a University in Dwarka. She suffers from health problems resulting in leg pain. This restricts her ability to use an e-rickshaw for commuting to-and-from the metro station. As a result, she was forced to shift her place of residence to Dwarka so that she could retain her job. She is now able to drive to her workplace.
Domestic Work Burden
We enquired about the average time spent by working women on fulfilling domestic chores like cleaning the house, washing utensils, laundry, and cooking food, care for children and elderly. During weekdays, 45.5% of women spent up to 2 hours per day on such work, 32.4% spent 3–4 hours a day, and 20% spent more than 4 hours a day. However, during the weekends, 40% of them said that they devote more than 5 hours or more per day for completing all the household work (Table ).
Table 6
No. of hoursWeekdaysWeekends02.11.41–245.528.53–432.429.95 or more20.040.3Total100.0100.0
Differences in the gendered division of work and time conflict faced by working women are more pronounced in larger families than smaller families (Craig and Mullan 2010). However, in the Indian context the composition of the family also matters as will be seen from some of the cases discussed later in the paper. Given the disproportionate double burden of domestic work and paid work, availability of Delhi metro as a fast and dependable means of public transport helps women in managing their time and physical resources efficiently. We found that with an increase in the average family size to 5 or more members, the likelihood of using the metro service regularly also tends to rise from 40.6 to 54% (Table ).
Table 7
Number of family membersRegularlyOccasionallyNeverLess than equal to 440.629.030.45 or more54.027.618.4Total47.628.324.1
Moreover, married women, particularly those with pre-school children, prefer shorter work trips (Pazy et al. 1996). They are more likely to opt for easily accessible and faster means of transport due to constraints on the amount of time available for travelling (Iwata and Tamada 2008; Lee and McDonald 2003). In our study, more than 70% of the mothers said that they prefer to travel by metro because it enables them to rush back home to their children in the shortest possible time (Fig. ).
For instance, Ms S, a middle-rank employee in a semi-government organization at ITO says that she leaves her office at 5:45 pm and has to pick-up her two-and-a-half-year-old daughter from a day-care centre near her home in Pitampura, before 7 pm. The Mandi House metro station is near her office and enables her to avoid traffic jams and reach home in the shortest possible time.
Job Characteristics (Or Income Earned)
Travel expense as a proportion of monthly income is another key variable influencing the choice of mode of commuting by working women (Ola Mobility Institute 2019). We utilize job characteristics and position of women in the vertical hierarchy to assess the linkage of this dimension with the metro usage pattern of women in Delhi-NCR region. A relatively higher percentage of women in temporary jobs (55.2%) rather those in permanent jobs (42.5%) are regular metro users. Occasional dependence on metro is also higher among those in temporary jobs (Table ).
Table 8
Job characteristicsFrequency of metro useRegularlyOccasionallyNeverPermanent42.526.431.0Temporary55.231.013.8Total47.628.324.1
Similarly, rise in the hierarchical position of women tends to reduce the likelihood of their using the metro service. Table shows that 57.6% of the women at entry level are regular metro users, and the proportion reduces to 50% for women at the middle level and 24.2% for those at the senior level.
Table 9
Job designationFrequency of metro useRegularlyOccasionallyNeverJunior57.630.312.1Middle50.023.926.1Senior24.230.345.5Total47.628.324.1
The above findings are similar to those of other studies which indicate that women with low-income levels and students cannot afford to use their personal vehicle on a daily basis, and prefer to commute by public transport or cover the possible distance on foot (Gautam et al. 2019). However, with increase in income level, dependence on personal vehicle tends to increase (Sánchez and González 2016).
The Metro Changed the Commuting Preference of Women
The Delhi metro has changed the perception of women towards public transport in the city. Earlier, Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) buses were the primary means of public commute. Since buses were overcrowded, erratic and required long waiting times, they were used only by those who could not afford any alternative transport. Although the Delhi Government has recently made travelling in public buses free of charge for female commuters, women consider the Metro to be a more comfortable and safer commuting option.
For instance, Ms R, a senior nurse at AIIMS hospital, lives in the Geeta colony with her husband, adult daughter, and 85 year old mother-in-law. She said, “I always used public transport for covering a distance of around 45 kilometres between home and workplace. Earlier, the public bus was my primary means of commuting. The availability of the metro service has reduced my dependence on buses. Whereas there are many incidents of eve-teasing in buses, the safety measures in the metro prevent occurrences such incidents to a large extent. I am easily able to manage my emergency shifts at the hospital by using the metro.”
Women who are not working outside the home identified commuting related problems as one of the critical barriers faced by them. As many as 42% of the 252 respondents in this category said that if a job is available, they are willing to travel to the workplace now that they can use the Delhi metro network.
Young women consider the metro to be the most favoured means of commuting to their educational institution, and for job search. Some of them said, “now websites of companies and their vacancies are accompanied by a map displaying the nearest metro station(s) and corresponding route for reaching the exact location.” These young commuters constitute the largest section of women utilizing metro service for their career growth and progress.
Metro connectivity has been particularly beneficial for women traveling long distances between their home and workplace. It helps them avoid the fatigue and delays from traffic jams on Delhi roads during peak office hours.
Ms P lives in Uttam Nagar. She works as a senior communications manager in a semi-government Institute in Patparganj. Her family has 10 members that include her husband, daughter, parents-in-law, husband’s grandmother, as well as her brother-in-law and his wife, and their two children. She said, "Metro is my lifeline. I live in a big joint family, and it would have been impossible for me to work outside the home in the absence of metro connectivity. Despite long commuting hours extending to 120 minutes (one-way), I feel that it is the safest, most reliable, and comfortable means of rapid transit. It helps me to manage the time constraint and physical stress of travel. I feel very relaxed while I ride back home from a long day of hard work at the office". She said, “Metro is dependable because I can calculate the exact amount of time that I will take to reach office in the morning and reach home in the evening. There might be some 10 to 15 minutes of variation in the traveling time, which is much less than the time wasted in unpredictable traffic and jams on the roads of Delhi”.
Women from diverse professions and family compulsions depend on the Delhi metro. This means of mass transit has enhanced the feasibility of their working outside the home instead of being restricted to the domestic sphere. In this regard, we cite the situations of three respondents, for whom the metro facilitated their spatial mobility and enabled them to gain economic independence despite the unsupportive attitude of the family members.
Ms G is a middle-aged woman currently employed as an administrative head in a private company. She was able to change jobs and work at new locations due to the availability of the metro. She lives in Mayur Vihar with her husband, two sons and mother-in-law. Her first job was as an administrative assistant at a company in Chirag Delhi in the year 2000. She lived in Andrews Ganj and the ease of commuting while using public buses was the reason for her choice of job location. After marriage her residence shifted to Mayur Vihar. Since the metro services had started she joined a semi-government research institute at ITO. She said that "It was because of the metro connectivity on my office route that my husband and mother-in-law permitted me to continue work post-marriage.” Her current job at Chanakyapuri is also linked with the metro network. She appreciates the Delhi metro as a safe means of public transport for working women. It helps her to manage her domestic responsibilities as she is able to save time by avoiding the unpredictable traffic on the roads of Delhi.
Ms H, a 35 year old school teacher, lives in Preet Vihar with her husband, two children and parents-in-law. She teaches in a school in Shahdara. Her school hours are from 7:30 am to 3 pm. She never uses the school bus because it takes a long round-about route. Additionally, the early morning schedule does not permit her to complete her household chores. Metro is her primary support system for commuting to-and-from the school. Earlier, she was dependent on the metro network's blue and red line and felt it was very uncomfortable due to overcrowding. The start of the pink line in 2018 eased her commuting issues. She is very content with the expanding connectivity network and its utility for working women.
Ms K is a 29 year old marketing executive working in the social media department of a consulting company. She is living in a family of 5 members in Kirti Nagar. Her husband has a business of rental cars, and her brother-in-law has a tours and travels company. She has to take care of her young 3 year old daughter and elderly mother-in-law and is unable to hire domestic help. She joined her current job in 2016. Her family is not keen on her working outside the home. They would prefer it if Komal uses her marketing skills for the family business. She transferred her office location from the head office at Gurugram to a smaller branch in Connaught Place in order to address their concerns. She is entirely dependent on the Delhi metro for commuting to-and-from the workplace. She said that “it is the metro connectivity to the office which helped me convince my family that I should continue working. I can reach back home on time and manage my multiple responsibilities.”
We found that metro has become a preferred means of transport not only for the office-going women who have to travel regularly but also for those women who are staying at home or working from home. A group of homemakers from Badli in North-West Delhi narrated their experience by saying, “together we make shopping trips to Chandni Chowk using the metro service. The coach reserved for women provides us with personal space to discuss everyday issues.” They said, “travelling together in the metro is like a picnic, and they all enjoy spending time together, shop together, and eat together. Earlier, they used to travel alone or had to hire multiple auto-rickshaws…”.
Moreover, access to metro is now an essential part of the commuting pattern of the people in Delhi. In our personal interviews, women from Karol Bagh said "all our travel plans with friends and relatives begin with whether metro connectivity is available on our route or how far is the nearest metro station from the destination."
