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3581	dbpedia	3	63	https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/tmr/article/view/14824/20942	en	99.08.15, Hambly, ed., Women in the Medieval Islamic World	https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/public/journals/53/favicon_en_US.ico	https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/public/journals/53/favicon_en_US.ico	[ "https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/public/journals/53/pageHeaderLogoImage_en_US.jpg", "https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/public/journals/53/pageHeaderLogoImage_en_US.jpg", "https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/lib/pkp/templates/images/atom.svg", "https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/lib/pkp/templates/im...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/public/journals/53/favicon_en_US.ico		null	The history of women has been attractive to many historians in the last decades. Every year, in several countries, dozens of books are published with a common concern: to reconstruct several aspects of the women's life in the past. However, in spite of all this interest, the historians have been concentrating their studies in western women's history, especially Europeans or from North America. Although we can find works that focus on African, Asian and Latin American women, these are, in the great majority of cases, monographic works, with very specific temporal and spatial foci, produced by local historians, mainly post- graduation students who don't find space for the publication of their texts in their countries. Works of synthesis, therefore, are rare. Thus, the situation is not very different from that of almost ten years ago, when the The History of Women, organized by Georges Duby and Michele Perrot, was published. We read in this introduction, elaborated by the coordinators of the book, that the work was a history of western, white women, but not out of desire for exclusion or judgement of value. And they add: "We dreamed of a history of women in the oriental world and on the African continent, that will fit to the women and the men of those countries to write and that will be completely different from ours, because it presupposes a double look: on themselves and on us." (Lisbon, 1993). The book that I reviewed tries to fill this gap. Women in Medieval the Islamic World: Power, Patronage, Piety is the sixth title of the series The New Middle Ages, edited by Bonnie Wheeler, of Southern Methodist University, that has as its objective to publish studies in medieval history, especially works on women's histories in several cultures, both monographs and collections of essays. The volume under review fits in the latter case. Organized and presented by Gavin R. G. Hambly, history professor of the University of Texas at Dallas, this book draws together twenty-three works, written by researchers of several nationalities, that possess as common goal to present new information and reflections on the women of pre-modern Muslim culture. The title of this work can bring some confusion for a non- specialized reader, since its chapters diverge from the traditional chronological conventions and present works with temporal ranges that go from the end of antiquity to the nineteenth century. In this sense, some texts are about the pre-Islamic period (chapters 1 and 2) and others of the neocolonial period (chapters 21, 22 and 23). On the other hand, although the book intends to be "the first publication devoted to Muslim women in pre-modern terms" (p.xi), it concentrates only on the study of women from the oriental Islamic world. Without doubt, the inclusion of articles on women in Al-Andalus and the Magreb, investigations developed by Maria Jesus Vigueira (mentioned in the final bibliography), Manuela Marin, Maria Luisa Avila, Teresa Garulo, Maria Isabel Fierro and Maria Jesus Rubiera, and others, would further enrich, this edition. The articles gathered in Women in Medieval the Islamic World possess many different themes. For studying the Muslim women, real or fictitious, the authors have used different theoretical lines, methods and diverse primary sources, concentrating mainly on women of the upper classes. The result is very unequal: there are narrative works, which seem to be the fruit of a first approach to the theme; others present original problems and solid analyses of the subject. This inequality among the works can also be explained by the different investigative fields in which the several authors are located. And, as is possible to infer from the brief presentation of each collaborator at the end of the book (p. 561-566), few had already published specific works on Muslim women. After the presentation of the series The New Middle Ages, by Bonnie Wheeler, of the foreword, written by the editor, and of the index of illustrations, are the twenty-three chapters, organized chronologically, preceded by an introduction, also written by Gavin R. G. Hambly. The work contains a final bibliography and the already-mentioned collaborators' presentation. The articles gathered in Women in Medieval the Islamic World don't necessarily present women, as their central object, through studies of gender or social history, but they analyze several aspects of Muslim culture and society where the women were found as one of the key elements. Thus, there are articles that use the approach of the history of literacy, as in chapter 13, which studies the conversion of oral texts to writing in the Ottoman court of Aintab; of cultural history, as in chapter 3, which discusses the feminine representations present in shi'ite devotional literature; or even of the history of daily life, as in chapter 17, in which feminine day- to-day life in Safavid Iran is reconstructed from European travelers' testimonies. The Introduction of the work, entitled "Becoming Visible: Medieval Islamic Women in Historiography and History " (p. 3- 27), of Gavin R. G. Hambly, starts with the fact that works on Islamic History give little information on women and, when they do, they concentrate on themes such as the use of the veil, polygamy, concubinage and the harem. The author concludes, therefore, that these women are not really well-known, since most researchers ignore them, considering them "invisible", reinforcing the stereotypes of Muslim women. The author presents the principal researchers and studies that during the twentieth century have tried to elucidate the Muslim woman's situation. Starting from the pioneer, Nabia Abbott, who began to publish works on this subject in 1941, several aspects of Muslim women's history began to be explored: women and popular religiosity; women and Sufism; female Islamic scholars; women and public life; women and power. The author points out, even so, that many of these themes deserve to be deepened and that several subjects still stay unexplored. He affirms that it is with this objectivity that the work was organized: "this book will modify the stereotypical assumption that in traditional Islamic society women were somehow 'invisible'." (p.19) Chapter 1, "Three queens, two wives, and the goddess: role and images of women in Sasanian Iran", was written by Jenny Rose, an independent scholar who studies childbirth and divorce in the Zoroastrian world. Using iconography, plastic art and Zoroastrian texts, the author tries to reconstruct the several roles and the physical appearance of prominent women in Sasanian Iran. The author begins her text by discussing marriage and its several social implications for women in pre- Islamic Iran. In a second section, she is concerned, fundamentally, with the figurative images of feminine illustrations: the goddess Ardwisur Anahid; the queens Ardashir-Anahid, Shapurdukhtag, Buran, and of unidentified character. Rose concludes that a lot of women received prominence in Sasanian Iran, to the point that they were represented artistically: queens, concubines, goddesses, legendary figures of the Sasanian dynasty and the powerful families' followers of Zoroastrianism. Although in this group of women we can find some who possessed a Christian, Jewish, or pagan past, through marriage or concubinage, and since they accepted and assumed the principles of Zoroastrianism, not only they were accepted socially, but they started to have a prominent role in the Sasanian Empire's development. Chapter 2, "Women in central pre-Islamic Asia: the Khatun of Bukhara" (p.55-69) was written by Richard N. Frye, Emeritus Aga Khan Professor of Iranian Studies at Harvard University and the former President of the Asia Institute of Pahlavi University, Shiraz. Based on archaeological vestiges, especially cult objects and coins, and in general theories on the old societies--such as the presence of the matriarchy, polyandry and the polytheism in some societies, called by the author, as prehistoric--Frye traces some considerations on women's roles in Central Asia during antiquity before starting the study of the queen of Bukhara. For Frye, women's roles in old Iran and in Central Asia did not differ much from the present in other primitive societies, which can be evidenced by the outstanding role of feminine divinities, like Anahita and Ashi, which survived even in this area with the contact with other cultures, such as the Hellenistic. This prestige of feminine illustration would be connected to the nomadic character of these societies. The author adds, however, that there is also evidence that not all women possessed, in this area, honors and privileges and only in exceptional cases a woman got to reach a position of authority, like Khatun of Bukhara, for whom, in spite of countless legends, a historical illustration can be considered. Khatun was queen regent in Bukhara in the seventh century AD, for fifteen years, while her son, Tughshada, was an infant, and had her authority recognized by her people. Chapter 3, "Zaynab Bint'Ali and the place of the women of the households of the first imams in shi'ite devotional literature " (p.69-98) is, in my personal opinion, one of the better elaborated articles of the whole book. It was written by David Pinault, Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Santa Clara University. This article tries to reconstruct shi'ite models of spirituality, through the analysis of medieval and contemporary devotional literature, synthesized in the feminine figures of the Mohammed family and of first Imans--Husayn, son of Fatima al Zahra and grandson of the Prophet, and Qasin, nephew of Husayn--who died in the battle of Karbala. The feminine figures analyzed are: Fatima al Zahra, daughter of Mohammed, symbol of passive tolerance and of eternal mourning; the daughters of Husayn, Sakina Bint Husayn and Fatima Kubra, this last one also bride of Qasin, figures of vulnerability and sorrow; Shahrbanu, daughter of the Sasanian king Yazdigird III, who came to Islam and became the wife of Husayn, and who symbolizes the union between the old Iranian monarchy with the Prophet's house; and Zaynab Kultheim, sister of Husayn, who is seen as the representation of the resistance from defeat. For Pinault, the memories and narratives on the episode of Karbala should be seen as a myth: "... the story that makes sense of shared historical experience, that tells the people who they are, that defines them by insisting on the necessity and inevitability of the suffering they have collectively had to undergo " (p.95). The author, even so, argues that it is not a static myth, but one that can undergo modulations in the passage of time. Chapter 4, " The bold and the beautiful: women and fitna in the 'Sirat Dhat Al-Himma ': the story of Nura " (p. 99-116), was written by Remke Kruk, Professor of Arabic and Islamic Culture at the University of Leiden. In this chapter, taking as a point of departure wider research on women in Arab epic texts, the author states that in popular Arab narratives, which includes the epic texts, women's roles are different from those present in the learned literary texts. In those popular texts, the women are characterized as sagacious, astute and ingenious, while the fellows of the opposite sex just possess the qualities of being handsome and virile. According to Kruk, in the epic literature, "many women, among them female warriors, make their appearance the part of the inner circle of leading heroes " (p 100). The author, to base her hypotheses, chooses to study two feminine characters which are represented in the long epic text Sirat Dhat Al-Himma: Dhat Al-Himma, the heroine that gives her name to the text and acts as a type of horsewoman, and Nura, Byzantine princess who enchants all men. She centers her analysis on two points: in the loss of responsibility and dignity of the male heroes who link with Nura and in her relationship with Dhat Al-Himma. She concludes that these characters synthesize the roles developed by women in society: Nura represents feminine sexuality and social disorder and Dhat Al-Himma, the denial of the sexuality, and the responsiblity for order and social stability. The Chapter 5, entitled "Sayyida Hurrah: the Isma'ili Sulayhid Queen of Yemen" (p.117-130), written by Farhad Daftary, Head of the Department of Academic Researches and Publications at the Institute of Ismaili Studes, presents a biography, just as the title suggests, of the queen of Yemen who lived in the twelfth century, Sayyida Hurrah. According to the author, this woman was an exceptional case because she was the only medieval feminine figure who exercised, simultaneously, political and religious leadership in Sulayhid Yemen: hujja of Yemen was designated also the person officially responsible for the business of the caliph-iman al Muslansir in the west of India. The text is a narrative of many facts that allow us to conclude that Sayyida Hurrah owed great dignities, in first place, to the good relationships maintained with the Fatimids, who not only demonstrated a renewed tolerance in religious matters, but also adopted an unprecedented policy concerning feminine education. We can even deduce, in the second place, that this caliphate paid attention to Yemen because it possessed a great interest in integrating Egypt to India commercially, through the Red Sea. The Chapter 6, "Women's lamentations: the protest in the 'Sahanama'" (p. 131-146), was written by Olga M. Davidson, Assistant Professor in Arabic and Persian Languages and Literatures in the Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies at Brandeis University. This chapter is a comparative study of the fictitious lament of Tahmina--present in the Persian epic text composed by Firdawsi, Shahnama, in the beginning of the eleventh century--and laments observed by ethnographers in several cultures. Taking as a point of departure the presupposition proposed by anthropologists, that emotion is built culturally, the author notes that laments are cultural manifestations that are gender specific. In this sense, she concludes that the feminine laments are "gender- specific protest" (p.132). The feminine protests, therefore, not only refer to the specific and private situations of misery, but they also arise against the destiny generally allotted to all women. Of all the chapters of the book, this is the only one that presents long transcriptions in Arabic, followed by translations in English, radically out of harmony with the others. As probably the great majority of readers of this work don't know Arabic, an interesting resource would be to include such texts in the notes, maintaining in the body of the work only the translation. Such a procedure would have made the reading most agile and pleasant. Chapter 7, "Heroines and others in the heroic acts of the turks" (p. 147-160) was written by Geoffrey Lewis, Emeritus Professor of Turkish in the University of Oxford. According to this author, the epic traditions of the Turks were transmitted vocally for centuries until they were fixed in writing in several texts, especially the book Dede Korkut. This work, probably organized in the end of the twelfth century, gathers together twelve stories of the Heroic Age of Oghuz, preceded by a translation. Lewis tries to demonstrate that these reports maintain traditions that go back to the period in which Turkish Oghuz entered in contact with Islam, since they give evidence of a superficial Islamization and contain countless non-Islamic habits. In the observation of these, the aspect that is most highlighted is the role assumed by women and their way of life. In such a work, the women possess great freedom, they are active and behave more heroically than the men, to the point that the protagonist of the sixth story, the princess Saljan, is, according to Lewis, the representation of ideal Oghuz. In Chapter 8, "Female piety and patronage in the medieval 'Hajj'" (p. 161-179), by Marina Tolmacheva, Professor of Middle Eastern History at Washington State University, the object of study is the feminine pilgrimage to Meca, the hajj. According to the author, the hajj was one moment in which a considerable freedom granted to women. Thus, agreeing with William C. Young, she affirms: "the hajj presented Muslim women with a ritual model which temporarily allowed them to transcend profane models of gender of ordinary life" (p.161). In the article two aspects related to the pilgrimage are studied: the spiritual meaning of the hajj for women and their philanthropic activities. According to the author, these two elements are linked, because feminine piety fed patronage and this transformed piety into philanthropy, which meant that a larger number of people, men and women, could participate in the hajj. Chapter 9, "Sultan Radiyya Bint Iltutmish " (p. 181-197), is by Peter Jackson, Lecturer in History in the University of Keele. In this text the reign of Radiyya bint Iltutmish, who governed for about three years the sultanate of Delhi, during the thirteenth century, is reconstructed with the few existent sources. The article is a narrative of many political and military facts. Even so, as the narrative progresses, the author tries to explain how and why Radiyya arrived at the sultan's position. To Jackson, this was only possible with the support of the official Turkish slaves, who belonged to the first generation of converted to Islam, coming from a society in which the women possessed a more active role. In Chapter 10, entitled "Timurid Woman: the cultural perspective" (p.199-226), Priscilla P. Soucek, Professor of Islamic Art at New York University, reconstructs the biography of three women of the family of Timurlane, a Turk originating from Transoxiana who reconstructed Genghis Khan's Empire in the fourteenth century: Qutlugh Tarkhan Agha, his older sister; Saray Mulk Khanim, his main wife; and Khanzada Begum, his favorite daughter-in-law. Starting from iconographic and written sources and concentrating on these women's biographies, Soucek traces the several roles carried out by the women of the Timurid dynasty, as much in the ambit of private as public life. The author concludes that, concerning personal and private life, this dynasty maintained many practices of the Ghingizid Mongols, which provided feminine participation in the court. In relation to public space, breaking with the past, they started to share several average Islamic traditions in the cities of Central Asia. Chapter 11, "Married rights versus class prerogatives: the divorce marries in Mameluk Cairo" (p. 227-240), written by Carl F. Petry, Professor of History at Northwestern University, analyzes a case of divorce which happened in the city of Cairo, in 1470, registered by columnist Nur al-Din Ali ibn Da'ud al Jawhari al-Sayrafi. According to the author, this juridical case allows us to see the presence of gender relationships in pre-modern Muslim society. Starting from the analyzed case, the author concludes that a woman was capable of presenting a process to the court, without her parents' mediation or that of a masculine agent; possessing the perspective that the litigants could be accused of violating her rights; and the possibility that the accused were punished by its lack. Chapter 12, entitled "Invisible Women: residents of early sixteenth-century Istanbul" (p. 241-268), written by Yvonne J. Seng, Visiting Professor Lecturer in Middle Eastern History at Georgetown University and at Wesleyan Theological Seminary in Washington, analyzes the economic and social roles occupied by the women in the city of Istanbul during the last years of reign of Sultan Sulayman, using material from legal courts. According to the author, through this documentation, the women become visible, which not always is possible using another source type, especially in the foreigners' texts. According to the author, "Muslim women were not seen by strangers" (p. 242). For the author, the women were indeed engaged in the community's social and economic life. Their presence was not limited to going to the Mosque or public bathing, but also to the markets, where they acted as saleswomen and buyers, as well as in the courts, in which their complaints were presented and their mistakes were judged. The Chapter 13 "'She is trouble ...and I will divorce her': orality, honor, and representation in the ottoman court of Aintab" (p. 269-300), written by Leslie Peirce, Associate Professor in Near Eastern Studies at Cornell University, is an important work in the field of the history of literacy, since it explores the meaning of oral speech in the courts of Aintab, county of the Ottoman Empire, and its transformation into written text, during the period of September of 1240 to 1241. The author centered his study on cases of divorce. According to Peirce, the passage from oral speech to written in the analyzed cases don't happen in a uniform way. The author defends the hypothesis that these variations are related not only to the demands of the legal processes, but also for the great social and collective interest of preserving the individuals' well-being and that of the community. In this sense, adds the author, not all the cases of divorce that happened in the county of Aintab in the analyzed period arrived in the courts. The individuals who opted for presenting their cases of divorce before the court did so, above all, in search of a form of social sanction. This chapter presents a great concern with the theoretical-methodological aspects, which gives it a singular face compared to the other researches of the book. With mastery, the author is presenting his key concepts and the limits of his own investigations, giving a true type of cultural history. Chapter 14, "Women and the public eye in eighteenth-century Istanbul" (p. 301-324), was written by Fariba Zarinebf-Shahr, Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Illinois, Chicago. In this work the transformations operating on social morality in the city of Istanbul during the eighteenth century are studied. This moment is, in the opinion of specialists, the culmination of Ottoman decline. Analyzing the registrations of the courts, Zarinebf-Shahr tries to capture the legal and social dynamism of Ottoman society of the period, which a lot of times is not contemplated by historiography. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a process of crisis in civil society, in which, according to Zarinebf-Shahr, the women occupied an important role. In this period, the courts occupied a role of middlemen between the government's authority and the civil society. In this context, the courts, as much ruled by the Islamic law as by the imperial ordinances, reveal an attenuation of attitudes, tolerance and change of habits in a cosmopolitan and international city like Istanbul. Chapter 15, "The 'jewels of wonder': learned ladies and princess politicians in the provinces of early Safavid Iran" (p. 325-347) is by Maria Szuppe, Researcher in the History of Iran and Central Asia at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique of Strasbourg. Starting with information present in Persian texts of different natures, the author reconstructs aspects of the life of the women of the upper classes, not only from the capital, but of the counties and marks of the Safavid Empire. Szuppe studies the feminine literary manifestations and the political activities exercised by women during the sixteenth century and she concludes that "... women took in the unexpectedly large part in public life during the first century of Safavid rule in Iran" (p. 335). In Safavid Iran's first century, the cultural and social models of the Timurid Empire still stayed alive. The author argues, however, that in spite of the Timurid traditions, which qualified women to participate in the intellectual and artistic life, the cultural past of the semi-nomadic and militarized Turks, who formed the Safavid Empire, became the base of the private social status that the women occupied in this area in this period. Chapter 16, "The 'Aqa'id Al-Nisa': the glimpse at Safavid women in local Isfahani Culture" (p. 349-381), written by Kathryn Babayan, Assistant Professor of Persian Studies at the University of Michigan, looks to reconstruct the marriages, the social space, the attitudes of the relationships of urban women of Isfahani in the seventeenth century. To do this, she analyzes the work Aqa'id Al-Nisa, probably written in the second half of the seventeenth century, by a clergyman. The choice of the study of this source is justified by Babayan by the fact that this illuminates certain aspects of women's life, which is not possible to notice through other texts. The author tries to demonstrate as the changes of certain traditions are legitimated, that they checked the women an active role in the family, they affected the political universe and the court, when the institutions of the Safavid state became more sedentary and the administration centralized. In Chapter 17, "Woman in Safavid Iran: The Evidence of European Travelers" (p. 383-406), by Ronald W. Ferrier, an independent scholar who specializes in the history of Iran, is a study on the daily life of Persian women in Safavid Iran, in the period from 1501 to 1722, starting from several European travelers' testimonies. The author analyzes the writings of John Freyer, Thomas Herbert, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, Jean Chardin, Raphael du Mans, and others, men who possessed several occupations, came from different places in Western Europe and traveled to Iran for varied motivations. Faced with countless questions on the validity of the study of these testimonies, the author defends their importance, although recognizing its limitations, because such sources are replete with prejudices and possess moralized character. Starting from the European travelers' testimonies, the author reconstructs the women's physical appearance, the husbands' choice, the several marriage types, marriage ceremonies, divorce, mortuary rites, superstitions, prostitution, the harem, etc. The Chapter 18, "Contributors to the urban landscape: women builders in Safavid Isfahan and Mughal Shahjahanabad" (pp. 407- 428), written by Stephen P. Blake, Associate Professor of History at Saint Olaf College, is a comparative study of the construction activities sponsored by women in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the cities of Isfahan, capital of the Safavid Iranian State, and in Shahjahanabad, capital of the Indian Empire of Mughal. Using the comparative method, the author identifies the women who sponsored the buildings, the place, the year and the type of building built. Blake verifies that while the women in Isfahan sponsored thirteen buildings, the ones of Shahjahanabad sponsored nineteen. Starting from this data, he concludes that the women in Safavid Iran were more confined and without capacity to act in the public sphere than in Mughal India. In this sense, he affirms: "...protection of women seems to have been crucial to maintenance of male honor and more deeply entrenched in Iran than in India" (pp.407-8). Even so, he still produces another conclusion that, although obvious, results in the reader questioning the previous ones: Safavid Iran was smaller and poorer than Mughal India. Chapter 19, entitled "Armed women retainers in the zenanas of indo-muslim rulers: the case of Bibi Fatima" (pp. 429-67), was written by Gavin R. G. Hambly. This article tries to break with the whole fantasy and ignorance about zenanas, more known as harems, whose rise originated in the Middle Ages. Using coming sources of Muslim India, dated to the sixteenth century, Hambly is concerned with studying the organization and administration of harems, and he verifies that "sensual and exotic stereotypes of zenana life projected by eighteenth and nineteenth century European orientalists, whether scholars, romance-writers, or painters, had their origin in the indigenous values of Islamic elite society rather than, as is sometimes asserted, their own prurient imaginings" (p. 437). The author emphasizes that the harems had for their administration, besides the eunuchs, a feminine bureaucratic hierarchy. These women met the illustration of the urdubegis, a type of bodyguard combined with chambermaid. Hambly finishes this article with a study of the biography of one of those urdubegis, Bibi Fatima, who acted in the zenana of Mughal padshah Humayun in the sixteenth century. In Chapter 20, "Private Lives and public piety: Woman and the practice of Islam in Mughal India" (pp. 469-88), written by Gregory C. Kozlowski, Professor of Islamic and South Asian History at DePaul University, the two opposite visions that are still discussed among historians regarding feminine spirituality in the south of India, in the Mughal Era. The tendency is either to see them as silent victims of a religion dominated by men, or to emphasize women's specific cases that received prominence. For Kozlowski these two postures are wrong because they think of the Muslim Indian woman as using categories and ideas from Europe and North America, such as the ideals of feminine freedom or the rigid division among private and public. The author marks that it is necessary to think that women can exercise real power in men's behavior in the domain of the private, as well as to break with the idea that their religious power was insignificant. In this way, he defends the idea that in the Mughal Era there was no misogynic prejudice and that in spite of the fact that we possess little information about individual personalities, it is possible to attest women's religious importance for the success of the dynasty. In Chapter 21, "Woman and the feminine in the court and high culture of Awadh, 1722-1856" (pp. 489-519), written by Michael H. Fisher, Professor of History of Oberlin College, women's roles and feminine themes in the kingdom of Awadh, during the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries are studied. In the small kingdom of Awadh, the shi'ite faith and the regional traditions took part in the formation of an original culture. According to Fisher, in the court and in the culture of Awadh the women became prominent and many men adopted feminine identities, to the point that many Indians and English criticize it. This criticism, besides, worked as a ideological justification for English political aggressiveness against this kingdom and its later annexation. Chapter 22, entitled "Embattled begams: women the power brokers in early Modern India" (p. 521-36), of Richard B. Barnett, Professor at the University of Virginia, is also about the kingdom of Awadh. The author studies the political and social power that two noble women, Beguns of Awadh, exercised in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Sadr al-Nisa Begam, daughter of the founder of the dynasty, and Bahu Begam, its daughter-in-law. Barnett reconstructs the women's trajectory and concludes that, despite facing important rivals-- such as the English--and cultural conventions, these women exercised power with creativity. In first place, they were not limited by the present gender prescriptions in their society; they acted to the side or occupied power vacuums of their husbands or children and they used their woman's status as source of power. Chapter 23, "Sitt Nasra Bint ' Adlan: the Sudanese noblewoman in History and Tradition" (p. 537-49), was written by Idris al- Hasan, Visiting Professor of the Department of Sociology of the Addis Ababa University, and Neil Mc Hugh, Associate Professor in the Department of History at Fort Lewis Collage in Durango, Colorado. The latter already taught at the University of Gezira, Sudan and recently also acted as Visiting Professor at Addis Ababa University. This chapter presents a historical biography of a Sudanese noble woman, Sitt Nasra bint' Adlan, who lived from 1800 to 1860. For the authors, this woman has not received, until now, the importance owed by historians, given her social, political, and economic prominence. Starting from three groups different from sources--the testemunies of traveling Europeans, the oral and anecdotal social memory and the Sira, the biography--the authors try to reconstruct this feminine character's career. They conclude that each type of researched source presents a different vision of Sitt Nasra bint' Adlan. Foreigners are fascinated by her power, also over the men. In collective memory, they see Sitt Nasra as a personal autocrat, a woman in action who didn't submit to masculine authority. Finally, in Sira, she is criticized. For this text, of moral character, this woman, since she was not controlled by any man, didn't know limits to satisfy her desires; she is presented, therefore, as immoral. The several chapters above mentioned, in spite of the divergences, present countless points of contact. Because of this, despite the fact that the book includes an introduction, in which the texts are presented by their thematic content, I believe that a final conclusion, containing a synthesis, would be fundamental. Several articles allow us to infer, for example, that pre-Islamic traditions, such as those of the Turks or Persians, survive after Islamicization, and were an important factor in the configuration of women's status in Islamic societies. Since the main objective of the volume is to break with the stereotypes of Muslim women who lived in the pre-modern period, what new vision of these women do these articles allow to emerge? Women in the Medieval Islamic World is very nicely bound. The quality of the paper is excellent, since it is dull and it doesn't tire the reader. However, there are two formal aspects that hinder the reading and understanding of the texts: the option of putting the notes at the end of each chapter, which requires the interruption of reading by the search for the corresponding notes, and the fact that the photos are in black and white, which hinders observation, especially in the case of the scenes with many details and that were reduced, as the ones on pp. 215, 368 and 441. This work is, without doubts, important for historians, anthropologists, scholars of literature and university students, as well as for everybody who is interested in women's studies and in studies of pre-modern Islamic culture. It doesn't demand great previous knowledge, except for knowledge about the spatial-temporal organization of the oriental world from antiquity to nineteenth century, data accessible in manuals, atlases and encyclopedias.
3581	dbpedia	0	36	https://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/p/books-and-bibliographies.html	en	Bibliographies	https://1.bp.blogspot.co…o-nu/Antakya.jpg	https://1.bp.blogspot.co…o-nu/Antakya.jpg	[ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-rKEHZ71NoI4/VA1jQwM2i8I/AAAAAAAAGBc/usOkYWKFp6Y/s1600/Antakya.jpg", "https://www.blogger.com/img/blogger_logo_round_35.png", "https://resources.blogblog.com/img/icon_delete13.gif", "https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVlUxFyI71sKMy2Ar9MaNV_yvADnYT8VSJhAqwr0-...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Chris Gratien" ]	2019-04-24T01:58:00+03:00	Welcome to the Ottoman History Podcast books and bibliographies section, which features hand-crafted bibliographies on select themes and p...	en	https://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/favicon.ico		https://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/p/books-and-bibliographies.html	Heather Hughes holds an M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies and an MSIS. She is currently Middle East Studies Librarian at UC Santa Barbara. She is interested in subject librarianship in Middle Eastern Studies and archival practice.
3581	dbpedia	3	0	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaziantep	en	Gaziantep	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/99/AntepKale2_%28croppe...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2004-04-01T09:51:20+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaziantep	Metropolitan municipality in Turkey Metropolitan municipality in Southeastern Anatolia, Turkey Gaziantep,[a] historically Aintab and still informally called Antep,[b] is a major city in south-central Turkey. It is the capital of the Gaziantep Province, in the westernmost part of Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Region and partially in the Mediterranean Region. It is located approximately 185 km (115 mi) east of Adana and 97 km (60 mi) north of Aleppo, Syria and situated on the Sajur River. The city is thought to be located on the site of ancient Antiochia ad Taurum and is near ancient Zeugma. As of the 2021 census, the Gaziantep province (Metropolitan municipality) was home to 2,130,432 inhabitants, of whom 1,775,904 lived in the metropolitan area made of two (out of three) urban districts of Şahinbey and Şehitkamil, as Oğuzeli is not conurbated. It is the sixth-most populous city in Turkey. Gaziantep is a diverse city inhabited mostly by ethnic Turks and a significant minority of Kurds and Syrian refugees. It was historically populated by Turkmens, Armenians, Jews, and a plethora of other ethnic groups. In February 2023, the city was heavily damaged by the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake. Name [edit] Due to the city's contact with various ethnic groups and cultures throughout its history, the name of the city has many variants and alternatives, such as: Hantab, Hamtab, or Hatab as known by the Crusaders,[4][5] Antab and its variants in vulgar Turkish and Armenian since 17th century the latest,[6][7] Aīntāb (عين تاب) in Ottoman Turkish, Gazi Ayıntap in official Turkish after February 1921, when the Turkish parliament honored the city as غازى عینتاب Ghazi Aīntāb to commemorate its resistance to the French Siege of Aintab during the Franco-Turkish War, Gaziantep in official Turkish after 1928,[8] 'Aīntāb (عينتاب) in Arabic, Êntab or Dîlok in Kurdish,[9] Aïntab or Verdun Turc in French.[10] The several theories for the origin of the current name include:[citation needed] Aïntap may be derived from khantap, meaning "king's land" in the Hittite language. Aïn, an Arabic and Aramaic word meaning "spring", and tab as a word of praise. Antep could be a corruption of the Arabic 'aīn ṭayyib meaning "good spring".[11] However, the Arabic name for the city is spelled with t (ت), not ṭ (ط). Ayin dab or Ayin debo in Aramaic, meaning "spring of the wolf" History [edit] Hellenistic period [edit] Gaziantep is the probable site of the Hellenistic city of Antiochia ad Taurum[12] ("Antiochia in the Taurus Mountains"). Medieval history [edit] During its early history, Aintab was largely a fortress overshadowed by the city of Dülük, some 12 km to the north. Aintab came to prominence after an earthquake in the 14th century devastated Dülük.[2]: 22 Following the Muslim conquest of the Levant, the region passed to the Umayyads in 661 AD and the Abbasids in 750. It was ravaged several times during the Arab–Byzantine wars. After the disintegration of the Abbasid dynasty, the city was ruled successively by the Tulunids, the Ikhshidids, and the Hamdanids.[citation needed] In 962, it was recaptured by the Byzantines, upon the expansion led by Nikephoros II Phokas.[13] After Afshin Bey captured the fortress in 1067, Aintab fell to Seljuk rule[14] and was administered by Seljuk emirs of Damascus. One of these emirs, Tutush I appointed Armenian noble Thoros of Edessa as the governor of the region.[15] It was captured by the Crusaders and united to the Maras Seigneurship in the County of Edessa in 1098. The region continued to be ruled by independent or vassalized Armenian lords, such as Kogh Vasil.[16] It reverted to the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm in 1150, was controlled by the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia between 1155–1157 and 1204–1206 and captured by the Zengids in 1172 and the Ayyubids in 1181. It was retaken by the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm in 1218.[citation needed] With the turn of the 13th-century, Dülük became one of Aintab's dependencies according to geographer Yaqut al-Hamawi. In the next century, Aintab was the capital of its district and a town with fine markets much frequented by merchants and travellers, while Duluk was in ruins, according to Abulfeda.[17] Still, Aintab continued to be hotly contested throughout these centuries.[2]: 22–3 It was besieged by the Mongols in 1270.[2]: 23 It repeatedly changed hands between the Ilkhanate and the Mamluk Sultanate or the Dulkadirids, a Turkoman vassal state of the Mamluks. Gaziantep was near the southern frontier of the Dulkadir emirate, and on several occasions it slipped out of their control.[2]: 23 The Ilkhans ruled over it between 1260 and 1261, 1271–1272, 1280–1281 and 1299–1317. The Mamluks controlled the city between 1261 and 1271, 1272–1280, 1281–1299, 1317–1341, 1353–1378, 1381–1389. It was unsuccessfully besieged by the Dulkadir leader Sevli Beg in 1390. Although the Mamluks and their Dulkadirid vassals could control the city from 1395 until the Ottoman conquest in 1516, the city was besieged by Timur in 1400, and then in 1420 by the Ak Koyunlu leader Kara Yusuf.[2]: 23 These attacks all caused destruction and suffering among the local population. But at the same time, the city was "acquiring a reputation as a cultured urban center". Badr al-Din al-Ayni, an Aintab native who became a successful diplomat, judge, and historian under the Mamluks, wrote at the end of the 1300s that the city was called "little Bukhara" because so many scholars came to study there. Ayni also left a firsthand account of the suffering caused during Sevli Beg's siege in 1390.[2]: 23 Another rough patch for Aintab's people came in the late 1460s, when the Dulkadir prince Şehsuvar rebelled against the Mamluks.[2]: 25 Mamluk forces captured Aintab in May 1468, driving out Şehsuvar's forces; a report by the governor of Aleppo indicates that resistance had been fierce. Just a month later, Şehsuvar recaptured Aintab after four "engagements" with Mamluk forces. After Şehsuvar's final defeat and public execution by the Mamluks in 1473, Gaziantep enjoyed a period of relative peace and stability under his brother and successor Alaüddevle. Alaüddevle appears to have considered Gaziantep an important possession and commissioned several constructions in the city, including a reservoir and a large mosque in the middle of town. The city's fortress was also renovated, completed in 1481. These repairs were likely ordered by the Mamluk sultan Qaitbay during his tour of northern Syria in 1477; his name is inscribed above the entrance portal, perhaps symbolically marking his territory.[2]: 26 The end of the Dulkadir principality came around 1515. Alaüddevle refused to fight alongside the Ottomans at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. The Ottomans used this as a pretext to overthrow him, and in June 1515 he was executed.[2]: 24 As Alaüddevle had been a Mamluk vassal, the Mamluks considered this an affront, and the Mamluk sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri mobilized an army and marched north towards Aleppo.[2]: 25 The conflict over the region meant that in Gaziantep, anxieties about the fate of the city and its surroundings must have been high. Later court records from the early 1540s provide documentary evidence of "dislocation and loss of population" as people fled; this may have been more pronounced in rural areas than in the city itself.[2]: 30 Ottoman period [edit] The Ottoman Empire captured Gaziantep just before the Battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516, under the reign of Sultan Selim I. In the Ottoman period, Aintab was a sanjak centred initially in the Dulkadir Eyalet (1516–1818), and later in the Aleppo vilayet (1908–1918). It was also a kaza in the Aleppo vilayet (1818–1908). The city established itself as a centre for commerce due to its location straddling trade routes. Although it was controlled by the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia only between 1155–1157 and 1204–1206, for most of the last two millennia, Gaziantep hosted a large Armenian community. Armenians played a significant role in the city's history, culture, welfare, and prosperity. These communities no longer exist in the city due to the Hamidian massacres in 1895 and the Armenian genocide in 1915. Gaziantep served a significant trade route within the Ottoman Empire. Armenians were active in manufacturing, agriculture production and, most notably, trade, and became the wealthiest ethnic group in the city,[18] until their wealth was confiscated during the Armenian genocide.[19] Battle of Marj Dabiq [edit] At the beginning of his campaign against the Mamluks in 1516, the Ottoman sultan Selim I brought his army to Gaziantep en route to Syria. The city's Mamluk governor, Yunus Beg, submitted to Selim without a fight and gave him the keys to the castle on 20 August.[2]: 26 The next day, 21 August, Selim set up camp outside the city "with great majesty and pomp" and held meetings with local military commanders to discuss strategy for the upcoming battle.[2]: 26–7 The fateful Battle of Marj Dabiq took place just days later, on 24 August. Gaziantep, although not an active battle site, thus played a strategic role in the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk sultanate.[2]: 27 The Ottoman victory at Marj Dabiq had profound consequences for Gaziantep, although its inhabitants had no way of knowing at the time. For the first time in almost 1,000 years, Gaziantep was located in the middle of an empire rather than a contested border region. It lost its strategic importance, but also its vulnerability to attack. For four centuries, until the French occupation in 1921, Gaziantep was relatively peaceful.[2]: 27 Economic recovery [edit] In the short term, though, Gaziantep was still reeling from the instability before (and after) the Ottoman conquest.[2]: 28–9 During that period, Gaziantep had suffered from "depredation", as well as fear caused by political uncertainty.[2]: 29 Besides political conflict, the city's economic slump at this time can also be partly attributed to a general decline in commerce in the eastern Mediterranean region that caused a general economic downturn in the region in the early 1500s.[2]: 31–2 Only around the 1530s, when the Ottoman authorities turned their attention to the territories recently conquered from Dulkadir, do cadastral records indicate renewed prosperity in Gaziantep.[2]: 28, 30–1 An important event was Süleyman the Magnificent's successful Mesopotamian campaign against Safavid Iran in 1534-36, which took Baghdad and increased the security of trade routes in Gaziantep's region.[2]: 31 As with the earlier economic downturn, the renewed prosperity in Gaziantep in the 1530s was part of a broader regional pattern of economic growth during this period.[2]: 32 As a disclaimer – some of this apparent economic growth may be an artifact of using tax documents as a source. Tax assessors may have simply been doing more accurate counts in later surveys, or the government might have been applying more strict scrutiny as their control increased.[2]: 32 Part of this was deliberate – the Ottomans had a policy of lowering taxes in recently conquered territories, both to placate locals and to provide an economic stimulus to help war-torn areas recover.[2]: 32–3 Later, as their control solidified, the authorities would raise taxes again. According to Leslie Peirce, this seems to have been the case in Gaziantep – tax rates in 1536 were significantly lower than the rates in 1520, which she assumes were the pre-Ottoman rates. The rates went up again in the 1543 survey, which she interprets as the Ottomans raising taxes again in the meantime.[2]: 33 Administrative changes [edit] The Dulkadir emirate did not simply go away immediately after the Ottoman victory at Marj Dabiq. It stuck around as an Ottoman vassal until 1522, when the last Dulkadir ruler "resisted discipline by the Ottoman administration". The Ottomans had him executed and officially dismantled the Dulkadir principality, annexing its territories to the empire to form the beglerbeglik of Dulkadir.[2]: 25 Despite being part of the former Dulkadir territories, though, the sanjak of Gaziantep was initially put under the beglerbeglik of Aleppo instead of Dulkadir. This indicates how, just as in the Mamluk period, Gaziantep was then seen more as part of northern Syria than as part of Anatolia. The area was "culturally mixed", and many locals were bilingual in Turkish and Arabic (as well as other languages). Gaziantep's cultural and economic ties were mostly with Aleppo, which was a major international center of trade.[2]: 27 At some point in the 1530s, Gaziantep was moved into the beglerbeglik of Dulkadir, whose capital was Maraş. Even though it was now administratively part of Dulkadir, Gaziantep remained commercially more connected to Aleppo.[2]: 27 17th through 19th centuries [edit] The 17th-century Turkish traveller Evliya Çelebi noted it had 3,900 shops and two bedestens. In 1818, Gaziantep was moved back into the Aleppo province.[2]: 27 By the end of the 19th century, Aintab had a population of about 45,000, two-thirds of whom were Muslim—largely Turkish, but also partially Arab. A large community of Christians lived in the Armenian community. In the 19th century, considerable American Protestant Christian missionary activity occurred in Aintab.[20][21] In particular, Central Turkey College was founded in 1874 by the American Mission Board and largely served the Armenian community. The Armenians were systemically slaughtered during the Hamidian massacres in 1895 and later the Armenian genocide in 1915.[22][23] Consequently, the Central Turkey College was transferred to Aleppo in 1916. Republic of Turkey [edit] After the First World War and Armistice of Mudros, Gaziantep was occupied by the United Kingdom on 17 December 1918, and it was transferred to France on 5 November 1919.[24] The French Armenian Legion was also involved in occupation. In April 1920 irregular Turkish troops known as Kuva-yi Milliye besieged the city,[25] but the 10-month-long battle resulted in French victory.[26] Around 6,000 Turkish civilians were killed in the process.[27] The French made the last attempt to revive the Armenian community in the city during the Siege of Aintab, where the Armenians who fled the genocide were promised their homes back in their native lands. However, on 25 December 1921, the Treaty of Ankara was signed, and as a result, the French evacuated the city. According to Ümit Kurt, born in modern-day Gaziantep and an academic at Harvard's Center for Middle East Studies, "The famous battle of Aintab against the French … seems to have been as much the organised struggle of a group of genocide profiteers seeking to hold onto their loot as it was a fight against an occupying force. The resistance … sought to make it impossible for the Armenian repatriates to remain in their native towns, terrorising them [again] to make them flee. In short, not only did the local … landowners, industrialists, and civil-military bureaucratic elites lead to the resistance movement, but they also financed it to cleanse Aintab of Armenians."[28] The same Turkish families who made their wealth through the expropriation of Armenians in 1915 and 1921/1922 continued to dominate the city's politics through the one-party period of the Republic of Turkey.[29] In 2013, Turkey, a member state of NATO, requested deployment of MIM-104 Patriot missiles to Gaziantep to be able to respond faster in a case of military operation against Turkish soil in the Syrian Civil War, which was accepted.[30] On 6 February 2023, the city and nearby areas were devastated by catastrophic earthquakes. Around 900 buildings collapsed[31] and 10,777 other buildings were heavily damaged in the city, which have been slated for demolition.[32] Historic buildings including the Gaziantep Castle, the Şirvani Mosque and the Liberation Mosque were also heavily damaged. Geography [edit] The city is located on the Aintab plateau. Climate [edit] Gaziantep has a hot-summer Mediterranean climate (Köppen: Csa, Trewartha: Cs), with very hot, dry summers and cool, wet and often snowy winters. According to 1966 data, on average, Gaziantep experiences 4.6 snowy days per winter with 10 days of snow cover, along with 2.5 days of hail.[34]: 302 Highest recorded temperature: 44.0 °C (111.2 °F) on 29 July 2000 and 14 August 2023 Lowest recorded temperature: −17.5 °C (0.5 °F) on 15 January 1950[35] Politics [edit] The current mayor of Gaziantep is Fatma Şahin,[39] who had previously served as the minister of family and social policies in the third cabinet of Erdoğan. Mayors Of Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality [edit] Mayors of Gaziantep[40] Mayor Years of service Fatma Şahin (AK Party) 2014–present Asım Güzelbey (AK Party) 2004–2014 Celal Doğan (SHP, CHP) 1989–2004 Ömer Arpacıoğlu (ANAP) 1984–1989 Economy [edit] Gaziantep is famous for its regional specialities: copperware and "Yemeni" sandals, specific to the region, are two examples. The city is an economic centre for Southeastern and Eastern Turkey. The number of large industrial businesses established in Gaziantep comprise four percent of Turkish industry in general, while small industries comprise six percent. Also, Gaziantep has the largest organised industrial area in Turkey and holds first position in exports and imports.[41] The city is the centre of the green olive oil-based Nizip Soap industry. Traditionally, commerce in Gaziantep was centre in covered markets known as 'Bedesten' or 'Hans', the best known of which are the Zincirli Bedesten, Hüseyin Pasha Bedesten and Kemikli Bedesten. Gaziantep also has a developing tourist industry. Development around the base of the castle upgrades the beauty and accessibility to the castle and to the surrounding copper workshops. New restaurants and tourist-friendly businesses are moving into the area. In comparison with some other regions of Turkey, tourists are still a novelty in Gaziantep and the locals make them very welcome.[citation needed] Many students studying the English language are willing to be guides for tourists. Gaziantep is one of the leading producers of machined carpets in the world. It exported approximately US$700 million of machine-made carpets in 2006. There are over 100 carpet facilities in the Gaziantep Organized Industrial Zone.[citation needed] With its extensive olive groves, vineyards, and pistachio orchards, Gaziantep is one of the important agricultural and industrial centres of Turkey.[citation needed] Gaziantep is the centre of pistachio cultivation in Turkey, producing 60,000 metric tons (59,000 long tons; 66,000 short tons) in 2007, and lends its name to the Turkish word for pistachio, Antep fıstığı, meaning "Antep nut". Gaziantep is the main centre for pistachio processing in Turkey, with some 80% of the country's pistachio processing (such as shelling, packaging, exporting, and storage) being done in the city.[42] "Antep fıstığı" is a protected geographical indication in Turkey; it was registered under this status in 2000.[42] In 2009, the largest enclosed shopping centre in the city and region, Sanko Park, opened, and began drawing a significant number of shoppers from Syria.[43] Ties between Turkey and Syria have severely deteriorated since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Demographics [edit] Gaziantep is mostly inhabited by Turks.[44] It is also inhabited by a significant minority of Kurds,[44] about 450 thousand people,[45] and roughly 470 thousand Syrian refugees.[44] History [edit] In early 14th century, Arab geographer Dimashki noted that the people of Aintab were Turkomans.[17] Aintab continued to be Turkish or Turkoman majority through 18th,[46] 19th,[47][48][49][50] and 20th centuries.[51][52][10][4] Armenians inhabited Aintab from at least 10th century until the Armenian genocide.[53] Having abandoned Armenian in favour of Turkish as early as the 16th century,[54] the Armenians of Aintab predominantly spoke Turkish,[55][46][56][57][50] while the usage of Armenian increased after 1850.[54] The city also housed a smaller Jewish minority predominantly of Sephardic origin.[58] The Jewish population quickly decreased in mid-20th century, reaching zero people by 1980s.[59] Unlike most Southeastern Anatolian cities, the city of Gaziantep did not have a significant Kurdish minority until the 20th century, when it saw an increase in its Kurdish population through economically motivated migration from Turkish Kurdistan.[60] Up until the late 2010s, the Kurdish population increased to one fourth of the city and the province with 400,000 - 450,000 Kurds.[45] In the late Ottoman era, the city included a number of Europeans and Americans.[61] Aintab also had a sizable Uzbek minority dating back to the Ottoman rule.[62][63] Mother tongue composition of the city proper of Gaziantep in 1927 according to Turkish census[65] Languages Speakers % Turkish 38,281 95.7 Arabic 873 2.2 Kurdish 491 1.2 Other 359 0.9 Total 40,004 100 Culture [edit] Cuisine [edit] Gaziantep is largely regarded as the city with the richest cuisine in Turkey.[66] It was the first city in Turkey to be designated as a City of Gastronomy by UNESCO in 2015.[67][68] In 2013, Gaziantep baklava became the first Turkish product with a European protected designation of origin and geographical indication.[69] The cuisine of Aintab was attested to be "rich" by many travellers throughout the centuries. 19th-century British traveller noted:[70] "The padishah himself would do well to visit Aintab, just to taste the rich food to be found there." Types of kofta (Turkish: köfte; Gaziantep dialect: küfte[71]) include içli küfte (lit. 'stuffed kofta'), sini küfte, yoğurtlu küfte, yağlı küfte (lit. 'greasy kofta'), tahinli küfte, pendir ekmekli küfte (lit. 'kofta with bread and cheese'), and more.[72] Some koftas do not include any meat such as yapma[73] and malhıtalı küfte (lit. 'lentil kofta').[74] Pilafs in the Aintab cuisine often accompany the main dish and are not the main course alone. Traditionally, bulgur is used for the pilafs. The bulgur pilafs can include orzo (Şehriyeli bulgur pilavı; Şʿāreli burgul pilov) or ground beef (Kıymalı aş or Meyhane pilavı, lit. 'tavern pilaf').[72] There are several types of exclusively-Armenian soups in Aintab cuisine. These include vardapet soup and omız zopalı.[72] Vegetable dishes of Aintab often include meat but can be vegetarian as well. These include dorgama (doğrama), moussaka, bezelye, bakla, kuru fasulye, mutanya, türlü,[72] and kabaklama.[75] Dolma is a very common dish, different variants of which are cooked. One is kış dolması (lit. 'winter dolma'), for which dried vegetables, such as squash, eggplants, and peppers are used. Common sweets include bastık and sucuk. Local Turkish dialect [edit] The local Turkish dialect of Gaziantep is classified as a part of the Western Turkish dialects based on phonetic and grammatical similarities.[76][77] The dialect carries influences mainly from Armenian and Arabic.[78] The local Turkish dialect of Gaziantep is an integral part of the native identity of the city[79] and is being preserved through often humorous plays by theatrical troupes, such as Çeled Uşaglar (lit. naughty children).[80] Museums [edit] The Gaziantep Museum of Archaeology has collections of ceramic pieces from the Neolithic Age; various objects, figures and seals from the Chalcolithic and Bronze Ages; stone and bronze objects, jewellery, ceramics, coins, glass objects, mosaics and statues from the Hittite, Urartu, Greek Persian, Roman, Commagene, and Byzantine periods. The Zeugma Mosaic Museum houses mosaics from Zeugma and other mosaics, a total of 1,700 square metres (18,000 sq ft).[81][citation needed] It opened to the public on 9 September 2011.[82] The Hasan Süzer Ethnography Museum, a restored late-Ottoman stone building, has the old life style decoration and collections of various weapons, documents, instruments used in the defence of the city as well as the photographs of local resistance heroes. It was originally built in 1906 as the home of Garouj Karamanoukian. Some of the other historical remains are the Zeugma (also called Belkıs in Turkish), and Kargamış ruins by the town of Nizip and slightly more to the north, Rumkale. Yesemek Quarry and Sculpture Workshop is an open-air museum located in the village known by the same name, 30 km (19 mi) south of the town of Islahiye. It is the largest open-air sculpture workshop in the Near East and the ruins in the area date back to the Hittites. The Gaziantep Defence Museum: before you enter the Panorama Museum located within the Gaziantep Castle, you encounter the statues of three local heroes Molla Mehmet Karayılan, Şehit Mehmet Kâmil and Şahin Bey at the entrance. As you enter the museum, you hear the echoes: "I am from Antep. I am a hawk (Şahin)." The Gaziantep War Museum, in a historic Antep house (also known as the Nakıpoğlu House) is dedicated to the memory of the 6,317 who died defending the city, becoming symbols of Turkey's national unity and resolve for maintaining independence. The story of how the Battle of Antep is narrated with audio devices and chronological panels. Gaziantep War Museum Courtyard Gaziantep War Museum Arms display Gaziantep War Museum Strategy Gaziantep War Museum Smithy Gaziantep War Museum Mining Gaziantep War Museum Children at war Gaziantep Mevlevi Lodge Foundation Museum The Antep Mevlevi Lodge in 1638 as a Mevlevi monastery. The dervish lodge is part of the mosque's külliye (Islamic-Ottoman social complex centred around a mosque). It is entered via a courtyard which opens off the courtyard of the mosque. In 2007, the building was opened as the Gaziantep Mevlevi Culture and Foundation Works Museums. Gaziantep Mevlevi Museum Study group Gaziantep Mevlevi Museum Whirling Gaziantep Mevlevi Museum Musicians Gaziantep Mevlevi Museum Graves Emine Göğüş Cuisine Museum Gaziantep is known for its cuisine and food culture. A historical stone house built in 1904 has been restored and turned into the Emine Göğüş Cuisine Museum. The museum opened as part of the celebrations for the 87th anniversary of Gaziantep's liberation from French occupation. Historical sites [edit] Places of worship [edit] Liberation Mosque, the former Armenian Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God (Surp Asdvadzadzin), was converted into a mosque after the liberation of the city from the occupying French forces following the Franco-Turkish War (1918–1921). The French forces which occupied the city between 1918 and 1921 included the French Armenian Legion. Boyacı Mosque, a historic mosque in the Şahinbey district, was built by Kadı Kemalettin in 1211 and completed in 1357. It has one of the world's oldest wooden minbars which is elaborately adorned with Koranic verses, stars and geometric patterns. Its minaret is considered one of the symbols of the city. Şirvani Mosque (Şirvani Mehmet Efendi Mosque), also called İki Şerefeli Cami, is one of the oldest mosques of Gaziantep, located in the Seferpaşa district. It was built by Şirvani Mehmet Efendi. Ömeriye Mosque, a mosque in the Düğmeci district. Tradition states that it was first built during the period of the Islamic Caliphate under the second Caliph, Omar (hence its name), which would make it the oldest known mosque in Gaziantep. The modern mosque was restored at the site in 1850. It is known for its black and red marble mihrab. Şeyh Fethullah Mosque, a historic mosque built in 1563 and located in Kepenek. It has adjoining Turkish baths and a medrese. Nuri Mehmet Pasha Mosque, a mosque in Çukur built in 1786 by nobleman Nuri Mehmet Pasha. Between 1958 and 1968, it was changed into museum but was reinstated as a mosque after an extensive restoration. Ahmet Çelebi Mosque, a mosque in Ulucanlar that was built by Hacı Osman, in 1672. It is noted for its elaborate wooden interior. Tahtani Mosque, a wooden mosque located in Şahinbey, that was built in 1557. The mosque has a unique red marble mihrab. Alaüddevle Mosque (Ali Dola Mosque), built by Dulkadir bey Alaüddevle Bozkurt. Its construction started in 1479 and was completed in 1515. It has been restored recently with the addition of a new entrance. Ali Nacar Mosque, a mosque in Yaprak, Şehitkamil, is one of the biggest mosques in Gaziantep, originally built by Ali Nacar. It was enlarged in 1816. Eyüpoğlu Mosque, a mosque built by the local Islamic saint Eyüboğlu Ahmet during the 14th century. There has been a major restoration, so much so that the present structure hardly resembles the original building. Kendirli Church, a church that was built in 1860 by means of the assistance of French missionaries and Napoleon III. It is a Catholic Armenian church. It has a rectangular plan and was built through white cut stones on a foundation of black cut stone within a large garden. Bazaars [edit] Zincirli Bedesten is the Ottoman-era covered bazaar of Gaziantep and was built in 1781 by Hüseyin Pasha of Darende. From records, it is known that there was formerly an epigraph on the south gate written by Kusuri; however, this inscription is not in place today. This bazaar was used as a wholesale market hall for meat, fruit and vegetables. Bakırcılar çarşısi is the coppersmith bazaar of Gaziantep. This trade has existed in the region for over 500 years. The bazaar is part of the official culture route designed to help visitors discover the traditions and culture of the city. Inns [edit] Anatolia Inn The exact date of the inn's (caravanserai) construction is unknown, but it is estimated to have been built in the early 19th century. It is a two-storey building with two courtyards. It is said to have been built by Muhsinzade Hadji Mehmet Bey in 1892. The inn was repaired in 1985 and parts of the top floor were rebuilt. Kürkçü Inn Classic Ottoman Inn in Boyacı built in 1890. Old Wheat Inn The original building was constructed by Mustafa Ağa in 1640 to provide an income for the dervish lodge, but was completely destroyed in a fire. The exact construction date of the present building is unknown; however the architectural style suggests the 19th century. Şire Inn The building is built on a rectangular plan and contains many motifs of classical Ottoman inn architecture. It was built with evenly cut stones and the pitched roof is covered by tiles. Tobacco Inn This inn has no epigraph showing the dates of construction or renovation, but according to historical data, the estimated date of construction is the late 17th century. Ownership was passed to Hüseyin Ağa, son of Nur Ali Ağa, in the early 19th century. Yüzükçü Inn The construction date of this inn is unknown. The epigraph on the main gate of the inn is dated 1800, but the building apparently had been built earlier and was repaired at this date. The first owners of the inn were Asiye, the daughter of Battal Bey and Emine Hatun, the daughter of Hadji Osman Bey. Other [edit] Zeugma is an ancient city which was established at the shallowest passable part of the river Euphrates, within the boundaries of the present-day Belkıs village in Gaziantep Province. Due to the strategic character of the region in terms of military and commerce since antiquity (Zeugma was the headquarters of an important Roman legion, the Legio IV Scythica, near the border with Parthia) the city has maintained its importance for centuries, also during the Byzantine period. Gaziantep Castle, also known as Gala (lit. 'the castle'), located in the centre of the city displays the historic past and architectural style of the city. Although the history of castle is not fully known, as a result of the excavations conducted there, Bronze Age settlement layers are thought to exist under the section existing on the surface of the soil. Pişirici Kastel, a "kastel" (fountain) which used to be a part of a bigger group of buildings, is thought to have been built in 1282. "Kastels" are water fountains built below ground, and they are structures peculiar to Gaziantep. They are places for ablution, prayer, washing and relaxation. Old houses of Gaziantep, the traditional houses that are located in the old city: Eyüboğlu, Türktepe, Tepebaşı, Bostancı, Kozluca, Şehreküstü and Kale. They are made of locally found keymik rock and have an inner courtyard called the hayat, which is the focal point of the house. Tahmis Coffee House, a coffee house that was built by Mustafa Ağa Bin Yusuf, a Turkmen[83] ağa and flag officer, in 1635–1638, in order to provide an income for the dervish lodge. The building suffered two big fires in 1901 and 1903. Transportation [edit] The city is served by Oğuzeli Airport, which has commercial flights to domestic and regional international destinations. The city is served by Turkish State Railways which operates the Gaziantep Railway Station in the city centre. Gaziantep has a three line light rail system called the Gaziantep Tram. The Gaziantep Tram consists of three lines, is 35 km long and carries 75,000 passengers daily. The system opened in 2011 and was extended in 2012 and 2014. Gaziray is a commuter rail line serving Gaziantep, Turkey. Being 25 km (16 mi) long, the line is the fourth largest commuter rail system in the country.[84] The system is also a part of major upgrades along the Mersin-Adana-Osmaniye-Gaziantep railway corridor.[85] There are a total of 16 stations on the 25.532 kilometres (15.865 mi) long Gaziray line, two of which are underground, all of which are suitable for disabled access.[86] Gaziray Suburban Railway Network Stations Rank Station Connection Class Notes 1 Baspinar Level Gaziantep Organized Industrial Zone 2 OSB-3 Level Gaziantep Organized Industrial Zone 3 OSB-4 Level Gaziantep Organized Industrial Zone 4 Dolice Level Dolice (Dülük) Ancient City 5 Stadium Level Kalyon Stadium 6 Beylerbeyi Level 7 Fistiklik Gaziantep Intercity Bus Terminal Level 8 Selimiye Level Kayaönü 9 Adliye Underground Gaziantep Courthouse, Şehitkamil State Hospital, TEDAŞ 10 Topraklik Underground 11 Mucahitler Level Dr. Ersin Arslan Training and Research Hospital, SANKO University Hospital, NCR International Hospital 12 Gaziantep Gaziantep Central Railway Station - T1 - T3 Level Zeugma Mosaic Museum 13 Golluce Level İnayet Topçuoğlu Hospital 14 Seyrantepe Level Küsget Industrial Zone 15 Mustafa Yavuz Level Küsget Industrial Zone 16 Taslica Level Oduncular Industrial Zone Education [edit] Gaziantep Anatolian High School (founded in 1976) is a public school focusing on English language education. Gaziantep Science High School is a public boarding high school in Gaziantep, Turkey with a curriculum concentrating on natural sciences and mathematics, and with teaching in Turkish. There is also a variety of high schools consisting of both private and public schools, including Gaziantep Fen Lisesi. Gaziantep College Foundation is one of the oldest colleges in Gaziantep. Gaziantep College Foundation's (abbv. GKV) science high school is the most successful high school in Gaziantep. Sanko College is a younger but successful school in Gaziantep. Its facility is one of the most qualified school facilities in Turkey. Sanko's newest science and technology high school is also considered a very good school. The main campus of Gaziantep University is located 10 km (6 mi) away from the city centre. The institution acquired state university status in 1987, but had already offered higher education since 1973 as an extension campus of the Middle East Technical University. It is one of the largest universities in Turkey, boasting 27,000 students. Hasan Kalyoncu University (Hasan Kalyoncu Üniversitesi) is a private university established in 2008. Currently, the university has five faculties, three institutes and three vocational schools.[87] Zirve University (Zirve Üniversitesi) was a private university established in 2009. As of 2016, the university had five faculties. The university was closed by the government in 2016 and its facilities transferred to Gaziantep University. The youngest university in Gaziantep is Sanko University (Sanko Üniversitesi). Established in 2013, Sanko University is the first "thematic university" in Turkey. Sports [edit] Club Sport Established League Venue ALG Spor Women's football 1998 Women's Football Super League Batur Stadium Gaziantepspor Football 1969 Bölgesel Amatör Lig New Gaziantep Stadium Gazişehir Gaziantep F.K. Football 1988 Süper Lig New Gaziantep Stadium Gazikentspor Women's football 2006 Women's Second League Gazikent Stadium Gaziantep Büyükşehir Belediyespor (Played with sponsporship of Royal Halı since 2012) Basketball 2007 Turkish Basketball League Kamil Ocak Sports Hall Gaziantep Polis Gücü SK Men's Hockey Hockey 2003 Turkish Hockey Super League Gaziantep Asyaspor women's football 2021 Women's Football Super League Aktoprak Football Field Beslenspor has played in the Turkish Basketball League between 1986 and 1992 and presented Gaziantep at basketball once. Cityscape [edit] The historical core of Gaziantep is located on the Alleben Creek to the north and with heights to the south.[88]: 64 The location of the city among these heights was likely because of their defensibility.[88]: 64 Historically, the main trade axis was the route from the castle then going southeast along the road to Aleppo.[89]: 8, 13 A number of hans were built along this street.[89]: 8 Due to the hot climate, the city's streets were very narrow in order to maximize shade from the buildings.[89]: 9 Orientation of buildings was important so they could not see into each other's courtyards (an important private space, especially for women) and so that they would not block sunlight from neighboring houses.[89]: 6, 9 Generally, the city's population was organized according to ethno-religious groups who lived close together in the same neighborhood.[89]: 9–10 Around the time of World War I, the city's population was divided between Muslims in the east and non-Muslims (mostly Armenians) in the west.[90]: 197 Muslims lived in the Karagöz, Çukur, Tıslaki, and Şekeroğlu districts; Armenians lived in the Akyol and Bey districts; and Jews lived in the Düğmeci and Karagöz districts.[89]: 10 An early city planning effort took place in 1891 under Mustafa Ağa, the first mayor of Gaziantep, involving a city plan and province map.[88]: 64 According to Kuyucu and Özer, though, the resulting maps and plans are unavailable.[88]: 64 Another early city plan for Gaziantep was drawn up by Barsumyan and Nazaryan in the early 1920s, during the Turkish War of Independence.[90]: 197 [89]: 11 The Barsumyan-Nazaryan plan included an airport for the city but omitted any railway connections.[90]: 197 During this period, because the Jewish and Armenian communities had left the city during the war period, the city did not expand into new areas; instead, now-vacant neighborhoods were used to meet new demand.[88]: 64 The Jansen plan (1938) [edit] In the first years of the Republic of Turkey, new city planning laws were enacted requiring all major cities to have development plans.[88]: 64 In 1938, the Gaziantep municipality requested that Hermann Jansen draw up a plan for the city.[90]: 200 : 199–200 The resulting Jansen plan was the first large-scale city planning initiative in Gaziantep, and many of its proposals were ultimately put into action.[88]: 67 The Jansen plan sought to preserve the existing urban character of Gaziantep while also planning new areas outside the traditional core.[88]: 64 It mainly focused on new development on the north, south, and west sides of the city.[90]: 200 New industrial zones were drawn up along important transportation arteries, particularly the Nizip and Aleppo roads.[90]: 200 The most important was a 33-hectare industrial zone on the north side of town, which was to be connected to the railway network.[90]: 200 The new industrial area was specifically chosen to be on the northeast because the prevailing wind direction is from the northwest, so this way air pollution would not be blown over the city.[88]: 66 The plan introduced several important changes to the city's transportation network.[88]: 64 One of the most important was the addition of a rail line to connect Gaziantep to the national rail system.[88]: 64 Up to now, Turkish railway construction had ignored Gaziantep (partly because of its mountainous surroundings); a national railway plan also introduced in 1938 left Gaziantep unconnected to the rail network.[90]: 198–9 The Jansen plan represented the first major proposal to construct a railway to Gaziantep.[90]: 200 Jansen wanted to put the train station on the north side of the city, for multiple reasons.[88]: 64–5 First, because the topography on the north side is flatter; and second, because putting a railway on the south side would separate the old town from the new planned residential areas further south, which Jansen wanted to avoid.[88]: 65 Jansen also planned significant changes to the city's streets, opening up several new boulevards and widening pre-existing streets to help make a continuous transportation network.[88]: 65 He proposed combining the Narlı and Aleppo roads into İsmet İnönü Caddesi, which was to be the main transportation axis of the city.[88]: 65 The existing commercial axis along the Aleppo road, lined with hans and marketplaces, was to be expanded with new commercial buildings along the new İnönü Cd.[88]: 65–6 The plan also sought to create a SW-NE axis connecting the Kilis and Nizip roads by way of İstasyon Caddesi in the north and Atatürk Caddesi in the west; this axis would also be connected to İnönü Cd.[88]: 65 Two important pre-existing streets in the old town, Suburcu Cd and Eski Saray Cd, would also be expanded and connected with these other streets.[88]: 65 Finally, besides road and rail, Jansen also proposed the construction of an airport on the west side of town.[88]: 65 One of the most important features of the Jansen Plan was the designation of a green belt along Alleben Creek, running east–west across the entire city, where no construction was to take place.[88]: 66 This would provide a large open recreational area.[88]: 66 Jansen also proposed a large area to the north of the creek to be used for sports fields and a hippodrome, although these were never built.[88]: 66 The Jansen plan zoned for new residential areas to the south of the old city.[88]: 65 This may have been done to follow the pre-existing main axis along the southbound Aleppo road.[88]: 65 It may have also been because Jansen wanted the existing houses of the old city to be visible from the south.[88]: 65 He wanted to build new residential areas in a similar fashion, with two-story houses arranged on parallel streets that followed the slope of hills.[88]: 65 In order to provide space for the southward residential expansion, Jansen proposed that the pre-existing cemetery on the south side of town be moved to a new planned location in the northeast.[88]: 65–6 To the northwest of the old city, Jansen wanted to build one-story houses among vineyards in a low-density agricultural area.[88]: 65 The proposed workers' quarter, in the northeast near the planned industrial zone, was to follow a similar plan, with low-cost single-story houses.[88]: 65 For the city's new administrative buildings, Jansen chose to develop the Çukurbostan area, located in the old city center but with some vacant space available.[88]: 66 In a departure from his typical policy of not modifying the old urban fabric, also proposed demolishing some existing buildings and altering the pre-existing street layout to accommodate this new construction.[88]: 66 Impact [edit] Many elements of the Jansen plan were ultimately put into action, and it had a significant influence on how Gaziantep was built during the 20th century.[88]: 66 It especially shaped the city's transport network: the construction of a rail line on the north side, the opening of new transportation axes such as İnönü Cd, and the expansion of existing roads were all realized.[88]: 66 The expansion of commercial areas along the old Aleppo road led to the development of İnönü Cd as one of the city's main commercial axes, a role it still plays today.[88]: 66 The airport area he proposed, however, was never built – in the 1950s, as urbanization and population growth created new demand, the area was turned into a residential zone instead.[88]: 66 The planned residential expansion to the south did take place, as did the proposed relocation of the cemetery to the northeast, but ultimately the main direction of residential expansion shifted to the northwest instead.[88]: 66 This is partly because the hilly area to the south is less conducive for construction.[88]: 67 The industrial zone on the northeast was built, but the adjacent workers' quarter never materialized.[88]: 66 Although the recreational areas to the north were never built, the Alleben green belt became an important green space in the city, and it remains to this day (although some of it has since been turned over for new construction).[88]: 66 Jansen's recommendation of low-rise development also succeeded at preserving the silhouette of the city until the 1970s.[88]: 66 One failing of the Jansen plan was that it significantly underestimated the population growth of the city during the next 50 years, particularly after 1945.[88]: 66 This lack led to the growth of uncontrolled, unplanned settlements in the city.[88]: 67 In addition, Jansen's general non-intervention policy with the old city center proved insufficient to maintain its character – in the absence of managed oversight, many old buildings ended up deteriorating, ultimately getting demolished, and then being replaced with new structures that architecturally did not blend in.[88]: 67 The Aru-Söylemezoğlu plan (1955) [edit] By the 1950s, Gaziantep's rapid growth was outpacing the Jansen plan's limits, resulting in the creation of unplanned settlements (such as Karşıyaka in the north and Düztepe in the south) and prompting the creation of a new city plan.[91]: 556 This plan, drawn up by Kemal Ahmet Aru and Hamit Kemali Söylemezoğlu in 1955, continued the basic principles of the Jansen plan while adding some revisions.[91]: 556 The city's shape remained compact and focused around a single center, which was now being extended towards the south and west.[91]: 556–7 The main goal of the Aru-Söylemezoğlu plan was to provide new housing to meet the needs of the growing urban population.[91]: 560 There was also an effort to shift from agriculturally-oriented economy to industrial.[91]: 560 Among the important features introduced in the Aru-Söylemezoğlu plan were the railway station, now in its current location, and the addition of the new İpek Yolu highway as a northwards continuation of İstasyon Cd.[91]: 556 The new planned upscale residential neighborhoods of Bahçelievler, Kavaklık, and Öğretmenevleri signalled a shift towards building new neighborhoods to the southwest.[91]: 556 Ordu Cd, a westward extension of Atatürk Cd, was opened up, and the Kilis-Aleppo axis shifted to this route.[91]: 556–7 In general, the Aru-Söylemezoğlu plan planned a grid plan for the city's streets.[89]: 10 The area north of Alleben Creek, which under the Jansen plan had been designated as recreational areas, were converted into residential development under Aru-Söylemezoğlu plan.[91]: 557 Several small new industrial areas were also developed around Nizip Cd, Araban Yolu, and İpek Yolu.[91]: 556 The Can plan (1973) [edit] In 1973, a competition was organized under the supervision of İller Bank to draft a third city zoning plan for Gaziantep; it was held simultaneously with ones in Konya and Kayseri.[91]: 557 The Gaziantep contest was won by a team led by Zühtü Can and also including Yalçın Alaybeyoğlu, Abdullah Dellaloğlu, Müzeyyen Can, and Haluk Aral.[91]: 557 The resulting Can plan consisted of several stages guiding the city's development until a target year of 1995, when they projected a population of 1 million for Gaziantep.[91]: 557 The Can plan focused on developing Gaziantep as an industrial center, with an increasing share of land dedicated to industrial use.[91]: 557 These industrial areas were also increasingly set apart from residential areas.[91]: 561 The Can plan envisioned a three-pole city with industrial areas at the west and east ends and new residential development in the south.[91]: 557 Gaziantep's Organized Industrial Zone had been established in 1969 and was one of the first in Turkey.[91]: 558 By 1978, manufacturing had reached 11.6% of Gaziantep's GDP,[91]: 561 compared to about 17% for the country as a whole.[92] The 1970s were Gaziantep's highest period of immigration.[91]: 558 New residential development during this period was clustered into two main areas.[91]: 558 The first area was neighborhoods on the south and east sides of town like Karşıyaka, Düztepe, and Çıksorut, where many manufacturing jobs were available.[91]: 558 The second consisted of areas on the north and west where relatively higher-income people who worked in the service sector lived.[91]: 558 The patterns for urban development differed between these two areas.[91]: 558 In the south and east, there was an irregular settlement pattern formed by purchasing land around factories.[91]: 558 In the north and west, there was a regular grid of wide streets lined with houses and apartment complexes.[91]: 558 Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Can plan was undermined by illegal building and zoning amnesties, which disrupted the plan's form and caused the city to grow in unplanned ways.[91]: 558 The municipal government tried to address the situation by performing piecemeal interventions to rehabilitate these areas, but ultimately the effect was that poorly integrated pockets of the city were formed.[91]: 558 The Aldan plan (1990) [edit] The problem of illegal construction in the late 80s, combined with the introduction of the Metropolitan Municipality Law and changes to national zoning regulations such as Zoning Law 3194 (both giving cities increased authority in urban planning as opposed to the central government), necessitated an updated city plan.[91]: 558, 61 This plan, the fourth one in Gaziantep's history, was drafted in 1990 by H. Oğuz Aldan.[91]: 558 The Aldan plan had a target year of 2005, with a predicted population of about 1.8 million.[91]: 558 It planned for the city to expand to 8010 ha, of which 26% would be residential, 22% would be industrial, and 17% would be open green spaces.[91]: 558 The Aldan plan followed a metropolitan, polycentric model, with new commercial zones mixed in with the residential areas to serve as secondary urban centers.[91]: 558 The main directions for new development were toward the west and south.[91]: 558 A new ring road on the east, south, and west helped boost growth in these directions.[91]: 558 Some of the new secondary centers were built in the Karataş and İbrahimli areas.[91]: 559 Another major addition was a new commercial area on the east side of the city called the Gaziantep Ticaret ve Endüstri Merkezi (Gaziantep Trade and Industry Center), or GATEM for short.[91]: 559 Located on the Araban-Adıyaman highway, on the city's outskirts, the GATEM was to occupy 40 ha and also include an intercity bus terminal.[91]: 559 In the 21st century [edit] Since the 2000s, a number of smaller-scale targeted projects have taken place, such as local rezoning of industrial areas in the Ünaldı neighborhood; reworking unplanned settlements that do not meet building standards; and various other development projects (for example in areas like Bağlarbaşı, Geneyik, Sarıgüllük, Halep Bulvarı, Kilis Yolu, and Orta Tepe).[91]: 559–60 Zoo [edit] Gaziantep Zoo is one of the largest zoos in Turkey. Especially interesting are the bird pavilion and the aquarium. Gaziantep Zoo offers a large variety of animals, attractive picnic grounds, and a cafeteria. The facility is established on 1,000,000-square-metre (11,000,000 sq ft) field. There are 264 species and 6,814 animals. Gaziantep Zoo White deer Red-necked wallaby Gaziantep Zoo Eagles International relations [edit] Twin towns — sister cities [edit] Gaziantep is twinned with:[93][94][95] Notable people from Gaziantep [edit] See Category:People from Gaziantep See also [edit] Turkey portal Franco-Turkish War (Cilicia War) Rumkale Zeugma Notes [edit]