Thus, irrespective of the purpose of commuting, the metro has emerged as a reliable and dependable means of public transport. Access to and availability of the service is linked with a feeling of mental peace for women and their family members. In our study, 97.8% of our respondents agreed that traveling by metro makes them and their families feel less anxious about their safety while commuting. We quote a mother saying, “mujhe apne bete ke liye zyada chinta nahi hai kyuki metro toh ha hi uske travel route par”. (I am not worried much for my daughter because of the availability of metro connectivity on her travel route)”.
Delhi Metro, Challenges faced by Women and Covid-19
The Covid-19 pandemic has affected the operation and ridership of urban public transport globally (Gkiotsalitis and Cats 2020) due to advisories regarding travel to crowded places (WHO 2020). Use of public transport was also discouraged and limited to situations of absolute necessity. In India, the Delhi metro resumed its services in September 2020, after a halt for a total duration of 169 days. Strict guidelines were issued, and fines were imposed for violation of social distancing and face mask-wearing protocols.
The metro has undoubtedly been the preferred means of public transport for women in Delhi, but there are some challenges that need to be addressed. We use our complete primary sample of 462 women (and not just the sub sample of women who retained their jobs after the onset of Covid-19), in order to understand the problems that women face while using the metro. Overcrowding, safety and affordability are the major issues raised by metro riders though lack of user friendliness has been mentioned as well (Table ).
Table 10
S. NoProblemsPer cent1Overcrowding69.92aSafety problems of last-mile connectivity47.42bSafety issues while commuting17.53Affordability45.74System is not user friendly0.45No issues0.6
These challenges have also negatively influenced the willingness of women to use Delhi metro during the Covid-19 pandemic. In one of the findings from our survey, post-lockdown, 33% of the respondents said that the Delhi metro is not a preferred means of transport for them until the pandemic is over. Another 45.2% were doubtful about using it for commuting regularly. However, 22% of the respondents were optimistic and were willing to resume their metro ridership.
Overcrowding
Overcrowding of metro stations and coaches, as well as in buses, shared rickshaws and other means of transport, especially during peak hours, are usually experienced. The major intersection stations like Kashmere Gate, Rajiv Chowk, Anand Vihar, etc., face heavy footfall, due to which there are large and unmanageable crowds. Women find it challenging to use the metro during rush hours due to the crowds at the station and in the metro.
For instance, it is because of the difficulties arising due to overcrowding that Ms N, a 27 year old married woman quit her job during the 6th month of her pregnancy. She lives in Dichaon Kalan, Najafgarh. Her husband works in a private company. She has a 9 month old son. Before her son was born, she worked in an NGO at Rohini. Metro was her preferred means of travel from Najafgarh to Rohini. It helped her cover the long stretch of more than 25 kilometres in approximately one-and-a-half hour. However, due to overcrowding of metro stations she agreed to her family’s decision and quit her job in 2019.
Overcrowding raises apprehensions about the possibility of traveling safely during the Covid pandemic. Globally, transport operators are authorized to minimize contagion risk both on-board and during passenger waiting time by strict adherence to social distancing norms (UITP 2020). However, physical distancing challenges the very concept of mass public transit and is difficult to comply with during peak times and at nodal exchange points on a metro network (Tirachini and Cats 2020). The precautionary measure of keeping a distance of 1 to 2 m may be effective in open spaces. However, its utility in containing infection in closed spaces, particularly in longer journeys with prolonged exposure time, is still doubtful (Nishiura et al. 2020). The risk of catching infection increases with the level of passenger occupancy within the coach and the stations (Tirachini and Cats 2020). The perceived threat results from the airborne nature of Covid-19 virus transmission (Shen et al. 2020). Air conditioning, together with lack of proper ventilation in confined spaces, acts as a facilitator in the spread of infection (Lu et al. 2020; Sun and Zhai 2020).
Crowds also make it difficult to avoid physical contact with the surfaces like doors, windows, seats, elevators, handrails, etc., which can transfer germs in public vehicles (Jiang et al. 2020). The feasibility and effectiveness of measures like frequent spraying of disinfectant and installing hand sanitizers (Moreno et al. 2021) is doubtful. It also raises the question of the long-term sustainability of such measures because it imposes additional workforce and logistics costs on the transport authorities (Musselwhite et al. 2020).
Strict enforcement of face mask-wearing by passengers may help contain the risks. Still, this measure's effectiveness is subject to face mask material, which is linked with its filtration capacity (Konda et al. 2020). People also lack awareness about the proper way of handing and fitting face masks such that it completely covers the nose and the mouth (Prather et al. 2020).
All such fears seem to have stigmatized public transport's utility and shifted women's dependence to a personal or hired vehicle. The extent to which people's commuting patterns diverted away from public transport in response to the pandemic is also dependent on their economic access to alternative means of commute (Pawar et al. 2020). Several respondents in our survey depicted this preference shift due to Covid-19 pandemic.
Ms R, the healthcare worker at AIIMS hospital is not in the favour of using the bus or metro because it will enhance her risk of catching an infection. In the present situation, her husband has taken the responsibility of driving her to-and-from the workplace.
Ms G, our respondent who was able to change her job mainly due to metro connectivity, also stopped using it. Her current job at Chanakyapuri is contractual, and she is under constant fear of losing it due to pandemic. She hires an auto-rickshaw for commuting to-and-from the office. She worries about taking the infection back home.
Similarly, Ms P, our respondent who said that the metro is her lifeline, abandoned using it during Covid-19. Her office has shifted from Patparganj to Okhla. Despite metro connectivity in the new location, she said, "my family has not allowed me to use the metro”. The overcrowding issue of the metro makes it impossible to follow the physical distancing guidelines. “Since my husband's office is also in Okhla, I accompany him in our own car. But if my husband does not need to go to his office, I have no option but to spend money on a hired cab for fulfilling my professional commitments."
On the other hand, our respondent Ms V is forced to use the metro due to lack of alternative options. She is a 26 year old unmarried girl living in Rajapuri, Dwarka and her family is facing financial problems during Covid-19. Since her salary is low, she uses the metro for commuting to-and-from the workplace daily. She said that when the metro started re-functioning post lockdown, the guidelines pertaining to physical distancing, mask-wearing, and sanitization were followed. However, over time people seem tired of following the rules. Social distancing isn't followed by the crowd during office hours. They continue to push each other in order to catch the metro. She is always travelling under the psychological stress of catching an infection and taking it back home. From the work domain, she is also under continuous fear of losing her job and again becoming unemployed.
Affordability
Women have to manage their monthly expenditure on commuting to and from the workplace within the overall budget for household expenditure. Thus, the cost of transport becomes a vital factor in their choice of means of commuting.
The affordability of metro service is another key challenge faced by women in Delhi. This is particularly true for the women employed at the lower end of the hierarchy and in the daily wage earner category. The increase in travelling cost due to the rise in Delhi metro fares remains an overriding concern for them. In 2002, the minimum tariff for metro users was Rs. 6, while the maximum fare was Rs. 22. In 2009, the minimum tariff was raised to Rs. 8, and the maximum fare to Rs. 30. Further, in 2017, the minimum fare increased to Rs. 10 and the maximum fare to Rs. 50 (Delhi Metro Website 2021b). In addition to metro fares, women have to spend money on e-rickshaw, auto-rickshaw, cycle-rickshaw, buses, cabs, etc., for covering the distance between the metro station and workplace or home. This further increases the total commuting expenses.
The problem of affordability has constrained several women from utilizing the services of the Delhi metro. Such unequal access to public transport reinforces the persisting socioeconomic inequalities in our society (Gutiérrez et al. 2020). The pandemic has brought into sharp focus this widely discussed dimension of the Delhi metro. The relatively better educated and skilled women with secure jobs have the option of work-from-home. Women in occupations that cannot be performed remotely are unwilling to use the metro due to the fear of infection. They prefer using personal vehicles or hired cab/auto for commuting to and from the workplace.
On the other extreme, the lesser educated women, employed in unskilled jobs have none of the above options. In fact, the lockdown and economic contraction have increased the risk of job loss more severely for them (Adams-Prassl et al. 2020). With low wages and high metro fares, they cannot utilize Delhi metro's services. Deprived of access to affordable public transport facility, they are often forced to walk to their workplace and are termed as “no choice walker” (Mahadevia 2017).
In this regard, we cite the experiences of our respondents employed as daily wage earners. Working women residing in the Trilokpuri area of East Delhi mentioned affordability as the prime concern hampering their use of the Delhi metro for daily commute to and from the workplace. Women in this area belong to low-income families and constitute migrant workers from the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The average education level of women is secondary school. Most of them live in a joint family set up with an average family size of 6 members. The average monthly family income is in the range of Rs. 15,000–Rs. 20,000. Most women are employed in the private sector manufacturing units in Noida (sectors 7 to 15). They are paid on the basis of 12 h of work per day. On weekends, they try to earn extra income by working on an overtime basis. The nearest metro station from their place of residence in Mayur Vihar Phase-1 is at a distance of 1.5 kms.