3581	dbpedia	2	15	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Armenia	en	Military history of Armenia	https://en.wikipedia.org/static/favicon/wikipedia.ico	https://en.wikipedia.org/static/favicon/wikipedia.ico	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/eb/Arms_of_Armenia.svg/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2006-10-15T18:14:22+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Armenia	The early military history of Armenia is defined by the situation of the Armenian Highland between the Hellenistic states, and later the Byzantine Empire, in the west and the Persian Empire to the east. The Kingdom of Armenia had a series of repeated struggles against Persia or Rome, followed by renewed conquests into either of the neighboring empires. The period after the Muslim conquests in the 7th century, up to the late 15th century, was mostly marked by invasions by other empires, such as by the successive Arab Caliphates, the Seljuk Empire, the Ilkhanate, the Timurid Empire and the Ak Koyunlu and Kara Koyunlu, amongst others. Some periods of greater military independence were, intermittently, achieved under the Bagratids and, albeit located outside the Armenian Highlands, the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia. From the early 16th century, Eastern Armenia came under the rule of the successive dynasties of Iran, namely the Safavids, followed by the Afsharids and Qajars. In the course of the 16th century, and decisively with the Treaty of Zuhab (1639) Western Armenia came under Ottoman rule. Between the 16th century and mid 17th century, nevertheless, many of the frequent Ottoman-Persian Wars razed over both parts of Armenia as both rivals tried to expand their territories. Many Armenians fought in the Ottoman-Iranian armies for centuries. After losing the war in 1828 Qajar Iran ceded Eastern Armenia to the Russian Empire. Thus, from 1828 and on, historical Armenia was again situated between two empires, this time the Ottoman Empire vs. the Russian Empire. During the events of the Armenian genocide, many Armenians resisted the actions of the Turkish government and took up arms. In 1991, when, following the dissolution of the USSR the Armenian Republic was founded, hostile relations with the neighboring Azerbaijan Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been marked as being the most important military matters in Armenia. Early history [edit] Armani [edit] The Armani are mentioned to have fought the Akkadian Empire and to have a city sacked but not much more is known about the campaigns and wars between the nations nor the Armani nation itself.[citation needed] Mitanni [edit] After a few successful clashes with the Egyptians over the control of Syria, Mitanni sought peace with them, and an alliance was formed. During the reign of Shuttarna II, in the early 14th century BC, the relationship was very amicable, and he sent his daughter Gilu-Hepa to Egypt for a marriage with Pharaoh Amenhotep III. Mitanni was now at its peak of power. However, by the reign of Eriba-Adad I (1390–1366 BC) Mitanni influence over Assyria was on the wane. Eriba-Adad I became involved in a dynastic battle between Tushratta and his brother Artatama II and after this his son Shuttarna II, who called himself king of the Hurri while seeking support from the Assyrians. A pro-Hurri/Assyria faction appeared at the royal Mitanni court. Eriba-Adad I had thus loosened Mitanni influence over Assyria, and in turn had now made Assyria an influence over Mitanni affairs. King Ashur-Uballit I (1365–1330 BC) of Assyria attacked Shuttarna and annexed Mitanni territory in the middle of the 14th century BC, making Assyria once more a great power. At the death of Shuttarna, Mitanni was ravaged by a war of succession. Eventually Tushratta, a son of Shuttarna, ascended the throne, but the kingdom had been weakened considerably and both the Hittite and Assyrian threats increased. At the same time, the diplomatic relationship with Egypt went cold, the Egyptians fearing the growing power of the Hittites and Assyrians. The Hittite king Suppiluliuma I invaded the Mitanni vassal states in northern Syria and replaced them with loyal subjects. In the capital Washukanni, a new power struggle broke out. The Hittites and the Assyrians supported different pretenders to the throne. Finally a Hittite army conquered the capital Washukanni and installed Shattiwaza, the son of Tushratta, as their vassal king of Mitanni in the late 14th century BC. The kingdom had by now been reduced to the Khabur Valley. The Assyrians had not given up their claim on Mitanni, and in the 13th century BC, Shalmaneser I annexed the kingdom. Nairi, Shupria and Hayassa [edit] The Nairi, Shupria and Hayassa tribes are a successive continuation of Armenian confederations that fought the Assyrians and Hittites for almost 500 years going from periods of vassalisation and infighting to periods of fierce campaigns against the Hittites causing a lot of trouble. There are mentions of 40 kings confirming the fact that this was a confederation of kingdoms who had to pay tribute to the Assyrians Urartu [edit] Urartu (Biainili in Urartian) was an ancient kingdom in the mountainous plateau between Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Caucasus mountains, later known as the Armenian Highland, and it centered around Lake Van (present-day eastern Turkey). The kingdom existed from about 1000 BC, or earlier, until 585 BC. The name corresponds to the Biblical Ararat. Urartu was often called the "Kingdom of Ararat" in many ancient manuscripts and holy writings of different nations. The reason for uncertainty in the names (i.e. Urartu and Ararat) is due to variations in sources. In fact, the written languages at that time employed only consonants and not vowels. So the word itself in various ancient sources is written as "RRT", which could be either Ararat, or Urartu, or Uruarti and so on (for more on the name's etymology, see the section Name below). Ancient sources have sometimes used "Armenia" and "Urartu" interchangeably to refer to the same country. For example, in the trilingual Behistun inscription, carved in 520 BC by the order of Darius the Great of Persia the country is referred to as Arminia in Old Persian, translated as Harminuia in Elamite and Urartu in Babylonian. Furthermore, the kingdom was known as Armenia to the Greeks (and, subsequently, to the Roman Empire) living in western Anatolia, possibly due to the fact that the contacts they had with Urartu, were through the people of the tribe of Armen. The kingdom fought mainly with the Assyrians and under Sarduri II and Argishti II defeated the Assyrians and drove them to their heartlands, cutting them off North and East. Their successors however would prove incapable of maintaining the Empire and after the death of Argishti II the Empire lost a successive war to Assyria and would later become a vassal of the Medes. Antiquity [edit] Artaxiad dynasty [edit] An Armenian Hellenistic state was founded in 190 BC and ruled by the Artaxiad dynasty. At the height of its power, Greater Armenia spread over parts of what is today the Caucasus, Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. After its expansion under the leadership of Tigranes II, it confronted the Republic of Rome. Although it briefly lost its independence, it reaffirmed itself in the region with the Arsacid dynasty of Armenia. From then on, Romans and Persians both tried to create close relations with the Armenians. Although the Arsacid dynasty was of Iranian origin, it severed its relations with Persia when the rival Sassanid dynasty took over, and further when Armenia accepted Christianity in 301. While under Persian control, in 451, the battle of Vartanantz was fought by Armenians against the Persians in order to resist forced conversion to Zoroastrianism. Although a military defeat, the Persians afterwards allowed the Armenians to freely practice Christianity. The army of Tigranes II [edit] Tigranes II had massed a large army in his quest to extend the borders of Armenia. According to the author of Judith, his army included chariots and 12,000 cavalrymen, probably indicating heavy cavalry or cataphracts, commonly used by Seleucids and Parthians. He also had 120,000 infantrymen and 12,000 mounted archers, which were also an important feature of the Parthian army. Like the Seleucids, the bulk of Tigranes' army were the foot soldiers. The Jewish historian Josephus talks of over 500,000 men in total on their march and conquest into Seleucia and Nabatea, including the camp followers. These latter were the camels, donkeys, and mules for the baggage; innumerable sheep, cattle, and goats for the food supply which was abundant for each man, and much gold and silver. As a result, the marching Armenian army was "a huge, irregular force, too many to count, like locusts or the dust of the earth". It was thus, not unlike the Eastern hordes. Regardless, the smaller Cappadocian, Graeco-Phoenician, and Nabatean armies were no match for the sheer number of soldiers. However, the organized Roman army with its legions posed a much greater challenge to the Armenians.[1] Note that the numbers given by Israelite historians of the time were probably exaggerated, considering the fact that the Hasmonean Jews lost the war against Tigranes. Plutarch wrote that the Armenian archers could kill from 200 meters with their deadly accurate arrows. The Romans admired and respected the bravery and the warrior spirit of the Armenian Cavalry -- the hardcore of Tigran's Army. The Roman historian Sallustius Crispus wrote that the Armenian [Ayrudzi - lit. horsemen] Cavalry was "remarkable by the beauty of their horses and armor" Horses in Armenia, since ancient times were considered as the most important part and pride of the warrior.[2][unreliable source?] Armenian cavalry [edit] Armenian horsemen were used by both Armenia, and also by nearby kingdoms or empires such as Pontus, Parthia, Persia, and the Roman Empire. Chapot wrote: "What they say about Armenia bewilders us. How could this mountain people develop such a cavalry that was able to measure itself against the horsemen of the Medes? One thing which is certain is the fact that Armenia was a source of excellent well bred horses. The people in this country had discovered that horses were not just an economic asset, but could also be used for military purposes."[3] In Sassanid Persia, the Armenians were accorded a status similar to the elite "Savaran" of the Persian army. The equipment of the Armenian cavalry was similar to that of the Savaran. Pro-Sassanian Armenian cavalry units fought under Sassanid banners and were allowed to enter the royal capital, Ctesiphon. The Armenians were in fact honoured for their services. For example, general Smbat Bagratuni was accorded particular honor and attention by Khosrow II. In 619, due to his victory over the Turks who then resided in Central Asia, he was given gifts, such as lavishly decorated robes, and the command of a number of the king's royal guards. Khosrow II also raised him to third in rank among the nobles of the court. Moreover, pro-Sassanian Armenians supplied excellent light cavalry and infantry, who were notable for using slings to repel enemy cavalry, and spears for close combat.[4] Early Middle Ages [edit] Armenia in the Byzantine Empire [edit] During the Byzantine occupation of Western Armenia, the Armenians were considered an important element of the Byzantine army. As a result, they were encouraged to settle in distant regions of the Byzantine Empire in order to serve there. For example, in the 6th century, Emperor Maurice encouraged Armenians to settle around Pergamum in Western Anatolia. The Armenian troops became more and more important towards the 7th century; 2000 formed an armoured cavalry elite on the Danube frontier against the Avars, a nomadic people who were invading Europe. Others even defended the imperial capital of Constantinople.[5] In sixth century Narses, one of great generals of Justinian I, along with other victories succeeded in reconquering Italy from Ostgoths. Traditional Armenian arms and armour [edit] "David of Sassoun" is an Armenian national epic that developed towards the Middle Ages during the Arab occupation of Armenia. Traditional Armenian arms and armour seem to be reflected in it. In this oral tale, the warrior wears a padded helmet, a mail shirt, and a lamellar cuirass plus metal leg defenses and a large shield. His weapons include sword, spear, bow and arrows, but primary importance goes to the mace. Constant reference to such weapons being thrown by horsemen, and even of a mace pinning a rider's leg to his saddle, seem to suggest that later transmitters of this oral tale might have been confusing the mace "gurz" with a heavy javelin known in Iran as "guzar". Javelin-combat between horsemen with blunted weapons is still a popular game in Eastern Anatolia, where it is known as "cerit".[6] Bagratid Kingdom of Armenia [edit] Following Byzantine occupation of Western Armenia, Sassanid occupation of Eastern Armenia, and subsequent Arab conquest of the region, the Armenians reestablished their sovereignty over their ancestral lands in the form of the Bagratid Kingdom of Armenia. In Armenia, local nakharars were able to raise 25,000 to 40,000 men, but such a levy was rare. The country was strongly fortified. It is said that seventy castles defended the province of Vaspurakan, near Lake Van. There existed a special regiment of mountaineers who were trained to roll rocks onto their foes. In siege warfare, Armenians used iron hooks to help them climb fortification walls, and large leather shields to protect them from anything that would be dropped from above. Each nakharar led a force of free men under his own coat-of-arms. Armenians were well equipped for the time, as their country was rich in iron. The Armenian army also consisted of heavy cavalry called Ayruzdi. These Ayruzdi were said to be the strongest cavalry force of the time. Levies were recruited from the commoners in Armenia. Christian Armenian levies would fight for Christianity for any of the Christian armies of the time. It is said that most of Vartan Mamikonian's army were Christian levies[5] Fortifications of Ani [edit] During the reign of King Ashot III, Ani became the capital of Armenia. It was a naturally protected city, built on a triangular plateau, its only vulnerable part being the north. In order to protect the future capital of Armenia and its inhabitants, the king built defenses across the narrowest point of the site. However, upon being declared capital of the kingdom, the city expanded quickly. Consequently, a line of massive double walls were built further to the north during the reign of King Smbat II. These northern walls are the most impressive part of Ani. The rest of the city was also well protected by fortifications and towers.[7] High Middle Ages [edit] Involvement in the Byzantine army [edit] In the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, Armenian involvement in the Byzantine army came from three different sources: "allied" contingents from Bagratid Armenia, soldiers regularly recruited by the Byzantine army, as well as emigrants from Arab-controlled parts of Armenia. The fall of Bagratid Armenia and the subsequent dispersion of Armenians throughout Eastern Anatolia filled the ranks of the Byzantine army with Armenian military units or tagmata Armeniôn.[8] In this period, some dukes of Antioch, as well as those of Chaldia and Mesopotamia were thought to have such units under their command. Because of the Armenian presence in the Byzantine military in those areas, these three "themes" or districts were called armenika themata.[8] An Armenian contingent in the Byzantine army fought and terrorized the Arabs of Crete in 960-961 when Nicephorus Phocas invaded the island, and in 965, a contingent was sent to Cilicia as well. Under John Tzimisces, an Armenian contingent also participated in the campaigns against the Rus in 971, and under Basil II, in 986, there was an Armenian participation in the campaigns against the Bulgars. Armenian mercenaries were also present in the Byzantine capital of Constantinople, and there existed Armenian military colonies in Cyprus.[8] When the Byzantine Empire took over Bagratid Armenia in 1045, and with the subsequent Seljuk conquest of the area, a large number of Armenians moved elsewhere. Most of these fleeing families settled in and around Cilicia where they established a kingdom,[9] while some moved further south, to Egypt, and others went to the Balkans, Crimea, and Poland. Involvement in the Egyptian army [edit] Although most Armenians were Christians, they played a significant role in nearby Muslim nations, such as Egypt. Some Muslim Armenian mercenaries were employed by the Egyptian Tulunids towards the end of the 9th century. Armenian troops also served in Hamdanid, Mirdasid, and Fatimid forces. When Byzantium subjugated the Bagratid Armenian kingdom, many Armenians migrated to Egypt and formed a large corps of infantry archers under Muslim Armenian leadership. Eventually, Armenian troops seized control of Cairo in 1073–1074. Their leader thus took important positions in the Fatimid administration, in the context of which more Armenians were recruited in the Egyptian army. This recruitment was reduced after the Seljuk Turks and Crusaders made their arrival.[10] Georgian rule [edit] Armenia was occupied by the Great Seljuk Empire until 1123, when the Kingdom of Georgia liberated some Armenian areas after Armenian liberation. Armenia became part of the feudal land of Kingdom of Georgia and noble Georgian-Armenian family of Mkhergrdzeli (Zakaryan) had a significant role in a country. Starting in 1190, the Mkhargrdzelis rose quickly in power. In the ninth year of Tamar's reign the Mandaturtukhutsesi and Amirspasalar Zakaria Mkhargrdzeli and his brother Ivane the atabag took Dvin in 1193. They also took Gelakun, Bijnisi, Amberd, and Bargushat, and all the towns above the city of Ani, up to the bridge of Khodaafarin bridge. In 1195 when Eldiguzids invaded in the kingdom. Armenian troops joined the feudal army of Georgia under command of David Soslan. General battle was held in 1195 near Shamkor (Battle of Shamkor). Abu-Bakr, reinforced by his client Muslim emirs, met the enemy at the well-fortified city of Shamkor on June 1, 1195. David Soslan sent a relatively small force to break through the gates of the city, while he led the main Georgian troops to raid deep in the enemy's rear. However, poor roads and difficult landscape were setback for the Georgians, and the Atabeg defended the city for a while. Nevertheless, David Soslan's maneuver proved to be decisive and Abu Bakr's army was severely defeated. Shamkor was eventually captured by the Georgians who then chased the enemy's soldiers up to the city of Ganja which in its turn fell to the victors. Around the year 1199, they took the city of Ani, and in 1201, Georgian ruling queen Tamar gave Ani to them as a fief.[11] Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia [edit] The Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia was founded during the Middle Ages by Armenians fleeing from the Byzantines, and later, the Seljuk Turks. The Cilician Armenians, being Christian, were at times allied with Frankish crusaders during the First Crusade.[9] In the context of the friendly Crusader-Armenian relations, they adopted European traditions, even in their military garments and strategies. According to contemporary chroniclers, there were up to 100,000 men in the Cilician Armenian army, a third of which was cavalry. At the time, Armenian heavy cavalry bore heavy resemblances to their Frankish counterparts, and the equipment used by the Armenian army was more and more akin to that used by the Europeans.[12] The Armenians provided great help in the Crusaders' military campaigns in the Levant. In fact, the Crusaders employed Armenian siege engineers throughout their campaigns. For example, a certain specialist named "Havedic" (Latinized form of "Avedis") designed the machines used to attack Tyre in 1124.[6] Leo II introduced important changes in Cilician Armenian military organization, which until then was similar to that the Armenian kingdoms of Greater Armenia. The "nakharars", Armenian feudal nobles, lost much of their old autonomy. The names and functions of regional leaders were Latinized, and many facets of the army structure were inspired or copied from the Crusader states, particularly from the nearby principality of Antioch.[6] Fortifications in Cilician Armenia [edit] Most Armenian fortification in Cilicia are characterized by multiple bailey walls laid with irregular plans to follow the sinuosities of the outcrops, rounded and especially horseshoe-shaped towers, finely-cut often rusticated ashlar facing stones, a complex bent entrance with a slot machicolation, embrasured loopholes for archers, barrel or pointed vaults over undercrofts, gates and chapels, and cisterns with elaborate scarped drains.[13] In the immediate proximity of many fortifications are the remains of civilian settlements.[14] Some of the important castles in the Armenian Kingdom include: Sis, Anavarza, Vahka, Yılankale, Sarvandikar, Kuklak, T‛il Hamtun, Hadjin, Lampron, and Gaban (modern Geben).[15] Armenian design ideas influenced castle building in nearby Crusader states, such as the Principality of Antioch, where fortifications ranged from tiny hilltop outposts to major garrison fortresses. Antioch attracted few European settlers, and thus they relied heavily on military elites of Greek, Syrian, and Armenian origin, who probably influenced the design of local fortifications.[16] Ottoman-Iranian Rule [edit] In 1375, the Egyptian Mamelukes took over Cilician Armenia, effectively ending Armenian sovereignty. The Ottoman Empire eventually established its rule over Cilicia with its conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate under Selim I. The khachen principality which was Armenias last bastion of independence managed to resist and manage rule after successive rule of the Seljuks, Mongol Empire, Ilkhanate, the Timurids and the Ak and Kara Koyunlu, Armenia was conquered by the emerging Safavid state of king Ismail I. In 1555 with the Peace of Amasya, and decisively with the Treaty of Zuhab (1639), the Ottomans gained Western Armenia, while Eastern Armenia remained under Persian rule. Many Armenians served in the armies of both empires. Many Armenians were enlisted in the elite gholam corps of the Safavids. The Ottoman Army at its earlier stage enjoyed the service of Armenian infantry archers who relied on an old-fashioned composite bow. They wore muted colors or black as a result of the Ottoman laws which reserved brighter costume for the Turkish elite.[18] Later on, some Armenian children were raised as Janissaries. The eastern part of the traditional Armenian lands was conquered by Imperial Russia from Qajar Iran, as confirmed in 1828 by the Treaty of Turkmenchay. Armenian militia [edit] The Armenian militia were irregular units who voluntarily left their families in order to fight and defend Armenian villages and city quarters from Ottoman aggression and massacres. There were often only a handful of "fedayees" during their battles against the Ottoman troops and Kurdish irregulars. Their distant goal was to gain Armenian autonomy (Armenakan) or independence (Dashnaks, Hunchaks) depending on their ideology and degree of oppression received by Armenians. Some of them also helped the Iranian revolutionaries during their revolution. World War I [edit] The Armenian people were subjected to a genocide by the Young Turk government during World War I. Between 1.5 million and 2 million men, women and children were killed. Armenians often resisted the actions of the Turkish government, such as during the Van Resistance. With the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Armenia, in the Caucasus Campaign after the collapse of the Russian Empire and Army, the newly organized army fought a couple of battles against the Ottoman Empire. Victory at the Battle of Sardarapat proved that the Armenians were a capable power, but ultimately the Armenians were forced to surrender most of their land and weapons. During the same time, the Democratic Republic of Armenia also faced the Georgian-Armenian War 1918 and Armenian-Azeri war 1918. Aftermath [edit] In 1920, Armenia fought a series of battles with Turkey during the Turkish-Armenian War. After an invasion by the Soviet Red Army, Armenia was absorbed in 1921 by the Soviet Union. World War II [edit] Armenia participated in the Second World War on the side of the Allies under the Soviet Union. Armenia was spared the devastation and destruction that wrought most of the western Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War of World War II. The Nazis never reached the South Caucasus, which they intended to do in order to capture the oil fields in Azerbaijan. Still, Armenia played a valuable role in aiding the allies both through industry and agriculture. An estimated 300–500,000 Armenians served in the war, almost half of whom did not return.[19] Armenia thus had one of the highest death tolls, per capita, among the other Soviet republics. A total of 117 citizens of Armenia including 10 non ethnic Armenians were awarded Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 36 had been killed in action and were awarded this title posthumously.[20][21] 27 Armenian soldiers and sergeants were also awarded the Order of Glory, and a total of 66,802 participants from Armenia were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. Armenians living in the areas occupied regions of the Soviet Union formed partisan groups to combat the Germans.[22] Over sixty Armenians were promoted to the rank of general, and with an additional four eventually achieving the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Hovhannes Bagramyan was both the first non-Slavic Marshal and commander to hold the position of front commander when he was assigned to be the commander of the First Baltic Front in 1943. Admiral Ivan Isakov became the second Admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union. Hamazasp Babadzhanian was the second of only two Chief Marshal of the Tank and Armored Troops. Sergei Khudyakov had been among the third to be Marshal of Aviation. Sergey Aganov became the fifth Marshal of the Engineering Troops[22] Six special military divisions were formed in Soviet Armenia in 1941–42, partly because so many draftees from the republic could not understand Russian. These six divisions alone had more than 67,000 soldiers. Five of them, the 89th, 409th, 408th, 390th, and 76th Divisions, would have a distinguished war record, while the sixth(261st Rifle Division) was ordered to stay in Armenia to guard the republic's western borders against a possible incursion by neighboring Turkey. The 89th Tamanyan Division, composed of ethnic Armenians, distinguished itself during the war. Led by Major General Nver Safaryan, it fought in the Battle of Berlin and entered Berlin. Many Armenian soldiers also served in two other multi-ethnic divisions. They came not only from Soviet Armenia, but also from the other Soviet republics and other countries with considerable Armenian minorities.[20] The Armenian SSR provided weapons and rebuilt broken airplanes. Workers donated to the Defense Fund 216,000,000 rubles. Armenia, as a gift, sent to the front 45 wagons of provisions. Armenian communities in the Middle East and the West also donated considerable sums of money to the Soviet government to help construct a series of tanks for the Red Army. These tanks were named after David of Sasun, the hero of an Armenian medieval epic, and Marshal Bagramyan.[20] Outside of Armenia and the Soviet Union, Missak Manouchian was one of the leaders of the French Resistance. He was captured and executed by the Nazis in 1944, together with over 20 members of FTP-MOI Paris region led by Manouchian, and remains a much respected figure in modern French history.[20] Decorated soldiers who fought in the United States Army include Ernest H. Dervishian (recipient of the Medal of Honor), Harry Kizirian (most decorated serviceman from Rhode Island and one of the most decorated marines of the war), and Victor Maghakian (one of the most decorated American soldiers of the war).[23] Brothers Noel Agazarian and Jack Agazarian both served in the British Royal Air Force, Noel was promoted to Flying Officer and participated in the Battle of Britain before being killed in action in 1941, while Jack also became a field agent for the Secret Intelligence Service and was captured and executed in 1945. Their sister, Monique Agazarian, became one of only 10 young women accepted into the Air Transport Auxiliary for ab initio pilot-training.[24] Gevork Vartanian was an intelligence agent responsible for thwarting Operation Long Jump, and thus preventing the assassination of Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Tehran conference in 1943.[25] During World War II, about 18,500 Armenians served in the armed forces of the United States.[26] A number of them were decorated for their service, including Col. Ernest Dervishian, a native of Virginia, who was awarded the Medal of Honor.[27] US Marine Harry Kizirian is considered the most decorated soldier of the state of Rhode Island.[28] Another Marine captain, Victor Maghakian, is considered one of the most decorated American soldiers of the war.[29][30] The highest-ranking Armenian-American during World War II was Brigadier General Haig Shekerjian (who had previously served in the Pancho Villa Expedition and as an American military attache in the Middle Eastern theater of World War I). He was appointed commanding general of Camp Sibert, Alabama Archived July 25, 2020, at the Wayback Machine, which was used extensively as the main training camp for chemical warfare troops, and remained in that position until 1945. Shekerjian also gave numerous speeches during the war encouraging Americans of Armenian descent to enlist.[31] On the Axis side, the Armenische Legion was created within the Wehrmacht, which consisted mainly of Soviet prisoners of war, who had opted to fight for German forces rather than be sent to the Nazi POW camps or killed. The legion was led by former Defence Minister of Armenia General Drastamat Kanayan, who fought against the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front. Kanayan was among the minority in the legion who volunteered, under the hope of freeing Armenia from Soviet control. The total number of Armenians serving in the German armed forces during the war reached 33,000: 14,000 were placed in field battalions, while another 7,000 served in logistical and other non-combat units. The legion participated in the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and the Caucasus. It did not take part in the Holocaust, on the contrary several Jewish soldiers captured as POWs were saved by some of the Armenians in the Legion. Several instances included Jews being sent to the battalion to evade detection by the Nazis. Towards the end of the war, many of the legion deserted, defected or revolted.[32] In spite of Nazi Germany acknowledging the Armenians were an Indo-European (or Aryan) people, Adolf Hitler personally stated, "I don't trust the Armenians."[33] An estimated 600,000 Armenians served in World War 2 from all over the world.[citation needed] As of 2005 , some 9,000 veterans of the war were still living in Armenia.[20] Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) [edit] During the 20th century, Nagorno-Karabakh had been denied an Armenian identity by the succeeding Russian, British, and Azeri rulers.[34] The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh had accused the Soviet Azerbaijani government of conducting forced ethnic cleansing of the region. The majority Armenian population, with ideological and material support from Armenia, started a movement to transfer the territory to Armenia. The issue was at first a "war of words" in 1987. In a December 1991 referendum, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh approved the creation of an independent state. A Soviet proposal for enhanced autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan satisfied neither side. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a war for independence of the Republic of Artsakh erupted between the Armenians and Azerbaijan, which claimed the area. In the post-Soviet power vacuum, military action between Azerbaijan and Armenia was heavily influenced by the Russian military. Furthermore, the Azeri military employed a large number of mercenaries from Ukraine and from Russia. As many as one thousand Afghan mujaheddin participated in the fighting.[35] There were also fighters from Chechnya fighting on the side of Azerbaijan.[36][37] By the end of 1993, the conflict had caused thousands of casualties and created hundreds of thousands of refugees on both sides. By May 1994 the Armenians were in control of 14% of the territory of Azerbaijan. As a result, the Azerbaijanis started direct negotiations with the Karabakhi authorities. A cease-fire was reached on May 12, 1994, through Russian negotiation. But, a final resolution to the conflict has yet to be realized.[needs update] Timeline of notable events [edit] Victories are in light gray, losses are in red. War/battle Opponent Part of Date Armed Force Assyrian-Urartuian Wars Neo-Assyrian Empire 714-627 BC Kingdom of Urartu Battle of Gaugamela Macedonia Wars of Alexander the Great 331 BC Yervanduni Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Protopachium Roman Republic First Mithridatic War 89 BC Artashesian Kingdom of Armenia Armenian-Parthian War Parthian Empire 87-85 BC Artashesian Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Tigranocerta Roman Republic Third Mithridatic War 69 BC Artashesian Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Artaxata Roman Republic Third Mithridatic War 68 BC Artashesian Kingdom of Armenia Armenian-Iberian War Caucasian Iberia 51-53 AD Arshakuni Kingdom of Armenia War of the Armenian Succession Roman Empire Roman–Parthian Wars 58-63 AD Arshakuni Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Bagrevand Sassanid Empire 371 Arshakuni Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Avarayr Sassanid Empire 451 Armenian rebels Battle of Varnakert Umayyad Caliphate 702 Armenian rebels Battle of Bagrevand Abbasid Caliphate 775 Armenian rebels The Battle of 40 Abbasid Caliphate 863 Armenian rebels Battle of Sevan Sajid Emirate of Azerbaijan 924 Bagratuni Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Ani Byzantine Empire 1042 Bagratuni Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Azaz (1125) Seljuk Empire Crusades 1125 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Mamistra Byzantine Empire 1152 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Siege of Acre (1189–1191) Ayyubid dynasty Crusades 1189-1191 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Ain Jalut Mamluk Sultanate Mongol invasions of the Levant 1260 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Garni Khwarezmid Empire 1225 Zakarian Principality of Armenia Siege of Baghdad (1258) Abbasid Caliphate Mongol invasions of the Levant 1258 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Ain Jalut Mamluk Sultanate Mongol invasions of the Levant 1260 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Siege of Aleppo (1260) Mamluk Sultanate Mongol invasions of the Levant 1260 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Mari Mamluk Sultanate 1266 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Second Battle of Sarvandik'ar Mamluk Sultanate 1276 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Second Battle of Homs Mamluk Sultanate Mongol invasions of the Levant 1281 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Wadi al-Khaznadar Mamluk Sultanate Mongol invasions of the Levant 1299 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Marj al-Saffar (1303) Mamluk Sultanate Mongol invasions of the Levant 1303 Cilician Kingdom of Armenia Battle of Halidzor Ottoman Empire Armenian national liberation movement March 1726 Armenian militiamen under Davit Bek First Zeitun Resistance Ottoman Empire Armenian national liberation movement August 1862 Armenian fedayi First Sasun Resistance Ottoman Empire Armenian national liberation movement, Hamidian massacres August 1894 Social Democrat Hunchakian Party Second Zeitun Resistance Ottoman Empire Hamidian massacres October 1895-January 1896 Social Democrat Hunchakian Party First Van Resistance Ottoman Empire Hamidian massacres June 3–11, 1896 Armenian civilians, Armenakan Party Khanasor Expedition Kurds of Khanasor Armenian national liberation movement July 25–27, 1897 Armenian Revolutionary Federation, assisted by Social Democrat Hunchakian Party, Armenakan Party Battle of Khasdour Ottoman Empire Armenian national liberation movement 1899 Armenian Revolutionary Federation [citation needed] Battle of Holy Apostles Monastery Ottoman Empire Armenian national liberation movement November 3–27, 1901 Armenian fedayi Second Sasun Resistance Ottoman Empire Armenian national liberation movement March–April, 1904 Armenian Revolutionary Federation Battle of Sulukh Ottoman Empire Armenian national liberation movement May 27, 1907 Armenian Revolutionary Federation Third Zeitun Resistance Ottoman Empire Armenian resistance during the Armenian genocide August 30, 1914 – March 25, 1915 Social Democrat Hunchakian Party Second Van Resistance Ottoman Empire Armenian resistance during the Armenian genocide April 19-May 17, 1915 Armenian civilians, Armenian Revolutionary Federation & Armenakan Party Battle of Salmas Ottoman Empire Persian Campaign of World War I April 19-May 17, 1915 Caucasus Army of the Russian Empire, Armenian volunteer units Shabin-Karahisar Resistance Ottoman Empire Armenian resistance during the Armenian genocide June 2–30, 1915 Social Democrat Hunchakian Party Musa Ler Resistance Ottoman Empire Armenian resistance during the Armenian genocide July 21-September 12, 1915 Armenian civilians First Urfa Resistance Ottoman Empire Armenian resistance during the Armenian genocide September 29-October 20, 1915 Armenian civilians Armenian-Azerbaijani War Azerbaijan March 30, 1918 – April 28, 1920 Republic of Armenia, Central Caspian Dictatorship & Armenian Revolutionary Federation Battle of Bash Abaran Ottoman Empire Caucasus Campaign of World War I May 21–24, 1918 Armenian volunteer units[38] Battle of Sardarapat Ottoman Empire Caucasus Campaign of World War I May 22–26, 1918 Armenian volunteer units[38] Battle of Gharakilise Ottoman Empire Caucasus Campaign of World War I May 25–28, 1918 Armenian volunteer units[38] Battle of Arara Ottoman Empire Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I September 19, 1918 French Armenian Legion Armenian-Georgian War Georgia October 17-December 31, 1918 Republic of Armenia Marash Resistance Ottoman Empire Cilicia Campaign of Turkish War of Independence January 21-February 13, 1920 French Armenian Legion Second Urfa Resistance Ottoman Empire Cilicia Campaign of Turkish War of Independence February 9-April 11, 1920 French Armenian Legion Aintab Resistance Ottoman Empire Cilicia Campaign of Turkish War of Independence April 1, 1920 – February 9, 1921 French Armenian Legion Armenian-Turkish War Ottoman Empire Turkish War of Independence June 16-December 2, 1920 Republic of Armenia Armenian-Soviet War Russian SFSR Russian Civil War September–November 29, 1920 Republic of Armenia Anti-Soviet Resistance Russian SFSR February 13, 1921 – July 13, 1921 Armenian Revolutionary Federation (until April 26); Republic of Mountainous Armenia (after April 26) First Nagorno-Karabakh War Azerbaijan Post-Soviet conflicts February 13, 1988 – May 12, 1994 Republic of Artsakh Republic of Armenia Second Nagorno-Karabakh War Azerbaijan Turkey Post-Soviet conflicts September 27, 2020 – November 10, 2020 Republic of Artsakh Republic of Armenia See also [edit] History portal Armed Forces of Armenia Armenian Air Force History of Armenia List of wars involving Armenia Military history of the Republic of Artsakh References [edit]
3581	dbpedia	1	3	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aintab	en	Battle of Aintab	https://en.wikipedia.org/static/favicon/wikipedia.ico	https://en.wikipedia.org/static/favicon/wikipedia.ico	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/99/Question_book-new.svg/50p...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2008-05-02T03:15:35+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aintab	Battle in the Holy Land in 1150 In the Battle of Aintab in August 1150, a Crusader force commanded by King Baldwin III of Jerusalem repelled the attacks of Nur ad-Din Zangi of Aleppo and evacuated the Latin Christian residents of the County of Edessa. This was both a tactical victory and a strategic defeat for the Crusaders. Zengi, Nur ad-Din's father, had seized Edessa in 1144. Deprived of their capital, the western lands of the County of Edessa continued a precarious existence for six more years. They came under increasing pressure from the Muslim states surrounding them. In 1150, the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Komnenos expressed an interest in acquiring the rump of the County of Edessa. As their feudal overlord, Baldwin III was required to defend them in case of attack. Recognizing that the Crusaders were unlikely to hold on to these territories for much longer, Baldwin agreed to turn them over to the Byzantines. Baldwin met with Manuel's agents at Turbessel (Tell Bashir) to negotiate the transfer of territories. Franks or Armenians who wished to remain under Latin rule were allowed to march back to the Principality of Antioch with the king, taking their possessions with them. Baldwin's small army consisted of 500 mounted knights[1] and an unknown number of foot soldiers. Nur ad-Din's forces fell upon the withdrawing Latin column between Dülük and Aintab. By deploying his soldiers in battle order, Baldwin was able to get his non-combatants safely into the town of Aintab, where the Latin force spent the night. The following day the Franks organized their soldiers to protect the refugees and the baggage train. Baldwin led the advance guard while Antiochene knights protected the right and left flanks. Raymond II of Tripoli and Humphrey II of Toron directed a strong rear guard. The position of the foot soldiers in the formation was not mentioned by the chronicler, William of Tyre. Nur ad-Din's Turks attacked in the traditional manner, surrounding the column and subjecting it to "arrows in such showers that the appearance of the baggage soon resembled a porcupine."[2] All day long, the Turks tried to break up the Crusader formation or cause a collapse of morale. But the Franks plodded ahead, keeping a strict march discipline and making partial charges when their enemies pressed too close. Nur ad-Din, discouraged by his lack of success and short on supplies, withdrew at sunset. The Crusader column delivered the refugees to Antiochene territories without further trouble. Baldwin had calculated correctly. Within a year, the remaining territories of the former County of Edessa fell to the Turks. The skirmish had been a tactical success because the Crusaders escaped serious losses and successfully protected the pro-Latin civilians. But the permanent loss of the County of Edessa represented a strategic defeat.
3581	dbpedia	1	16	https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520228900.003.0003	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
3581	dbpedia	3	1	https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520228900.003.0003	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
3581	dbpedia	0	60	https://naasr.org/pages/previous-recipients	en	Grant Recipients	https://cdn.shopify.com/…36952&width=1200	https://cdn.shopify.com/…36952&width=1200	[ "https://naasr.org/cdn/shop/files/NAASRlogo_7_350x.png?v=1613536952", "https://naasr.org/cdn/shop/files/NAASRlogo_7_300x300.png?v=1613536952" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Grants Issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan (since 2012) In addition to the grants listed below, since 2006 NAASR has provided annual support to the Zoryan Institute’s Genocide and Human Rights University Program and the UCLA Armenian Graduate Student Colloquium. 2019 Tigran Aleksanyan, archaeologist, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography of NAS RA, support for project to document monuments preserved in the Republic of Armenia and Artsakh associated with the memory of Vardanants' martyrs. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Khoren Grigoryan, PhD student, NAS RA Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, Yerevan, travel grant to participate in 16th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2, 2018, presenting paper “Transforming Identity after 1915: Case of Musa Dagh.” NAASR grant issued. Hratch Kestenian, PhD candidate in History at the Graduate Center, CUNY, travel grant to visit Istanbul to consult the Ottoman archives housed at the Başbakanlık and archives of Surp Prgich (Holy Savior) hospital in Istanbul for doctoral research for thesis entitled “The Making of a Social Disease: Tuberculosis and the Medicalization of Ottoman Society (1827-1922).” Grant issued by NAASR. Amine Alkan Reis, PhD student, Fakultät VI Planen, Bauen, Umwelt of Technische Universitaet Berlin, support for travel and fieldwork for thesis, “A Model Proposal for a Holistic Approach to the Conservation of Evacuated Rural Settlements in the North Eastern Anatolia's Armenian Heritage: Case Study of Aprank (St. David) Monastery and Üçpınar (Aprank) Village.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Henry Shapiro, Van Leer Institute, Fellow at the Polonsky Academy for Advanced Study Jerusalem, Israel, and Visiting Researcher at the Faculty for Humanities, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, travel grant to visit Venice and Istanbul to access materials on Eremia Chelebi for transformation of thesis “The Great Armenian Flight: The Celali Revolts and the Rise of Western Armenian Society” into book. Grant issued by NAASR. Abraham Terian, retired Professor of Armenian Patristics and Academic Dean at St. Nersess Armenian Seminary, applying for additional support for project: The Life of Mashtots‘ by His Disciple Koriwn, with an introduction, translation, and commentary. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ani Yenokyan, PhD student, Armenian State Academy of Fine Arts, and Junior researcher at the department of Art History and Writing Center of Research, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts “Matenadaran,” travel grant to participate in 16th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2, 2018, presenting paper “The Illustrations of Armenian Printed Books in the Context of Early Modern Armenian Culture (16th-18th Centuries).” Grant issued by NAASR. 2018 Taner Akçam, Robert Aram & Marianne Kaloosdian and Stephen & Marian Mugar Chair in Armenian Genocide Studies, Clark University), on behalf of organizers of conference “The Abdul Hamid Era and Beyond: Massacres and Reform, Rupture and Continuity,” which will take place in October 2018 at Clark University. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Rosie Vartyter Aroush, Ph.D. Candidate, Program Coordinator, Teaching Fellow UCLA, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages & Cultures, research grant to support transcription costs of interviews for doctoral work on “Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Armenians in Los Angeles: Family Relationships, Identity Negotiation, & Community Involvement.” Grant issued by NAASR. Lusine Balyan, independent researcher, Armenia, travel grant to participate in International Conference “Linguistic and Literary Studies on the Caucasus”, May 2018, University of Verona, Italy, and present paper “The Individual Between Traditional and Modern Morals in the Works of Hrant Matevosyan.” Grant issued by NAASR. Emre Can Daglioglu, Ph.D. student, History Department, Clark University, travel grant for May 2018 trip to London to conduct research in Foreign Office archives for doctoral research on “Reform and Violence in the Hamidian Era.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Asya Darbinyan, Ph.D. candidate, Clark University, travel grant to participate paper at workshop “Armenian Childhood(s): Histories and Theories of Childhood and Youth in Armenian Studies,” University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, April 2018, to present paper “Victims, Survivors, Savages: Armenian Refugee Children in the Caucasus during the Great War.” Grant issued by NAASR. Marta Filippini, Conservator, Central Institute for the Conservation of Archival and Bibliographic Material of the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage, & Paolo Lucca, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Asian and North African Studies, travel grant to support trip from Italy to Armenia to conduct research at the Matenadaran and other museums to carry out research on medieval Armenian recipes for parchment, inks, pigments, and adhesives manufacturing. Grant issued by NAASR. Samvel Grigoryan, Ph.D. student, Center for Medieval Studies of the Paul-Valery University of Montpellier, France, travel grant to support participation in the 16th Annual Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2018, presenting paper on “Recent Discoveries in Cilicia and Their Contribution to the Issues of Cilician Armenian Studies.” Grant issued by NAASR. Khoren Grigoryan, Ph.D. student, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, NAS Republic of Armenia, travel grant to conduct fieldwork in Anjar in Lebanon for doctoral research on “Identity of Mussadaghian Armenians in Anjar.” Grant issued by NAASR. Shushan Hambaryan, Ph.D. student, Matenadaran, Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, travel grant for research trip from Yerevan to Jerusalem to study manuscripts at Jerusalem Patriarchate of 17th century miniaturist and scribe Markos Patkerahan, for doctoral dissertation, 10-25 May 2018. Grant issued by NAASR. Polina Ivanova, Ph.D. Candidate in History, Harvard University, travel grant to carry out research in Yerevan in September–November 2018 for dissertation “From East of the Mediterranean to West of Iran: Migration, Mobility and Remaking of Human Geography in Medieval Asia Minor (1000-1300).” Grant issued by NAASR. Pınar Karakılçık, Ph.D. student, Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales [INALCO], Paris, travel grant to cover two trips (Istanbul-Yerevan, Istanbul-Paris) in May 2018 to participate in academic events in Paris and in Yerevan. Grant issued by NAASR. Carla Kekejian, Ph.D. student in Communication Sciences and Disorders, University of Utah, travel grant to go to Armenia to document uses of Harsneren in region of Goris and its neighboring villages in Gegharkunik Province for doctoral research. Grant issued by NAASR. Arman Khatchatryan, Ph.D. student in Interdisciplinary Studies, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, travel grant to support participation in the 16th Annual Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2018, presenting paper on “The Political and Scientific-Educational Activities of the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 1909-1949. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Umit Kurt, Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellow, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem, travel grant for research trip to Armenia for book project on key genocide perpetrators in Aintab region Ali Cenani, Ahmed Faik, and Mehmet Yasin. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Khatchig Mouradian, Nikit and Eleanora Ordjanian Visiting Professor, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies Department, Columbia University, travel grant to conduct archival research in Europe (Britain’s National Archives and the Mkhitarist Archives in Vienna), Armenia (National Archives and Library), and Turkey (Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives) for research project on Aram Manougian. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Taline Papazian, Researcher, Institute of Armenian Studies, University of Southern California, grant to support English-language translation of her French-language book L’Arménie à l’épreuve du feu: Forger l’Etat à travers la guerre (Paris: Karthala, 2016). Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Anush Sargsyan, junior researcher and Ph.D. candidate, Mesrop Mashtots Scientific Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts [Matenadaran], travel grant to participate in the 16th Annual Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2018, presenting paper “An Exposition of Yohannes of Amidas’ Heavenly Jerusalem Miniature” (Chester Beatty Library No. 551). Grant issued by NAASR. Marine Sargsyan, Doctoral student at Leiden University, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for History, grant to support visiting research fellowship at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University in 2018, writing thesis on "The Policy of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers: The Case of the Republic of Armenia." Grant issued by NAASR. Alvard Semirjyan, Associate Professor, Faculty of Armenian Philology - Chair of Theory of Literature and Literary Criticism, Yerevan State University, travel grant to participate in International Conference “Linguistic and Literary Studies on the Caucasus,” May 2018, University of Verona, Italy, and present paper “Literary Relations in Post-Independent Period of Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani Literary Texts (Levon Khechoyan’s “King Arshak, Drastamat Eunuch”, Otar Chiladze’s “The Basket” and Akram Aylisli’s “Stone Dreams”).” Grant issued by NAASR. Abraham Terian, Professor of Armenian Patristics and Academic Dean at St. Nersess Armenian Seminary (retired), travel and research grant to support writing of commentary on Koriwn’s The Life of Mashtots in Armenia in 2018. Grant issued by NAASR and the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Meri Yeranosyan, Independent Consultant/Research Analyst, & Sona Mnatsakanyan, Instructor, Armenian Language and Literature, American University of Armenia, travel grant to participate in “Archives of Resistance” International Conference organized by and held at Leeds University, June 2018, to present paper on literary works of Zaven Biberyan. Grant issued by NAASR. 2017 Scott Abramson, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, translation grant to allow completion of forthcoming academic article with working title “The Armenians of the Levant: The Region’s Unsung Builders and Modernizers.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Rosie Vartyter Aroush, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, grant to cover costs of transcription of interviews of subjects for PhD dissertation. Grant issued by NAASR. Gayane Babayan, graduate student, Central European University and Yerevan State University, travel grant to present paper “The Multi-Cultural Artistic Milieu of Fourteenth-Century Crimea: A Note on the Patterns of Artistic Adoption and Adaptation in the Miniatures of the Fourteenth-Century Crimean-Armenian Tetraevangelion” at 15th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA on February 24, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR. Kevork Bardakjian, Manoogian Professor of Armenian Language and Literature, University of Michigan, grant to support travel to Armenia for work on translation of the Chronicle of Grigor Daranaghtsi (or Kamakhetsi), covering 1595-late 1630s, and bibliographic assistance support for two articles on Armenian literature covering the period 1600-1840 and 1840-1920 for AIEA Handbook on Armenian literature to be published by Brill. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Melissa Bilal, Visiting Scholar, Dept. of History, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, travel grant to go to Yerevan in order to complete research in the archives and to work with the staff of the Digital Library (Digilib) of American University of Armenia on the digitization and editing of material for the forthcoming Feminism in Armenian: A History, a book and a website project by Melissa Bilal and Dr. Lerna Ekmekcioglu, about the lives and work of twelve Armenian women who were born in Ottoman Constantinople. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. George Bournoutian, Iona College, publication grant to help cover printing costs of translation with extensive commentary of two books dealing with land tenure in the Yerevan Province in the last years of the 19th century, Земельные Дачи Эриванской Губернии. Выпуск 1- Дачи Эриванского Уезда (Tiflis, 1903) and Земельные Дачи Эриванской Губернии. Выпуск 2. Дачи Новобаязетского Уезда (Tiflis, 1905). Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Iván Gaztañaga González, PhD. Candidate on Genocide, International Law, University of Granada, Spain, research grant to cover costs of copying, digitizing, and transcribing diplomatic documents (letters, telegrams, postcards and press news) in the Spanish National History Archives relating to the Armenian Genocide; for presentation of exhibition of materials; and for publication of materials. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Vahagn Hakobyan, PhD student, Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia, travel grant to conduct research in Iran on “The Impact of Iran’s Political Situation on Armenian Liberation Movement in the Second Half of the 18th Century.” Grant issued by NAASR. Ani Kasparian, independent researcher and Assistant Director, Armenian Research Center, Dearborn, MI, travel grant to conduct interviews and research in Turkey on the experiences of concealed and Islamized Armenians. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Péter Kránitz, graduate student, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest, travel grant to travel to present paper “From Colonialist to Humanitarian? The Dissolution of the Armenian Question into the Discourse on Refugee Rights,” at 15th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA on February 24, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR. Umit Kurt, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, travel grant to conduct research in British National Archives for book project provisionally titled The Curious Case of Ali Cenani Bey: The Story of a Genocidaire During and After the 1915 Armenian Genocide. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Jennifer Manoukian, travel grant to present paper “Disrupting Literature in Diaspora: Zareh Vorpouni’s The Candidate and the Nouveau Roman” at the 15th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 24, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR. Caroline McCune, Masters Candidate in Art History and Museum Studies, Tufts University, travel grant to present paper “Guns & Roses: The Battle of Avarayr in an Armenian Hymnal at the Boston Public Library” at 15th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 24, 2017. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Lilit Melikyan, Ph.D. student in Diaspora studies, Yerevan State University, travel grant for 2-month stay in Tbilisi researching history of Armenians in Georgia during the 12th-18th centuries. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Laura Samvelyan, independent researcher and Assistant Creative Director, Publicis Armenia, travel grant to present paper “Language and Literacy Practices in a Diasporic Setting: Case Study of Armenian Community in Buenos Aires,” at conference “Heritages of Migration: Moving Stories, Objects and Home,” Buenos Aires, Argentina, April 6-10, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR. Marine Sargsyan, PhD Student, Leiden University, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for History, grant to support academic visit at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, as Visiting Scholar, to carry out work for dissertation “Pattern of Change: Socio-Economic Growth and Political Transition in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1991-2013.” Grant issued by NAASR. Theo van Lint, University of Oxford, on behalf of AIEA (Association Internationale des Etudes Arméniennes, grant in support of the 14th General Conference of the AIEA, hosted at Pembroke College, Oxford, August 10-12, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR and by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Tigran Yepremyan, Ph.D. Candidate in World History, Yerevan State University, travel grant to conduct research and participate in symposium “On the Edges of Christianity — Iceland and Armenia in the Middle Ages” at the Centre for Medieval Studies (Miðaldastofa) at the University of Iceland, Reykjavík. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. 2016 Nairi Hakhverdi (project coordinator), publication grant towards translation costs for Anthology of Late Ottoman Armenian Literature (S. Peter Cowe and Theo van Lint, project supervisors). Grant issued by NAASR. Jesse Siragan Arlen, doctoral student in Armenian Studies, UCLA, travel grant to participate in workshop “Introduction to Armenian Manuscript Studies” in Berlin. Grant issued by NAASR. Khatchig Mouradian, Ph.D candidate, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University, travel grant to conduct research in Ottoman archives on the role of Arabs during the Armenian Genocide. Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Lokman Sazan, graduate student at Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona, Spain, research grant to support fieldwork for the project “In Pursuit of Memories of Genocide Among Armenians of Mardin in Turkey.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Vahagn Hakobyan, doctoral student at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Armenia, travel grant to support research in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives in Moscow on “The Situation in the South Caucasus in the 18th Century.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Taner Akçam, Clark University, for digitization and indexing of Fr. Krikor Guerguerian archive of documents on the Armenian Genocide. Grant issued by NAASR. Carla Kekejian, University of California, Irvine, to conduct research in Armenia for project on Harsneren, “the language of the bride,” a defunct, indigenous sign language of Armenia. Grant issued by NAASR. Narek Mkrtchyan, Ara Merjian, Smbat Hovhannisyan, publication grant in support of bilingual (English and Armenian) edition of Gramsci's ‘Circle of Humanity’ and Armenia. Grant issued by NAASR. Rose Vartiter Aroush, doctoral candidate, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, travel grant to participate in joint UCLA-American University of Armenia Graduate Student Conference, “Factors Influencing The Contemporary Construction of Armenian Identity this Spring,” with paper on “Negotiating Multiple Armenian Identities in the Diasporic Community of Los Angeles.” Grant issued by NAASR. Umit Kurt, Ph.D candidate, Clark University, travel grant to participate in panel entitled “New Issues, Perspectives and Sources in Armenian Studies,” for the 5th Global Conference of the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INoGS) in Jerusalem. Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Erna Shirinian (project coordinator), Matenadaran (Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts), Yerevan, grant in support of conference “Historical Tayk: History, Culture, Confession,” organized in Yerevan by the Matenadaran, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, and the Armenian National Committee of Byzantine Studies. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies and NAASR. Erin Piñon, graduate student at Southern Methodist University, travel grant to participate annual meeting of the Sixteenth Century Society and Conference in Bruges, August 18-20, 2016, presenting paper “Lions and Tigers and Trdat—Oh My! Zoomorphic Figures in the Armenian Christianization Myth.” Grant issued by NAASR. Anna Aleksanyan, PhD student, Clark University, travel grant to attend and present paper “‘Neutral Home’ and the Issue of Identity of Armenian Child Survivors” at third international multidisciplinary conference titled "Children and War: Past and Present" which will take place on July 2016, in Salzburg, organized by the University of Wolverhampton (UK), together with the University of Salzburg. Grant issued by NAASR. Jasmine Dum-Tragut, University of Salzburg, research grant for project “The Unknown Armenian Prisoners of War in Habsburg Austria, 1915-1917: The anthropological studies of Rudolf Pöch.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ani Honarchiansaky, PhD student, UCLA, travel grant to attend and present paper “'And they took away from them the bones of their own kings that the Persians were carrying away into captivity': The Significance of Bones in Armenian, Zoroastrian, and Early Christian Beliefs,” at the International Medieval Congress (IMC) in Leeds, England, July 2016. Grant issued by NAASR. Allison Suhan, Adventures in Preservation Board Member, grant in support of ongoing documentation and creation of database of Gyumri’s Kumayri Cultural Museum-Preserve as part of long-term Gyumri restoration and documentation project. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ani Tatintsyan, travel grant to attend and present paper on “To Remember and Demand” at “Truth, Lies and Manufacturing Memory,” the third annual interdisciplinary conference hosted by Humber College, School of Liberal Arts and Sciences and the International Festival of Authors (IFOA), Toronto, October 2016. Grant issued by NAASR. Ani Danielyan, Ph.D student in Archeology, University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, research grant for completion of doctoral work on “Pre-Protohistoric Rock Art of Armenia.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Sona Tajiryan, doctoral student, UCLA, travel grant to present paper “From Surat to Izmir, Aleppo and Venice: Family Networks of Armenian Gem Merchants in Early Modern Global Trade of Diamonds” at “The Levant and Europe: Shipping and Trade Networks of People and Knowledge,” organized by the Levantine Heritage Foundation, November 2016, in London. Grant issued by NAASR. James Wiener (Co-Founder and the Communications Director, Ancient History Encyclopedia), travel grant to cover expenses to produce articles and definitions, and catalogue photographs entries concerning Armenian history and culture for Ancient History Encyclopedia’s “Ancient Armenia Project.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Gohar Grigoryan, doctoral candidate, University of Fribourg, travel grant to conduct research in Pisa for dissertation on “Royal Images of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia (1198-1375) in the Context of Mediterranean Intercultural Exchange.” Grant issued by NAASR. Özlem Galip, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of Oxford, travel grant to support post-doctoral project aimed at exploring and comparatively assessing the way Kurdish, Turkish and Armenian intellectuals have responded to the Armenian Genocide in both oral and literary narratives. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Emre Can Daglioglu, doctoral student, Clark University, travel grant to support archival research in Turkey for doctoral research on “The 1895-6 Armenian Massacres: Violence and Resistance in Van.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ararat Sekeryan, travel grant to support research in Armenia for bilingual (Armenian-Turkish) publication of Siamanto’s Garmir Lurer Paregames (Red News from My Friend, 1909) with a comprehensive introduction on the author’s life and work. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ani Shahinyan, doctoral student, UCLA, travel grant to present paper “Tracing Models of Martyrdom: The Effect of the Martyrdom Narratives in the Armenian Bible on the Composition of Martyrologies and Development of Theological Thought in Medieval and Early Modern Armenia” at the 350th anniversary of the first Armenian printed Bible conference at Etchmiadzin, October 2016. Grant issued by NAASR. 2015 Alexis Demirdjian, editor and project coordinator, in support of the March 2015 conference “The Armenian Genocide Legacy 100 Years On” at the Hague, Netherlands; and towards the editing of the proceeds of this conference published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015 as The Armenian Genocide Legacy. Grant issued by NAASR. Grant to the University of Rhode Island in support of its course “The Armenian Experience: History and Culture” offered in winter-spring 2015. Grant issued by NAASR. Grant to Clark University’s Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in support of the April 2015 Third International Graduate Students' Conference on Genocide Studies, “New Perspectives in Holocaust and Genocide Studies 100 Years After the Armenian Genocide.” Grant issued by NAASR. Andrew Palmer, Institute of Eastern Christian Studies, Nijmegen, Netherlands, in support of his translation of Syriac Bishop Israel Odo’s monograph on the persecution of the Armenian and Aramaean Christians in the Diyarbekir region in 1915. Grant issued by NAASR and the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Erin Piñon, graduate student at Southern Methodist University, to present paper “Commemorating Genocide: The Armenian Khatchkar as National Tombstone,” at the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) conference in Yerevan in July 2015. Grant issued by NAASR. George Bournoutian, Iona College, grant to support the publication of his translation of The 1819 Russian Survey of the Khanate of Sheki: A Primary Source on the Demography and Economy of an Iranian Province Prior to Its Annexation by Russia (published by Mazda, 2015). Ani Shahinyan, graduate student, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, travel grant in support of her research in Armenia on martyrological works in Armenian history through consultation with scholars and investigation of historical documents. Grant issued by NAASR. Fred Sienkiewicz, doctoral student, Boston University School of Music, travel grant to conduct research in Armenia for comprehensive scholarly study of Alexander Arutiunian's life and a critical survey and catalog of his complete works, with an overview of the cultural and musical context of Soviet Armenia geared toward the general Western musician. Grant issued by NAASR. Edip Gölbaşı, doctoral candidate, Department of History, Simon Fraser University (British Columbia, Canada), travel grant to visit the Ottoman archives and conduct research for thesis “The Fourth Imperial Army: Internal Security and Violence in the Eastern Provinces of the Late Ottoman Empire, 1880–1908.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Umit Kurt, doctoral candidate, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University, travel grant to conduct research in Turkish archives for thesis “The Making of the Aintab Elite: Social Support, Local Incentives and Provincial Motives Behind the Armenian Genocide (1890s–1920s).” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Hayarpi Papikyan, University of Paris Descartes, Paris, France, travel grant to support research in Yerevan and Tbilisi for thesis “Scolarisation des Filles Arméniennes en Caucase de 1880 à 1920.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Yelena Ambartsumian & Leah Marangos, travel grant to conduct research on the intersection of cultural property, historiography, and Armenian identity in Nagorno-Karabakh for an article “Cultural Heritage as Identity: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,” to appear in Convivium: Exchanges and Interactions in the Arts of Medieval Europe, Byzantium and the Mediterranean (Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies). 2014 Vicken Cheterian, Webster University, Geneva, research grant in support of publication Open Wounds: Armenians, Turks, and a Century of Genocide (published by Oxford University Press, 2015). Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Umit Kurt, Ph.D. candidate at Clark University, research grant to support work on dissertation “The Making of the Aintab Elite: Social Support, Local Incentives and Provincial Motives Behind the Armenian Genocide (1890s–1920s).” Grant issued by NAASR. Sona Haroutyunian, University of Venice, travel grant to present paper on “Translation and Representation of the Armenian Genocide in Literature and Film,” at the 44th Annual Scholars Conference on the Holocaust and the Churches, “Remembering for the Future: Armenia, Auschwitz and Beyond.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Anoush Suni, Ph.D. student, UCLA Department of Anthropology, research grant in support of doctoral project “Buried Histories: Ruins and the Politics of Memory in Anatolia.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Taner Akçam, Clark University, project coordinator, grant for translation, editing, and publication online of archives of documents from the League of Nations/Danish Friends of Armenians reception house in Aleppo, Syria, for Armenian genocide survivors released from Muslim households from 1922 to 1930. Grant issued by NAASR and the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies Asya Darbinyan, Ph.D. student at Clark University, travel grant to present a paper at the conference “Why Does It Happen? Complicity and Resistance to Genocide in World History” in Grand Rapids, MI. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Danny Fittante, Ph.D. student at UCLA, travel grant to conduct research in Moscow on the activities of the Armenian diasporan community. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Flora Keshgegian of the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, CA, towards her work on a collaborative book (with Burcu Tung) on dynamics of recollection and reticence in the shaping of Turkish and Armenian identities. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Mazda Publishers, subvention in support of Cinema of Armenia: An Overview, by Siranush Galstyan and with an introduction by Dickran Kouymjian (published 2016). 2013 Kaitlin Fertaly, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Colorado-Boulder, travel grant to conduct research for dissertation entitled “Changing Food Production and Provisioning in Rural Armenia.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Igor Dorfman-Lazarev, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, research grant in support of Italian language translation of the poetry of Eghishe Charents. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Armen Marsoobian, Southern Connecticut State University, research grant in support of publication Dildilian Brothers: Memories of a Lost Armenian Home: Photography and the Story of an Armenian Family in Anatolia, 1850–1923 (Birzamanlar Yayincilik). Grant issued by NAASR. Ani Honarchiansaky, Ph.D. student, UCLA Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, research grant to support work for dissertation on “Bishop Marutha of Mesopotamia: The Ambassador of the Roman Empire in the Sasanian Court.” Grant issued by NAASR. 2012 Kristin Bell, Ph.D. candidate, Northeastern University, travel grant to conduct research for dissertation entitled “Victims’ Voices: Sexual Violence in the Armenian and Rwandan Genocide.” Grant issued by NAASR. Khatchig Mouradian, Ph.D. candidate, Clark University, travel grants to conduct research for dissertation entitled “Genocide and Humanitarian Resistance in Ottoman Syria, 1915-1917.” Grants issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies and NAASR. Wolfgang Gust, general editor, grant in support of ongoing translation and digitization of German source documents on the Armenian Genocide, on the website www.armenocide.net, A Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in World War I. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. David Zakarian, D.Phil. Candidate in Oriental Studies, St Antony's College, Oxford. Travel grant to participate in UCLA Armenian Graduate Student Colloquium, presenting paper “The ‘Epic’ Representation of Armenian Women of the Fourth Century.” 2011 George Bournoutian, Iona College, publication grant in support of the book The 1823 Russian Survey of the Karabagh Province (published by Mazda, 2011). Grant issued by NAASR. Robert Hewsen & Karen Ketendjian, publication grant in support of translation and publication of A History of the Land of Artsakh: Karabagh and Genje, 1722-1827 by Sargis Hasan-Jalaliants (published by Mazda, 2013). Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Asya Darbinyan, Senior research fellow, Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Yerevan, travel grant to conduct research in U.S. archives on Near East Relief. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Anahit Kartashyan, doctoral student, St. Petersburg State University, research grant in support of doctoral work on “The Armenian Communities of Istanbul an Izmir Under the State Reforms of the 19th Century.” Grant issued by NAASR.			NAASR	https://naasr.org/pages/previous-recipients	Grants Issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies (since 2011) 2022 Dr. Boris Adjemian, Director, AGBU Nubar Library, Paris, grant to support publication of an English translation from French of his book on the history of Armenians in Ethiopia. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Tigran Aleksanyan, Institute of Archeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Armenia, grant to support preliminary exploration of the fortresses of the Berd region. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Armineh Babikian, PhD student, University of Toronto, and Jennifer Thompson, Occupational Therapist, Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital, travel grant to present paper “International Innovation from America to Armenia: Providing Remote Education for Rehabilitation Clinicians in Armenia Treating Acquired Amputation During Post-Armed Conflict” at 2022 World Federation of Occupational Therapy (WFOT) International Congress and Exhibition. Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Cevat Dargin, Postgraduate Research Associate, Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, grant to support additional research for book on PhD the history of state making and nation building in the Middle East through the case of Dersim from the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War to the Turkish state’s violent transformation of the region in 1937–38. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ruben Davtyan, PhD student, Martin-Luther University Halle-Wittenberg (Germany) & Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography NAS RA, grant to support excavations in Lori Berd, one of the main Bronze and Iron Age archaeological sites in Armenia. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Thomas Simsarian Dolan, Visiting Assistant Professor of History, American University in Cairo, travel grant to conduct archival research for chapter Calouste Gulbenkian for book project “Unusual Figures: Empire, Race and Unseeing the Global Middle East.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Davit Gevorgyan, Junior Researcher at the Matenadaran / Mashtots Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts and PhD student in Historiography and Source Science, grant to attend online classes in Ancient Georgian paleography to facilitate PhD research project on “Armenian monasteries on the Black Mountain as scientific-educational center (11th-13th centuries).” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Aram Ghoogasian, PhD candidate in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, grant to travel to the Boston area for two weeks to visit three Armenian libraries in support of dissertation on reading culture across the Armenian world in the mid-19th century. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Rachel Goshgarian, Calouste Gulbenkian Fellow in Armenian History, Department of History, Boğaziçi University, and Associate Professor, Department of History, Lafayette College, travel grant to support January 2023 trip to Yerevan to conclude research in the Matenadaran for monograph tentatively titled “Armeno-Turkish and the Space of Language in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Worlds: Manuscript Production and the Circulation of Ideas, Literature, and People.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Khachik Grigoryan, Ankyunacar Publishing, grant request to support translation and publication of English edition of Anania Sanahnetsi’s “Objections Against Dyophysites” from Grabar (Classical Armenian). Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Julia Hintlian, PhD student in Religion, Harvard University, travel grant to visit Armenia to conduct research for her dissertation. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Whitney Kite, PhD student in Art History and Archaeology, Columbia University, travel grant to conduct research in Armenia, Venice, Paris, and London, and Turkey for dissertation “The Lay of the Land: Armenian Monasteries in their Local Landscapes.” Grant issued by NAASR. Tsovinar Kuiumchian, PhD student, University of Oxford, travel grant to carry out research in New York for thesis project “‘The Space That We Couldn’t Find Prior’: Trauma and Vitality in Contemporary Armenian Art.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Deborah Mayersen, Senior Lecturer in International and Political Studies, University of New South Wales Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy, travel grant to support research on 1896 mass violence in Van. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Lilit Melikyan, Lecturer in Chair of History of Armenia’s Neighboring countries, Ph.D. student in Chair of Diaspora Study, Yerevan State University, travel grant to go to St. Petersburg to carry out research for project entitled “The relationships between Artsakh royal families and Georgian kingdom during the 12th-15th centuries.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Tigran Mikayelyan, Advisor to Permanent Representation of the Republic of Artsakh in the Republic of Armenia and PhD student, Armenian State University of Economics, grant to support research project on demographic and migration challenges in post-war Artsakh. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Suren Minasyan, Chief Specialist, Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Armenia, and PhD student in Economics, Russian-Armenian University grant to cover travel and fieldwork for research project “Food Security Issues of the Republic of Armenia in the Context of the 44-Day War and the Recent Russian-Ukrainian Conflict.” Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Oksana Nesterenko, Visiting Scholar, Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, New York University, grant to conduct on-site research in Armenia in order to complete the final chapter of book, “A Forbidden Fruit? Religion, Secularity and Music in the USSR before its Fall,” under contract with Indiana University Press. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Daniel Ohanian, PhD student, UCLA, and Director of Research at the Sara Corning Centre for Genocide Education, grant to compile and republish Armenian-Canadian periodical from the 1920s Ararat Monthly / Արարատ ամսաթերթ, the official publication of the Georgetown Boys. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Jakub Osiecki, Deputy Director, The Research Center for Armenian Culture in Poland, travel grant to visit U.S. for interdisciplinary study on the Armenian Church in the 20th century based on oral history resources in Boston and New York. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Lori Pirinjian, PhD student in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, grant to support research project investigating how Armenia’s Russian-backed “anti-gender” movement uses national rhetoric to advance its cause in the regional power struggle between the Russian Federation and the West. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Mariam Saribekyan, Institute of Аrchaeology and Еthnography, National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Armenia, grant to support excavation work on Veri Berd Fortress in Lernakert. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Erna Manea Shirinian, Matenadaran / Institute of Ancient Manuscripts and President of Armenian Committee of Byzantine Studies, travel grant to present paper “Some Observations Concerning the Forgeries in the Byzantine Empire” at the 24th International Congress of Byzantine Studies in Venice and Padua in August 2022. Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Konrad Siekierski, Doctoral Candidate in Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London, grant to support dissertation fieldwork in Armenia in fall 2022 for “Gospel Books as Home Saints: Between Vernacular Christianity and Armenian National Heritage.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Khachatur Stepanyan, Head of the Chair of World History and its Teaching Methods, Armenian State Pedagogical University, grant to support visit to Boston to use ARF archives for book on Armenia-Persia relations in 1918-1921. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Talin Suciyan, Associate Professor (Privat Dozent) of Turkish Studies at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, grant to support research/publication project on indigenous medicine in the form of a translation and scholarly analysis of an Armeno-Turkish manuscript of remedies. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Armine Tigranyan, PhD student of the Department of Cultural Studies, Yerevan State University, grant to support publication of monograph “Mechanisms of protection of Artsakh’s cultural heritage in the international system of heritage protection.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Benik Vardanyan, Department of the Early Archaeology of Armenia Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, NAS RA, grant to support project of preparing a scientific catalog of Lchashen archeological excavations including H. Mnatsakanyan’s archive. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Tatevik Vardanyan, Armenian State University of Economics, Yerevan, grant to support travel and fieldwork for a policy paper on assessing improvement and efficiency needs of water systems management in Artsakh, “The Issue of Water Resources as an Important Pillar of Artsakh’s Economic Security.” Grant issued by NAASR. 2021 Lilia Arakelyan, Department of Politics & International Relations, Florida International University, grant in support of project “A Case Study of International Terrorism: Foreign Fighters in the Nagorno-Karabakh War.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Maria Armoudian and Katherine Smits, both of University of Auckland, grant in support of research project “How Soon we Forget: Memory entrepreneurs, modern public diplomacy and the remaking of WWI memory in New Zealand.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Rosie Vartyter Aroush, grant to support publication of Identity, Family, and Community Experiences among LGBTQ Armenians in the Diaspora to by published by Routledge. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Houri Berberian, University of California, Irvine, and Talinn Grigor, University of California, Davis, grant in support of forthcoming book “Contesting the Silences: Minoritarian Modernism and the Armenian Women of Iran,” examining the history of Armenian women in modern Iran from the beginning of Naser al-Din Shah’s reign in 1848 to the 1979 fall of the Pahlavi dynasty. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Alessia Boschis, Università degli Studi di Torino, grant to support project “Armenian Cultural Heritage in European Travel Literature: The Cases of Nakhichevan and Artsakh.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Emre Can Daglioglu, PhD candidate in History, Stanford University, travel grant to conduct research for dissertation in the Bibliothèque Nubar de l’UGAB, in Paris to use unexamined archival materials and Armenian-language published materials. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Igor Dorfmann-Lazarev, Aix–Marseille Université, and Haroutioun Khatchadourian, grant in support of forthcoming publication “The Destruction of Armenian Heritage by Azerbaïdjan,” co-edited by the applicants. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Merih Erol, Faculty of Social Sciences, Özyeğin University, Istanbul, travel grant to support research trip for project “Armenian Refugees from Anatolia: Survival, Identity, and Citizenship in Greece (1920-2020).” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Tatul Hakobyan/Ani Centre, grant to support creation of a report on the Syunik region of Armenia, covering its geography, history, demographics, economy, and social situation. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Carla Kekejian, PhD candidate in Communication Sciences and Disorders, University of Utah, grant to support dissertation “Does translanguaging lead to an accurate picture of linguistic ability? An exploratory study with Armenian-English bilingual children.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ovsanna Keshishyan, PhD student and researcher, Matenadaran/ Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, travel grant to support visit Armenian Patriarchate in Jerusalem to view items for dissertation work on “The Artistic Decoration of Cilician Handwritten Bibles in the 13-14th centuries.” Grant issued by NAASR, with support from Dean Shahinian. Armen Manuk-Khaloyan, PhD student, Georgetown University, travel grant to conduct research in archives in Armenia and in Turkey for dissertation "Reimagining Empire: Ottoman Armenians and the Encounter with Imperial Modernity, 1870-1914." Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Seda Manukyan, PhD student and researcher, Matenadaran/ Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, travel grant to visit Armenian Patriarchate in Jerusalem to view items for research project on Scenes of Christ's Healing Power in Armenian manuscripts. Grant issued by NAASR, with support from Dean Shahinian. Deborah Mayersen, University of New South Wales Canberra, at the Australian Defence Force Academy, travel grant to conduct archival research in support of project “Investigating Armenian Resistance to the Hamidian Massacres.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Hayarpi Papikyan, adjunct faculty, American University of Armenia, grant to support research project “Armenian Church parish schools as centers of community and social life in Artsakh, 1870-1920.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Mariam Shakhmuradyan, Department of Early Archaeology at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, grant in support of project “An Archaeological Investigation of ‘Desert Kites’ in Armenia.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Benik Vardanyan, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic Armenia, principal researcher, Lernakert archaeological project, grant to support investigation of the “Wheel House” Bronze Age megalithic monument in Lernakert. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. 2020 Dr. Taner Akcam, Kaloosdian-Mugar Professor of Armenian Genocide Studies, Clark University, grant to support continuation of research project on Cemal Pasha and His Role in the Armenian Genocide. Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Maral Aktokmakyan (translator) and Nora Lessersohn (editor), publication grant in support of English translation from Armeno-Turkish of Akabi Hikâyesi (The Story of Akabi, 1851). Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Kate Franklin, Lecturer in Medieval History, Birkbeck, Univ. of London, grant to support the Open Access publication of her recently completed monograph Everyday Cosmopolitanisms: Living the Silk Road in Medieval Armenia (Univ. of Calif. Press). Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Aram Ghoogasian, PhD student in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, grant to support participation in online Russian-language course in connection with doctoral project a history of Armenian readers in the mid-nineteenth century (the first decades of the ashkharhapar periodical press), focusing primarily on newspapers and their networks of circulation around the world. Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Ana Ruiz Gutiérrez, Associate Professor at History of Art Department, Granada University, Spain, research grant to support work towards publication project on Armenian merchants in Andalusia and their connection with overseas Hispanic territories in the early modern era. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Edgar Hovhannisyan, Dean of the Faculty of History and Jurisprudence of the Armenian State Pedagogical University after Khachatur Abovyan, travel grant to conduct research in Antilias on “The Armenian Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia and its activities in 1920-1930s.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Meryem Kalayci, Director and Co-Founder of the Oxford Network for Armenian Genocide Research, and British Academy Newton International Fellow at the Faculty of History at the University of Oxford and Junior Research Fellowship at Pembroke College Oxford, grant in support the translation of the book Dark Times: An Armenian Memoir of the 20th Century by Harutyun Alboyadjian and related research trips to Armenia and France. Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Umit Kurt, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Polonsky Academy for Advanced Studies Department, grant to support creation of a detailed index for The Armenians of Aintab: The Economics of Genocide in an Ottoman Province (under agreement with Harvard Univ. Press). Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Evangeline McGlynn, PhD Candidate in Geography, University of California, Berkeley, grant to support work on doctoral thesis “The Destruction of Space: Spitak Earthquake Recovery in Peace and War 1988-2018.” Grant issued by NAASR. Emil Sanamyan, freelance writer and editor, travel grant to present paper “Finding an Organic Narrative: The April War and the Armenian Revolution” at the conference entitled “Nationalist Historiography in Post-Communist South Caucasus,” hosted by the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary on February 15-16, 2020. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Davit Poghosyan, Khachatur Abovyan Armenian State Pedagogical University, Chair of Museology, Library Studies, Bibliography, grant to support creation of digital textbook Theoretical Museology [Museum Studies] and Armenian Museological Thought that will be used by the Armenian State Pedagogical University Scientific Board as an educational handbook. Grant issued by NAASR. Konrad Siekierski, PhD Research Programme in Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, grant to cover costs associated with doctoral fieldwork for “Gospel Books as Home Saints: Between Vernacular Christianity and Armenian National Heritage.” Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Talin Suciyan, Assoc. Prof., Ludwig Maximilian University, grant to support of Russian-language translation of her book The Armenians in Modern Turkey: Post-genocide Society and Politics (orig. published in English in 2016). Dr. Suciyan’s book was the 2017 co-winner of the Society for Armenian Studies book prize. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Pending. Dr. Benik Vardanyan (project director), Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences, Rep. of Armenia, grant to support study of the ancient landscape of Lernakert (Shirak). Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Tasha Vorderstrasse, University and Continuing Education Program Coordinator, Oriental Institute, University of Chicago, grant to support publication of Catalog for Oriental Institute Museum Exhibition: Antoin Sevruguin: Past and Present (September 2020–March 2021). Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. 2019 Dr. Taner Akçam, Kaloosdian-Mugar Professor of Armenian Genocide Studies, Clark University, Worcester, MA, grant to conduct archival in Ottoman, German, British, and American archives for new research project on Cemal Pasha and his role during Armenian Genocide. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Tigran Aleksanyan, archaeologist, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography of the National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Armenia, support for project to document monuments preserved in the Republic of Armenia and Artsakh associated with the memory of Vardanants' martyrs. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Anahit Avagyan, Senior Researcher, Department of Researching and Editing of the Ancient Armenian Texts, Mashtots Matenadaran–Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, Yerevan, travel grant to present paper “Armenian Translation of the Pseudo-Athanasian Dialogue 'Quaestiones ad Antiochum ducem' (CPG 2257): Some Preliminary Remarks on its Possible Critical Edition,” at the 18th International Conference on Patristic Studies in August 19-24, 2019, at Oxford. Grant issued by NAASR. Nora Bairamian, graduate student at Columbia University in the Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies, Columbia University, travel grant to conduct research at the University of Michigan, Dearborn, Armenian Research Center, for Master’s Thesis, “Reassessing the Legacy of Mkrtich Khrimian.” Grant issued by NAASR. Anoush Baghdassarian, MA student at Columbia University, New York City, travel grant to go to Armenia to conduct research for thesis on the attitudes of Syrian-Armenian refugees in Armenia toward efforts of redress and transitional justice in post-conflict Syria. Grant issued by NAASR. Sargis Baldaryan, Ph.D. student at Armenian History Chair, Yerevan State University, travel grant to visit Bodleian Library to access manuscripts for preparation of critical text of trade manuals of Constant of Julfa (17th century). Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Emre Can Daglioglu, Ph.D. student in History, Stanford University, travel grant to conduct research in ABCFM archives at Harvard and at General Staff Military History and Strategic Research (ATASE) Archives (Ankara) for doctoral thesis “‘Unintended Fatalities’: Armenian Victims of the Pontian Genocide.” Grant issued by NAASR. Dmytro Dymydyuk, Ph.D. candidate in History, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Ukraine), travel grant to take part in the conference “Military Campaigns, Weaponry, and Military Equipment (Antiquity and Middle ages),” May 16-18, 2019, in Varna, Bulgaria, to present paper “One-Edged and Curved Blade in Bagratid Armenia (late 9th-mid 11th c.): Problem of Interpretation of Sources.” Grant issued by NAASR. Prof. Salah Mahgoub Edris, Faculty of Arts, Dept. of Oriental Languages, Cairo University, travel grant to visit University of Michigan, Dearborn, Armenian Research Center, and UCLA to conduct research for research/translation project on the Armenian-language version of the Story of the Seven Sages and Sinbad, known in Armenian as Patmutiwn kaysern Pontsianosi ew knojn ew ordwoy norin Diokghetianosi ew eotn imastasirats. Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Danny Fittante, visiting scholar, Center for Advanced Studies in Sofia (CAS), grant to support fieldwork for research project “Armenian Mobilization/ Intermediation in Contemporary Romania.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Stas Gorelik, Ph.D. student in Political Science, George Washington University, travel grant to conduct grant focus groups in Armenia (with Dr. Yevgenya Paturyan of AUA) for dissertation covering comparative analysis of Armenia's Velvet Revolution, Moldova's anti-corruption protests in 2015-16, and Ukraine's Euromaidan. Grant issued by NAASR. Khachik Grigoryan, Managing Director, Ankyunacar Publishing (Yerevan), grant to support compilation of the Armenian full text of "Commentary on the Epistle to Hebrews" by Cyril of Alexandria, its translation into English, and publication of parallel Armenian and English text in one volume. Grant issued by NAASR. Khoren Grigoryan, PhD student, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Armenia, travel grant to participate in 16th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2, 2019, presenting paper “Transforming Identity after 1915: Case of Musa Dagh.” Grant issued by NAASR. Julia Hintlian, Ph.D. student in Religion, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, travel grant to present paper at the XVIII International Conference on Patristic Studies at the University of Oxford, August 19-24, 2019, presenting paper “Metz Mayr Miriam: The Embellished Armenian Lineage of Marutha of Maipherkat.” Grant issued by NAASR. Vahe Hovsepyan, Ph.D. student in Department of History, Yerevan State University, travel grant to conduct research in the St. Petersburg Russian State Historic Archive for dissertation on “Eastern Armenia in Caucasian Viceroyalty (1844-1882).” Grant issued by NAASR. Carla Kekejian, Ph.D. student in Communication Sciences and Disorders, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, travel grant to support participation in “Entangled Encounters” Armenian Studies Conference at Harvard University, March 28-29, 2019, to present paper “Harsneren: “Language of the Armenian Bride.” Grant issued by NAASR. Hratch Kestenian, PhD candidate in History at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, travel grant to consult the Ottoman archives housed at the Başbakanlık and archives of Surp Prgich (Holy Savior) hospital in Istanbul for doctoral research for thesis entitled “The Making of a Social Disease: Tuberculosis and the Medicalization of Ottoman Society (1827-1922).” Grant issued by NAASR. Onnik Kiremitlian, PhD student, Oriental Institute of the Catholic University of Louvain, travel grant to participate in the 18th International Conference on Patristic Studies which will be held in Oxford, August 19-23, 2019, to present paper relating to Armenian-Syriac cultural relations, “Newly-discovered gems from Syriac literature: Armenian translations of Syriac works by Marutha of Tagrit.