Ms E is a 39 year old woman, educated up to secondary level. She has a family of 6 members. She is employed as an assembly helper and earns a monthly income of Rs 10,000 only. The distance between the metro station and her workplace is 2 kilometres. She cannot afford to use the metro for commuting to her office because this would incur a monthly expense of Rs 2,400. Besides the daily metro fare of Rs.40, she has to bear additional travelling costs of Rs. 40 linked with the expenses on shared e-rickshaw (home to metro station) and shared auto-rickshaw (metro station to the office). She prefers to use the DTC (Delhi Transport Corporation) bus, which allows her a free ride. With the onset of Covid-19, followed by a complete lockdown of the Indian economy, the manufacturing firms in Noida were closed, and she did not receive any salary. Subsequently, with the relaxation in the lockdown restrictions, the manufacturing units re-started functioning in a limited manner (shut down after 6 pm and closed during weekends). Despite, the risks of catching the infection, she immediately re-joined their workplace. Covid-19 increased her commuting problems. Besides monetary constraints and the fear of catching infection at the workplace, she also faced the issue of travelling to the workplace. The unavoidable social distancing norm prevented her from using a shared auto-rickshaw, which carries 4 to 5 riders in a single trip. She also stopped using DTC bus for the same reason. Hence, in order to save her commuting expenses and risk of infection, she preferred to cover the entire stretch of 5 to 6 kilometres between her residence and workplace by walking. She said that "I have no option but to walk to-and-from the workplace. In order to reach the manufacturing unit on time, I start at 7 am. In the evening, I reach home by 7:30 pm. I also suffer from the additional stress of walking alone on the deserted roads during dawn and dusk as the lockdown restrictions have only partially been lifted and factories shut early".
Safety
Delhi metro has several provisions for ensuring the safety and security of women passengers. One coach in every train is reserved for female commuters. Men who try to travel in this coach are subject to penalty or punishment. In addition, seats are earmarked in other cars for women. There is CCTV surveillance in train coaches, at the stations and on the platforms. Women CISF staff are deployed at the stations for frisking of female passengers. Security arrangements at the metro stations are escalated after sunset.
Despite all possible measures, the safety of women continues to be a cause of concern. Women prefer to take up jobs where the working hours are limited from 9 am to 5 pm. Any late stay at the office is possible only occasionally. Jobs that require women to stay late in the office on a frequent basis are not acceptable to family members.
We asked if travelling by Delhi metro was preferred if they were delayed at the office. We found 83.8% of the respondents preferred the metro for late evening travel, but the remaining 16.2% stated their apprehensions. Among the respondents who did not prefer using the metro, 70.7% said they would like a family member to pick her up from her office and bring her home, while 46.7% were in the favour of availability of an office cab, and 28% preferred using a hired cab or auto-rickshaw (Table ).
Table 11
Is metro the preferred means of transportPer centYes83.8No16.2Total100.0Other preferred means of transportOffice cab46.7The family picks up from the office70.7Private cab or auto28.0
Nevertheless, a common observation is that women traveling back home from work should not travel alone, whether by metro or otherwise. They should be accompanied by a relative(s) or friends or office colleagues. Otherwise, it is preferable for them to stay overnight near the office, at the residence of a relative or friend.
The safety dimension of Delhi metro is linked with issues faced by women both within the metro stations and outside the metro stations that are described below.
Safety Within the Metro Station
Traveling in a coach reserved for women gives them a sense of safety by providing them personal space, within which they do not have to worry about men staring at them or pushing them. However, despite penalty, punishment and vigilance, there are instances of men trying to travel in the car reserved for women. This is more common during late evening hours if security staff are absent.
During peak hours, several women reported incidents of pick-pocketing and eve-teasing. At times, due to overcrowding, women are forced to travel in the general coaches, i.e. coaches other than the one reserved for ladies. There are instances of abuse and harassment in those coaches. Moreover, the crowd of men around makes it difficult to pinpoint the culprit (Sharma 2020, India TV Newsdesk 2014).
Safety Outside the Metro Station
The thin presence of fellow women passengers within and outside the metro stations has enhanced the vulnerability of the few who continue to use the metro. They often have to wait alone on poorly lit deserted streets risking their safety, but with no plausible options (United Nations 2020).
Outside the metro stations, women's safety is jeopardized due to the problem of last-mile connectivity or end-to-end connectivity. This as a major issue is cited by 47.4% of our respondents. It relates to the availability of safe means of transport for covering the distance between workplace and metro station as well as between metro station and place of residence.
Ms G, our respondent who travels daily from Mayur Vihar to Chanakyapuri, said that "my only complaint relates to the end-to-end connectivity of the metro. From the metro station, I need to board a public bus to reach the office. At times due to delay, I find it very difficult to run after the bus in order to catch it. My work hours are 9:30 to 5:30 for five days a week. Any delay in leaving office, particularly during winter, arouses fear about reaching the metro station from my workplace in Central Delhi."
The common apprehensions of metro riding women arise from the lack of proper lighting in the parking lots of metro stations, and dark lonely stretches on roads connecting the stations. Several instances of snatching and eve teasing have been reported, particularly after rush hours. Some respondents expressed such fears about safety outside metro stations. One section of respondents belonged to Najafgarh, and other to Burari.
Najafgarh is located in South West Delhi. Till 2019, Dwarka and Nagli metro stations were the two nearest stations at a distance of 6 kilometers and 7 kilometers, respectively. Since 2020, Dilli Gate metro station also started functioning. The problem faced by female commuters relates to their safety on the entire stretch between their residence and the metro station. The area becomes deserted during the evening as the road passes through agricultural lands of villagers residing in this place. Street lights are missing at several vacant spots. Moreover, due to some wine shops, men get drunk and can be found roaming around. Since agriculture and rental income are the main source of livelihood, most of the time, they are found sitting idle, passing comments, or chasing women commuting to-and-from the area. They even stop the women riding a scooty or e-rickshaw. Given these problems, women are not allowed to travel alone by their families after 5 pm.
Ms B is a 28 year old single woman living alone with her widowed mother in a rented house in Burari. After completing her post-graduation, she is pursuing her Ph.D. She supports the family through private tuitions and school projects, which she can complete from home, along with her studies. Their average monthly income, including her mother’s widow pension, is Rs 12,000. Despite good qualifications, safety concern have restricted her job search to places where she can commute by DTC bus or auto-rickshaw. The nearest metro station is GTB Nagar, which is 4 kilometers away. Though it is a crowded place with easily available shared-autorickshaw and RTV buses for commuting to-and-from the metro station, women avoid late evening travel as there is a wine shop on the route.
Based on the findings of research on safe cities conducted in partnership with the Government of Delhi and others, Jagori (2010a, b) identified the lack of effective and visible police or civil guards, men taking alcohol or drugs, crowded public transport, bus stops and stations, poor lighting, poor signage and poor maintenance of open public spaces as reasons for making Delhi unsafe.
Conclusion
The Covid-19 pandemic has affected the lives, livelihoods and working situations across the globe. It led to advisories regarding cutting down on all travel unless absolutely essential. The pandemic has altered the commuting preferences of working women due to fear of infection while using public transport and difficulty in maintaining physical distancing. Travel has also declined due to the increased use of online work platforms.
However, with the exception of this unprecedented time of anxiety created by Covid-19, the metro has undoubtedly become the preferred means of public transport for women in Delhi and has led to a massive improvement in the availability of public transportation in Delhi. Nevertheless, there are several challenges that women face while using the metro such as overcrowding, safety both while commuting in the metro and in metro stations as well as outside them due to problems in last-mile connectivity from the metro station to the destination, affordability and user friendliness.
It is important that policy measures are implemented to address these challenges. For instance, overcrowding can be reduced by increasing the frequency of trains and the number of coaches in each train, especially during peak hours. The Delhi metro has just announced a decision to increase the number of coaches in its trains. However, if this can be combined with flexible timing in offices, that may help to reduce the crowds at the metro stations and in metros during office rush hours. CCTV footage in metro stations and in coaches must be monitored on a real time basis and immediate remedial action taken to address safety concerns. Announcements regarding action taken could act as a deterrent and make women feel safer while using the metro. Functional street lights, clear footpaths for walking, frequent plying of female operated e-rickshaws and taxis in the evening hours together with better police patrolling will address concerns regarding last-mile connectivity. In the context of safety, efforts have also been made by the Delhi Government to form women safety teams.
Affordability is a major issue as metro fares are unaffordable for a large proportion of the working population that struggles for survival in the city. The Delhi Government had announced that metro rides, DTC bus rides and feeder buses will be made free for women in Delhi as the metro fare hikes “hit women the worst forcing them to shift to more unsafe modes of transport like private buses, ride sharing, or even walking. This move will help them return to the Metro's safety …and help women reclaim public spaces" (Sengar 2019). However, while free travel for women has been implemented for DTC bus rides, it has yet to be implemented for metro rides. Light rail systems lead to “less congestion, less travel time and less pollution” (Fageda 2021). Apart from reduction in congestion and pollution, travel by the metro is comfortable and reduces the wastage of time and energy in waiting for the uncertain arrival of buses and traffic jams on the road. It is therefore important for metro travel to be affordable and for fares to be kept low in order to provide access to women from lower income classes too.
Lack of user friendliness and difficulties in access for those with health issues or age-related difficulties have been identified areas that needs attention. Support for using escalators, finding the correct platform, interchanging from one line to another and automated walkways where distances between platforms are large, would be enabling for those with access issues.
Footnotes
1In recognition of the fact that many women who are at home are not only engaged in unpaid work domestic work but are also engaged in various economic activities, the nomenclature used for the first category is “those who have never worked outside the home” or do not travel for work.
2These are women who were travelling to work but have left their job and are currently not working outside the household.
3These are women who are working outside the household and were travelling to and from the workplace at the time of the onset of Covid-19.