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Umit Kurt, Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellow, The Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem, publication grant to support editorial work on English translation of his book Antep 1915: Soykirim ve Failler for publication by Palgrave. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Sergio LaPorta, Haig and Isabel Berberian Chair of Armenian Studies, CSU Fresno, and Dr. Allison Vacca, Associate Professor of History, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, publication grant to support inclusion of maps in forthcoming new English translation and edition with an introduction and commentary of the Historical Discourse (Patmabanut‘iwn) of Łewond, to be published by the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Grant issued by NAASR and Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Marco Marsili, Ph.D. student in Studies of Security and Defense from the ISCTE–Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTEIUL), travel grant to conduct fieldwork in Armenia and Karabagh in fall 2019 for thesis on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Khatchig Mouradian, lecturer at the Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies Department (MESAAS), Columbia University, travel grant to participate in the 2019 Special Session of “Lessons and Legacies” conference in Munich in the fall to present a paper titled “Unarmed and Dangerous: Resistance in Holocaust and Genocide Scholarship.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Sona Nersisyan and Lusine Tanajyan, researchers and PhD students, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography of NAS RA, participation in 17th International Polish Sociological Congress, 11-14 September in Wroclaw, Poland, travel grant to present joint paper “Diasporic Identity and Cross Cultural Issues.” Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Milena Oganesyan, Research Associate Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage, Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., travel grant to conduct research in Los Angeles towards publication project on American theater and film director Rouben Mamoulian’s Armenian heritage as it relates to his art. Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Janice Okoomian, Assistant Professor of Gender and Women’s Studies, Rhode Island College, grant to support translation and transliteration of interviews to take place in Summer 2019 in Armenia with staff and clients of women's resource centers in Yerevan and in one or two of the provincial areas (Gyumri, Spitak, Vanador), for planned academic publication. Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Hayk Paronyan, Associate Professor, Regional Autonomous University of the Andes (UNIANDES), Ecuador, travel grant to participate in Central Eurasian Studies Society 2019 20th Annual Conference, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., Oct. 10, 2019, to Oct. 13, 2019, to present a paper entitled “Political crisis in Armenia in 2018: Reasons and Consequences.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Pauline Mari Pechakjian, MA student, Department of History, University of California, Irvine, travel grant to support research in Armenia for thesis “Rethinking ‘Repatriation’: A Social History of the Mass Migration of Diaspora Armenians to Soviet Armenia, 1946-49.” Grant issued by NAASR. Amine Alkan Reis, PhD student, Fakultät VI Planen, Bauen, Umwelt of Technische Universitaet, Berlin, support for travel and fieldwork for thesis, “A Model Proposal for a Holistic Approach to the Conservation of Evacuated Rural Settlements in the North Eastern Anatolia's Armenian Heritage: Case Study of Aprank (St. David) Monastery and Üçpınar (Aprank) Village.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. James Robins, author and journalist, grant to support travel and source material acquisition for publication project "When We Dead Awaken: Australia, New Zealand, and the Armenian Genocide." Grant issued by NAASR. Anoush Sargsyan, PhD candidate and Junior Researcher, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts—Matenadaran, Yerevan, travel grant to attend conference “The Surrounding Forest: Trees in the Medieval Imaginary,” organized by the Department of English and Humanities School of Arts, Birkbeck, University of London, June 22, 2019, to present paper “Genealogical Tree of Christ in the Context of the Armenian Version of Peter’s Compendium in Historiae Genealogia Christi.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Lusine Sargsyan, Junior Researcher, Matenadaran, Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, and Visiting lecturer at Chair of Armenian Art History and Theory, YSU, travel grant to participate in 12th International Congress of South-East European Studies, 2-9 September, 2019, in Bucharest, Romania, presenting a paper on the codicological, paleographic, iconographic and stylistic analysis of the Armenian Gospel, copied in 1354 in Surkhat' (Crimea) in the session entitled “From Ani to Romania: History, Tradition and Iconography.” Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Alvard Semirjyan, Associate Professor, Faculty of Armenian Philology - Chair of Theory of Literature and Literary Criticism, Yerevan State University, travel grant to participate in Surrealisms 2019 (2nd Conference of the International Society for the Study of Surrealism [ISSS]), University of Exeter, August 29-31, 2019, to present paper “Surrealism in Contemporary Armenian Art and Literature.” Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Ani Shahnazaryan, Senior Researcher, Matenadaran, Scientific Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, travel grant to participate in Digital Armenian Conference organized by the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, the Association pour le Traitement Automatique des Langues (ATALA, Paris), the Calfa Association (Paris), the French Society for Armenian Studies, with the support of the Laboratory of Excellence EFL (Paris) on 3-5 October 2019, to present paper on the project “A digital critical edition of Aghvesagirk.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Henry Shapiro, Van Leer Institute, Fellow at the Polonsky Academy for Advanced Study Jerusalem, and Visiting Researcher at the Faculty for Humanities, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, travel grant to visit Istanbul to access materials on Eremia Chelebi for transformation of thesis “The Great Armenian Flight: The Celali Revolts and the Rise of Western Armenian Society” into book. Grant issued by NAASR. Dr. Khachatur Stepanyan, Chair of History of Armenia of the Armenian State Pedagogical University after Kh. Abovyan, travel grant to conduct research in the ARF archives in Watertown, Mass., in fall 2019, towards study “The Activity of the ARF in Soviet Armenia, 1921-1933.” Grant issued by NAASR. Sipana Tchakerian, PhD candidate in archaeology at the University of Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne, in the Labex RESMED and at the University Aix-Marseille, travel grant to carry out field research in Armenia and Georgia, July-August 2019, for thesis “Les monuments crucifères à stèle quadrilatère d’Arménie et d’Ibérie orientale de l’Antiquité tardive au haut Moyen-Age.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Abraham Terian, retired Professor of Armenian Patristics and Academic Dean at St. Nersess Armenian Seminary, New Rochelle, NY, grant to support preparation of The Life of Mashtots‘ by His Disciple Koriwn, with an introduction, translation, and commentary. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Dr. Daria Vorobyeva, travel grant to expand PhD thesis “Forced Ethnic Migrants' Integration: Syrian Armenians in Armenia and Lebanon (2011-2016),” completed at University of St. Andrews, Scotland (2018), leading to a book and an article publications. Grant issued by NAASR. Ani Yenokyan, PhD student, Armenian State Academy of Fine Arts, and Junior researcher at the department of Art History and Writing Center of Research, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts –Matenadaran, Yerevan, travel grant to participate in 16th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2, 2018, presenting paper “The Illustrations of Armenian Printed Books in the Context of Early Modern Armenian Culture (16th-18th Centuries).” Grant issued by NAASR. 2018 Taner Akçam, Robert Aram & Marianne Kaloosdian and Stephen & Marian Mugar Chair in Armenian Genocide Studies, Clark University), on behalf of organizers of conference “The Abdul Hamid Era and Beyond: Massacres and Reform, Rupture and Continuity,” which will take place in October 2018 at Clark University. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Rosie Vartyter Aroush, Ph.D. Candidate, Program Coordinator, Teaching Fellow UCLA, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages & Cultures, research grant to support transcription costs of interviews for doctoral work on “Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Armenians in Los Angeles: Family Relationships, Identity Negotiation, & Community Involvement.” Grant issued by NAASR. Lusine Balyan, independent researcher, Armenia, travel grant to participate in International Conference “Linguistic and Literary Studies on the Caucasus”, May 2018, University of Verona, Italy, and present paper “The Individual Between Traditional and Modern Morals in the Works of Hrant Matevosyan.” Grant issued by NAASR. Emre Can Daglioglu, Ph.D. student, History Department, Clark University, travel grant for May 2018 trip to London to conduct research in Foreign Office archives for doctoral research on “Reform and Violence in the Hamidian Era.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Asya Darbinyan, Ph.D. candidate, Clark University, travel grant to participate paper at workshop “Armenian Childhood(s): Histories and Theories of Childhood and Youth in Armenian Studies,” University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, April 2018, to present paper “Victims, Survivors, Savages: Armenian Refugee Children in the Caucasus during the Great War.” Grant issued by NAASR. Marta Filippini, Conservator, Central Institute for the Conservation of Archival and Bibliographic Material of the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage, & Paolo Lucca, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Asian and North African Studies, travel grant to support trip from Italy to Armenia to conduct research at the Matenadaran and other museums to carry out research on medieval Armenian recipes for parchment, inks, pigments, and adhesives manufacturing. Grant issued by NAASR. Samvel Grigoryan, Ph.D. student, Center for Medieval Studies of the Paul-Valery University of Montpellier, France, travel grant to support participation in the 16th Annual Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2018, presenting paper on “Recent Discoveries in Cilicia and Their Contribution to the Issues of Cilician Armenian Studies.” Grant issued by NAASR. Khoren Grigoryan, Ph.D. student, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, NAS Republic of Armenia, travel grant to conduct fieldwork in Anjar in Lebanon for doctoral research on “Identity of Mussadaghian Armenians in Anjar.” Grant issued by NAASR. Shushan Hambaryan, Ph.D. student, Matenadaran, Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, travel grant for research trip from Yerevan to Jerusalem to study manuscripts at Jerusalem Patriarchate of 17th century miniaturist and scribe Markos Patkerahan, for doctoral dissertation, 10-25 May 2018. Grant issued by NAASR. Polina Ivanova, Ph.D. Candidate in History, Harvard University, travel grant to carry out research in Yerevan in September–November 2018 for dissertation “From East of the Mediterranean to West of Iran: Migration, Mobility and Remaking of Human Geography in Medieval Asia Minor (1000-1300).” Grant issued by NAASR. Pınar Karakılçık, Ph.D. student, Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales [INALCO], Paris, travel grant to cover two trips (Istanbul-Yerevan, Istanbul-Paris) in May 2018 to participate in academic events in Paris and in Yerevan. Grant issued by NAASR. Carla Kekejian, Ph.D. student in Communication Sciences and Disorders, University of Utah, travel grant to go to Armenia to document uses of Harsneren in region of Goris and its neighboring villages in Gegharkunik Province for doctoral research. Grant issued by NAASR. Arman Khatchatryan, Ph.D. student in Interdisciplinary Studies, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, travel grant to support participation in the 16th Annual Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2018, presenting paper on “The Political and Scientific-Educational Activities of the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 1909-1949. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Umit Kurt, Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellow, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem, travel grant for research trip to Armenia for book project on key genocide perpetrators in Aintab region Ali Cenani, Ahmed Faik, and Mehmet Yasin. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Hrach Martirosyan, Leiden University, grant in support of the August 2018 workshop “Artsakh-Gharabagh: Language and Cultures,” to be held in Shushi, Republic of Nagorno-Karabagh. Grant issued by NAASR and the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Khatchig Mouradian, Nikit and Eleanora Ordjanian Visiting Professor, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies Department, Columbia University, travel grant to conduct archival research in Europe (Britain’s National Archives and the Mkhitarist Archives in Vienna), Armenia (National Archives and Library), and Turkey (Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives) for research project on Aram Manougian. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Taline Papazian, Researcher, Institute of Armenian Studies, University of Southern California, grant to support English-language translation of her French-language book L’Arménie à l’épreuve du feu: Forger l’Etat à travers la guerre (Paris: Karthala, 2016). Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Anush Sargsyan, junior researcher and Ph.D. candidate, Mesrop Mashtots Scientific Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts [Matenadaran], travel grant to participate in the 16th Annual Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 2018, presenting paper “An Exposition of Yohannes of Amidas’ Heavenly Jerusalem Miniature” (Chester Beatty Library No. 551). Grant issued by NAASR. Marine Sargsyan, Doctoral student at Leiden University, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for History, grant to support visiting research fellowship at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University in 2018, writing thesis on "The Policy of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers: The Case of the Republic of Armenia." Grant issued by NAASR. Alvard Semirjyan, Associate Professor, Faculty of Armenian Philology - Chair of Theory of Literature and Literary Criticism, Yerevan State University, travel grant to participate in International Conference “Linguistic and Literary Studies on the Caucasus,” May 2018, University of Verona, Italy, and present paper “Literary Relations in Post-Independent Period of Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani Literary Texts (Levon Khechoyan’s “King Arshak, Drastamat Eunuch”, Otar Chiladze’s “The Basket” and Akram Aylisli’s “Stone Dreams”).” Grant issued by NAASR. Abraham Terian, Professor of Armenian Patristics and Academic Dean at St. Nersess Armenian Seminary (retired), travel and research grant to support writing of commentary on Koriwn’s The Life of Mashtots in Armenia in 2018. Grant issued by NAASR and the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Meri Yeranosyan, Independent Consultant/Research Analyst, & Sona Mnatsakanyan, Instructor, Armenian Language and Literature, American University of Armenia, travel grant to participate in “Archives of Resistance” International Conference organized by and held at Leeds University, June 2018, to present paper on literary works of Zaven Biberyan. Grant issued by NAASR. 2017 Scott Abramson, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, translation grant to allow completion of forthcoming academic article with working title “The Armenians of the Levant: The Region’s Unsung Builders and Modernizers.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Rosie Vartyter Aroush, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, grant to cover costs of transcription of interviews of subjects for PhD dissertation. Grant issued by NAASR. Gayane Babayan, graduate student, Central European University and Yerevan State University, travel grant to present paper “The Multi-Cultural Artistic Milieu of Fourteenth-Century Crimea: A Note on the Patterns of Artistic Adoption and Adaptation in the Miniatures of the Fourteenth-Century Crimean-Armenian Tetraevangelion” at 15th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA on February 24, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR. Kevork Bardakjian, Manoogian Professor of Armenian Language and Literature, University of Michigan, grant to support travel to Armenia for work on translation of the Chronicle of Grigor Daranaghtsi (or Kamakhetsi), covering 1595-late 1630s, and bibliographic assistance support for two articles on Armenian literature covering the period 1600-1840 and 1840-1920 for AIEA Handbook on Armenian literature to be published by Brill. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Melissa Bilal, Visiting Scholar, Dept. of History, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, travel grant to go to Yerevan in order to complete research in the archives and to work with the staff of the Digital Library (Digilib) of American University of Armenia on the digitization and editing of material for the forthcoming Feminism in Armenian: A History, a book and a website project by Melissa Bilal and Dr. Lerna Ekmekcioglu, about the lives and work of twelve Armenian women who were born in Ottoman Constantinople. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. George Bournoutian, Iona College, publication grant to help cover printing costs of translation with extensive commentary of two books dealing with land tenure in the Yerevan Province in the last years of the 19th century, Земельные Дачи Эриванской Губернии. Выпуск 1- Дачи Эриванского Уезда (Tiflis, 1903) and Земельные Дачи Эриванской Губернии. Выпуск 2. Дачи Новобаязетского Уезда (Tiflis, 1905). Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Iván Gaztañaga González, PhD. Candidate on Genocide, International Law, University of Granada, Spain, research grant to cover costs of copying, digitizing, and transcribing diplomatic documents (letters, telegrams, postcards and press news) in the Spanish National History Archives relating to the Armenian Genocide; for presentation of exhibition of materials; and for publication of materials. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Vahagn Hakobyan, PhD student, Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia, travel grant to conduct research in Iran on “The Impact of Iran’s Political Situation on Armenian Liberation Movement in the Second Half of the 18th Century.” Grant issued by NAASR. Ani Kasparian, independent researcher and Assistant Director, Armenian Research Center, Dearborn, MI, travel grant to conduct interviews and research in Turkey on the experiences of concealed and Islamized Armenians. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Whitney Kite, graduate student, Tufts University, grant to develop Armenian language skills at Padus-Araxes Summer Intensive Language program in Venice, Italy, for MA thesis “Horomos, the Žamatun, and Sacred Wine.” Grant issued by NAASR. Péter Kránitz, graduate student, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest, travel grant to travel to present paper “From Colonialist to Humanitarian? The Dissolution of the Armenian Question into the Discourse on Refugee Rights,” at 15th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA on February 24, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR. Umit Kurt, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, travel grant to conduct research in British National Archives for book project provisionally titled The Curious Case of Ali Cenani Bey: The Story of a Genocidaire During and After the 1915 Armenian Genocide. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Jennifer Manoukian, travel grant to present paper “Disrupting Literature in Diaspora: Zareh Vorpouni’s The Candidate and the Nouveau Roman” at the 15th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 24, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR. Caroline McCune, Masters Candidate in Art History and Museum Studies, Tufts University, travel grant to present paper “Guns & Roses: The Battle of Avarayr in an Armenian Hymnal at the Boston Public Library” at 15th Annual Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies at UCLA, February 24, 2017. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Lilit Melikyan, Ph.D. student in Diaspora studies, Yerevan State University, travel grant for 2-month stay in Tbilisi researching history of Armenians in Georgia during the 12th-18th centuries. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Prof. James R. Russell, Harvard University, grant to support publication of 2-volume compilation of writings Armenian and Iranian Studies 2 to be published by UC Irvine. Grant issued by NAASR. Laura Samvelyan, independent researcher and Assistant Creative Director, Publicis Armenia, travel grant to present paper “Language and Literacy Practices in a Diasporic Setting: Case Study of Armenian Community in Buenos Aires,” at conference “Heritages of Migration: Moving Stories, Objects and Home,” Buenos Aires, Argentina, April 6-10, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR. Marine Sargsyan, PhD Student, Leiden University, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for History, grant to support academic visit at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, as Visiting Scholar, to carry out work for dissertation “Pattern of Change: Socio-Economic Growth and Political Transition in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1991-2013.” Grant issued by NAASR. Theo van Lint, University of Oxford, on behalf of AIEA (Association Internationale des Etudes Arméniennes, grant in support of the 14th General Conference of the AIEA, hosted at Pembroke College, Oxford, August 10-12, 2017. Grant issued by NAASR and by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Tigran Yepremyan, Ph.D. Candidate in World History, Yerevan State University, travel grant to conduct research and participate in symposium “On the Edges of Christianity — Iceland and Armenia in the Middle Ages” at the Centre for Medieval Studies (Miðaldastofa) at the University of Iceland, Reykjavík. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. 2016 Nairi Hakhverdi (project coordinator), publication grant towards translation costs for Anthology of Late Ottoman Armenian Literature (S. Peter Cowe and Theo van Lint, project supervisors). Grant issued by NAASR. Jesse Siragan Arlen, doctoral student in Armenian Studies, UCLA, travel grant to participate in workshop “Introduction to Armenian Manuscript Studies” in Berlin. Grant issued by NAASR. Khatchig Mouradian, Ph.D candidate, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University, travel grant to conduct research in Ottoman archives on the role of Arabs during the Armenian Genocide. Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Lokman Sazan, graduate student at Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona, Spain, research grant to support fieldwork for the project “In Pursuit of Memories of Genocide Among Armenians of Mardin in Turkey.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Vahagn Hakobyan, doctoral student at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Armenia, travel grant to support research in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives in Moscow on “The Situation in the South Caucasus in the 18th Century.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Taner Akçam, Clark University, for digitization and indexing of Fr. Krikor Guerguerian archive of documents on the Armenian Genocide. Grant issued by NAASR. Carla Kekejian, University of California, Irvine, to conduct research in Armenia for project on Harsneren, “the language of the bride,” a defunct, indigenous sign language of Armenia. Grant issued by NAASR. Narek Mkrtchyan, Ara Merjian, Smbat Hovhannisyan, publication grant in support of bilingual (English and Armenian) edition of Gramsci's ‘Circle of Humanity’ and Armenia. Grant issued by NAASR. Rose Vartiter Aroush, doctoral candidate, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, travel grant to participate in joint UCLA-American University of Armenia Graduate Student Conference, “Factors Influencing The Contemporary Construction of Armenian Identity this Spring,” with paper on “Negotiating Multiple Armenian Identities in the Diasporic Community of Los Angeles.” Grant issued by NAASR. Umit Kurt, Ph.D candidate, Clark University, travel grant to participate in panel entitled “New Issues, Perspectives and Sources in Armenian Studies,” for the 5th Global Conference of the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INoGS) in Jerusalem. Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Erna Shirinian (project coordinator), Matenadaran (Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts), Yerevan, grant in support of conference “Historical Tayk: History, Culture, Confession,” organized in Yerevan by the Matenadaran, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, and the Armenian National Committee of Byzantine Studies. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies and NAASR. Erin Piñon, graduate student at Southern Methodist University, travel grant to participate annual meeting of the Sixteenth Century Society and Conference in Bruges, August 18-20, 2016, presenting paper “Lions and Tigers and Trdat—Oh My! Zoomorphic Figures in the Armenian Christianization Myth.” Grant issued by NAASR. Anna Aleksanyan, PhD student, Clark University, travel grant to attend and present paper “‘Neutral Home’ and the Issue of Identity of Armenian Child Survivors” at third international multidisciplinary conference titled "Children and War: Past and Present" which will take place on July 2016, in Salzburg, organized by the University of Wolverhampton (UK), together with the University of Salzburg. Grant issued by NAASR. Jasmine Dum-Tragut, University of Salzburg, research grant for project “The Unknown Armenian Prisoners of War in Habsburg Austria, 1915-1917: The anthropological studies of Rudolf Pöch.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ani Honarchiansaky, PhD student, UCLA, travel grant to attend and present paper “'And they took away from them the bones of their own kings that the Persians were carrying away into captivity': The Significance of Bones in Armenian, Zoroastrian, and Early Christian Beliefs,” at the International Medieval Congress (IMC) in Leeds, England, July 2016. Grant issued by NAASR. Allison Suhan, Adventures in Preservation Board Member, grant in support of ongoing documentation and creation of database of Gyumri’s Kumayri Cultural Museum-Preserve as part of long-term Gyumri restoration and documentation project. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ani Tatintsyan, travel grant to attend and present paper on “To Remember and Demand” at “Truth, Lies and Manufacturing Memory,” the third annual interdisciplinary conference hosted by Humber College, School of Liberal Arts and Sciences and the International Festival of Authors (IFOA), Toronto, October 2016. Grant issued by NAASR. Ani Danielyan, Ph.D student in Archeology, University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, research grant for completion of doctoral work on “Pre-Protohistoric Rock Art of Armenia.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Sona Tajiryan, doctoral student, UCLA, travel grant to present paper “From Surat to Izmir, Aleppo and Venice: Family Networks of Armenian Gem Merchants in Early Modern Global Trade of Diamonds” at “The Levant and Europe: Shipping and Trade Networks of People and Knowledge,” organized by the Levantine Heritage Foundation, November 2016, in London. Grant issued by NAASR. James Wiener (Co-Founder and the Communications Director, Ancient History Encyclopedia), travel grant to cover expenses to produce articles and definitions, and catalogue photographs entries concerning Armenian history and culture for Ancient History Encyclopedia’s “Ancient Armenia Project.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Gohar Grigoryan, doctoral candidate, University of Fribourg, travel grant to conduct research in Pisa for dissertation on “Royal Images of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia (1198-1375) in the Context of Mediterranean Intercultural Exchange.” Grant issued by NAASR. Özlem Galip, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of Oxford, travel grant to support post-doctoral project aimed at exploring and comparatively assessing the way Kurdish, Turkish and Armenian intellectuals have responded to the Armenian Genocide in both oral and literary narratives. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Emre Can Daglioglu, doctoral student, Clark University, travel grant to support archival research in Turkey for doctoral research on “The 1895-6 Armenian Massacres: Violence and Resistance in Van.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ararat Sekeryan, travel grant to support research in Armenia for bilingual (Armenian-Turkish) publication of Siamanto’s Garmir Lurer Paregames (Red News from My Friend, 1909) with a comprehensive introduction on the author’s life and work. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Ani Shahinyan, doctoral student, UCLA, travel grant to present paper “Tracing Models of Martyrdom: The Effect of the Martyrdom Narratives in the Armenian Bible on the Composition of Martyrologies and Development of Theological Thought in Medieval and Early Modern Armenia” at the 350th anniversary of the first Armenian printed Bible conference at Etchmiadzin, October 2016. Grant issued by NAASR. 2015 Alexis Demirdjian, editor and project coordinator, in support of the March 2015 conference “The Armenian Genocide Legacy 100 Years On” at the Hague, Netherlands; and towards the editing of the proceeds of this conference published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015 as The Armenian Genocide Legacy. Grant issued by NAASR. Grant to the University of Rhode Island in support of its course “The Armenian Experience: History and Culture” offered in winter-spring 2015. Grant issued by NAASR. Grant to Clark University’s Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in support of the April 2015 Third International Graduate Students' Conference on Genocide Studies, “New Perspectives in Holocaust and Genocide Studies 100 Years After the Armenian Genocide.” Grant issued by NAASR. Andrew Palmer, Institute of Eastern Christian Studies, Nijmegen, Netherlands, in support of his translation of Syriac Bishop Israel Odo’s monograph on the persecution of the Armenian and Aramaean Christians in the Diyarbekir region in 1915. Grant issued by NAASR and the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Erin Piñon, graduate student at Southern Methodist University, to present paper “Commemorating Genocide: The Armenian Khatchkar as National Tombstone,” at the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) conference in Yerevan in July 2015. Grant issued by NAASR. George Bournoutian, Iona College, grant to support the publication of his translation of The 1819 Russian Survey of the Khanate of Sheki: A Primary Source on the Demography and Economy of an Iranian Province Prior to Its Annexation by Russia (published by Mazda, 2015). Ani Shahinyan, graduate student, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, UCLA, travel grant in support of her research in Armenia on martyrological works in Armenian history through consultation with scholars and investigation of historical documents. Grant issued by NAASR. Fred Sienkiewicz, doctoral student, Boston University School of Music, travel grant to conduct research in Armenia for comprehensive scholarly study of Alexander Arutiunian's life and a critical survey and catalog of his complete works, with an overview of the cultural and musical context of Soviet Armenia geared toward the general Western musician. Grant issued by NAASR. Edip Gölbaşı, doctoral candidate, Department of History, Simon Fraser University (British Columbia, Canada), travel grant to visit the Ottoman archives and conduct research for thesis “The Fourth Imperial Army: Internal Security and Violence in the Eastern Provinces of the Late Ottoman Empire, 1880–1908.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Umit Kurt, doctoral candidate, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University, travel grant to conduct research in Turkish archives for thesis “The Making of the Aintab Elite: Social Support, Local Incentives and Provincial Motives Behind the Armenian Genocide (1890s–1920s).” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Hayarpi Papikyan, University of Paris Descartes, Paris, France, travel grant to support research in Yerevan and Tbilisi for thesis “Scolarisation des Filles Arméniennes en Caucase de 1880 à 1920.” Grant issued by Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Yelena Ambartsumian & Leah Marangos, travel grant to conduct research on the intersection of cultural property, historiography, and Armenian identity in Nagorno-Karabakh for an article “Cultural Heritage as Identity: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,” to appear in Convivium: Exchanges and Interactions in the Arts of Medieval Europe, Byzantium and the Mediterranean (Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies). 2014 Vicken Cheterian, Webster University, Geneva, research grant in support of publication Open Wounds: Armenians, Turks, and a Century of Genocide (published by Oxford University Press, 2015). Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Umit Kurt, Ph.D. candidate at Clark University, research grant to support work on dissertation “The Making of the Aintab Elite: Social Support, Local Incentives and Provincial Motives Behind the Armenian Genocide (1890s–1920s).” Grant issued by NAASR. Sona Haroutyunian, University of Venice, travel grant to present paper on “Translation and Representation of the Armenian Genocide in Literature and Film,” at the 44th Annual Scholars Conference on the Holocaust and the Churches, “Remembering for the Future: Armenia, Auschwitz and Beyond.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Anoush Suni, Ph.D. student, UCLA Department of Anthropology, research grant in support of doctoral project “Buried Histories: Ruins and the Politics of Memory in Anatolia.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Taner Akçam, Clark University, project coordinator, grant for translation, editing, and publication online of archives of documents from the League of Nations/Danish Friends of Armenians reception house in Aleppo, Syria, for Armenian genocide survivors released from Muslim households from 1922 to 1930. Grant issued by NAASR and the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies Asya Darbinyan, Ph.D. student at Clark University, travel grant to present a paper at the conference “Why Does It Happen? Complicity and Resistance to Genocide in World History” in Grand Rapids, MI. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Danny Fittante, Ph.D. student at UCLA, travel grant to conduct research in Moscow on the activities of the Armenian diasporan community. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Flora Keshgegian of the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, CA, towards her work on a collaborative book (with Burcu Tung) on dynamics of recollection and reticence in the shaping of Turkish and Armenian identities. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Mazda Publishers, subvention in support of Cinema of Armenia: An Overview, by Siranush Galstyan and with an introduction by Dickran Kouymjian (published 2016). 2013 Kaitlin Fertaly, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Colorado-Boulder, travel grant to conduct research for dissertation entitled “Changing Food Production and Provisioning in Rural Armenia.” Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Igor Dorfman-Lazarev, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, research grant in support of Italian language translation of the poetry of Eghishe Charents. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Armen Marsoobian, Southern Connecticut State University, research grant in support of publication Dildilian Brothers: Memories of a Lost Armenian Home: Photography and the Story of an Armenian Family in Anatolia, 1850–1923 (Birzamanlar Yayincilik). Grant issued by NAASR. Ani Honarchiansaky, Ph.D. student, UCLA Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, research grant to support work for dissertation on “Bishop Marutha of Mesopotamia: The Ambassador of the Roman Empire in the Sasanian Court.” Grant issued by NAASR. 2012 Kristin Bell, Ph.D. candidate, Northeastern University, travel grant to conduct research for dissertation entitled “Victims’ Voices: Sexual Violence in the Armenian and Rwandan Genocide.” Grant issued by NAASR. Khatchig Mouradian, Ph.D. candidate, Clark University, travel grants to conduct research for dissertation entitled “Genocide and Humanitarian Resistance in Ottoman Syria, 1915-1917.” Grants issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies and NAASR. Wolfgang Gust, general editor, grant in support of ongoing translation and digitization of German source documents on the Armenian Genocide, on the website www.armenocide.net, A Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in World War I. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. David Zakarian, D.Phil. Candidate in Oriental Studies, St Antony's College, Oxford. Travel grant to participate in UCLA Armenian Graduate Student Colloquium, presenting paper “The ‘Epic’ Representation of Armenian Women of the Fourth Century.” 2011 George Bournoutian, Iona College, publication grant in support of the book The 1823 Russian Survey of the Karabagh Province (published by Mazda, 2011). Grant issued by NAASR. Robert Hewsen & Karen Ketendjian, publication grant in support of translation and publication of A History of the Land of Artsakh: Karabagh and Genje, 1722-1827 by Sargis Hasan-Jalaliants (published by Mazda, 2013). Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies. Asya Darbinyan, Senior research fellow, Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Yerevan, travel grant to conduct research in U.S. archives on Near East Relief. Grant issued by the Knights of Vartan Fund for Armenian Studies.
3581	dbpedia	3	35	https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/locusts-of-power/savage-swarms-18901908/85E8004E759FE00B045DBAC344982F42	en	“Savage Swarms” (1890–1908) (Chapter 2)	https://www.cambridge.or…hare_600x600.jpg	https://www.cambridge.or…hare_600x600.jpg	[ "https://www.cambridge.org/core/cambridge-core/public/images/icn_circle__btn_close_white.svg", "https://www.cambridge.org/core/cambridge-core/public/images/logo_core.png", "https://www.cambridge.org/core/cambridge-core/public/images/logo_core.svg", "https://www.cambridge.org/core/cambridge-core/public/images/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Samuel Dolbee", "Vanderbilt University" ]	null	Locusts of Power - May 2023	en	/core/cambridge-core/public/images/favicon.ico	Cambridge Core	https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/locusts-of-power/savage-swarms-18901908/85E8004E759FE00B045DBAC344982F42	To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle. Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
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3581	dbpedia	0	17	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witnesses_and_testimonies_of_the_Armenian_genocide	en	Witnesses and testimonies of the Armenian genocide	https://upload.wikimedia…ian_Genocide.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…ian_Genocide.jpg	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f0/Witnesses_of_the_Arm...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2013-07-30T21:36:41+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witnesses_and_testimonies_of_the_Armenian_genocide	Person Occupation Quotes, testimonies Main perpetrator of the genocide Ottoman Minister of the Interior, 1913–18 Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, 1917–18 Interviewed by Berliner Tageblatt in May 1915, Talat stated: "We have been blamed for not making a distinction between guilty and innocent Armenians. [To do so] was impossible. Because of the nature of things, one who was still innocent today could be guilty tomorrow. The concern for the safety of Turkey simply had to silence all other concerns. Our actions were determined by national and historical necessity."[22] Talat told German ambassador Johann von Bernstorff "What on earth do you want? The question is settled, there are no more Armenians." "It is no use for you to argue . . . we have already disposed of three quarters of the Armenians; there are none at all left in Bitlis, Van, and Erzeroum. The hatred between the Turks and the Armenians is now so intense that we have got to finish with them. If we don't, they will plan their revenge."[24] On 3 August 1915, Talat met with US ambassador Morgenthau and told him "that our Armenian policy is absolutely fixed and that nothing can change it. We will not have the Armenians anywhere in Anatolia. They can live in the desert but nowhere else."[24] Governor of Diyarbekir Vilayet, genocide perpetrator "Either the Armenians were to eliminate the Turks, or the Turks were to eliminate the Armenians. I did not hesitate when I was confronted with this dilemma. My Turkishness prevailed over my profession. I figured, instead of wiping us out, we will wipe them out....On the question how I, as a doctor, could have murdered, I can answer as follows: the Armenians had become hazardous microbes in the body of this country. Well, isn't it a doctor's duty to kill microbes?"[25] CUP finance minister "Ottoman history has never opened its pages, even during the time of the Middle Ages, onto such determined murder[s] and large scale cruelty." "If you want to bloody the Armenian question politically, then you scatter the people in the Armenian provinces, but scatter them in a humane manner. Hang the traitors, even if there are thousands of them. Who would entertain hiding Russians [and] the supporters of Russians? But stop right there. You dared to annihilate the existence of an entire nation, not [only] their political existence. You are both iniquitous and incapable. What kind of conscience must you have to [be able to] accept the drowning, in the mountains and next to lakes, of those women, children and the elderly who were taken to the countryside!" "With these acts we have [ruined] everything. We put an irremovable stain on the current administration."—Diary entry for 29 August–24 September 1915[26] First President of Turkey and Founder of the Republic of Turkey There is much debate as to whether Atatürk, at least partially, acknowledged the systematic nature of the massacres in 1915.[27] According to David Gaunt and other historians, Kemal was "involved in completing genocide and ethnic cleansing in the years 1919 to 1924 [and] he used outright anti-Christian rhetoric to urge his cohorts to drive the last remaining Christians out".[28] Historian Rouben Paul Adalian has argued that "Mustafa Kemal completed what Talaat and Enver had started in 1915".[29] "These leftovers from the former Young Turk Party, who should have been made to account for the lives of millions of our Christian subjects who were ruthlessly driven en masse from their homes and massacred, have been restive under Republican rule. They have hitherto lived on plunder, robbery and bribery, and become inimical to any idea or suggestion to enlist in useful labor and earn their living by the honest sweat of their brow."[30] "The World War I massacres against the Armenians (Ermenilere karşı katliam) [was] a shameful act (fazahat)."[31][32][33][34] Ottoman naval officer and statesman Rauf Orbay mentioned in his memoirs during a discussion with James Harbord: "Kemal used the 800,000 figure to describe the number of Armenian victims. He, in fact, 'disapproved of the Armenian massacres.' (Ermeni katlini o da takbih ediyordu)."[35] Sheikh and member of Ottoman parliament Faiz El-Ghusein was exiled to Diyarbakir under the suspicion of supporting the Arab Revolt.[36] While in Diyarbakir, El-Ghusein witnessed the massacres of Armenians in and around the area.[37] El-Ghusein wrote much of what he witnessed in his book Martyred Armenia which provides an eyewitness account of the massacres and exposes its systematic nature.[36][38] The account was originally published in Arabic in 1916 under the title "Massacres in Armenia" but was changed to Martyred Armenia under its English translation.[37] In the foreword of the book, El-Ghusein states, "The war must needs come to an end after a while, and it will then be plain to readers of this book that all I have written is the truth, and that it contains only a small part of the atrocities committed by the Turks against the hapless Armenian people."[38] "As to their preparations, the flags, bombs and the like, even assuming there to be some truth in the statement, it does not justify the annihilation of the whole people, men and women, old men and children, in a way which revolts all humanity and more especially Islam and the whole body of Moslems, as those unacquainted with the true facts might impute these deeds to Mohammedan fanaticism."[38] "Annihilation seemed to be the sole means of deliverance; they found their opportunity in a time of war, and they proceeded to this atrocious deed, which they carried out with every circumstance of brutality — a deed which is contrary to the law of Islam."[38] Governor (Vali) of Sivas, Council of State, and cabinet minister in the Ottoman government Reşid Akif Paşa provided important testimony during a session of the Ottoman parliament on 21 November 1918.[39] The speech had outlined the process in which official statements made use of vague terminology when ordering deportation only to be clarified by special orders ordering "massacres" sent directly from the Committee of Union and Progress headquarters and oftentimes the residence of Talat Pasha himself.[40] "During my few days of service in this government I've learned of a few secrets and have come across something interesting. The deportation order was issued through official channels by the minister of the interior and sent to the provinces. Following this order the [CUP] Central Committee circulated its own ominous order to all parties to allow the gangs to carry out their wretched task. Thus the gangs were in the field, ready for their atrocious slaughter."[40] "The 'mission' in the circular was: to attack the convoys and massacre the population ... I am ashamed as a Muslim, I am ashamed as an Ottoman statesman. What a stain on the reputation of the Ottoman Empire, these criminal people ..."[41] Young Turk politician and President of the first Ottoman parliament Ahmed Rıza had opposed the Temporary Law of Deportation because he claimed the bill was unconstitutional since it was never voted on and was never approved by the Ottoman parliament.[40][42] Rıza submitted a draft bill which called for the suspension of the deportations until after the war and proposed to provide security for the deportees.[40][42] The bill, however, was never passed.[40][42] Nevertheless, the arguments and issues exposed by Rıza showed that no member of parliament was informed about the deportation bill.[40] Rıza expressed his objections to the Temporary Law on Abandoned Goods bill in a session in parliament on a 30 November 1915.[40] "It is unlawful to designate the Armenian assets as "abandoned goods" for the Armenians, the proprietors, did not abandon their properties voluntarily; they were forcibly, compulsorily removed from their domiciles and exiled. Now the government through its efforts is selling their goods ... Nobody can sell my property if I am unwilling to sell it. Article 21 of the Constitution forbids it. If we are a constitutional regime functioning in accordance with constitutional law we can't do this. This is atrocious. Grab my arm, eject me from my village, then sell my goods and properties, such a thing can never be permissible. Neither the conscience of the Ottomans nor the law can allow it."[40] "Let's face it, we Turks savagely killed off the Armenians."[41][43][44][45] In a statement in the Ottoman Parliament, Rize referred to the Special Organization as "murderers and criminals".[40] Abdülhalim Akkılıç Turkish Colonel of cavalry "There were no Armenians left in east, central Anatolia and to a certain degree in the western regions. If this cleaning had not been carried out, getting the independence struggle to succeed could have been much more difficult and could have cost us much more. May God be merciful and compassionate toward Enver and Talat Pashas who actualized this [cleaning]. Their foresight has saved the Turkish nation."[46] Journalist and poet "The armed bands formed under the SO stained the [reputation of] the entire Turkish nation in the view of the world, causing the inclusion of bloody and barbarous pages in her history. It is not within the purview of justice and fairness to have the responsibility and consequences of these events placed squarely upon the shoulders of Anatolian Turks. Instead, the CUP leaders and especially...[Drs.] Bahaeddin Shakir, Nazım and [education minister] Şükrü who invented and administered this SO must be mentioned." Musa Anter Kurdish Kurdish writer and intellectual In his memoir, Anter wrote that Şükrü Baban [tr] had once recounted the following story: "I [Baban] went to the part of the house reserved for males [selamlık], kissing the hands of my father and Talat Pasha. The pasha said: "Oh Şükrü, may God's grace be upon you, you have grown and become a man....And you have graduated as well, is that so?" "Yes, my Pasha," I replied. "Then, my son, from this day on, I appoint you the General Director of Settlements." Bewildered, I asked, "Uncle Pasha, who am I going to settle?" to which he laughed, replying, "My son, you are going to settle the Armenians." When I responded, "Okay, but aren't the Armenians (p.256) [already] settled; are they to become nomads instead? How can I do this job, I do not know," he laughed out loud, saying: "Şükrü, you went to Paris, but are still a child....My son, it is easy; you are going to give the command. When the Armenians in Erzurum come to Muş, they will be settled on the road; those of Van will be settled in Bitlis, the ones of Bitlis in Siirt, those of Diyarbekir in Urfa, the ones of Urfa in Mardin, and those in Mardin can be settled on the way to Musul." When I understood [the scope of] this pretend settlement on the road and the [ensuing] calamity, I turned white and could not utter a word. They immediately ordered me to leave." Turkish novelist, nationalist, and feminist political leader In 1916–1917, Halide Edip acted as an inspector for schools in Damascus, Beirut, and Mount Lebanon. According to a teacher who worked briefly under her, Halide Edip "was at the head of an orphanage of 1,000 children in the mountains who were mostly Armenian children. She said, 'Their names are changed (to Moslem names) but they are children; they don't know what religion means. Now, they must be fed and clothed and kept safe.' She didn't say what would be afterwards."[49] Halide Edip's account of her inspectorship emphasizes her humanitarian efforts and her struggles to come to terms with the violence of the situation. The account of one acquaintance, however, accuses her of "calmly planning with [Cemal Pasha] forms of human tortures for Armenian mothers and young women" and taking on "the task of making Turks of their orphaned children."[50] A U.S. High Commissioner refers to her as a "chauvinist" and someone who is "trying to rehabilitate Turkey."[51] "We slaughtered the innocent Armenian population ... We tried to extinguish the Armenians through methods that belong to the medieval times".[52][53] In a discussion with Djemal Pasha about Armenian children undergoing Turkification in Turkish orphanages: "Why do you allow Armenian children to be called by Moslem names? It looks like turning the Armenians into Moslems, and history some day will revenge it on the coming generation of Turks." "You are an idealist," [Cemal Pasha] answered gravely,"... Do you believe that by turning a few hundred Armenian boys and girls Moslem I think I benefit my race? You have seen the Armenian orphanages in Damascus run by Armenians. There is no room in those; there is no money to open another Armenian orphanage. This is a Moslem orphanage, and only Moslem orphans are allowed. When I hear of wandering and starving children, I sent them to Aintoura. I have to keep them alive. I do not care how. I cannot bear to see them die in the streets." "Afterward?" I asked. "Do you mean after the war?" he asked. "After the war they will go back to their people. I hope none is too small to realize his race." "I will never have anything to do with such an orphanage." He shook his head. "You will," he said; "if you see them in misery and suffering, you will go to them and not think for a moment about their names and religion ..." Last Caliph of Islam of the Ottoman Dynasty, 1922–1924 Abdülmecid II was the last Caliph of Islam from the Ottoman Dynasty and Heir-Apparent to the Ottoman Throne. He is often noted for his intervention and confrontation with Enver Pasha before the latter's support of initiating the deportations and subsequent massacres.[40] In an interview with an Istanbul Special Correspondent of a newspaper based in London, Abdülmecid II describes the encounter. "I refer to those awful massacres. They are the greatest stain that has ever disgraced our nation and race. They were entirely the work of Talat and Enver. I heard some days before they began that they were intended. I went to Istanbul and insisted on seeing Enver. I asked him if it was true that they intended to recommence the massacres which had been our shame and disgrace under Abdul Hamid. The only reply I could get from him was: 'It is decided. It is the program.'"[4][32][55] Governor of Aleppo and Konya Because he refused orders to deport Armenians, Celal Bey was removed from his post as governor of Aleppo and transferred to Konya.[39] As deportations continued, he repeatedly demanded from the central authorities that shelter be provided for the deportees.[56] In addition to these demands, Celal Bey sent many telegraphs and letters of protest to the Sublime Porte stating that the "measures taken against the Armenians were, from every point of view, contrary to the higher interests of the fatherland."[56] His demands, however, were ignored.[56] Mehmet Celal Bey compared himself to "a person sitting by the side of a river, with absolute no means of saving anyone. Blood was flowing in the river and thousands of innocent children, irreproachable old people, helpless women, strong young men, were streaming down this river towards oblivion. Anyone I could save with my bare hands I saved, and the others, I think they streamed down the river never to return."[57][58] Mehmet Celal Bey at first did not believe that the deportations were meant to "annihilate" the Armenians: "I admit, I did not believe that these orders, these actions revolved around the annihilation of the Armenians. I never imagined that any government could take upon itself to annihilate its own citizens in this manner, in effect destroying its human capital, which must be seen as the country's greatest treasure. I presumed that the actions being carried out were measures deriving from a desire to temporarily remove the Armenians from the theater of war and taken as the result of wartime exigencies."[59] "... but why were the Armenians of Bursa, Edirne, and Tekirdag removed? Was this part of the Sakarya basin as well? Why were they sent to Aleppo, a place whose population was only one-twentieth Armenian? Right or wrong, for the sake of the fatherland the Armenians were removed from their lands, how is this a practical policy? Has the government even thought about the implications of deporting these helpless Armenians without food or shelter to Der Zor where Arab nomadic tribes solely reside? If so I ask: how much food was provided and how many shelters were built for these deportees? What is the purpose of deporting the Armenians, who have lived for centuries on these lands, to the deserts of Der Zor without water and lumber to construct their new settlements? Unfortunately, it is impossible to deny and distort the facts. The purpose was to annihilate [imhaydı] and they were annihilated [imha edildiler]. It is impossible to hide and conceal this policy conducted by the İttihat and Terakki which was drafted by its leaders and was ultimately accepted by the general public."[60] Interior Minister of the Ottoman Empire, 1917–1918 Mustafa Arif (since Surname Law Mustafa Arif Deymer) served as Interior Minister succeeding Talat Pasha after the latter had stepped down from office.[39] In regards to the massacres, Arif was especially known for establishing a governmental commission that examined the events. On 18 March 1919, the commission concluded that 800,000 Armenians died during World War I. The figure became reputable after other Turkish historians such as Yusuf Hikmet Bayur used the figure in their research and writing.[39] "Surely a few Armenians aided and abetted our enemy, and a few Armenian Deputies committed crimes against the Turkish nation ... it is incumbent upon a government to pursue the guilty ones. Unfortunately, our wartime leaders, imbued with a spirit of brigandage, carried out the law of deportation in a manner that could surpass the proclivities of the most bloodthirsty bandits. They decided to exterminate the Armenians, and they did exterminate them."[32] "The atrocities committed against the Armenians reduced our country to a gigantic slaughterhouse."[32][61] Ottoman military officer and head judge of the Turkish Courts-Martial of 1919–1920 Also known as "Nemrud" Mustafa Pasha, Mustafa Yamulki was the head judge of the Turkish Courts-Martial of 1919–1920 since the day of its creation in February 1919.[62] The Courts-Martial's was later known for condemning Talat, Enver, Cemal, and others to death for their role in the massacres against Armenians.[63][64] "Nemrud" Mustafa Pasha had a reputation for being honest and was instrumental in exposing the crimes and corruption scandals of the Ottoman Empire during World War I.[62] Due to his open accusations against the massacres, "Nemrud" Mustafa Pasha was sentenced to three months imprisonment.[62] The sentences he gave condemning various Turkish officials for conducting massacre were overturned.[62] "Our fellow countrymen committed unheard of crimes, resorted to all conceivable methods of despotism, organised deportations and massacres, poured gas over babies and burned them, raped women and girls in front of their parents who were bound hand and foot, took girls in front of their parents and fathers, appropriated personal property and real estate, drove people to Mesopotamia and treated them inhumanly on the way ... they put thousands of innocent people into boats that were sunk at sea ... they put Armenians in the most unbearable conditions any other nation had ever known in its history."[65][66] General in the Ottoman Army and commander of the Ottoman Third Army during the Caucasus Campaign Vehip Pasha assumed the commandment of the Third Army in February 1916 from Mahmud Kâmil Pasha, after much of the deportations concluded.[39] During his post, Vehip Pasha received an order to send 2,000 Armenians as labor battalions for the construction of the Baghdad-Berlin Railway. However, Vehip Pasha was "outraged" after receiving word that the Armenians he had sent were massacred. Vehip Pasha set up a court-martial for the men in charge of the transfer and massacre, Kör Nuri and Çerkez Kadir, who were later hanged on Vehip's orders. During the court-martial, Nuri blamed the governor of Sivas, Ahmet Muammer, for the massacres. Ahmet Muammer was eventually relieved by Talat Pasha who subsequently positioned him outside of Vehip Pasha's supervision. Though Vehip Pasha is largely known for his commandment during the Caucasus Campaign in 1918, he also condemned the massacres against Armenians that happened prior to his appointment as commander of the Third Army in 1916.[40] "The massacre and destruction of the Armenians and the plunder and pillage of their goods were the results of decision reached by Ittihad's [the Young Turks] Central Committee ... The atrocities were carried out under a program that was determined upon and involved a definite case of premeditation. It was [also] ascertained that these atrocities and crimes were encouraged by the district attorneys whose dereliction of judicial duties in face of their occurrence and especially their remaining indifferent renders them accessories to these crimes."[40][69] "In summary, here are my convictions. The Armenian deportations were carried out in a manner entirely unbecoming to humanity, civilization, and government. The massacre and annihilation of the Armenians, and the looting and plunder of their properties were the result of the decision of the Central Committee of Ittihad and Terakki. The butchers of human beings, who operated in the command zone of the Third Army, were procured and engaged by Dr. Bahattin Şakir. The high ranking governmental officials did submit to his directives and order ... He stopped by at all major centers where he orally transmitted his instructions to the party's local bodies and to the governmental authorities." Turkish historian, poet, and writer After World War I, Ahmet Refik wrote Two committees two massacres (İki Komite iki Kitâl), an account of the massacres during the War. Though Refik writes about massacres conducted on both sides, he concludes that the massacres against the Armenians was an attempt by the Turkish government to "destroy the Armenians".[40] "The criminal gangs who were released from the prisons, after a week's training at the War Ministry's training grounds, were sent off to the Caucasian front as the brigands of the Special Organization, perpetrating the worst crimes against the Armenians."[40] "In a situation such as this, a just government which is confident of its force would have punished those who rebelled against the government. But the Ittihadists, wanted to annihilate the Armenians and in this manner eliminate the Eastern Question."[40][71] "It was said that the most distressing tragedies occurred in Bursa and Ankara; houses were ransacked, hundreds of Armenian families were put into cars and hurled into streams. Many women went insane in the face of such awful murders. Houses of wealthy Armenians were bought, but the payments were recovered by fiat upon transfer of title. This conduct was a murder against humanity. No government, in any age, had brought about a murder this cruel."[52][71] Governor of Erzurum Formerly the Vali of Van, Hasan Tahsin was appointed Governor of Erzurum in late 1914. On 2 August 1919, during the Mamuretulaziz trial, Tahsin testified that the Teskilat-ı Mahsusa, under the command of Bahaeddin Sakir, was mobilized to kill Armenians.[73] According to his testimony, when orders of deportation and massacre were made by the Interior Ministry, Tahsin protested by saying the Armenians were blameless and that the local Armenian population was not staging a rebellion. He also pointed out that the Van rebellion would not have occurred if the Ottoman government did not provoke the Armenians.[62] Having failed to put a stop to the deportations, Tahsin nevertheless attempted to ensure the safety of the deportees within his jurisdiction.[75] However, despite his attempts, many convoys were "destroyed" in the outskirts of the city.[76] "During the deportation of the Armenians I was in Erzurum ... The caravans which were subject to attacks and killings resulted from the actions of those who'd assembled under the name "Tes-ı Mahsusa." The Teskilat-ı Mahsusa was composed of two units. When I came back from Erzurum, the Teskilat-ı Mahsusa had turned into a major power and they'd become involved in the war. The Army knew about it. Then there was another Teskilat-ı Mahsusa, and that one had Bahaeddin Sakir's signature on it. In other words, he was sending telegrams around as the head of the Teskilat-ı Mahsusa...Bahaeddin Sakir had a code. He'd communicate with the Sublime Porte and with the Ministry of the Interior with it. During the deportation he communicated with the Army as well Bahaeddin Sakir had two different codes with which to communicate with both the Sublime Porte and the Ministry of War."[73] Mayor of Lice Huseyin Nesimi Bey was the mayor of Lice, a town not far from Diyarbakir. At the time of his governance, the governor of Diyarbakir, Mehmed Reshid, was conducting deportations and massacres towards the Armenians in the area. Having known that the deportations meant massacre,[77] Huseyin Nesimi refused to have the Armenians of Lice deported.[39][78] Due to his refusal of proceeding with the deportations, Nesimi Bey was murdered.[39] When news reached the interior ministry about the assassination of Nesimi Bey, Reshid had claimed that Armenian militants had killed him.[79] However, Nesimi Bey's son, Abidin Nesimi, wrote in his memoirs decades later that his father was murdered because he refused to deport the Armenians of the village.[79] With Nesimi Bey dead, the massacre of the Armenians of Lice resumed, resulting in the deaths of thousands.[80] When orders of deportations reached Nesimi, it is reported that he said: "I don't want to participate in this sin!"[77] Huseyin Nesimi's son, Abidin Nesimi, wrote in his memoirs: "During the governorship of Dr Reshid, many crimes were committed whose agents could not be found. The most important of these are the murders of Governor of Basra Ferit, Governor of the Province Muntefek Bedi Nuri, Lieutenant Governor of Lice, my father Huseyin Nesimı, Representative Lieutenant Governor of Besiri, Sabit and journalist Ismail Mestan. All these people killed were either socialists or philanthropists. It was impossible to carry out the Armenian deportations with the Circassian gendarme team and members of Bedirhani, Millı, Karakecili tribes who were actually Kurdish militia, because these groups were interested in plunder and pillage. Unable to realize deportations they transformed them into massacres. Hence the elimination of the administrative staff who would oppose this plunder and pillage was also inevitable. Therefore this cadre deemed the elimination of the above mentioned persons necessary, too."[81] Deputy of the Turkish National Assembly and Minister of Agriculture and of Finance of the Republic of Turkey During the early years of the Republic of Turkey, secret sessions of the National Assembly took place which discussed the governments role during World War I. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first president of the Republic of Turkey, presided over the secret sessions.[82] The sessions also touched upon the massacres of Armenians and the situation of their "abandoned" property. Hasan Fehmi (Ataç), a deputy representing Gümüşhane, openly testified the motives of the government and the nature of the massacres during one such session. Fehmi (Ataç) also proclaimed that the confiscation of property was only done to Christian minorities.[83] "As you know the [Armenian] deportations were an event that triggered a worldwide outcry and caused us to be regarded as murderers. Before embarking upon it we knew that the Christian world would not indulge us and would direct its full wrath and deep-seated enmity against us on account of it. Why have we then [opted for] appending to ourselves the label of murderers (Neden katillik unvanini nefsimize izafe ettik)? Why have we involved ourselves in such a grave and difficult conflict? We acted thusly simply to ensure the future of our fatherland that we consider to be dearer and more sacred to us than our own lives."[82][84] When referring to the confiscated Armenian properties and assets, Fehmi (Ataç) stated: "Not a single Muslim's good were liquidated, you can establish these facts by examining the old records of the secret deliberations. The Parliament at that time secretly secured reassurances from the Finance Minister that the law would not apply to Muslims who had fled as a result of war. Only after registering this assurance did we proclaim to the world that law. Presently, we are repeating that procedure."[40] Ottoman regional governor and military commander Halil Kut was the uncle of Enver Pasha, one of the "masterminds" of the Armenian genocide.[85] Kut had conducted "the massacre" of Armenian battalions as stated by the German Vice-consul of Erzurum and later testified by a soldier who had been under his command by saying, "Halil had the entire Armenian population (men, women and children) in the areas of Bitlis, Mus, and Beyazit also massacred without pity. My company received a similar order. Many of the victims were buried alive in especially prepared ditches." Others, such as German vice-consul of Erzurum Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, reported that "Halil Bey's campaign in northern Persia included the massacre of his Armenian and Syrian battalions and the expulsion of the Armenian, Syrian, and Persian population out of Persia ..." Halil Kut wrote in his memoirs having killed: "300,000 Armenians, it can be more or less. I didn't count."[33][88] In the summer of 1918, in front of many Armenians in Yerevan, Halil Kut declared: "I have endeavored to wipe out the Armenian nation to the last individual."[33][40][89] "I will not leave even one Armenian on the surface of the earth!" Minister of Education, March – May 1919 Interior Minister, May – June 1919 Ali Kemal Bey was a liberal Ottoman journalist, newspaper editor and poet who was also a Minister of the Interior and Minister of Education under the government of Damat Ferid Pasha, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. Ali Kemal condemned the massacres of the Armenians and demanded prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators.[32] Ali Kemal Bey was also an editor of various newspapers including the Turkish dailies Sabah, Alemdar, Peyam, and later Peyam-Sabah, openly blamed not only the Ittihadist leaders, but also the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies and "thousands and thousands" of ordinary people participating in the massacres.[32] In an 18 July 1919 issue of the Alemdar newspaper, Ali Kemal Bey wrote: "... our Minister of Justice has opened the doors of prisons. Don't let us try to throw the blame on the Armenians; we must not flatter ourselves that the world is filled with idiots. We have plundered the possessions of the men whom we deported and massacred; we have sanctioned theft in our Chamber and our Senate. Let us prove that we have sufficient national energy to put the law into force against the heads of these bands who have trampled justice underfoot and dragged our honor and our national life through the dust."[32] In a 28 January 1919 issue of the Sabah newspaper, Kemal Bey wrote: "Four or five years ago a historically singular crime has been perpetrated, a crime before which the world shudders. Given its dimensions and standards, its authors do not number in the fives, or tens, but in the hundreds of thousands. In fact, it has already been demonstrated that this tragedy was planned on the basis of a decision reached by the Central Committee of Ittihad."[32] Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire March 1919 – October 1919, April 1920 – October 1920 Damat Ferid Pasha was a prominent Ottoman statesman who became a Grand Vizier twice during the reign of Sultan Mehmed VI Vahdeddin (1918–1922).[91] It was under his administration that the Court Martial was held which ultimately sentenced those involved with the systematic massacres to death.[92] "In the course of the war nearly the whole civilised world was shocked by the recital of the crimes alleged to have been committed by the Turks. It is far from my thought to cast a veil over these misdeeds, which are such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror for ever; still less will I endeavour to minimise the degree of guilt of the actors in the great drama. The aim which I have set myself is that of showing to the world with proofs in my hand, who are the truly responsible authors of these terrible crimes."[93][94][95][96] Hasan Mazhar Turkish Governor of Ankara Hasan Mazhar Bey, who was appointed Vali of Ankara on 18 June 1914, is known for having refused to proceed with the order of deportations.[58] Upon refusal, Mazhar Bey was removed from his post as governor in August 1915 and was replaced with Atif Bey, a prominent member of the Teşkîlât-ı Mahsûsa (Special Organization), a militant organization utilized to murder Armenians.[97] After leaving his post, Mazhar went on to report that "in the kaza [district], the plunder of Armenian property, by both officials and the population, assumed incredible proportions."[80] Above all, Mazhar became the key figure in the establishment of the "Mazhar Inquiry Commission", an investigative committee which immediately took up the task of gathering evidence and testimonies, with a special effort to obtain inquiries on civil servants implicated in massacres committed against Armenians.[98] "When I received orders from the Ministry of the Interior regarding the deportation of Armenians I pretended not to understand. As you know, other provinces were done with the deportations before I had ever started. Then one day Atif Bey came to me and orally conveyed the interior minister's orders that the Armenians were to be murdered during the deportation. "No, Atif Bey," I said, "I am a governor, not a bandit, I cannot do this, I will leave this post and you can come and do it.""[39][99] Turkish poet and Governor of Baghdad Süleyman Nazif was the Vali of Baghdad during the Armenian genocide and was instrumental in preventing massacres from occurring in the province. In one instance, Nazif had intercepted a convoy of deportees numbering 260 Armenian women and children who were being sent to their deaths. Nazif demanded that the convoy be transferred to a safer zone in Mosul but his proposal was refused. The convoy was eventually massacred. During his time as governor of Baghdad, Nazif visited Diyarbakir where he encountered a "pungent smell of decaying corpses" which "pervaded the atmosphere and that the bitter stench clogged his nose, making him gag."[79] Nazif was critical of Dr. Mehmed Reshid, the governor of Diyarbakir, who was known as the "Butcher of Diyarbakir".[101] Nazif, who stated that Reshid "destroyed through massacre thousands of humans" also wrote about a committee established by Reshid with the objective of providing a 'solution of the Armenian question'.[79][102] The committee had its own military unit and was called the 'Committee of Inquiry'.[79] Nazif also encouraged other governors not to proceed with the deportation order. In a letter written to his brother Faik Ali Bey, the governor of Kutahya, Nazif wrote, "Don't participate in this event, watch out for our family's honor."[103] In a testimony to the Interior Ministry, Nazif stated, "the catastrophic deportations and murders in Diyarbakir were Reshid's work. He alone is responsible. He killed the kaymakams in order to scare all other opposition Muslim men and women-he displayed the corpses of the kaymakams in public." In a 28 November 1918 issue of the Hadisat newspaper, Nazif wrote: "Under the guise of deportations, mass murder was perpetrated. Given the fact that the crime is all too evident, the perpetrators should have been hanged already."[105] When Talat Pasha condemned Reshid for robbery, Nazif wrote, "Talat Pasha dismissed Resit as a thief, while he adored him as murderer".[106][79] Turkish Poet and Governor of Kutahya Faik Ali Ozansoy is especially known for having saved the lives of thousands of Armenians during the Armenian genocide.[107] During the Armenian genocide, Ozansoy served as governor of the Kütahya Province.[108] When orders of deportations reached Ozansoy, he refused to carry them out.[80][109] His brother, Suleyman Nazif, insisted in a letter that he not "participate in this event, watch out for our family's honor."[103][110][111] Meanwhile, while many Armenians were being deported through Kutahya and onto further destinations, Ozansoy protected them and provided shelter. He was then invited by Talat Pasha to Istanbul to explain his actions towards the Armenians. While Ozansoy was in the capital negotiating with Talaat, the chief of police in Kutahya, Kemal Bey, took advantage of Ozansoy's absence and forced many Armenians in the province to convert to Islam.[108] Consequently, many did convert so as to save themselves from deportation. Upon returning to Kutahya, Ozansoy was upset over the mass conversions. He immediately removed Kemal Bey from his post and reassessed the situation by asking the Armenians of Kutahya whether they wished to remain Muslim.[108] All, with the exception of one, decided to stay Christian.[108] Due to protecting the life of Armenian Christians, Ozansoy was known as the "governor of the infidels" by his contemporaries.[110] On 24 April 2013, the day of remembrance for the Armenian genocide, various prominent figures of both the Armenian and Turkish community visited his grave to pay their respects.[109][112] Ali Faik's encounter with Talat Pasha is described by Armenian writer Stepan Stepanyan, who was informed about the details of their meeting from Ali Faik himself. The following is Stepanyan's transcript of the conversation as described by Ali Faik: Talaat asks him why he hasn't deported the Armenians of his town. He answers that the Armenians of his sandjak have always been faithful Ottomans and that they have always lived with the Turks like brothers. Talaat points out that the decision for deportations is for all Armenians and there can be no exception to this rule. "In that case, since I don't want to be a murderer, please accept my resignation and find a successor who is willing to implement such a policy" says Ali Faik Bey. Only then Talaat says, "Fine, fine. Take your Armenians and just sit in your place."[110][113][114] Grandson of Midhat Pasha and prominent member of the Young Turk party Kemal Midhat Bey was the grandson of prominent reformer Midhat Pasha. He was a member of the Young Turk party and was an instrumental figure during the 1908 revolution and its subsequent government. Kemal Midhat Bey openly declared that "the Armenians are the most faithful and loyal citizens of the Ottoman empire" and then stated that the Armenians "have in no wise deserved the inhuman and bloody measures applied to them by the Young Turks of the present government."[115] His full length testimony of the massacres was first published in the Journal de Genève on 1 January 1918. "To you, Armenians, faithful citizens, local and useful to the Empire, Turkey is indebted for the eminent services that you rendered to it as well for its economic and commercial development as intellectual and artistic. At this hour, a band of adventurers calling themselves "Young Turks" hold the power in Constantinople and, in order to hold on to it, they have recourse daily to the most sanguinary means which were never seen, even under the reign of Abdul Hamid! And we were impotent witnesses of this coward extermination of our Armenian brothers that these gangsters have deported and massacred by the hundreds of thousands. To justify these crimes, the current Government of Turkey has published more than one booklet cynically untrue against the Armenians. After having slaughtered the women and children, it was necessary to invent all kinds of accusations against the unfortunate Armenian people..."[116] Trabzon Deputy and Justice Minister in the Republic of Turkey A lawyer by profession,[117] Hafız Mehmet stated that he and other local politicians in Trabzon had known about the systematic massacres against the Armenians.[118] He stated that the policy was conducted mainly through the Special Organization.[118] Hafız Mehmet repeatedly protested the decision of the local government and particularly Vali Cemal Azmi's decision of drowning Armenians in the Black Sea in and around Trabzon as part of the Armenian genocide. Mehmet protested to Interior Minister Talat Pasha, but was unsuccessful in bringing the drownings and massacres to an end.[56] "God will punish us for what we did [Allah bize belasını verecektir] ... the matter is too obvious to be denied. I personally witnessed this Armenian occurrence in the port city of Ordu [about 155 km west of Trabzon]. Under the pretext of sending off to Samsun, another port city on the Black Sea [about 255 km west of Trabzon], the district's governor loaded the Armenians into barges and had them thrown overboard. I have heard that the governor-general applied this procedure [throughout the province]. Even though I reported this at the Interior Ministry immediately upon my return to Istanbul ... I was unable to initiate any action against the latter; I tried for some three years to get such action instituted but in vain."[120][88] Ottoman statesman and Ambassador to Sweden Mehmed Şerif Pasha was the brother-in-law of Prime Minister Said Halim Pasha and was a prominent member of the Young Turk government.[122] In a New York Times article dated 10 October 1915, Şerif Pasha condemned the massacres and declared that the Young Turk government had the intentions of "exterminating" the Armenians for a long time.[122] "To be sure, the state of mind of the Unionists was not revealed to the civilized world until they had openly taken sides with Germany; but for more than six years I have been at exposing them in the Mecheroutiette (his newspaper, published first in Constantinople and then in Paris) and indifferent journals and reviews, warning France and England of the plot against them and against certain nationalities within the Ottoman borders, notably the Armenians, that was being hatched."[122] "Alas! at the thought that a people so gifted, which has served as the fructifying soil for the renovation of the Ottoman Empire, is on the point of disappearing from history-not enslaved, as were the Jews by the Assyrians, but annihilated-even the most hardened heart must bleed: and I desire, through the medium of your estimable journal, to express to this race which is being assassinated, my anger toward the butchers and my immense pity for the victim's."[122] Person Occupation Quotes, testimonies Henry Morgenthau is regarded as one of the most prominent Americans who denounced and condemned the Armenian genocide.[18] Throughout his career as an ambassador, Morgenthau had established contacts with many Young Turk politicians and especially Talat Pasha, the "mastermind"[166][85] of the Armenian genocide.[167] During the deportations and subsequent massacres of Armenians, Morgenthau repeatedly tried to intervene with Talat Pasha and pleaded on their behalf to save them.[167] Early in 1915, when Morgenthau raised his concerns about the deportations of Armenians to Turkish authorities, the authorities expressed their "annoyance" over the concerns. Morgenthau, who coordinated much of the activity of the American consuls throughout the Empire, received from them reports nearly every day about the deportations and subsequent massacres that were taking place. Morgenthau estimated that a million Armenians were deported and referred to the deportations as a "death warrant to a whole race". When returning to the United States, Morgenthau helped support funds that helped the refugees and survivors of the Genocide.[167] In 1918, Morgenthau wrote about his accounts in a book entitled, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story. The book dedicates a chapter to the plight of the Armenians called "Murder of a Nation" where he described the deportations and the atrocities as a "cold-blooded, calculating state policy."[167] "The real purpose of the deportation was robbery and destruction; it really represented a new method of massacre. When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact."[169] "I am confident that the whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this. The great massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared to the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915."[4][170][171] "They have drawn from the fields the male population and thereby destroyed their agricultural communities. They have annihilated or displaced at least two thirds of the Armenian population and thereby deprived themselves of a very intelligent and useful race." "Deportation of and excesses against peaceful Armenians is increasing and from harrowing reports of eyewitnesses it appears that a campaign of race extermination is in progress under a pretext of reprisal against rebellion."[173] American businessman Walter Mackintosh Geddes provided a detailed account of the situation of the Armenian deportees in the Syrian Desert. While in Aleppo, he witnessed thousands die of exposure and starvation. Upon returning from Aleppo back to Smyrna, Geddes remarked "the sights that I saw on my return trip were worse than those on my trip going".[175] Greatly saddened and affected by the scenes he witnessed,[176] he ultimately committed suicide on 7 November 1915. "Several Turks[,] whom I interviewed, told me that the motive of this exile was to exterminate the race". "The destination of all these Armenians is Aleppo. Here they are kept crowded in all available vacant houses, khans, Armenian churches, courtyards and open lots. Their condition in Aleppo is beyond description. I personally visited several of the places where they were kept and found them starving and dying by the hundreds every day." Italian Consul of Trabzon, 1911–1915 During World War I, Gorrini openly denounced the Armenian genocide through press articles and interviews and didn't hesitate to describe the policies of massacre perpetrated against the Armenians. He said if everyone had seen what he had, the condemnation of those acts would have been universal especially on the side of the Christian powers. He was in touch with American Ambassador Morgenthau and the Apostolic delegate to Constantinople Angelo Dolci, and this way he managed to save 50,000 Armenians from deportation and mass murder.[180] In 1911–1915, he served as Italian Consul in Trabzon and was an eyewitness to the massacres in and around the area.[180] In August 1915, with Italy's participation in the war effort and their subsequent declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire, Gorrini was forced to leave his office.[180] "The local authorities, and indeed the Moslem population in general, tried to resist, to mitigate it, to make omissions, to hush it up. But the orders of the Central Government were categorically confirmed, and all were compelled to resign themselves and obey. It was a real extermination and slaughter of the innocents, an unheard-of thing, a black page stained with the flagrant violation of the most sacred rights of humanity ... There were about 14,000 Armenians at Trebizond — Gregorians, Catholics, and Protestants. They had never caused disorders or given occasion for collective measures of police. When I left Trebizond, not a hundred of them remained."[181] "As for the Armenians, they were treated differently in the different vilayets. They were suspect and spied upon everywhere, but they suffered a real extermination, worse than massacre, in the so-called 'Armenian Vilayets.' from the 24th June onwards, the Armenians were all "interned" — that is, ejected by force from their various residences and dispatched under the guard of the gendarmerie to distant, unknown destinations, which for a few will mean the interior of Mesopotamia, but for four-fifths of them has meant already a death accompanied by unheard-of cruelties."[182][183] American Consul of Izmir, 1911–1917 George Horton is particularly remembered for his book The Blight of Asia, which describes the systematic ethnic cleansing of the Christian population up until the Great Fire of Smyrna.[185] Becoming American Consul of Izmir once again during the time of the Great Fire of Smyrna, Horton became an eyewitness to the destruction of the city and notes that the goal of the Ottoman government was to get rid of all Christian peoples in the Empire.[185] Horton believed that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk continued the policies of the Young Turks.[185][186] "The Turks were now making a thorough and systematic job of killing Armenian men. The squads of soldiers were chiefly engaged in hunting down and killing Armenians."[185] "I have also other statements from eyewitnesses, not natives of this country, of the highest standing in the religious and educational world, which leads me to believe that what is now taking place in Armenian Turkey, surpasses in deliberate and long protracted horror and in extent anything that has hitherto happened in the history of the world." "From what all these people worthy of the highest credence tell me, from 800,000 to 1,000,000 human beings are now going through this process of slow and hideous torture, and the movement instead of waning is increasing in ferocity, so that before it is finally over, in the neighborhood of 2,000,000 people will be affected, a very large percentage of whom will certainly perish as they are driven along for weeks and months without food or shelter and without the means of procuring these." "The murder of the Armenian race had been practically consummated during the years 1915–1916, and the prosperous and populous Greek colonies, with the exception of Smyrna itself, had been ferociously destroyed."[185] Venezuelan officer in the Ottoman army Nogales Méndez was hired by the Ottoman army as a mercenary while serving for the German army. During his service in the Ottoman army during World War I, Nogales Méndez witnessed the massacres of Christians in and around the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire and described them to be "unjustified massacres of the Christians."[188][79] He believed that the massacres were committed by Khalil bey, the Commander and Chief of the Expeditionary Army he volunteered to serve.[188] Nogales Méndez reported that the civil authorities found it preferable to murder at night with the help of local Kurds.[190] When visiting Aghtamar, an island in Lake Van where the Armenian Cathedral of the Holy Cross is located, he notes that he uncovered the corpses of many priests.[191] Nogales Méndez visited Diyarbakir on 26 June 1915 and spoke with the governor Mehmet Reşid, who was to be later known as the "butcher of Diyarbakir".[101][192] Nogales Méndez recounts in his memoirs that Reşid mentioned to him that he received a telegram directly from Talat Pasha ordering him to "Burn-Destroy-Kill".[79] "At dawn I was awakened by the noise of shots and volleys. The Armenians had attacked the town. Immediately I mounted my horse and, followed by some armed men, went to see what was happening. Judge of my amazement to discover that the aggressors had not been the Armenians, after all, but the civil authorities themselves! Supported by the Kurds and the rabble of the vicinity, they were attacking and sacking the Armenian quarter, I succeeded at last, without serious accident, in approaching the Beledie reis of the town, who was directing the orgy; whereupon I ordered him to stop the massacre. He astounded me by replying that he was doing nothing more than carry out an unequivocal order emanating from the Governor-General of the province to exterminate all Armenian males of twelve years of age and over."[190] "The civil authorities of the Sultan kill noiselessly and preferably by night, like vampires. Generally they choose as their victim's sepulchre deep lakes in which there are no indiscreet currents to bear the corpse to shore, or lonely mountain caves where dogs and jackals aid in erasing all traces of their crime. Among them I noticed some Kurds belonging to a group of several hundred which, on the following morning, was to help in killing off all the Armenians still in possession of some few positions and edifices around the town. Seeing that the enemy's fire was dwindling down, and unable to endure any longer the odor of scorched flesh from the Armenian corpses scattered among the smoking ruins of the church."[190] Surgeon and Orientalist Jakob Künzler was known as the "Father of Armenian Orphans."[194] With an invitation from Protestant missionary Johannes Lepsius, he visited Urfa and was his assistant. With the start of World War I, Künzler was heavily preoccupied by providing medical assistance to the needy.[195] During his time in the Ottoman Empire, Künzler with his wife Elisabeth helped the destitute and wounded Armenian orphans in the Syrian desert.[194] He was especially involved with the Near East Foundation and has saved thousands of Armenian lives.[195] In his memoirs, In the Land of Blood and Tears, Künzler recounts the massacres he had witnessed in Ottoman Turkey and especially in Urfa.[196] "... two Turkish officials who appeared in Urfa. The rumor was that they hurried out in order to drive forward the extermination of the Armenian people with all their might, and they had the sanction of the highest state authority for doing so. They ordered on this basis, scarcely the moment they arrived in Urfa, the killing of all gathered prisoners. 'Why should we feed them any longer?' they said."[197] "I resolved to serve that people as a true brother. Ever since, I have come to deeply believe that all barbaric schemes to destroy the Armenian people will always be destined to fail."[194] "After what I experienced, I had felt that I had been summoned from the Heavens, the Lord had shown me the path [and] led me to a people, who, despite all adversities and miseries, had resolved to remain faithful to their God and the Lord ... Isn't this the same people who just a couple of years ago [1894–1896] had been subjected to horrible massacres? Their villages razed, plundered, and tens of thousands massacred? And yet, this very people, with resolute faith in God, continue to remain hopeful that better days are yet to come and that they will be more felicitous. God dispatched me to such a people so that I can attend to their wounds as their true brother."[194] Lieutenant General in the United States Army James Harbord was sent to the Caucasus to lead an American Military Mission to Armenia in order to provide detailed information about the country to the United States. Upon returning to the United States, Harbord wrote Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia,[198] which was a summary of the expedition that provided various details of the mission. The report includes maps, statistics, and a historical analyses of the country and its population. In addition to such details, Harbord collected evidence and information regarding the massacres of Armenians and was an eyewitness to them. "The dead, from this wholesale attempt on the race, are variously estimated at from five hundred thousand to a million, the usual figure being about eight hundred thousand. Driven on foot under a hot sun, robbed of their clothing and such petty articles as they carried, prodded by bayonets if they lagged, starvation, typhus, and dysentery left thousands dead by the trail side."[200] "Massacres and deportations were organized in the spring of 1915 under definite system, the soldiers going from town to town. The official reports of the Turkish Government show 1,100,000 as having been deported. Young men were first summoned to the government building in each village and then marched out and killed. The women, the old men, and children were, after a few days, deported to what Talat Pasha called "agricultural colonies," from the high, cool, breeze-swept plateau of Armenia to the malarial flats of the Euphrates and the burning sands of Syria and Arabia ... Mutilation, violation, torture, and death have left their haunting memories in a hundred beautiful Armenian valleys, and the traveler in that region is seldom free from the evidence of this most colossal crime of all ages." American Consul in Trabzon While serving as American Consul in Trabzon, Oscar S. Heizer witnessed the Armenian genocide and often risked his own life to save the lives of Armenians.[202] Being one of the first to report massacres,[204] Heizer's initial reporting to the American consulate in Constantinople said that it was permissible "whenever the parents so desire" to leave children – girls up to the age of 15 and boys up to the age of ten – in the "orphanages by the Turks."[39] Heizer also describes how some children were assimilated into Muslim Turks in a matter of weeks.[205][206] Often writing about the systematic drowning of Armenians in the Black Sea, Heizer exposed the direct link and collaboration between the central Ottoman government and local members of the Committee of Union and Progress.[207] "This plan did not suit Nail Bey ... Many of the children were loaded into boats and taken out to sea and thrown overboard. I myself saw where 16 bodies were washed ashore and buried by a Greek woman near the Italian monastery."[40][208][210] "It is impossible to convey an idea of the consternation and despair the publication of this proclamation has produced upon the people. I have seen strong, proud, wealthy men weep like children while they told me that they had given their boys and girls to Persian and Turkish neighbors. Even a strong man, without the necessary outfit and food would likely to perish on such a trip ... The People are helpless but are making preparations to start on the perilous journey."[211] Swedish Military Attaché Einar af Wirsén wrote much about the Armenian genocide in his memoirs Minnen från fred och krig ("Memories from Peace and War").[212] In his memoirs, Wirsén dedicated a chapter to the massacres entitled Mordet på en nation ("The Murder of a Nation").[212] He believed that the deportations were a way of concealing the massacres.[213] The memoirs provide an important analysis of the deportations and massacres from a country who was not involved in World War I.[213] "Officially, these had the goal to move the entire Armenian population to the steppe regions of Northern Mesopotamia and Syria, but in reality they aimed to exterminate [utrota] the Armenians, whereby the pure Turkish element in Asia Minor would achieve a dominating position".[213] "The annihilation of the Armenian nation in Asia Minor must revolt all human feelings ... The way the Armenian problem was solved was hair-raising. I can still see in front of me Talaat's cynical expression, when he emphasized that the Armenian question was solved".[213] Abram Isaac Elkus succeeded Henry Morgenthau as United States Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in August 1916. By the time Elkus assumed his position as ambassador, the policy of deportations had come to an end. However, Elkus continued the work of Morgenthau and remained committed to the Armenians. Elkus reported that the Armenian situation in the Ottoman Empire had not changed since the departure of his predecessor, except that by now the deported had in large numbers been killed, or had died of exhaustion, starvation, or disease, or had become refugees in unfamiliar lands. Due to his support of the relief efforts, Elkus is known for saving the lives of thousands of Armenians.[216][217] "From report by eyewitness sent by Consul Jackson and from other reliable sources it appears that deportations accompanied by studied cruelties continue. Families are separated and scattered among Moslems. Clergy separated from their people, forced conversions to Islam perseveringly pushed, children and girls from deported families kidnapped. In order to avoid opprobrium of the civilized world, which the continuation of massacres would arouse, Turkish officials have now adopted and are executing the unchecked policy of extermination through starvation, exhaustion, and brutality of treatment hardly surpassed even in Turkish history."[219] American Consul in Aleppo, 1908–1923 According to Jackson the Armenian massacres were "carefully planned" and a "gigantic plundering scheme as well as a final blow to extinguish the race." In September 1915 he estimated that one million Armenians were killed in a year. Jackson later became a leading figure in the relief effort of Armenian refugees and is known for having saved thousands of Armenians during the genocide.[222] He remarked that the outrages "upon a defenseless and inoffensive people that demand nothing more than to be given a chance to eke out at the best a miserable existence" and continued by saying, "it is without doubt a carefully planned scheme to thoroughly extinguish the Armenian race."[7][88][223][224] "One of the most terrible sights ever seen in Aleppo was the arrival early in August, 1915, of some 5,000 terribly emaciated, dirty, ragged and sick women and children, 3,000 in one day and 2,000 the following day. These people were the only survivors of the thrifty and well to do Armenian population of the province of Sivas, where the Armenian population had once been over 300,000." Anckarsvärd was an ambassador who traveled frequently throughout the Empire and established many contacts. During the massacres, Anckarsvärd highlighted the aim of the Young Turk government and its policies to "exterminate the Armenian nation".[213] When reporting to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Anckarsvärd used terms such as "the annihilation Armenian nation", "wipe out the Armenian nation," "extermination of the Armenians", etc. to describe the events.[226] "The persecutions of the Armenians have reached hair-raising proportions and all points to the fact that the Young Turks want to seize the opportunity, since due to different reasons there are no effective external pressure to be feared, to once and for all put an end to the Armenian question. The means for this are quite simple and consist of the extermination (utrotandet) of the Armenian nation."[213] "It is obvious that the Turks are taking the opportunity to, now during the war, annihilate [utplåna] the Armenian nation so that when the peace comes no Armenian question longer exists".[213] "[The deportations] can not be any other issue than an annihilation war against the Greek nation in Turkey and as measures hereof they have been implementing forced conversions to Islam, in obvious aim to, that if after the end of the war there again would be a question of European intervention for the protection of the Christians, there will be as few of them left as possible."[213] American Consul in Harput, 1914 to 1917 When serving as American Consul in Harput, Leslie A. Davis was an eyewitness to the massacres.[7] Davis summarized what he witnessed and reported it to the United States State Department.[7] He was among the mixed party of Americans who examined the mass graves of Armenians killed near Harput. After seeing tens of thousands of corpses in and around Lake Geoljuk (present-day Lake Hazar), Davis subsequently wrote a vivid account to the Department of State.[228] Davis had also been instrumental in saving the lives of many Armenians by helping them cross the Euphrates River into Russia. Though there were warnings by the Turkish government not to help the Armenians, Davis still continued to aid them.[230] Due to what he witnessed during the Armenian genocide, Leslie A. Davis referred to Harput as the "slaughterhouse province" which became a book under the same name.[231] "Any doubt that may have been expressed in previous reports as to the Government's intentions in sending away the Armenians have been removed and any hope that may have been expressed as to the possibility of some of them surviving have been destroyed. It has been no secret that the plan was to destroy the Armenian race as a race, but the methods used have been more cold-blooded and barbarous, if not more effective, than I had first supposed."[223][232][233] "All of them were in rags and many of them were almost naked. They were emaciated, sick, diseased, filthy, covered with dirt and vermin, resembling animals far more than human beings. They had been driven along for many weeks like herds of cattle, with little to eat, and most of them had nothing except the rags on their backs. When the scant rations which the Government furnished were brought for distribution the guards were obliged to beat them back with clubs, so ravenous were they. There were few men among them, most of the men having been killed by the Kurd before their arrival in Harput. Many of the women and children also had been killed and very many others had died on the way from sickness and exhaustion. Of those who had started, only a small portion were still alive and they were rapidly dying."[205] Norwegian explorer, scientist, statesman, author and Nobel winner Though Fridtjof Nansen is renowned in Norway for his explorations and scientific writings, he is also famous for supporting the plight of the Armenians during the Armenian genocide.[234] Nansen supported Armenian refugees in acquiring the Nansen passport, which allowed them to travel freely to various countries.[234] Nansen wrote the book, Armenia and the Near East in 1923 which describes his sympathies to the plight of the Armenians in the wake of losing its independence to the Soviet Union.[235] The book was translated in many languages including Norwegian, English, French, German, Russian and Armenian. In the book, Nansen characterizes the genocide as "atrocities which far exceeded any we known in history, both in their extent and their appalling cruelty." He believed that the deportations was not a 'necessary military measure' as claimed by the Ottoman government, but instead that "the Turks already had what they considered the splendid idea of carrying out the whole plan of extermination." After visiting Armenia, Nansen wrote two additional books called "Gjennern Armenia" ("Across Armenia"), published in 1927 and "Gjennern Kaukasus til Volga" ("Through Caucasus to Volga").[238] "The massacres that started in 1915 have nothing to compare with the history of mankind. The massacres by Abdul Hamid are minor in comparison to what today's Turks have done."[239] "Then, in June 1915, the horrors began to which we know no parallel in history. From all the villages and towns of Cilicia, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia the Armenian Christians were driven forth on their death march; the work was done systematically, clearing out one district after another, whether the population happened to be near the scene of war or hundreds of kilometres away from it. There was to be a clean sweep of all Armenians. As the majority of men had already been taken for war work, it was chiefly a matter of turning women, children, and the aged and crippled out of house and home. They were only given a few days' or hours' notice. They had to leave behind all their property: houses, fields, crops, cattle, furniture, tools, and implements. Everything was confiscated by the Turkish authorities. The things they managed to carry with them, such as money, jewellery, or other valuables, and even clothes, were subsequently taken away from them by the gendarmes; and if any of them had been allowed to take their wagons and draught animals, the gendarmes appropriated them on the way. The poor creatures were rounded up from the different villages and driven in long columns across the mountains to the Arabian desert plains, where no provision had been made for the reception and maintenance of these herds of starving wretches, just as nothing had been done to keep them alive on the march. The idea was that those who did not succumb or get killed on the way should at any rate die of starvation." Writer, traveler, and archeologist Gertrude Bell was an English writer, traveler, political officer, administrator, archaeologist and spy who explored, mapped, and became highly influential to British imperial policy-making due to her skill and contacts, built up through extensive travels in Greater Syria, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, and Arabia. In comparison to previous massacres, Bell wrote that the massacres of preceding years "were not comparable to the massacres carried out in 1915 and the succeeding years."[240] With the flow of refugees into Syria, Bell reported that in Damascus, "Turks sold Armenian women openly in the public market."[241] Reporting a statement by a Turkish prisoner-of-war: "The battalion left Aleppo on 3 February and reached Ras al-Ain in twelve hours....some 12,000 Armenians were concentrated under the guardianship of some hundred Kurds...These Kurds were called gendarmes, but in reality mere butchers; bands of them were publicly ordered to take parties of Armenians, of both sexes, to various destinations, but had secret instructions to destroy the males, children and old women...One of these gendarmes confessed to killing 100 Armenian men himself...the empty desert cisterns and caves were also filled with corpses...No man can ever think of a woman's body except as a matter of horror, instead of attraction, after Ras al-Ain."[242] In regards to the Adana massacre, Bell wrote: "But in the Armenian villages panic was scarcely laid to rest. Tales of Adana were in every mouth; tale, too, of the narrow margin which had lain between the speakers themselves and massacre. And as I journeyed further west I came into the skirts of destruction and saw charred heaps of mud and stone which had been busy centres of agricultural life. The population, destitute and homeless, had defended itself and come off with naked existence—a respite of six years, it we had known it, until 1915 carried out the work which 1909 had left uncompleted."[241] Persian writer and journalist Mohammad-Ali Jamalzadeh was one of the most prominent writers of Iran in the 20th century. During his youth, he studied in Europe where he joined a group of Iranian nationalists in Berlin who were to eventually start a newspaper (Rastakhiz) in Baghdad in 1915. After remaining in Baghdad, Jamalzadeh went to Constantinople where he witnessed the deportations of Armenians and encountered many corpses during his journey.[243] He wrote of his experiences and eyewitness accounts decades later in two books entitled "Qatl-e Amm-e Armanian" (Armenian massacres) and "Qatl o ḡārat-e Arāmaneh dar Torkiya" (On the massacres of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey) which were published in 1972 and 1963 respectively.[243] "We moved from Baghdad and Aleppo towards Istanbul by hand-cart and wagon. From the first days of our journey, we met many groups of Armenians. The Turkish armed guards and gendarmes drove them (on foot) towards death and perdition. First, it made us very surprised, but little by little we got used to it and we even did not look at them, and indeed it was hard to look at them. By the hit of lashes and weapons, they drove forward hundreds of weeping weak and on foot Armenian women and men with their children. Young men weren't seen among the people, because all the young men were sent to the battle fields or were killed for precaution."[244] "Armenian girls had shaved all their hairs, and were completely bald, to discourage Arab and Turkish men from harassing them. Two to three gendarmes by the hit of the lashes drove these groups forward, like cattle. If one of the captives fell because of tiredness, weakness or by accident, they were to remain behind and kept back forever. The groaning of their relatives were useless."[244] "So step by step, we saw Armenian men and women who were fallen near the road since they were either dead or were giving life or agony of death. Later we understood that some of the young residents of that area had not kept honor of some Armenian girls who were dying or had died in order to satisfy their lust. Our way was in the direction of Western Bank of Euphrates, and every day we saw the corpses in the river, which the river carries them with it."[244] Founding member of NILI Eitan Belkind was one of the founding members of NILI, a Jewish organization that fought against the Ottoman Empire through the support of the British forces.[245] Belkind joined the Ottoman army and was subsequently transferred where Cemal Pasha was stationed in Syria. During his time in Syria, while secretly trying to garner support from the British, Belkind witnessed the massacres against Armenians and wrote of them in his memoirs So It Was which was published decades later. "The Armenian camp was one kilometer away from our house. The screaming continued all night. We asked what was happening, they told us that children were being taken from their mothers to live in dormitories and continue their education. However in the morning when we set off and crossed the bridge across Euphrates, I was shocked to see the river red with blood and beheaded corpses of children floating on the water. The scene was horrible, as there was nothing we could do."[247] "In my trips in the south of Syria and Iraq I saw with my own eyes the extermination of the Armenian nation, I watched the atrocious murders, and saw children's heads cut off and watched the burning of innocent people whose only wrongdoing was to be Armenian."[245][247] "After a three day ride I reached the heart of Mesopotamia where I was a witness to a terrible tragedy...The Circassian soldiers ordered the Armenians to gather thorns and thistles and to pile them into a tall pyramid...afterwards they tied all the Armenians who were there, almost five thousand souls, hand to hand, encircled them like a ring around the pile of thistles and set it afire in a blaze which rose up to heaven together with the screams of the wretched people who were burned to death by the fire...Two days later I returned to this place and saw the charred bodies of thousands of human beings." Physicist of the American hospital in Antep Fred D. Shepard had a history of helping Armenians during the Hamidian massacres and the Adana massacre. However, during the Armenian genocide, while stationed in the American Hospital in Antep (today Gaziantep), Shepard is especially known to have attempted many times to save the Armenians from deportations and subsequent massacre.[249] During the genocide, he intervened on behalf of the Armenians to the governor general of Aleppo, Mehmet Celal, by persuading him not to proceed with the deportations of Armenians. Upon hearing from the governor general of Aleppo that the orders came from the central authorities in the capital Constantinople, Shepard went to the capital in order to try to prevent further deportations. Though he was unsuccessful at stopping them, he did manage however to collect relief funds for the deportees. Meanwhile, he also received assurances from central authorities that the Catholic and Protestant Armenians would not be deported. However, when he returned to Antep, he had learned that the assurances were not fulfilled and the Catholic and Protestant Armenians were deported and killed. Shepard also reported to the Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, that in Zeitun and neighboring villages alone, 26,500 Armenians were deported with many of them being sent to Aleppo. In the report, he also requested aid "until they get established in their new surroundings," since in a matter of months "two thirds or three fourths of them will die of starvation and disease." Alice Shepard Riggs describes when Shepard intervened on behalf of the Armenians: "When the wave of deportation had reached, and swept over, the neighboring towns and was threatening Aintab, Dr. Shepard made a strong appeal to the Vali [Governor General] of the province of Aleppo, and this official, who was a righteous man, firmly prevented the action being carried out. Another righteous man of another town refused to send out the innocent people of his city, saying, "You may deport me and my family, if you will, but I will not carry out these orders." He was soon removed from his post. The righteous Vali of Aleppo, too, was sent away, and the fiendish work ordered against the "Christian nation" still went on." Riggs also describes how he appealed on behalf of the Armenians to the central government in Constantinople: "Having failed in his efforts to save all, and brokenhearted at the thought of this final tragedy. Dr. Shepard started for Aleppo to make one last appeal. Nothing could be accomplished there. "The orders were from higher up." So the doctor decided to take his appeal higher, and set out on the long journey to Constantinople. Five days later he wrote that the Imperial Government had graciously granted immunity from deportation to the Protestant and Catholic Armenians." However, Riggs concludes that the assurances were not fulfilled: "On his arrival in Aintab, he found, to his grief, that the immunity from deportation, which the Imperial Government had so graciously granted to Protestant and Catholic Armenians, was but a camouflage immunity. Several of the college professors and their families had already been deported, the young men had been scattered and killed, and no hope was left of re-opening the college that fall." During World War I, Johann von Pallavicini successfully worked to bring the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers. Due to his long tenure and being the dean of the diplomatic corps in Constantinople, he wielded a large influence over events in the Ottoman Empire. However, his role with regard to the Armenian question has been debated by historians over the years and criticism has been raised that he did not protest loudly enough.[256] The reports that he sent to Vienna clearly show that he was aware of the nature of the Ottoman initiative and that it involved a "centrally planned and organised extermination".[257] Already in June 1915, he wrote to Vienna that "the Armenian population is not only being subjected to the greatest misery but also to a total extermination (einer gänzlichen Ausrottung)". To his defence, however, records also show that he did protest but to no avail.[258] "The Armenian population which is being expelled from its homeland is not only being subjected to the greatest misery but also to a total extermination." "The manner in which the Armenian are being deported for resettlement purposes is tantamount to death a verdict for the affected people." "The time will come when Turkey will have to account for this policy of extermination." American Charge d'Affairs in Constantinople Einstein's diplomatic career began in 1903, when he was appointed as Third Secretary of Legation at Constantinople.[260] He advanced from Second Secretary to First Secretary and then Charge d'Affairs during the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, remaining in Constantinople despite the hostilities.[261] After serving as ambassador to Costa Rica, Einstein returned to the Ottoman Empire and continued his diplomatic career. In 1915, during the start of World War I, Einstein kept a diary from the months of April to September. The diary described the most critical points in the Ottoman Empire's involvement in the war. Einstein also paid special attention to the massacres of Armenians and wrote about it extensively throughout the diary. He described the events and stated that "the policy of murder then carried out was planned in the coldest blood" in the preface of his diary. He blamed the cooperative pact between Germany and the Ottoman Empire as the supportive and responsible agents behind the massacres. He also pointed out that the stockpiles of armaments that was used as a justification for the arrests was in fact a "myth". By 4 August, Einstein wrote in a diary entry that the "persecution of Armenians is assuming unprecedented proportions, and is carried out with nauseating thoroughness." He kept in contact with both Enver and Talat and tried to persuade them to reverse their policy towards the Armenians. In a diary entry, he states that Talat insisted that the Armenians sided with the enemies and that Enver believed the policy was out of military necessity, but in reality both leaders feared the Armenians. Einstein's diary was published in 1918 under the title Inside Constantinople: A Diplomatist's Diary During the Dardanelles Expedition.[267] "The murder of Armenians has become almost a sport, and one Turkish lady passing one of these caravans, and thinking she too would relish killing an Armenian, on the guards' invitation took out a revolver and shot the first poor wretch she saw. The whole policy of extermination transcends one's capacity for indignation. It has been systematic in its atrocious cruelty, even to the extent of throwing blame for the murders on the Kurds, who are instigated by the Government to lie in wait in order to kill and pillage. Its horrors would be unbelievable if less universally attested. For scientific cruelty and butchery it remains without precedent. The Turks have willfully destroyed the great source of economic wealth in their country. The persecution is madness, but one wonders when the day will come, and if it is close enough at hand still to save the few remnants of this wretched community." "An engineer who had just returned from the interior related to me his experiences in the region of Sivas. Throughout the interior wholesale arrests of Armenian had taken place, and it was the impression of his Turkish friends that when those arrested were led away at night, it was to be butchered in solitude. He saw caravans of Armenian women and children arriving from the Caucasus region. He did not know what fate awaited them, but Turkish friends told him that they too would be massacred." "In town the arrests of Armenians are proceeding. So far they have taken only those of provincial birth or whose fathers were not Constantinople-born. But it is a beginning, and if given time the whole Armenian population will probably share the same fate. They are first thrown into prison, and then deported, to be massacred or die of hunger in the interior after they have been robbed of all their belongings." Professor and orientalist Johannes Østrup was a Danish philologist and professor at the University of Copenhagen where he served as rector from 1934 to 1935. Østrup was noted for conducting a survey tour of the Middle East. After the study tour in the Middle East, he rode on horseback back to Copenhagen, crossing much of the Ottoman Empire. Along his way, he met with several Young Turk politicians and leaders. In his memoirs, Østrup recounts his meeting with Talat Pasha in the autumn of 1910. According to Østrup, during such meetings, Talat talked openly about his plans to "exterminate" the Armenians.[271][272] "It had really been Talat's plan to exterminate all of the Armenian people, and the plan did not originate as the result of a war psychosis. I spoke with Talat on several occasions in the autumn of 1910, and among many other things we also talked about the Armenians. "You see," he said, "between us and this people there is an incompatibility which cannot be solved in a peaceful manner; either they will completely undermine us, or we will have to annihilate them. If I ever come to power in this country, I will use all my might to exterminate the Armenians." Six years later he fulfilled his promise; the persecutions which were effectuated in the years of 1915 and 1916 cost—according to the lowest counts—the lives of more than 1.5 million persons. And yet one could not but like Talat; he was a barbarian or a fanatic, whatever one wants to call it, but his soul was free from deceit."[271][272] Divisional General and Vice Marshal, Austrian Military Attaché and Military Plenipotentiary to the Ottoman Empire Josef Pomiankowski had a keen insight into the functioning of the Ottoman government and was familiar with the decisions and activities of the Young Turk party. In his memoirs, Pomiankowski wrote, "I had ample opportunity to get to know the land and the people of Turkey. During the war, however, I was from start to finish eyewitness of practically all the decisions and activities of the Turkish government."[40] In 1909, Pomiankowski stated that the Young Turk government planned to "exterminate" non-Muslim conquered peoples.[40] When the genocide occurred, it was Pomiankowski who condemned the genocide and urged Austrian diplomats to take stance against the genocide, as well as trying to obtain security for the Armenians, but not successful.[273] "The Van uprising certainly was an act of desperation. The local Armenians realized that general massacres against the Armenians had already started and they would be the next target. In the course of the summer 1915 the Turkish government with inexorable consequence brought its bloody task of extermination of an entire nation to an end." "The barbaric order to deport and resettle in the northern desert regions of Arabia, i.e., Mesopotamia, where the Euphrates flows, the entire Armenian population of Asia Minor in reality entailed the extermination [Ausrottung] of Asia Minor's Armenian population."[40] Member of the Near East Foundation Henry Harness Fout was a Bishop of the United Brethren Church located in the United States. He had worked for the Near East Foundation which aimed at assisting Armenian refugees of the Genocide who were scattered throughout the Middle East. Fout stated that the Armenians were in an "appalling condition" and that they needed immediate help from the United States.[275] "There is plenty of mute evidence in the hundreds of thousands of skeletons scattered throughout the Turkish Empire that the Turks sought to exterminate the Armenians by systematic massacre. The Armenians were driven like herded cattle from one locality to another until they were exhausted by tortures and torments of unbelievable character. In addition the Turks sought to wipe out the clergy of Armenia. Only eight out of forty-four Bishops survive, while only 10 per cent. of the clergy is living today."[275] "Turkey by her inhuman treatment, in my opinion, has lost the right to be entrusted with authority to rule. From various estimates I have reached the conclusion that out of the Armenian nation of 3,000,000 at the outbreak of the war, 1,000,000 were massacred. The condition of the remainder is most appalling."[275] Lieutenant general and officer of the Australian Army Stanley George Savige was an Australian Army soldier and officer who served in World War I and World War II.[citation needed] "These we handed over to two Syrians who were to follow on behind. The rest of us rode out to pick up the 100 men. 6 miles, no men, asked Chief why, he said they were camped on the left near the river a little ahead. Got there, no men. People streaming in in thousands. The women rush us kissing hands & feet& amp; calling down the blessing of God. Midday, no men, no food, but hear Dr. Shed is ahead fighting the Turks & Kurds. The villages en route all destroyed by Christians & in flames, many murdered Persians [Armenians and Assyrians] both male & female in all these places. At 4pm we reach Mrs. Shed who is looking after a bunch of wounded women. She said her husband was a little further back with a handful of men putting up a rearguard. Still no sign of our 100 men. Apparently all the men went back to save their families."[276] "We then pushed on to. Shed & found him with 24 men as a Rearguard. I asked him why the others were not helping but he simply said "They are Armenians & Syrians". We urged him to go back to Sain Kala at once as he was wanted in handling the people there. I then took over these 24 & as Shed had had his last fight 18 miles further on decided to ride out & hide my force in the rough country & give them a go with the M.G's trusting that the new weapon would lead the enemy to believe that British Troops were now in the field & bluff them off. The great anxiety was to get the people back to Sain Kala before the Turkish Commander at Maindab (who has 250 Turks & 250 Kurds) can get down on us. We rode on past Chailkanan to a village in a narrow valley 6 miles ahead. Before we got to the village we'd left our horses tethered to the poplar trees on the outskirts & 2 miles South a long valley branches off to the right & apparently joined the main one North of this village."[276] World-famous French academician, Nobel Prize laureate, famous writer During the genocide committed against Armenians, a number of prominent figures of the world condemned the genocide against Armenians. Anatole France (1844-1924), world-famous French academician, Nobel Prize laureate, famous writer. On April 9, 1916, he delivered a speech at the Sorbonne University in Paris. We will quote only the part where he skillfully presented the main motives of the genocide. And finally, 96 years after this call, on January 23, 2012, the upper house of the French Parliament approved the bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. ...We understood that the long-lasting unequal struggle of the Turkish oppressor and the Armenian is the struggle of tyranny, the struggle of barbarism against the spirit of justice and freedom. And when we saw that victim of Turkey, looking at us with dying eyes, in which a ray of hope flashed, we finally understood that it is our sister who is dying in the East and she is dying precisely because she is our sister, whose crime is that she was filled with our feelings, she loved what we love, she thought as we think, she believed in what we believe, and she valued wisdom, justice, art like us. This was her unforgivable crime.[277] Person Occupation Quotes, testimonies Christian missionary In 1909, Büll, then a Russian citizen, again attempted to go to work with Armenians, however, her trip was put on hold by the Adana massacre in Cilicia. Instead, Büll attended for two years a seminary for missionary teachers. After finishing her studies, Büll was finally able to proceed for Cilicia where she worked as a teacher at an Armenian orphanage in Maraş between 1911 and 1916.[278] When the war broke out and Ottoman declaration of war on Russia, she was one of the only few Russian nationals to stay in the Ottoman Empire. In 1915, Büll witnessed the Armenian genocide in Cilicia and was instrumental in saving the lives of about two thousand Armenian children and women when Maraş was turned into "The City of Orphans".[279][280] Büll was recalled from Maraş in 1916.[278] In 1921, Büll was sent by the newly founded Action Chrétienne en Orient to Aleppo, Syria, where she established a refugee camp for the survivors of the Armenian genocide. She also organized medical help for plague victims and the construction of two hospitals. Büll organized the establishment of weaving shops, gardens, an Armenian language school, and other enterprises to better the lives of the refugees. In 1951, when most of the refugees under her care repatriated to Armenian SSR, Hedvig Büll was refused a visa by the Soviet authorities. She then returned to Europe in 1951. She died on 3 October 1981, near Heidelberg, Germany, after having spent more than 40 years of her life for the betterment of lives of Armenian refugees. On 29 April 1989, a memorial tablet was dedicated for her by the Armenian-Estonian Cultural Society on her birth house in Haapsalu, Kooli Street 5. Her memory is also preserved by a monument in Armenia and at the Armenian Genocide Museum in Yerevan. Among the refugees she helped to save and in Armenia she is sometimes referred to as the Mother of Armenians. "In 1915 during Easter, a terrible calamity happened with the Armenians, I could hear the following words, "Where is your brother Abel, do I hear call of blood from the earth?" My brother, do these words make us perceive all these differently? Yes, they were my brothers and sisters, who went to our Lord when the earlier planned massacre reached the city Marash. I saw rivers of tears; I heard cries of salvage, appeals to God. I could hear their wailing, "My Lord, save us!" Poor suffering Christians condemned to cursing..." Here is another group of refugees, coming down of the mountain. Women, men, old and young, the invalid, the blind, the sick incessantly went along the rocky roads in burning sun. There are more terrible days in store for them, and perhaps death. The policemen hurry them and they, feeble, all fell on the ground in the cattle yard in Kahn. I saw my brothers and sisters in that condition. Next day they again were on their way. A young woman's corpse lies on the ground with her newly born child, born here at this night; she was not able to continue her way. There is also an invalid; he was not able to continue his way as well. Thousands of people continue their way, hardly dragging their wounded feet, together with other Christians they try to reach Marash. And if your brother is among them, what consolation it is to the soul? But as Marash is seized at mourning, I saw more and more crowds of people leaving their city. They walk silently unable even to cry. I see an old man as he casts a parting glance to the city. There is also our Zaruhi in the crowd; she takes her blind mother's hand that is in the harness tied to the horse saddle, she can neither stand nor walk; she is a blind widow and is being sent. Who will count the corpses of the dead lying along the death road, having lost their children or those who have been kidnapped, crying and calling for their mothers?"[281] Presbyterian missionary Frederick G. Coan was a Christian missionary who served in Persia for over 50 years.[282] He provided detailed eyewitness accounts of the deportations and massacres of Armenians. During World War I and at the start of the Armenian genocide, Coan was continuing his missionary activities in Urmia. On 2 January 1915, Kurdish and Turkish regular troops broke through the Russian military lines and had already advanced their regiments deep into Persia and stationed themselves around the Urmia plain, where Coan was stationed.[283] As a result, an estimated 20,000 Armenians and other Christians sought immediate protection.[284] Coan managed to provide the necessary shelter for these refugees and provided as much provisions as possible. After five months of providing care for the refugees and as the deportations of Armenians had just begun, Coan made a desperate attempt to travel around the districts where the Armenians were deported to in order to further assist their needs.[283] In the summer of 1915, Coan reported encountering a "trench full of human bones".[285] Coan believed that the number of dead during the Armenian genocide exceeded one million people[286] and referred to the Ottoman government's policy towards the Armenians as one of "extermination".[285] "Then, through deportation, they determined to complete what had already been begun by the sword. The Turkish soldiers, in many cases offered by Germans, drove the Armenians across the plains, perpetrating upon them brutalities that were enough to break anyone's heart. I found on day a great mass of human bones, thirty feet high, and I said to my Turkish guide: "How do you account for this?" He replied: "We got tired of driving them, we got tired of hearing their moans and cries, and took them up that that precipice one day and flung them down to get rid of the job."[285] "There was a trench full of human bones, and I was told of the brave fight that 2,000 Armenians, standing for their homes and for the honor of their wives and daughters, had waged with their flintlock rifles against the Turkish troops. They held off a Turkish regiment for two weeks, until their ammunition was exhausted. Then the Turkish officer, taking an oath on the Koran, the most binding of all oaths to Moslems, promised the Armenian fighters that if they surrendered, he would, in deference to their courage, allowed them to go unharmed. These 2,000 men had no sooner surrendered than they were given picks and spades and told to dig a trench. When they had dug it they were shoved in with the bayonet."[285] Christian missionary Maria Jacobsen wrote the Diaries of a Danish Missionary: Harpoot, 1907–1919, which according to Armenian genocide scholar Ara Sarafian, is a "documentation of the utmost significance" for research of the Armenian genocide.[287] Jacobsen will later be known for having saved thousands of Armenians during the aftermath of the Armenian genocide through various relief efforts.[287][288] "It is quite obvious that the purpose of their departure is the extermination of the Armenian people."[288][289] "Conditions now are completely different from what they were during the massacres of 20 years ago. What could be done then is impossible now. The Turks know very well about the war raging in Europe, and that the Christian nations are too busy to take care of Armenians, so they take advantage of the times to destroy their "enemies"."[289][290] Christian missionary and president of Euphrates College Henry H. Riggs was stationed in Kharpert during the Armenian genocide. His book Days of Tragedy in Armenia: Personal Experiences in Harpoot, 1915–1917, is considered to be one of the most detail accounts of the Armenian genocide in the English language,[18] provides an important eyewitness account of the events.[291] Riggs concluded that the deportation of Armenians was part of an extermination program organized by the Ottoman government.[291][295] "The attack on the Armenian people, which soon developed into a systematic attempt to exterminate the race, was a cold-blooded, unprovoked, deliberate act, planned and carried out without popular approval, by the military masters of Turkey." "Very good evidence exists for the belief that both there and Ras-ul-Ain, also in the same desert, the people were massacred wholesale as soon as they left the villages where they had been quartered. At the beginning of the period under discussion, that is, at the beginning of 1916, there were in exile in that district something like 485,000 Armenians. Fifteen months later, after the last deportation had been completed, not more than 113,000 out of that throng could be located. Out of the 372,000 who had perished most had died from starvation and disease, but many thousands were also massacred at the last moment, when apparently the Turkish government had tired of the pretense of carrying out the theory of deportation." Christian missionary Bodil Katharine Biørn was a Christian missionary stationed in Mush when the Armenian genocide started. She was instrumental in saving thousands of Armenian lives.[297] Biørn wrote much of what she witnessed in her personal diary. She is also noted for taking hundreds of photographs of the situation providing details of the events in the back of each photograph.[297] Bodil eventually took care of Armenian orphans in Syria, Lebanon and Constantinople. In 1922 she founded an orphanage named "Lusaghbyur" in Alexandropol, Soviet Armenia
3581	dbpedia	3	81	https://search.proquest.com/openview/0699a487d0c79cf9c88c69aa8e80109b/1%3Fpq-origsite%3Dgscholar%26cbl%3D51922%26diss%3Dy	en	Roads on the Frontier Between Rome and Persia: Euphratesia, Osrhoene and Mesopotamia from AD 363 to 602	https://search.proquest.…roQuest_logo.gif	https://search.proquest.…roQuest_logo.gif	[ "https://search.proquest.com/assets/ctx/51be0a5b/images/icons/blank.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Explore millions of resources from scholarly journals, books, newspapers, videos and more, on the ProQuest Platform.	en	/apple-icon-57x57.png		null	Database copyright ProQuest LLC; ProQuest does not claim copyright in the individual underlying works. Your library or institution may also provide you access to related full text documents in ProQuest.
3581	dbpedia	1	77	https://dokumen.pub/the-turkish-war-of-independence-a-military-history-1919-1923-2021008010-2021008011-9781440878411-9781440878428.html	en	The Turkish War of Independence: a Military History, 1919	https://dokumen.pub/img/…781440878428.jpg	https://dokumen.pub/img/…781440878428.jpg	[ "https://dokumen.pub/dokumenpub/assets/img/dokumenpub_logo.png", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/the-turkish-war-of-independence-a-military-history-1919-1923-2021008010-2021008011-9781440878411-9781440878428-e-1205194.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/war-in-the-east-a-military-history-of-the-russo-turkis...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	It is exceedingly rare to run across a major historical event that has no comprehensive English-language history, but su...	en	https://dokumen.pub/doku…e-icon-57x57.png	dokumen.pub	https://dokumen.pub/the-turkish-war-of-independence-a-military-history-1919-1923-2021008010-2021008011-9781440878411-9781440878428.html	Table of contents : Cover Title Page Copyright Dedication Contents Illustrations Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter One: The End of World War I Chapter Two: Call to Arms Chapter Three: To the First Inönü Campaign Chapter Four: The Long War against Insurgents Chapter Five: A Short War on the Eastern Front Chapter Six: The Franco-Turkish War Chapter Seven: Second I˙nönü and Kütahya-Eskis¸ehir Chapter Eight: The Culminating Point at Sakarya Chapter Nine: Operational and Strategic Pause Chapter Ten: The Great Offensive and the Pursuit to Izmir Chapter Eleven: The Advance to the Straits and the Armistice Chapter Twelve: The Treaty of Lausanne and the Establishment of the Turkish Republic Conclusion Appendix A: Casualties by Professor Konstantinos Travlos Appendix B: Campaigns of the Turkish War of Independence Bibliography Index About the Author Citation preview
3581	dbpedia	1	20	https://www.newarab.com/Blog/2016/4/21/A-shared-agony-from-Aintab-to-Haifa	en	A shared agony: from Aintab to Haifa	https://www.newarab.com/…5d&itok=OPr95Sy-	https://www.newarab.com/…5d&itok=OPr95Sy-	[ "https://www.newarab.com/themes/custom/new_arab/logo.png", "https://www.newarab.com/sites/default/files/styles/image_212x120/public/2167975369.jpeg?h=30a9cc90&itok=b28ybvdX", "https://www.newarab.com/sites/default/files/styles/image_212x120/public/2095059317.jpeg?h=0e714722&itok=ks4Xh2nr", "https://www.newara...	[]	[]	[ "Turkey", "Palestinian Nakba", "Palestine", "memory", "Israel", "Haifa", "Armenian genocide" ]	null	[ "Yeghia Tashjian" ]	2016-04-21T00:00:00	Blog: Two men uprooted from their homes found sanctity in the Armenian district of Beirut. Amid war they found peace and shared the solidarity of the dispossessed, writes Yeghia Tashjian.	en	/themes/custom/new_arab/fav.ico	The New Arab	https://www.newarab.com/Blog/2016/4/21/A-shared-agony-from-Aintab-to-Haifa
8955	dbpedia	2	7	https://socotra.info/sanaa-capital-city-of-yemen.html	en	Sana`a - Capital City of Yemen	https://socotra.info/ass…es/sanaa_150.jpg	https://socotra.info/ass…es/sanaa_150.jpg	[ "https://socotra.info/site/theme/images/logo-light.png", "https://socotra.info/site/theme/images/logo-light.png", "https://socotra.info/site/theme/images/header.jpg", "https://socotra.info/assets/images/sanaa_150.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "Sanaa", "Yemen", "Socotra" ]	null	[]	null	Sana'a is one of the ancient Yemeni cities dating back to the Sabaean dynasty of the 6th Century BC. The oldest written reference to its existence is found in inscriptions which date back to the 1st century AD.		favicon.ico		null	Geography Sana'a lies in the heart of Yemeni highlands on a plateau at an altitude of 2,200 m (7,220 ft) surrounded by several mountains. It has a cool and dry climate and in the winter time light frost is possible. Extreme recorded temperatures are −3 °C (27 °F) and 34.4 °C (93.9 °F). The city enjoys a fair weather during the months of April to October. Afternoon thunderstorms are common which brings much of Sana'a's annual rainfall. The city is around 370 km (230 mi) north of Aden, the economic and financial center of Yemen. History The heritage books begin with what is provided for in them about Sana’a by the Story of Shem the son Noah, who came from the north of the south looking for a better homeland for settlement till he finally found the appropriate place and founded the palace of Ghamdan and thereafter the city was named Sam City “City of Shem” and that means it is the oldest town. While other Books mention another name for the city, i.e. Azal as provided for recurrently in the poems and indications about the antiquity of the city too, because Azal is one of the sons of Joktan Bin Amir Bin Shalik Bin Arfakhashed Bin Shem Bin Noah. It is a name that is provided for the Old Testament. From the name Azal comes the present verb Yazl meaning fortified , Storing and Manufacture. The same meaning in Amhric (a Yemenite Dialect spoken in Ethiopia) Manufacture. May be due to the lapse of time there has been confusion concerning the name but generally the name of town, as “Azal” has always been ubiquitous in the poetry. But the name that always accompanied the city and its history events since 20 centuries age is Sana’a and its root is in the Sabaeic Encyclopedia and is referred to as Hasna when in adjective mode meaning (Beauty). The first ever found inscription mentioning Sana’a dates to 70 AD as one of the Sabaeaic towns following Marib in importance as per the context of its reference in the inscription, while Ghamdan Palace was the second after Salheen in Marib. From the inscriptions also it has been found that”Dhu Nawas , the last Himyarite King was the first to establish Sana’a as his capital in 525 AD and remained so during the Abyssinian occupation for almost half a century. Whilst when Sana’a fell under the Persian Empire’s Control it remained as the capital of the Persian Ruler. As of the dawn of Islam till the beginning of independence of Islamic sub-state in many parts of Yemen detaching from the Capitals of the Islamic Caliphate from Madina at the Time of the Disciples Caliphs , to the Umayyad in Damascus and the Abbasids in Baghdad up till the outset of the third Hegira Century (9th Century AD) Sana’a persisted begin the Capital City of the Ruler , who himself is Caliph’s deputy in running the affairs of one of Yemen’s Three Makhalifs i.e . Mikhlaf Sana’a, Mikhlaf Al-Janad and Mikhlaf Hadhramawt, The city of Sana’a recurrently assumed an important status and all Yemenite States competed to control it of which is the famous competition between the Zaidite and Qarmatite States or was at times adopted as capital of a Sultanate. The Sullaihiad Kings (One of the Biggest Yemenite States during the Islamic Reign) were the first to adopt Sana’a as Capital for the Sullaiyhid Dynasty before transferring the capital to Jiblah between the years 1047, and 1083. Then it became a capital of Hatimite State (a tribe of Hamdan) from 1098 till 1173.They were partisans of the Sullaiyhids and were in war with the Zaidites Imams in Sadah and were allies of the Zaidites in Aden during their wars with Al-Mahdi in Zabid till the Hatimate State demised at the hands of the Ayyubides (1174-1229 AD. Also Sana’a remained important during the Ayyubides and the Zone named Bostan A-Sultan in Sana’a refers to Sultan Taghtakin Bin Ayub whose capital was Taiz . The Status of Sana’a didn’t change during the region of the Rasoulides 1226-1454 and this was the strongest Islamic Sub-state in Yemen which covered most of Yemen .i.e. Greater Yemen. Their capital was Taiz. Also during the Tahiride Rule of Yemen Sana’a remained as an important city. The Mamelukes arrived in Yemen following the Portuguese Invasion of Yemenite Coasts in 1517 AD following the collapse of the Mamelukides in Egypt at the hands of the Ottoman Turks, Yemen fell under the Ottoman Rule and during the first Ottoman rule of Yemen between 1538-1635 Sana’a became the capital of the Ottoman Vilayet. Albeit the Zaidite expansion following the first Ottoman exodus to the extent that it covered Greater Yemen but Sana’a was not the capital of that State and the condition in later times deteriorated till the number of Imams in Sana’a and its surroundings were five at the same times. Then again came the Ottomans and controlled Yemen with Sana’a as capital as of 1872-1918.After the Ottomans Sana’a was the capital of Imam Yehya who ruled North Yemen till 1948 and during Imam Ahmed’s rule it was the capital of Sana’a Province till the break out of Revolution in 1962 where after it become the capital of the Arab Republic of Yemen till the Reunification declaration of Yemen was proclaimed on 22 May 1990 and it was dubbed as the Historical Capital of Yemen. Old City The old, fortified city has been inhabited for more than 2,500 years and contains a wealth of intact architectural gems. It was declared a World Heritage City by the United Nations in 1986. Efforts are underway to preserve some of the oldest buildings, some of which are over 400 years old. Surrounded by ancient clay walls which stand six to nine metres (20-30 ft) high, the old city boasts over 100 mosques, 12 hammams (baths) and 6,500 houses. Many of the houses look rather like ancient skyscrapers – reaching several stories high and topped with flat roofs, they are decorated with elaborate friezes and intricately carved frames and stained glass windows. One of the most popular attractions is Suq al-Milh (Salt Market), where it is possible to buy not only salt but also bread, spices, raisins, cotton, copper, pottery, silverware, both fake and real antiques and formerly, slaves. The majestic seventh century al-Jami'a l-Kabir (The Great Mosque) is one of the oldest in the Muslim world. Bāb al-Yaman "Yemen Gate" is an iconized entry point through the city walls and is over 700 years old. Sana’a main tourists attractions: Sana’a is one of the ancient Yemen cities dating date back to the Sabean dynasty. The oldest reference to its existence is found in inscriptions dates back to the late the 1st Century AD. The inscriptions also refer to the historical Palace of Ghamdan associated with Salheen Palace in Marib . This suggested that Sana’a was the capital of the Himyrate dynasty at the onset of the 6th century AD when king Yousef Athar Dhu Nawas the last of the Himyarite kings was in power . It was also the capital of the Abyssinian rules and after them the Persians who also made Sana’a their capital. Sana’a in the various stages of its history continued to be an important city or capital for a ruling State. I t was an important station on the trade route which started at Aden passing through the mountains through Sana’a. This route was known as As’ad Route or the Route of the Elephant Owners. During the Islamic period Sana’a entered another stage and put on a new fashion with the Holy Mosque replacing the Church of Ibraha (Al-Qillis). Thus, the minarets and domes dominated the skyline of the city. Schools and steam baths (Hamamat) were built. Gardens were expanded to become luscious outlets for the surrounding houses. The houses of Sana’a are old and some are 500 years old. It is believed that the foundations of some of those houses today dates back to more 1000 years taking into consideration the tradition to rebuild on top of collapsing houses. The houses of old sana’a are known as tower houses with some reaching eight stories. In old Sana’a there are more than 14000. Such houses from the middle of old Sana’a (Cattle market) one can walk 500m in any direction with coming across new building. The ground and first floors of the old city houses are built of stone with the upper floors being built of cooked bricks. The floors are separated from one another with a strip of the same building material. The rooms are lit with marble arched stained-glass windows. The exterior walls are decorated with ornaments coated with lime in an updated architectural style and similar material. The ground floors are used as stores, while the large first floors are used for entertaining. These as also rooms allocated for women and children. The Mafraj is the male domain, located at the top of the house, and is a rectangular room with broad windows allowing good sight of the surroundings. It is the most decorated and beautiful room in the house. Old Sana’a as exposed to many natural disasters and war calamities the most severe of which was the sweeping floods in the late 9th century. However, It was rebuilt and restored to its original condition and then expanded during the Aubbide Reign in the 12th century AD, when they built what is called Sultan Orchard. The city also witness expansion under the first Ottoman period, and a new quarter was added to Sana’a called Quarter of Beer al-Azab , which was populated by the Senior officials. This quarter was distinct in its architectural Style differing from that of old Sana’a with regard to orchards and fountains. In the middle of the 16th century, Sana’a expanded again by adding the “Qa’a Al-Yahud”, a rampart dating back to the first century encircled “The Jewish Quarter” Old sana’a but it grew with the expansion of the city to include the new quarters. The rampart was in the shape of an 8,and used to have six gates four of which were used for the old city. These gates were closed each night at 8:00 o’clock and were opened before the dawn prayer at 4:00 am Today only the southern gate rampart together with its towers have collapsed but still some parts exist, particularly eastern and the southern parts adjacent to Bab Al-Yemen. The wall of the city had towers of which the thickness was enough to tow a cannon or tow walking knights. Sana’a is the most beautiful city in Yemen and in the Arabian Peninsula. It is a miraculous city with matchless architectural style. It can be said that it is a fantastic Islamic museum and international cultural Center in the Same way as Jerusalem (Al-Qawds Fez,Venice, and Florence).UNESCO has considered Sana’a as an international patrimony and undertook an international camping to protect, Safeguard and maintain it in 1984. City Mosques In Sana’a there are more than 50 mosques, five with domes and many with minarets, most Important of which is the Great Mosque, built during the life of Prophet Mohammed and ordered by him in the Eighth Hegira year 630 AD. This mosque was built, near the market place of stones from the famous Palace of Ghamdan and its pillars considered to be rare and wonderful masterpieces. They are believed to have been reused after they were moved from Ghamdan Palace of from a Sheba Temple the present building dates back (without the present annexes), to the period of Ya’furriya State in the late third century AD (9th century AD). Queen Arwa Bint Ahmad AL-Sulayhi and other participated in expanding it. The ceiling of the Great Mosque itself is considered as one of the important scientific and, ideological schools throughout the Islamic History until today. The Western library, the most famous manuscript library in Yemen, is annexed to this Mosque. There are many other mosques which are not less beautiful or wonderful with respect to the style of minarets, domes and artistic embellishments, such as Al-Mehdi Abbas Dome dating back 18th century AD and Bakirriya dome which dates back to the first Ottoman period, and which was renovated in the late 19th century by order of the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul-hameed. Markets: The market is considered to be one of the significant components of the Arab Islamic city the markets of old Sana’a are regarded as a living example of this. There are ten such markets, each specializing in a certain craft or merchandise such as the Cloth market, Grain market, Silk market, Raisins market, Cattle market, Thread market, Coffee Husk market, Caps market, Carpet market, Salt market, Brassware market, Silverware market, Firewood market, all perfumed with the scents of the East and a reminder of the tales of “ One Thousand and one Night”. Steam Baths (Hammamat) There are in old Sana’a about 15 steam baths, which are a fundamental feature of the city, as baths are associated with cleanliness. It is said that the Persians introduced the baths. The style of steam baths in Yemen is similar to that of North Africa but still some suggest that they were introduced during the Umayyad Period in the late first century Hegira (7th century AD). Samsarah (Caravansaries) In old Sana’a there were a number of inns (Khans) which used to perform specific functions that were complementary to the business of the market, such as services of accommodation, storage, safekeeping of deposits and precious items. Such facilities had a specific architecture style characterized by arches and terraces in the interior, the ground floor of which was usually used for camels and horses there are now samples of such brokerage inns one of them is Al-Nahas Caravansary at the entrance of Salt Market, Bab AL-Yemen (Yemen Gate), which is now used as a center for the training of craftsmen and displaying their products. Nearby is another example called Samsarat Al-Mansour, which is presently a center for the painting artists. Recreational Area around Sana’a Rawdah Rawdah is 8km away to the north of the city and for the residents of Sana’a it is a place where they can spend some time away from the city, especially during grape season. The farms of Rawdah are well known for excellent grapes called Al-Rawdah grape in this area a weekly market is held every Sunday. There is an ancient mosque in Rawdah with artistically decorated minarets dating back to 17th century AD. Rawdah is characterized by a special architectural style which heavily depends on adobe (straw mixed clay). There is also a historic palace dating back to the early twentieth century. Wadi Dhahr Wadi Dhahr is located 14 km to the northwest of Sana’a and is considered to be the most important recreation area for the city of Sana’a. Here all kinds of fruit are grown. In the center of the wadi perches Dar Al-Hajar (Rock Palace), a palace built on top of an enormous rock dating back to 1786 AD, and ordered by Imam Mansour Ali Bin Mehdi Abbas. In the 1930s, Imam Yahya Hameed Al-Din added the upper stories and annexes and used it as a rest house. There is an ancient well piercing the rock from top to bottom as well as an old rocky graveyard. It is nowadays on of the main tourist attractions. In addition there are a number of ancient monuments scattered within the wadi. Bait Baws A typical old village, Bait Baws is located 7km to the south of Sana’a. Existing inscriptions found in the west of village show that the area was an important center in the ancient history of Yemen. The village is naturally fortified with only on entrance to the south. The most renowned mountains in the Capital Secretariat Nugom Mountain on which part of Sana’a is located on its western foot, it is its guardian and has got a traditional fortress and is 3000m above sea level.
8955	dbpedia	0	14	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-president-leaves-egypt-for-saudi-capital/1232326	en	Yemeni president leaves Egypt for Saudi capital	https://cdnuploads.aa.co…0af.jpg?v=173927	https://cdnuploads.aa.co…0af.jpg?v=173927	[ "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnuploads.aa.com.tr/uploads/Contents/2018/08/15/thumbs_b_c_5b0146ca7cb7715a8234a4646ead40af.jpg?v=173927"...	[]	[]	[ "Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi", "Egypt", "Saudi Arabia", "Yemen", "Anadolu Ajansı" ]	null	[]	null	Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi has been living in Riyadh since he fled Yemen in 2015 - Anadolu Ajansı		https://cdnassets.aa.com…avicon-32x32.png		https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-president-leaves-egypt-for-saudi-capital/1232326	By Shukri Hussein ADEN, Yemen Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi left the Egyptian capital, Cairo, on Wednesday for Saudi Arabia after a three-day visit. “President Hadi left Cairo for Riyadh after a 3-day business visit,” his office director Abdullah al-Alimi said on Twitter. He described Hadi’s talks in Cairo with President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi as "successful". Al-Alimi said the Yemeni leader has obtained “serious pledges” from Egyptian authorities about facilitating the living of Yemenis in Egypt. Hadi has been living in Riyadh since he fled Yemen in 2015 after the Shia Houthi group overran much of the country, including capital Sanaa one year earlier. The conflict escalated in 2015 when Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies launched a massive air campaign in Yemen aimed at rolling back Houthi gains and shoring up the country’s pro-Saudi government.
8955	dbpedia	3	16	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-61020866	en	Yemen president hands power to council in major shake-up	https://ichef.bbci.co.uk…371fromelvis.jpg	https://ichef.bbci.co.uk…371fromelvis.jpg	[ "https://www.bbc.com/bbcx/grey-placeholder.png", "https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/240/cpsprodpb/12211/production/_124075247_mediaitem124075246.jpg.webp 240w,https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/320/cpsprodpb/12211/production/_124075247_mediaitem124075246.jpg.webp 320w,https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/480/cpsprodpb/12211/prod...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "BBC News" ]	2022-04-07T10:47:37+00:00	Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi tells a new leadership council to negotiate a peace deal with the Houthis.	en	/bbcx/apple-touch-icon.png		https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-61020866	Yemen's president has sacked his deputy and transferred power to a leadership council in a major shake-up of the Saudi-backed coalition fighting Houthi rebels in the country's civil war. Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi announced that the eight-member council would be led by former minister Rashad al-Alimi. He tasked it with negotiating with the Houthis to agree a permanent ceasefire and a political solution to the war. The move comes five days after the start of a two-month nationwide truce. Yemen has been devastated by a conflict that escalated in 2015, when the Iran-aligned Houthis seized control of large parts of the west of the country. Mr Hadi fled abroad, and a Saudi-led alliance of Arab states intervened to restore his rule. However, seven years of military stalemate have followed. The fighting has reportedly left more than 150,000 people dead and triggered one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with more than 23 million people - three quarters of the population - in need of some form of aid. "I irreversibly delegate to the Presidential Leadership Council my full powers in accordance with the constitution and the Gulf Initiative and its executive mechanism," Mr Hadi announced in a statement in the early hours of Thursday. He said the council would manage Yemen's political, military and security affairs during what he called the "transitional period". It would also "negotiate with the Houthis to reach a ceasefire all over Yemen and sit at the negotiating table to reach a final political solution", he added. The council will be chaired by Mr Alimi, an adviser to Mr Hadi and former interior minister who reportedly has close ties with Saudi Arabia and Yemen's powerful Sunni Islamist Islah party. The other seven members include Aidrous al-Zubaidi, head of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which wants an independent South Yemen; Tareq Saleh, a military commander and nephew of late former president Ali Abdullah Saleh; and Sheikh Sultan al-Arada, the governor of the oil-rich province of Marib, a key battleground in the conflict. Peter Salisbury, a Yemen analyst for the International Crisis Group, wrote on Twitter that the transfer of power to political and military figures with direct roles on the ground was the "most consequential shift in the inner workings of the anti-Houthi bloc since war began". But he added: "How this will actually work in practice will be... complicated to say the least." Saudi Arabia stressed its full support for the council and pledged $3bn (£2.3bn) in new financial aid, state media reported. Saudi Arabia will use part of that money, along with the United Arab Emirates, to inject $2bn (£1.5bn) into the Central Bank of Yemen, while $1bn will be provided for petroleum products and development projects. Saudi Arabia also called on the council to "embark on negotiations with the Houthis under the auspices of the UN". On Wednesday, UN special envoy Hans Grundberg said there had been a "significant reduction in violence" since the first nationwide truce in six years took effect on Saturday, the start of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. However, he warned that there had been "reports of some hostile military activities, particularly around Marib, which are of concern". The truce should also see 18 fuel ships enter the rebel-controlled port of Hudaydah; the operation of two commercial flights a week in an out of the rebel-held capital Sanaa; and the opening of roads in the city of Taiz, which the rebels have besieged since 2015. So far, the government has released four fuel ships and preparations are under way for the first flight from Sanaa.
8955	dbpedia	0	5	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/now-that-yemeni-president-hadi-is-out-whats-next-for-yemen	en	What lies ahead for Yemen after President Hadi’s exit?	https://www.aljazeera.co…size=1920%2C1440	https://www.aljazeera.co…size=1920%2C1440	[ "https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2019-05-30T225419Z_1518297323_RC13DD80A860_RTRMADP_3_SAUDI-SUMMIT.jpg?resize=770%2C513&quality=80", "https://www.aljazeera.com/static/media/aj-footer-logo.bac952ad.svg" ]	[ "https://www.youtube.com/embed/hxuCDfDbaGg?version=3&rel=1&showsearch=0&showinfo=1&iv_load_policy=1&fs=1&hl=en-US&autohide=2&wmode=transparent", "https://www.youtube.com/embed/8_eXXCl0Wxs?version=3&rel=1&showsearch=0&showinfo=1&iv_load_policy=1&fs=1&hl=en-US&autohide=2&wmode=transparent" ]	[]	[ "News", "Humanitarian Crises", "Politics", "Middle East", "Yemen" ]	null	[ "Abubakr Al-Shamahi" ]	2022-04-08T00:00:00	Lack of alternatives and international legitimacy kept Hadi in power regardless of being in exile and unpopular.	en	/favicon_aje.ico	Al Jazeera	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/now-that-yemeni-president-hadi-is-out-whats-next-for-yemen	The end of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s period in power is not being mourned by many Yemenis. That says a lot about the presidency of a man seen as an “accidental” leader who has been unable to lead government forces effectively during a now almost-eight-year civil war that has decimated the country. Hadi, former vice president of 33-year leader Ali Abdullah Saleh, was parachuted into the presidency in 2012 when Saleh was forced out after a year of Arab Spring protests. He was supposed to be in power for two years and serve as a transition to full, inclusive Yemeni democracy. Instead, Hadi turned a blind eye to the rising power of the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in the north, who eventually took the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, and forced Hadi to flee in 2015. Hadi failed to rise to the challenge of being a wartime leader. Stuck in Riyadh, he appeared subservient to Saudi Arabia, which was now fighting the Houthis on his behalf. Yemenis had a silent president, one who spoke to his people on camera only a handful of times over the past few years. As war raged, salaries were unpaid and a humanitarian disaster spread. So what kept Hadi, despite his exile and unpopularity, as president for so long? A lack of an alternative that could be accepted by the divided anti-Houthi coalition, along with Hadi’s “legitimacy” as the internationally recognised president. It appears now, however, that the Saudis have had enough, and decided that the alternative is in fact to group representatives from the different anti-Houthi groups into one presidential council, in the hope that it keeps them all happy. Observers should not presume that this group of eight, announced on Thursday, will remain united. One of them, Aidarous al-Zubaydi, believes in the secession of southern Yemen from the state and labels himself as the southern president. The interests represented on the presidential council are bound to clash. The question is whether they will be able to stay on message and put their divisions to one side, for now. The departure of Vice President Ali Muhsin, a powerful military man who has been influential and divisive for more than 40 years, will be welcomed by many, in particular the United Arab Emirates-backed factions in Yemen. Muhsin has long been associated with Islah, Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood-influenced party, which is deeply opposed by Zubaydi’s Southern Transitional Council, and other UAE-backed groups. However, Islah will be placated by the inclusion on the presidential council of Sultan al-Aradah, the popular governor of Marib who is close to him, and the president of the council, Rashad al-Alimi, who has good relations with the party leadership. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have quickly shown their support for the presidential council to the tune of $3bn to prop up the Yemeni economy. The reluctance over the past few years to give much in the way of economic aid and weapons to the Yemeni government, which the Saudi-led coalition was fighting on behalf of, clearly showed the coalition’s dissatisfaction with Hadi and those around him. It was a key reason for the Houthis’ military expansion in that period. Is this now a government that Saudi Arabia and the UAE feel they can deal with? If it is, will they now ramp up their support? And what does it mean for Yemeni sovereignty when neighbouring powers have such a hold over its government and its very makeup? The elephant (not) in the room is of course the Houthis, who refused to attend the Riyadh talks that preceded the announcement of the presidential council. Houthi leaders immediately denounced the presidential council, labelling it as imposed by foreigners and not representative of Yemen. The group has also argued that this further undermines the claim that the Yemeni government is legitimate. In reality, negotiations between the Saudis and the Houthis have been ongoing for months. A two-month ceasefire went into effect this month and is a sign that there is a push, at least temporarily, for de-escalation. This was augmented further when, speaking after the formation of the presidential council, Yemen’s Saudi-backed Prime Minister Maeen Abdel Malik said the military solution in Yemen had “failed”. That acknowledgement means that the public narrative coming from the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni government is that political negotiations are the only solution to the war and that is the task of the presidential council. The question now is whether Yemen’s elites are willing to give a seat at the table to the Houthis, and whether the Houthis can even be trusted to share rule at all. If those talks fail once again, a transformation of this political presidential council into a war council may be seen quickly – together with a continuation of this devastating conflict.
8955	dbpedia	1	62	https://en.irna.ir/news/83180343/Abdrabbuh-Mansur-Hadi-playing-no-role-in-solving-Yemeni-crisis	en	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi playing no role in solving Yemeni crisis	https://img9.irna.ir/old…343-72796054.jpg	https://img9.irna.ir/old…343-72796054.jpg	[ "https://en.irna.ir/resources/theme/irna/img/logo_invert.png", "https://en.irna.ir/barcode?text=https%3A%2F%2Fen.irna.ir%2Fnews%2F83180343%2F&c=0fbcc0c8167feae356f2176923e84e9508c940c8a27d3b7a3c7d662ee1862431d5e53415cbc8c20da01615355049766828581af120ac4020795f9b975aa66e4f", "https://img9.irna.ir/old/Image/1397/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "IRNA English" ]	2019-01-22T13:57:37+00:00	Tehran, Jan 22, IRNA - Secretary-General of Ansarullah political bureau says the deposed president of Yemen Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and his deputy Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar have no position in solving Yemeni crisis.	en	/resources/theme/irna/img/icons/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png	IRNA English	https://en.irna.ir/news/83180343/Abdrabbuh-Mansur-Hadi-playing-no-role-in-solving-Yemeni-crisis	Tehran, Jan 22, IRNA - Secretary-General of Ansarullah political bureau says the deposed president of Yemen Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and his deputy Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar have no position in solving Yemeni crisis. According to Arab media 'Al Mayadeen', Fadhel Abutaleb made the remarks in a meeting with the UN deputy envoy Maeen Sharim. He added that leaving Saudi and Emirati partied without answer as regards prisoners' fate will damage Stockholm agreement. He also referred to the UN delegation team Patrick Cammaert's favoritism and also aggressors' indifference as obstacles on Al Hudaydah agreement. The United Nations Security Council enacted resolution 2451 to support the Stockholm Agreement on deployment of a team in order to facilitate monitoring and implementing the Agreement and establishing truce in important Yemeni ports. The resolution mainly focuses on sending essential commodities to the Yemeni people, supporting the Stockholm Agreement, assigning the Secretary-General of the United Nations to implement it and observing the ceasefire. The fourth round of Yemen peace talks kicked off in Stockholm, Sweden, on December 6, with the attendance of the UN special envoy Martin Griffith and the government representatives, and agreed to establish truce in Yemeni ports of al-Hudaydah, al-Salif, and Ayn Issa. Saudi Arabia and its regional allies attacked Yemen in March 2015 to bring back to power the deposed president of Yemen Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Since then, the invaders have committed horrible war crimes against Yemeni civilians. 9376**1420 Follow us on Twitter @IrnaEnglish
8955	dbpedia	3	82	https://www.telegraph.co.uk/obituaries/2017/12/04/ali-abdullah-saleh-former-president-yemen-obituary/	en	Ali Abdullah Saleh, former President of Yemen – obituary	https://www.telegraph.co…icy=logo-overlay	https://www.telegraph.co…icy=logo-overlay	[ "https://www.telegraph.co.uk/etc.clientlibs/settings/wcm/designs/telegraph/core/clientlibs/ui/dist/static/resources/images/flags/UK-SVG.svg", "https://www.telegraph.co.uk/etc.clientlibs/settings/wcm/designs/telegraph/core/clientlibs/ui/dist/static/resources/images/flags/USA-SVG.svg", "https://www.telegraph.co.u...	[]	[]	[ "Yemen", "Standard", "Obituaries" ]	null	[]	2017-12-04T00:00:00	Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of Yemen, who has reportedly been killed aged 75, was the longest-serving ruler in the post-Ottoman Middle East and was known to some in the West as “Little Saddam” after the man he hero-worshipped;	en	/etc.clientlibs/settings/wcm/designs/telegraph/core/clientlibs/core/resources/icons/favicon.ico	The Telegraph	https://www.telegraph.co.uk/obituaries/2017/12/04/ali-abdullah-saleh-former-president-yemen-obituary/	Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of Yemen, who has reportedly been killed aged 75, was the longest-serving ruler in the post-Ottoman Middle East and was known to some in the West as “Little Saddam” after the man he hero-worshipped; but in the wake of 9/11, he became an unlikely ally in the American-led “War on Terror”. He was forced from power in late 2011 after mass protests inspired by the Arab Spring, and handed power to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, his vice president. But when Houthi forces rose up against Hadi in 2015, Saleh re-emerged as a political player, joining forces with the rebels in their fight against coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia, a former ally. However, his alliance with the rebels began to unravel last week as the two sides fought in Sana’a, and Saleh indicated that he was ready to come to terms with Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government. He was killed during the fighting, according to Houthi-controlled media; one of his aides subsequently confirmed his death to the BBC. Ali Abdullah Saleh was born on March 21 1942 in the town of Almaradh, in what was then the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, to a Zaydi (Shia Muslim) peasant. His education was limited but he joined the army at an early age and became a corporal, taking part in the 1962 coup that overthrew the Zaydi imamate and installed a republic in North Yemen. His leadership skills were noticed, and in 1977 the president of North Yemen, Ahmad bin Hussein al-Ghashmi, appointed him military governor of Ta’izz. After al-Ghashmi’s assassination by a “peace envoy” from South Yemen the following year, Saleh was elected president of North Yemen by a constituent assembly which saw him as someone who could easily be manipulated. Instead, he proved shrewder, and more ruthless, than his predecessors. While allowing some democratic structures to grow, he built a system of patronage to keep a firm grip on power, surrounding himself with a circle of close aides – notably his brothers, whom he appointed to key military and security posts. In 1990 he presided over the union of North Yemen and the communist South Yemen, which had just lost its Soviet patron. Like neighbouring Saudi Arabia, he also welcomed tens of thousands of Arab fighters returning from the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, rewarding many of them with jobs in the country’s military and security forces. The same year, however, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait punished Yemen for siding with Iraq in the Gulf War by expelling some 700,000 Yemeni expatriate workers, depriving the country of remittances that constituted one of its main revenues. When a brief civil war broke out in 1994 between the north of Yemen and the more secular south, Saleh sent in the Islamist veterans of Afghanistan to crush the rebels, a feat which made him the one and only ruler, whereas before he had had to share power with former leaders of the south. Thus began a pragmatic relationship with Islamist militants that would come to trouble Saleh’s later alliance with the United States. Following Yemen’s unification, Saleh launched a cautious reform process, introducing some elements of a multi-party system. He organised legislative elections in 1993 and 1997, and a presidential ballot in 1999, in which his only “rival” won 3.7 per cent of the vote. He would be re-elected to another seven-year term in 2006. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, fearing that Yemen could become the target of an American invasion, Saleh flew to Washington and promised President George W Bush that he would cooperate in the fight against terrorism. He rounded up thousands of jihadists, and in the years that followed, Yemen’s elite American-trained counter-terrorism forces captured and killed a number of militants. Yet Saleh, a self-styled “field marshal”, was not an especially lovable ally and his relationship with Washington was complicated by the political juggling act which had kept him in power for so long. Even though Washington spent tens of millions of dollars training his forces, his standard response when asked about cooperation with Washington was: “We’re not your employees!” Leaked cables from American diplomats published on the WikiLeaks website in 2010 labelled Saleh “petulant” and “bizarre” in his dealings with them, “at times disdainful and dismissive and at others conciliatory and congenial”. This was partly a reflection of the fact that his government was hopelessly ineffective at preventing infiltration by al-Qaeda, whose presence in Yemen grew as the economic situation worsened. Indeed, Saleh and his allies occasionally seemed to encourage the militants: a jail break in 2006 that injected new energy into al-Qaeda’s operations was thought to have been an inside job. Washington was also angered by the freeing of such figures as Jamal al-Badawi, wanted for the USS Cole bombing in 2000, and Jaber al-Baneh, wanted by American prosecutors on terrorism charges. Saleh also maintained close ties with extremist figures such as Abdul Majid al-Zindani, a cleric who supported him in the 2006 presidential elections, but who is listed as a “specially designated global terrorist” by the UN and the United States. Others such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who mounted an unsuccessful attempt in 2009 to bomb a US-bound passenger aeroplane, and US Army Major Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, are thought to have had links with Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born jihadist cleric hiding in Yemen, who was killed in 2011 in an American drone attack. In 2009 al-Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi wings merged into a new group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen. Even without the problem of militancy, Saleh’s achievement in remaining in power for so long was a remarkable one. Beset by an exploding population, spiralling unemployment, a water shortage so acute that Yemen’s cities had water for only a couple of hours a day, and dwindling oil output, he was also dealing with a grinding civil war in the north and a resurgence of separatist sentiment in the south. By 2009 Yemen qualified as a failing state. Yet until the “Arab Spring” protests of early 2011, Saleh had the support of the main pillars of power in Yemen – the tribes and the army – based on a network of patronage whereby all jobs were distributed according to political loyalty in a constant process of balancing and manoeuvring which Saleh himself likened to “dancing in a circle of snakes”. A large proportion of the resources for this high-wire act were provided by Saudi Arabia which, much as they disliked the man, saw Saleh’s regime as a bulwark against extremist threats aimed at the Saudi royal family. A notable exception to this network were the Houthis, a Shia-led religious-political movement that emerged from Sa’dah, northern Yemen, in the 1990s and felt particularly marginalised by Saleh and angered by the growth of Saudi Arabia’s conservative religious influence and Yemen’s alliance with America in its war on terror. Hundreds of people died in fighting between the Houthis and pro-government forces between 2004 and 2010. When Yemeni students joined the wave of popular protests sweeping the Arab world in 2011, even Saleh’s traditional support began to show signs of ebbing away. At first he played for time, calling a state of emergency, sacking his cabinet and promising that he would not seek to extend his term in office beyond 2013. But he had made and broken similar promises in 2006, and his refusal to step down and deployment of thugs to intimidate the demonstrators merely intensified opposition to his regime. The event that propelled Yemen’s crisis to an apparent climax was the announcement in March 2011 by Major-General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the country’s most powerful military leader, that he was supporting the youthful protesters, after police, including rooftop snipers, shot dead 52 of them after Friday prayers on March 18. His announcement was followed by a series of high-profile defections by generals, ambassadors and some tribes, putting Saleh in the position of choosing between sending his elite units into battle to defend his authority or negotiating his own exit. With a push from the Gulf states, Saleh stepped down early in 2012 and was succeeded by Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Thus began a short-lived period of optimism, during which talks brokered by the UN led to a plan in 2014 for a new constitution enshrining a federal system. In early 2015 the rebels seized control of the capital, forcing Hadi to flee and prompting Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states, alarmed by the rise of a group they believed to be backed by Iran, to launch an air campaign aimed at restoring Hadi’s government. Since then more than 8,600 people have been killed and 49,000 injured, many of them in air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition, while the conflict and a blockade imposed by the coalition have also left 20 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Although neither side appears close to achieving a military victory, cracks which appeared last week between forces loyal to Saleh and the Houthis have raised hopes of a fresh effort at negotiating an end to the war. Saleh was married and had seven sons. Ali Abdullah Saleh, born March 21 1942, died December 4 2017
8955	dbpedia	0	38	https://www.dw.com/en/yemens-president-hadi-declares-new-temporary-capital/a-18332197	en	Yemen has new 'temporary capital' – DW – 03	https://static.dw.com/im…e/18272783_6.jpg	https://static.dw.com/im…e/18272783_6.jpg	[ "https://static.dw.com/image/18272783_600.jpg 78w, https://static.dw.com/image/18272783_601.jpg 201w, https://static.dw.com/image/18272783_602.jpg 379w, https://static.dw.com/image/18272783_603.jpg 545w, https://static.dw.com/image/18272783_604.jpg 767w, https://static.dw.com/image/18272783_605.jpg 1199w" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Deutsche Welle" ]	2015-03-21T16:40:19+00:00	Yemen's leader has used a televised speech to declare a new 'temporary capital.' The president, who fled house arrest last month, also called on the Huthi rebels to abandon control of government ministries in Sanaa.	en	/images/icons/favicon-16x16.png	dw.com	https://www.dw.com/en/yemens-president-hadi-declares-new-temporary-capital/a-18332197	In a televised speech on Saturday, Yemen's President Raboo Mansour Hadi pledged to fight Iran's influence on his violence-ridden country. Hadi, who was under rebel imposed house arrest until last month when he fled to Aden in the south of the country, accused Shiite Huthi militia of importing Tehran's ideology into Yemen. In the broadcast, Hadi said he would "ensure the Yemeni republic flag will fly on the Marran Mountain instead of the Iranian flag." In September, the Houthis overtook Yemen's capital, Sanaa, inluding Marran Mountain, seizing many state institutions. Since then they have also taken over nine of the country's 21 provinces. Temporary capital Locked in a power struggle with Houthi rebels, Hadi Saturday declared the port city of Aden Yemen's temporary capital. "My move to Aden was not a step towards separation," despite claims to this effect from the "coup plotters," Hadi said in the address broadcast on official Aden TV. "My aim is to safeguard the legitimate state institutions." "Aden is an economic and temporary capital," he added. Hadi's televised address comes one day after suicide bombers killed more than 130 people in twin-attacks on mosques in Sanaa. The bombers blew themselves up during noon prayers at the Badr and Al-Hashahush mosques, situated on opposite sides of the city, witnesses and officials said Friday. The self-styled "Islamic State" claimed responsibility for the attack. The mosques are frequented by Shiite Houthi rebels, allied with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who have control of the capital. Meanwhile, US broadcaster CNN reported Saturday that Washington was evacuating 100 Special Forces troops from Yemen because of the unstable political situation in the country. This came after al Qaeda fighters reportedly seized the southern city of al-Houta, not far from the Al Anad air base where the US troops are stationed. Howerver, Reuters on Saturday reported, citing local officials and residents, that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had been driven back out of the southern city on Saturday. Al-Houta is only around 30 kilometers (roughly 20 miles) from the "temporary capital" of Aden declared as President Hadi's interim headquarters. jlw/msh (Reuters, dpa, AFP, AP)
8955	dbpedia	1	54	https://lobelog.com/tag/abdrabbuh-mansur-hadi/	en	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi – LobeLog	https://lobelog.com/wp-c…im-lobe-logo.png		[ "https://lobelog.com/wp-content/uploads/lobelog-jim-lobe-logo.png", "https://lobelog.com/wp-content/uploads/640px-Sitting_down_for_a_meeting_Yemen_President_Abd_Rabuh_Mansur_Hadi_listens_as_Secretary_of_Defense_Chuck_Hagel_welcomes_him_to_the_Pentagon_July_30_2013.jpg", "https://lobelog.com/wp-content/uploads/A...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Guest Contributor" ]	2019-08-31T10:00:02-04:00		en			null	We value your opinion and encourage you to comment on our postings. To ensure a safe environment we will not publish comments that involve ad hominem attacks, racist, sexist or otherwise discriminatory language, or anything that is written solely for the purpose of slandering a person or subject. Excessively long comments may not be published due to their length. All comments are moderated. LobeLog does not publish comments with links. Thanks for reading and we look forward to hearing from you!