We gratefully acknowledge the Indian Council of Social Science Research and their IMPRESS project team for sponsoring this research; Professor Alakh N. Sharma and his team at IHD for inputs and support; an anonymous reviewer for very useful comments; our team of investigators and interns, Jaswant Rao Gautam, Anisha Yadav, Shweta Sharma, Swayam Singh, Tanvi Rao, Amarjeet Singh Lamba and Adarsh Mishra and most importantly, all the respondents for their valuable inputs.
Publisher's Note
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Contributor Information
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7121 | dbpedia | 1 | 39 | https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/delhi-news/peeragarhi-metro-station-on-delhi-s-green-line-to-become-important-interchange-station-with-magenta-line-extension-boosting-connectivity-and-easing-commuting-for-residents-set-to-open-in-september-2025-101680459347166.html | en | Peeragarhi set to emerge as key Metro interchange station in West Delhi | [
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] | 2023-04-02T23:45:46+05:30 | The existing station has an average daily footfall of only 9,500 passengers, but will rise to 50,000 after the station is connected to the Magenta Line. | Latest News Delhi | en | Hindustan Times | https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/delhi-news/peeragarhi-metro-station-on-delhi-s-green-line-to-become-important-interchange-station-with-magenta-line-extension-boosting-connectivity-and-easing-commuting-for-residents-set-to-open-in-september-2025-101680459347166.html | The Peeragarhi Metro station on the Green Line is set to emerge as an important interchange station in west Delhi, becoming the point of intersection with the proposed extension of the Magenta Line, officials aware of the project said on Sunday, adding that the new station is set to be ready by September 2025.
West Delhi is all set to get a new interchange facility at Peeragarhi, which will make commuting easier for residents of this part of the national capital, said Anuj Dayal, principal executive director, corporate communications at DMRC, adding that the Green and Magenta Lines will be connected via a 140-metre foot overbridge.
Read here: IMD predicts rain in Delhi till April 4, spike in mercury to follow
The existing Peeragarhi station has an average daily footfall of only 9,500 passengers, but Metro officials estimate that this figure will rise to 50,000 after the station is connected to the Magenta Line.
This new interchange station will also give residents of northwest Delhi areas like Peeragarhi, Mundka, and Paschim Vihar direct access to Terminal 1 of the Indira Gandhi International airport (via the IGI Airport station on the Magenta Line), Dayal said.
He added that the extension of the Magenta Line will also help residents of Bahadurgarh in Haryana get enhanced Metro connectivity — three stations of the Green Line, namely Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh, Bahadurgarh City and Pandit Shree Ram Sharma, are located in the satellite city.
Arun Shokeen, 58, a Peeragarhi resident, said, The Magenta Line reaching Peergarhi will not only aid development further, but boost the industries and commercial units that operate from the area. For people who also want to travel to Dwarka or the airport, one would earlier have to go all the way to Kirti Nagar to change, but an interchange at Peeragarhi will cut travel time by at least 30 minutes.
Diwan Singh, a resident of Mundka, said, A lot of development has happened along the Green Line, but at the same time, we are also seeing more people moving to this area to work or to live, which has increased traffic congestion on the roads. A solution is needed, he said.
At present, the 38-km Magenta Line runs from Botanical Garden station in Noida to Janakpuri West station in west Delhi. as part of the Delhi Metro phase 4 expansion, this line will be extended further from Janakpuri West station towards Bhalswa, before turning back and forming a loop, ending at Ramakrishna Ashram Marg station (currently a single-line station on the Blue Line).
Read here: Restore Sanjay lake by June 30, says Delhi LG
Under this plan, the Magenta Line will be extended by around 29km, with 23 new Metro stations. This extension will intersect with existing lines at seven points — Peeragarhi (Green Line), Pitampura (Red Line), Haiderpur Badli Mor (Yellow Line), Majlis Park (Pink Line), Azadpur (Yellow Line), Pulbangash (Red Line) and Ramakrishna Ashram Marg (Blue Line). The entire 29km stretch is expected to be completed in 2025. | |||||
7121 | dbpedia | 0 | 34 | http://www.capitalgreensdelhi.com/blog/best-places-to-live-in-delhi-with-family/ | en | Best Places To Live In Delhi With Family | http://www.capitalgreensdelhi.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Best-Place-in-Delhi-with-Family.webp | http://www.capitalgreensdelhi.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Best-Place-in-Delhi-with-Family.webp | [
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] | 2023-10-13T12:49:01+00:00 | Choose the best places to live in Delhi with Family. Read this blog and choose the best one. Get the best deals now. | en | http://www.capitalgreensdelhi.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/favicon.ico | DLF Capital Greens Delhi | http://www.capitalgreensdelhi.com/blog/best-places-to-live-in-delhi-with-family/ | DELHI: STEPPING INTO THE WORLD OF LUXURY
Investment in the real estate market is the most secure kind of investment. Most importantly, “DELHI” serves as a promising destination for all property investors.
Delhi’s residential market is booming exceptionally to a great extent. Tremendous advancements in the commercial, infrastructural, and industrial sectors play a massive role in adding beauty to the housing sector.
Every investor dreams of owning a house in the most legendary best place to live in Delhi, i.e. Delhi. This city is a one-stop place for all those who want to sense the true essence of luxury and richness.
There are several posh localities in Delhi that are best suited to live a luxe lifestyle. But there are few areas in Delhi that stand out in the best way possible.
As we move forward, I will state some magnificent facts about the best location in Delhi where you can think of investing to get maximum benefits.
CONNAUGHT PLACE
This locality is the souvenir of Britishers and a legendary area for investors seeking an elite place to reside in. This area offers a neutralized way of living to each resident as here, you will be surrounded by 5-star hotels, cafes, clubs, lounges, multi-cuisine restaurants, and central park, diversified shopping complexes, etc.
Residents are offered a variety of choices in abundance which ensures a high-end luxury lifestyle. Moreover, Connaught Place is centrally located and has excellent connectivity to several other localities of Delhi.
MOTI NAGAR
One such iconic location in Delhi that has built spectacular credibility amongst home buyers and investors is Kirti Nagar.
This area is located at the heart of Delhi, i.e. Central-West Delhi. Being in close vicinity to Central Delhi is what makes it the top favorite area of Delhi.
Additionally, all renowned multi-national organizations, IT companies, and corporate spaces are built right outside your residential accommodations. This ensures all working professionals a convenient commute from their homes to workplaces.
Top builders have acquired this exquisite location to launch their luxury residential as well as commercial projects. Well-reputed real estate developers such as DLF, The Anant Raj Corporation, Raheja Developers, etc. have launched exceptional residential and mix use development.
Moti Nagar is enclosed with incredible tourist destinations that will sweep you off your feet. Additionally, this area shares proximity with several prominent localities and shopping destinations of Delhi. For example, Janpath, Palika Bazaar, Rajouri Garden Main Market, and Kirti Nagar Market. This location is the perfect stop for all shopaholics out there!!!
Also, Moti Nagar is one of the rare places in Delhi that has incredible connectivity via the metro as residents living in this location can access the following metro stations:
Moti Nagar Metro Station
Kirti Nagar Metro Station
Punjabi Bagh Metro Station
Satguru Ram Singh Marg Metro Station
If you are a resident of Moti Nagar, then you can access different areas of South Delhi within 20-25 minutes.
Moving towards the end, I will state the best project coming in this exquisite location that will sweep you off your feet.
ROHINI
Rohini is one of the most popular areas, located in the North-West region of Delhi. There are numerous sectors that prevail in Rohini.
This area is a blend of comfort and high-end amenities as here, you will find high-end retail stores, schools, colleges, grocery & departmental stores, shopping malls, local eating joints, etc. right outside your residential units.
Moreover, you will also easily connect to the metro stations, i.e. Rohini East and Rohini West within 5 minutes from your location.
The entire area of Rohini provides you with a homey vibe and is extremely vibrant. The streets of Rohini are always decorated with rainbow colors and fairy lights, giving it a heavenly look.
Moreover, the district park of Rohini is built within walking distance for the comfort of residents. Outside of this, you can buy fruits, vegetables, pottery items, fresh juice, and many other healthy items.
Another great benefit offered by the residential communities in Rohini is that all festivities are celebrated with utmost excitement and in a grand manner.
SAKET
Saket is a well-reputed city that is a prominent part of South Delhi. If you want to reside in an exclusive area that is a blend of affordable and luxury lifestyle, then Saket is the perfect place to choose.
Hot spots of Delhi such as Select City Mall, DLF Avenue Saket, MGF Metropolitan Mall, Svelte Hotel & Personal Suites, College Of Vocational Studies, Shaheed Bhagat Singh College, etc. are right outside residential units.
Saket is a high-spirited area as all the above-mentioned malls hold exclusive events for every visitor to enjoy at maximum level. These are some of the very famous tourist attractions where individuals belonging to every age group have fun.
Moreover, you will find numerous eating joints within walking distance from your place. Other than this, you will find clubs, cafes, fine-dining restaurants, pubs, and many more fine-dining restaurants within proximity of your home.
GREATER KAILASH
Greater Kailash is a high-end locality in South Delhi where you get to live a luxurious lifestyle. This area is an iconic retail destination as some of the most famous and lavish street shopping districts lie in Greater Kailash.