8955	dbpedia	1	0	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi	en	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi	https://upload.wikimedia…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/70/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Had...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2010-11-04T06:01:57+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi	President of Yemen from 2012 to 2022 Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (Arabic: عبدربه منصور هادي, romanized: ʿAbd Rabbih Manṣūr Hādī Yemeni pronunciation: [ˈʕæb.də ˈrɑb.bu mɑnˈsˤuːr ˈhæːdi];[3][4] born 1 September 1945) is a Yemeni politician and former field marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces who served as the president of Yemen from 2012 until 2022, when he stepped down and transferred executive authority to the Presidential Leadership Council, with Rashad al-Alimi as its chairman.[5] He was the vice president to Ali Abdullah Saleh from 1994 to 2012. Between 4 June and 23 September 2011, Hadi was the acting president of Yemen while Ali Abdullah Saleh was undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia following an attack on the presidential palace during the 2011 Yemeni uprising.[6] On 23 November, he became Acting President again, after Saleh moved into a non-active role pending the presidential election "in return for immunity from prosecution". Hadi was "expected to form a national unity government and also call for early presidential elections within 90 days" while Saleh continued to serve as president in name only.[7] Mansour Hadi was chosen as a president for a two-year transitional period on 21 February by Yemen's political factions, in an election where he was the sole consensus candidate, although the election was boycotted by Houthis in the north and Southern Secessionists in the south of the country. Hadi's mandate was extended for another year in January 2014.[8] According to pro-Houthi media outlet SABA, Hadi remained in power after the expiration of his mandate.[9] On 22 January 2015, he was forced to resign by the Houthis in the midst of mass protest against his decision to raise the fuel subsidies and due to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 2011 Revolution. Subsequently, the Houthis and the supporters of Saleh seized the presidential palace and placed Hadi under house arrest. The Houthis named a Revolutionary Committee to assume the powers of the presidency, as well as unify with the General People's Congress, Hadi's own political party.[10][11][12] A month later, Hadi escaped to his hometown of Aden, rescinded his resignation, and denounced the Houthi takeover. He arrived in Riyadh the next day, as a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia intervened in support of his government.[13] He returned to Aden in September 2015, as Saudi-backed government forces recaptured the city.[14] In late 2017, he was reportedly residing in Riyadh under house arrest.[15] In 2022, Hadi transferred his powers to a newly formed Presidential Leadership Council led by Rashad al-Alimi which would seek a political solution to Yemen's civil war.[5] This came amid a broader push for peace with Saudi Arabia.[16] Multiple sources in the Saudi and Yemeni governments alleged that he had been forced to cede power by the Saudis.[17][18][19] Early life and education [edit] Hadi was born on 1 September 1945 in Thukain, Al Wade'a District, Abyan, a southern Yemeni governorate.[20] He graduated from a military academy in the Federation of South Arabia in 1966.[21] In 1966 he graduated after receiving a military scholarship to study in Britain, but was not able to attend, as he did not speak English.[20] In 1970, he received another military scholarship to study tanks in Egypt. Hadi spent the following four years in the Soviet Union studying military leadership. He occupied several military posts in the army of South Yemen until 1986, when he fled to North Yemen with Ali Nasser Mohammed, president of South Yemen, after Ali Nasser's faction of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party lost the 1986 civil war.[21] Career [edit] Hadi played a low-profile role during the Aden Emergency. Following the independence of South Yemen, he rose to prominence in the new military, reaching the rank of Major General.[21] He remained loyal to President Ali Nasser Mohammed during the South Yemen Civil War, and followed him into exile in neighboring North Yemen. During the 1994 civil war in Yemen, Hadi sided with the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and was appointed as Minister of Defense.[21] In this role he led the military campaign against the Democratic Republic of Yemen.[22] Following the war he was promoted to vice president on 3 October 1994, replacing Ali Salim Al-Beidh, who had resigned and fought against the government during the civil war.[citation needed] President of Yemen [edit] Main article: 2012 Yemeni presidential election Hadi was the sole candidate in the presidential election that was held on 21 February 2012. His candidacy was backed by the ruling party, as well as by the parliamentary opposition. The Electoral Commission reported that 65 percent of registered voters in Yemen voted during the election. Hadi won with 100% of the vote and took the oath of office in Yemen's parliament on 25 February 2012.[23] He was formally inaugurated as the president of Yemen on 27 February 2012, when Saleh resigned from the presidency and formally ceded power to Hadi.[24] Political reform [edit] In March 2013 the National Dialogue Conference was conceived as a core part of the transition process and is intended to bring together Yemen's diverse political and demographic groups to address critical issues.[25] In January 2014, Hadi pushed delegates at the conference to break a deadlock on key issues and bring the talks to an overdue close. When those in attendance finally agreed on a final few points, he launched into an impassioned speech that led to a spike in his popularity. It was agreed that Yemen would shift to a federal model of government in the future, a move which has been proposed and forcefully backed by Hadi.[26] For many Yemenis, particularly in northwestern Yemen, this decentralization was less attractive. This mountainous region is the poorest of Yemen and decentralization would mean that it would receive less money from the central government. Relevant here is that the overwhelming majority of Yemen's population has resided in this area for many years.[27] Indeed, the 'decentralization' of Yemen along the lines proposed by the Saudi-imposed Hadi regime threatened Yemen's long-term economic and political independence; scholar Isa Blumi points out that "To any rational observer, the idea of developing Yemen into six disproportionate regions with enormous autonomy was a blatant effort to benefit foreign interests and subdue the rebellious populations through poverty and administrative obscurity."[27] Indeed, if the Saudi-American decentralization 'road map to peace' is implemented, Yemen's oil wealth would be confined almost entirely to the provinces of Hadhramawt and Saba', Yemen's two least populated provinces.[28] Blumi goes on to point out that "This would make bribing the few thousands of eligible 'residents' with a tiny portion of the oil revenue (no longer flowing to the central state) easy, while creating an enormous windfall for those hoping to steal Yemen's wealth."[28] They also didn't like that the new regional borders would rob them of access to the sea. Military [edit] In a move to unify the Armed Forces of Yemen which suffered from split since the Yemeni Revolution, Hadi began reforming the Military. He issued Presidential decree No.104 December 2012 reorganizing the Military into five main branches: Air Force, Army (Ground Force), Navy and Coastal Defence, Border Troops and Strategic Reserve Forces, which includes the Special Operation Command, the Missile Defence Command and the Presidential Protective Forces. The Strategic Reserve Forces replaces the Republican Guard.[29] Security issues [edit] See also: 2012 Sanaʽa bombing From his early days at office, Hadi advocated fighting Al-Qaida as an important goal. In a meeting with British Foreign Secretary, William Hague in his first days in office Hadi said "We intend to confront terrorism with full force and whatever the matter we will pursue it to the very last hiding place".[30] The Yemeni military had suffered from sharp divisions since Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar defected in late March 2011 amid protests demanding the ouster of Hadi's predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The military protests extended to the Republican Guard based in the south of Sana'a when dozens from the Fourth Brigade closed down southern entrances to the capital city and demanded the firing of the brigade's commander, Mohammad Al-Arar, and his general staff.[30] In an interview in September 2012 given to The Washington Post, Hadi warned that his country, still reeling from the popular uprising that ousted Saleh, risked a descent into a civil war "worse than Afghanistan" should an upcoming months-long national dialogue fail to resolve the state's deep political and societal rifts. He also said that Yemen was facing "three undeclared wars" conducted by al Qaeda, pirates in the Gulf of Aden, and Houthi rebels in the north, and that Iran was supporting these adversaries indirectly without giving further details.[31] Houthis, on their side, complained of murder attacks on their delegates to the NDC.[32] In response to the murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi after visiting a Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Hadi said that the "cheap political and media targeting of Saudi Arabia will not deter it from continuing its leading role in the Arab and Islamic worlds."[33] Rebel takeover and civil war [edit] Hadi was forced to agree to a power-sharing deal after the fall of Sana'a to the rebel umbrella organization Ansar Allah in September 2014. Also known as the Houthis, these revolutionaries refused to participate in the "unity government", although they continued to occupy key positions and buildings in Sana'a and hold territory throughout northern Yemen. Hadi was further humiliated when the General People's Congress ousted him as its leader and rejected his cabinet choices on 8 November 2014.[34] It is important to note that the Houthis' pretext for entering Sana'a and deposing Hadi was to reverse an apparent breach of the Hadi government's mandate by unilaterally declaring an extension of its power beyond the two-year intermediary period actually set by the GCC and the United States.[35] They also accused the president of seeking to bypass a power-sharing deal signed when they seized Sana'a in September, and say they are also working to protect state institutions from corrupt civil servants and officers trying to plunder state property.[36] Three days after Hadi's resignation (21 January 2015), the Houthis took over the presidential palace.[37] Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah tendered their resignations to parliament which reportedly refused to accept them.[38] Then the Yemeni cabinet was dissolved.[39] Hadi and his former ministers remained under virtual house arrest since their resignations.[40] United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for Hadi to be restored as president after the Houthis installed themselves as the interim government in February 2015.[40][41] According to Houthi-controlled state media, Hadi reaffirmed on 8 February that his resignation was "final" and could not be withdrawn.[42] However, after leaving Sana'a and traveling to his hometown of Aden on 21 February, Hadi gave a speech in which he presented himself as Yemen's president and said the actions taken by the Houthis since 21 September were unconstitutional and invalid.[43][44] On 26 March 2015 Saudi state TV Al Ekhbariya reported that Hadi arrived at a Riyadh airbase and was met by Saudi Arabia Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud as Saudi Arabia and its allies launched airstrikes in Yemen against the Houthis in the 2015 military intervention in Yemen. His route from Aden to Riyadh was not immediately known.[45] On 25 March 2017 a court in the Houthi-controlled Sana'a sentenced Hadi and six other government officials to death in absentia for "high treason", which meant "incitement and assistance" to Saudi Arabia and its allies."[46][47] The sentence was announced by the Houthi-controlled Saba News Agency.[46] Resignation [edit] On April 7, 2022, Hadi announced in a televised speech that he is resigning from office, dismissing vice president Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and transfers both office's powers to the newly formed eight member Presidential Leadership Council chaired by Rashad al-Alimi. He also said that the council was tasked with negotiating with the Houthi rebels to agree to a permanent ceasefire.[48][49] The presidential council's leader had close ties with Saudi Arabia, and some of Yemen's other political groups, including the Islah party.[50] Officials from Saudi Arabia and Yemen claimed that Hadi was pushed by Riyadh to give up his power to the presidential council. Hadi received a written decree from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to transfer his authority to the council. According to Prince Mohammed the decision was approved by other Yemeni leaders. Hadi was also threatened by Saudi officials using the evidence of corruption allegedly committed by him. Following his decision to step down, he was kept under a house arrest in his Riyadh residence and was not allowed to communicate with anyone. All these claims were denied by Saudi Arabia.[51] References [edit] Media related to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi at Wikimedia Commons
8955	dbpedia	0	59	https://freedomhouse.org/article/end-yemens-brutal-war-2017	en	End Yemen's Brutal War in 2017	https://freedomhouse.org…43&itok=mL9HdBaS	https://freedomhouse.org…43&itok=mL9HdBaS	[ "https://freedomhouse.org/themes/custom/ts_freedomhouse/logo.svg", "https://freedomhouse.org/themes/custom/ts_freedomhouse/img/share-facebook.svg", "https://freedomhouse.org/themes/custom/ts_freedomhouse/img/share-twitter.svg", "https://freedomhouse.org/themes/custom/ts_freedomhouse/img/share-email.svg", "h...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Freedom House" ]	2017-01-12T17:25:00	Yemen’s civil war, which is partly a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, has claimed more than 10,000 lives and caused a humanitarian crisis. Ending the fighting must be a priority for the United States and the international community in 2017.	en	/sites/default/files/favicon.ico	Freedom House	https://freedomhouse.org/article/end-yemens-brutal-war-2017	Yemen’s civil war, which is partly a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, has claimed more than 10,000 lives and caused a humanitarian crisis. Ending the fighting must be a priority for the United States and the international community in 2017. The war and humanitarian crisis in Yemen—with its rampant human rights violations, multiple militant and terrorist factions, foreign interventions, widespread famine, and unchecked disease—bears an increasing resemblance to Syria. However, Yemen has received far less attention from the international community. The U.S. government and other international actors urgently need to focus their efforts on (1) halting logistical support and weapons sales to warring parties, (2) working to reach an inclusive political settlement, (3) pushing for an international inquiry into human rights violations, and (4) supporting local efforts to document such violations. The forgotten war Turmoil in Iraq and Syria, an increase in terrorist attacks in Europe, and the divisive U.S. election were just a few of the stories that stole the spotlight from the failed state in Yemen during 2016. While the media themselves have dubbed Yemen’s crisis “the forgotten war,” few observers seem to truly understand the dangers associated with ignoring the conflict. The civil war began in late 2014, pitting a northern rebel group known as the Houthis—allied with forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh—against the government of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. The rift was rooted in decades of economic underdevelopment (Yemen is the region’s poorest country), corruption, authoritarian misrule, and political marginalization, but it has also taken on sectarian dimensions. Yemeni citizens had grown tired of President Hadi’s inability to properly manage the country in the wake of Arab Spring protests that forced Saleh’s resignation. Sensing their discontent, and carrying the banner of democracy, the Houthis launched a stunning offensive that led to the successful takeover of the capital, Sana’a, in September 2014. Hadi eventually fled to neighboring Saudi Arabia. His ouster led to a counteroffensive backed by the Saudis and their regional allies, including a fierce bombing campaign starting in early 2015, aimed at restoring the Hadi government. Amid the chaos, the local branches of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) militant group have expanded their influence and in some cases seized territory in southern and eastern Yemen. Just last month, a suicide bomber killed at least 40 Yemeni soldiers in the southern port city of Aden. A major factor behind Saudi Arabia’s involvement is the role of its regional rival, Iran, which has been smuggling weapons to the Houthis. Earlier this week, an Australian naval patrol seized a huge supply of light arms, including nearly 2,000 assault rifles and 81 grenade launchers, found aboard an Iranian dhow off the coast of Yemen. Observers have noted the sectarian link between Shiite-led Iran and the Houthis, whose Zaydi faith is technically a branch of Shia Islam. However, there are major theological differences between the two, and Iran’s main interest in Yemen is political rather than ideological. It has worked to establish armed clients and proxies across the region as part of a broader effort to project power and influence beyond its borders. Mounting human rights violations The conflict in Yemen has been catastrophic for human rights. The Saudi-led bombing campaign made international headlines multiple times during 2016, for instance when a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders was bombed in August, and when an air strike on a funeral in October killed 140 civilians. The Saudis have admitted to using cluster munitions, which randomly scatter bomblets over a wide area and pose an enormous threat to civilians. Many of the bomblets fail to explode on impact and effectively act as landmines. Though these inherently indiscriminate weapons have been banned in 100 countries by international treaty, the United States, Britain, and Brazil have supplied them to Saudi forces throughout the conflict. The Saudi-Hadi alliance is also implicated in large-scale damage to property and civilian infrastructure. Houthi-Saleh forces have engaged in apparent human rights violations of their own, including indiscriminate shelling of populated areas, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances. Freedom House collected documentation of human rights violations in 15 Yemeni governorates. Airstrike casualties, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances were most commonly reported in and around Sana’a, which is under the control of the Houthi-Saleh alliance. Extrajudicial killings and physical assault or harm were most frequently reported in the southern areas under Hadi control, like Aden, Lahij, and Abyan, as well as the highly contested areas of Taiz and Al-Bayda. Destruction of property and extrajudicial killing were reported near Aden, where Al-Qaeda and IS have a presence. The international community Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other human rights organizations have called on the U.S. government to take concrete measures to bring an end to the conflict. Despite the full-blown humanitarian crisis, efforts to date have been feeble. In fact, the U.S. government has supported the Saudi-led campaign since March 2015 with logistical aid, including mid-air refueling for warplanes, intelligence sharing, and targeting assistance. Washington has also offered the Saudis $115 billion in weapons sales since President Barack Obama took office in 2009, more than during any other U.S. administration. Britain has sold more than $3 billion in weapons to Saudi Arabia since March 2015, and blocked a critical effort led by the Netherlands last year to establish an official UN inquiry into human rights violations in Yemen. The inquiry, which would have begun in March 2017, was replaced by a weak, partisan national inquiry that reports to President Hadi. Britain also helped Saudi Arabia secure a position on the UN Human Rights Council through backdoor deals. In October 2016, Saudi Arabia was reelected to the council for a three-year term, receiving support from 79 percent of member states. Although members are elected via secret ballot, neither the United States nor Britain voiced opposition to reelecting the Saudis. In December, pressure from human rights organizations led the Obama administration to reduce U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia. But this minor step is simply not enough. Experts agree that without U.S. and British support, the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen would quickly grind to a halt. What next? The most recent attempt to reach a political settlement unsurprisingly ended in Kuwait last summer after the Hadi government obstinately refused to enter into negotiations with the Houthis unless they disarm and withdraw from territory they have held since 2015. This absurd stipulation should have been considered a nonstarter by mediators. “The Yemen conflict is still solvable and must end now,” said Farea al-Muslimi, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, in a recent conversation with Freedom House. “But since there isn’t a refugee crisis in Yemen, the Western media and policymakers aren’t paying attention. As a result, we’re slowly beginning to see a new Syria emerge in the Arabian Peninsula.” That outcome is dangerous for everyone. The United States, Britain, and the United Nations should work to ensure that all Yemen-bound military assistance and weapons sales are halted. In addition, Washington and London should signal support for and work with other members of the international community to establish an independent inquiry by the UN Human Rights Council into violations. Finally, the United States, Britain, and the United Nations should work for a fair and inclusive political settlement that considers the legitimate interests of both sides in the conflict—which is rooted in a lack of fair democratic governance, free political participation, and equitable economic development across the country. In the meantime, there is a critical need to increase support for local civil society organizations to document the country’s grossly underreported human rights violations and prepare for a future transitional justice process. If we continue to ignore the true scale and causes of this conflict, our neglect will only magnify the threats it generates and raise the costs of a resolution.
8955	dbpedia	2	17	https://en.as.com/latest_news/where-is-yemen-what-is-its-capital-how-many-inhabitants-does-it-have-and-why-is-it-considered-bicontinental-n/	en	Where is Yemen, what is its capital, how many inhabitants does it have and why is it considered bicontinental?	https://img.asmedia.epim…t=828&smart=true	https://img.asmedia.epim…t=828&smart=true	[ "https://en.as.com/pf/resources/images/logos/navextra/los40-usa.svg?d=504", "https://as01.epimg.net/img/comunes/fotos/fichas/paises/84_56/esp.png", "https://as01.epimg.net/img/comunes/fotos/fichas/paises/84_56/chi.png", "https://as01.epimg.net/img/comunes/fotos/fichas/paises/84_56/col.png", "https://as01.ep...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "As.com", "Greg Heilman" ]	2024-01-13T06:23:46-05:00	We’ll tell you some facts about Yemen: where is it, its capital, population and why it is in such a strategic location on the Arabian Peninsula.	en	/pf/resources/images/favicon/favicon.ico?d=504	AS USA	https://en.as.com/latest_news/where-is-yemen-what-is-its-capital-how-many-inhabitants-does-it-have-and-why-is-it-considered-bicontinental-n/	The Republic of Yemen is a country located in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula. Its capital is in Sana’a and the nation’s formation is recent, emerging in 1990 as the result of the unification between North Yemen and South Yemen. Currently, it has an estimated population of over 31 million inhabitants according to the Central Intelligence Agency. The first civil war came in 1994, in a combat between south and north that ended with the victory of the latter. The second great crisis came with the Arab Spring of 2011, which led to the fall of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The civil war of 2014, the longest conflict in the country However, the longest modern conflict in the country is the civil war of 2014, which still continues and pits the Houthis against forces loyal to the Government. The Houthis call themselves Ansarolá or Supporters of God. Originally from Saada, they practice Zaidism, a Shiite branch of Islam close to Sunism, a minority in the country. They currently control around 30% of the country's territory, including the capital, Sana'a, and other areas near Saudi Arabia. For its part, the official Government, in the hands of Rashad al-Alimi, has its provisional capital in the port city of Aden. The support of the Houthis and the official government Saudi Arabia, the United States and other countries in the region support the official Government, while countries like Iran support the Houthis. Other actors that support the group led by Abdul-Malik al-Houth are Hamas and Hezbollah, who are described as the ‘Axis of resistance’. The Houthis’ continued attacks on ships crossing the Red Sea in response to the conflict in the Gaza Strip have been the trigger for a combined attack by the United States and the United Kingdom on Houthi-controlled sites. This is one of the most important maritime trade routes, especially for the passage of oil and other final consumer goods. The surface of Yemen and its strategic enclave The country extends across an area of approximately 205,000 square miles (almost four times the size of Alabama), of which 1,200 miles are of coastline divided between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. Yemen borders Saudi Arabia and Oman. All this, added to its presence in the Gulf of Aden, makes this country one of the best positioned at a strategic level, also due to its proximity to the African continent. In fact, it is one of the few countries in the world considered bicontinental. Its continental part is located in Asia, while the island of Socotra belongs to the African continental shelf. In addition to this enclave located in the Indian Ocean, its continental territory can be divided into three large areas: Poverty in Yemen Yemen’s civil war has plunged the country into what the United Nations has described as “one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises” and is considered one of the poorest countries on the planet. According to the agency, it is estimated that more than 20 million people, or two-thirds of Yemen’s population, “are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection services.”
8955	dbpedia	1	42	https://www.egypttoday.com/Tag/33246/Abdrabbuh-Mansur-Hadi	en	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi	http://www.egypttoday.com/siteimages/Larg/27227.jpg		[ "https://www.egypttoday.com/images/Logo.png", "https://www.egypttoday.com/images/redlogo.png", "http://www.egypttoday.com/siteimages/Larg/34056.jpg", "http://www.egypttoday.com/siteimages/Larg/33569.jpg", "http://www.egypttoday.com/siteimages/Larg/27227.jpg", "https://www.egypttoday.com/images/redlogo.png...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			/favicon.png		null	Hadi speaks in British parliament over the situation in Yemen Tue, 05 Dec 2017 - 03:05 GMT Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi met Tuesday with Member of the British House of Commons Keith Vaz. Yemen allies fight on in Sanaa as mediation efforts collapse Sat, 02 Dec 2017 - 09:10 GMT Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s supporters battled Iran-aligned Houthis for a fourth day on Saturday in the capital Sanaa, residents said.
8955	dbpedia	0	9	https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/m0fyc5	en	Sana'a — Google Arts & Culture	https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/ci/AL18g_QY4Zte7SCjp8vgcxGX5Gif4qVOw4B6iNDm_VIPbR5uZFVlcIzKeEqDcMcfsez9szMPF25cOhY	https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/ci/AL18g_QY4Zte7SCjp8vgcxGX5Gif4qVOw4B6iNDm_VIPbR5uZFVlcIzKeEqDcMcfsez9szMPF25cOhY	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Sanaa, also spelled Sanaʽa or Sana, is the largest city in Yemen and the centre of Sanaa Governorate.	en	//www.gstatic.com/culturalinstitute/stella/apple-touch-icon-180x180-v1.png	Google Arts & Culture	https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/sana-a/m0fyc5	Sanaa, also spelled Sanaʽa or Sana, is the largest city in Yemen and the centre of Sanaa Governorate. The city is not part of the Governorate, but forms the separate administrative district of "Amanat Al-Asemah". Under the Yemeni constitution, Sanaʽa is the capital of the country, although the seat of the Yemeni government moved to Aden, the former capital of South Yemen in the aftermath of the Houthi occupation. Aden was declared as the temporary capital by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in March 2015. At an elevation of 2,300 metres, Sanaa is one of the highest capital cities in the world and is next to the Sarawat Mountains of Jabal An-Nabi Shu'ayb and Jabal Tiyal, considered to be the highest mountains in the country and amongst the highest in the region. Sanaa has a population of approximately 3,937,500, making it Yemen's largest city. As of 2020, the greater Sanaa urban area makes up about 10% of Yemen's total population. The Old City of Sanaa, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, has a distinctive architectural character, most notably expressed in its multi-storey buildings decorated with geometric patterns. Show lessRead more Wikipedia
8955	dbpedia	1	39	https://amwaj.media/tag/50946293	en	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi	https://amwaj.media/appi…s/appicon512.png	https://amwaj.media/appi…s/appicon512.png	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Amwaj.media offers news, opinion and analysis on Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula - coverage of the region, from the region.	en	/favicon.ico	Amwaj.media	https://amwaj.media/tag/50946293	We use cookies to improve user experience and analyze website traffic. For these reasons, we may share your site usage data with our analytics partners. By clicking “Accept Cookies,” you consent to store on your device all the technologies described in our Cookie Policy. Learn more
8955	dbpedia	0	22	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/exiled-yemen-president-steps-aside-amid-hopes-over-truce-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi	en	Exiled Yemen president steps aside as truce raises hopes of end to war	https://i.guim.co.uk/img…abb05640df06da5f	https://i.guim.co.uk/img…abb05640df06da5f	[ "https://sb.scorecardresearch.com/p?c1=2&c2=6035250&cv=2.0&cj=1&cs_ucfr=0&comscorekw=Yemen%2CWorld+news%2CSaudi+Arabia%2CUnited+Arab+Emirates%2CMiddle+East+and+north+Africa%2CHouthis", "https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/3661cb4bdb00289fc8c549d79e094e128a1b7f40/109_0_3281_1969/master/3281.jpg?width=465&dpr=1&s=none" ...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Guardian staff" ]	2022-04-07T00:00:00	Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi says a newly established council will lead negotiations with Iranian-backed Houthis	en	https://assets.guim.co.u…e-touch-icon.svg	the Guardian	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/exiled-yemen-president-steps-aside-amid-hopes-over-truce-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi	Yemen’s exiled president has stepped aside and transferred his powers to a presidential council as international and regional efforts to end the country’s long-running civil war gained momentum with a two-month truce. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, major players in the conflict, appear to have had a role in Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s decision, quickly welcoming it with a pledge of $3bn (£2.3bn) in aid. The head of the new council has close ties to Riyadh. Whether the switch will expedite an end to the grinding war remains to be seen, as UN-sponsored negotiations have been at an impasse and fighting, airstrikes and missile attacks continued until late last month. The Houthis did not immediately comment on Hadi’s announcement. Hadi said the newly established council would run the internationally recognised government and lead negotiations with the Iranian-backed Houthis, according to a statement aired on state-run media. The move is meant to unify the anti-Houthi camp after years of infighting and disputes, and was almost certainly orchestrated in Riyadh, where Yemeni factions were meeting over the past week to discuss efforts to end the war. “With this declaration a presidential leadership council shall be established to complete the implementation of the tasks of the transitional period. I irreversibly delegate to the presidential leadership council my full powers,” Hadi declared on Yemen’s state-run TV. Hadi also sacked the vice-president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a powerful military figure, and delegated Ahmar’s powers to the presidential council. The presidential council is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi enjoys close ties with Saudi Arabia and other political groups inside Yemen, including the powerful Islah party – the transnational Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in Yemen. The council has seven members, including Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, head of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council – an umbrella group of heavily armed and well-financed militias propped up by the UAE since 2015. Sheikh Sultan al-Aradah, the powerful governor of energy-rich Marib province, was also named a member of the council. So was Tariq Saleh, a militia leader and nephew of the late president who has close ties with the UAE. Hadi was named president of Yemen in 2012 with a mission to oversee a democratic transition following its Arab spring uprising that ended Saleh’s longtime rule. However, the Houthis, a religious movement turned rebel militia, allied with Saleh and seized the capital Sana’a in 2014, forcing Hadi and his government into exile in Saudi Arabia. Months later, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition and entered the war to try to restore Hadi’s government to power. The conflict has in recent years become a regional proxy war that has killed more than 150,000 people, including more than 14,500 civilians. It has also created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Welcoming Hadi’s move, Saudi Arabia urged the presidential council to embark on UN-led negotiations with the Houthis to find a “political, final and comprehensive” settlement to the conflict, according to the state-run Saudi Press Agency. The powerful Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has also met with the council head and its members, according to Saudi state-run TV. The warring sides announced a two-month ceasefire earlier this month, the first nationwide truce in Yemen in six years. Hadi’s announcement came as Yemeni talks called by the Saudi-based Gulf Cooperation Council entered their final day on Thursday. The Houthis boycotted the GCC-facilitated efforts because they are taking place in Saudi Arabia, their adversary’s territory.
8955	dbpedia	3	77	https://commons.wikimedi…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	en	File:Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/70/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi.jpg/449px-Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi.jpg?20200131025818", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/38/Extracted_image_icon.svg/50px-Extracted_image_icon.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fd...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2013-07-30T08:47:35		en	/static/apple-touch/commons.png		https://commons.wikimedi…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	Click on a date/time to view the file as it appeared at that time. Date/TimeThumbnailDimensionsUserComment current02:58, 31 January 20201,448 × 1,932 (684 KB)Ericliu1912File:Sitting down for a meeting, Yemen President Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi listens as Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel welcomes him to the Pentagon July 30, 2013.jpg cropped 71 % horizontally, 41 % vertically, rotated 1° using CropTool with precise mode. 16:15, 14 December 2018341 × 444 (53 KB)GTVM92User created page with UploadWizard This file contains additional information such as Exif metadata which may have been added by the digital camera, scanner, or software program used to create or digitize it. If the file has been modified from its original state, some details such as the timestamp may not fully reflect those of the original file. The timestamp is only as accurate as the clock in the camera, and it may be completely wrong. Image title Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel hosts an honor cordon to welcome Yemen President Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi to the Pentagon July 30, 2013. DoD Photo By Glenn Fawcett (Released) Camera manufacturerNIKON CORPORATIONCamera modelNIKON D4AuthorGlenn FawcettExposure time1/125 sec (0.008)F-numberf/2.8ISO speed rating1,250Lens focal length130 mmCity shownPentagonShort title130730-D-NI589-141Credit/ProviderOffice of the Secretary of DefenSourceDoDWidth4,928 pxHeight3,280 pxBits per component 8 8 8 Pixel compositionRGBOrientationNormalNumber of components3Horizontal resolution200 dpiVertical resolution200 dpiSoftware usedAdobe Photoshop CS5.1 MacintoshWhite point chromaticity 0.313 0.329 Chromaticities of primarities 0.64 0.33 0.21 0.71 0.15 0.06 Color space transformation matrix coefficients 0.299 0.587 0.114 Y and C positioningCo-sitedExposure ProgramAperture priorityExif version2.3Meaning of each component Y Cb Cr does not exist Image compression mode4APEX shutter speed6.965784APEX aperture2.970854APEX exposure bias−0.33333333333333Maximum land aperture3 APEX (f/2.83)Subject distance3.55 metersMetering modePatternLight sourceUnknownFlashFlash did not fireDateTime subseconds20DateTimeOriginal subseconds20DateTimeDigitized subseconds20Supported Flashpix version1Color spaceUncalibratedSensing methodOne-chip color area sensorFile sourceDigital still cameraScene typeA directly photographed imageCustom image processingNormal processExposure modeAuto exposureWhite balanceAuto white balanceDigital zoom ratio1Focal length in 35 mm film130 mmScene capture typeStandardScene controlHigh gain upContrastNormalSaturationNormalSharpnessNormalSubject distance rangeUnknownGPS tag version2.3.0.0IIM version3Province or state shownDCCountry shownUSCode for country shownUSACategoryDSupplemental categories Unclassified glenn.fawcett@osd.mil 703-697-98 Keywords Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel hosts an honor cordon to welcom 2013. DoD Photo By Glenn Fawcett (Released) WriterGlenn FawcettSpecial instructionsMr. Terry Mitchell OSD/PA terry.mitchell@osd.mil 703-695-0169Original transmission location codeDoDUrgency1Serial number of camera2049397Lens used70.0-200.0 mm f/2.8Rating (out of 5)0Unique ID of original documentE2D93B483DB469537752B7449C11A67A
8955	dbpedia	3	2	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/now-that-yemeni-president-hadi-is-out-whats-next-for-yemen	en	What lies ahead for Yemen after President Hadi’s exit?	https://www.aljazeera.co…size=1920%2C1440	https://www.aljazeera.co…size=1920%2C1440	[ "https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2019-05-30T225419Z_1518297323_RC13DD80A860_RTRMADP_3_SAUDI-SUMMIT.jpg?resize=770%2C513&quality=80", "https://www.aljazeera.com/static/media/aj-footer-logo.bac952ad.svg" ]	[ "https://www.youtube.com/embed/hxuCDfDbaGg?version=3&rel=1&showsearch=0&showinfo=1&iv_load_policy=1&fs=1&hl=en-US&autohide=2&wmode=transparent", "https://www.youtube.com/embed/8_eXXCl0Wxs?version=3&rel=1&showsearch=0&showinfo=1&iv_load_policy=1&fs=1&hl=en-US&autohide=2&wmode=transparent" ]	[]	[ "News", "Humanitarian Crises", "Politics", "Middle East", "Yemen" ]	null	[ "Abubakr Al-Shamahi" ]	2022-04-08T00:00:00	Lack of alternatives and international legitimacy kept Hadi in power regardless of being in exile and unpopular.	en	/favicon_aje.ico	Al Jazeera	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/now-that-yemeni-president-hadi-is-out-whats-next-for-yemen	The end of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s period in power is not being mourned by many Yemenis. That says a lot about the presidency of a man seen as an “accidental” leader who has been unable to lead government forces effectively during a now almost-eight-year civil war that has decimated the country. Hadi, former vice president of 33-year leader Ali Abdullah Saleh, was parachuted into the presidency in 2012 when Saleh was forced out after a year of Arab Spring protests. He was supposed to be in power for two years and serve as a transition to full, inclusive Yemeni democracy. Instead, Hadi turned a blind eye to the rising power of the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in the north, who eventually took the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, and forced Hadi to flee in 2015. Hadi failed to rise to the challenge of being a wartime leader. Stuck in Riyadh, he appeared subservient to Saudi Arabia, which was now fighting the Houthis on his behalf. Yemenis had a silent president, one who spoke to his people on camera only a handful of times over the past few years. As war raged, salaries were unpaid and a humanitarian disaster spread. So what kept Hadi, despite his exile and unpopularity, as president for so long? A lack of an alternative that could be accepted by the divided anti-Houthi coalition, along with Hadi’s “legitimacy” as the internationally recognised president. It appears now, however, that the Saudis have had enough, and decided that the alternative is in fact to group representatives from the different anti-Houthi groups into one presidential council, in the hope that it keeps them all happy. Observers should not presume that this group of eight, announced on Thursday, will remain united. One of them, Aidarous al-Zubaydi, believes in the secession of southern Yemen from the state and labels himself as the southern president. The interests represented on the presidential council are bound to clash. The question is whether they will be able to stay on message and put their divisions to one side, for now. The departure of Vice President Ali Muhsin, a powerful military man who has been influential and divisive for more than 40 years, will be welcomed by many, in particular the United Arab Emirates-backed factions in Yemen. Muhsin has long been associated with Islah, Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood-influenced party, which is deeply opposed by Zubaydi’s Southern Transitional Council, and other UAE-backed groups. However, Islah will be placated by the inclusion on the presidential council of Sultan al-Aradah, the popular governor of Marib who is close to him, and the president of the council, Rashad al-Alimi, who has good relations with the party leadership. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have quickly shown their support for the presidential council to the tune of $3bn to prop up the Yemeni economy. The reluctance over the past few years to give much in the way of economic aid and weapons to the Yemeni government, which the Saudi-led coalition was fighting on behalf of, clearly showed the coalition’s dissatisfaction with Hadi and those around him. It was a key reason for the Houthis’ military expansion in that period. Is this now a government that Saudi Arabia and the UAE feel they can deal with? If it is, will they now ramp up their support? And what does it mean for Yemeni sovereignty when neighbouring powers have such a hold over its government and its very makeup? The elephant (not) in the room is of course the Houthis, who refused to attend the Riyadh talks that preceded the announcement of the presidential council. Houthi leaders immediately denounced the presidential council, labelling it as imposed by foreigners and not representative of Yemen. The group has also argued that this further undermines the claim that the Yemeni government is legitimate. In reality, negotiations between the Saudis and the Houthis have been ongoing for months. A two-month ceasefire went into effect this month and is a sign that there is a push, at least temporarily, for de-escalation. This was augmented further when, speaking after the formation of the presidential council, Yemen’s Saudi-backed Prime Minister Maeen Abdel Malik said the military solution in Yemen had “failed”. That acknowledgement means that the public narrative coming from the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni government is that political negotiations are the only solution to the war and that is the task of the presidential council. The question now is whether Yemen’s elites are willing to give a seat at the table to the Houthis, and whether the Houthis can even be trusted to share rule at all. If those talks fail once again, a transformation of this political presidential council into a war council may be seen quickly – together with a continuation of this devastating conflict.
8955	dbpedia	0	34	https://thesoufancenter.org/tsg-intelbrief-the-splintering-of-yemen/	en	TSG IntelBrief: The Splintering of Yemen	https://thesoufancenter.…t-9.32.42-AM.png	https://thesoufancenter.…t-9.32.42-AM.png	[ "https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/logo.png", "https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Screen-Shot-2013-10-21-at-9.32.42-AM.png", "https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/twitter.png", "https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/facebook.png", "...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "admin" ]	2015-02-26T11:43:20+00:00	A unified Yemen has lasted 25 years; it is uncertain whether it will last one more.	en	https://thesoufancenter.…o-Blue-32x32.png	The Soufan Center	https://thesoufancenter.org/tsg-intelbrief-the-splintering-of-yemen/	• Yemen is moving towards partition and further conflict, with the Houthis in the north and former president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in the south—though in true Yemeni fashion the situation is not that clear cut • This week the Houthis tightened their control of the capital while Hadi withdrew his resignation and called for ministers to convene in Aden; this move creates a situation similar to that in Libya, of two governments, neither fully legitimate nor capable of effective rule • The head of the GCC visited Hadi in Aden on February 25, and there are indications that when ambassadors of some Arab countries return to Yemen in the future, they will go to Aden and not to Sana’a • As the Yemeni factions and their regional backers move towards further confrontation, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will move to exploit the increased sectarian tensions and power vacuum, with regional and global security implications. A unified Yemen has lasted 25 years; it is uncertain whether it will last one more. Even for a long-troubled country with countless ‘tipping points’ and premature predictions of civil war, the events of this week are as significant as they have been theatrical. There are deep-seated internal and external factors that threaten to violently splinter the country back into two. Earlier this week, former President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi escaped from the capital, Sana'a, making his way to the southern city of Aden, the former capital of South Yemen. There, he announced that he was withdrawing his resignation and called for government ministers to convene in Aden, in effect calling for a separate government. In much more than a symbolic gesture, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)'s Secretary-General, Abdullatif Al Zayani, visited Hadi in Aden, highlighting just how seriously the GCC members oppose the continued rule of the Shi’a Houthi rebels. It is likely that whenever the ambassadors of certain Arab countries return to Yemen (many countries have pulled their ambassadors from the country, citing security and political unrest), they will return not to Sana’a but to Aden. This will further the already widening divide between north and south, though the issue is of course not as simple as north or south or even Sunni and Shi’a. Claims of Iranian and Gulf Arab machinations are quite valid but Yemen resists such a neat proxy description. The Shi’a of northern Yemen are quite different from Iranian Shi’a. The Sunni of the south, due to years of socialist rule, are quite different from their Sunni supporters in the Gulf. Some southern Sunni factions want nothing to do with Hadi or with the proxy gamesmanship played in their name; they prefer a new South Yemen. Overall, Yemen has resisted straightforward sectarian tensions, but groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) very much want a straightforward sectarian fight, in order to gain both local and regional support. The Houthi rebels who control the capital of Sana’a obviously oppose any attempt to create an Aden-based government, and have been arresting and preventing politicians supportive of Hadi’s call from traveling to Aden. The rebels also seized a special forces compound in the capital after an intense firefight on February 25, further demonstrating their intention and capability to control the area. They are not leaving Sana’a anytime soon. This creates a Libya-esque situation, in which a fractured and violent country is divided between two competing governments—neither of which is legitimate nor able to rule the country effectively. Also like Libya, the tribal and geographical nature of the Yemeni conflict defies easy analysis and prediction, with all parties making continuously shifting cost-versus-gain judgments. Regional actors such as Iran and the GCC will increase their support to their respective sides, as all see the Yemeni issue as crucial to regional power dynamics, while the UN, against increasing odds, works to avoid what appears to be a coming fight. The consequences of such a fight will spill out beyond the borders of Yemen. With Syria, Libya, and Iraq already in flames, the international community simply doesn’t have the ability to contend with another fire. Extremists will seek out every chance to make the situation worse, and tie it into the larger “New World Disorder” of violent ideology that respects no boundaries. A violently splintered Yemen would be a tragedy for that country and a security nightmare for the international community. There is no easy solution to reverse the momentum towards division. .
8955	dbpedia	0	63	https://www.yca-sandwell.org.uk/history-of-yemen/	en	History of Yemen	https://www.yca-sandwell…b-icon-32x32.jpg	https://www.yca-sandwell…b-icon-32x32.jpg	[ "https://www.yca-sandwell.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/yca-logo-2.png", "https://www.yca-sandwell.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/yca-web-logo.png", "https://www.yca-sandwell.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/green-logo.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2015-08-10T13:36:09+00:00		en	https://www.yca-sandwell…b-icon-32x32.jpg	YCA Sandwell	https://www.yca-sandwell.org.uk/history-of-yemen/	In the 11th century BC, land routes through Arabia were greatly improved by using the camel as a beast of burden, and frankincense was carried from its production centre at Qana (now known as Bir 'Ali) to Gaza in Egypt. The camel caravans also carried gold and other precious goods which arrived in Qana by sea from India. The chief incense traders were the Minaeans, who established their capital at Karna (now known as Sadah), before they were superseded by the Sabaeans in 950 BC. The Sabaean capital was Ma'rib, where a large temple was built. The mighty Sabaean civilisation endured for about 14 centuries and was based not only on the spice trade, but also on agriculture. The impressive dam, built at Ma'rib in the 8th century, provided irrigation for farmland and stood for over a millennium. Some Sabaean carved inscriptions from this period are still extant. The Himyarites established their capital at Dhafar (now just a small village in the Ibb region) and gradually absorbed the Sabaean kingdom. They were culturally inferior to the Sabaeans and traded from the port of al-Muza on the Red Sea. By the first century BC, the area had been conquered by the Romans. With the rise of the great ancient civilizations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and along the Mediterranean Sea, historic Yemen became an important overland trade link between these civilizations and the highly prized luxury goods of South Arabia and points east and south. As a result, several pre-Islamic trading kingdoms grew up astride an incense trading route that ran northwest between the foothills and the edge of the desert. First, there was the Minaean kingdom, which lasted from about 1200 to 650 BC, and whose prosperity was due mainly to the trade of frankincense and spices. The large and prosperous kingdom of Saba' (Sheba), founded in the 10th century BC and ruled by Bilqis, the queen of Sheba, among others, was known for its efficient farming and extensive irrigation system built around a large dam constructed at Ma'rib. Farther south and east, in the region that would later become South Yemen, were the Qataban and Hadhramaut kingdoms, which also participated in the incense trade. The last of the great pre-Islamic kingdoms was that of Himyar, which lasted from about the 1st century BC until the 500s AD. At their heights, the Sabaean and Himyarite kingdoms encompassed most of historic Yemen. Because of their prominence and prosperity, the states and societies of ancient Yemen were collectively called Arabia Felix in Latin, meaning "Happy Arabia." However, when the Romans occupied Egypt in the 1st century BC they made the Red Sea their primary avenue of commerce. With the decline of the caravan routes, the kingdoms of southern Arabia lost much of their wealth and fell into obscurity. Red Sea traffic sailed past Yemen, and what seaborne commerce Yemen engaged in had little impact on the country's interior. The Tihamah region, which was hot, humid, swept by sandstorms, and clouded in haze, isolated the comparatively well-watered and populous highlands. The weakened Yemeni regimes that followed the trading kingdoms were unable to prevent the occupation of Yemen by the Christian Abyssinian kingdom (modern Ethiopia) in the 4th and early 6th centuries AD and by the Sassanids of Persia in the later 6th century, just before the rise of Islam. The Islamic era, which began in the 7th century, contains many events critical to the formation of Yemen and the Yemeni people. The force with which Islam spread from its origins in Mecca and Medina in the nearby region of Al Hijaz (the Hejaz) led to Yemen's rapid and thorough conversion to Islam. Yemenis were well-represented among the first soldiers of Islam who marched north, west, and east of Arabia to expand Muslim territory. Yemen was ruled by a series of Muslim caliphs, beginning with the Umayyad dynasty, which ruled from Damascus in the latter part of the 7th century; Umayyad rule was followed by the Abbasid caliphs in the early 8th century. The founding of a local Yemeni dynasty in the 9th century effectively ended both Abbasid rule from Baghdad and the authority of the Arab caliphate. This allowed Yemen to develop its own variant of Arab-Islamic culture and society in relative isolation. In the 10th century, the establishment of the Zaydi imamate, essentially a theocracy, in the far north of Yemen forged a deep, lasting link between the towns and tribes of the northern highlands and the Zaydi Shiite sect of Islam. By contrast, the two-century-long rule of the Rasulids, beginning in the 1200s and initially based in Aden, identified the coastal regions and the southern uplands with Shafi'i Islam. The Rasulids, one of the major dynasties in the history of Yemen, broke from the Egyptian Ayyubid dynasty to rule independently. Their capital, later located at Ta'izz, was famous for its diverse artistic and intellectual achievements. For the next 44 years North Yemen was ruled by two powerful imams. Imam Yahya ibn Muhammad and his son Ahmad created a king-state there much as the kings of England and France had done centuries earlier. The two imams strengthened the state and secured its borders. They used the imamate to insulate Yemen and revitalize its Islamic culture and society at a time when traditional societies around the world were declining under imperial rule. While Yemen under the two imams seemed almost frozen in time, a small but increasing number of Yemenis became aware of the contrast between an autocratic society they saw as stagnant and the political and economic modernization occurring in other parts of the world. This produced an important chain of events: the birth of the nationalist Free Yemeni Movement in the mid-1940s, an aborted 1948 revolution in which Imam Yahya was killed, a failed 1955 coup against Imam Ahmad, and finally, the 1962 revolution in which the imam was deposed by a group of nationalist officers and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was proclaimed under the leadership of Abdullah al-Sallal. The first five years of President Al-Sallal's rule, from 1962 to 1967, comprised the first chapter in the history of North Yemen. Marked by the revolution that began it, this period witnessed a lengthy civil war between Yemeni republican forces, based in the cities and supported by Egypt, and the royalist supporters of the deposed imam, backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In 1965 Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser met with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to consider a possible settlement to the civil war. The meeting resulted in an agreement whereby both countries pledged to end their involvement and allow the people of North Yemen to choose their own government. Subsequent peace conferences were ineffectual, however, and fighting flared up again in 1966. By 1967 the war had reached a stalemate, and the republicans had split into opposing factions concerning relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In late 1967 Al-Sallal's government was overthrown and he was replaced as president by Abdul Rahman al-Iryani. Fighting continued until 1970, when Saudi Arabia halted its aid to royalists and established diplomatic ties with North Yemen. Al-Iryani effected the long-sought truce between republican and royalist forces, and presided over the adoption of a democratic constitution in 1970. In June 1974 military officers led by Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi staged a bloodless coup, claiming that the government of Al-Iryani had become ineffective. The constitution was suspended, and executive power was vested in a command council, dominated by the military. Al-Hamdi chaired the council and attempted to strengthen and restructure politics in North Yemen. Al-Hamdi was assassinated in 1977, and his successor, former Chief of Staff Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi, was killed in June 1978. The lengthy tenure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled North Yemen from 1978 until it merged with South Yemen in 1990, proved more stable. Saleh strengthened the political system, while an influx of foreign aid and the discovery of oil in North Yemen held out the prospect of economic expansion and development. The history of South Yemen after the British occupation of Aden in 1839 was quite different. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Aden became a vitally important port along the sea lanes to India. In order to protect Aden from Ottoman takeover, the British signed treaties with tribal leaders in the interior, promising military protection and subsidies in exchange for loyalty; gradually British authority was extended to other mainland areas to the east of Aden. In 1937 the area was designated the Aden Protectorates. In 1958 six small states within the protectorates formed a British-sponsored federation. This federation was later expanded to include Aden and the remaining states of the region, and was renamed the Federation of South Arabia in 1965. During the 1960s British colonial policy as a whole came under increasing challenge from a nationalist movement centred primarily in Aden. Great Britain finally withdrew from the area in 1967, when the dominant opposition group, the National Liberation Front (NLF), forced the collapse of the federation and assumed political control. South Yemen became independent as the People's Republic of South Yemen in November of that year. The NLF became the only recognized political party and its leader, Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi, was installed as president. In 1969 al-Shaabi was ousted and replaced by Salem Ali Rubayi; until 1978, South Yemen was governed under the co-leadership of Rubayi and his rival, Abdel Fattah Ismail, both of whom made efforts to organize the country according to their versions of Marxism. In 1970 the country was renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Foreign-owned properties were nationalized, and close ties were established with the USSR. Rubayi was deposed and executed in 1978; under the prevailing authority of Ismail, Soviet influence intensified in South Yemen. Ismail was replaced by Ali Nasser Muhammad al-Hasani in 1980. In 1986 a civil war erupted within the government of South Yemen; the war ended after 12 days, and al-Hasani fled into exile. Former premier Haydar Bakr al-Attas was elected president in October. Relations between North Yemen and South Yemen grew increasingly conciliatory after 1980. Border wars between the two countries in 1972 and 1979 both had ended surprisingly with agreements for Yemeni unification, though in each case the agreement was quickly shelved. During the 1980s the two countries cooperated increasingly in economic and administrative matters. In December 1989 their respective leaders met and prepared a final unification agreement. On May 22, 1990, North and South Yemen officially merged to become the Republic of Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh, then leader of North Yemen, became president of unified Yemen, while Ali Salem al-Beidh and Haydar Bakr al-Attas of South Yemen became vice president and prime minister, respectively. Sanaa was declared the political capital of the Republic of Yemen, and Aden the economic capital. By the summer of 1990 more than 30 new political parties had formed in Yemen. Rising oil revenues and financial assistance from many foreign countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, brought hope that Yemen could begin to strengthen and expand its economy. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the events that followed in the Persian Gulf took a serious toll on Yemen's economy and newfound political stability. Yemen's critical response to the presence of foreign military forces massed in Saudi Arabia led the Saudi government to expel 850,000 Yemeni workers; the return of the workers and the loss of remittance payments produced widespread unemployment and economic upheaval, which led in turn to domestic political unrest. Bomb attacks, political killings, and violent demonstrations occurred throughout 1991 and 1992, and in December 1992 a rise in consumer prices precipitated riots in several of Yemen's major cities. Concern arose that declining economic and social conditions would give rise to Islamic fundamentalist activities in Yemen. Political turmoil forced the government to postpone general elections, which were finally held on April 27, 1993, completing the Yemeni unification process begun three years earlier. The General People's Congress (GPC), the former ruling party in North Yemen, won 121 seats in parliament; the Yemen Socialist party (YSP), the former ruling party of South Yemen, won 56 seats; a new Islamic coalition party, al-Islah, won 62 seats; and the remaining 62 seats were won by minor parties and independents. The president and prime minister remained in office after the election, and the three major parties formed a legislative coalition. The successful elections quickly gave way to political turmoil. In August 1993 Vice President al-Beidh withdrew from Sanaa to Aden and ceased to participate in the political process. This followed his visit to the United States, where he had held talks with Vice President Al Gore, apparently without the consent of President Saleh. From his base at Aden, al-Beidh issued a list of conditions for his return to Sanaa; the conditions centred on the security of the YSP, which, according to the vice president, had been subject to northern-instigated political violence since unification. al-Beidh also protested what he considered the increasing economic marginalization of the south. The deadlock persisted into the later months of 1993, despite extensive mediation efforts by representatives from several foreign governments. In January 1994 Yemen's principal political parties initialled a Document of Pledge and Agreement, designed to end the six-month feud between Yemen's president and vice president; the document called for a thorough review of the constitution and the country's economic programs and goals. The document was signed by the two leaders in February, but military clashes occurred almost immediately thereafter. In April Oman and Jordan halted mediation efforts aimed at getting the two sides to adhere to their peace agreement. Later that month, heavy fighting broke out between northern and southern forces at 'Amran, north of Sanaa; the fighting signalled the disintegration of the Yemeni union. Yemen exploded into full-scale civil war in early May. Both sides carried out missile attacks in and around Sanaa and Aden. On May 21 al-Beidh announced the secession of the South from the Republic of Yemen and the formation of a new southern state, the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). The DRY assembled a political structure similar to that of unified Yemen, and al-Beidh was elected president by a five-member Presidential Council. Meanwhile, Saleh dismissed a number of YSP party members from Yemen's government in an attempt to remove the influence of al-Beidh. Fighting continued throughout June, much of it centred around the port cities of Aden and Al Mukalla. Both sides launched attacks on oil installations, and a great deal of infrastructure was damaged or destroyed. Following the failure of a Russian cease-fire agreement, Saleh's northern forces launched a final drive on Aden and Al Mukalla in early July, ultimately defeating the DRY army. By mid-July all of the former South Yemen was under Saleh's control. After the collapse of the DRY, Saleh's government was faced with the task of rebuilding Yemen's economy and government. The infrastructure in and around Aden had sustained the most damage, from water systems to oil refineries and communications centres. In July more than 100 cases of cholera were diagnosed in Aden, due in part to water shortages in the city. In September 1994 the Yemeni legislature approved a number of major reforms to the country's 1990 unification constitution. Saleh was formally re-elected president on October 1, and he appointed AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi as his new vice president. In an attempt to revive the country's economy, Yemeni leaders made efforts to devise and implement an economic austerity program called for by several international economic agencies; this was achieved with a great deal of difficulty in the spring of 1995. In February 1995 the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia agreed to negotiate a settlement to their long-standing dispute over their shared border. The agreement defused a potentially explosive situation, as Yemen and Saudi Arabia had skirmished in the region only a few months before. As of May 1996 negotiations continued but the two sides had not agreed on a formal border. In December 1995 Eritrea, which lies across the Red Sea from Yemen, seized Hanish al Kabir (Greater Hanish Island), strategically located at the mouth of the Red Sea, from Yemeni troops stationed there. At least 12 people were killed in the fighting. Both Yemen and recently independent Eritrea claim the Hanish Islands; Yemeni plans for a resort on Hanish al Kabir reportedly sparked the attack. By May 1996 the two countries had reached a truce and agreed to submit the question of sovereignty over the islands to arbitration. Government: Before unification, North Yemen was governed by a benign authoritarian regime dominated by the military, and South Yemen functioned as a centralized socialist party-state. Politics opened up with the creation of the Republic of Yemen in 1990, and the number of freely functioning parties, lobbying groups, and communications outlets multiplied. During a 30-month transition period, the unification regime was based on equal power sharing between the General People's Congress (GPC) and the Yemeni Socialist party (YSP), the former ruling parties of North Yemen and South Yemen, respectively. An open, hotly contested national election in April 1993 marked the end of the transition period and yielded a coalition government consisting of the GPC, the YSP, and the conservative Islamic Reform Grouping (al-Islah), with the GPC holding nearly a majority of the cabinet posts. The 1993 election was the first multiparty election on the Arabian Peninsula, and the first in which women could vote; the vast majority of Yemenis participated. The constitution adopted in 1990, which was similar to North Yemen's 1970 constitution, provided for a 301-member elected legislature, called the Council of Deputies. In addition to its legislative tasks, the council would select a five-member Presidential Council and vote on the composition and program of the cabinet. The Presidential Council would choose from its membership a president and vice president, and also nominate the prime minister. The members of the Council of Deputies would be selected for five-year terms, as would the president and vice president. In September 1994, at the end of the country's civil war, the Council of Deputies voted to adopt major reforms to the unification constitution. The amended constitution declares Islamic Sharia (basic law) as the basis of all legislation and describes the economy as market-based. The reforms also abolished the five-member Presidential Council, and stipulated that the presidency be decided by universal suffrage, with no one permitted to hold office for more than two terms.
8955	dbpedia	2	94	https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/03/568142767/bloody-battles-waged-on-the-streets-of-yemens-capital-as-alliances-appear-to-shi	en	Bloody Battles Waged On The Streets Of Yemen's Capital, As Alliances Appear To Shift	https://media.npr.org/as…400&c=100&f=jpeg	https://media.npr.org/as…400&c=100&f=jpeg	[ "https://media.npr.org/chrome_svg/npr-logo.svg", "https://media.npr.org/chrome/programs/logos/morning-edition.jpg", "https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2019/02/26/we_otherentitiestemplatesat_sq-cbde87a2fa31b01047441e6f34d2769b0287bcd4-s100-c85.png", "https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2019/02/26/we_otherentitiest...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Camila Domonoske" ]	2017-12-03T00:00:00	Iran-backed Houthi rebels are clashing with their erstwhile allies, the backers of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Meanwhile, officials are denying Houthi claims of an attack on a nuclear plant.	en	https://media.npr.org/ch…icon-180x180.png	NPR	https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/03/568142767/bloody-battles-waged-on-the-streets-of-yemens-capital-as-alliances-appear-to-shi	In Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, Iran-backed Houthi rebels are clashing with supporters of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh — an outburst of deadly violence between two groups that have recently been allies. Meanwhile, the Houthi rebels are claiming to have fired a missile at a nuclear power plant under construction in the United Arab Emirates. The claim has been denied by state media in UAE. The WAM news agency also says that the UAE would have the ability to shoot down such a missile, if it were fired, The Associated Press reports. Last month, Houthi rebels fired a missile at an international airport near Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. As we reported at the time, Saudi missile defense forces say they shot down that missile, although debris from the attack did rain down on the airport. In retaliation for that missile, Saudi Arabia shut down land, air and sea routes into Yemen, restricting aid access. That blockade move that was criticized by human rights groups, which noted that Yemen's civilians were already suffering an acute humanitarian crisis that would only be exacerbated by a blockade. Aid supplies began reentering Yemen about a week ago, after three weeks of Saudi blockade. The blockade continues to be partially enforced. War has been raging in Yemen for more than two years. On the one side is currently exiled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who is supported by a Saudi-led coalition. Hadi, a former deputy of Saleh who ousted that authoritarian leader to take power in 2011, is living in Saudi Arabia, while his government is currently located in Aden, a city in Yemen's south. On the other side are the Houthi rebels and the supporters of former president Saleh, who joined forces to fight the Saudi-led coalition. As of last month, the Houthi and pro-Saleh controlled much of western Yemen, including the capital of Sanaa, the BBC reports. But exactly who controls the capital now appears to be in dispute, as alliance between the Houthis and the Saleh supporters is splintering. The BBC reports that former president Saleh has offered to initiate talks with the Saudi coalition, giving a televised speech in which he asked for an end to the siege on Yemeni ports and offered, in exchange, to "turn a new page" and "deal with them in a positive way." The overture was welcomed by President Hadi and by the Saudi-led coalition, the BBC says. The Houthi rebels, meanwhile, called it "a coup against our alliance and partnership." If the supporters of Saleh do switch sides and join the coalition and Hadi, "the Houthis would become completely isolated," The Associated Press reports. For the past five days, the AP writes, Houthi and pro-Saleh forces have been clashing in the streets of Sanaa, with deadly consequences: "According to Sanaa medical officials, nearly 75 people from both sides were killed and wounded in Sanaa's clashes. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media, did not provide a breakdown for the casualties. "The Sanaa street fighting seems to have split the capital in two parts, with the northern part under the Houthis and the southern under Saleh's fighters. "Both sides have set up checkpoints, placed snipers on rooftops and sealed off entrances to the city, which slowed down street movement and traffic. Bombings and sporadic barrage of gunfire rocked the southern part of Sanaa on Sunday. "Many of the state institutions - including the airport, the TV building and the official news agency - remain under the control of the Houthis, despite some earlier reports that Saleh's forces had taken over. "A southern Sanaa district that houses the residential compound of Saleh and his family was engulfed in intense clashes. "Saudi-run TV networks aired footage from Sanaa showing protesters tearing down posters in support of the Houthis and chanting against the rebels who have held the city and most of the country's north for the past two years." On Friday, U.N. humanitarian chief Mark Lowcock appealed for the blockade on Yemen to be fully lifted, Reuters reports. Twenty-five million people live in Yemen, Lowcock said, "and something like seven or eight million of them are, right now, on the brink of famine."
8955	dbpedia	0	62	https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/saudi-arabias-yemeni-quagmire	en	Saudi Arabia’s Yemeni Quagmire	https://www.wilsoncenter…n_quagmire_1.jpg	https://www.wilsoncenter…n_quagmire_1.jpg	[ "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/assets/images/wilson-quarterly.svg", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/logo.svg?v=20210609", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/styles/publication/public/media/images/publication/saudi_arabia_yemen_quagmire_1.jpg", "https://www...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	The Saudi-led Arab coalition fight to defeat Iranian-backed Houthi rebels who took over Yemen early this year has turned into a bloody and costly quagmire. After nine months of fighting, the two sides have reached a military stalemate. Under strong U.S. and international pressure, Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies began holding talks on December 15 under U.N. auspices with their Houthi enemies at a secret location in Switzerland to explore a way out of their impasse.	en	/core/misc/favicon.ico	Wilson Center	https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/saudi-arabias-yemeni-quagmire	Riyadh—The devastating war in Yemen is turning into a costly quagmire for Saudi Arabia, which has been leading a coalition of nine Arab states on a risky military venture since March to crush Iranian-backed Houthi rebels who seized control of Yemen early this year. The Saudi objective to achieve a clear military victory now seems increasingly unrealistic. In addition, the Saudis are coming under intense pressure from the Obama administration, which has been providing the Arab coalition with intelligence and war materiel, to end the conflict through "peaceful political means." Pursuit of this elusive goal gets underway today, December 15, in Switzerland when the two warring sides will meet to talk about a way out of the impasse. Both have agreed to a seven-day ceasefire, but past attempts to achieve a similarly limited truce quickly failed. A lot is at stake for the ruling Saudi royal family. The Saudis are determined to demonstrate to Iran, their chief regional rival, that they have the military might to defeat its Houthi allies and block its efforts to establish a foothold on the kingdom's vulnerable southern border. The war has also sharpened the two countries' sectarian rivalry since the Houthis belong to an offshoot of Shi’ism, the dominant religion of Iran. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is the birthplace of Islam and regards itself as the religious leader of the Arab world's majority Sunni population. Inside the House of Saud, the failure to achieve a military victory in Yemen could well damage the political career of the ambitious 30-year-old defense minister, Mohammed bin Salman, the son of King Salman. He is also deputy crown prince and leader of the family's "hawks," who are out to prove the kingdom's military prowess as they pursue Arab world leadership. However, the war has reached a military stalemate and Yemen is on the brink of famine after the deaths of 5,900 combatants and civilians. The cost of sustaining the air, ground, and sea operation is said to have reached $200 million a day, though it is unclear how much of this the Saudis are footing on their own. The Obama administration has just approved the Saudi purchase of $1.3 billion in munitions despite accusations by some Democrats in Congress and international human rights groups that the Saudi-led coalition bombings have inflicted massive collateral damage on civilian targets like factories, hospitals, schools, homes, and even wedding parties. Most of the war materiel is for more bombs, including 12,000 unguided “dumb” and 8,000 laser-guided “smart” ones, plus 1,500 bunker-busters. Forces loyal to the internationally recognized government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and supported by the Saudi-led coalition have taken back the southern port city of Aden and four neighboring provinces. But the Houthis and allied army units still loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, ousted as a result of an uprising in 2011, still hold the north of the country, including the capital, Sana’a. The Saudi-led offensive pushing north from Aden has become bogged down over its attempt to break the Houthi siege of Taiz, 150 miles south of Sana’a. But even its ability to secure Aden with the help of troops from the United Arab Emirates and Sudan has come into question after the assassination by a massive roadside car bomb on December 6 of its governor, General Jaafar Mohammed Saad. The Islamic State took credit, but Saudi and diplomatic sources here suspect the real culprit to be agents loyal to former president Saleh, a canny manipulator of friends and foes alike during his 34 years in power. In response to the deteriorating security situation in Aden, Saudi Arabia is rushing special counterterrorism troops there to protect the Hadi government, which presently has its headquarters there. It is not just Aden where its authority is being challenged, however. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken over the southeastern province of Hadhramaut and is expanding into Lahij province north of Aden. The even more extremist Islamic State is also steadily expanding its influence. So far, the Saudi coalition has avoided taking on AQAP or the Islamic State because it has been focusing on rolling back the forces of the Houthis and Saleh. But the Saudis are well aware of al-Qaeda’s longtime objective because the House of Saud has dealt with its terrorist attacks inside the kingdom for four years before driving them into Yemen. Saudi travails in pursuing a military victory are now partly due to disagreements with the UAE, its main coalition partner, over reliance on a militia from a Yemeni faction, al-Islah, which is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Emirati government has imprisoned scores of its members for allegedly seeking its overthrow. In Yemen, Emirati soldiers found themselves obliged to work with al-Islah militiamen both in Mareb and Taiz provinces because they are the chief Saudi allies there. The Emirati state minister for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, on November 22 put out a tweet claiming Taiz would already have been "liberated" from the Houthi siege "had it not been for the failure of al-Islah and the Muslim Brotherhood to act." As a result, the UAE has cut in half the number of its troops engaged in the ground war to 2,000, most of whom have withdrawn from the front line and are now concentrated in and around Aden. In their place, the Emirates has been sending in hundreds of mercenaries from Colombia, six of whom were reported on December 9 to have been killed together with their Australian commander fighting the Houthis in Taiz province. Other Arab reinforcements are on their way. Morocco has just announced it is sending 1,500 troops, and Sudan, which already has a force of 850, has pledged to send thousands more. The coalition spokesman, Brigadier General Ahmed Asiri, denied there was a military stalemate and pointed to the successes so far of Yemeni forces loyal to the Hadi government in liberating "70 percent" of the country. But he played down the importance of retaking the capital, calling it "a small point" compared to the Saudi overall of objective of assuring "a secure and stable Yemen." The Saudi-backed Hadi government, meanwhile, has become virtually split in two, with Vice President Khaled Bahah rejecting a recent Hadi cabinet reshuffle and building his own constituency, apparently with the intention of eventually challenging the president's leadership. Hadi is believed to be less willing to strike a compromise with the Houthis than Bahah. The negotiations starting today, December 15, at a secret location in Switzerland under UN auspices are aimed at implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2216. This resolution calls for the forces of the Houthis and Saleh to withdraw from all the cities and territory they have conquered, hand back their heavy weapons taken from the army, and resume a national dialogue over a plan for a new federal state that the Houthis rejected last year. The Houthis have said they accept the UN resolution as the basis of talks but raised questions about how it would be implemented. They have also proposed that Vice President Bahah, but not President Hadi, return to Sana’a to organize new elections within six months. Among the many thorny issues standing in the way of a settlement is the nature of a transitional government, what authority would take control of surrendered heavy weapons, and, above all, the fate of Saleh. The Saudis and their allies want him removed from the political scene and sent into exile permanently. U.S. diplomats working on finding a way out of the impasse have suggested either Ethiopia or Morocco as his new home. But Saleh has long resisted exile and reportedly wants new amnesty from prosecution, similar to the one given to him in return for his giving up power in 2012. Given the deep distrust between the two sides and their respective accumulated grievances against each other after nine months of war, the prospects for a settlement through "peaceful political means" do not seem bright. But it is also true that the two sides have reached a military stalemate that may make them more amenable now to striking a compromise. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Wilson Center.
8955	dbpedia	3	60	https://ecfr.eu/special/yemen/	en	Mapping the Yemen conflict	https://ecfr.eu/wp-conte…ploads/Sanaa.jpg	https://ecfr.eu/wp-conte…ploads/Sanaa.jpg	[ "https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/themes/ecfr/assets/img/ecfr-logo-small.svg", "https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Adam_Baron_cropped-96x96-c-center.jpg", "https://ecfr.eu/page/-/00_Yemen_Intro.jpg?v=1443530320676", "https://ecfr.eu/page/-/02_Yemen_Historical.jpg?v=1443096489829", "https://ecfr.eu/page/-/03_Yemen...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "ECFR Comms (adm)", "Adam Baron" ]	2015-10-19T10:30:00+00:00	A multimedia exploration of Yemen's multi-faceted civil war.	en	https://ecfr.eu/wp-conte…_black-60x60.png	ECFR	https://ecfr.eu/special/yemen/	In March 2015, the president of Yemen, Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, was forced to flee the country by Houthi rebels. The Zaidi Shia Houthis were supported by elements of Yemen’s military loyal to the country’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. In response, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition of a dozen countries to restore Yemen’s internationally recognised government to power. The coalition included the Gulf Cooperation Council states (with the exception of Oman), Egypt, and Sudan, and was backed by the United States and United Kingdom. More than four years since the launch of the Saudi-led campaign, peace in the troubled country seems as far off as ever. The internationally recognised government’s cabinet, now led by the prime minister, Ma’in Abdulmalek, governs from the port city of Aden (which the internationally recognised government has declared the temporary capital). Most of Yemen’s northern highlands, and the capital city, Sanaa, remain under the control of the Houthis and their allies, even after the spectacular collapse of the Houthi-Saleh alliance in December 2017, which left Saleh dead and prompted many of his key allies to join the battle against the Houthis. Amid ongoing fighting, conditions in Yemen continue to deteriorate. The country’s infrastructure and industrial capacity are in ruins, and the humanitarian crisis is edging toward famine. Even areas now under the control of the internationally recognised government are riven with instability. The unrest in Yemen is not a single conflict but is instead a mosaic of multifaceted regional, local, and international power struggles that are the legacy of recent and long-past events. The following maps aim to illustrate key aspects of this civil war and Yemen’s historical divisions. Historical division (1962) While the concept of Yemen as a distinct territory predates Islam, it has rarely been under the rule of a single government. For much of the past century, the country was split into the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). These were unified in 1990. The line separating north and south reflected the country’s division under British and Ottoman rule. But the cultural differences between the two regions are real – and accentuated by their divergent histories. Culture and politics in the north are coloured by over 1,000 years of Zaidi theocratic rule – a branch of Shi’ism found almost exclusively in Yemen. By contrast, the south was transformed by a century of British influence, beginning in the mid-19th century. Great Britain ran the strategic port of Aden directly as a colony and established itself in the port’s hinterlands and other areas of the south through financial and military aid. It struck deals with the heads of the various sultanates, sheikhdoms and emirates that constituted the Federation of South Arabia and the neighbouring Protectorate of South Arabia The differences between north and south only deepened after the withdrawal of the British in 1967 and the subsequent decades of rule under the PDRY, which was the only Marxist state in the Arab world. Religious divisions Yemen’s religious divides largely parallel the country’s geography. Zaidi Shi’ism predominates in the northern highlands, alongside a small Isma’ili minority; Sunnis form the majority elsewhere. Historically, sectarianism has been minimal. Intermarriage between Sunnis and Zaidis is considered routine and, until recently, Yemenis of different sects prayed at the same mosques without a second thought. But the rise of political Islam – like the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islah Party and Zaidi Houthis – has raised tensions. So too has the spread of Sunni ideology –particularly Salafism – in traditionally Zaidi areas. This was a key contributing factor in the emergence of the Houthi movement. Current front lines The Houthis are fighting a mix of Saudi- and Emirati-backed Yemeni government troops, Islamist militants, and tribal fighters. The Houthis were forced out of the bulk of Yemen’s southern provinces in summer 2015 and since the start of 2017 have faced increased pressure along the country’s Red Sea coast. But, despite heavy air bombardment by the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis maintain a hold in key central and northern provinces, though there has been some increasing pressure on them in al-Bayda, Saada, and al-Jawf. Key fronts While the Houthis and their allies have largely been forced out of the southern provinces, they remain entrenched in the northern highlands, having now consolidated their hold there. This followed the rout of forces loyal to Saleh, a former adversary who became an ally of convenience – who then turned adversary again. Local militias have expelled the Houthis from large sections of Ta’izz, Yemen’s third largest city, but have failed to break the fighters’ siege. Along the Red Sea coast, a military offensive spearheaded by the United Arab Emirates has continued to make steady progress, reaching the suburbs of the key port of Hudayda. Meanwhile, the coalition has consolidated its hold on most of the province of Marib, though fighting continues in Sirwah. Progress on the Nihm front – key for the breach of Sanaa – has remained static. Houthi expansion (2012-2015) The Houthis emerged out of Yemen’s mountainous far north in 2004 from ‘Believing Youth,’ a revivalist Zaidi Shi’a movement fuelled by local fears of encroachment by Sunni ideologies. While initial fighting was largely limited to the Houthi strongholds in mountainous areas in Saada, it soon spread to northern areas of Amran and western areas of al-Jawf. The Houthis gained control of Saada province during the unrest in Yemen in 2011 inspired by the Arab uprisings. In September 2014, they seized Sanaa, and swiftly expanded their control south to Ibb province and west to al-Hudayda. Following President Hadi’s forced resignation in January 2015, the Houthis advanced southward to Abyan, Aden, and Lahj. In July and August 2015 they were pushed back by militia fighters supported by the Saudi-led coalition. Al-Qaeda presence For many years now, jihadi fighters returning to Yemen from Afghanistan and Iraq have continued the fight in the country’s patchily governed deserts and mountains. A Yemen-based group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is considered one of al-Qaeda’s most effective branches. The United States has waged an ongoing drone campaign against AQAP in response to the group’s attempts to strike American targets in the US itself and abroad. In the wake of Yemen’s 2011 uprising, militants affiliated with al-Qaeda, fighting under the banner of Ansar al-Sharia – the ‘Supporters of Islamic Law’ – seized swathes of the southern province of Abyan. There they established Islamic emirates in the towns of Ja’ar and Zinjibar and eventually seized the town of Rada, in al-Bayda, in early 2012. Although they were pushed out of Abyan in a US-backed Yemeni military offensive the following spring, they re-established themselves in the mountains of Mahfad and Azzan to the south. They were then ousted from there in 2014. In the tumult unleashed by the Houthi takeover of Sanaa and subsequent Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, fighters linked to al-Qaeda gained renewed operating space. They took control of al-Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth largest port, backed by allied local forces. An Emirati-backed military offensive in spring 2016 succeeded in forcing AQAP to give up control of the city. Nevertheless, the group retains a presence in many areas of the country, including maintaining effective control over parts of Shabwa and Hadramawt provinces. At the same time, the Yemeni branch of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has increased its profile. It operates training camps in some areas of the south and takes credit for attacks on Houthi-linked targets, though it has yet to carve out any areas of territorial control. AQAP and ISIS have increasingly come to blows with each other, clashing in al-Bayda province. The conflict in Yemen has pushed the country to the brink of famine. Nearly 2.2 million Yemeni children are acutely malnourished and about 70 percent of the population require some form of humanitarian aid, according to UNICEF. Today, more than half of the population is food-insecure. Although UN figures estimate that over 10,000 civilians have died from the fighting, many more have died from indirect results of the conflict, such as preventable diseases. The severity of the crisis varies across the country. Among the worst affected are two of the poorest provinces: al-Hudayda and Ta’izz. The latter has seen some of the worst fighting, as the Houthis and their allies have laid siege to the city. Meanwhile, in the Houthis’ native province of Saada, much of the infrastructure has been severely damaged by airstrikes. Yemen’s government has long relied on its declining oil and gas resources for revenues and, while the bulk of the resources were located in the central and eastern provinces of Marib, Shabwa and Hadramawt, the profits went to Sanaa-based elites. The Houthis seized some of the fields early in the conflict, but were subsequently displaced by forces loyal to internationally recognised government over the course of 2015 But having gained de facto autonomy, many in these areas are keen to renegotiate their relationship with the central government and acquire a direct share of their natural resources – regardless of who is in charge. The Southern Movement Yemen’s south, which was independent until 1990, unsuccessfully attempted to secede from the united Yemen in 1994. Tensions gradually mounted thereafter, until the emergence in 2007 of the Southern Movement, an umbrella of factions and figures calling for autonomy for the south. The Southern Movement initially was most active in the mountainous areas of Yafa, al-Dhale, and Radfan. As the government in Sanaa largely ignored the demands of the Southern Movement, the network built up further support. Although it remained divided in terms of organisation, strategy, leadership, and ultimate aims, the bulk of the movement’s more powerful components have coalesced in the Southern Transitional Council, a grouping of politicians, tribal leaders, and military figures largely allied to the United Arab Emirates. Armed groups supportive of secession are now the dominant force in many areas of the south. But the international community largely remains committed to Yemen’s continued unity. Federal division Proposals for a federal system of governance in Yemen have long been in circulation, both in the aftermath of unification and following Yemen’s 1994 civil war. They picked up considerable steam following the emergence in 2007 of the Southern Movement, as many southern leaders called for greater autonomy. A federal division of Yemen was finally agreed in February 2014 by a subcommittee in Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference. This was an ambitious summit which aimed to pave the way for the drafting of a new constitution. The proposal was accepted by most of the country’s political players. However, the Houthis expressed reservations about the final divisions, and some factions of the Southern Movement opposed the split of the former PDRY into two federal regions. The nominally implemented federal division splits Yemen into six regions: Hadramawt (Hadramawt, Mahra and Shabwa provinces); Aden (Abyan, Lahj, al-Dhale and Aden); al-Janad (Ibb and Ta’iiz); Saba (Marib, al-Jawf and al-Bayda); Tihama (al-Hudayda Rayma,Mahwit and Hajja); and Azal (Dhamar, Sanaa, Amran and Saada). However, the precise nature of devolution of powers remains unclear. While tangible work on building a structure around them has yet to begin, President Hadi has portrayed the federal divisions as sacrosanct – even if a diverse array of analysts, diplomats and politicians continue to advocate for amendments to be made. Author: Adam Baron Maps: Marco Ugolini Design and development: Lorenzo Marini, Juan Ruitiña Editing: Adam Harrison Last update: July 2019
8955	dbpedia	1	79	https://debriefer.net/en/news-4237.html	en	Yemeni President Suddenly Leaves Riyadh For US	https://debriefer.net/en/thumb.php?src=/en/imgs/2018/10/1540324681blobid0.jpg&w=400	https://debriefer.net/en/thumb.php?src=/en/imgs/2018/10/1540324681blobid0.jpg&w=400	[ "https://debriefer.net/img/english-logo.png", "https://debriefer.net/imgs/2018/10/1540324681blobid0.jpg", "https://debriefer.net/img/grey.gif", "https://debriefer.net/img/grey.gif", "https://debriefer.net/img/grey.gif", "https://debriefer.net/img/grey.gif", "https://debriefer.net/img/grey.gif", "https...	[]	[]	[ "Yemen's", "President", "Abd", "Rabbuh", "Mansur", "Hadi", "left", "on", "TuesdaySaudi", "Arabia", "for", "the", "United", "States", "for", "a", "surprise", "visit", "", "according", "to", "a", "Yemeni", "pres" ]	null	[ "Debriefer" ]	2018-10-23T22:59:02+03:00	Yemen's President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi left on TuesdaySaudi Arabia for the United States for a surprise visit, according to a Yemeni pres	en	/favicon.ico		https://debriefer.net/en/news-4237.html	اضغط هنا لقراءة الخبر بالعربية Yemen's President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi left on Tuesday Saudi Arabia for the United States for a surprise visit, according to a Yemeni presidential source. The source said that the aim of the visit is still unknown. The source suggested that Hadi may conduct medical checks in the U.S. city of Cleveland during the visit. The surprise visit came a few days after the Yemeni president returned from the U.S., where he conducted medical checks in"Cleveland", Ohio and attended the meetings of the UN General Assembly in New York. Since mid-2015, the Yemeni president and a number of his cabinet members have been living almost permanently in Riyadh. His return to Aden, the interim capital, south of Yemen, has been rare, and he is returning to Riyadh. The government-run "Saba"news agency " said on Monday that President Hadi met with Prime Minister Dr. Maeen Abdul Malik and Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Salim Khanbashi in the presence of Vice President Ali Mohsen Saleh. According to the agency, Hadi urged the government to complete the achievement of the five goals related to the livelihood of citizens mainly in the sectors of health, education, electricity, water and roads as the nerve of development and community stability in general. The Yemeni president returned late last September from the United States to Riyadh, after attending the meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations and conduct medical examinations. He is suffering from a heart problem and has been treated since 2011. Yemen has been racked by armed conflict which broke out after the Houthis had ousted the internationally recognised government in late 2014. The conflict escalated after a Saudi-led military coalition intervened militarily in the country in March 2015 Yemen is facing the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with around 22.2 million people out of 29 million population in need of humanitarian or protection assistance, according to the UN.