Greater Kailash shares amazing proximity with Lajpat Nagar and Sarojini Nagar Main Market which are known for the best stylish clothing, accessories, footwear, jewelry, home decoration items, showpieces, utensils, and many other unique items at the most negotiable prices.
Popular landmarks such as Indira Gandhi International Airport, Connaught Place, Aerocity, Mahipalpur, Gurgaon, Nizamuddin Railway Station, Saket, Malviya Nagar, Khan Market, Jawahar Lal Nehru Stadium, Kalkaji, Nehru Place, etc. share proximity with Greater Kailash.
One of the most famous Durga Pooja is held every year at CR Park which is a prominent location of Greater Kailash. In this area, people get to enjoy the authentic style of Durga Pooja along with enjoying various types of street food around the corner.
Moreover, the entire area of Greater Kailash offers a positive and high-end vibe as the streets are decorated with vibrancy and liveliness. Roads are well-equipped with luxurious branded showrooms of Clothes, Watches, Footwear, Electronics, Cars, Furniture, Home Decor Materials, etc.
Additionally, there are lots of high-end restaurants and famous eating joints are built here where you can enjoy delightful delicacies with your loved ones.
KAROL BAGH
Karol Bagh is a significant area that is centrally located in Delhi. This exclusive locality is a mixture of residential units as well as commercial spaces.
Karol Bagh is an extremely sophisticated area that is popular for a diversified range of things. For instance, Karol Bagh is home to the below-mentioned places:
– Janki Devi Memorial College, Delhi University
– Guru Nanak Khalsa College, Delhi University
– Kalinidi College, Delhi University
– Gaffar Market
– Karol Bagh Main Market
– BLK Hospital
Gaffar Market and Karol Bagh Main Market are the two prominent hubs to do marvelous street shopping for yourself as well as your loved ones.
Here, you can acquire the best clothing material, ready-made apparel, decoration stuff, footwear, accessories, electronic items, good quality phone covers, perfumes, cosmetics, and many other splendid items.
If you possess good negotiable skills, then residing in Karol Bagh is a blessing in disguise for all of you. Additionally, residential accommodations in Karol Bagh are constructed in a well-strategized manner.
Moreover, Karol Bagh metro station is built in proximity to the residential accommodations to ensure a fret-free lifestyle for all residents.
KAMLA NAGAR
This is one of the most exclusive areas of Delhi which lies in its Northern part. Kamla Nagar is a thriving destination of Delhi whether it is residing, shopping, education, lifestyle destinations, and infrastructural development.
North campus, a well-reputed area that is a prominent part of Delhi University is known for numerous attractions for college students and shopaholics.
Tremendous colleges under Delhi University are strategically placed near each other. For example, Kirori Mal College, Hansraj College, Hindu College, St. Stephens College, Sri Ram College Of Commerce, Ramjas College, etc. are some of the most famous colleges that are desired by students from all over India.
Additionally, Kamla Nagar Market is one such exclusive market that is one of the most popular tourist attractions and residents of Delhi. Kamla Nagar is one of the best areas to own a house. Moreover, Kamla Nagar is a hub for PG and hostels.
Kamla Nagar shares amazing proximity with Vijay Nagar and Huson Lane. Vijay Nagar is extremely famous for coaching institutes for government exams. For instance, Drishti IAS, ADDA 24*7, Vajiram & Ravi, Shri Ram IAS, Samudra IAS, etc.
On the other hand, Hudson Lane comprises spectacular cafes, lounges, and restaurants, such as Big Yellow Door, Mama’s Boui, Cafeteria & Co, Ricos, Smbookas Cafe, Moh Maya Cafe & Bar, etc. All these thriving places are strategically placed adjacent to each other.
VASANT KUNJ
Vasant Kunj is an exceptional location, a significant area of South Delhi, and shares proximity with Gurgaon.
Interestingly, it shares seamless connectivity to popular landmarks such as Qutub Minar, Mehrauli, Saket, Malviya Nagar, Indira Gandhi International Airport, Aerocity, Chattarpur, Golf Course Road, DLF Cyber Hub, etc.
The neighborhood of Vasant Kunj is beyond beautiful as it comprises green surroundings and the lively spirit of the rich city. Vasant Kunj has affluent surroundings as it is enclosed with numerous high-end shopping malls and other top destinations for tourists.
For instance, DLF Promenade, Ambience Mall, and DLF Emporio. These malls fall under the super-luxury category. Moreover, Vasant Kunj shares proximity with 5-star hotels such as Jaypee Vasant Continental, The Leela, The Grand, Eros Hotel, etc.
Having such luxe properties right next to your accommodations ensures that you enjoy a high sense of royalty and makes you a proud owner.
PUNJABI BAGH
If there is one location that is widely popular for its strategic location in West Delhi, undoubtedly it is Punjabi Bagh. This elite location is one of the top of every investor’s checklist.
Accommodations built-in Punjabi Bagh are exceptionally royal and offer all prospective investors and buyers an authentic meaning of opulence.
Punjabi Bagh Club Road is one of the most popular areas that is under this exclusive locality. Here, you can access high-end clubs, lounges, cafes, fine-dining restaurants, spas & salons, retail stores, local eateries, etc.
Punjabi Bagh is home to all sumptuous amenities that ensure residents live the life of their dreams. To make the lifestyle of residents an embodiment of ease and comfort, excellent metro connectivity is available for all residents of this area.
For instance, metro stations such as Punjabi Bagh West, Punjabi Bagh, Shivaji Park Metro Station, Ashok Park Main, and Moti Nagar are located in close vicinity to Punjabi Bagh.
Moreover, all other infrastructural facilities are available right outside the residential community of Punjabi Bagh. For example schools, colleges, employment hubs, hospitals, pharmacies, etc.
If you want to travel to Rajouri Garden, Mayapuri, Paschim Vihar, Pitampura, Kirti Nagar, Moti Bagh, and Netaji Subhash Place, it will take merely 15-20 minutes of your traveling time.
Moreover, you can travel to several prominent locations of South Delhi via Dhaula Kuan, such as Chanakyapuri, IIT Delhi, R.K. Puram, Saket, Malviya Nagar, etc.
To sum up, Punjabi Bagh is one of the most exquisite places where you can own an ideal home where you can pamper yourself and your family.
HAUZ KHAS
There are numerous exclusive factors that one will get out of residing in this godlike area. Hauz Khas is the true epitome of richness and grandeur.
Aspects that lure residential accommodations towards this area can be quoted as “innumerable” as each factor is beyond marvelous.
Plenty of legendary landmarks are situated in Hauz Khas such as Hauz Khasi Village aka HKV, Shahupur Jat, and IIT Delhi. Here is a list of all exclusive attractions found in Hauz Khas Village and Shahpur Jat:
– High-end designer showrooms
– Spectacular Cafes
– Clubs
– Lounges
– Multi-Cuisine Restaurants
– Restobars
Moroever, inside HKV another popular tourist attraction is the spectacular ancient buildings surrounded by reservoirs. Hauz Khas is one such magnificent area that is widely popular amongst foreigners as well as people coming from different cities as well.
Hauz Khas is enclosed with popular landmarks such as Green Park, Safdurjang Enclave, Gulmohar Park, Asiad Village, Champa Galli, and many such well-renowned places.
Moreover, places such as Saket, Greater Kailash, Khan Market, Jawahar Lal Nehru Stadium, and Kalkaji are also located near Hauz Khas.
Moreover, Hauz Khas shares proximity with luxurious 5-star hotels such as ITC Maurya, Hyatt, Ashoka Hotel, The Leela Palace, and Taj Vivanta. Other than this, Embassies of different countries are smoothly accessible from Hauz Khas within 10 minutes.
LUXURIOUS PROJECT IN DELHI
As I promised in the above section, I will give a piece of beneficial information about a thriving project that has been launched in Moti Nagar. This exquisite residential development is yet another successful launch by DLF.
This realty major has named this exclusive project “DLF Capital Greens”. Standing true to its name, DLF Capital Greens is enveloped by a 100-acre lengthy stretch of lush green landscapes.
DLF Capital Greens is offering all potential investors as well as home buyers an amazing opportunity to be a part of this exceptional project and enjoy the true meaning of luxury and comfort.
Here, residents can choose amidst a wide range of 2, 3, and 4 BHK lavish apartments. Each unit is curated with utmost elegance and sophistication. Residents are offered perfect accommodations that vary between a range of 1200 sq. ft. – 3105 sq. ft. which will provide a great opportunity for growth in a vibrant environment.
DLF Capital Greens is further segregated into three phases and comprises 23 sky-high towers. Here, residents are showered with an amazing opportunity of cherishing picturesque views from their respective units.
Residents of DLF Capital Greens enjoy the utmost sense of tranquility and peace while being associated with the vigorousness of the most legendary location in Delhi. As a result, at DLF Capital Greens, you are being offered the best of both worlds.
Additionally, DLF Capital Greens is located in the midst of luxury surroundings. The entire neighborhood of DLF Capital Greens is well-equipped with all infrastructural facilities.
To sum up, DLF Capital Greens is a blessing in disguise for all the potential home buyers who are looking forward to upgrade their way of living.
CONCLUSION
This article contains a substantial amount of significant information regarding the layout of some of the high-end and best places in Delhi where you can reside for a high-end lifestyle.
Every investor plans on offering the best lifestyle to themselves as well as their loved ones. In order to help you in making a well-informed decision, I have stated all prominent aspects of specialties of every area.