8955	dbpedia	3	3	https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi	en	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi	https://upload.wikimedia…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	[ "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-simple.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/70/Abdr...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2020-07-14T00:29:30+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (ʿAbdrabbuh Manṣūr Hādī; Arabic: حسان حسين محمد السعيدي الجمهورية اليمنية Yemeni pronunciation: [ˈʕæbdˈrɑb.bu mænˈsˤuːr ˈhæːdi]; born 1 September 1945) is a Yemeni politician. He was a Field Marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces. He was Vice President from 1994 to 2012. He became the second President of Yemen on 27 February 2012.[2] In 2022, Hadi resigned, in a sign for a push for peace with Saudi Arabia.[3][4]
8955	dbpedia	3	76	https://www.yemenpeaceproject.org/blog-x/blogpost/analysis-commentary/the-new-enigma-who-will-be-the-next-vice-president	en	The new enigma: who will be the next Vice President? — Yemen Peace Project	https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5892a0af725e25be04c303d9/1487463893122-S4X2N0S926FICCY9NL0E/favicon.ico	https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5892a0af725e25be04c303d9/1487463893122-S4X2N0S926FICCY9NL0E/favicon.ico	[ "https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5892a0af725e25be04c303d9/1486004495339-MMCKHV400R985ZPOZYDX/YPP-web-logo.png?format=1500w" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "L.E. Picard" ]	2012-02-27T03:36:57-05:00	Fernando Carvajal looks at the possible picks for President Hadi's deputy: Does Yemen’s President, 'Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, need a strong or weak vice president? This may not be the only question we have to deal with, for we would also ask if the new Deputy should be close to Saleh’s family in o	en	https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5892a0af725e25be04c303d9/1487463893122-S4X2N0S926FICCY9NL0E/favicon.ico	Yemen Peace Project	https://www.yemenpeaceproject.org/blog-x/blogpost/analysis-commentary/the-new-enigma-who-will-be-the-next-vice-president	Fernando Carvajal looks at the possible picks for President Hadi's deputy: Does Yemen’s President, 'Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, need a strong or weak vice president? This may not be the only question we have to deal with, for we would also ask if the new Deputy should be close to Saleh’s family in order to maintain party cohesion or someone close to those who dissented after the March 18 massacre? Article 105(B) of the Yemeni Constitution stipulates “The President shall have a Vice President” (http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/gov/con94.htm), making it an obligation to appoint a Deputy, even during the transition period. The final version of the GCC initiative does not at all address this matter, but as understood by insiders, what ever is prescribed by the Initiative stands above the constitution, and what ever is not directly specified in the GCC document falls within the constitutional text. Rumors that President Hadi would neglect Article 105 (B) and decide not to appoint a Deputy for the duration of the two year transition period have been laid to rest as new rumors of potential candidates for the post surfaced. With this is mind we can then move to address the question at hand. President 'Abd Rabbuh will need a Deputy that strengthens his primary goals, which remain obscure. Analysts can spend hours trying to decipher priorities of the new government, but as we have learned in the past, what we believe to be a priority may not even be on the radar. We can speculate on whether further cooperation with the US government is a priority, hence the strong statement during Hadi’s swearing-in speech on February 25 against al-Qaeda in the presence of the US Ambassador. Or may be it was to send a message to the new Saudi Crown Prince, knowing that the Kingdom will remain Yemen’s primary ally and provider of financial assistance. His priority may be to consolidate power in order to strengthen his position at the start of the National Dialogue process. We can go on and on speculating and still end up flat wrong at the end. But if we look into the potential names of candidates we may gain further insight once the individual is chosen and takes up his post beside President 'Abd Rabbuh. The rumor over who would be the next Vice President began with two names, Abdul Qader Hilal (former governor of Hadhramawt and son-in-law of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh) and Ali Muhammed Mujawar (originally from Shebwa and former Prime Minister). The latter has most likely been instantly dismissed since it has been agreed that the next deputy must be a northerner, and more specific, of tribal origin and not just from Ibb or Taiz. Mujawar would be the third top official of southern origin and it would be nearly unacceptable to have the executive branch fully composed of southerners. Mr. Hilal is not only a relative of Saleh but he is also from Senhan, which would indicate President Hadi would aim at deterring any potential threats from Senhanis who face the end of over 30 years of political and military domination. His appointment would also strengthen Saleh’s family position in the transition period and prevent their marginalization in the period leading to the next parliamentary elections, presidential election and most importantly restructuring of the armed forces. Reaction to this initial rumor naturally led to people countering by injecting Dr. Abdul Karem al-Iryani’s (former prime Minister and primary political advisor to Ali Abdullah Saleh) name along with Hilal’s. Yemenis saw this as a natural balance to rumors of Hilal as the front runner. Dr. Iryani has made no public comment on the issue, and it would be difficult to imagine that such an experienced politician would allow others to use his name in a game of ponds, but it would also be difficult to imagine him saying no to President Hadi if personally offered the post. There is also the matter of Dr. Iryani’s persona. There is no other Yemeni politician with the degree of respect and confidence internationally as well as within the region of the Arabian Peninsula. He would represent a high value asset for Hadi with regards to the necessary confidence required to secure international assistance during the transition period, whether financial or technical. Yet, if we were to be logical in our analysis (if!) then most would agree that Dr. Iryani would be a greater asset for president Hadi within the General People’s Congress (GPC). Iryani has also served as deputy Secretary General of the GPC, under 'Abd Rabbuh, for a long time, and as co-chair of the Dialogue committee, also with 'Abd Rabbuh, no one else knows the process and the actors like him. Dr. Iryani will remain a major asset for the president within the party, and this would allow him to multi-task and multiply his contributions to Hadi’s priorities. As Hadi’s Deputy his role may be limited vis-à-vis the party and the opposition, whether it’s Islah or Houthis or the Southern Movement. Again, how do we identify the president’s priorities? Some insiders go beyond the suggestion that the next Deputy should be a northerner. Some have even suggested it would be a smart move for Hadi to appoint a Zaydi northerner, not so much a Houthi or a sayyid, but a Zaydi tribesman. Along this line some also suggested Rashad al-Ailami (former Minister of Interior and highly trusted security official) and Yahya al-Ra’i (current speaker of Parliament). Both were injured during the attempted assassination of President Saleh on June 3, 2011. Neither would fit the criteria proposed but they represent ties to Saleh’s family as well as people of confidence within the security establishment. The last name suggested by few people is Qaleb Mutahar al-Qamish (current head of PSO and former Minister of Interior, also of Hashid origin). Mr. Qaleb represents the most interesting candidate. A northern tribesman of Zaydi origin and highly trusted across the GPC establishment. In addition, he represents the future of the security establishment. Rumor has it the intelligence agencies will merge under a new agency. This new structure may serve to ease the way out of Saleh’s relatives as well as serve as confidence building measures for relations with the West and Saudi Arabia. He would be a strong asset for Hadi but problematic vis-à-vis the revolutionary youth and activists. Islah itself might not have a problem with Mr. Qaleb, but grassroots activists and other opposition parties will look at this nomination as intensifying the image of a police state. It is still unlikely that President Hadi will appoint a Deputy on Monday during the farewell ceremony for 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh, but it would be a priority if he wishes to deter further criticism over the lack of constitutional legitimacy for the transition process. We must keep in mind that pressure on Hadi doesn’t only come from protesters in San'a and Ta'iz, who will use Syria’s situation in order to sustain numbers every Friday, but pressure also comes from regional neighbors needed increased stability and Western governments who have invested a lot in the transition process as a potential model for other Arab states confronting the Arab Spring tsunami. If the rumor is correct that the option to pass on a Deputy was considered then we imagine the nomination of a non-threatening personality, who does not represent and asset to Hadi either but merely serves a ceremonial post for the duration of the transition period. This person may not even contribute to the constitutional reform process and therefore not have any ambitions to be in office after the coming parliament elections.
8955	dbpedia	1	80	https://www.newarab.com/Comment/2016/4/13/President-Hadis-dubious-leadership	en	President Hadi’s dubious leadership	https://www.newarab.com/…5d&itok=ZDJaR4yx	https://www.newarab.com/…5d&itok=ZDJaR4yx	[ "https://www.newarab.com/themes/custom/new_arab/logo.png", "https://www.newarab.com/sites/default/files/styles/image_212x120/public/2166613689.jpeg?h=38d368d7&itok=nIYr448W", "https://www.newarab.com/sites/default/files/styles/image_330x185/public/2166712953.jpeg?h=199d8c1f&itok=QzVPYVTD", "https://www.newara...	[]	[]	[ "Yemen", "Saudi Arabia", "Houthis", "Hadi", "Ali Abdullah Saleh" ]	null	[ "Afrah Nasser" ]	2016-04-13T00:00:00	Comment: Hadi's focus on building international ties over domestic ones betrays a lack of concern for Yemeni citizens, and a desire to engineer his own survival, says Afrah Nasser.	en	/themes/custom/new_arab/fav.ico	The New Arab	https://www.newarab.com/Comment/2016/4/13/President-Hadis-dubious-leadership	Headlines on the critical state of Yemen's current affairs highlight the catastrophic humanitarian situation, war atrocities and the precarious upcoming peace talks. But there is another calamity brewing in Yemen that is receiving little attention: the unreliable leadership of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Hadi's latest New York Times op-ed, and his cabinet reshuffle both demonstrate that his own survival comes first on his agenda, overlooking the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the Yemeni public. The fact that he appears more concerned with speaking to the west, only pausing to address Yemeni politics for his own survival interest, is weakening his status domestically. Hadi needs to rethink his leadership style and expand his public diplomacy to include both domestic and international audiences. Inevitably, after spending 17 years in office as the vice president of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hadi has learned about the politics of staying in office from Saleh who for the past 38 years has masterfully engineered his own survival. For Hadi, though, the tactics he is employing are proving problematic. While Saleh used to preach that ruling Yemen was "like dancing on the heads of snakes", Hadi seems to have adopted the idea that ruling Yemen can be achieved through publishing op-eds in western media, for western audiences. Public diplomacy starts at home The two op-ed pieces written by Hadi for The New York Times in April 2015 and March 2016 on the conflict in Yemen were meant to polish his image exclusively on the international stage. Clearly, these addresses were not intended to speak to the people of Yemen, where more than half the population is illiterate, let alone able to read English. This is not to say that he does not address the Yemeni press. Hadi's texts in Arabic for local press have mostly been about his decrees; no intellectual messages are ever expressed to the hearts and minds of Yemeni citizens. Hadi has made no effort to address the locals in Yemen with anything more creative than a few Facebook statements In addition, Saleh's television appearances and public speeches addressing the Yemeni public outnumber Hadi's television appearances. The few interviews or televised speeches made by Hadi were done so through foreign media channels such as the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya. Unsurprisingly, nearly all operating TV channels inside Yemen are affiliated to Saleh and/or the Houthis, as other media offices have been attacked and shut down. Nonetheless, Hadi has made no effort to address the locals in Yemen with anything more creative than a few Facebook statements. In choosing to emphasise addresses to western audiences rather than Yemeni citizens, Hadi has missed the point: successful public diplomacy must start at home. Turning the tables for survival Hadi's time in office - which was only supposed to last two years but has now lasted four - has seen constant cabinet reshuffles. This, in addition to his most recent shake-up, demonstrates his wavering efforts as a leader to continually adapt to a changing situation. Just one week before the scheduled ceasefire on April 10, Hadi sacked Khaled Bahah, a well-respected technocrat who had a relatively peaceful connection to the Houthis and who served as both vice president and prime minister. Hadi gave away the positions to two key figures who had formerly been key hardliner members in Saleh's circle: General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Ahmed bin Dagher. This has been seen as a very problematic move in the context of efforts to hold peace talks, and US Secretary of State John Kerry has reportedly stated that President Hadi has significantly complicated efforts for peace negotiations. Hadi's actions are simply serving to fuel the fire. Al-Ahmar, who used to be Saleh's right hand man, not only turned the tables against Saleh in 2011 by joining the uprising, but he is also believed to have plotted the assassination attempt against Saleh in June 2011. US Secretary of State John Kerry has reportedly stated that President Hadi has significantly complicated efforts for peace negotiations Reminiscent of Saleh's survival politics that saw him once again become an ally to his former enemies the Houthis, Hadi today is establishing his new allies and turning the tables against Saleh and his clan. Despite Hadi's attempts at survival, his popularity is heading for a dramatic downturn. Reports on opposing groups reflect the growing discontent over his leadership. Even Bahah has questioned Hadi's decree stipulating his dismissal, explaining that Hadi was violating the constitution, the GCC peace initiative and the UN Security Council Resolution 2216. Hadi's recent tactics embody his dubious leadership. In a tribal country such as Yemen, where a leader's power is extremely locally-based through a leverage-building process, Hadi is drifting dramatically from strengthening his domestic ties, towards focusing solely on building his links with the West, which is itself, slowly starting to express discontent over his leadership.
8955	dbpedia	0	8	https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis	en	Who are Yemen's Houthis?	https://www.wilsoncenter…shutterstock.jpg	https://www.wilsoncenter…shutterstock.jpg	[ "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/assets/images/wilson-quarterly.svg", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/logo.svg?v=20210609", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/assets/images/program-logos/the-islamists.svg", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Iran is widely accused of backing the Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite movement that has been fighting Yemen’s Sunni-majority government since 2004.	en	/core/misc/favicon.ico	Wilson Center	https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis	Iran is widely accused of backing the Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite movement that has been fighting Yemen’s Sunni-majority government since 2004. The Houthis took over the Yemeni capital Sanaa in September 2014 and seized control over much of north Yemen by 2016. Yemeni officials and Sunni states have repeatedly alleged that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah have provided arms, training, and financial support to the Houthis. But Iranian and Hezbollah officials have denied or downplayed the claims. The United States, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, has presented physical evidence of Iranian arms transfers to the group. Houthi-Saudi Tensions The Houthi movement emerged in northern Yemen in the 1990s, in part, as a reaction to rising Saudi financial and religious influence. In November 2009, the Houthis crossed into Saudi Arabia amid their rebellion against Yemen’s central government. For the first time, the Saudi army deployed abroad without an ally. The Saudis launched air strikes against the rebels and engaged in ground skirmishes. More than 130 Saudis died. The next major round of Saudi-Houthi fighting began in March 2015. A coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) launched airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. The war between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government and its supporters dragged on, despite U.N. efforts to broker peace talks. Tensions between the Saudi-led coalition and Iran escalated sharply on November 4, 2017, when a ballistic missile was fired at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, the first time a ballistic missile had come so close to the capital since the start of the war. The Saudi Defense Ministry claimed that it had intercepted the missile. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir called the attack an act of war by Iran. “It was an Iranian missile, launched by Hezbollah, from territory occupied by the Houthis in Yemen,” he said. U.S. President Donald Trump also accused the Islamic Republic. “A shot was just taken by Iran, in my opinion, at Saudi Arabia…and our system knocked the missile out of the air,” he said. Tehran rebuffed the Saudi and U.S. claims as “false, irresponsible, destructive and provocative.” In Lebanon, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah refuted allegations of the group’s involvement as “silly” and “completely baseless.” In response to the attack, Saudi Arabia imposed a near-total blockade on Yemen. The situation further deteriorated when the Houthis killed ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 4, 2017. Saleh had officially aligned with the Houthis in May 2015, helping them gain control over much of northern Yemen. But the alliance was shaky at best. In August, one of Saleh’s top advisers was shot and killed following a confrontation with the Houthis. On December 2, Saleh publicly split from the Houthis, seeking a “new page” with the Saudi-led coalition. “I call upon the brothers in neighboring states and the alliance to stop their aggression, lift the siege, open the airports and allow food aid and the saving of the wounded and we will turn a new page by virtue of our neighborliness,” he said. Two days later he was killed by Houthi rebels in a roadside ambush. Iranian officials celebrated Saleh’s death. Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of Iran’s nuclear program and a former foreign minister, said that Saleh got what he deserved, Fars News Agency reported. A senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Saleh’s death would help the Yemeni people “determine their own fate” free of Gulf influence. “The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia conspiracy was foiled by the people of Yemen,” Ali Akbar Velayati said. In 2018, Houthi missile attacks on Saudi Arabia became increasingly common. The group also grew increasingly bold in its choice of targets. It damaged a Saudi oil tanker in July 2018. The fighting exacerbated what the United Nations called the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis.” More than 23 million people – 80 percent of Yemen’s population – needed humanitarian aid and protection, the U.N. reported. On September 14, 2019, the Houthis claimed credit for drone attacks on two key oil installations in Saudi Arabia. But U.S. intelligence presented to the U.N. Security Council reportedly demonstrated that the attack originated from within Iran, not Yemen. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of perpetrating the “unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply.” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif dismissed the U.S. claims in a tweet. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MD4M1j76wWA The Houthis widened the scope of the conflict in early 2022 by targeting UAE with drones and ballistic missiles. Emirati and U.S. military forces intercepted two ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis toward Abu Dhabi on January 24. The 2,000 U.S. troops housed at Al Dahfra Air Base sheltered in bunkers and fired Patriot missiles in response. A Houthi spokesperson warned that the UAE had “become an unsafe country.” The following is an overview of the Houthi movement, including its origins, religious inspiration and alleged links to Iran. Where are the Houthis from? What role have they played in Yemen's history? The Houthis are a large clan originating from Yemen’s northwestern Saada province. They practice the Zaydi form of Shiism. Zaydis make up around 35 percent of Yemen’s population. A Zaydi imamate ruled Yemen for 1,000 years, before being overthrown in 1962. Since then, the Zaydis – stripped of their political power – have struggled to restore their authority and influence in Yemen. In the 1980s, the Houthi clan began a movement to revive Zaydi traditions, feeling threatened by state-funded Salafist preachers who established a base in Houthi areas. Not all Zaydis, however, align with the Houthi movement. Houthi insurgents have clashed with Yemen’s government for more than a decade. Since 2011, the Houthi movement has expanded beyond its Zaydi roots and become a wider movement opposed to the central government. The insurgents have also begun referring to themselves as Ansarullah, or “Party of God.” How does Zaydism compare to the type of Shiism practiced in Iran? Like other Shiites, Zaydis believe that only descendants of the Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali, have the right to lead the Muslim community as imams - divinely-appointed successors of the Prophet. Most adherents of Zaydism reside in Yemen, and Zaydis make up around eight percent of the world’s 70 million Shiites. But the Zaydis are distinct from the “Twelver” form of Shiism practiced by the majority of the world’s Shiites, including most Shiites in Iran. Twelver Shiites believe the twelfth imam, whom they consider infallible, disappeared in 874AD and will one day return to usher in an age of justice as the Mahdi, or promised one. In the Mahdi’s absence, Twelver Shiites believe clerics can substitute for his authority on certain issues. The faithful are obliged to obey the clerics’ religious rulings, a power transferred to Iran’s theocracy after the 1979 revolution. Zaydis, also known as “Fivers,” believe that Zayd, the great-grandson of Ali, was the rightful fifth imam. But Twelver Shiites consider Zayd’s brother, Mohammad al Baqir, the fifth imam. The Zaydis do not recognize the later Twelver imams, and instead believe anyone related to Ali is eligible to lead the Muslim community. They also reject the Twelver doctrine that the imam is infallible. The Houthis’ close connections to Iran, however, seem to have led to an increase in Twelver influence. “Twelver Shiite practices that are novel to Yemen are increasingly being incorporated into religious practice; for example, the commemoration of Ashura was publicly celebrated by Houthi supporters en masse for the first time in 2017, and Yemeni Shiites now openly observe Eid al-Ghadir, a Shiite religious celebration rumored to have been practiced mostly in secret previously,” according to Sama’a Al-Hamdani. The movement’s leadership has close ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah. Who is supporting the Houthis? How? Iranian officials have supported the Houthis’ cause and compared the group to Hezbollah. “Iran supports the rightful struggles of Ansarullah in Yemen and considers this movement as part of the successful Islamic Awakening movements,” Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, said in October 2014. But Tehran has repeatedly denied providing arms, funds or training to the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has long accused Iran of arming the Houthis to fight a proxy war. “We are worried about…the tendencies of Iran in the region, which is one of the leading elements implanting instability in the region,” the late Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al Faisal, said in 2015. In October 2016, a U.S. admiral said that U.S. Navy and allied nations’ warships had intercepted five weapons shipments from Iran to the Arabian Peninsula since April 2015. The shipments reportedly included anti-tank missiles, sniper rifles and thousands of AK-47 automatic rifles. “These accusations are totally false,” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Ghasemi (left) said in response. In April 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that Iran supports the Houthis’ “attempted overthrow of the government by providing military equipment, funding, and training, thus threatening Saudi Arabia’s southern border.” In November 2017, however, Revolutionary Guards commander Maj. Gen. Ali Jafari claimed that “Iran’s assistance is at the level of advisory and spiritual support.” Tensions over Iranian support of the Houthis escalated in late 2017. In November, Saudi Arabia charged Iran with an act of war for a missile fired at the Saudi capital by the Houthis in Yemen. Iran denied any links to the attack. But remnants of four ballistic missiles fired into Saudi Arabia by the Houthis on May 19, July 22, July 26 and November 4, 2017 appear to have been designed and manufactured by Iran, according to a confidential U.N. report from November 2017. "The United States welcomes this report, as should every nation concerned about Iranian expansion," U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said on December 14, in front of the remains of a missile allegedly fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia. "It was made in Iran, then sent to Houthi militants in Yemen. From there it was fired at a civilian airport, with the potential to kill hundreds of innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia." The Qiam is thought to have a maximum range of nearly 500 miles. Iranian officials and Houthi leaders denied the U.S. allegations. "After three years of war, America suddenly finds evidence that Iran supports the Houthis," a Yemeni spokesman said, according to Reuters. "America did not find any evidence in all the missiles fired from Yemen until now. The story is clear. They want to give Arabs a story to divert their attention from Jerusalem. Instead being angry at Israel, they wave the Iranian boy," he added. On December 21, the U.S. State Department echoed Haley's allegations. "There is a very key relationship between the Iranians and the Houthis," Tim Lenderking, deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, said. "I don’t want to overstate it. I don’t want to suggest that the Houthis operate entirely at the behest of the Iranians. But it’s an important relationship and one that the Iranians are able to exploit." Lenderking encouraged reporters to visit the display of missile remains and other military equipment that Haley highlighted the previous week. In January 2018, a U.N. report concluded Iran had violated an arms embargo by failing to prevent the Houthis from obtaining Iranian missiles. Iran did not comment on the U.N. panel report, but Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif denied U.S. claims of Tehran's missile support once again in a series of tweets in late January 2018. Less than two weeks later, however, Houthi spokesman Mohammad Abdul Salam met with Zarif in Tehran. Abdul Salam updated Zarif on the current conditions in Yemen. Zarif outlined Iran's four-point peace plan for Yemen and stressed the need for an immediate end to the war. He also called for the immediate shipment of humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians. In February 2018, the United States, Britain, and France drafted a U.N. resolution that condemned Iran for violating the Yemen arms embargo by failing to prevent the Houthis from obtaining Iranian missiles. Russia vetoed the resolution. The Houthis stepped up their attacks on Saudi Arabia in the following months. In late March 2018, the rebels fired seven missiles at Saudi Arabia in one night and resulted in the of an Egyptian resident. A few weeks later, they struck a Saudi oil tanker in international waters west of Yemen's Hodeidah port. A mid-April 2018, a missile targeting the Saudi capital Riyadh prompted a U.S. response. The State Department condemned the attack and blamed Iran for its alleged Houthi support. "We support the right of our Saudi partners to defend their borders against these threats, which are fueled by the Iranian regime’s dangerous proliferation of weapons and destabilizing activities in the region," said State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif accused the United States of fabricating evidence related to the displayed missile parts recovered from Saudi Arabia. One featured logo was from the Standard Institute of Iran, which regulates consumer goods, not weapons, Zarif told the Associated Press during a visit to New York in late April 2018. “It’s a sign of quality,” Zarif said. “When people want to buy it, they look at whether it’s been tested by the Standard Institute of Iran that your cheese puffs are good, your cheese puffs will not give you a stomach ache. I mean, nobody will put the logo of the Standard Institute of Iran on a piece of missile.” In November 2018, the State Department claimed that Iran’s support for the Houthis had deepened. Brian Hook, the special envoy for Iran, unveiled a sampling of weapons allegedly manufactured in Iran and transferred to Yemen, including a Sayyad 3C surface-to-air missile with a range of 46 miles and two types of anti-tank guided missiles. Hook also said components of a Shahed 123 drone were recovered in Yemen. That model is likely a predecessor of the Shahed 129, which flies at a medium altitude and can endure long missions. In January 2019, the U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen reported that the Houthis were gaining access to increasingly advanced drone technology. “The unmanned aerial vehicles continued to be used in significant numbers in Yemen, implying that the Houthi forces retained access to the critical components, such as engines, guidance systems, from abroad that are necessary to assemble and deploy them.” The experts warned that the Houthis gained access to an additional drone in mid-2018 with the potential range of up to 932 miles. “It would give credence to the claims by the Houthis that they have the capability to hit targets such as Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Dubai,” they wrote. The panel also highlighted the wide use of “suicide or kamikaze drones,” drones fitted with explosives that crash into their targets. The report noted that the most-commonly used Houthi drone was the Qasef-1, first seen in the field in 2016, which is similar to the Iranian-made Ababil-2/T suicide drone. In February 2022, U.S. Central Command implicated Iran in providing advanced weaponry to the Houthis after they fired ballistic missiles at Abu Dhabi. “Medium range ballistic missiles that were fired from Yemen and entered UAE were not invented, built, designed in Yemen,” General Kenneth McKenzie told reporters. “All that happened somewhere else. So I think we certainly see the Iranian connection to this.” The Houthis have other sources of support, however. They have reportedly received funding from local supporters and sympathetic charities as well as from illegal trade. What are the Houthis' political views? The Houthis do not promote a coherent ideology, and their political platform is vague and contradictory. The original Houthi insurgents desired to imitate Hezbollah, to have power without actually ruling. “The Houthis have always been on the outside. They've been a militia group that's now starting to dabble in politics,” Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen, who studied and lived in the country for years, told NPR’s “Fresh Air” in April 2015. “And they don't really know how to rule.” The Houthi emblem only offers a broad view of the group’s views. It is made of up entirely of the following phrases, “God is great, Death to America, death to Israel, damnation to the Jews, victory to Islam.” But the Houthis’ Hezbollah-like denunciation of the United States and Israel often seems “largely for show,” according to Les Campbell at the National Democratic Institute. Their ties to former president Saleh threaten to expose the group as “just another group sharing in the spoils of corruption.” The Houthis’ Zaydi roots do not necessarily dictate their approach to politics. Their leaders have claimed they are not attempting to revive the Zaydi imamate, but rather to seek greater political inclusion. Since 2011, they have used nationalist and populist language in their messaging rather than framing themselves as a strictly Zaydi movement. And they have cultivated a range of Sunni political allies. The Houthis participated in the U.N.-sponsored National Dialogue Conference from 2013 to 2014. While they did not reject the reform agenda in principle, the Houthis opposed proposals to convert Yemen into a six-region federalist state. The proposal would link Saada with Sanaa, but the Houthis want Saada to be its own autonomous region. What are the roots of the Houthis' conflict with the central government? Hussein Abdreddin al Houthi, a prominent Zaydi cleric and member of parliament from 1993 to 1997, became a strong critic of President Ali Abudllah Saleh in the 1990s. He accused the government of aligning too closely with the United States and Israel. Tensions mounted further after President Saleh reportedly cut funding to Hussein al Houthi in 2000. Frustrated by the Zaydis’ poor political and economic status, he began rallying supporters for anti-government demonstrations in the early 2000s. The government issued a warrant for al Houthi’s arrest, and his followers began clashing violently with security forces. Al Houthi was killed by security forces in 2004. Since then, his relatives and supporters have waged six uprisings against the government, known as the Houthi wars. President Saleh accused Iran of supporting the rebellions. The Houthis signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2010, but joined the Arab Spring protests against Saleh one year later. How did the Houthis rise to power? After months of protests, President Saleh ceded power to his deputy, Abd Rabbuh Mansour al Hadi in November 2011. But Hadi enjoyed little popular support in Yemen, and the Houthis took advantage of the power vacuum in the north. From 2012-2013, they gained followers and allies. They consolidated their territorial control, pushing south towards Sanaa. In September 2014, the Houthis took over the capital. They initially agreed to a U.N.-brokered peace deal that required them to withdraw from Sanaa following the formation of a unity government. But in January, the Houthis rejected the government’s newly drafted constitution and took over the presidential palace. President Hadi and his government resigned on January 22. The next month, the Houthis announced that a five-member presidential council would replace Hadi. Hadi fled south to Aden and revoked his resignation, declaring himself the legitimate president of Yemen. In response, Houthi insurgents began bombing Hadi’s Aden headquarters. At Hadi’s request, Saudi Arabia – along with a coalition of nine other Sunni nations – began launching airstrikes against Houthi positions on March 26. The Houthis remained defiant. “Our fighters will not evacuate from the main cities or the government institutions,” Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al Houthi said on April 19. “Anyone who thinks we will surrender is dreaming.” On April 21, Saudi officials announced the end of the campaign, known as operation “Decisive Storm,” claiming they had successfully degraded the Houthis’ military infrastructure. The Houthis also agreed to meet several U.N. demands, including releasing the Yemeni Defense Minister, whom they were holding captive. But Saudi Arabia resumed airstrikes two days later, and the first month of the campaign had neither driven the Houthis from Sanaa nor restored Hadi to power. Multiple attempts at peace talks organized by the United Nations failed. The first two attempts were in Switzerland in June and December 2015. The United Nations tried again in Kuwait in April 2016, but discussions broke down in August and fighting between the Houthis and pro-government forces resumed. As of March 2017, seven ceasefire agreements had been broken in the conflict. In December 2017, after 30 months of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, the Houthi’s were largely in control of northern Yemen. In December 2018, the warring parties met in Stockholm, Sweden, for the first talks in two years. They agreed to a ceasefire, prisoner exchange and coalition troop withdrawal from the port of Hodeidah, which handles the majority of imports. But the truce broke down by early 2019. In April 2022, the Houthis and the Yemeni government agreed to two-month truce brokered by the United Nations. The United States and Iran welcomed the first nationwide ceasefire since 2016. In June 2022, the warring parties agreed to extend it for another two months. “The truce represents a significant shift in the trajectory of the war and has been achieved through responsible and courageous decision making by the parties,” Hans Grundberg, the U.N. special envoy for Yemen, said in a statement. What is the relationship between Houthis and other Islamists in Yemen? The Houthis have a tense relationship with Islah, a Sunni Islamist party with links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Islah claims the Houthis are an Iranian proxy, and blames them for sparking unrest in Yemen. The Houthis, on the other hand, have accused Islah of cooperating with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). After the Houthis took over Sanaa in September 2014, Islah initially took a few steps towards reconciliation. In November, top Islah and Houthi leaders met to discuss a political partnership. Islah called on the Houthis to cease attacks on Islah members and to release Islah prisoners. In December, the United Nations and Gulf Cooperation Council brokered a deal between the two groups to cease hostilities. But clashes between the Houthis and Islah continued. In the first four months of 2015, the Houthis kidnapped dozens of Islah party leaders and raided their offices. By April, more than 100 Islah leaders were detained by the Houthis. Tensions increased after Islah declared support for the Saudi-led airstrikes. The Houthis are also at odds with Sunni extremist groups. On March 20, 2015, an ISIS affiliate calling itself the Sanaa Province claimed responsibility for suicide bomb attacks on two Zaydi mosques that killed at least 135 people and injured more than 300 others. The group issued a statement that said “infidel Houthis should know that the soldiers of the Islamic State will not rest until they eradicate them.” AQAP denied involvement in the mosque attacks, but has frequently targeted the Houthis. In April 2015, the group claimed responsibility for three suicide attacks that killed dozens of Houthis in Abyan, al Bayda’, and Lahij. AQAP has reportedly partnered with southern tribes to fight the Houthis. Who are their leaders? Abdul Malik al Houthi, brother of Hussein al Houthi, has been the group’s spiritual, military, and political leader since 2007. Little is known of his personal life, and he makes few public appearances. His brother-in-law, Youssef al Midani, is the deputy leader. Abdul Malik’s two brothers, Yahia and Abdul-Karim, are also senior leaders of the movement. On April 14, 2015, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on Abdul Malik al Houthi for engaging in acts that “threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.” The same month, the U.N. Security Council imposed an arms embargo against the Houthis and blacklisted Abdul Malik al Houthi. On January 10, 2021, the Trump administration announced that it would designate the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The State Department accused Iran’s Revolutionary Guards of providing missiles, drones and training to the Houthis in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran “continues to thwart the efforts of the United Nations and friendly countries to solve the crisis peacefully and end the conflict,” Pompeo said in a statement. The designation went into effect on January 19, 2021 – a day before Trump’s term ended. The Biden administration, however, revoked the listing less than a month later. “We have listened to warnings from the United Nations, humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among others, that the designations could have a devastating impact on Yemenis’ access to basic commodities like food and fuel,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on February 12, 2021. He clarified that senior Houthi leaders – Abdul Malik al Houthi, Abd al Khaliq Badr al Din al Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim – would remain sanctioned as individuals. The group was removed from the terrorist lists on February 16, 2021. Timeline: The Houthis in Yemen 2014 Sept. 21-22: Houthi rebels stormed Sanaa and seized government buildings. The United Nations brokered a deal requiring President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to form a new government. Nov. 1: Houthi rebels attacked the al Islah party headquarters in the southwestern city of Ibb. Nov. 7-8: Hadi announced a new cabinet, but the Houthis rejected it. Nov. 28: Houthi rebels and al Islah reached a deal agreeing to cease hostilities, but clashes between the groups continued. Dec. 14: Houthi rebels blew up a building belonging to al Islah in Sanaa. Dec. 20: Dozens of protestors gathered in Sanaa to demand that Houthi rebels leave the capital. Houthis respond by abducting activist Shadi Khasrouf, who participated in the protests. 2015 Jan. 22: Hadi resigned under pressure from the Houthi rebels. March 20: Suicide attacks targeting two Houthi mosques in Sanaa killed more than 130 people and injured more than 300 others. March 26: Saudi Arabia began launching airstrikes in Yemen in coordination with a 10-nation coalition. Sept. 22: Hadi returned to Aden, on major city on Yemen’s southern coast, after the Houthis were driven out. Oct. 15: The Houthis fired a Scud missile that landed near Khamis Mushayt, close to a Saudi air force base. In response, Saudi planes bombed targets in Sanaa. Dec. 15: U.N.-sponsored peace talks began in Geneva, Switzerland and a ceasefire went into effect in Yemen. 2016 Jan. 7: Iran claimed that Saudi warplanes attacked Iran’s embassy in Sanaa. The Saudi-led coalition and Yemen’s government denied that the embassy building was targeted. April 21: U.N.-backed talks began in Kuwait between the Houthis and Hadi’s government. Aug. 7: U.N.-backed talks in Kuwait concluded without an agreement between the Houthis and Hadi’s government. Oct. 19-21: The Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition agreed to a 72-hour ceasefire, allowing for civilian access to humanitarian aid. The ceasefire held for three days, and Saudi-led coalition airstrikes recommenced shortly after the truce expires. Oct. 27: U.N. Yemen envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed proposed a new peace plan aimed at ending the conflict. It called for members of the internationally-recognized Hadi government to step down or accept diminished roles in exchange for a Houthi withdrawal from major cities. Oct. 31: U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, called for an end to indiscriminate Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen. Nov. 29: The Houthis and members of the ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress formed a new 35-minister government based in Sanaa. 2017 Jan. 18: A Houthi strike killed six civilians in the central city of Taiz, just one day after the killing of six other civilians outside of the city. Jan. 23: Yemeni government forces seized control of the Red Sea port of Mokha after launching an assault against the port and pushing out Houthi rebels. Jan. 30: Three Houthi suicide boats reportedly attacked a Saudi frigate off the Hodeida port in the Red Sea, killing two crew members and wounding three others. On the following day, the Houthis claimed that they had launched a ballistic missile at a Saudi-led coalition military base on the Red Sea island of Zuqar. Feb. 22: The Houthis launched a missile at a military camp outside of Mokha and killed a senior Yemeni army general. March 25: A court in Houthi-controlled territory sentenced President Hadi and six other government officials in absentia to death for “high treason.” May 19: The Houthis said that they fired a ballistic missile towards Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh. The Saudi-led coalition said that it intercepted the missile some 124 miles west of the city. May 30: Oman mediated between the Saudi-backed Hadi government and the Houthi rebels over a U.N. plan for peace talks. June 5: The Houthis banned the U.N. special envoy, Cheikh Ahmed, for allegedly abandoning his neutrality and not respecting U.N. resolutions, according to Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Salam. June 15: Houthi rebels fired a missile at an Emirati ship carrying medical supplies in the Red Sea. One person was injured in the attack. The United Nations urged warring parties in Yemen to agree to a U.N.-negotiated deal over the management of port city Hodeidah and resuming government salary payments. June 17: The Saudi-backed Yemen government agreed to the U.N. two-point solution regarding the Hodeidah port. July 22: The Houthis fired a Burkan-2 ballistic missile at an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia. July 26: Houthi rebels launched a Scud missile at an oil facility near the port city of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. July 29: The Houthis claimed an attack on an Emirati ship off the western coast of Yemen. But no casualties or damage were reported. Aug. 23: Houthi fighters called their main ally, ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh, “evil” and condemn his description of them as a “militia.” The statement highlighted a growing rift between Saleh and the Houthis. Aug. 24: Saleh held a massive rally in Sanaa to celebrate 35 years since the founding of his General People’s Congress (GPC) party. Aug. 27: A colonel and close adviser to Saleh was killed in clashes with Houthi rebels at a check-point in Sanaa’s southern neighborhood of Hadda. Aug. 31: Former president Saleh demanded the arrest of the Houthi gunmen who killed his close adviser. Early September: Leaders from Saleh’s GPC party and the Houthis met to fix the rift between both groups. Sept. 24: President Hadi said that a military solution could solve Yemen’s crisis. “The military solution is the more likely one for the Yemen crisis in light of the intransigence of the Houthi and Saleh coup militias which continue to take orders from Iran,” Hadi said in an interview on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. Sept. 25: The Houthis detained a U.S. citizen in Sanaa. Oct. 1: The Houthis claimed that they shot down a U.S. surveillance drone in the capital of Sanaa. Oct. 29: Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir said that Iran was blocking peace efforts in Yemen and was still smuggling weapons to the Houthis. Nov. 4: Saudi Arabia said that it intercepted a ballistic missile near King Khaled Airport in Riyadh that was fired from Yemen. Saudi Arabia later blamed Iran for the Houthi missile attack on Riyadh airport. Nov. 7: Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Jubeir charged Iran with an act of war following the Houthi missile attack on Riyadh. The Saudi-led coalition closed all air, land and sea ports Yemen to stem the flow of supplies and arms to the Houthis from Iran. Nov. 8: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that the Houthi missile attack on Saudi Arabia was a reaction to Saudi aggression. “How should the Yemeni people react to bombardment of their country. So, they are not allowed to use their own weapons? You stop the bombardment first and see if the Yemenis would not do the same,” Rouhani said. The White House condemned the Houthi missile attack on Saudi Arabia that occurred on November 4. Nov. 12: The Houthis threatened to attack warships and oil tankers in retaliation for Saudi Arabia closing Yemen’s ports. Nov. 22: The Saudi-led coalition said it was going to reopen Yemen’s Hodeida port to allow humanitarian aid through to the capital of Sanaa. Nov. 24: Remnants of four ballistic missiles fired into Saudi Arabia by the Houthis appear were designed and manufactured in Iran, a confidential U.N. report said. Dec. 2: Saleh publicly split with the Houthis. He called for a “new page” in his relationship with the Saudi-led coalition. Dec. 4: Saleh was killed by the Houthis in a roadside ambush near Sanaa. Dec. 19: Saudi Arabia intercepted a ballistic missile over southern Riyadh. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, which was targeting the royal Yamama Palace in the capital. No damage was reported. 2018 Jan. 9: Houthi rebels threatened to block the Red Sea shipping lane if the Saudi-led coalition kept moving towards the Hodeidah port. “If the aggressors keep pushing toward Hodeidah and if the political solution hits wall, there are some strategic choices that will be taken as a no return point, including blocking the international navigation in the Red Sea,” the Houthis’ political council chief, Saleh al-Samad, said. Jan. 10: The Saudi-led coalition said that it foiled an attack on a Saudi oil tanker by Houthi fighters near the Hodeidah port. The coalition destroyed a boat carrying explosives headed towards the tanker, coalition spokesman Colonel Turki al Maliki said. Jan. 11: The Houthis fired a ballistic missile at a special forces camp and a facility housing helicopter gunships in the Saudi border province of Najran. Saudi air defense forces shot down the missile mid-air without any casualties, Colonel Maliki said. Jan. 12: A U.N. panel concluded that Iran violated an arms embargo imposed on Yemen by failing to prevent the Houthi rebels from obtaining Iranian missiles. The report did not say that Tehran had directly supplied missiles to the Houthi rebels, but said the Islamic Republic was in "noncompliance" with Resolution 2216, for failing to keep such weapons out of Yemen. Jan. 16: Houthi rebels said that they fired a short-range ballistic missile toward a regional airport in the Saudi border province of Jizan. Saudi defense forces said that they shot down the missile over Jizan. “This hostile action by the Houthi group, which is backed by Iran, proves the Iranian regime's continuous support for the armed Houthi group by providing them with capabilities, which is in violation of U.N. resolutions,” a spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition said. Jan. 18: The Houthis fired a missile into the border province of Najran in Saudi Arabia. The missile targeted an air defense operations center and inflicted heavy damage to an air defense base in the Khadhra crossing point. Jan. 25: Danny Lavon Burch, a U.S. citizen held captive by Houthi rebels since September 2017, was released and taken to Oman. He was accompanied to Oman by Mohammed Abdel-Salam, a senior Houthi leader. Jan. 30: Houthi rebels said that they fired a long-range ballistic missile at King Khaled International Airport in Riyadh. It was the second time that the Houthis targeted the Saudi airport. Feb. 10: Houthi spokesman Mohammad Abdul Salam met with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Tehran. Zarif outlined Iran's four-point peace plan for Yemen and stressed the need for an immediate stop to the war. He also called for the immediate shipment of humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians. The Arab coalition's Patriot air defense systems intercepted a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis from the Ras Kutayb area in the Hodeidah province. The missile was destroyed before reaching its intended target, suspected to be Mokha city in the western Yemeni province of Taiz. Feb. 12: Major General Gameel al Mamari, a high-ranking Houthi official, defected to the Yemeni army. He had been a spokesman for the Houthis' air defense forces and a deputy director of the military forum, a group of high-ranking army officers in Sanaa. Feb. 13: The Houthis agreed to join a new round of peace talks with the General People's Congress party in Oman. The peace talks were to take place as soon as a new U.N. Peace Envoy to Yemen was announced. Senior Houthi field commander Abu Taha al Ghalisi was killed by pro-government forces’ shelling Houthi positions in the southwestern city of Taiz. Ghalisi was responsible for leading Houthi forces north of Taiz. Feb. 14: The Saudi military repelled a cross border attack by Houthi rebels in the southern border town of Nathran. Around 25 Houthi militants were reportedly killed. Saudi helicopters also destroyed three Houthi military vehicles. It was the second cross--border attack by the Houthis in less than a week. Feb. 16-26: The United States, Britain and France drafted a U.N. Security Council resolution that condemned Iran for failing to stop its ballistic missiles from falling into the hands of the Houthis. The draft also called for renewed U.N. sanctions on Yemen and would allow the Security Council to impose targeted sanctions for “any activity related to the use of ballistic missiles in Yemen.” Russia vetoed the resolution. The U.N. Security Council subsequently passed a Russian-drafted resolution that renewed the embargo and panel's mandate but omitted the Iran-Houthi issue. Feb. 21: Mohammed Ali al Houthi submitted a letter to the United Nations to end the three-and-a-half-year war. The document, titled “An Initiative to End the Tragedies Caused by the Aggression on Yemen,” criticized the U.N. Security Council for failing “to prevent the interference and aggression against Yemen as well as the massacres committed daily against the Yemeni citizens.” The letter also included proposals for ending the conflict, such as forming a reconciliation committee, presidential and parliamentary elections, international guarantees to begin reconstruction and compensation for damages, and preventing any aggression from foreign countries against Yemen. Feb. 27: The Houthis refused to sign a U.N.-negotiated peace agreement with the Hadi government, outgoing U.N. envoy to Cheikh Ahmed said. The Houthis rejected security arrangements that required them to pull out of cities and hand over weapons to a neutral military committee. “It became clear that the Houthis were not prepared to make concessions on the proposed security arrangements. This has been a major stumbling block towards reaching a negotiated solution,” Ahmed said in his last briefing to the U.N. Security Council. March 1: Coalition airstrikes killed more than 100 Houthi rebels and injured dozens of fighters in the western Hodeidah district. March 25: The Houthis fired seven missiles at four Saudi cities: three at the capital Riyadh, one at the southwest city of Khamis Mushait, one at southern Najran and two at Jizan. The Houthi Ministry of Defense claimed that the missiles hit seven different targets inside Saudi Arabia, including four airports. But the Saudi coalition said that all the missiles were intercepted and destroyed. Fragments from the intercepted missiles killed an Egyptian resident. It is the first death on Saudi soil since the military intervention began in 2015. March 29: Houthi rebels fired a ballistic missile from the northern Yemeni province of Saada at the Saudi city of Jizan. Air defenses intercepted the missile before it could strike its target. March 30: The Yemeni army destroyed a Houthi weapons stockpile in Saada province. The strike coincided with a coalition raid on Houthi militias in the northern province. Houthi militants had launched a ballistic missile at Saudi Arabia from the province the night before. March 31: Saudi air defense forces intercepted a missile fired by the Houthis. The missile targeted a Saudi National Guard base in the southern city Najran, a rebel-run news agency reported. An Indian resident was injured by falling debris in the attack. April 2: Saleh al Samad, the head of the Houthi Political Council in Sanaa, said that the rebels were “ready to buy weapons from any country that wants to sell to us, be it Russia or Iran.” But he demanded that the weapons be delivered to Sanaa to bypass the coalition blockade. Samad made the comments during a graduation ceremony speech for Houthi military cadets in Sanaa. April 3: Houthi rebels struck a Saudi Arabian oil tanker with a missile west of Hodeidah in international waters. A coalition warship intervened and escorted the tanker, which sustained minimal damage, northwards. The Houthis said that the attack was in response to a coalition airstrike on the rebel-held Hodeidah port that killed 14 people, including women and children, the day before. April 4: Saudi Arabia intercepted a Houthi missile that was launched at southern Jizan. April 6: The Houthis fired a missile at the southern city Najran, Saudi Arabia. Saudi defense forces intercepted the missile. No damage or casualties were reported. April 11: The Houthis launched a Burkan 2-H ballistic missile at the Saudi capital Riyadh and also targeted oil facilities in southern Najran and Jizan, according to the rebel's Al Masirah television network. The missile traveled more than around 500 miles into Saudi Arabia before it was intercepted by Saudi air defenses. The Saudi-led coalition said that it had also shot down two drones in southern Saudi Arabia. The Houthis claimed they targeted some areas with Qasif-1 drones. April 12: Saudi air defense forces intercepted a Houthi missile targeting southern Jizan. April 13: “As long as the aggression continues, our military capabilities will grow and develop,” Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the rebel group, warned . The Houthis also fired a missile at Saudi Arabia for the third day in a row. The missile targeted southern Jizan but was intercepted by Saudi defense systems. April 15: Iran supplied the Houthis with drones used to attack Saudi Arabia, the Hadi government alleged. The drones were “made in Iran” and it was “impossible to manufacture them locally,” Yemen's internationally-recognized government said. April 19: The Houthis reportedly shot down a U.S. drone over Hodeidah. Saleh al Sammad, the head of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was killed in Saudi airstrikes on Hodeidah province, Al Masirah TV reported. Mahdi al Mashat was elected as Sammad's successor. “This crime will not break the will of our people and state ... [and] will not pass without accountability,” Abdul Malik al Houthi said. “The forces of this aggression led by Washington and the Saudi regime are legally responsible for such a crime and all its implications.” April 22: The Houthis fired a ballistic missile at southern Najran. Saudi air defenses intercepted the missile, “but the shrapnel scattered over residential areas and cause a fire at a farm belonging to a citizen, without causing any injuries,” the Saudi Press Agency said. April 23: Saudi Arabia intercepted two ballistic missiles at a Saudi Aramco oil production facility in southern Jizan. The Houthis claimed responsibility. April 24: Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif accused the United States of fabricating evidence that Houthi missiles launched against Saudi Arabia were manufactured in Iran. April 26: Saudi Arabia intercepted four ballistic missiles from Houthi rebels over southwestern Jizan. Falling debris from the interception killed one person. April 29: The Houthis vowed to intensify rocket attacks on Saudi Arabia and said that they were manufacturing their own ballistic missiles. Three Saudi soldiers died in clashes with the Houthis along the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border, the Saudi Press Agency said. May 3: The U.N. envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, arrived in Omani to meet with Houthi officials to try and revive peace talks. May 6: Houthi rebels launched two ballistic missiles at Najran. Saudi air defense forces intercepted the missiles. Debris from the missiles fell on residential neighborhoods but no injuries or damage were reported. “This hostile action by the Houthi militias proves the continued involvement of the Iranian regime,” Saudi coalition spokesman Col. Turki al Maliki said. May 9: The Houthis fired missiles at economic targets in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia intercepted one missile, and another missile landed in an uninhabited area in the desert south of the capital. May 11: Some 40 Houthis were killed during clashes with Yemeni forces outside the city of Hodeidah. May 14: Houthi rebels launched a ballistic missile at a Saudi Aramco facility in southern Jizan province. The missile landed in the open desert and no damage was inflicted, the Saudi-led coalition said. May 19: Saudi Arabia intercepted ballistic missiles from the Houthis, which were targeting the city of Khamis Mushait. May 22: The United States sanctioned five Iranians it said provided Yemen's Houthis with technical expertise and weaponry to launch attacks against Saudi Arabia. May 29: Yemeni forces advanced within 20 kilometers of the Houthi-held Hodeidah port. June 13: Heavy fighting resumed in the Durayhimi district south of the Hodeidah port after the Houthi rebels failed to meet a UAE deadline to surrender the port. The Saudi-UAE-backed coalition said that it had plans to ensure the provision of humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians, even though most aid arrived through the port. The U.N. called for an emergency meeting to discuss the worsening humanitarian crisis. June 19: Government forces seized the Hodeidah port from the Houthi rebels. The government needed control of the port to protect shipping routes and prevent the Houthis from smuggling weapons into the country. June 25: The Saudi-led coalition announced that it had killed eight members of Hezbollah in the battle against the Houthis. Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite militia and political party supported by Iran, had previously denied accusations that it was providing assistance to the rebels. July 1: The UAE paused its military campaign on Hodeidah to allow U.N. peace negotiations to be “fully explored.” The United Nations met with leaders of both parties to the civil war and suggested that an international body might assume management of Hodeida port through the negotiations. July 5: The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 17,350 households (over 121,000 people) had been displaced from Hodeidah in the month of June by renewed air attacks on the port city by the Saudi-led coalition. Approximately 80,000 received food and medical aid from humanitarian aid workers, but the report warned that only half of the displaced children could attend school. July 25: Houthi rebels attacked a Saudi oil tanker in the Red Sea. The Saudi-led coalition claimed that the tanker was only slightly damaged “due to immediate intervention of the Coalition's fleet.” July 29: The Saudi-led coalition abandoned the July 1 ceasefire and renewed airstrikes on the Hodeidah port city in response to the attack on Saudi oil tankers. Saudi Arabia also announced that it would suspend shipments through the Bab al Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important waterways for shipping, until the waterway was safe from similar attacks. The coalition had not made any progress in securing the port city since it launched the campaign on June 12. July 31: The Houthis promised to suspend attacks in the Red Sea for two weeks to support peace negotiations. Mohammed Ali al Houthi suggested that the ban on attacks could be extended if the Saudi-led coalition reciprocated. July 31: A roadside bombing in Aden wounded Aref Ahmed Ali, a prominent member of the Islah party. Three other members of Yemen’s branch of the Muslim brotherhood were also wounded. Aug. 2: A series of explosions around Hodeidah killed 55 civilians and injured 170 more. The blasts hit crowded population centers, including a fish market and the area surrounding al Thawra hospital. Saudi Arabia blamed the Houthi rebels in a letter to the United Nations and demanded immediate disarmament and enforcement of U.N. resolutions. Aug. 7: An investigation by the Associated Press found that the Saudi-led coalition had cut numerous deals with al Qaeda militants in Yemen, paying the fighters to retreat or recruiting them to the coalition. The deals reportedly allowed the coalition to claim victories over their enemies without engaging in combat. Aug. 9: A coalition airstrike on Saada killed at least 29 children and wounded 30 more when it hit a school bus. Houthi-run Al-Masirah TV reported even higher numbers. The coalition defended its actions and claimed that it does not target civilians despite several accusations from human rights groups. Aug. 31: The US military seized over 1,000 smuggled rifles from ships around the Gulf of Aden. The ships were bound for Yemen, and the sailors aboard were handed over to the Saudi-backed government after the U.S. Navy discovered the arms cache. Sept. 9: U.N. peace talks collapsed when the Houthi delegation claimed that logistical difficulties prevented them from attending the talks. The Yemeni delegation accused the United Nations of giving the Houthis excuses to ignore a U.N. resolution. Sept. 12: The Yemeni army, assisted by the Saudi coalition, seized two roads near Hodeidah from the Houthi rebels. The move cut off two of the Houthi’s main supply routes into the city and followed a renewal of airstrikes on the rebel forces. Sept. 25: The Saudi-led coalition agreed to open a humanitarian aid corridor between Hodeidah and Sanaa, two rebel strongholds in Yemen. The coalition worked with the United Nations to get supplies to starving civilians. Oct. 2: Saudi Arabia transferred $200 million to Yemen’s Central Bank to stabilize the currency amidst the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Millions of Yemenis were already close to starving, and the currency freefall threatened even more civilians with famine. Saudi Arabia hoped to boost local economies and slow the devaluation of the rial. Oct. 3: The Houthis released two sons of the late President Saleh in Sanaa after detaining the men for 10 months. The Houthi media agency said that the brothers were released by a pardon from the Supreme Political Council after mediation by the Sultan of Oman. Oct. 13: President Hadi fired Prime Minister Ahmed bin Dagher and appointed Mae’en Abdulmalik Said as his replacement. The former Minister of Public Works was charged with revitalizing the collapsing economy. Oct. 24: An airstrike reportedly killed at least 16 civilians and wounded 12 in Hodeidah province. The Saudi-led coalition hit a vegetable packaging factory in Bayt al Faqih. Nov. 2: The Saudi-led coalition announced that it had bombed an air base near the Sanaa airport. A Houthi media outlet counted 30 airstrikes on the base and surrounding area. The coalition claimed that the Houthi rebels were using the base to launch ballistic missiles and drones, and that no commercial flights or humanitarian aid efforts were affected by the attack. Nov. 18: In response to demands from the United Nations and a pause in Saudi attacks on Hodeidah, the Houthi rebels promised to stop missile attacks on the Saudi-led coalition. The group said it would agree to a ceasefire if the coalition was ready for peace. Nov. 20: Outbreaks of street fighting and airstrikes around Hodeidah ended a day-long ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels. Residents described the fighting as the worst yet. Dec. 2: The United Nations helped evacuate 50 wounded Houthi soldiers to Oman for treatment. The Saudi-led coalition explained the evacuation as a “confidence-building measure” ahead of a second attempt at peace talks in Sweden. Dec. 13: U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres joined the final day of Yemeni peace talks in Sweden. Negotiations produced a prisoner swap, resumed oil and gas trade, reopened the Sanaa airport, and paid civilian salaries, but control of the Hodeidah port remained a pressing issue. The Houthis wanted the port to be neutral while the coalition forces insisted on government control over the port. They eventually agreed to a ceasefire and a second round of peace talks in January. 2019 Jan. 10: A Houthi drone attack on the al Anad base killed six soldiers and wounded 12 others, ending a short ceasefire negotiated with the U.N. in December. Jan. 15: The second round of U.N. peace talks fell apart when both sides refused to sit down with the other after reports that both had violated the ceasefire agreement. Jan. 17: The U.N. delegation overseeing the truce was fired upon in Hodeidah. An armored vehicle carrying Patrick Cammaert was struck, although no one was injured. Both the Houthis and the coalition blamed each other for the attack. Jan. 19: The Saudi-led coalition attacked Sanaa, further eroding prospects for a peace agreement. A coalition spokesman claimed that the airstrikes targeted Houthi military facilities, which the rebels used to launch drone attacks. Feb. 5: A round of negotiations in Amman, Jordan focused on prisoner exchanges as a critical first step in the peace process. UN Special Envoy Griffiths said that a list of thousands of prisoners would be given to the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations. March 18: A report by the Norwegian Refugee Council found that the average number of civilian casualties in Yemen had doubled since the U.N. ceasefire was instituted in December. While violence in Hodeidah had decreased, increased attacks in other parts of the country had offset that reduction. April 2: Doctors Without Borders reported that the cholera outbreak in Yemen was the worst in history with some 1.4 million cases. April 16: President Trump vetoed a Senate resolution that proposed to withdraw American support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. May 11: The Houthi forces began to remove troops from the Saleef port in Hodeidah as a “show of commitment” to the UN-negotiated peace agreement. This was the first concession towards the agreement the Houthis made, although the Saudi coalition claimed it was a facade intended to boost the Houthi’s standing at future meetings. May 15: Fighting resumed in Hodeidah just days after the Houthis had reportedly pulled troops out of the port. May 25: President Hadi acccused U.N. Special Envoy Griffiths of siding with the Houthis. In a letter, he claimed Griffiths had treated the Houthis as legitimate government and that Griffiths had not held the Houthis accountable for fulfilling their promises under previous agreements. June 3: The Saudi-led coalition captured the leader of the Yemeni ISIS affiliate along with three other ISIS members. June 15: The Houthis launched a drone strike on Saudi Arabia’s Abha airport, the most recent of several drone and missile strikes on Saudi territory. Another strike on the Saudi Jizan airport killed 26 on June 12. June 20: A British court ruling on arms sales to Saudi Arabia declared the use of British weapons in Yemen illegal. The historic ruling recognized a breach of international humanitarian law, setting a precedent for challenging the arms trade and reducing Western support for either party to the civil war. Aug. 4: The Houthis reached an agreement with the World Food Programme (WFP), which allowed the U.N. aid organization to resume deliveries in rebel-held areas. The WFP had previously accused the rebels of stealing and misusing aid deliveries and suspended aid, affecting an estimated 850,000 people. Sept. 2: Saudi-backed coalition forces bombed a prison just south of Sanaa, killing at least 60. The coalition claimed that it was targeting a weapons stash in accordance with international humanitarian law, but Houthi media said that many of the prisoners killed were due to be released in a negotiated prison swap. The Houthis accused the coalition of war crimes. It was the deadliest attack to date in 2019. Sept. 10: Houthi militants and coalition representatives agreed to establish a de-escalation center in Hodeidah. The center, which would be overseen by the United Nations, would host “liaison and coordination officers” from both sides. Sept. 26: After clashes with separatists supported by the UAE in Aden, the Yemeni government announced that it would move the interim capital to Ataq “until the liberation of Aden and Sanaa.” Sept. 30: The Houthis announced that they would unconditionally release 350 prisoners who were listed in the prisoner exchange deal both parties had signed in December. The rebels claimed to have captured thousands of Saudi troops a few days earlier, but still asked their opponents to reciprocate the goodwill gesture and release their own prisoners. Oct. 14: Saudi forces retook Aden, ending the standoff between the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and southern separatists supported by the UAE. The UAE had begun withdrawing troops from the city a few days earlier. Nov. 5: The Saudi-backed Yemeni government signed an agreement with southern separatists intended to end coalition infighting. The Riyadh agreement called for power-sharing, a cabinet with equal representation from the north and the south, and contributions to national security from both groups. Nov. 13: Officials from both the Saudi-backed coalition and Houthi rebels said that the two sides engaged in indirect peace talks. Oman facilitated the discussions via video conference and through European intermediaries, and said that they focused on interim goals. Nov. 25: A U.S. warship seized a significant cache of Iranian weapons bound for Yemen’s Houthi rebels. A U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard boarding team interdicted the weapons during a flag verification of a small wooden boat in the northern Arabia Sea. “An initial investigation indicates that these advanced missile components are of Iranian origin,” the Pentagon said. On December 5, the U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, revealed that components of anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, air defense missiles, and anti-tank missiles were found. “The weapon components comprise the most sophisticated weapons seized by the U.S. Navy to date during the Yemen conflict,” he said. 2020 Feb. 13: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said that it had seized a large cache of Iranian-made weapons from a dhow in the Arabian Sea. The military equipment, which included surface-to-air-missiles and anti-tank missiles, was “identical” to the weapons systems captured by the United States in the northern Arabian Sea in November, according to the CENTCOM statement. The United States “assessed” that those arms were produced by Iran and bound for Yemen’s Houthis in violation of a U.N. Security Council embargo on supplying arms to the rebels. Feb. 17: The United Nations announced that the coalition and rebels had agreed on the first “package” of prisoners to be swapped. July 8: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that U.S. and partner forces had seized Iranian arms bound for Houthi rebels in Yemen. The weapons – including 200 rocket-propelled grenades, more than 1,700 AK rifles and various types of missiles – were found on a boat off the coast of Yemen on June 28. It was the third arms shipment interdicted by the United States since November 2019. Aug. 26: The Southern Transitional Council (STC), Yemen’s southern separatists, withdrew from the Riyadh Agreement. The STC cited military escalation and crumbling public services for its withdrawal from the agreement, which was backed by the Saudis and intended to end violence within the anti-Houthi coalition. Oct. 15: The Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition began a two-day prisoner swap. The U.N. brokered the exchange of more than 1,000 prisoners with support from International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Yemen. The ICRC’s Middle East director, Fabrizio Carboni, described the event as “a good first step towards building the confidence needed between parties to the conflict.” Oct. 29: The U.S. Justice Department filed a complaint to forfeit two shipments of Iranian missiles bound for Yemen, as well as 1.1 million barrels of oil intended for Venezuela. The missiles were seized by the U.S. in November 2019 and February 2020, and the oil was captured in August 2020. The arms were allegedly sent by the Revolutionary Guards. Nov. 25: The Houthis allowed the United Nations to assess for repairs a decaying oil tanker that has been stranded off the Yemeni coast since 2015. The tanker was moored in Houthi territory, but the surrounding ocean is controlled by the Saudi coalition, preventing the Houthis from selling the oil. A spill from the vessel could cause a significant environmental disaster and could shut down Yemen’s main Hodeidah port. Dec. 18: The Saudi-led coalition announced a new cabinet in the internationally-recognized government that will share power between the northern and southern separatists. This new government, headed by Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik, united the anti-Houthi factions in Yemen whose conflicts have limited U.N efforts to establish a ceasefire. Dec. 30: The Aden International Airport was hit by a large explosion, killing 26 and injuring at least 50. The attack came shortly after the new cabinet had landed at the airport and was followed by another explosion near the presidential palace. Yemeni Information Minister Moammar al Eryani blamed the Houthis for the explosions, but the Houthis denied responsibility. 2021 Jan. 10: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would list the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity. The designations will provide additional tools to hold the Houthis accountable for “terrorist acts, including cross-border attacks threatening civilian populations, infrastructure, and commercial shipping.” The U.S. sanctions were scheduled to go into effect on January 19, the last full day of the Trump administration. Aid agencies worried that the designations and sanctions would disrupt their supply chains and aid flows; Pompeo’s statement asserted that the U.S. Department of the Treasury will issue special operational licenses to humanitarian groups. Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al Houthi denounced the move as “terrorist" policy. The Houthis “reserve the right to respond to any designation issued by the Trump administration or any administration.” Feb 7: The Houthis launched a campaign to capture Marib Governorate, a stronghold of the Yemeni government. Marib is strategically significant because it is the center of gas and oil production. The battle for control of Marib has continued since this date. Feb. 10: The Houthis launched four bomb-laden drones at Abha International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia. One civilian plane caught fire. Feb. 12: The Biden administration announced that the terrorist designation of the Houthis would be revoked on February 16. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that its decision would ensure that U.S. policies do not impede aid efforts. “By focusing on alleviating the humanitarian situation in Yemen, we hope the Yemeni parties can also focus on engaging in dialogue.” But Washington “remains clear-eyed about Ansarallah’s malign actions,” Blinken added. He said that the three Houthi leaders - Abdul Malik al Houthi, Abd al Khaliq Badr al Din al Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim - designated as terrorists by the Trump administration would remain sanctioned. Nov. 11: The Houthis had detained an unspecified number of Yemeni security guards who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, the State Department announced. A “majority” of the staff had been released. The State Department urged the Houthis to release the remaining guards, vacate the compound and return seized property. Dec. 25: An unspecified projectile killed two people in a store in Jazan in southern Saudi Arabia. Riyadh blamed the Houthis. On the same day, the Saudi-led coalition launched an airstrike against weapons storehouses at a Houthi camp in Ajama near Sanaa in Yemen. At least three people were reportedly killed and six others were injured. 2022 Jan 3: The Saudi-led coalition accused the Houthis of “piracy” after they seized an Emirati-flagged vessel, the Rwabee, in the Red Sea. The coalition said that the ship carried medical supplies from a dismantled field hospital. But the Houthis claimed that they found military supplies aboard. They aired footage of rifles, military-style rafts and trucks. Jan 17: The Houthis claimed responsibility for what appeared to be a drone attack that killed three people and wounded six in Abu Dhabi. An initial report stated that small flying objects fell and may have sparked a blast that destroyed three oil tankers and started a fire at the airport. The Houthis said that five ballistic missiles and a “large number” of drones were used in the operation. In response, the Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes on Sanaa. At least 12 people were killed and 11 were injured, according to Al Masirah, a television station run by the Houthis. The attack targeted a residential neighborhood, according to Human Rights Watch. Jan 20: The Saudi-led coalition launched a late-night airstrike on a telecommunications building in Hodeida that knocked out the internet across Yemen until January 25. Jan 21: The Saudi-led coalition conducted airstrikes on a Houthi detention facility in Saada in northern Yemen. A local human rights organization reported that 82 people were killed and 162 were injured. Houthi forces reportedly shot detainees who tried to escape. Medical workers said that 16 of the dead and 35 of the injured were shot. Jan 24: Emirati and U.S. military forces intercepted two ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis toward Abu Dhabi. The some 2,000 U.S. troops housed at Al Dahfra Air Base sheltered in bunkers and fired Patriot missiles in response. The Houthis claimed that they had launched drones and ballistic missiles at several sites, including the base. “We warn foreign companies and investors to leave the Emirates!" Yehia Sarei, the Houthi military spokesman, said. “This has become an unsafe country!” The attack marked a serious escalation in tensions. Feb. 7: General Kenneth McKenzie, the head of U.S. Central Command, said that the United States would help strengthen UAE defenses. He implicated Iran in providing advanced weaponry to the Houthis. “Medium range ballistic missiles that were fired from Yemen and entered UAE were not invented, built, designed in Yemen,” McKenzie told reporters before arriving in Abu Dhabi. “All that happened somewhere else. So I think we certainly see the Iranian connection to this.” March 25: A large fire was ignited at an oil depot in Jeddah a day before the start of the Formula 1 Saudi Arabian Grand Prix. The Houthis claimed to have launched missiles at Aramco facilities and drones at two refineries. Formula 1 decided to hold the races despite the attack. April 2: A two-month ceasefire between the Houthis and the Yemeni government went into effect after U.N.-brokered peace talks. The United States and Iran welcomed the first nationwide truce since 2016. June 2: The Houthis and the Yemeni government agreed to extend the U.N.-brokered ceasefire for another two months. “The truce represents a significant shift in the trajectory of the war and has been achieved through responsible and courageous decision making by the parties,” Hans Grundberg, the U.N. special envoy for Yemen, said in a statement. He said that he would work with the warring parties to reach a political settlement and end the war. Cameron Glenn from the U.S. Institute of Peace, the primary author of this article, originally published it in 2015. Garrett Nada and Mattisan Rowan from the U.S. Institute of Peace updated this report.
8955	dbpedia	2	16	https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/yemen/	en	The World Factbook	https://www.cia.gov/the-…1f66c6c2685054a1	https://www.cia.gov/the-…1f66c6c2685054a1	[ "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/261475bc43d2ef51e08e8684fb77c41a/7f08a/YM_001.jpg", "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/261475bc43d2ef51e08e8684fb77c41a/7f08a/YM_001.jpg", "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/ef03f3a4740eb9c84e5bd7686c86b09f/28380/YM-flag.jpg", "https://www...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			/the-world-factbook/favicon-32x32.png?v=c3853bf09f084a8b1f66c6c2685054a1		null	Background The Kingdom of Yemen (colloquially known as North Yemen) became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic. The British, who had set up a protectorate area around the southern port of Aden in the 19th century, withdrew in 1967 from what became the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (colloquially known as South Yemen). Three years later, the southern government adopted a Marxist orientation and changed the country's name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributed to two decades of hostility between the states, which were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A southern secessionist movement and brief civil war in 1994 was quickly subdued. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed to delineate their border. Fighting in the northwest between the government and the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010, and then again from 2014 to the present. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2007. Public rallies in Sana'a against then President Ali Abdallah SALIH -- inspired by similar Arab Spring demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt -- slowly gained momentum in 2011, fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. Some protests resulted in violence, and the demonstrations spread to other major cities. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) mediated the crisis with the GCC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH eventually agreed to step down and transfer some powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. After HADI's uncontested election victory in 2012, SALIH formally transferred all presidential powers. In accordance with the GCC Initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. HADI concluded the NDC in 2014 and planned to proceed with constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections. The Houthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces with SALIH and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen, which culminated in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabled their forces to overrun the capital, Sana'a, in 2014. In 2015, the Houthis surrounded key government facilities, prompting HADI and the cabinet to resign. HADI fled first to Aden -- where he rescinded his resignation -- and then to Oman before moving to Saudi Arabia and asking the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen. Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes, and ground fighting continued through 2016. In 2016, the UN initiated peace talks that ended without agreement. Rising tensions between the Houthis and SALIH culminated in Houthi forces killing SALIH. In 2018, the Houthis and the Yemeni Government participated in UN-brokered peace talks, agreeing to a limited cease-fire and the establishment of a UN mission. In 2019, Yemenâs parliament convened for the first time since the conflict broke out in 2014. Violence then erupted between HADI's government and the pro-secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in southern Yemen. HADI's government and the STC signed a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting, and in 2020, the signatories formed a new cabinet. In 2020 and 2021, fighting continued as the Houthis gained territory and also conducted regular UAV and missile attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia. In 2022, the UN brokered a temporary truce between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. HADI and his vice-president resigned and were replaced by an eight-person Presidential Leadership Council. Although the truce formally expired in 2022, the parties nonetheless refrained from large-scale conflict through the end of 2023. Saudi Arabia, after the truce expired, continued to negotiate with the Yemeni Government and Houthis on a roadmap agreement that would include a permanent ceasefire and a peace process under UN auspices. Telecommunication systems general assessment: Yemen continues to provide an exceptionally challenging market for telcos; civil unrest has caused havoc and devastation across most parts of the country, while the threat of sanctions has also made it a challenging environment in which to operate; a large proportion of the population requires humanitarian assistance, and there is little disposable income for services upon which telcos can generate revenue; essential telecom infrastructure, such as mobile towers and fiber cabling, has often been targeted, destroyed, or damaged by the opposing sides in the ongoing conflict; these difficulties have proved to be a disincentive to telcos investing in infrastructure, with the result that the country lacks basic fixed-line infrastructure, and mobile services are based on outdated GSM; this has prevented the development of a mobile broadband sector, or the evolution of mobile data services; the ownership of telecommunication services, and the scrutiny of associated revenues and taxes, have become a political issue in Yemen; until telecom infrastructure can be improved across Yemen, and until civil unrest eases, there will be little progress for the sector (2022) domestic: fixed-line teledensity is 4 per 100 but mobile cellular is 46 per 100 (2021) international: country code - 967; landing points for the FALCON, SeaMeWe-5, Aden-Djibouti, and the AAE-1 international submarine cable connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2020) Military - note government forces under the Yemeni Ministry of Defense are responsible for territorial defense, but also have internal security functions; their main focus is on the Houthi rebels and protecting Yemenâs maritime borders, which are susceptible to smuggling of arms, fighters, and other material support for the Houthis and terrorist groups operating in Yemen, including al-Qaâida in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Yemen; the National Army is organized into brigades of armored, border guard, infantry, mechanized, presidential protection, and special forces; the brigades vary significantly in size, structure, and capabilities; the Air Force has small numbers of mostly Soviet-era aircraft while the Navy and Coast Guard have a few patrol boats in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states (UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt) intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Houthis; Saudi military forces conducted operations in Yemen and raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border; UAE's participation in 2015 included several thousand ground troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a smaller military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); UAE has recruited, trained, and equipped tens of thousands of Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units Houthi (aka Ansarallah) forces are organized into combat, presidential protection, special forces, and tribal/militia/paramilitary brigades and independent battalions; the Houthis also have UAV and missile units, as well as naval forces (mines, anti-ship missiles, and some boats); Iran has provided military and political support to the Houthis; in January 2024, the US Government designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group; the designation came after the Houthis began launching attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, as well as military forces positioned in the area to defend the safety and security of commercial shipping (2024)
8955	dbpedia	2	41	https://jcpa.org/article/iran-sanaa-yemen/	en	Iran: Sana’a, Yemen Is “the Fourth Arab Capital in Our Hands”	https://i0.wp.com/jcpa.o…=240%2C240&ssl=1	https://i0.wp.com/jcpa.o…=240%2C240&ssl=1	[ "https://res.cloudinary.com/dolgvcjae/image/upload/c_scale,w_436/v1687682619/jcpa_logo_white_transparent_text_oneline_large_bqa5dq.png", "https://i0.wp.com/jcpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Iran’s-copying-machine.jpg?resize=555%2C367", "https://i0.wp.com/jcpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Yemen-map.png?resiz...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2014-11-03T14:28:06+00:00	Iran commands the Strait of Hormuz and now is trying to seize the Bab el-Mandeb Strait - Iran: Sana’a, Yemen Is “the Fourth Arab Capital in Our Hands”	en	https://i0.wp.com/jcpa.o…it=32%2C32&ssl=1	Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs	https://jcpa.org/article/iran-sanaa-yemen/	Institute for Contemporary Affairs Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation Vol. 14, No. 36 November 3, 2014 Yemen’s geostrategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea and across from the Horn of Africa along with the inherent weakness of the central regime has made it an attractive target for subversion by external power centers. In September, Shia rebels took over the capital city of Sana’a and the Al-Hudaydah port on the Red Sea. Iran has long been trying to take over the sea lanes surrounding the Arab world. It commands the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and is now trying to seize the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. A member of the Iranian parliament who is close to Khamenei declared, “Three Arab capitals (Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad) have already fallen into Iran’s hands and belong to the Iranian Islamic Revolution.” He suggested Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, is the fourth. Iran views Yemen as a convenient staging ground for subversive activity against Saudi Arabia, its main religious-political rival in the Middle East. There is nothing new in Iran’s subversive activity aimed at promoting Shia Islam in various Middle Eastern countries. Iran’s officials no longer fear voicing Iran’s real intentions and have become open, blunt, and defiant in doing so. Iran will keep trying to augment its advantage over Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Arab world with its nuclear program, or, to put it simply, a “Shia bomb,” which would provide an umbrella and immunity for promoting the further spread of the Shia revolution and the survival of the regime. In recent years the Yemeni government conducted a series of military operations against rebels of the al-Houthi clan of the Zaidi sect of Shia Islam.1 This conflict, which has already gone on for over 10 years, stems from feelings of political, economic, and social discrimination among the Zaidi Shia residents of Yemen’s north. The Houthis constitute about 30 percent of Yemen’s population, which totals over 25 million people. The Zaidi Shia are considered one of the moderate Shia schools, closer from a legal standpoint to the Shafi’i school of the Sunna. At the same time, since the Islamic Revolution in Iran and all the more so in recent years with growing Iranian subversive activity in Yemen, the Zaidi Shia have been increasingly exposed to the ideological influence and political agenda of the regime in Iran, leading to a change in the usually moderate attitudes of the Zaidi Shia.2 Yemen’s geostrategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea and across from the Horn of Africa, along with the inherent weakness of the central regime, has made it an attractive target for subversion by external power centers, both political and nonpolitical. That pertains particularly to Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Al Qaeda as another disruptive element. In September, Shia rebels of Ansar Allah (Houthi’s military wing) were able to exploit the weakness of Yemen’s central government, which is also engaged in a struggle with the Sunni Al Qaeda and with tribal and separatist elements in the southern part of the country. Ansar Allah took over on September 21 the capital city of Sana’a and the Al-Hudaydah port (150 kilometers southwest of Sana’a) on the Red Sea, Yemen’s second most important port after Aden almost without resistance by the security forces and the Yemeni army. The Houthi forces’ entry into the capital was accompanied by calls of “Death to America” and “Death to the Jews,” imprecations heard frequently from the Iranian regime. Battles are also being waged in Yemen between Ansar Allah and Ansar al-Sharia, which is affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and has had difficulty coming to terms with the recent Shia successes in Yemen. The Houthi Shia rebels, having conquered Sana’a and Al-Hudaydah, are now concentrating their efforts on a further conquest of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. This key waterway, the southern gateway to the Red Sea, passes through the Gulf of Aden, linking the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, and historically constituted a strategic hub connecting Eastern and Western trade routes. Yemen overlooks and indeed commands movement through the strait from the island of Miyun (Birim). From the African side, Eritrea and Djibouti overlook the strait. Iran views Yemen, in general, and the northern Shia sector in particular, as a convenient staging ground for subversive activity against Saudi Arabia, its main religious-political rival in the Middle East, via the Saudis’ “backyard.” Iran also sees Yemen as an important factor in its policy of establishing a physical Iranian presence, both ground and naval, in the countries and ports of the Red Sea littoral, which control the shipping lanes that lead from the Persian Gulf to the heart of the Middle East and onward to Europe. If the Shia rebels gain control of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, Iran can attain a foothold in this sensitive region giving access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, a cause of concern not only for its sworn rivals Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states, but also for Israel and European countries along the Mediterranean. Arab commentators in the Gulf have warned in recent years about this Iranian push. For example, economic analyst Muhammad Abduh al-Absi said in an interview to Asharq Al-Awsat that Iran has long been trying to take over the sea lanes surrounding the Arab world. It commands the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf (through which five million barrels of oil pass daily) and now is trying to seize the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (through which three million barrels of oil pass daily), which forms a key conduit of trade for all the states along the Red Sea. Al-Absi emphasized that Houthi control of the strait will have a harmful impact on the entire world, but those that will suffer the most will be the Gulf states, which will be at Iran’s mercy.3 Before invading Sana’a and seizing other parts of the country, the Houthis were concentrated in the city of Sa’dah in northern Yemen, on the Saudi border. There the Zaidi Shia form a majority of the population. Now the Houthis are trying to extend their control beyond the oil-rich Mar’ib province in the country’s east. Sana’a: The Fourth Arab Capital to Fall into Iran’s Hands For Iran, which in recent years has supported the Houthis’ struggles as part of its fight with Saudi Arabia over regional influence, the Houthis’ recent gains in Yemen mark an impressive achievement. Senior Iranian spokesmen have referred publicly and particularly defiantly to the latest Houthi successes and have not hidden their support and satisfaction with the expansion of their control in Yemen and their political gains. It should be noted that before the Arab spring erupted and undermined the old order in the Middle East harsh criticism was leveled in Iran at the government’s helplessness in the face of the “slaughter of the Shia” in Yemen. Ali Akbar Velayati, former Iranian foreign Minister, and currently adviser on international affairs to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and president of the Expediency Council’s Center for Strategic Research, recently told a group of Yemeni clerics in Tehran: “The Islamic Republic of Iran supports the rightful struggles of Ansar Allah [Houthis] in Yemen and considers this movement as part of the successful materialization of the Islamic Awakening [the name Iran adopted for the “Arab Spring”] movements.”4 Velayati added that the Houthis had succeeded in creating a movement without precedent in any Arab state, and that their frequent and rapid triumphs (in the domestic arena) proved that “Ansar Allah planned their moves well in advance [perhaps hinting at Iranian involvement?] and learned from past experience.” [5]Velayati added that he was sure Ansar Allah’s triumph in Yemen meant that the Houthis would play a similar role to the one Hizbullah plays in Lebanon.6 Velayati was asked about the effects of the Yemeni revolution and responded, “The important issue is that the road to freeing Palestine passes from Yemen since Yemen has a strategic location and is near Indian Ocean, Gulf of Oman and Bab al-Mandeb.”7 Ali Riza Zakani, a member of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) who is close to Khamenei, said in a similar vein but with the defiance that increasingly marks Iran’s foreign policy, “Three Arab capitals (Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad) have already fallen into Iran’s hands and belong to the Iranian Islamic Revolution.” He added that Iran is now at a stage of “Grand Jihad” [one of the outcomes of the Arab Spring] and must carefully calibrate its foreign policy to this reality. Iran’s functionaries, he asserted, must be informed of the regional developments and the political actors in each country, through whom one can influence the course of events and help “the oppressed peoples in the Middle East.” Ali Riza Zakani added that, whereas before the revolution there were two principal trends – Saudi Islam and Turkish secularism, today the Islamic Revolution has changed the power equations in the region in its own favor and Iran is now at the height of its power, imposing its will and strategic interests on the region as a whole. Zakani praised the activity of Qasam Suleimani, commander of the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF), and said that without the Qods Force’s intervention in Baghdad it would have fallen into ISIS’s hands. “If Haj Qassem [Suleymani] had come to Baghdad several hours later it would have fallen,” said Zakani. The same held true for Syria, according to Zakani: “If we had hesitated in the face of the Syrian crisis and not intervened militarily, the Syrian regime would already have fallen at the beginning of the revolt.” After Assad’s victory in the elections, he said, “Instead of congratulating me, congratulate the leadership of Iran.” Social networks post pictures of Qasam Suleimani on visits to Iraq and in meetings he holds with commanders of the Iraqi army, with the Kurdish Peshmerga, and with Shiite militias in Iraq that are fighting ISIS.8 First Yemen, then Saudi Arabia As for Yemen, Zakani added that it constitutes “a natural extension of the Iranian Revolution…. What is happening in Yemen is bigger than what’s happening in Lebanon… 14 of its 20 provinces will soon to fall into Houthi control.” In a jibe at Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s sworn enemy, he warned the revolution would not be restricted to Yemen and would also permeate deeply into the Saudi kingdom …. After the victory of the revolution in Yemen, the turn of Saudi Arabia will inevitably come because these two countries (Yemen and Saudi Arabia) share 2,000 kilometers of common borders. Now there are two million organized armed men in Yemen.9 In this vein the editor of Kayhan, who is close to Khamenei, estimated a few days before the Houthi takeover of Sana’a that “the al-Saud family would fall and the kingdom would not survive the Houthi revolution transpiring in Yemen.”10 Yadollah Javani, one of Khamenei’s senior advisers in the IRGC, wrote in the conservative, IRGC-affiliated newspaper Javan that recent developments in Yemen had again shown the power of the Islamic awakening and induced great concern in the Gulf states and in the West. He also remarked that the Houthis in Yemen have accumulated greater experience than other Islamic movements [by implication, Sunni] in the Arab world, and that “it is worth noting the pictures of the Leaders of Iran, Khomeini and Khamenei, that the Yemeni Shia carried.”11 The paper also used the Houthi rebels’ takeover of the Yemeni capital to slam the BBC in Persian, a target of Iranian criticism, saying it prefers highlighting the chickenpox of Iranian opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi to reporting on the dramatic events in Yemen.12 The deputy commander of the IRGC, Hussein Salami, analyzed the strategic situation in the region and assessed that it was favorable to Iran, stressing that Iran is “capable of controlling the political developments in the region without using military force and without having a direct presence on the ground.” Salami added that U.S. aerial attacks on ISIS testify to the United States’ blatant failure, its being sidelined from the main events in the region despite its aim to regain control over them, while the U.S. policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Libya had suffered a complete failure. He pointed to the West’s inability to isolate Iran and noted that the United States, France, and Britain were begging Tehran for help in their war against a small organization, ISIS, which is actually, he claimed, their own creation. In contrast, Salami asserted, “Iran is on the verge of reaching a new level of power…. Today our conflict with the West has expanded to the Mediterranean and this indicates a change in the regional power equations, an increase in our power, and a narrowing of the range of our enemies’ power,” along with the rising power of Islam and the Muslims.13 In this vein Brigadier General Massud Jazayeri, deputy chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, accused the United States (before the Shia rebels’ takeover of Sana’a) of a double-standard policy in Yemen and called on it “to respect the will of the Yemeni people…. The Yemenis do not provoke foreigners, including the United States and the reactionary Arab states [Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states], to interfere in its internal affairs.”14 Houthi-led demonstrations in Yemen calling for restoration of fuel-price subsidies (as indeed was done in the end) and to replace the government won support in the Iranian media. An Iranian journalist interviewed on a Hizbullah-affiliated TV channel, Mayadeen TV, said that: “The Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz tighten the noose on the Red Sea, on Israel in the Suez Canal,” and called Saudi Arabia a “tribe on the verge of extinction.” He added that the leader of the Houthis, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, would become the leader of the Arabian Peninsula and that U.S. president Barack Obama, after having drunk from the poisoned chalice at the gates of Damascus, the walls of Gaza, and the suburbs of Baghdad, was drinking from it for the fourth time in Yemen.15 The conquest of the capital strengthens the Houthis’ bargaining posture in the political negotiations they are conducting with the Yemeni government, and enables them – with Tehran’s encouragement – to pose political dictates and adopt an anti-Western line. For the first time in years, Shiites in Yemen publicly commemorated the day of Ashura in Sana’a to mark the death of Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad.16 Iran has expressed support for the reconciliation agreement that was signed by the Shia rebels and the government in September, a short time after Sana’a fell. Iran will probably intensify its involvement in the Yemeni domestic sphere in line with the Hizbullah model in Lebanon, determining the identity of the prime minister and his government and holding the reins of the army. Iran will do so while exploiting the political vacuum created by the Houthi takeover of the capital. With most of the Houthis’ power concentrated in areas along the Saudi border, Iran will also leverage the Houthis’ gains to step up its effort to subvert the kingdom, with the Shia in the oil-rich areas of eastern Saudi Arabia as its target audience. Yemeni Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa resigned shortly after Sana’a’s fall to the Shia rebels. On October 13 Khaled Bahah (who served until June as UN ambassador) was elected to the post after gaining the support of most of the political groups, and after Chief of Staff Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, the preferred candidate of Presidential Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, was rejected for the post because of Houthi protest. In any case, Bahah’s job will not be easy; he will have to secure the agreement of the Houthis (with Iran meddling behind the scenes) for his moves and deal with the growing battles between the Houthis (Ansar Allah) and Al Qaeda, which has been infiltrating Sana’a, and between Al Qaeda and the army. In addition, the central government remains weak in relation to the south and to the tribal elements. Public Subversion There is nothing new in Iran’s subversive activity in various Middle Eastern countries aimed at promoting Shia Islam. The Arab Spring and the collapse of the old regional order reinforced and accelerated this activity, and Iran is now conducting it publicly without any fear of negative consequences. Iran is exploiting the Arab regimes’ weakness, along with the decline of U.S. influence and power projection in the region, to aggressively promote its agenda, which centers on strengthening the Shia element in the Arab countries. The main change in Iran’s policy is that its senior officials no longer fear voicing Iran’s real intentions and have become open, blunt, and defiant in doing so. Iran’s enhanced confidence is apparent in other areas as well. In southern Lebanon, for example, Hizbullah has gone back to challenging Israel, and for the first time since the 2006 Second Lebanon War the organization was quick to take responsibility for laying explosive charges it activated against the IDF.17 Hizbullah is indeed bogged down in Syria and Iraq, operating in Yemen, and paying a heavy price in blood for its involvements. Yet it is also accumulating battle experience in urban warfare and the conquest of villages. Iran’s defiant posture intensifies the threat felt in the Arab states in general and in the Gulf states in particular. The United States’ continued ignoring of this trend along with its de facto détente policy18 toward Iran further reinforce these states’ unease and sense of threat. Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal said that Iran’s military involvement in active conflicts in the Arab states only fans the flames of these conflicts. At the end of an emergency meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia following the Houthi takeover of Sana’a, the interior ministers of the Arab states declared they “will not stand idly in the face of foreign interventions which are of a sectarian nature, as Yemen’s security and the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are considered one issue which cannot be separated.”19 Yet the GCC states’ ability to intervene in Yemen is limited, even though in the past, after the Shia in Bahrain (who constitute a majority) gained strength and posed a threat to the regime, these states under Saudi leadership sent a military force – the Peninsula Shield Force – to help the king of Bahrain maintain his throne against the Iranian-supported Shia.20 While Iran is not actually part of the coalition fighting ISIS, it reaps the benefits – the weakening of a radical Sunni actor that has been gaining sympathy in the region and in the world and that could threaten Iran’s western border (Iraq). ISIS also diverts the spotlight from Iran’s nuclear program and its subversion of regional countries. Meanwhile Iran continues its activity in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen by means of the Qods Force and local Shia organizations under its authority, thereby ensuring its long-term interests in these countries. Involvement of the Qods Force and the IRGC Since the battles between Yemen and the Houthi Shia rebels began Yemen’s government has accused Iran and Hizbullah of helping the insurgents. Yemen also arrested Hizbullah and IRGC members who aided the Houthi rebels and the secessionist Al-Hirak movement in southern Yemen. The Yemeni prime minister also charged that the leader of the movement, Salem al-Beidh, enjoys Hizbullah protection. Hizbullah also helped establish the Houthi rebels’ Al-Masira radio station. On September 25, Yemeni president Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi was forced to free a number of IRGC members and Hizbullah operatives under the pressure of the Houthis, who had taken over Sana’a. These individuals left Yemen on an Omani plane. At the beginning of the year, IRGC men were arrested at the airport after arriving in Yemen to help train the Houthis.21 In mid-2014 Yemen arrested some Hizbullah operatives who were helping train the Houthi military force. According to different reports, Hizbullah’s Unit 380022 (whose corollary Unit 1800 also operates with Palestinian organizations in Israeli territory) has been training the Houthis’ military wing in Yemen. For years Yemeni security professionals have been charging that Hizbullah is active in training the Houthi rebels’ military wing in northern Yemen. Iran, through the Qods Force and with Hizbullah’s help, is fortifying a presence in Yemen that enables it to smuggle weapons and drugs from Iran to the Yemeni ports and from there via the Red Sea to terror organizations it supports in the Middle East and North Africa and even to European shores. The Shia insurgents’ takeover of the Al-Hudaydah port and their aim to conquer the Bab al-Mandeb Strait further facilitates such activity by Iran. The combination of the Qods Force and Hizbullah Lebanon, which is training local Shia actors, repeats itself in other Middle Eastern countries where Iran is operating, especially Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain. On January 23, 2013, Yemen interdicted an Iranian ship, the Jihan-1, which was carrying weapons for the Houthi rebels. The weapons on the ship included 122-mm rockets, 20 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS), 100 bombs and RPG launchers, Iranian- and Russian-made night-vision binoculars, silencers for automatic weapons, large quantities of high-quality RDX plastic explosives, electronic equipment for the activation or production of IEDs, monitoring equipment, and other weaponry.23 A report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea said the captured shipment may have been intended for the Al Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab terror group.24 It should be noted that the UN investigatory committee revealed that the weaponry was hidden among diesel-fuel tanks, and stated that all the findings led to the conclusion that Iran was behind the smuggling attempt in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1747.25 In October 2009 Yemen interdicted the Mahan-1 ship carrying weapons, mainly antitank missiles for the Houthi rebels.26 A Far-Reaching Struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia The intensifying political-religious-military struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran has expanded to most of the Middle East’s countries. Iran’s power projection to the southern border of Saudi Arabia adds regional implications to the conflict between the Yemeni regime and the Shia rebels well beyond the domestic Yemeni dimension. The ongoing success of the al-Houthi tribe’s revolt with Tehran’s support, which has now led to the takeover of extensive parts of Yemen, creates another locus of regional confrontation (in addition to Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian territories) between Iran and Saudi Arabia, each with its own interests and proxies in the Yemeni arena. The warfare between the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels is not only being waged on the ground but also on TV screens, satellite channels, and social networks. The two main actors in this war for public awareness, however, are Iran and the Saudis. Iran’s media favorably cover the efforts and achievements of the Shia rebels while slamming Saudi Arabia and its ties with the United States; whereas the Saudi-affiliated media, particularly the satellite channel Al Arabiya, which broadcasts from Abu Dhabi with Saudi funding, and the pan-Arab press led by Asharq Al-Awsat, harshly condemn Iran for backing the Houthi rebels and intervening militarily in other Middle Eastern centers of conflict and crisis, particularly Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain. Iran blames Saudi Arabia for manipulating oil prices with the U.S. to weaken Iran. The oil glut, aided by Saudi production, has plunged the current prices close to $80 per barrel; Iran requires more than $100 p/b to sustain its budget. Clear and Present Danger In sum, Iran is continuing to exploit the Arab camp’s weakness and Washington’s hesitant policy toward the developments in the region since the start of the Arab Spring. While the Gulf states, chiefly Saudi Arabia, are occupied with thwarting ISIS and are joining the rickety coalition the United States has formed to defeat it, Iran keeps pursuing with increased intensity and without fear its policy of exporting its revolution to main areas of conflict, particularly Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. Via its proxies, Iran is gradually managing to take hold of strategic areas of the Arab world that are mired in ongoing internal crisis and where there is an active Shia population that has long been subject to Sunni authority. The Arab states’ weakness plays into Iran’s hands; it encounters no substantial resistance to its activity apart from feeble, toothless protests. As for the international community, Iran suddenly finds that it is the United States that, in effect, is helping strengthen and stabilize the Shia axis that extends from Iran through Iraq, Syria (where the United States refrained from military action after Bashar Assad crossed the chemical weapons “red line” it had drawn), Lebanon, and now also crosses the Red Sea to Yemen and back through Bahrain in a sort of circle surrounding the Arab world. For the Gulf states the fall of Sana’a (“the fourth Arab capital in Iran’s hands”) to the Shia rebels and the possibility that they will soon control the Bab al-Mandeb Strait constitute a “clear and present danger.” In the context of its campaign against ISIS, the United States turned to — and was rebuffed by — Iran. Yet Washington believes that its interests in the struggle against ISIS overlap with those of Iran. As in the past, however, it is doing Tehran’s work (as in the defeat of the Taliban in 2001 and the ouster of Saddam Hussein) and serving Tehran’s long-term interest in achieving regional Shia hegemony. Washington is investing limited effort and great diplomatic energy in defeating about 20,000 ISIS operatives while simultaneously strengthening Iran and its role in Iraq and Syria. In actuality, the United States is playing in the Shia court and helping vanquish a radical Sunni actor (ISIS) that poses a substantial challenge to Iran. And in the court of the nuclear talks, the United States is not taking a strong position comparable to the red lines that Iranian Leader Khamenei is laying down.27 In any case, in fighting ISIS Washington is apparently using as collateral its long-term interests connected to its continued presence in the region, ties with traditional regional allies (which are weakening), and attempts to stabilize the region for the pursuit of short-term interests – particularly a conciliatory line toward Iran and avoidance of angering it when there is a common enemy, ISIS. The great fear is that the United States will also take a conciliatory approach in the nuclear negotiations in return for Iran’s continued, apparently indirect cooperation in the war against ISIS. The Sunni-Shia Fault Line Even the “degrading and destroying of ISIS,” as Washington has put it, would not remedy the ongoing collapse of the Middle Eastern political system and old historical order. The relations between (Sunni) Saudi Arabia and (Shia) Iran in particular, and the relations in the Arab world in general, will continue to be defined in the near and more distant future by the religious division and the Sunni-Shia fault line, which has been the dominant factor in these relations for hundreds of years. The Sunni-Shia rivalry will continue to characterize and dictate the course of events in the region; meanwhile, as part of this struggle, Iran goes on gaining strategic territorial assets. This rivalry will also continue to affect other conflict arenas throughout the Middle East where Iran will try to impose its influence, as it does in Lebanon through Hizbullah. Saudi Arabia, for its part, will keep trying to counter the Iranian-Shia threat, as it is doing in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq with great transfusions of money. This will be very difficult for Saudi Arabia in the absence of U.S. support. Yemen, which is not threatened by ISIS and where Iran has now prevailed, is clearly a case in point. A Shia Bomb Meanwhile, Iran will keep trying to augment its advantage over Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Arab world with its nuclear program, or, to put it simply, a “Shia bomb,” which would provide an umbrella and immunity for promoting the spread of the Shia revolution and the survival of the regime. From Iran’s standpoint this will entail the redress of a historical injustice – dating back to the dawn of Islam – of contemptuous, arrogant treatment of the Shia by the Sunnis, while providing a viable, Islamic, Shia alternative for confronting the West and Israel, the West’s “handiwork” in the Middle East, after the repeated failures of Arab nationalism. Should Iran complete its nuclear program and attain a bomb, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states will be forced to settle for an American or Pakistani nuclear umbrella, and may even choose to launch their own nuclear program and thus open a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. More than they fear enriched uranium or a few thousand determined ISIS fighters, the Saudis fear Shiism enriched to high levels of subversion in the east of the kingdom (in the oil-rich areas with their restive Shia population) and to the south (along the border with Yemen). The Houthi takeover of Sana’a, which constitutes an Iranian victory in the pitched battle with Saudi Arabia over its backyard, Yemen, has augmented the Saudi sense of threat and shown that Iran, which is gaining a foothold at the entrance to the Red Sea and the major international shipping lanes, does not intend to stop there. From Iran’s standpoint, Yemen is part of a series of “heavenly” victories as Khamenei calls them (the “victory” of Hizbullah in the Second Lebanon War and the rounds of fighting between Hamas and Israel), as Iran builds its status as a regional power on the ruins of the old Arab and superpowers order. * * * Notes 1 Its name is derived from Zaid ibn Ali (grandson of Hussein), one of the descendants of the Imam Ali, who claimed the rights of the descendants of Ali from the Umayyad caliphs and paid for that with his life (in the year 740). 2 http://jcpa.org/article/yemen-changes-hands/ 3 http://www.aawsat.com/home/article/196851 4 http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930726001299 5 http://www.kayhan.ir/files/en/publication/pages/1393/7/26/137_1084.pdf 6 http://www.arabnews.com/columns/news/648071e_expands_into_yemen_houthis_sanaa 7 http://www.rasanews.ir/en/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=1471 8 https://twitter.com/Iraqnow0/status/519048512177049600 9 http://www.rasanews.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=221379 ; http://www.alkalimaonline.com/article.php?id=271298 10 http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8178.htm#_ednref1 11 http://javanonline.ir/fa/news/679810/%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A 12 http://javanonline.ir/fa/news/676189/%D8%A2%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%BA%D9%88%D9%86-bbc-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86 13 http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81335408/ 14 http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930617001089 15 http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/4530.htm 16 http://www.alalam.ir/news/1644558; http://www.abna.ir/arabic/service/archive/2014/10/29/647758/story.html 17 http://jcpa.org/article/significance-first-hizbullah-attack-israeli-forces-since-2006/ 18 http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-iran-relations-move-to-detente-1414539659 19 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/14476-gulf-states-we-will-not-stand-idly-by-in-front-of-foreign-interventions-in-yemen 20 http://jcpa.org/article/why-iran-is-pushing-for-a-shiite-victory-in-bahrain/ 21 http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/yemen-frees-hizbollah-and-revolutionary-guard-prisoners 22 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollah-in-iraq-a-little-help-can-go-a-long-way 23 http://yemenobserver.com/reports/403-yemen-%E2%80%9Cjihan%E2%80%9D-defendants-in-court.html 24 http://www.iranianuk.com/page.php5?id=20130702225226033 25 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/331 26 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=–OrhgWvbvc&feature=player_embedded
8955	dbpedia	1	1	https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abd-Rabbuh-Mansur-Hadi	en	ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī \| president of Yemen	https://cdn.britannica.c…e.jpg?v=3.124.31	https://cdn.britannica.c…e.jpg?v=3.124.31	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/70/191970-131-A85628DA/Color-wheel-light-color-spectrum.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/47/190947-131-FCF3F960/Olympic-to...	[]	[]	[ "ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[]	null	Other articles where ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī is discussed: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: After Saleh’s resignation, his successor ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī launched an offensive to retake the area in 2012 with the support of the United States, which also carried out series of air strikes by unmanned drones targeting suspected militants. By mid-2012 Yemeni forces had retaken many of the areas formerly…	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abd-Rabbuh-Mansur-Hadi	ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī president of Yemen Learn about this topic in these articles: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula In al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula After Saleh’s resignation, his successor ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī launched an offensive to retake the area in 2012 with the support of the United States, which also carried out series of air strikes by unmanned drones targeting suspected militants. By mid-2012 Yemeni forces had retaken many of the areas formerly… Read More Arab Spring In Arab Spring: Yemen …power to the vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. In accordance with the agreement, Hadi took over governing responsibility immediately and formally assumed the presidency after standing as the sole candidate in a presidential election in February 2012. Unable to improve conditions or maintain stability, however, Hadi’s government faced armed… Read More association with Ṣāliḥ In Ali Abdullah Saleh: Challenges to Saleh’s rule Saleh’s vice president, ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī, took the position of acting president in Saleh’s absence. Read More history of Yemen In Yemen: Transfer of power to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi took the position of acting president. In November, about two months after returning to Yemen, Saleh agreed to a deal that would grant him immunity from prosecution if he ceded some of his power to Hadi and stepped down after a… Read More In Yemen Uprising of 2011–12: Uprising …day, leaving his vice president, ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hadī, to serve as acting president in his absence. Yemeni officials maintained that Ṣāliḥ would quickly return to Yemen and resume his duties, but members of the opposition hailed his absence as an opportunity to negotiate a transition agreement that would formally… Read More Operation Decisive Storm In Mohammed bin Salman: In charge of defense and economic policy Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi a decisive advantage against the Shiʿi Houthi insurgency in the north of the country. It was thought that a Houthi victory might give Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main regional rival, a foothold along Saudi Arabia’s southern border. The campaign, however, failed to… Read More Yemeni Civil War In Yemeni Civil War: The rise of the rebels and the fall of Sanaa Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi took the position of acting president. In November, about two months after returning to Yemen, Saleh agreed to a deal that would grant him immunity from prosecution if he ceded some of his power to Hadi and stepped down after a… Read More
8955	dbpedia	0	19	https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/yemeni-president-abdrabbuh-hadi-steps-down-under-saudi-pressure-report-122041800076_1.html	en	Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Hadi steps down under Saudi pressure: Report	https://bsmedia.business…9490424-8583.jpg	https://bsmedia.business…9490424-8583.jpg	[ "https://sb.scorecardresearch.com/p?c1=2&c2=8021726&cv=4.4.0&cj=1", "https://bsmedia.business-standard.com/include/_mod/site/html5/images/business-standard-logo.png", "https://www.business-standard.com/assets/web-assets/images/logo-bs.webp", "https://bsmedia.business-standard.com/_media/bs/img/article/2020-01...	[]	[]	[ "Countries", "Contemporary history", "Government of Yemen", "IranSaudi Arabia proxy conflict", "Yemeni Crisis", "Houthis", "IranSaudi Arabia relations", "In Yemen", "Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi", "President of Yemen", "Yemen", "Ali Abdullah Saleh", "Consumer Publishing (NEC)", "President", "Pr...	null	[ "Business Standard" ]	2022-04-18T09:13:00+05:30	Prince Mohammed told Hadi that other Yemeni leaders had agreed that it was time for him to relinquish power, according to the Saudi and Yemeni officials	en	https://www.business-standard.com/favicon.ico		https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/yemeni-president-abdrabbuh-hadi-steps-down-under-saudi-pressure-report-122041800076_1.html	(Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)
8955	dbpedia	2	98	https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/middleeast/houthi-rebels-in-yemen-seize-a-capital.html	en	Houthi Rebels in Yemen Seize a Capital	https://static01.nyt.com…op.png?year=2015	https://static01.nyt.com…op.png?year=2015	[ "https://static01.nyt.com/images/2015/03/26/world/middleeast/geography-of-chaos-in-yemen-maps-1427396352427/geography-of-chaos-in-yemen-maps-1427396352427-videoLarge-v6.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Saeed Al-Batati" ]	2015-06-15T00:00:00	Houthi rebel fighters seized Hazm, capital of Jawf Province, tightening their control of the country despite a monthslong, Saudi-led bombing campaign.	en	/vi-assets/static-assets/favicon-d2483f10ef688e6f89e23806b9700298.ico		https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/middleeast/houthi-rebels-in-yemen-seize-a-capital.html	AL MUKALLA, Yemen — Houthi rebel fighters seized the capital of a northwestern Yemeni province bordering Saudi Arabia early Sunday, tightening their control of the country despite a monthslong, Saudi-led bombing campaign intended to force a retreat. The capture of the city, Hazm, capital of Jawf Province, highlighted the steady Houthi advance into most of Yemen’s 21 provinces over the past 10 months. In late March, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Arab states began a military campaign against the Houthis with the goal of restoring President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who was forced into exile by the Houthis, to power. The capture of the town appeared to give the Houthis another bargaining chip in United Nations-sponsored peace talks that are scheduled to begin Monday in Geneva. The capital, Sana, is already dominated by the Houthis, who are fighting for control of other major cities, including Aden and Taiz. The Houthis, who are allied with military forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s former president, have also been able to carry out a string of deadly attacks across the border in Saudi Arabia.
8955	dbpedia	2	20	https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/15943	en	The Case for Mukalla as Yemen’s Capital	https://sanaacenter.org/…/12/Mukalla.jpeg	https://sanaacenter.org/…/12/Mukalla.jpeg	[ "https://sanaacenter.org/wp-content/themes/sanaacenter/assets/img/placeholder.gif", "https://sanaacenter.org/wp-content/themes/sanaacenter/assets/img/translate.svg", "https://sanaacenter.org/wp-content/themes/sanaacenter/assets/img/placeholder.gif", "https://sanaacenter.org/wp-content/themes/sanaacenter/asset...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Farea Al-Muslimi" ]	2021-12-09T15:00:28+00:00	In 2014, the Houthis took control of Sana’a. Five years later, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi lost his temporary capital of Aden to the Southern Transitional Council. Yemen's internationally recognized government is thus in need of a capital. The Cabinet, which spends most of its time in exile in Riyadh and other regional capitals, needs a presence inside Yemen if…	en	https://sanaacenter.org/…h-icon.png?v=1.0	Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies	https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/15943	In 2014, the Houthis took control of Sana’a. Five years later, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi lost his temporary capital of Aden to the Southern Transitional Council. Yemen’s internationally recognized government is thus in need of a capital. The Cabinet, which spends most of its time in exile in Riyadh and other regional capitals, needs a presence inside Yemen if it hopes to reunite the country and remain legitimate. The fact that several ministers are based in Aden, the heartland of a rival political group, is awkward to say the least. There are few safe cities in Yemen that are well placed to serve as a new capital; Mukalla is the top option. The capital of Hadramawt governorate in eastern Yemen, Mukalla is the country’s fourth-largest city. It is a coastal urban sprawl, with a low enough population density to accommodate growth, and has an active port with space to expand along the Arabian Sea, home to some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Once the government is physically positioned in the city, Mukalla could become Yemen’s economic as well as political capital, revitalizing trade via land routes to Oman and Saudi Arabia and internationally via maritime routes to commercial partners in East Asia. Mukalla, unlike other large Yemeni cities, does not suffer from water shortages. Hadramawt, which accounts for more than one-third of Yemen’s territory, borders Marib, Shabwa and Al-Mahra, and produces nearly two-thirds of Yemen’s oil and gas for export. The governorate also enjoys wide social diversity, a measure of economic diversity through its fishing industry and post-war tourism potential, and is home to some of Yemen’s best universities. Sana’a, Aden and Hudaydah — the three largest Yemeni cities — are no longer viable options, and even an end to the war will not necessarily make them better suited. Sana’a, the official capital, is under the control of an armed group, and is likely to run out of water within a few decades due to the projected impact of climate change and years of improper drilling and inland water use. An affordable, sustainable way to supply water to the highland city and its 4 million inhabitants remains out of reach, making growth unsustainable. Aden has been the internationally recognized government’s interim capital since 2015, but the past few years have demonstrated that the city is incapable of restoring its historical role as a center that embraces all Yemenis. Apparently, it cannot even embrace all southerners. There are a number of competing armed groups in Aden, and it is difficult to control the security situation. Aden’s infrastructure, hit hard by the war since 2015, has effectively collapsed and will take decades to repair, and the city suffers serious problems pertaining to garbage and sanitation. Aden is overcrowded and under-resourced. In addition, the plundering and neglect Aden suffered following Yemen’s 1994 civil war at the hands of northern elites, and Sana’a in particular, deflated its cosmopolitan spirit. It is under this pretext that armed warlords who have emerged since 2015 have turned Aden into a city feared by Yemenis. In recent years, residents with northern roots have been threatened and chased out. Hudaydah, a port city along the Red Sea coast, has fewer security problems than Aden or Sana’a. It can provide its own water through desalination. However, Hudayah is currently under Houthi control, and has lost much of its earlier economic value and infrastructure. The commercial sector based around the port city was largely destroyed after 1990, as Aden became the main port post-unification. Hudaydah is now among the poorest cities in Yemen. Choosing an Alternative A few years ago, Taiz was suggested as a potential capital for geographical, cultural and historical reasons. However, in addition to the social and economic destruction it has suffered during the war, it is densely populated and its geography does not lend itself to expansion. The security situation is unstable, and similar to Aden in terms of the presence of irregular armed groups. Taiz struggles to provide sufficient water to its residents. This problem will worsen as the population increases, mostly due to poor infrastructure, which has been neglected for decades and only deteriorated more rapidly over the course of the war. During the past few years, there has been talk of setting up a new capital in Marib or Shabwa governorates, with Marib city or Ataq replacing Sana’a. This is simply impractical, wishful thinking. Beyond the contested military situation there, the area of Marib city is barely equal to a single district of Mukalla. The larger governorate of Marib is desert. The infrastructure is underdeveloped within the city, now home to about 1 million people. Marib has been unable to provide services to an increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), estimated by the International Organization for Migration at 1 million across the governorate, and existing schools and healthcare centers are few in number and not properly equipped. Shabwa is in a similar situation, even though it is home to the most economically significant facility in Yemen, the refinery in Balhaf. Shabwa’s oil and gas wealth are not enough, however, to make the governorate suitable for hosting a national capital. Shabwa’s central city, Ataq, has poor infrastructure, and, like Marib, it is in the middle of the desert, home to strong tribal groups that may chafe at urban expansion. Enter Mukalla Despite its political and economic advantages, comparatively good infrastructure, and elegance and distinction as a city, Mukalla has drawn little international attention except, perhaps, from Saudi Arabia. Many Hadrami expatriates have acquired Saudi nationality since the formation of the modern kingdom. Over the years, they have developed strong financial and business networks in Saudi Arabia, while maintaining a strong connection to their local community in Hadramawt. Perhaps the most important reason for establishing Mukalla as the new capital, and keeping it there after the war, is that it would derail the plans of those parties that want to fragment Yemen, such as the Houthis in the north or the Southern Transitional Council in the south. Furthermore, it would help deter dominant regional powers across Yemen from establishing central control. Restraining both fragmentation and centralization from Mukalla could redefine Yemenis’ relationships with each other, and help address and heal the grievances of the country’s citizens. This piece was originally published in the November 2021 Yemen Review.
8955	dbpedia	0	39	https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/YEM	en	BTI 2024 Yemen Country Report	https://bti-project.org/…24_YEM_EN_CR.png	https://bti-project.org/…24_YEM_EN_CR.png	[ "https://bti-project.org/typo3conf/ext/bti2020/Resources/Public/assets/images/logos/bti.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	“So far, the various political factions in Yemen have failed to understand that they need each other to build a viable state.”	en	/typo3conf/ext/bti2020/Resources/Public/assets/favicon.ico	BTI 2024	https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report	The internationally recognized government (IRG) lost control of the majority of the population of the Republic of Yemen years ago. Numerous political groups, as well as militant Islamist organizations and militias – some of which are sponsored by members of the Saudi-led coalition (SLC) that former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi requested assistance from in 2015 – have assumed control. Fragmentation of the state apparatus is progressing. Institutions such as the government administration, parliament, central bank and even the currency are being duplicated or divided between Ansar Allah (Partisans of God, led by the Huthi family), the IRG and its formal component, the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Ansar Allah’s attempts to gain control of the oil and gas fields in Marib in 2021 led to heavy fighting and the displacement of several thousand people, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) who had sought refuge in Marib. Without access to the country’s hydrocarbon resources, Ansar Allah resorted to highly creative methods of taxation, confiscation and embezzlement of humanitarian aid to finance its operations. Ironically, Ansar Allah implemented several reforms that the International Financial Institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund, IFIs) had long demanded: the abolition of subsidies, expansion of the tax base and stabilization of the currency. Despite claiming the moral high ground in Yemen and internationally, Ansar Allah’s leadership increasingly faces allegations of extortion, kidnapping and sexual violence perpetrated by its leaders and supporters. While the IRG, Ansar Allah and the STC play the blame game, 24.3 million people (out of 34 million) need humanitarian assistance, and 4.3 million have been displaced since 2015. Despite a Saudi-sponsored formal agreement between several parties to the conflict to form a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in April 2022, infighting within the anti-Ansar Allah alliance continued. The head of the PLC, Rashad al-Alimi, has started to organize yet another military force, the Nation Shield Forces. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah attacked oil installations and launched missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The World Bank estimated reconstruction costs at $20 to $25 billion in 2020. GDP growth is negative, inflation is high and poverty is rampant. Political violence, malnutrition and diseases such as malaria, cholera and dengue fever plague the Yemeni population, with only half of the country’s health facilities operational. Despite substantial civic engagement and donor-funded trainings for NGOs (mostly pre-2015), the capacity of civil society remains low due to the suffocating political and security contexts and weak cross-regional networks. While human rights violations are widespread and sexualized violence is increasing, the U.N. Human Rights Council refused to extend the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts (GEE) in 2021. On the positive side, some U.N. interventions have yielded positive results. The prisoners exchange, which was agreed upon in Stockholm in 2018, was successfully implemented, and preparations are underway for another exchange. The two-month truce that began in April 2022 was extended until October 2022, and even afterward, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSEGY) noted the “absence of large-scale fighting.” Negotiations for another truce were ongoing in early 2023. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) formed a delicate alliance with the internationally recognized government (IRG) by signing the Riyadh Agreement in 2019. As part of this agreement, the STC joined the cabinet and the Presidential Leadership Council, although it did not disarm its militias. Furthermore, efforts are underway to address the urgent issue of the ailing Safer oil tanker, which contains over a million barrels of crude oil that could potentially spill into the Red Sea at any moment. Governance in Yemen mostly relies on commitments among individuals and on agreements between social and political actors rather than state institutions. While this has contributed to the current crisis, it also makes Yemeni society more resilient during periods without a government. The Republic of Yemen (RoY) emerged in 1990 from the unification of the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South Yemen). The initial years of the RoY were marked by previously unseen freedom of the press, a constitutional referendum, a multiparty system and elections. However, economic pressure and power struggles between the Yemeni Socialist Party – South (YSP) and the General People’s Congress – North (GPC) as well as the newly formed conservative-Islamist Yemeni Congregation for Reform (YCR), also known as al-Islah, increasingly threatened the nascent democratic framework. In May 1994, the two former state leaders entered into open warfare, with the northern one emerging victorious in July 1994. The postwar coalition government of the GPC and al-Islah immediately amended the constitution, erasing many political and personal freedoms. The YSP boycotted the 1997 elections, which gave the GPC an absolute majority. Al-Islah thus became the dominant opposition party but rarely challenged the GPC. Incumbent President Ali Abdullah Salih, who had been in office as the north’s president since 1978, overwhelmingly won the first direct presidential election in 1999. After the GPC had further consolidated its absolute power with a sweeping victory in the 2003 (and last) parliamentary elections, the Huthi family in northern Sa’dah started an on-and-off rebellion. This rebellion was triggered by economic and political marginalization, as well as the spread of Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism. The spread of this ideology threatened the social status of families claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Meanwhile, the opposition (al-Islah, YSP and some smaller parties) succeeded in developing a common platform. This limited the regime’s ability to play these groups against each other. The opposition negotiated with the government, after Salih’s re-election as president in 2006, to postpone parliamentary elections until April 2011. However, by January 2011, this dialogue had officially failed as the GPC once again submitted wide-ranging constitutional amendments to parliament. Sluggish political and economic transformations contributed to the Yemeni Youth protests that began in January 2011 and put immense pressure on Salih. His heavy-handedness with protesters and his efforts to outwit his opponents and the international community backfired. After the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2014, Salih formally accepted the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, which was supposed to steer the transition period. After being granted legal immunity, Salif handed over presidential powers to Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi on November 22, 2011. The GPC formed a coalition government with al-Islah, which had joined, manipulated and then hijacked the popular protests. While the first phase (90 days) of the transition ran relatively smoothly, the second phase, which was supposed to conclude with elections in February 2014, experienced delays. A National Dialogue Conference (NDC), lasting for a period of 10 months, generated a total of 1,800 recommendations. However, influential members of the southern Hirak movement boycotted the NDC and refused to accept a six-region federation – as opposed to a separate southern state or a two-region federal system. The Ansar Allah movement, led by the Huthi family, also rejected the six-region model due to its potential for severing their access to the port of Hudaidah. Without a mandate, the NDC extended President Hadi’s term when elections had to be postponed. In September 2014, aligned with Salih, Ansar Allah invaded Sana’a. In January 2015, Hadi eventually escaped to Saudi Arabia, leaving behind a political mess and inviting the Saudi government to intervene militarily. On March 26, 2015, a Saudi-led coalition (SLC) launched its Decisive Storm operation, renamed Restoring Hope shortly thereafter, with the aim of reinstalling Hadi. The ensuing developments quickly resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe for the population as the Yemeni state, society and economy went into a tailspin. The war also amounted to an economic and reputational disaster for Saudi Arabia because there were thousands of civilian victims of SLC airstrikes. Salih’s alliance with Ansar Allah was short-lived. When Salih allegedly entered negotiations with the SLC in late 2017, Ansar killed him in an ambush. By the end of 2021, the United Nations estimated that 377,000 Yemenis had been killed by combat operations and the lack of food and health care. International efforts to solve the complex set of conflicts have had only limited effects, including consultation rounds under the auspices of the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen in Geneva and Biel in 2015, Kuwait in 2016 and Stockholm in 2018. However, in April 2022, Hadi was replaced by a Presidential Leadership Council, and a truce was implemented that lasted until October 2022. Airstrikes, land and sea blockades by the Saudi-led coalition and the existence of militias armed by Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (and maybe others) clearly show that the state has no monopoly on the use of force. It is not the state but Ansar Allah that controls the majority of the population and about one-quarter of the territory, employing force and the “supervision” of the state apparatus. However, the governors of Marib and Hadramaut, leaders of the Joint Forces (including a relative of former President Salih) in control of the southern part of the Tihama/west coast, and representatives of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), who used to oppose the internationally recognized government (IRG) and control large parts of the south, including the “temporary capital” Aden, have at least formally joined the Presidential Leadership Council. Therefore, it can be said that, as of early 2023, an anti-Huthi alliance linked to Saudi Arabia and the UAE controls about three-quarters of Yemeni territory, that is, more than the internationally recognized government of ex-President Hadi did after 2015. On the ground, however, nothing has changed. The constitution does not provide for collective leadership, and the PLC’s performance has not met expectations. As of January 2023, the discussion of internal regulations was still ongoing. Moreover, the various militias and other irregular forces in PLC territory have not been disarmed and sometimes fight each other. Ansar Allah keeps smuggling arms and materials via the Arabian Sea and even through regions nominally under the control of the IRG. While the SLC has mostly stopped engaging in aerial attacks, it still controls Yemeni airspace to a large extent. Hence, there is no state monopoly on the use of force. Rather, a range of de facto authorities have emerged. Religious dogmas have been part of the legal and political spheres for centuries, and the Shariah has officially remained the sole source of legislation except in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1967 – 1990) and in the Republic of Yemen (1990 – 1994). The draft constitution of 2015 avoids the term “only source of legislation” but still makes Shariah “the source of legislation,” leaving interpretation to the legislative authority. In practice, religious, customary and state laws of varied origin coexist. The new draft constitution of 2015 had the potential to reduce the influence of religious dogmas on legal and political institutions. But, even without the war, its enforcement would have been very limited. While the state could function as a secular order with modern institutions, the combination of Islamist radicalization (Zaydi or Sunni) and Saudi Arabia’s political influence has strengthened the position of religious dogmas. Islamic scholars have shaped public opinion on crucial questions such as women’s rights, form of the state (federal/central) and the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) where many religious leaders were among the deputies. Preachers influenced by Saudi-type Wahhabism claim that the Qur’an and Sunna are above the constitution. Initially, and unlike Sunni hard-liners, Ansar Allah did not oppose the concept of secularism or federalism. This changed after Ansar Allah gained control of most of northwest Yemen in 2014. Its leaders (and affiliated media) promote hate speech against Jews and Baha’is and persecute and deport members of those tiny religious minorities (and seize their property). Moreover, Ansar Allah’s interpretation of zakat, their claims that descendants of Prophet Muhammad (ahl al-bait) are superior to other citizens, and the changes they introduced to school curricula violate the principle of equality. Gender segregation and travel bans on unaccompanied women (including aid workers), for example, are increasingly enforced in regions under the control of Ansar Allah or Sunni Islamists. Hence, a rise in intolerance, justified in religious terms, impacts the daily lives of people. Already deficient prior to the war, basic administrative structures are under severe stress. That said, taxes are still being collected on the national as well as on the local level, though they do not necessarily reach Yemen’s central bank (CBY). The governors of Marib, Hadhramaut and Shabwah keep a percentage of taxes and fees, and at least some of these funds are used to finance basic administration and local investment. Ansar Allah diverts (illegal) taxes and fees to their own coffers to finance their operations and – ostensibly – to pay some public sector salaries. In spring 2020, Ansar Allah reinterpreted the zakat law and introduced a new 20% tax on some businesses (seemingly not applied before 2023). The Huthis and other families claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad are among the beneficiaries of this additional revenue, which is termed “Hashemite tax.” It “institutionalizes hereditary discrimination and racism and is an affront to the values of equal citizenship enshrined in the republic’s constitution,” according to the SCSS (2020). Provision of electricity and water is limited, although some improvement was seen during the truce (Yemen Policy Center/YPC 2023). According to World Bank data (2020), only 60% of the population has access to some kind of water source, only half the population has access to basic sanitation, with a mere 20% having access to safe sanitation. Clinics, hospitals and schools are either closed or function at a very low level due to import restrictions, logistical challenges, unpaid salaries, internal displacement, mines, airstrikes, targeted attacks and an unknown number of COVID-19 cases. If they do provide services, they are often dependent on national and international NGOs and humanitarian organizations or the donor-funded Social Development Fund (SDF). According to UNDP’s Human Development Report 2020, there are seven hospital beds per 10,000 Yemenis. Although about one-quarter of the telecommunication assets have been damaged or destroyed, mobile phone and internet services still function on a basic level. However, the sector is becoming increasingly fragile, not least due to double taxation and import restrictions. Remarkably, public institutions like ministries or local administration still function to some extent – in spite of war and irregular salaries paid to public servants, no matter who the government is (or claims to be, like Ansar Allah-appointed “supervisors” or STC representatives). Since the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Implementation Agreement of 2011 bypassed the constitution, separation of powers – never fully implemented – has been de facto abolished. There are no longer any legitimate state powers that could be subject to the law. Parliament and the judiciary are split between the combating parties and unable to control the various “executives.” However, the rump-parliament in Sana’a is reported to have refused to pass the new Zakat Law in 2018, thus forcing Ansar Allah to introduce the desired changes as bylaws (Berghof 2020). Ansar Allah issued a Constitutional Declaration in early 2015 and has since developed a parallel system consisting of a Supreme Political Council (roughly equivalent to a presidential council and replacing the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, officially abolished in 2019), a “National Salvation Government,” and a network of “supervisors” to control formal state institutions on the national and local levels, the private sector and civil society organizations. Without the cooperation of the security apparatus groomed under ex-President Salih, it would be hard to achieve such extensive control. Ansar Allah’s continuous reference to “the aggression” (the SLC) seems to appeal to the security apparatus. Ansar Allah hence not only copies Salih’s system, but it also perfects it. The newly established PLC is dominated by military and militia leaders and has yet to prove that it has added value. In IRG areas, several de facto authorities have emerged as well. While this has prevented the emergence of one authoritarian regime in those areas, a separation of powers has not yet occurred. The judiciary is institutionally differentiated but not independent. The sheer amount of human rights violations indicates that in many regions the judiciary cannot fulfill its role. The few recent reports about the judiciary in Yemen suggest that like other state institutions it has fallen prey to conflict parties. Courts cannot function independently of whatever group holds power in the respective area, and sometimes militias assume the role of the judiciary. Courts and judges are dismissed, bypassed, replaced or even targeted (intimidated, kidnapped and even killed, as in the case of Supreme Court Justice Muhammad Humran in 2022). While at least some courts in the capital and provincial capitals still function, to what extent the trials are fair or fulfill a minimum standard is a completely different matter. Specialized courts issue an increasing number of death sentences, though such rulings do not always seem to be implemented. In areas under Ansar Allah’s control, courts have enforced measures against female lawyers and media offices or ordered confiscation of private property and bank accounts. In areas not under the control of Ansar Allah, the judiciary is considered “weak, dysfunctional and mostly ignored by the security forces” (PoE 2022). Judges have repeatedly gone on strike to protest intimidation and interference by the various militias and security forces. If any kind of law and order is upheld, then this occurs on the local level or in governorates that have not been overrun by Ansar Allah or STC militias. Remnants of institutions elected in the 2000s (for example, the parliament and local councils on the governorate and district levels) still exist. However, they are subject to (sometimes extensive) intervention and manipulation and have a number of shortcomings, including expired terms, inadequate funding and a lack of qualified personnel. On the national level, democratic institutions have degenerated into mere tools of the conflict parties. Parliament was last elected in 2003 for six years (elections were postponed to 2011 but never held). Its performance was always limited by subnational interests and clientelism. It was rendered completely powerless by the GCC initiative. Unless parliament (and the cabinet) reach a consensus, decisions rest with the president. Hadi did not even try to secure a vote of confidence from his last cabinets. As the General People’s Congress (GPC, formerly dubbed Salih’s party) holds a two-thirds majority since the last elections, parliament was still able to reach a quorum until 2015, even though the majority of southern parliamentarians has boycotted the sessions for years (north-south population ratio 1:5). With the GPC split again after Salih was killed by Ansar Allah in December 2017, and with many GPC leaders having fled abroad or been arrested, parliament is unlikely to reach a quorum. Still, Ansar Allah and the IRG both orchestrate parliamentary sessions – without ever announcing the number of parliamentarians present. Despite some positive developments prior to the war, the topography of interest groups is limited and important social interests are not represented. Prior to the war, NGOs, in particular those concerned with human rights and anti-corruption, flourished and were increasingly organized and differentiated. Since 2015, many of them have shifted their focus from governance to humanitarian aid, often on behalf of international donors. There are very few human rights organizations that have been able to move beyond their ties to the conflict parties. Those that have are subject to harassment, most notably prominent U.N.-supported initiatives, such as those supporting Yemen women and representing civil society and political parties. Unions are generally weak, mainly as a result of successful co-optation under previous regimes, the small and decreasing size of the formal sector, and political polarization within organizations in recent years. The Southern Movement (al-Hirak) is fragmented in terms of objectives, leadership and means. Objectives range from demands for a two-region federal system to separation from the north. Initiatives like the Tihama Movement, which originally attempted to draw attention to local grievances, struggle to maintain independence from the various regional “de facto authorities” in the Tihama, either Ansar Allah or Tarik Salih (nephew of former President Salih, commander of the Republican Guards, a leader of the West Coast forces with political ambitions and member of the PLC). In the past, there was a heterogeneous and fragmented set of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations. However, self-organization was rarely formalized and usually restricted to members of the same family, village, tribe or region. In recent decades, increasing numbers of Yemenis have migrated from rural areas to the cities or from Aden, Taiz or Marib to Sana’a. And more recently, thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have settled in the governorate of Marib. Nevertheless, many IDPs have found refuge with their relatives or friends in other regions, which can be taken as an indicator of solidarity, at least on the level of the extended family. Charities and other NGOs are still active, most of all in the humanitarian sector. Results of the 2017 Yemen Polling Center Survey on perceptions of the Yemeni public regarding living conditions and security-related issues indicate that neither state authorities, tribal sheiks, neighborhood Aqils (community elders) nor Ansar Allah were considered conducive to security. Hence, citizens’ self-reliance has become a necessity, and future governments will find it extremely difficult to be accepted. More worrying, however, is the rising political polarization and the increasing tendency of conflict parties to frame political antagonisms in religious terminology and sectarian narratives. The longer the war lasts, the harder it will be to overcome such divisions. In addition, the fault line between north and south continues to deepen. The fact that the number of attacks on “northerners” living in the south, first reported in 2010, seems to have decreased is likely the result of many people of northern origin having left the south. On the positive side, local communities increasingly make use of the social capital that can be generated in rural areas and urban neighborhoods. Supported by SFD, UNDP, the European Union and bilateral development partners, hundreds of local communities have established (often elected) committees of male and female members and planned and implemented their own projects. Yemen ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1987, which guarantees equal access to public services. Although the state has never been able to adequately provide those services, in many areas they are now completely unavailable. After reaching a rank of 154th (out of 187 countries) in the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2014, Yemen fell back to rank 160th (out of 188) in 2015 and further to 183rd (out of 191) in 2021/22. Even before the war, social exclusion was widespread and deeply embedded in the structure of society. This exclusion was primarily caused by factors such as poverty, lack of education, income inequality based on gender, and various other social barriers faced by marginalized groups, such as the Muhammashin. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah is actively attempting to revive the social structure that existed before the revolution, a structure characterized by inequality. In 2016, the World Bank estimated that approximately three-fourths of the Yemeni workforce were employed in the informal sector, and the number is likely to have risen since. Remittances and foreign aid are significant sources of income. However, remittances declined, donor funding is insufficient and Ansar Allah – despite collecting more fees from imports since the beginning of the truce – refuses to pay regular salaries to public sector employees in areas under its control (PoE 2023). While the majority of the population was excluded from market-based socioeconomic development in the past, no positive development can be expected when public sector salaries are unpaid and the formal economy is in freefall. The crisis of the banking sector and rising world market prices resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine further increased food prices. Yemen remains the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. According to U.N. organizations, at least 80% of the population needs humanitarian aid, with most experiencing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above). The estimated number of individuals in IPC Phase 5 exceeds 160,000. Additionally, despite the 2022 truce resulting in reduced fatalities and internally displaced persons (IDPs), a staggering 4.3 million Yemenis were internally displaced between 2015 and 2022, as reported by OCHA. Life expectancy at birth is 65 years. The Gini coefficient for Yemen was 36.7 in 2014 (no recent data is available). On the Gender Inequality Index, Yemen can be continuously found in last place. In 2017 (latest data), only 27% of the population had access to the internet. However, the private sector provides clean water, food, education, health services and energy – to those few who can afford it. While large parts of the public sector are paralyzed by the war and the private sector is suffering – by late 2015, half of the private sector companies had already laid off staff or reduced salaries – the regulatory framework in place before the war is still intact. Decree 19 of 1999 regulates market competition, monopoly prevention and commercial deception. Law 1/2008 abolished the legal requirement for a foreign business to have a Yemeni partner, as well as other legal constraints. Investment capital and profits could be transferred without limitations on amount or currency – as long as banks could provide such services. The investment law (2010) allowed all investors full ownership (100%) of an investment project, as well as freedom to transfer foreign currency and employ foreign nationals (in principle). In theory, private companies can operate freely. In practice, however, the private sector – dominated by a few large family businesses – has to cope with interference from various political factions and the emergence of two different types of economies. Smaller businesses can often barely survive because 40% of households purchase food or medicine on credit, according to Oxfam. Nevertheless, private companies have shown remarkable resilience, thus qualifying as partner organizations for international donors. Despite efforts by the Saudi-led coalition to control Yemen’s airspace, borders and ports, smuggling goods – including weapons – humans and money into the country has become more profitable than ever. The large informal sector, where about three-quarters of the workforce were employed in 2014 (ILO), is likely to have grown further. Goods that are transported from Aden to Sana’a, for example, are likely to be “taxed” several times and hence become exorbitantly expensive. Also, there are reports that import and export licenses are only granted to those who are “loyal” to the respective powerholders, providing some companies with the chance to dominate the market. Prior to the war, foreign trade had been significantly liberalized. After nearly 15 years of negotiations, Yemen officially joined the World Trade Organization as its 160th member in June 2014. Despite this, Yemen continues to boycott goods and services originating in Israel. Until at least 2013, importing goods was restricted to Yemeni nationals. Importing alcohol, explosives, hazardous waste (Yemen became a signatory to the Basel Convention in 1996), and specific food items such as pork are prohibited. Between 2015 and 2022, the SLC, not the Yemeni state, controlled foreign trade. It blocked commercial flights and controlled – and sometimes delayed and prevented – imports, such as fuel, equipment for the telecommunication sector or solar energy systems, via air, sea and land. This sometimes included goods that had been cleared by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which was established in 2016. These measures isolated Yemen’s formal economy from the world market and provided fertile ground for smuggling. Import conditions improved in 2022 (Yemen imports 100% of its medicine, 90% of its wheat and rice, and 70% of its fuel) after the Saudi-led coalition eased its air, land and maritime blockade. Yet, the IRG has no capacity to further liberalize or even control foreign trade. Other priorities dominate the agenda of the various “de facto governments.” The Ansar Allah-controlled government in Sana’a is attempting to mitigate the shortage of food imports by seeking ways to enhance self-reliance, and the Omani Mazunah Free Trade Zone, located in the Oman-Yemen border area, has acquired importance for Yemeni merchants and investors. The regulatory system is weak, fragmented and outdated, and credit risk management is insufficient. The underdeveloped banking sector was already burdened with non-performing loans in 2014 (almost 25%) and has been hit hard by economic warfare. In 2015, Yemeni banks temporarily suspended withdrawals of foreign currency deposits. However, until September 2016, Yemen’s central bank (CBY) was perceived as relatively independent in political, economic and financial terms, especially when compared to other central banks in the region. It was also seen as one of the few national institutions that, despite the war, managed to fulfill its tasks, including paying salaries to public sector employees, providing debt service, issuing letters of credit and the maintaining a stable Yemeni riyal. The badly managed CBY relocation in 2016, Hadi’s selection of CBY governors, and their erratic decision-making contributed to currency instability and import restrictions. Meanwhile, the CBY branches in Sana’a and Aden operate with competing regulations. While the Aden branch has been readmitted to the SWIFT system, most of the competent CBY staff and many files have remained in Sana’a, where most banks have their headquarters. However, banks may relocate because Ansar Allah started an initiative to ban “usurious transactions” (interest) in late 2022 (PoE 2023). As a result, the sector is highly fragmented. Yemen is classified as a high-risk area, and private exchange companies have taken over banking sector tasks. The fact that Ansar Allah openly engaged in extorting banks in Sana’a and threatening their staff (for example, at the Tadhamon Bank in an attempt to confiscate Hadi’s accounts) and the STC – sometimes forcefully – seized public funds has not helped the situation (PoE 2021 and 2022). The number of banks (state-run, Islamic and microfinance) operating in Yemen has remained relatively stable, with 17 according to the YSEU in 2015 and 18 according to ACAPS/YAT in 2022. Additionally, the Yemeni NGO SEMC counted 1,350 exchange offices, most of them operating without a license from the CBY, in 2018. In 2007, the first microfinance bank was established, and a leasing law was introduced. The establishment of a stock exchange had been under discussion for some time but has not occurred. The introduction of e-riyal in Ansar Allah-controlled territories in 2020 was intended to address the liquidity crisis but has not had a measurable impact. The ongoing liquidity crisis, the increasing amount of currency in circulation outside banks, and a population that mostly has no access to or refuses to use e-payment mechanisms all indicate that trust in the banking sector is low. According to World Development Indicators, only 64 out of every 1,000 Yemenis above the age of 14 had an account in a commercial bank in 2014 (latest data available). Almost all private sector companies pay their staff and suppliers in cash or via cash transfer. Moreover, transferring money between areas controlled by different parties to the conflict has become very difficult due to Ansar Allah’s ban on newly printed banknotes from Aden, extremely high transfer fees and the risk posed by checkpoints staffed with various militias looking for funds. Importers turn to the informal currency market to acquire hard currency, particularly for fuel and food imports. According to the World Bank’s initial Yemen Economic Brief for 2019, currency circulating outside of banks has surged by over 100% since 2014. The IRG has been unable to pursue monetary stabilization. Neither part of the CBY is independent of its respective powerholder. Even worse, the split of the CBY has contributed to the establishment of two separate political entities within the Republic of Yemen, turning monetary policy into a weapon of war (SEMC 2020). Throughout Yemen, there is a severe shortage of foreign currency, so currency speculation has become a lucrative business. Both branches of the CBY have attempted various measures to control private exchange companies, including forming networks under the control of their respective branches (SEMC/ERT 2021). However, it has been reported that the IRG keeps income from oil exports in the al-Ahli bank in Riyadh instead of in the CBY (see Q11.1). Exchange and inflation rates – extremely volatile – caused several large businesses to temporarily close in 2018, as they were unable to determine the prices of their commodities. The riyal’s value in January 2015 was YER 215 to $1. However, since 2021, the U.S. dollar trades for up to YER 1,700 (in early December 2021) in IRG-controlled territory. In Ansar Allah-controlled areas, where the newly printed IRG banknotes were banned in 2020, the exchange rate is considerably lower and more stable. In summer 2022, one U.S. dollar cost over 1,000 riyals in Aden, but only half that much in Sana’a. Food prices rose by 20% to 30% in 2021, while the overall inflation rate was estimated at more than 40% in 2021 and 2022, with higher rates in IRG-controlled territories (IMF, PoE 2022, WB YEM 2022/1). Overall, the Ansar Allah-controlled government, which established a “Payments and Foreign Currency Committee” in 2017, more effectively controls inflation and exchange rates than the IRG. In late 2021, the IRG appointed a new CBY management and established a new mechanism to control the exchange rate. A few months later, in April 2022, KSA and UAE announced their intention to provide an additional $3 billion. However, although this measure helped stabilize the riyal, food prices continued to remain high due to international developments. Yemen relies on imports from Ukraine and Russia for approximately half of its wheat supply. Some observers have already noted that the bifurcation of institutions now includes the Yemeni currency. Old and (distinguishable) new banknotes are treated as two different currencies. The government cannot protect private property. Militias confiscate private property and bank deposits, raid banks and impose “taxes” at will. Prior to the war, the system was already deficient. Although the law defined property rights and regulated the acquisition and registration of property, both of which were rather easy, there were severe problems with lack of documentation, fraud and constant struggles over land ownership. This not only harmed the country’s investment climate but also had strong political implications. One issue that led to the rise of the southern al-Hirak movement was the arbitrary confiscation of land by Salih loyalists. This mainly occurred in the south, but there were also poorly publicized cases in Sana’a and al-Hudaidah, for example. The problem is exacerbated by judicial corruption, which often renders efforts to settle disputes over property rights futile. The concept of intellectual property rights (Investment Law No. 15/2010 and Intellectual Property Rights Law No. 19/1994) is generally unknown. Apart from Ansar Allah’s general demands directed at Saudi Arabia, there are no strategies detailing if and how citizens will be compensated for the loss of family members or injuries and for their homes, farms, shops or factories destroyed by shelling or airstrikes. However, Yemen has signed several international and bilateral agreements on settling commercial and investment disputes that, in peacetime, might substitute for the shortcomings of the judiciary. De jure, private companies can act freely, though some special regulations for international companies exist – such as a ban on engaging in the weapons and explosives industry and specific rules in vital sectors. Enterprises in the public and mixed sectors, such as the Yemeni Economic Corporation, are estimated to constitute approximately one-fourth of the country’s large firms. These enterprises occasionally played an opaque role, particularly those that were under the control of relatives or in-laws of former President Salih. However, even prior to the war, there were massive economic, political and social barriers to business development. Key issues included deficiencies in infrastructure, corruption and a shortage of qualified workers. According to a 2019 World Bank report, 20% of private sector companies closed, more than half shrank and another 20% relocated their main offices since the beginning of the war. Established private businesses are not protected from blackmail by various “officials,” have to pay extra fees, cope with dysfunctional financial and judicial systems, be subject to a volatile exchange rate in the financial (money exchange) and real estate sectors, and have to compete with militias engaged in imports of oil derivatives, medicine or food. International contracts in the hydrocarbon sector are managed by the Yemen General Corporation for Oil and Minerals, which reports to the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources. However, in 2015, production stopped due to the security situation. The Austrian company OMV was the first international oil company to restart exports in 2018. Cal Valley, with shareholders Medco Energi and Hood Oil, followed in 2019, but declared force majeure after Ansar Allah’s attacks on its facilities in 2022. Gas liquidation operated by Yemen LNG, with shareholders TOTAL, HUNT OIL and others, in Belhaf (Shabwah) has been suspended since 2015. In 2017, UAE forces occupied parts of the facilities and used them as a military base and detention center. Support for the elderly, the ill, the unemployed and the internally displaced is primarily provided by family, tribe and village structures, private welfare organizations, and other NGOs – if and where they exist. The severe hardship the population has endured since 2015 limits people’s ability to provide for themselves, let alone for others. For example, Marib, a city of less than 20,000 inhabitants before the war, was hosting approximately one million IDPs in 2021. Remittances, another lifeline for many families, have been declining since summer 2020, according to Oxfam. Fees for transferring remittances to Yemen have risen, sometimes up to 50% of the transfer amount, leading to a further reduction in funds. Additionally, social structures have weakened in certain areas due to internal displacement and migration. Since 2016, around 1.2 million Yemenis employed in the public sector have not received their full salaries, which – when including dependents – has affected at least six million people. The Social Welfare Fund, primarily financed by international donors, exhausted its funds by the end of 2014. In 2017, the General Authority for Insurance and Pensions (GAIP) was unable to pay pensions to approximately one-third of the recipients (Yemen Socioeconomic Update/YSEU 30). The only public institutions that continue to provide a minimum level of welfare throughout the war are the largely donor-funded Social Development Fund (SDF) and the Public Works Projects (PWP), established in the 1990s. Though the population in need continues to grow, donors are becoming increasingly reluctant to fund the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). This reluctance arises primarily from the institutional weaknesses of implementation partners on both sides, the effects of COVID-19, restrictions imposed by local power-holders, high operational costs and rising violence against aid workers (YSEU 60). In 2022, the HRP faced a funding gap of approximately 50% (OCHA 2023). Nevertheless, international donor organizations – often in cooperation with local NGOs and the private sector – play a major role in staving off the worst consequences of the war for the civilian population. Moreover, local private sector companies often provide food for free and even run their own charities. Before the war, there were few institutions to compensate for Yemen’s significant social disparities rooted in poverty, gender and social status. The Muhammashin, as a marginalized group, are primarily engaged in menial labor and have extremely restricted access to essential public services. Violent conflicts, destruction of educational facilities, politicization of curricula by Ansar Allah, internal displacement and rampant poverty have further reduced the quality of and access to education for all. According to the Gender Development Index (GDI) 2022, boys have a mean of 5.1 years of schooling, while girls have 2.9 years. Boys, perceived as less vulnerable and as “future breadwinners,” are more likely to be sent to school and attend school for more years, although their enrollment rates are still insufficient. Girls’ school enrollment, traditionally low, had increased until 2015. However, many parents are now concerned about the security situation or are unable to afford school supplies for all their children. The ratio of female-to-male enrollment in primary schools is 0.9, 0.7 in secondary schools and 0.4 at the tertiary level, according to the WDI 2022. While boys face the risk of being recruited into various militias, girls face the risk of child marriage. Half of Yemen’s population aged between 15 and 24 was not in education, employment or training in 2014, according to the World Bank. However, the group most in need of improved access to opportunities are women. The estimated GNI per woman was $176, while it was $2,428 per man. Yemen ranked 183rd out of 191 countries, according to the GDI 2022. Women are under-represented in all sectors, particularly in high government offices. The situation seemed to improve when a female quota was applied to the National Dialogue Conference. Four women were among the 17 members of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, and, in principle, a female quota was included in the draft constitution of 2015. However, only about 10% of the delegates who participated in the 2015 to 2016 peace negotiations were female. In late 2018, during consultations held in Stockholm, the U.N. special envoy established an eight-member Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group. Nonetheless, there was only one woman representing the conflict parties. The Presidential Leadership Council of 2022 is entirely male, and there are only five women among the 50 members of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission. Videos of the PLC members taking the oath illustrate this. Overall, patriarchal structures and informal decision-making, in combination with gender segregation, often lead to the exclusion of women from decision-making and the labor market and sometimes even prevent them from traveling. This is unlikely to be changed by Articles 76 and 128 of the 2015 draft constitution or Decree 75/2019, which details a National Action Plan to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Hydrocarbon production and exports from IRG territory increased temporarily before Ansar Allah, demanding a share, attacked oil installations there in late 2022. Officially, the attack served as a warning to national and international companies to stop “looting” Yemeni crude oil, as the revenues “do not reach the Yemeni people [and are] not listed in any local bank” (Sabanet). In reality, according to SCSS in 2022, the revenues are paid to the al-Ahli Bank in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia announced it would deposit more than $2 billion in the CBY in 2018, of which the final installment of $174 million was paid only in 2022 (Reuters, 2022). However, the CBY in Aden may have “lost” a large amount on foreign exchange transactions (PoE, 2021). By 2019, CBY reserves were down to $1.4 billion – or 1.6 months of imports. In April 2022, Saudi Arabia, which had extended its 2018 installment, and the UAE announced another $3 billion aid package to stabilize the economy and fund the IRG. Disbursement was tied to substantial reforms of the CBY. The IMF and the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) also announced additional funds. However, some experts argue that international aid is fostering dependency and fueling the war economy. Nevertheless, Yemen’s trade balance and foreign direct investment (FDI) continue to be negative. Public debt rose from 45.7% to 69.7% between 2011 and 2021, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2022). The IMF predicts an inflation rate of over 17% compared to GDP growth of just over 3% for 2023, while the World Bank estimates a persistent contraction in GDP and GDP per capita (down 50% over the last decade). Yemen issued its first environmental protection law in 1995, signed the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1996, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 and issued a National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) in 2009. In late 2012, the government renewed its efforts to at least provide a framework for environmental protection. Laws 21 and 22 ratified the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC), as well as the OPRC-Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) Protocol. Yemen set up an environmental protection strategy and an Environmental Protection Agency. On the ground, mismanagement of resources and land-grabbing prevails all over the country – from Sana’a (Ansar Allah) to the World Heritage Site Socotra Archipelago, with its unique biodiversity, where the UAE has established control via the STC. There are reports that the UAE even sells land located in the protected areas of Socotra (YPC 2021). Despite their importance for healthy and livable habitats, environmental concerns rarely play a role in national strategy. The awareness of the fundamental problem of water scarcity has been overshadowed by the need to ensure the provision of clean drinking water to as many people as possible. There have been instances of shortages of diesel and spare parts for water pumps. The conflict parties have targeted desalination plants, water pipelines and other relevant infrastructure. Despite these challenges, qat (a leaf with stimulant effects) is still produced and marketed, while only half the population has access to clean drinking water. Apart from environmental and health problems arising from locust infestations, floods, garbage, illegal extraction of water, leaking sewage and oil pipelines, deforestation, poaching and hazardous waste (ammunition), Yemen’s most urgent environmental problem is the 45-year-old Safer oil tanker, moored close to the port of Hudaidah. It has been used for storage and offloading for 30 years and contains more than one million barrels of oil. The tanker is “at risk of leaking, exploding, or catching fire,” according to the United Nations. Despite potentially devastating ecological and economic effects for all states bordering the Red Sea, Ansar Allah blocked a U.N. expert team from inspecting the tanker for years. Only in 2022 did the United Nations collect the funds needed to transfer the oil cargo. As of early 2023, preparations seem to still be underway, although the United Nations reached a new agreement with the IRG and Ansar Allah in 2022. Without access to oil and gas fields, Ansar Allah might still consider one million barrels of oil a major economic asset and political bargaining chip. That Ansar Allah has no environmental concerns became obvious when they attacked oil facilities in October and November 2022, including a terminal in Hadhramaut, as an oil tanker was offloading. While governmental agencies are largely defunct or unable to coordinate their activities, there are still some civil society organizations spread over several governorates that attempt to address the multitude of problems contributing to local distribution conflicts. These conflicts are likely to worsen due to the further depletion of water resources and climate change (CARPO, YPC 2021). Because public power grids are unreliable and diesel for generators is scarce, there has been an increased use of solar power. In December 2022, the IRG signed an agreement with Masdar (Abu Dhabi) to construct a solar power plant in Aden. Any progress made by such positive developments is overshadowed by a general lack of concern for environmental issues. In the face of Yemen’s declining but still high population growth (estimated at more than 2% for 2023), educational institutions at all levels – despite substantial investments in the past – are hopelessly overburdened. According to UNICEF (2018), only 17% of Yemenis have a birth certificate, making enrollment data potentially unreliable. Nevertheless, the World Bank reports that primary school enrollment rates are on the decline. They reached 97.5% in 2013 but fell to 92.5% by 2016. Enrollment rates for secondary education were 51% in 2016, and for tertiary education, they were almost 10% in 2011 (latest available data). Yemen’s score on the U.N. Education Index as of 2021 was 0.359. According to UNICEF, the number of children unable to attend school rose to two million by March 2018 because approximately 2,500 schools were damaged, occupied by IDPs or combatants, or simply lacked teachers due to unpaid salaries. By late 2020, additional schools had closed, with dozens converted into COVID-19 centers. According to the HDR 2015, only 4.6% of GDP was allocated to education, a decrease from the previous year. It is reasonable to assume that expenditures have further decreased since then (recent data is unavailable). According to Yemen’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, only 4.4% of aid was allocated to the education sector in 2021. While there is statistically one teacher per 27 students (HDI 2020), salaries for teachers are low or unpaid, and many teachers need a second job to support their families. However, most schools and universities remain open. In certain instances, parents may bear the cost of schooling. Donors fund specific groups of public servants in the health and education sector. Nevertheless, this is not a sustainable solution. By late 2019, the conflict parties had attacked 380 schools or their vicinities. In 2020, the World Bank estimated that approximately $500 million would be needed to recover and reconstruct only the schools in the 16 cities it surveyed. According to the Ministry of Planning, in 2020, one-third of Yemeni girls and one-quarter of Yemeni boys do not attend school regularly. And even at school, children are not safe, as schools under the supervision of Ansar Allah are used for recruitment and indoctrination, teaching social and gender inequality (PoE 2022; YPC 2023). Prior to the war, the number of private education institutions was on the rise. In 2014, there were 101 private universities and colleges, with 83,177 out of a total of 310,340 tertiary-level students enrolled in private institutions. Out of a total of 16,730 primary and secondary schools, 899 were private in 2016. Nevertheless, research and development facilities are almost nonexistent. Data on public research and technology expenditures is unavailable. The violent conflicts that have plagued the country for years have exacerbated the high structural constraints on governance. Air raids and landmines further damage the country’s rather poor infrastructure (power grids, airports, harbors, roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, factories). Yemen’s internet almost exclusively depends on the FALCON submarine cable. When it broke down for more than a month in early 2020, this added another layer to the already existing constraints. Many roads are destroyed or blocked by militias (Ta’izz), harbors have been blocked (Hudaidah) and Sana’a airport, closed by the SLC since 2015, reopened only in 2022 with a limited number of flights. Suffering from a shortage of water and energy – and already being the poorest Arab country before the war – Yemen’s population has been pushed into extreme poverty. In 2022, 23.4 million people needed some kind of humanitarian assistance, more than four million people were internally displaced and two million children were out of school. Leadership struggles, large-scale corruption, a lack of strategy and a shortage of funds have bled the public sector dry. Moreover, about one million Yemenis have left the country in the course of the war. With many well-educated middle-class Yemenis among them, this brain drain affects state institutions as well as the private sector and civil society. Meanwhile – and in spite of severe abuses – the migration of Africans through Yemen to the rich Arab Gulf states continues unabated. IOM estimated their number at more than 40,000 in 2022. Given the high rate of malnutrition and the prevalence of infectious diseases like cholera, malaria, diphtheria, measles, dengue fever and even a polio outbreak (in Saada in August 2020), authorities did not pay much attention to COVID-19. Statistics show a low number of approx. 12,000 COVID-19 cases (Johns Hopkins, January 2023), which is extremely unlikely to reflect the real number of infections. Nevertheless, some (donor-funded) COVID-19 centers were set up, and schools were temporarily closed or (ab)used as COVID-19 centers. The state has always been rather absent in many areas of Yemen. Therefore, most Yemenis are quite capable of organizing their lives without a functioning government. Yemen has civil society traditions that go back to labor migrants’ self-help organizations in the 1940s or a 1970s cooperative movement that was absorbed into the local administration and the GPC in the early 1980s. Still, tribal councils come together on occasion, usually at times of high political tension. Some tribal mediators have the capacity to broker local cease-fires or arrange prisoner exchanges. Most of the several thousand registered NGOs are charities with a limited geographical scope, but prior to the war, there were also several hundred, mainly urban, NGOs focusing on governance issues such as combating corruption and educating the public about human rights, women’s rights and press freedom. Unlike political parties, NGOs are characterized by a strong representation of women among leaders and activists. The Social Development Fund (SDF) and some donor organizations ran training programs for NGOs. But still, many NGOs have limited or no appeal to the general public, weak networks and internal structures, and generally lack a broad funding base. Some NGOs should be considered enterprises, are subject to manipulation by powerful individuals and political parties or were founded to communicate human rights violations of their sponsors’ political opponents to the international community. However, many civil society activists are highly committed. Several NGOs were among the groups of protesters who finally ousted Ali Abdallah Salih in 2011. The war has further exposed the weakness of civil society. Caught between a rock and a hard place, very few NGOs were in a position to maintain independence and stay operational without in-country donors. Under the current circumstances, many NGOs have either become dormant or shifted their activities toward distributing humanitarian aid on behalf of the donor community. In other cases, activists have emigrated to escape persecution. Nevertheless, civil society has the potential to promote political and economic development. Some NGOs still organize workshops, trainings, art exhibitions and public debates. Moreover, networks of local mediators and of Yemeni academics and professionals have been set up. Though the civil war is based on social and political differences and fueled by regional powers, it is framed as a religious or sectarian conflict by some conflict parties (AQAP, Ansar Allah). In any case, untangling the different conflict lines on the regional, national and local levels seems almost impossible. Conflict intensity peaked in 2011 with the ouster of Ali Abdallah Salih and in 2014, when Ansar Allah started an offensive against those they held responsible for spreading Saudi-sponsored Salafism and the six wars in Sa’dah between 2004 and 2010. Ansar Allah took control of the capital Sana’a in summer 2014, looted or destroyed property belonging to its enemies, persecuted members of al-Islah (affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood) and directly attacked AQAP and its affiliates in several governorates. Ansar Allah’s temporary occupation of Aden in 2015 was followed by years of fighting between Ansar Allah militias and forces fighting in the name of the “legitimate government” (without necessarily supporting it), particularly in and around Taiz and al-Hudaidah. There have been hundreds of assassinations and attempted assassinations of members of the security forces, high-ranking politicians, political activists, journalists and intellectuals. The Southern Movement has gained strength but is split between UAE-supported groups demanding independence and activists who refuse external intervention and/or would settle with a “southern state in Yemen.” UAE-trained militias, fighting AQAP and Ansar Allah, function as the military arm of the Southern Transitional Council. Meanwhile, AQAP bombed civilian and military targets, even controlling villages and cities in the south temporarily, and tried to create a base among some southern tribes but was more or less pushed back. SLC air raids since March 2015 and fighting between the various military units and militias have killed tens of thousands and displaced millions. In 2021, the level of conflict peaked again with Ansar Allah intensifying drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and trying to advance to the oil-rich governorate of Marib. The IRG responded by designating Ansar Allah as a terrorist organization, hoping other states would follow. At the end of 2021, the United Nations estimated the number of (direct and indirect) victims of the war at 377,000. In April 2022, the United Nations brokered a two-month truce that was officially extended until October 2022 and has contributed to an easing in violence since then. Hostilities declined, imports of oil derivatives via the Hudaidah seaport increased and Sana’a’s airport reopened. Even after the truce had expired, Yemen sustained a decrease in hostilities. However, the Ta’izz road (controlled by Ansar Allah) remained closed, and, in October 2022, Ansar Allah started attacking oil facilities in the south. After making substantial progress prior to 2012, the emerging anti-corruption regime was severely diminished. In 2014, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) expired. A renewal was discussed by the main stakeholders in Amman but never materialized. One of the main players, the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC), was already handicapped by ex-President Hadi’s (illegal) decisions concerning the board in 2013. Also in 2013, the government ordered the media not to cover SNACC activities any longer. Nevertheless, at least until March 2015, the revision of Yemen’s anti-corruption legislation (UNCAC gap analysis) was underway. The Ansar Allah-controlled government officially made “Improving the degree of integrity, transparency and combating corruption” a strategic goal in its National Vision in 2019. Hence, the SNACC (under the Ansar Allah-controlled government in Sana’a) processes the financial disclosure files of high-ranking public officeholders. It also implemented its new anti-corruption strategy (2022 – 2026) and submitted an annual report in January 2023. The IRG, however, has not taken any such steps. Other relevant public institutions, like the Central Authority for Control and Auditing (COCA) and the High Authority for Tender Control (HATC), managed to continue working at a reduced capacity despite war damage, a lack of electricity and “supervision” by representatives of Ansar Allah. No matter how good the initial intentions are, under the current circumstances the above organizations are likely to be used to cover up illicit property confiscations and as political weapons. The COCA president, appointed by Hadi in 2012, fled to Aden in early 2018, reportedly taking several sensitive files with him. The declarations in the Riyadh Agreement that address transparency and accountability, like strengthening the COCA but not the SNACC, await implementation. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah started the introduction of e-payment for government transactions and to “modernize the central bank’s digital infrastructure” in 2019 (World Bank 2020). This move might at least reduce the privatization of public offices in Ansar Allah-controlled regions and could indicate contradictory objectives and strategies within Ansar Allah’s leadership. Civil society organizations have very limited space for action. Hence, on the ground, there is no auditing of public spending. The PoE concluded in 2021 that “those in the top political leadership compete to enrich themselves from limited state and public resources,” while the World Bank’s “control of corruption” indicator scored Yemen 1.4 (out of 100) in 2021. Yemen signed and ratified the U.N. Convention against Corruption, UNCAC. Still, there has been no attempt to recover the assets (estimated to be $30 to 60 billion) former President Salih and others diverted (AWTAD, UNCAC Chapters II & V, 2022). Prior to 2015, there was some consensus on the formal level – between government parties and NGOs – as to the value of a market economy and democracy. The final documents of the National Dialog Conference (NDC), especially those of the working groups on state-building, good governance, independent institutions, rights and freedoms, as well as transitional justice and sustainable development, clearly reflect the ambitions of the 565 delegates. The IRG keeps referring to the NDC recommendations as one of the three core documents (the others being U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 and the GCC initiative and its implementation mechanism). The Ansar Allah-controlled government only pays lip service to NDC outcomes in documents like the National Vision for the Modern Yemen (2019). According to the draft constitution, “the national economy is a free social economy.” Other available documents suggest that the IRG aims to diversify the economy, strengthen the role of the private sector and improve the business environment while, at the same time, ensuring justice, employment, sustainability and social welfare. The programmatic documents of the government in Sana’a address similar issues but are more focused on creating revenues and reducing dependence on external funds and imports. The two regions are developing different characteristics. While Ansar Allah finances its version of governance mainly through taxes and fees, President Hadi and his government remain dependent on oil and political rents. On the ground, followers of all the conflict parties can be found among the beneficiaries of the war economy, which has emerged as an additional obstacle for (re-)establishing a formal market economy. The GCC Implementation Mechanism requires the government to take the input of civil society actors into consideration. NGOs were represented in the National Dialog Conference (40 out of 565 seats), and influential civil society actors have played a significant role before, during and after the NDC. However, the understanding that civil society has a role in governance is still limited, even among otherwise rather reform-minded high-ranking officials. With several civil society activists appointed as ministers in the 2014 government, civil society was primed to acquire a strong position when it came to agenda-setting, as well as monitoring NDC outcomes. This cannot be said about subsequent governments. Although the weakness of the government(s) and the risk of total breakdown of public services stress the importance of civil society, the political and security situation combined with repression limit its potential. As in the Salih era, civil society is kept in a constant state of alert and increasingly restricted. Many activists have left Yemen or aligned with the conflict parties, while others have shifted their activity to humanitarian aid or activities tolerated by the respective authorities and their external patrons, thus trying to avoid arrest or assassination. Nevertheless, many NGOs and civil society activists are still working on subjects related to peacebuilding or conflict management. The presidential declaration transferring power to a Presidential Leadership Council (April 2022) provided for a Commission for Reconciliation and Consultation (CRC), comprised of well-known members of Yemeni civil society, predominantly male (five women among the 50 members). The CRC had not been noticeably active by early 2023. Before the war, many political and social forces claimed that they were victims of past injustice, and most demanded compensation or at least recognition. These include Ansar Allah (“Sa’dah issue”), the Southern Movement Hirak (“southern issue”), the victims of 2011 and their families, as well as former elites who spent the last decades in exile. The government, as bound by the GCC Implementation Mechanism, at least officially recognized the need to deal with these claims. And while the Sa’dah issue and the southern issue, as well as the victims of 2011, have been officially acknowledged, the transitional justice law recommended by the NDC has not been issued because there was no consensus about the period to be covered and hence the victims who are eligible for compensation. The transitional justice and looted funds draft laws were presented to the cabinet in June/July 2014 but never issued. In 2013, a fund was to be set up, with Qatar allegedly promising $350 million of the required $1.2 billion. The Commission on the Forcibly Retired in the Southern Governorates and the Commission on Land-Related Disputes, set up with UNDP support in 2014, suspended work in 2015. According to a CARPO report from 2016, about $1 billion would be required to compensate just those who lost their jobs in the public sector or their property in the southern part of the country between 1994 and 2011. In Aden, a Committee of Dismissed Southerner Employees had registered 126,000 applications by 2018. However, fighting in recent years has produced scores of more victims of injustice, thus adding another layer to a complicated issue. The fact that war crimes might involve governments of other states makes reconciliation decidedly difficult. As OCHA put it in 2020, “There are no clean hands in this conflict…violations have been committed by the government of Yemen, the Houthis, the Southern Transitional Council, as well as members of the Coalition” (led by the KSA and UAE). Ansar Allah prefers to ignore the IRG as much as possible. Rather, it addresses its demands (including for compensation) directly to the Saudi leadership, which has openly started direct negotiations. The STC, by contrast, uses past injustices to justify its demands for an independent southern state. As a result, the “mechanisms so far set up by the Saudi and UAE-led Coalition, the internationally recognized government of Yemen, and the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group are wholly inadequate to accomplish the task of ensuring reparations to civilian victims” (Mwatana for Human Rights, 2022). If national reconciliation is addressed again, the overall situation will require careful consideration since attempts to compensate for historic injustices could trigger further conflict and more corruption. The IRG as well as Ansar Allah seek international support to finance immediate needs (for example, public sector salaries, military assistance, humanitarian aid). Equally important, all parties to the conflict are eager to receive international recognition as legitimate representatives of the Yemeni population or parts thereof. This may also be the reason Ansar Allah gave up its demand to officially tax international aid in 2020. Even so, it did not give up its claims to control (and at times impede) humanitarian aid through the Supreme Council for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA), established in November 2019. Regarding a long-term development strategy, the Ansar Allah-controlled government can clearly draw on more technical expertise than can the IRG. However, seeking international assistance to end the conflict has been fairly limited. The U.N. sponsored peace talks in Geneva/Biel (2015), Kuwait (2016) and Stockholm (2018), but the meeting in Stockholm in December 2018, facilitated by U.N. Special Envoy Martin Griffith, was the first to produce results. At that time, Ansar Allah had cut itself off from former President Salih’s funds, while the SLC had advanced on Hudaidah. Simultaneously, international pressure increased against the IRG’s main sponsor, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, in the aftermath of the killing of prominent Saudi journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi. So far, the Hudaidah seaport has been kept operational. A major prisoner exchange (one of the main elements of the agreement) took place between Ansar Allah and the IRC/SLC in October 2020, and another one was underway in early 2023. However, fighting in and around Ta’izz has not come to an end. A truce, brokered by the United Nations in 2022, turned out to be rather effective. It was extended until October 2022 and may be followed by another, more comprehensive arrangement in 2023. However, Ansar Allah and the Saudi government simultaneously seek a separate settlement, which could derail the U.N. process (ICG 2022). The conflict parties show no respect for Yemen’s international human rights obligations – most seriously, children’s rights – and little enthusiasm for international cooperation efforts, especially during the time of the first two U.N. special envoys. Beginning in 2018, the main conflict parties adopted a slightly more cooperative attitude toward the United Nations. However, they claim the United Nations is biased, disrespect U.N. staff, ignore agreements concerning registering the redeployment of troops, withhold money or withdraw money from CBY branches at will (Ansar Allah and Joint Forces/Tihama), impede international humanitarian support for Yemeni people, and are neither credible nor reliable. Ansar Allah members even threaten and intimidate U.N. staff and try to sideline U.N. mediation efforts (PoE, ICG). Ansar Allah frames the conflict as external aggression (by KSA, UAE, the United States, Israel, etc.), has attacked Saudi and UAE territory with drones and rockets, and was consequently designated a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the outgoing Trump administration in January 2021. The Biden administration recalled the designation a month later because it would have blocked humanitarian aid. The STC finally signed the Riyadh Agreement in November 2019, joined the cabinet in December 2020 and the PLC in April 2022. This may reflect pressure from regional allies and an increasing need among the main sponsors of the anti-Ansar Allah alliance to develop an exit strategy. The Yemeni government stopped serving its international debts – except debts owed to the IMF and the International Development Association – in 2016. However, in August 2022, the IMF allocated Special Drawing Rights worth $650 billion to the IRG. Knowing perfectly well that Yemen’s future depends on the financial support of GCC members and on the political development of states in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the country’s past leaderships tried to promote regional and international integration. For example, Yemen is a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and a signatory to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, a regional initiative to tackle piracy around the Horn of Africa. Efforts to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a dominant regional free trade area started in 2005 but went nowhere. Currently, there is no coherent approach to cooperation with neighboring countries, and each conflict party attacks the others for their connections with regional allies. For Saudi Arabia, poor and populous Yemen is primarily a security issue. In the recent past, security cooperation seemed generally good (an extradition agreement in 2014). Due to the absence of a comprehensive arrangement concerning the legal entry of Yemeni labor migrants into GCC states, illegal migration (especially to Saudi Arabia) continuously causes problems for both sides. In 2013, Saudi Arabia tightened the visa regulations for migrant workers and deported up to 200,000 Yemeni workers, increasing pressure on the Yemeni government and tainting its own reputation because many of the returnees reported human rights violations. Meanwhile, a (rather expensive) solution for the remaining Yemenis in Saudi Arabia has been found. After years characterized by a mix of providing and withholding financial and in-kind support to the Yemeni government, the Saudi government started Operation Decisive Storm in 2015. It thus not only further destabilized Yemen but also provoked retaliation in the form of border skirmishes and attacks on Saudi and UAE territory. Ansar Allah has a record of being unreliable and uncooperative – whether in negotiations about peace agreements or the recovery of the Safer Tanker. Various Yemeni and international governments and experts have accused Iran of supporting Ansar Allah (as well as southern separatism). Ansar Allah’s activities (such as attacking United States, UAE and Saudi naval ships, and Saudi and UAE territory) certainly serve Iran’s agenda, and in particular that of its Revolutionary Guards, but simultaneously could also harm Iran’s international standing. Despite Iran serving as a role model and Iranian (and Lebanese Hezbollah) military experts and hardware, Iranian influence on Ansar Allah’s decisions seems to be limited when compared to the dependence of the IRG on its regional allies. This dependence is not restricted to financial and military aid. It also includes political aspects, such as Saudi Arabia’s successful campaign to the Human Rights Council not to extend the GEE’s mandate in 2021. The previously highly centralized Yemeni state is undergoing major changes. At least two different economic systems have emerged: one mainly tax-based (north) and the other rent-based (south). There are at least two governments, central banks and monetary policies, etc. So far, the various political factions have failed to understand that they need each other to build a viable Yemeni state. All of them lack legitimacy. None of the regions they control have all the necessary ingredients to function as a state: financial and natural resources (oil and gas), infrastructure (harbors) and human capital (technical expertise). Even if the international community supported a separation along the current major frontlines – thus giving in to STC demands and leaving Ansar Allah without access to the country’s oil and gas resources – peace would not come any closer than it is. First, there are major political forces that insist on Yemen’s unity and are likely to react violently. Second, the northern part is not economically viable unless it includes Marib and receives a share of the oil rents coming from Shabwa and Hadhramaut. Ansar Allah has made it very clear that it strives to rule all Yemen and will not allow international companies to “loot” Yemeni oil and gas resources. Third, the new entities might fragment even further. In the long run, a federal state, or at least a confederation, is the most promising option. The Saudi government is openly trying to disentangle itself from its client, the IRG, and has intensified direct negotiations with Ansar Allah. If the Saudi government – stepping in for the IRG – hands over the money to pay outstanding public sector salaries for Ansar Allah, the consequences could range from violent in-fighting among Ansar Allah factions to skyrocketing prices for food and energy. If the transfer is managed badly, the benefit to the Yemeni population is likely to be short-lived. What is beyond doubt is that significant investment is needed to fund the recovery of Yemen’s infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, water and sewage systems, power grids, the oil and gas sector, and telecommunications. The increasing popularity of solar power in Yemen provides a promising starting point for further development. In general, the private sector has taken on many services that were previously provided by the state. However, logistical and security concerns are suffocating the private sector and may compel commercial banks, which are primarily still based in Sana’a, to close or relocate. This, in turn, would further hinder imports, including food and fuel, and have a devastating impact on the humanitarian situation. Therefore, investment in Yemen is not enticing unless companies adopt a long-term strategy, similar to that of some state-owned UAE companies. A decade of violent conflict has left Yemeni youth without knowledge of alternative political settings, with children and young people subject to massive manipulation through state and social media, and, more worryingly, at school. The sooner Yemeni youth are given the chance to compare what they are being taught with the realities outside the propagandistic bubbles of the respective de facto authorities, the greater the chances for civil society to act in a coordinated way toward sustainable peace. With the international community focusing on violent conflicts and the humanitarian situation, attention to environmental issues – including illegal land seizure in environmentally protected areas – and support for civic engagement to build networks that crosscut the various conflict lines is largely lacking. Both topics deserve more consideration due to their role in peacebuilding at the local, regional and national levels.