In this manner, you can choose what suits you best. As we all know location for investment is a huge decision to be made. Hence, it is important to consider every factor before one jumps into this exquisite journey of investment.
Interestingly, Delhi is the dream location of every investor and home buyer who wants to live the finest type of lifestyle. Additionally, the areas mentioned in this article are a blend of utmost ease and luxury.
I have also mentioned one of the best residential developments, built in the heart of Delhi, i.e. Moti Nagar. This is a lavish project that comprises exclusive high-rise towers and gives you picturesque views of the iconic landmarks of Delhi.
For example, places such as Rashtrapati Bhawan and India Gate are accessible from your residential accommodations. This gives all the residents of DLF Capital Greens an additional sense of luxury and sumptuousness.
Thus, you should definitely read this article thoroughly as it will help you immensely in order to make a final decision. | ||
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Now book and track home sample collections online for your convenience. | ||||
7121 | dbpedia | 0 | 62 | https://traveltriangle.com/blog/romantic-places-in-delhi/ | en | 32 Romantic Places In Delhi And Its Vicinity Ideal For Couples | [
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"Tanishk Juneja"
] | 2021-03-22T05:25:47+00:00 | Want to escape the city with your love? These 32 Romantic places in Delhi and within its vicinity will serve as the ideal romantic getaway. | en | https://traveltriangle.com/blog/romantic-places-in-delhi/ | If you’re in love and you live in Delhi, you’re one lucky bloke! Believe it or not, the city is a haven for lovers. There is a myriad of romantic places in Delhi for every love-bitten soul out there. There are several markets, cafes, monuments, and even parks in Delhi for couples to explore. These romantic places are often seen full of lovebirds, especially in winters.
Whether you are a history lover, peace seeker, or a party goer, Delhi is home to everything that makes your date memorable! From shopping streets to food markets, the capital city gives to enormous chances of impressing your special one. If you wish to plan a perfect date in Delhi, then here are the most romantic places in Delhi for the love birds!
Best Romantic Places In Delhi
Here are top places to visit in Delhi with your significant other to have an amazing time on your date. The list is an assortment of parks, attractions, high-end restaurants, and forts in Delhi.
1. Garden Of Five Senses, Saidul Ajaib
Image Source
Located in the Saidul Ajaib locality near Saket, Garden of Five Senses is the best couple park in Delhi. It’s an immaculately designed landscape with numerous theme areas, including a section on the lines of Mughal Gardens, bamboo courts, pools with water lilies, herb gardens and solar energy park. There are also some of the best restaurants of Delhi in the garden where you can share a romantic meal with your dear one including Fio and Magique. Now isn’t it the best place for couples in Delhi?
Location: Freedom Fighter Colony, Near, Saket, New Delhi
Things to do: Attend festivals, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy food at cafeteria
Distance from city centre: 30 km
How to reach: The nearest metro station to Garden of Five Senses is Saket and is located on a yellow line.
Must Read: 55 Hill Stations Near Delhi
Long Weekend Trips Starting @ Rs 3499/-
2. Lodhi Garden, Khan Market
Image Source
One of the most beautiful places in Delhi, a stroll along the archaic ruins of Lodhi garden can actually be one of the most idyllic picnic spots in Delhi for couples. Situated near Khan Market in Lodhi Road of South Delhi Lodhi garden is one of the most amazing places to visit in Delhi for couples. Spend a relaxing afternoon with your sweetheart here enjoying the well-kept flowers beds and the scenery all around. One of the best places to visit in Delhi for couples, the park also has some famous food joints nearby that you can try out including the Lodhi gardens restaurant.
Location: Lodhi Estate, New Delhi
Things to do: Attend festivals, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy food at cafeteria, visit bonsai garden
Distance from city centre: 15 km
How to reach: The nearest metro station to Lodhi Garden is Jor Bagh. It only takes a 5-10 minute walk from metro. You could also take a rickshaw or auto.
3. Buddha Garden, Dhaula Kuan
Image Source
Buddha Garden in Dhaula Kuan is one of the famous couple places in Delhi. It could be a little unsafe because it’s in a secluded area and there have been reports of notorious incidents happening here but that doesn’t seem to stop the love-bitten Bravehearts to find themselves a cozy little spot at the park. One of the most peaceful places in Delhi, it must be the beautifully manicured lawns, streams, sloping terrain of the park that attracts them in such a big number. You can always come later here for a photo-session as it’s one of the best spots for pre-wedding shoot in Delhi NCR
Location: Dhaula Kuan, New Delhi
Things to do: Plan a picnic with friends, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy food at cafeteria
Distance from city centre: 9 km
How to reach: Dhaula Kuan is the nearest metro station that is located on the Delhi Airport Express Line.
Suggested Read: 39 Best Resorts Near Delhi
4. Deer Park, Hauz Khas Village
Image Source
It’s a shame if you haven’t yet gone for a date at Deer Park till now! It can actually be considered one of the most romantic places in Delhi. Covering a vast area, the park has a charming lake (or tank) in its premises not to mention the well-trimmed lawns and flower beds making it one of the beautiful places in Delhi. On any given day you can spot peacocks, Deers, rabbits, and guinea pigs here. You’ll almost forget you’re still in a congested and polluted city like Delhi while spending your hours here!
Location: Hauz Khas Village, New Delhi
Things to do: Click pictures, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy sunrise
Distance from city centre: 26 km
How to reach: The nearest metro station is Hauz Khas or Saket. You could take an auto from the metro station that will cost you 50 bucks.
5. Parthasarathy Rocks, JNU
Image Source
Another extraordinarily romantic place in Delhi, Parthasarathy Rock which is an open-air auditorium in JNU Campus where you can witness the city’s most gorgeous sunset while enjoying the silence of the surrounding. Surrounded by a number of rocky hills and crevices, the gem of the green is the Parthasarathy Rocks which is lovingly called PSR by the campus students. This hidden gem is a perfect place to hide away from the noise and chaos of the city, and certainly one of the most romantic places to visit in Delhi.
Location: Lodhi Estate, New Delhi
Things to do: Enjoy sunset, go for an evening walk
Distance from city centre: 30 km
How to reach: The nearest metro station is RK Puram Take an auto from this pointto get to the JNU campus where the rocks are located.
Suggested Read: This Heritage Park In Delhi
6. Delhi Haat, INA
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You might find it hard to believe but Dilli Haat is in fact one of the best places for couples in Delhi. With many handicraft shops and restaurants offering cuisines from all over the country you can have a hearty time here with your lover. Take a stroll along the stretch between the Bengal and the Naga Pavilion early evenings and see youngsters getting high on planet love. You could take your partner here on the Valentine’s Day in Delhi.
Location: INA, New Delhi
Things to do: Attend festivals and exhibitions, indulge in shopping, enjoy the variety of food from different stalls
Distance from city centre: 24 km
How to reach: INA Metro Station is the nearest metro station. Take an auto from the metro station to Delhi Haat.
7. India Gate Complex
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I know, the image in your head about India Gate might be pretty bad but try picturing it without the nasty crowd; amazing isn’t it? That is probably the best thing about India Gate, it is accessible 24X7 and is the safest place in the country at all times and also one of the most romantic places in Delhi. Try going there late at night, and I mean really late when the area turns into one of the best places in Delhi for couples. You can share a chuski or an ice cream with your partner and have an unforgettable experience. In case you didn’t know, you could go on a night walking tours in Delhi for a unique date night.
Location: New Delhi
Things to do: Pay homage, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy food from local stalls
Distance from city centre: 10 km
How to reach: Central Secretariat is the nearest metro station to India Gate.
Suggested Read: 30 Reasons I Would Rather Be In Delhi
8. Ridge Road, North Campus
Image Source
A walk or drive on a deserted road is certainly romantic but where would you find that in Delhi you ask? Well, just head to North Campus and find some of the most romantic places in Delhi for couples. The Ridge Road extremely peaceful and a beautiful spot for lovers. It is one of the best places for couples in Delhi. There are also several monuments like the Mutiny Memorial and the Baoli near Pir Ghraib, which you can be explored.
Location: North Campus, New Delhi
Things to do: Go for a drive
Distance from city centre: 3.7 km
How to reach: Vishwavidalya is the nearest metro station to the North Campus. Though it is a 6-minute walk, you can also take an auto to get to the Ridge Road.
9. Qutab Minar Complex
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The beautiful Qutab Minar complex is one of the coolest places to visit in Delhi with girlfriend. Located in Mehrauli area of South Delhi the place is laden with numerous historical monuments. The most striking among them is the Qutab Minar itself. Spend an evening here with your beloved and you’d realise what a beautiful city you live in! The monument of Qutab Minar has been classified as one of the UNESCO World Heritage Sites. It stands tall at a height of 73 meters. Undoubtedly the best place for couples in Delhi, the monument has its first three storeys made using red sandstone while the last two are made with marble as well as sandstone.
Location: New Delhi
Things to do: Attend festivals and exhibitions, go for an afternoon stroll, enjoy food at cafeteria
Distance from city centre: 28 km
How to reach: Qutub Minar is the nearest metro station and is located on Yellow line of Delhi Metro. Take an auto from the station to get to the complex.
Suggested Read: 25 Most Happening New Year Parties In Gurgaon
10. Connaught Place
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Connaught Place is known for the stunning white buildings that reflect the colonial influence. Even though Connaught Place is a busy locale but it can also be one of the best hang out places in Delhi for couples. Shopping, eating out, sitting on the Central Park, and of course ambling through the streets are some amazing things to do here with your date. The best time to visit Connaught Place is during the New Year or Christmas eve when the whole area is lit up and there’s a celebratory vibe all around.
Location: New Delhi
Things to do: Catch the true vibe of Delhi, visit clubs and cafes, enjoy nightlife, indulge in shopping
Distance from city center: 8 km
How to reach: Rajeev Chowk is the nearest metro station to Connaught Place.
11. Mehrauli Archaeological Park
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Just a two-minute walk away from Qutub Minar, Mehrauli Archeological Park is known for having over hundred historical structures. Rajon Ki Baoli and Lal Kot Fort are among the most beloved remnants. The park covers 200 acres of area in Mehrauli. A walk through the pavements of this park unearths various mysteries, depicting the place’s historical significance. A stroll through its green gardens is one of the most romantic things to do in Delhi for couples. After all, it is the best couple park in Delhi with no kids around.
Location: Anuvrat Marg, Mehrauli, New Delhi
Things to do: Go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy food at cafeteria
Distance from city centre: 29 km
How to reach: Chhatarpur and Qutub Minar are both located nearby Mehrauli. You could drop down at either stations and take an auto or cab to the archaeological park.
Suggested Read: 39 Exciting Road Trips From Delhi
12. Indian Mountaineering Foundation, Moti Bagh
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If you’re the kind of couple that never says no to trying adventures, Indian Mountaineering Foundation is for people like you. Whether you are beginners or experts in rock climbing, this place will give you just what you’re looking for. Other adventurous activities can also be tried at the Burma Bridge, rope ladder, and tyre swing available at this site.
Location: Moti Bagh, New Delhi
Things to do: Click pictures together, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll
Distance from city centre: 15 km
How to reach: Moti Bagh metro station is the nearest station to IMF
13. World Of Wonder, Noida
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One of the best amusement parks in NCR and most romantic places in Noida, World of Wonder offers everything from crazy rides to waterpark fun. This is amongst the top couple places in Delhi to spend the day with that special someone. With options like Go Karting, paintball, and air hockey and more activities inside the park, this can be an adventurous as well as romantic places in Delhi NCR for couples. This place is ideal for those looking for a perfect weekend getaway.
Location: Noida
Things to do: Go Karting, paintball, and air hockey , enjoy a variety of food
Distance from city centre: 20 km
How to reach: Noida Sector 18 and Botanical Gardens are the two nearest metro stations to the Worlds of Wonder.
Suggested Read: 22 Adventurous Places In Delhi NCR
14. Sevilla, The Claridges
Image Credit: The Claridges, New Delhi for Facebook
The Sevilla is an extremely romantic place for couples in Delhi. This chic and alfresco restaurant has some Spanish elements in its decor and theme. The menu features gastronomical delights from Moroccan and Southern European cuisine. The romantic setting is perfect for a date for lovelorn couples. This can be counted as one of those romantic and cozy places to visit in Delhi for couples at night.
Location: Dr APJ Abdul kalam Rd, New Delhi
Things to do: Go for a romantic dinner and enjoy scrumptious delicacies
Distance from city centre: 15 km
How to reach: Race Course is the nearest metro station to the Aurangzeb Road. You could also take a cab to get to The Claridges.
15. The Garden Restaurant, Lodi Gardens
Image Credit: The Claridges, New Delhi for Facebook
The Garden Restaurant in Lodi – a lovely dining area amidst a manicured garden, surely one of the best romantic places in Delhi to celebrate birthday with just your beloved. Come here to enjoy the breathtakingly beautiful settings and a flavorsome gourmet fare which is prepared using local organic produce. The freshly prepared dishes here add to the perfect date and make this one of the peaceful places in Delhi to take your better half along.
Location: Lodi Garden, New Delhi
Things to do: Enjoy delicious food as they have really interesting menu, click pictures together
Distance from city centre: 11 km
How to reach: Jor Bagh is the nearest metro station to the Lodi Gardens.
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16. Thai High, Mehrauli
Image Credit: The Claridges, New Delhi for Facebook
Romantic rooftop restaurant, in an isolated location, Thai High serves the best of Thai Cuisine with authentic taste and is hands down, one of the most romantic date places in Delhi. Sneak out to this place with your love and enjoy your time feasting while the city lights and fairy lights make the ambience even more enchanting. This place is perfect for those who have a thing for flawlessly prepared dishes and can even be one of the romantic places for lunch in Delhi.
Location: Mehrauli, New Delhi
Things to do: Enjoy delicious Thai recipes cooked with authentic flavours
Distance from city centre: 29 km
How to reach: Chhatarpur and Qutub Minar are both located nearby Mehrauli. You could drop down at either stations and take an auto or cab to the archaeological park.
17. Delhi Eye, Kalindi Kunj
Image Credit: KuwarOnline for Wikipedia
Could there be a better date, than hopping on a giant ferry and glaring at the city’s glimmering skyline? If you’re excited about this one, the Delhi Eye is inspired by the famous London Eye and is among the perfect tourist places in Delhi for couples. You get inside the air-conditioned capsules and enjoy the breathtaking view of the city from up above. With London Eye and what all, it is the best couple park in Delhi.
Note: For the time being, the Delhi Eye is closed for renovation, and will open shortly.
Location: Kalindi Kunj, New Delhi
Things to do: Capture the bird’s eye view of the surrounding area
Distance from city centre: 23 km
How to reach: Kalindi Kunj has its own metro station by the same name.
Suggested Read: 39 Super Fun Places In Delhi
18. Adventure Island, Rohini
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Yet another spot to bring alive the child in both of you, Adventure Island is one of the fun as well as romantic places to visit in Delhi with girlfriend. The theme park is located in one of the biggest malls of Delhi, Metro Walk. Alongside shopping and rides, many events are organized frequently, such as belly dancing, ring dance, magic show, and fire acts.
Location: Rohini, New Delhi
Things to do: Take rides, do shopping together, indulge in entertaining activities hosted at the venue, enjoy food at cafeteria.
Distance from city centre: 20 km
How to reach: Rithala is the nearest metro station to the Adventure Island. It is the last station on Red Line of Delhi Metro.
19. Ice Lounge, Saket
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Listed among the best hang out places to visit in Delhi for couples in summer, Ice Lounge is actually a cool place to beat the heat with your date. The lounge has subzero temperature and almost everything here, even the sculptures, are made of ice. You’re given heavy jacket to keep yourself warm. This is among the most adventurous things to do in Delhi for couples.
Location: Saket, New Delhi
Things to do: Enjoy delicious food
Distance from city centre: 28 km
How to reach: Saket is the nearest metro station to the Ice Lounge. Take an auto or rickshaw from the station to get here.
Suggested Read: 46 Weekend Getaways From Delhi Under 5K
20. Le Cirque, Chanakyapuri
Image Credit: Le Cirque New Delhi for Facebook
Le Cirque is an opulent dining space for a special date if you are looking for romantic places in Delhi for Valentine’s. This is where you get to taste the bona fide taste of Italian and French cuisine, amidst an elegant setting. Take your date to Le Cirque and savor delicacies like Sage Pappardelle, handmade Tortellini, Fettuccini al Tartufo and more.
Location: Chanakyapuri, New Delhi
Things to do: Enjoy fine dining experience
Distance from city centre: 12 km
How to reach: Race Course is the nearest metro station to Chanakyapuri. You could take an auto to get to Chanakyapuri that will cost you 50 bucks.
21. Humayun’s Tomb
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An epitome of precision of Mughal architecture, Humayun’s Tomb is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, and now also one of the top couple places in Delhi. The site dates back to the sixteenth century and is well-maintained. Early morning is an ideal time to visit this place with your date as it’s more quiet and less crowded during this time of the day.
Location: New Delhi
Things to do: Attend festivals, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy food at cafeteria
Distance from city centre: 14 km
How to reach: Jor Bagh and JLN Stadium are the nearest metro stations to Humayun’s Tomb.
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22. Nehru Planetarium
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While the other couples only talk about stars and moon, you both can actually spend time looking at them up and close. Nehru Planetarium never ceases to amaze with the magic of Science and thus it is in our list of best places to go on a date in Delhi. If both of you want to have a unique experience in the metropolitan city of Delhi, then this place should not be missed.
Location: Teen Murti Marg, New Delhi
Things to do: Get amazed by the magic of Science
Distance from city centre: 10 km
How to reach: Lok Kalyan Marg and Udyog Bhawan Metro Station are the nearest to planetarium. Take an auto from the metro station to the planetarium.
23. Rose Cafe
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Looking for most romantic dinner places in Delhi? Head to the cozy cafe with Victorian Era decor which also serves delectable food and vintage wine. Rose Cafe is located in Saket and here you can enjoy a quiet candlelight dinner. This dainty cafe can be counted amongst the romantic places in South Delhi, as the ambiance is beautifully vibrant. The staff here is quite humble and welcomes you with utmost warmth.
Location: Saiyad Ul Ajaib Extension, Saket, New Delhi
Things to do: Plan a candlelight dinner with your significant other!
Distance from city centre: 28 km
How to reach: Saket is the nearest metro station to the Rose Cafe.
Suggested Read: Delhi In March
24. Purana Quila Or Old Fort
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Elevate your routine romance to mythic majesty at Purana Quila. The lovely green lawns with the backdrop of an ancient imposing structure of red sandstone prove to be one of the best places to visit in Delhi for couples. Enjoy leisurely walks, boating at the lake or a visit to the nearby zoo is an excellent idea.
Location: Old Fort Road, New Delhi
Things to do: Attend festivals, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy food at cafeteria
Distance from city centre: 13 km
How to reach: Pragati Maidan on Blue Line is the nearest metro station to Purana Quila.
Romantic Places Near Delhi: Gurgaon
You are lucky that Gurgaon is in the vicinity of Delhi if you ever get bored of the attractions in Delhi. You can drive to these fun and romantic getaways near Delhi anytime for your date night.
25. Smaaash, Gurgaon
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Located in the beloved Cyber Hub of Gurgaon, Smaaash is the ultimate fun destination. This isn’t just a virtual gaming zone, as you both can also indulge in activities like bowling, cricket, or even hit the dance floor. Visiting this place with your loved one is surely one of the most fun things to do in Delhi. Since the nightlife in Gurgaon is a must to experience, it is best if you visit this place during the late evening. If you are looking for one of those romantic places near Delhi within 200 kms, then this is it!
Location: Gurgaon
Things to do: Enjoy virtual games and other activities
Distance from city centre: 28 km
How to reach: You could take connecting Rapid Metro from Sikandarpur Metro Station and then get down at IndusInd Cyber Hub station. You could alternatively take a cab to the Cyber Hub. Parking lot is available.
Suggested Read: 22 Super Awesome Places To Visit Near Delhi In Monsoon
26. Kingdom Of Dreams, Gurgaon
Image Credit: Ekabhishek for Wikipedia
A Bollywood-themed leisure destination, Kingdom of Dreams is a colorful extravaganza if you are looking for places to visit near Delhi for couples. This is where you get to experience inspiring art, cultural performances, lip-smacking food, and more! The setup is grand and the attention to detail steals the heart away. This place is full of entertainment and the perfect destination for couples desiring to undergo exclusive experiences. This might as well be one of the romantic places in Delhi NCR.
Location: Gurgaon
Things to do: Enjoy a variety of food, click photographs, enjoy entertainment shows
Distance from Delhi: 32 km
How to reach: IFFCO Metro Station is the nearest to KOD. You will have to take an auto from the station to get here.The auto ride is 50 bucks.
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Romantic Places Outside Delhi
If you are looking for weekend getaways near Delhi for couples, then you could spend a day at these places near Delhi. Not only it will give you a change of scenery but also a unique experience on your date.
27. Neemrana Fort Palace
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Neemrana Fort Palace has become one of the favorites among young couples and counted among the private places for couples in Delhi. Situated in the Alwar district of Rajasthan 150 km away, the fort can be reached in a 3 hours’ drive from the city. Perched atop a hill, the fort offers amazing views, and you can spend some time enjoying the royal treatment here. If you are looking for romantic places in Delhi to celebrate birthday, then Neemrana fort palace will be perfect for you and your beloved.
Location: Delhi-Jaipur Highway, Neemrana, Alwar, Rajasthan
Things to do: Plan a getaway
Distance from Delhi: 122 km
How to reach: The only way to reach Neemrana Fort is by your own car. It takes about 3 hours from Delhi to get here.
Suggested Read: 9 Refreshing Getaways From Delhi
28. Murthal
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If your idea of an ideal date is to go for a long drive to the outskirts of the city, Murthal is a highly recommended and definitely the best place for couples in Delhi. On the Delhi-Chandigarh Highway, it is a charming place with beautiful monuments making it a romantic getaway near Delhi. Do try out the famous roadside dhabas there and binge into some delectable paranthas!
Location: Sonipat, Haryana
Things to do: Enjoy food
Distance from city centre: 50 km
How to reach: Take a road trip in your car or hire a Zoomcar on rent to take a trip to Murthal. Just a head’s up: there is always heavy jam on this road.
29. Surajkund
Image Credit: Varun Shiv Kapur for Wikipedia
Another one of the romantic places near Delhi for couples, Surajkund is a lovely place in Faridabad that offers peaceful and beautiful environment for couples. There’s a charming lake which is actually an ancient water tank. Moreover, there a few amazing resorts at the vicinity where you can enjoy quality time with your loved one and make your visit to this city in Haryana more memorable.
Location: Faridabad, Haryana
Things to do: Attend festivals, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll, enjoy food
Distance from city centre: 31 km
How to reach: Badarpur Border is the nearest metro station located on the violet line. You could also take special buses running on the route during the festival time.
Suggested Read: 6 Walking Tours In Delhi
30. Damdama Lake
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Damdama Lake is the most romantic place in Delhi, situated 50 km away and takes a mere 2 hours’ drive from Delhi to reach. It is a charming lake, spreading over 3000 acres that was originally built by the British as a reservoir. There are numerous lovely resorts surrounding the serene environment of the lake where couples can stay overnight.
Location: Sohna district, Haryana
Things to do: Attend festivals, go for a morning walk or an evening stroll
Distance from city centre: 57 km
How to reach: The best way to reach here is by taking your own car. There are no buses on this line.
31. Tilyar Lake
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Located in Rohtak, Haryana, Tilyar Lake is one of the most romantic places near Delhi and a lovely spot where you can go for a picnic with your special one. You can spend the entire day here enjoying the natural beauty of the place. Also, the lake offers boating and there’s a theme park and a zoo that you can visit. You can also choose to spend you weekend here as well.
Location: Tilyar Trail, Rohtak, Haryana
Things to do: Go for a morning walk or an evening stroll
Distance from city centre: 73 km
How to reach: Take a bus to Rohtak from ISBT, Delhi and get down at Tilyar Lake on Rohtak-Delhi Bypass Road.
Suggested Read: An Absolute Post-Covid Travel Guide To Delhi
32. Heritage Village Resort & Spa, Manesar
Image Credit: Heritage Village Resort and Spa, Manesar for Facebook
Every once in a while, it’s a great idea to escape the city’s hustle and bustle, for a grand staycation. Treating your date an escape to an exclusive retreat is a heart-warming gesture. Heritage Village Resort & Spa is a brilliant choice for a one-day trip near Delhi for couples, as it’s in the NCR region, Manesar. It is recommended as one of the best places to celebrate anniversary in Delhi to make your day more special.
Location: Manesar, Haryana
Things to do: Plan a romantic stay
Distance from city centre: 50 km
How to reach: Take a cab or your own car to get to the resort in Manesar.
Further Read: 8 Wonderful Places To Visit In Delhi In June
Know a better place than the ones listed? Share with us in the comments below! All set to explore the most romantic places? Plan your trip to Delhi with TravelTriangle and leave right away! These romantic spots will surely make your day.
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Frequently Asked Questions About Romantic Places In Delhi
Which are the most romantic places in Delhi that are best to visit during summers?
You can plan a visit to the popular gardens such as Lodhi Garden, Buddha Garden, Garden of Five Senses, etc. You can search for romantic places in Delhi for lunch as it is home to numerous interesting cafes and restaurants featuring serene ambiance. You can add some entertainment by going for a movie at multiplex or indulging in shopping at malls.
If you and your significant other love exploring historical places then you can also visit Red Fort, India Gate, Purana Quila, etc. but make sure that you plan a visit either early morning or after sunsets.
Which romantic places in Delhi are best for young couples?
Some of the well-renowned romantic tourist places in Delhi for couples in Delhi are Garden of Five Senses, Lodhi Garden, Buddha Garden, Deer Park, Delhi Haat, India Gate Complex, Ridge Road, and Qutub Minar Complex.
Which are the most romantic places in Delhi that the couples should not miss?
The most romantic place depends on your personal preferences. If you are looking for a secluded escape amid lush green ambiance then Sanjay Van, Jamali Kamali, Garden of Five Senses, Lodhi Garden, Deer Park are the best places. If you are interested in an interactive day where you can enjoy scrumptious food, along with checking out latest fashion collections then you can visit Rajiv Chowk, Hauz Khas, Mandi House, Shahpur Jat, SDA Market, etc.
Which are the most romantic and soothing places in New Delhi to visit with your fiance?
The Humayun’s Tomb, Lodhi Garden, Old Fort, and the Garden of Five Senses are among the most beautiful and tranquil places in Delhi that you must visit with your fiancé. We suggest visiting these places early in the morning as afternoons and evenings are usually a little crowded.
What are romantic places near Delhi within 100 km?
Sohna, Manesar, Surajkund are some of the other places located just within 100 kms where the couples can spend a memorable time together.
Where can couples spend a night in Delhi?
Couples can spend a night at Heritage Village Resort and Spa in Delhi to escape the hustle-bustle of the city and plan an incredible staycation for their partner. It is a great choice for a one-day trip in Delhi.
Is Lodhi Garden safe?
Lodhi Garden is safe for couples. You can plan a picnic with your other half in the garden or take a romantic stroll in the evening. It is easily accessible by bus and metro, so you don’t have to worry about how to reach there. It is open all days of the week from 6 AM to 7:30 PM.
How do you get to the Garden of Five Senses?
If you’re driving your own vehicle, take National Highway number 48 and drive until you reach Abdul Gaffar Khan Marg/Vasant Kunj Marg. If you’re taking the metro, get off at Saket and take an auto from the station. |