8955	dbpedia	3	83	https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-08-08/who-are-the-houthi-rebels-attacking-israel-and-red-sea-ships%3Fsrnd%3Denergy	en	Who Are the Houthi Rebels Attacking Israel and Ships in the Red Sea?	https://assets.bwbx.io/i…/v0/1200x800.jpg	https://assets.bwbx.io/i…/v0/1200x800.jpg	[ "https://assets.bwbx.io/images/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/iEy6_yi3LqI4/v0/-1x-1.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "Israel", "Yemen", "War", "Iran", "Military", "United Kingdom", "Tel Aviv", "Gaza", "JULY SARL/CAEN", "Cruise", "politics", "markets", "quicktake" ]	null	[ "Caroline Alexander" ]	2024-08-08T00:00:00	Soon after war broke out in October between Israel and the militant Palestinian group Hamas, the Houthi rebels who control northwestern Yemen joined in. The Houthis, who like Hamas are hostile to Israel and backed by Iran, began disrupting traffic in the Red Sea by attacking ships there, provoking a military response led by the US and UK. The rebels also started flinging missiles and drones at Israel, which is separated from Yemen by about 1,500 kilometers (932 miles) at the closest point. They	en	https://www.bloomberg.co…avicon-black.png	Bloomberg.com	https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-08-08/who-are-the-houthi-rebels-attacking-israel-and-red-sea-ships	Soon after war broke out in October between Israel and the militant Palestinian group Hamas, the Houthi rebels who control northwestern Yemen joined in. The Houthis, who like Hamas are hostile to Israel and backed by Iran, began disrupting traffic in the Red Sea by attacking ships there, provoking a military response led by the US and UK. The rebels also started flinging missiles and drones at Israel, which is separated from Yemen by about 1,500 kilometers (932 miles) at the closest point. They scored a hit on July 19, when one of their drones hit a building in central Tel Aviv, killing a man and injuring several others. As tensions have escalated between Israel and both Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese militia Hezbollah, the Houthis have indicated that if those two allies launch a coordinated attack against Israel, they could join in to overwhelm the country’s air defenses. They are rebels who seized control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, in 2014, launching a civil war that continues to this day. Part of a clan that hails from Yemen’s northwestern Saada province, the Houthis are followers of the Zaidi branch of Shiite Islam, which accounts for an estimated 25% of the country’s population. After North Yemen and South Yemen were unified in 1990, the Houthis waged a series of rebellions before successfully taking the capital. The Houthis are anti-Western and anti-Israeli.
8955	dbpedia	1	75	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-president-leaves-egypt-for-saudi-capital/1232326	en	Yemeni president leaves Egypt for Saudi capital	https://cdnuploads.aa.co…0af.jpg?v=173927	https://cdnuploads.aa.co…0af.jpg?v=173927	[ "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnuploads.aa.com.tr/uploads/Contents/2018/08/15/thumbs_b_c_5b0146ca7cb7715a8234a4646ead40af.jpg?v=173927"...	[]	[]	[ "Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi", "Egypt", "Saudi Arabia", "Yemen", "Anadolu Ajansı" ]	null	[]	null	Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi has been living in Riyadh since he fled Yemen in 2015 - Anadolu Ajansı		https://cdnassets.aa.com…avicon-32x32.png		https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-president-leaves-egypt-for-saudi-capital/1232326	By Shukri Hussein ADEN, Yemen Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi left the Egyptian capital, Cairo, on Wednesday for Saudi Arabia after a three-day visit. “President Hadi left Cairo for Riyadh after a 3-day business visit,” his office director Abdullah al-Alimi said on Twitter. He described Hadi’s talks in Cairo with President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi as "successful". Al-Alimi said the Yemeni leader has obtained “serious pledges” from Egyptian authorities about facilitating the living of Yemenis in Egypt. Hadi has been living in Riyadh since he fled Yemen in 2015 after the Shia Houthi group overran much of the country, including capital Sanaa one year earlier. The conflict escalated in 2015 when Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies launched a massive air campaign in Yemen aimed at rolling back Houthi gains and shoring up the country’s pro-Saudi government.
8955	dbpedia	2	36	https://www.baytalfann.com/post/the-old-city-of-sanaa-in-yemen	en	The Old City of Sanaa in Yemen	https://static.wixstatic…e467710~mv2.jpeg	https://static.wixstatic…e467710~mv2.jpeg	[ "https://static.wixstatic.com/media/7335d9_6602c8f4063c41d39901a964bd5601a4~mv2.jpg/v1/crop/x_323,y_178,w_9504,h_1773/fill/w_1744,h_325,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_auto/BAF-Web-Header.jpg", "https://static.wixstatic.com/media/7335d9_fb40d6676c824cac9396fdfc0e467710~mv2.jpeg/v1/fill/w_135,h_180,al_c,q_80,usm_...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "BAYT AL FANN" ]	2022-08-17T10:35:09.469000+00:00	The Old City of Sanaa in Yemen is one of the oldest cities in the world, continuously inhabited for more than 2500 years. Meaning 'fortified palace', the city is a work of art in itself, & remains one of the greatest treasures of Arabia.Although an exact date for the establishment of Sana’a is unknown, according to Yemeni legend, it was founded by Shem, one of the three sons of Prophet Noah.Defined by distinct rammed earth and burnt brick tower-houses, the walled city has been inhabited for over	en	https://static.wixstatic…9ed3ed%7Emv2.jpg	Bayt Al Fann	https://www.baytalfann.com/post/the-old-city-of-sanaa-in-yemen	The Old City of Sanaa in Yemen is one of the oldest cities in the world, continuously inhabited for more than 2500 years. Meaning 'fortified palace', the city is a work of art in itself, & remains one of the greatest treasures of Arabia. Although an exact date for the establishment of Sana’a is unknown, according to Yemeni legend, it was founded by Shem, one of the three sons of Prophet Noah. Defined by distinct rammed earth and burnt brick tower-houses, the walled city has been inhabited for over 2,500 years and is home to the ancient pre-Islamic fortress of Ghumdan, a 20-story palace believed to be the world's first ever 'skyscraper'. Once a seat of government for the early Islamic caliphs, it is today the capital city of Yemen. Its Islamic heritage is reflected in its 106 mosques, 12 hammams (bath houses) and 6,500 houses built before the 11th century. As you step through the iconic 'Yemen Gate', the only one of the city's seven historic gates left standing, you will feel as though you have taken a step back in time. Like an elaborate work of art in an expansive open-air museum, more than 6,000 houses built before the eleventh century lie within the old city walls, tucked close together and connected by a comprehensive network of narrow streets and alleyways. The city has remarkably retained its historical ambience and splendor over the centuries and remained unspoiled by modern architecture, maintaining a comfortable rhythm between its traditional architectural fabric and the requirements of modern life. More than 1,000 years ago & preceding most of the world’s cities, the old city of Sana’a presented a model of green architecture in its 6,500 buildings (UN-Habitat /2020), constructed with local environment friendly materials, such as stones, mud, baked bricks, wood & gypsum. The architectural heritage of Sana'a consists of multi-story buildings decorated with geometric shapes and horizontal bands rendered in gypsum, narrow streets, urban gardens, elegant minarets and imposing monuments. Typical houses in Sana'a rise to as many as nine stories. The lower levels are usually built of stone, and the upper ones of lighter brick. The windows are outlined in white gypsum and have fan lights of alabaster or coloured glass held in gypsum tracery. The stained glass windows on the houses and buildings in the old city of Sana’a glisten in the night. The Great Mosque of Sana'a (Arabic: الجامع الكبير بصنعاء, al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr bi-Ṣanʿāʾ) is an ancient mosque in Sana'a, Yemen, and one of the oldest mosques in the world. The mosque is said to have been founded in the early Islamic period, suggested to be in 633. The Dar al-Hajar is a former royal palace located in Wadi Dhar about 15 kilometres from Sana‘a. Built in the 1920s as the summer retreat of Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din, ruler of Yemen from 1904 to 1948 it sits on top of a structure built in 1786 for scholar al-Imam Mansour. Even If the buildings are demolished, the ruins will not be harmful to the environment or health. The construction method of the old city of Sana’a focused on creating large green areas in the outskirts & centers of the city neighborhoods, which are about 69 neighborhoods. In every neighborhood, there is a garden (Mqshama), and in general, there exist around 40 gardens (Mqashama) across the old city of Sana’a. These gardens used to ensure self-sufficiency of homegrown vegetables. The old city of Sana’a adopted a wonderful technique for environmentally appropriate drainage of water from residential & public buildings, sewage water, as well as water from mosques, which go in a drainage system to irrigate the green spaces centered all the neighbourhoods. The old city of Sana’a retains many environmental features in terms of planning & design that can be applied to modern architecture. Additionally, Old Sana’a has adopted the implementation of environmental practices, recently known as the principles of green architecture. The city's architecture has been damaged, demolished and rebuilt through flooding, wars and prosperity. Yet, it wasn't until the modernization in the 1970s that the city's architectural fabric was truly in danger of disappearing. In 1972, the Italian writer and film director, Pier Paolo Pasolini, said, “From the architectural point of view, Yemen is the most beautiful country in the world, and Sanaa is Venice of the Arabia”. In the early 1980s, at the request of the Yemeni government, UNESCO launched an international campaign to conserve the city. Sana'a city was designated as an UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1988 and given an Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1995. Sana'a's architectural vocabulary was already well formed by the tenth century when Ibn Rustah wrote that most of the houses "are adorned with gypsum, baked bricks, and symmetrical stones.
8955	dbpedia	0	4	https://newlinesmag.com/argument/yemens-great-enabler-departs/	en	Yemen’s Great Enabler Departs	https://newlinesmag.com/…oads/Hadiweb.jpg	https://newlinesmag.com/…oads/Hadiweb.jpg	[ "https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=864379585153152&ev=PageView&noscript=1", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/themes/cgpolicy/images/NEW-NL-Logo-Horizontal-Black-Grey.svg", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/themes/cgpolicy/images/NL-Logo-Black.svg", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/uploads/farea-web-80x80...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Farea Al-Muslimi" ]	2022-05-05T11:02:00+00:00	The former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi was a ‘painful friend’ to have – and a worse president	en	https://newlinesmag.com/…ground-32x32.jpg	New Lines Magazine	https://newlinesmag.com/argument/yemens-great-enabler-departs/	One might be taken in by former Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, until meeting him in person. A very “adi” — mediocre — guy, not somebody whose words convey new knowledge or provoke deeper thought in the listener. That is how I felt walking out of his house in Sanaa in January 2014. At 23 years old, all I gained from the encounter was the courage to smoke in front of my father that afternoon, after he had seen me on the news sitting down with our president. Nothing in Hadi’s speeches or public remarks in the years since has changed my impression, which I came to learn was shared by many others who met him. Now that Hadi has departed, replaced by a presidential council, it’s time to consider his legacy. And what a pointless lack of legacy it is. For a man who led a country and its people for a decade, there are precious few achievements to point to. Hadi resembles no world leaders so much as former Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika — an ill and often absent president, removed by his own government — and Afghanistan’s Ashraf Ghani, a corrupt figurehead, who fled the country. Like Hadi, my generation got some sort of agency out of the Yemeni revolution of 2011. After more than 33 years of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hadi embodied our newly gained ability to imagine more than one president in our lifetime. We were so taken by the possibility of change that 6.6 million Yemenis — 65% of eligible voters — turned out to vote for Hadi in a one-candidate election in 2012. Some friends chuckled at me for taking part in such a “fake election.” But we were desperate to find a way forward and for a leader who would bear out our aspirations for our country and navigate it through what was to be a brief transitional phase so that Yemen could be spared the bloody path we saw Syria careening down every day. Little did we know, or could we even imagine, that Hadi would take us on a catastrophic combination of Syrian, Libyan, Somali and Iraqi routes. That’s why many Yemenis feel Hadi has stabbed them in the back twice over, once through incompetence and a tolerance for corruption, and then again by allowing the country to be dragged into civil and proxy wars. He spent eight of his 10 years as Yemen’s “transitional” president living outside the country, abusing his power by indulging corrupt relatives and allies, granting his sons the decidedly unconstitutional authority to manage and meddle in state matters and showing little interest in appeals from Yemenis to ease their burdens. Throughout these years, Hadi, from outside Yemen, encouraged people to fight and die to preserve his status as Yemen’s “legitimate” president. His circle of advisers didn’t hesitate to uphold and repeat that dubious claim of legitimacy — and kept repeating it for years beyond his mandate, right up until the moment Hadi was finally forced out of office on April 7. At that point, those same advisers scrambled to secure their own interests. For all of these reasons, Hadi’s departure was not celebrated most by his Houthi opponents in Sanaa. Rather, it was by those who fought the Houthis under the banner of Hadi’s “legitimate” government. The mood lightened considerably in many gatherings in Marib and Shabwa governorates, this year’s key battleground, where sheikhs and residents discussed the changes during nightly Ramadan get-togethers, where qat, a plant chewed as a stimulant, is shared. But speaking to people across the country, there is a sense that at least with Hadi’s departure, things may actually move again. Governing Yemen requires someone who is actually in Yemen and interested in governing. Beyond all of that, and to our Yemen Arab Spring generation specifically, Hadi will always be viewed as the man who transformed opportunities into problems and dreams into nightmares. That is his legacy to the generation behind the 2011 revolution. We dreamed of Yemenis truly practicing democracy and taking our country forward; for many, having demanded these dreams become reality is their biggest regret in life. It was a dream to have a truly national dialogue, but Hadi and his aides abused the process of the 2013-14 National Dialogue Conference so horribly — by manipulating representation and outcomes, violating conference bylaws, buying loyalties — that it ended with a civil war. It was a dream to have the support of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries with sufficient resources and authority to make the transitional period succeed. Yet Hadi abused that relationship for personal interests to the extent his indulgent hosts, who justified their destructive role in Yemen’s war on Hadi’s request for intervention, eventually lost patience, kicking him out of office and effectively changing the locks by installing a command council to replace the presidency. It was a humiliating, though sadly unsurprising, end. The Saudis, it seems, learned what Yemeni business owner Khaled Abdulwahid knows all too well. Asked recently in Aden what it meant to have a lifelong friend like Hadi, he grimaced: “It is very painful.” Even those who did not like how Hadi’s departure was orchestrated understood why — and how — the Saudis did it. “They came to us for something that we have been asking for, for too long,” Abdullah Al-Namani, head of the Tadhamon political party and an MP, told me a few days after signing Hadi’s concession document. “How can you say ‘no’ to something you know is what you both want and need?” It was painful, but the only right thing. Hadi left no one any choice. For 18 years, Hadi held the most boring job in a presidential system: vice president. He accepted the title from Saleh in 1994, even though it came with little to no respect, and he made a career out of chairing inconsequential committees, cutting ceremonial ribbons and passing greetings to people from a boss who barely took notice of him. Even as president, that was the most consistent role he played; an enabler, of anyone or anything. In the south, he was an enabler for the British army (he and his family served as guards for the British Colony during their occupation of Yemen) and later for the Soviet-sponsored Marxist state. And when Saleh took the decision to invade the south in 1994, it was Hadi, a southerner, who led his troops against the south and on the side of Saleh. After the war, Hadi agreed to be the most senior southerner in Saleh’s government — enabling Saleh’s horrible political formula that allowed Saleh to dominate the country while claiming to act in the name of all Yemenis. He later colluded with whoever was in charge of Yemen, be it the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islah party, or the Houthis or those waging the Saudi war for eight long years. In his early days as president, it took people a while to fully absorb the fact he was president. Hadi didn’t enjoy mixing with people much or being in front of TV cameras. For months, his house in Sanaa continued to be referred to as “the VP’s house.” A running joke in Sanaa at the time was that on the day of his inauguration as a president, Hadi told his wife “Congratulations. Tomorrow, you will be the First Lady.” The second day, the joke went, his wife packed her stuff and moved to Saleh’s house — because not even Hadi’s own wife could imagine him as president. Hadi was “the coincidence president.” A powerful Arab Spring uprising had just shaken Saleh’s republican throne, an uprising so powerful even he, the wiliest of politicians, could not survive it. But Saleh hoped to place an “enabler” on the throne, so that he could maintain his power. Two names were floated at the time. Saleh’s prime minister by then, Ali Mujawaer, politely declined. And Rashad Alimi — now the head of the presidential council — was unpopular in those circles loyal to Saleh. Hence, the safest pick was Hadi. The Americans also liked the idea of a vice president taking over from a struggling president (an idea they also supported in Syria, Iraq before 2003 and elsewhere). Thus, all the stars in Yemen aligned for a Hadi presidency. During this time, in the early years of his presidency, even Hadi’s aides struggled to meet with him, and he was said to be obsessed with foreign support and more accessible to foreign dignitaries. With President Vladimir Putin, he would speak in Russian, which he learned during his time studying in Russia. Hadi was meeting with Western diplomats almost daily in his first year; multiple aides said he firmly believed that only the United States mattered. While Hadi was still in Sanaa early in his presidency, senior Yemeni officials, including some ministers, told me that they had to go through the British or U.S. ambassadors to get a meeting with him. He met with his own party leadership little more than a handful of times in the three years he worked from inside Yemen. Hadi earned a reputation during his years as Saleh’s deputy and as president for being willing to do or accept anything that would ensure he maintained his position. Between 2012 and 2014, he essentially surrendered to the Islamist Islah party, liberally appointing its members to run state institutions so they would protect his seat in power. And when the time came, Hadi handed Sanaa to the Houthis in the September 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement, surmising that even if a militia controlled the capital, he could still negotiate himself a place within it. The Houthis, however, had no interest in sharing Sanaa, or power overall, and Hadi fled the capital in early 2015, first to Aden and then via Oman to Riyadh. He quickly adapted to his new lifestyle in his Riyadh safe haven, where aides and close friends described him during those years as satisfied to merely sleep in and enjoy lunch and semi-fresh qat, as well as the songs of Muhammed Murshed Nagi and Faisal Alawi, two of his favorite singers. Hadi showed the same traits while president-in-exile as he had in Sanaa. Early on in Riyadh, he dismissed, or at best sidelined, advisers and ministers who disagreed with him, and he left daily decision-making to a close inner circle that included his adult sons. In February 2022, Hadi’s aide Abdulaziz Al-Maflahi told me he had last met personally with Hadi four years earlier, on being sworn in as an adviser to the president. Hadi also turned the Balhaf refinery in Shabwa governorate over to the United Arab Emirates in 2015, while he was on good terms with the Emiratis, to use as a military base. And he accepted, at times even encouraged, Saudi disregard for protocol as long he was allowed to stay comfortably in place. He signed off on many documents and orders that violated Yemen’s sovereignty, such as ceding control of the country’s air space to Saudi Arabia. Multiple military commanders told me they had received a written document that instructed them to take orders directly from Fahd bin Turki, the Saudi commander of coalition forces in Yemen until 2020, as if they had come from Hadi himself. As the former governor of Hadramawt, Ahmed bin Breik, once told me: “Hadi just wants to sit on that chair. If you in some way can give him that, even for an extra day, he will do whatever you want.” For weeks, months and years, the Saudis waited for their “guest” to leave. According to more than one Yemeni and Saudi source, more than once between 2018 and 2022, the Saudis politely offered to build him a palace anywhere in Yemen, including near the border or even on the Saudi side of it. But the man was happiest in Riyadh, far from Yemen and Yemenis. Hadi never made the slightest effort on issues he arguably could have handled easier from Riyadh, such as stopping the expulsion from Saudi Arabia of Yemeni workers, whose earnings are a lifeline for so many Yemeni families and communities. Tens of thousands of Yemeni workers — some in businesses mere minutes from Hadi’s palace in Riyadh — lost their jobs or were forced to leave the country because of Saudization, the policy of replacing foreign workers with Saudi citizens. Their remittances were the last main source of hard currency in Yemen. The mass expulsion of so many workers arguably did more harm to the country than the war itself. Instead, Hadi’s rare conversations with his host King Salman involved self-interested appeals to his host’s commitment to traditional Arab hospitality. During a 2017 meeting in Mecca, Hadi requested qat be allowed into his palace daily and, in a telephone call a few years later, he asked King Salman to allow him more time in his luxury accommodations in Riyadh, according to more than one source familiar with the call’s content. It took years until the Saudis realized there was a problem with the announced goal of their operation in Yemen to restore the legitimate Hadi government to its place in the capital Sanaa: Hadi himself had no intention of returning to anywhere in Yemen. Hadi was, in many ways, the worst ally to have. And the perfect enemy. He was happy with any compromise, any loss, as long as he stayed in power. Even if he was in exile, his seat of power was located in a Riyadh palace, as insulated from the realities of war back home — one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, let’s not forget — as it was from Riyadh’s scorching desert heat. He would do anything to maintain it. On April 7, the scene for Hadi in Riyadh, and for millions of Yemenis, was very different from, and much more difficult than, a decade ago. Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis have died in this war to restore legitimacy to a government led by a man who was not interested in serving them and their needs. Yemen is plagued by militias and in the grip of war economies. An entire generation transformed from being proud to, at best, gripped by guilt for daring to demand democracy and true reform. Yemen has endured so much. And yes, Hadi is far from being responsible for it alone. In a war as long and brutal as Yemen’s, there is plenty of blame to go around, from the reckless sectarianism of the Houthis to the meddling of countries in the region. And, most certainly, there were our own mistakes as youths demanding change that played a part in this fate. Our immaturity and political naivete don’t give us a pass. We could have done much better and acted more responsibly, in so many ways. Still, Hadi was the center of it all, powerfully placed during the peak of the hopes and through the seemingly bottomless lows. Everyone was willing to move the ship of state forward, except its assigned captain. Fast forward 10 years from beautiful Sanaa to Riyadh, where Hadi was summoned the night of April 6 to see the Saudi deputy defense minister, Khaled bin Salman. Hours later, in a brief, prerecorded statement, he ceded power to a presidential council. Hadi’s handover took 10 years, not two as initially planned, and he didn’t hand over to a president elected by the Yemeni people as promised in February 2013. Rather, power transferred to eight men agreeable to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including political and tribal foes Hadi had fired in the past, enemies who had tried to kill him more than once, and some allies who had advised him and negotiated on his behalf throughout the war. It took many Yemenis by surprise, all except the handful involved in preparing the text, but for many, Hadi had abandoned them long ago. And, despite any pain, friends as well as foes were ready for Hadi’s chapter to end.
8955	dbpedia	0	54	https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-yemen-hard-choices-hard-war	en	The War in Yemen: Hard Choices in a Hard War	https://csis-website-pro…men_conflict.jpg	https://csis-website-pro…men_conflict.jpg	[ "https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/styles/500_x_300/s3/publication/170509_yemen_conflict.jpg?VersionId=dLnBnbQ9hwZb9U2W2x2GfR8gpSIoB78f&h=266da715&itok=XQ6JcUiT", "https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/styles/135x135/s3/2022-09/5Codersman.jpg?VersionId=QUAMvvu5wHSxLCjsEvboKsA...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Anthony H. Cordesman" ]	null	The Middle East is filled with grim wars in failed states—Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—none of which have good options for a lasting peace.	en	/themes/custom/ts_csis/assets/favicon.ico		https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-yemen-hard-choices-hard-war	The Middle East is filled with grim wars in failed states—Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—none of which have good options for a lasting peace. The situation in Yemen, however, has moved beyond crisis, to the point of humanitarian nightmare. It has become a stalemate where the casualties from actual combat are limited, but where the fighting has produced a stalemate that has left the entire country without meaningful governance and security, and has crippled an already desperately poor economy. The Burke Chair at CSIS has released a new report on the war in Yemen, entitled “The War in Yemen: Hard Choices in a Hard War.” The report is available on the CSIS web site at: csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170509_Yemen_Hard_Choices_Hard_War.pdf?Hv3JAIjcvSh5eBGPB44sP4r4lCn1kJyG Summary: At present, Yemen remains divided between two major factions: a mix of Houthi Shi’ite rebels and military supporters of its former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the Saudi and UAE-backed faction that supports a government led by his replacement in a one candidate election: Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Some two years of fighting have reached a near stalemate in which the Houthi-Saleh faction controls the capital and much of the populated northwest, and the Saudi-UAE-Hadi faction have taken Aden and other cities, and has a decisive edge in air power, but lack the ground forces to drive the Houthi-Saleh faction out of the areas it now controls. At the same time, other warring factions like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and various tribal groups add to the fighting and instability in much of the rest of the country. The result has become a massive humanitarian crisis that will continue to grow until the fighting ends. It has already inflicted a level of economic damage so serious that Yemen may take a take a decade or more to fully recover—even if the fighting does not resume and some form of effective national unity and governance is established. Like Syria and Somalia, Yemen is a nation that lacks the resources to quickly recover. Worse, it has become a nation that will then find it difficult to move towards some form of sustained post-war development. No one can help Yemen unless it can acquire a level of unity and quality of governance that will allow it to help itself, but even then, it will have no clear prospect of growth and stability without massive outside aid. This presents major problems in terms of conflict termination, and in finding some kind of U.S. policy option that can help give Yemen a meaningful future. Putting an end to the conflict can only be a first step in easing Yemen’s growing agony. No ceasefire or settlement that leaves a weak, ineffective, and divided government in power can end Yemen’s humanitarian crisis or allow it to move forward. Real peace and stability can only come if Yemen can reach a level of unity it has lacked in the past, create a modern enough central government to actually focus on recovery and development, and attract major levels of outside aid. Simply ending the fighting may reduce its level of suffering in the short term, but will inevitably prolong it and may well be a prelude to new levels of conflict. This presents the problem that the United States must seek some solution that will either fully defeat the Houthi and Saleh faction, or find some kind of compromise that will lead the Houthi-Saleh faction to accept an effective central government. At the same time, even the most decisive military victory by the Saudi and UAE-backed government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi offers little hope of effective leadership. The Hadi government may be more secular and free of Iranian influence, but it is far from clear it can lead or govern effectively. Like America’s role in its other “failed state wars,” winning a war will only be meaningful if it is the prelude to winning a peace. Like it or not, this means giving nation building the same priority as winning some form of military victory. If anything, this may well be the greater challenge. Read the entire report at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170509_Yemen_Hard_Choices_Hard_War.pdf?Hv3JAIjcvSh5eBGPB44sP4r4lCn1kJyG Photo credit: SALEH AL-OBEIDI/AFP/Getty Images
8955	dbpedia	0	42	https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2023/03/27/implications-of-the-saudi-iran-deal-for-yemen/	en	Political Violence at a Glance	https://politicalviolenc…938ffeb46e_o.jpg	https://politicalviolenc…938ffeb46e_o.jpg	[ "https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/PV@G-logo-w-tagline-header-mob.png", "https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/PV@G-logo-w-tagline-header.png", "https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/PV@G-logo-w-tagline-header-mob.png", "h...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "politicalviolenceataglance", "Marta Furlan" ]	2023-03-27T00:00:00	Guest post by Marta Furlan In 2014, the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia armed group from the Sa’ada region…	en	https://politicalviolenc…icon-2-32x32.png	Political Violence at a Glance	https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2023/03/27/implications-of-the-saudi-iran-deal-for-yemen/	Guest post by Marta Furlan In 2014, the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia armed group from the Sa’ada region of northern Yemen, aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been removed following the Arab Spring uprisings. Together, they defeated the government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and established control over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and the entirety of northern Yemen. At that time, Iran began to progressively increase its support for the Houthis, seeing partnership with the group as an opportunity to advance its revisionist agenda in the region and establish its influence in the southern Red Sea, an area of immense strategic significance. Threatened by aggressive Iranian expansionism at its doorstep, in March 2015, Saudi Arabia entered the war alongside Hadi. As Iran sided with the Houthis and Saudi Arabia sided with Hadi, Yemen became the battlefield of both a domestic competition for power between different local factions and a regional competition for influence between Teheran and Riyadh. The complexity that characterizes the Yemeni conflict is not unique. In the modern Middle East, countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya also experienced civil wars that developed into multi-layered conflicts involving local, regional, and international actors. In Syria, for instance, the confrontation initially involved the Assad regime, the secular opposition, a plethora of jihadist groups, and the Syrian Kurds. It grew, however, into a competition between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey over the regional status quo and a competition between the United States and Russia over influence in the Middle East. Despite the civil war scholarship suggesting that one-sided victories become harder with the passing of time, the Syrian conflict ended de facto with the one-sided victory of Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russia and Iran. As far as Yemen is concerned, the conflict is still ongoing. A major development, however, occurred two weeks ago when Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic ties and reopen embassies within two months, seven years after they severed relations. Following the signing of the agreement, which was brokered by China, questions emerged as to whether the deal might have positive implications for the war in Yemen. Prospects aren’t promising. The conflict in Yemen is at its heart a civil war between Yemeni factions, which is driven by social and political tensions that emerged in Yemen following the country’s unification in May 1990. On the background of those tensions, the inception of the current conflict can truly be traced back to the early 2000s, when six rounds of confrontation saw the government and the Houthi movement fight each other in Sa’ada. Rather than being a simple binary confrontation between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government, the war in Yemen is a complex mosaic of multiple armed factions fighting against and, at times, alongside each other. Within the anti-Houthi camp, there is a significant degree of military and political fragmentation, with different militias harboring different interests and visions. Some of those include the Southern Transitional Council (STC); al-Islah; the National Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh; and the National Shield Force formed by Saudi Arabia. A reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia will not address the deep-rooted and long-harbored hostility between the Houthis and their opponents, nor will it address the tensions and differences that dominate the anti-Houthi camp. At the very best, the Saudi-Iranian détente will facilitate the bilateral talks that have been ongoing between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. Those talks were initiated last October, when a six-month-long ceasefire expired, yet no side (Houthis, Saudi Arabia, the government) was willing to return to the battlefront amidst war fatigue. However, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC, Yemen’s de facto government) has been excluded from the Houthi-Saudi negotiation table. Its exclusion inevitably makes any Houthi-Saudi deal that might be reached in the future with Iranian support hardly consequential for the country’s peace and stability. Will Yemen see a one-sided victory, similar to what happened in Syria? That’s unlikely. The Houthis and the government-aligned forces reached a mutually damaging stalemate in Marib that left them all weaker. Under these circumstances, academic research suggests that the warring parties could either take steps toward a negotiated settlement or persist indefinitely in a costly, stalled conflict. The regional dimension of the war might gradually be moving toward a negotiated settlement between the Houthis and Iran, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia, on the other. Pummelled by years of fighting, the Houthis and Saudi Arabia seem to view bilateral negotiations favorably. But the domestic dimensions of the war continue to evade any negotiated settlement between Houthis and the PLC and between different PLC-affiliated militias. As the civil war literature suggests, the trajectory of the conflict will depend on how those parties assess what they can gain or lose from fighting versus negotiating. As the Houthis appear once again determined to resort to force, prospects for peace do not look particularly encouraging. Marta Furlan is a research and policy consultant at Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office) in Germany.
8955	dbpedia	3	17	https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/spectre-divided-yemen	en	The spectre of a divided Yemen	https://www.lowyinstitut…75211118-min.jpg	https://www.lowyinstitut…75211118-min.jpg	[ "https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/styles/interpreter_article_image/public/GettyImages-875211118-min.jpg?itok=3FVjny_6", "https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Divided_Yemen.jpg", "https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/styles/large/public/GettyImages-538286678.jpg?itok=lg...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Nicola Williams", "Benedict Coleridge", "John Sexton" ]	null	Throughout the last year, Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s control over the south deteriorated.	en	/themes/custom/lowy/favicons/interpreter-apple-touch-icon.png		https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/spectre-divided-yemen	After the Houthi–Saleh coalition collapsed and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed in December, it didn’t seem as though the conflict in Yemen could get any more complicated. Barely two months later, however, another one of Yemen’s coalitions has imploded. On 27 January, intense fighting broke out between units loyal to Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and those backing the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a political body dedicated to the re-emergence of an independent South Yemen. This followed the STC’s 21 January demand that Hadi replace his prime minister and cabinet. By 1 February it was clear the separatists had gained the upper hand – most of the forces loyal to Hadi had either surrendered or were confined to a small strip of territory surrounding the Presidential Palace. The recent fighting marks the latest escalation in a political struggle that has raged between the STC, led by Aidarous al-Zubaidi, and the government of President Hadi. The driving force behind the STC is the Southern Movement, known colloquially as al-Hirak, a disparate yet popular separatist movement in south Yemen. Originally formed in 2007, the Southern Movement has gained significant momentum due to its role in driving Houthi forces out of Aden in 2015. Since then, a complex and competing array of security forces have coexisted in Aden. These include the UAE-backed Security Belt forces, many which are loyal to the Southern Movement, as well as the Presidential Protection units, largely loyal to President Hadi. Over the past two years, tensions between these groups has escalated. In February last year, fighting broke out at Aden airport. Another escalation occurred in late April when President Hadi sacked Zubaidi, the governor of Aden at the time, as well as Minister of State Hani bin Breik. In May, in response to the sacking, Zubaidi and bin Breik announced the formation of the STC, whose purpose was to prepare the ground for the eventual independence of South Yemen. Throughout 2017, Hadi’s control over the south continued to deteriorate. The borders of North Yemen and South Yemen prior to unifcation in 1990 (Map: Wikimedia) The role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia is important to understanding these recent events. While the UAE is the junior partner in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, it has been busy consolidating what it considers its strategic interests in the southern Yemeni coastal governorates. This includes the setting up of parallel security institutions outside the framework of the Yemeni state. Because of this, many Yemenis have come to view the recent events in Aden as part of UAE-led efforts to divide Yemen, and of divisions within the Saudi-led coalition itself. Although it has empowered southern actors, the UAE is unlikely to have risked playing a direct role in the recent events for fear of angering Saudi Arabia. Rather, the UAE’s support of armed groups functioning outside the Hadi government should be viewed as motivated by a pragmatic understanding of the limitations of that government, rather than as a clear intention to divide Yemen in two. For its part, Saudi Arabia is likely to be extremely unhappy with recent events, despite reportedly losing patience with the Hadi government. At the very least, the events in Aden completely eclipsed a recent PR push on Yemen based on a US$2 billion deposit into its central bank, as well as a US$1.5 billion commitment of humanitarian aid. Reducing these events to geopolitical manoeuvring does a disservice to the genuine anger many Yemenis in the south hold against the Hadi government. Despite its liberation from the Houthis in 2015, Aden continues to be plagued by a poor security environment; the presence of terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Islamic State; and a non-functional judicial system dominated by armed groups. In addition, public services, most notably the energy and health sectors, have been consistently degraded. Many blame high fuel prices on the corruption of businessmen close to Hadi himself. A large number of public sector wages have not been paid in months, and the Yemeni rial has continued to depreciate, damaging the purchasing power of Yemenis in a country that imports the vast majority of its food. The recent events have made clear the extent to which the legitimacy of the Hadi government has been eroded. This is no better emphasised than by the fact Hadi has not visited Yemen since February 2017. Although it is unclear what the full ramifications of events in Aden will be, they will mark a major setback for the Saudi-led coalition campaign against the Houthis, and play into the Houthi leadership’s perception that to triumph they only need to continue to fight a war of attrition. One thing is evident: the spectre of a divided Yemen is one step closer. Less clear is whether this would improve the well-being of Yemenis currently enduring the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Alexander Harper
8955	dbpedia	0	15	https://www.fcnl.org/issues/middle-east-iran/saudi-led-war-yemen-frequently-asked-questions	en	The Saudi-led War in Yemen: Frequently Asked Questions	https://www.fcnl.org/sit…ba59b2fee7_o.jpg	https://www.fcnl.org/sit…ba59b2fee7_o.jpg	[ "https://www.fcnl.org/themes/custom/fcnl2020/logo.svg", "https://www.fcnl.org/sites/default/files/styles/landscape_1170/public/2021-11/22340906563_ba59b2fee7_o.jpg?h=cc198e8e&itok=ywh9DyEg", "https://www.fcnl.org/themes/custom/fcnl2020/assets/img/FCNL.NoTag.Blue.svg", "https://widgets.guidestar.org/Transparen...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2024-04-09T13:20:46-04:00	Yemen’s political instability began after a 2011 Arab Spring uprising that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power since 1990.	en	/themes/custom/fcnl2020/favicon.ico	Friends Committee On National Legislation	https://www.fcnl.org/issues/middle-east-iran/saudi-led-war-yemen-frequently-asked-questions	Yemen War Background \| The Saudi Blockade \| The Houthis and Iran \| Congressional Action Yemen War Background How did the Yemen war start? Yemen’s political instability began after a 2011 Arab Spring uprising that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power since 1990. Then-Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi became Yemen’s interim president for what was supposed to be a two-year term, during the transition to a more representative form of government with regular elections. Yemen’s political instability began after a 2011 Arab Spring uprising that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In 2014, Yemeni frustration with rampant corruption, unemployment, and rising fuel prices led to unrest across Yemen, including calls for an independent Southern Yemen. Taking advantage of the situation, the Houthis – a political and armed movement that originated from the Houthi tribe — entered Sana’a in September with the assistance of ex-president Saleh and put Hadi under house arrest. In 2015, with the stated goal of restoring Hadi to power, Saudi Arabia joined forces with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and formed a coalition of nine Arab countries. The coalition was backed by the United States, United Kingdom (UK), France, and Canada. Saudi Arabia framed the conflict in sectarian terms, insisting that Iran was supporting the Houthis. In March 2015, the Saudi-led coalition began conducting airstrikes and imposing a naval blockade against Yemen, indiscriminately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. What was Saudi Arabia’s motivation to wage war in Yemen? Saudi leaders backed Hadi for many reasons. They were alarmed by the rise of the Houthis at Saudi Arabia’s southern border, who they said were backed by Saudi Arabia’s main regional competitor, Iran. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait off the coast of Yemen is a critical oil shipping lane that links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and the Saudis wanted to ensure they were in control of it. This sea route facilitates the movement of millions of barrels of oil per day for Saudi Arabia and is critical to the world’s oil supply. The Yemen war served the political ambitions of then Saudi Defense Minister, and now crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, who used the conflict to gain national recognition and consolidate power. Lastly, control over Yemen would allow Saudi Arabia to construct an oil pipeline from its southern border through Yemen’s eastern province, Al Mahra, into the Indian Ocean. The pipeline would ease Saudi Arabia’s dependence on shipping oil through the Strait of Hormuz, which borders Iran. What is the U.S. role in this conflict? The Saudi-led coalition’s war on Yemen has received almost unwavering military support and weapons sales from the United States, UK, France, and other Western countries. In 2015, the Obama administration accommodated Saudi Arabia’s request for military backing of the coalition’s war on Yemen. Such backing included targeting assistance and logistical support for coalition airstrikes, midair refueling for Saudi warplanes, spare parts transfers, and billions of dollars in weapons sales. On Feb. 4, 2021, President Biden announced that the United States would end support for the coalition’s offensive operations in Yemen. Unfortunately, the administration has not clearly defined what constitutes “offensive operations”, and important aspects of U.S. complicity remain. The administration verified that ongoing support includes maintenance and intelligence sharing for warplanes conducting airstrikes and enforcing an air and sea blockade of Yemen. It remains unclear what, if any, other forms of military support the United States continues to provide to the coalition, as the administration has so far refused to answer a set of detailed questions posed by 41 members of Congress in a February 2021 letter seeking clarity on U.S. involvement in the war. Why has the United States historically supported the Saudis? In 1945, President Roosevelt met King Abdul Aziz on a naval destroyer in the Suez Canal and unofficially began the U.S.-Saudi partnership with a handshake. Under the agreement, Saudi Arabia would receive U.S. security assistance in exchange for granting the United States access to Saudi oil, tied to the U.S. dollar. Every U.S. president since has agreed to continue this security cooperation, which was strengthened after the Islamic Revolution in Iran and again during the first Gulf war. But the relationship is losing strategic importance as the United States imports less than 7% of its petroleum from Saudi Arabia. Following the gruesome assassination of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the humanitarian crisis caused by the Saudi-led war and blockade in Yemen, Americans began to grow more skeptical of Saudi Arabia. A December 2021 poll showed that a strong majority of Democratic and Republican voters opposed President Biden’s recent $650 million weapons sale to Saudi Arabia, even when presented with the administration’s argument that these were for defensive purposes. Bipartisan, bicameral majorities in Congress successfully voted several times during the Trump administration to terminate U.S. involvement in the war. During a nationally televised presidential debate, candidate Joe Biden promised to make the Saudi Crown Prince a “pariah.” Is there more than one war in Yemen? Yes, the United States is also involved in counterterrorism operations in Yemen against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP emerged in 2009, after the Yemeni and Saudi branches of Al Qaeda merged into one organization. The United States began airstrikes against AQAP soon after its formation, as part of the “Global War on Terror.” The United States has conducted 376 drone strikes in Yemen, which have killed between 125 and 151 civilians. According to data from the think tank New America, the United States has conducted 376 drone strikes in Yemen, which have killed between 125 and 151 civilians, and have killed between 1,390 and 1,779 people overall. The United States’ drone strikes against AQAP is viewed by lawmakers as a separate from the Saudi-led coalition war against the Houthis. Though still a contested legal matter, the Executive Branch has claimed these operations against AQAP are authorized under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). About the Saudi Blockade How does Saudi Arabia’s blockade of Yemen contribute to the humanitarian crisis there? For nearly seven years, Saudi Arabia has imposed an air and sea blockade on Yemen that has restricted the flow of vital commercial and humanitarian goods into the country. The United Nations estimated that by the end of 2021, the war in Yemen led to the deaths of at least 377,000 Yemenis and pushed over 16 million Yemenis to the edge of famine. Over 60% of the deaths were due to disruptions in access to food, water, and medicine. Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel has described the ongoing Saudi blockade as “an offensive military operation that kills civilians.” Saudi Arabia’s restrictions on the entry of commercial and humanitarian goods have been a leading driver of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, where 400,000 children are at risk of dying of malnutrition this year, and the country is being pushed towards “the biggest famine in modern history.” Since January 2021, Saudi Arabia has severely restricted fuel imports, greatly hindering food shipments and hospitals’ ability to function. What has been the humanitarian impact of Saudi Arabia’s air blockade of Yemen’s Sana’a airport? Commercial flights in and out of Sana’a Airport, Yemen’s main international airport, have been halted by Saudi Arabia since 2016. These flight restrictions have blocked medical evacuations of tens of thousands of critically ill Yemeni civilians and prevented vital medicines and medical supplies from entering the country. Tragically, many Yemenis with chronic health issues, such as cancer, have needlessly suffered and died waiting for potentially life-saving medical evacuations and medicine. According to the humanitarian organization CARE, the nearly complete halt to medical supplies and equipment entering through Sana’a airport, combined with restrictions on fuel through Yemen’s Red Sea ports, has caused a doubling of prices of some medicine, putting it out of reach for most of the population. What is the impact of the Saudi blockade on fuel imports? The Saudi-led coalition’s restrictions on fuel imports are a key driver of the economic crisis, making basic needs unaffordable. The naval blockade enables the Saudis to control the entry of ships carrying fuel into Yemeni ports. Statistics from the UN show that Saudi Arabia is severely restricting the entry of fuel to amounts far below Yemen’s needs. In November 2021, Saudi Arabia allowed only 3% of the fuel Yemen needs each month into the country, and in December only 5%. Without fuel, food and medicine can’t be transported throughout the country, jeopardizing the health of millions of Yemenis. Fuel shortages also prevent hospitals from operating at full capacity. World Food Program Director David Beasley pleaded to the UN Security Council last year that the “blockade must be lifted, as a humanitarian act. Otherwise, millions more will spiral into crisis.” Is the Saudi blockade of Yemen’s ports needed to prevent Iranian weapons from reaching the Houthis? No. In 2015, the United Nations established an inspection and verification mechanism that ensures that ships docking at Yemen’s ports are not carrying weapons. All commercial vessels are inspected and approved by the UN in Djibouti before being allowed to berth in Yemen’s Red Sea ports. In April 2021, U.S. Special Envoy Tim Lenderking acknowledged that the mechanism “works quite well.” The import restrictions on UN-approved vessels imposed by Saudi Arabia and the Hadi government are a tactic of economic warfare that seeks to gain leverage over the Houthis through starvation and deprivation of civilian populations. What has the Biden administration said about the blockade? In its first several months, the Biden administration said nothing publicly about the blockade, even as the UN sounded the alarm over the impact of Saudi Arabia’s tightening restrictions on fuel imports. When pressed by reporters, a State Department spokesman claimed that “food and commodities are getting through, so it is not a blockade.” UN World Food Program director David Beasley has repeatedly spoken about the urgent need to lift the blockade. However, in response to mounting pressure from Congress, the media, humanitarian groups, and civil society, U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen, Tim Lenderking, said that commodities and humanitarian assistance must be allowed to enter into Yemen unimpeded and that “Saudi Arabia must not stand in the way.” When asked by Rep. Ted Lieu (CA-33) what if any leverage the administration is prepared to use to compel Saudi Arabia to lift its restrictions, Lenderking could not say. And though Lenderking testified that restrictions on commodities into Yemen’s ports should be taken “off the table” as a bargaining chip and “should not be a factor in political discussions,” the administration endorsed a Saudi ceasefire offer in March 2021 that explicitly sought to use the blockade as leverage to elicit Houthi concessions. Who has spoken out about the blockade? UN World Food Program director David Beasley has repeatedly spoken about the urgent need to lift the blockade. In April 2021, Beasley flew to Washington and reportedly “impressed upon lawmakers the urgency of lifting the blockade ‘immediately.’” Following the April briefing, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks (NY-05) and a bipartisan group of members of the Middle East subcommittee sent a letter urging the administration to pressure Saudi Arabia to lift the blockade. 76 members of the House, led by Rep. Debbie Dingell (MI-12), and 16 Senators, led by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (MA), sent similar letters, as did a coalition of over 70 national advocacy organizations and more than a dozen celebrities. Senators Bob Menendez (NJ), Jack Reed (RI), and Chuck Schumer (NY) wrote a letter in July 2021 calling for an end to restrictions on Yemen’s ports, and in December 2021, Senators Elizabeth Warren (MA) and Rand Paul (KY) and Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY-14) and Nancy Mace (SC-01) sent a letter calling on Saudi Arabia to open Sana’a airport. About the Houthis and Iran Who are the Houthis? The Houthi movement, otherwise known as Ansar Allah (which translates to Supporters of God), primarily belongs to the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam. The Houthi political movement emerged in the early 1990s as the “Believing Youth” in Saada and was led by Hussein Al-Houthi. The main objective of the movement was to revive Zaydi Islam in the face of the perceived spread of Saudi-exported Wahabi ideology in Yemen. In early 2004, the Houthis, who opposed the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003 and condemned Saleh’s alliance with the United States, became an armed movement and proceeded to fight six wars against the Saudi-backed Saleh government in Yemen. Surprisingly, in 2014, the Houthis formed an alliance with former president Saleh after he was removed from office. Together, they seized the capital Sana’a and put President Hadi under house arrest in January 2015. Houthi forces have committed horrific human rights abuses throughout the course of the war, including firing artillery indiscriminately into cities such as Taizz, killing and wounding civilians, and launching indiscriminate ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia. There is not a lot of reliable data or polling about the popularity the Houthis have among the Yemeni population it governs. However, over the course of the war, more and more Yemenis have left the south and moved to Houthi-held territory in search of safety and greater economic stability. The U.S. media and lawmakers often refer to the Ansar Allah-led government in Sana’a as the “Iran-backed Houthis rebels.” The official narrative in the United States about the Houthis is often oversimplified, as the government in Sana’a reflects a coalition. The Supreme Political Council includes Ansar-Allah and former President Saleh’s political party, the General People’s Council. The government in Sana’a is also supported by many local tribes in Yemen. Haven’t the Houthis also committed human rights violations? Houthi forces in Yemen have also carried out grave violations of human rights, as well as possible war crimes in attacks against civilians. Actions by Houthi de facto authorities have also exacerbated the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the country by interfering with and impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. U.S. government criticism and response to Houthi violations in Yemen rightly have been pronounced and consistent. The same cannot be said for the U.S. response to abuses by Saudi forces, which has been muted in comparison and has not led to a cut-off of military aid. Violations by Houthi forces do not serve as a justification for continuing U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and do not change U.S. obligations under international law. What is Iran’s involvement in the Yemen war? While it is true that Iran has provided weapons and training to the Houthis each year, Iran’s support is often exaggerated. Iran spends far less than the hundreds of billions of dollars Saudi Arabia spends annually backing Hadi forces. A significant portion of Houthi weaponry has been generated locally by defeating Saudi-backed forces, looting army stockpiles, taking weapons from militia tribes, and purchasing on the black market. Saudi Arabia’s policy has no prospect of achieving its stated objectives and is creating a humanitarian catastrophe. Seven years of indiscriminate airstrikes and an air and sea blockade on Yemen, as well as Saudi Arabia’s attempts to isolate the Houthis and avoid good-faith diplomacy, have only emboldened the Houthis and increased their domestic popularity. The Houthis now govern territory with over 80% of the country’s population and are closer to Iran now than before the war. Saudi Arabia’s policy has no prospect of achieving its stated objectives and is creating a humanitarian catastrophe through its collective punishment of Yemen. Do Houthi cross-border attacks on targets on Saudi Arabia constitute a legitimate reason for continued U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition? Over the course of the Yemen war, the Houthis have conducted drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia, which have been condemned by the United States and the international community. These cross-border attacks are often cited as a reason the United States must continue to send military support to Saudi Arabia. However, if the Saudis were to end their bombardment and blockade of Yemen, the Houthis would have no incentive to risk provoking their powerful neighbor into further attacks. If the Saudis ended their military aggression towards Yemen, the Houthis would be unlikely to conduct additional cross-border attacks. The best way to protect the Saudis from Houthi missiles is to end Saudi involvement in Yemen. The best way to protect the Saudis from Houthi missiles is to end Saudi involvement in Yemen. The rate and intensity of Houthi attacks have only increased over time as the Houthis have gained strength and the Saudis have tightened the blockade, demonstrating the failure of the Saudi approach. Continued U.S. support for Saudi aggression will neither weaken the Houthis nor bring the war to a quicker end. Instead, the United States and Saudi Arabia must demonstrate their commitment to diplomacy, international law, and human rights by lifting the blockade and ending the aerial bombardment of Yemen. Would labeling the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) affect humanitarian access and the peace process in Yemen? Yes. While the Houthis share much blame, alongside the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, for horrific human rights violations in Yemen, an FTO designation would do nothing to address these concerns. It would, however, prevent the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance to millions of innocent people, greatly hurt the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and further undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Rather than being a catalyst for peace, FTO designations are a recipe for more conflict and famine, while unnecessarily further undermining U.S. diplomatic credibility. It is more likely that these designations will convince the Houthis that their goals cannot be achieved at the negotiating table. Moreover, commercial shippers are already reluctant to import to Yemen given the high risk of delays, costs, and risks of violence. An FTO designation on the Houthis would only increase this level of risk for commercial entities and further place the vital work of humanitarian and peacebuilders at risk. Even if humanitarian exemptions are permitted, financial institutions, shipping firms, and insurance companies, along with aid organizations, are likely to find the risk of potential violations to be too high. As a result, these entities would dramatically scale down or even end their involvement in Yemen – a decision that would have indescribably severe human consequences. About Congressional Action What can Congress and the administration do to bring about an end to the blockade? As a top foreign policy priority, the Biden administration must use its vast leverage to encourage Saudi Arabia to immediately and unconditionally lift the blockade and reach a nationwide ceasefire to end the conflict. Members of Congress should continue to call on the administration to do so while working to pass a new Yemen War Powers Resolution prohibiting all forms of U.S. support for the blockade and other offensive operations of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. How has the 117th Congress attempted to end U.S. complicity in the Saudi-led war on Yemen? There were two key congressional votes on Yemen in 2021. The first was Rep. Ro Khanna’s (CA-17) amendment to the FY22 National Defense Authorization Act to end U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led war on Yemen. It passed the House with 219 votes. 11 Republicans supported it and 11 Democrats opposed it. The amendment was stripped out of the final bill during conference negotiations between the House and Senate. There were two key congressional votes on Yemen in 2021. The second vote was a joint resolution of disapproval, led by Sens. Rand Paul (KY), Mike Lee (UT), and Bernie Sanders (VT), to block the Biden administration’s announced sale of $650 million in new weapons to Saudi Arabia. While the resolution failed to pass 30-67, the vote still showed momentum to end U.S. complicity in the war. A majority of Senate Democrats voted for it, including Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (NY) and Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (IL). Many senators told FCNL staff that they believed that these air-to-air munitions were defensive in nature and that they still supported ending U.S. complicity in offensive operations, including by terminating spare parts and maintenance for Saudi warplanes. Have past congressional efforts to end U.S. complicity in the war had a tangible impact on the humanitarian situation and peace talks? In 2019, Senators Bernie Sanders (VT), Mike Lee (UT), and Chris Murphy (CT), made Senate history by passing S.J.Res.7, the War Powers Resolution to end U.S. military involvement in the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen. This was the first time since the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973 that both chambers of Congress passed a War Power Resolution. The advocacy effort for this legislation mobilized hundreds of thousands of activists all over the country to produce a bipartisan majority in the House and Senate. Its congressional passage pushed the UAE to draw down its military forces in Yemen, spurred a reduction in cross-border attacks by the Saudis and Houthis, led to the Hodediah ceasefire, and revived negotiations between the warring parties. But after the veto, Yemen suffered a breakdown in diplomacy, an uptick in violence, and a continuation of hostilities. What is the War Powers Resolution? The War Powers Resolution of 1973, otherwise known as the War Powers Act, is a federal law passed in response to executive overreach that enabled U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War. It was intended to provide a framework for Congress’s check on presidential power to use military force without congressional consent. The War Powers Resolution has three main parts. The President must get a declaration of war or specific authorization from Congress before sending troops overseas unless the United States or its armed forces are attacked. If the President initiates hostilities, these can only last 60 days and must then be terminated unless Congress authorizes their continuation. If there is no declaration of war or specific statutory authorization passed within 60 days, Congress can require the president to end U.S. participation in hostilities at any time Any member of the House or Senate, regardless of committee assignment, can invoke section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution and get a full floor vote on whether to require the president to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities. Under the procedural rules written into the War Powers Act, these bills receive a special expedited status that requires Congress to make a full floor vote within 15 legislative days of their introduction. This provision is especially useful because it allows members of Congress to force important debates and votes on the president’s use of military force and Congressional war authority.
8955	dbpedia	1	59	https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/president-abd-rabbuh-mansur-hadi	en	Getty Images			[ "https://www.gettyimages.com/sign-in/assets/static/white-f114c2d21e50f9b239ac.svg", "https://www.gettyimages.com/sign-in/assets/static/black-dd9588e3db810afab0eb.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Getty Images Deutschland. Finden Sie hochauflösende lizenzfreie Bilder, Bilder zur redaktionellen Verwendung, Vektorgrafiken, Videoclips und Musik zur Lizenzierung in der umfangreichsten Fotobibliothek online.	de			null
8955	dbpedia	3	40	https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/can-yemens-new-leadership-council-buck-the-trend-of-history/	en	Can Yemen’s New Leadership Council Buck the Trend of History?	https://mecouncil.org/wp…ial-council.webp	https://mecouncil.org/wp…ial-council.webp	[ "https://mecouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/logo-1.svg", "https://mecouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/dark-logo-1.svg", "https://mecouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Yemen-presidential-council.webp", "https://mecouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/صورة-شخصية-فوزي-الغويدي.jpeg", "https://mec...	[]	[]	[ "Yemen Presidential Council" ]	null	[]	2022-11-10T12:42:05+00:00	Although Yemen has experienced several decades of autocratic rule, the country also has a long history of being governed by councils representing its diverse political landscape. So, when a new leadership council was formed in April to replace President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, it was welcomed by many Yemenis and felt like an appropriate and familiar mechanism for improving the political and economic situation and progressing toward an end to the country’s seven-year civil war.	en	https://mecouncil.org/wp…/dark-logo-1.svg	Middle East Council on Global Affairs	https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/can-yemens-new-leadership-council-buck-the-trend-of-history/	Although Yemen has experienced several decades of autocratic rule, the country also has a long history of being governed by councils representing its diverse political landscape. So, when a new leadership council was formed in April to replace President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, it was welcomed by many Yemenis and felt like an appropriate and familiar mechanism for improving the political and economic situation and progressing toward an end to the country’s seven-year civil war. The latest council iteration includes eight members: four from the South and four from the North, including a powerful chairmanship held by Rashad al-Alimi, a former interior minister and member of the General People’s Congress. So far, the Presidential Leadership Council has been successful in easing political tensions among various political parties and militant factions under the central government’s umbrella. Yet based on Yemen’s troubled history with collective leadership, along with recent events on the ground, it is more likely the council ends up contributing to the political deadlock and becoming an obstacle to Yemen’s peace process. Yemen’s experience with the presidential council Yemen’s experience with the council system has not been positive stretching back for more than half a century. That was true before 1990, when the country was split between the North’s Yemen Arab Republic and the South’s People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, as well as in the post-unification Republic of Yemen. The first presidential council experiment took place following the revolution of December 26, 1962, and the overthrow of the Imams in Northern Yemen. At the time, council members were drawn from the army, and Abdullah Al-Sallal, considered the first president of the newborn Yemen Arab Republic, was placed at its helm. The council kept expanding and contracting its membership until its dissolution in 1966 as a result of Al-Sallal’s unilateral decision-making, which drove the other council members to overthrow him and form another presidential council—dubbed the Republican Council—led by Judge Abdelrahman Al-Irani. While the Republican Council did not devolve into the private domain of one man, it was eventually overthrown by what would later be known as the Corrective Movement of June 13, 1974. The leader of that coup, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, later formed the General Command Council, which served as a front for his exclusive control over power and decision-making. This did not change after Al-Hamdi’s assassination, nor the subsequent assassination of his successor, Ahmad al-Ghashmi, in 1979, after which Ali Abdallah Saleh ascended to power and remained there for the following 33 years. The presidential councils of Southern Yemen did not fare better than their Northern counterparts. In the Marxist South, power was equally split among the council members who abided by the leftist ideology. However, disagreements over whether to follow the Russian or Chinese model of Marxism produced internal squabbles that led to multiple coups from within the council. The situation soon degenerated into a full-blown civil war in 1986 that left thousands of dead in its wake. In 1990, following the reunification of Northern and Southern Yemen, a presidential council was formed to represent both partners of the reunification with two respective leaders, Ali Abdallah Saleh and Salem Al-Abyad, at its head. For the most part, this council was characterized by genuine power sharing, but was riven with political quarrels that were resolved militarily when diplomatic solutions could not be reached. In the summer of 1994, the country digressed into another war that would result in the council’s downfall and Saleh’s monopolization of power. So why has Yemen experienced this long history of failure in maintaining collective leadership? For one, the country lacks an ingrained democratic culture and the concept of individual rule is entrenched in the public’s collective consciousness. Indeed, almost all previous councils were undone by the eventual usurpation of power by the council’s chairman and the eventual sidelining of other members, as well as the failure to develop internal consensus. The makeup of past councils has also not been conducive to their success. Council members were never chosen according to any criteria or through a democratic process. They were merely selected by the powers that be at the time the councils were formed. The absence of clearly defined prerogatives and responsibilities for each council member made internal politicking particularly contentious. The undemocratic method of forming councils also invariably left some political factions outside the circle of decision-making. Reflecting on this history, it is possible to discern that Yemen’s presidential councils failed for three reasons: the organization of these councils was neither clear nor transparent; leadership powers were too concentrated in the hands of their presidents; and the representation of council members was not based on democratic foundations that included all the political parties. A short-term solution or a ticking time bomb? The current Presidential Leadership Council was formed under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—two external parties to Yemen’s civil war that back the central government. Political expediency and the desire to move past the presidency of Mansur Hadi dictated the process of its formation much more than the lessons of Yemen’s history with this form of governance. As a result, the current council is composed of members who do not trust each other and cannot collaborate effectively. The continued influence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the council may help keep it intact, but there is concern that it will threaten the independence of the council’s decision-making and Yemen’s sovereignty. Given the council members’ fundamentally different goals and aspirations, Chairman al-Alimi characterized them as “crisscrossing squares” gathered around their mutual opposition to the Houthi movement, which controls the capital, Sana’a, and northern parts of the country. Nevertheless, in an interview with the Middle East Institute, a think tank based in Washington D.C., al-Alimi said the council members have set their differences aside while they pursue the goals of recapturing the state, rebuilding its institutions, providing services to liberated areas, and improving the standard of living for its citizens. He also pointed out that council decision-making requires consensus among its members rather than a majority vote, even if it demanded the pressuring of individual council members to accept the will of the majority. Recent events on the ground, however, have demonstrated that the council will struggle to keep members from pursuing individual interests, especially given that several command paramilitary forces that can be used outside the collective will of the council. For example, in August in the governorates of Shabwah and Abyan, the armed forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a member of the Presidential Council backed by the UAE—clashed with the security forces of the central government, allegedly working in cooperation with the Al-Islah party—also a member of the Presidential Council. The incident was an important test for the council, which was ultimately unable to contain the tensions between its member’s armed forces on the ground. There is little doubt that the formation of the current presidential council occurred at an extremely complex and difficult moment for Yemen, in the midst of civil war, a humanitarian catastrophe, severe economic dependence, and the direct intervention of neighboring states in Yemen’s affairs. Nonetheless, the process would have been best served by learning the lessons of the past. While the current council does not appear to be at risk of being dominated by a single figure, its members were still selected without a transparent process and it has so far failed to implement effective and inclusive decision-making. Taken together with the events of Shabwa, the council appears increasingly like a ticking time bomb, with each faction buying time in preparation of a post-council future. While the continued involvement of Saudi Arabia and the UAE may pressure the members to peaceably resolve their internal differences, the associated cost of foreign influence over Yemeni affairs remains high and the primary objective of the council—to stabilize the country and serve Yemen’s collective needs—is compromised. This article was originally written in Arabic. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.
8955	dbpedia	1	6	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/exiled-yemen-president-steps-aside-amid-hopes-over-truce-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi	en	Exiled Yemen president steps aside as truce raises hopes of end to war	https://i.guim.co.uk/img…abb05640df06da5f	https://i.guim.co.uk/img…abb05640df06da5f	[ "https://sb.scorecardresearch.com/p?c1=2&c2=6035250&cv=2.0&cj=1&cs_ucfr=0&comscorekw=Yemen%2CWorld+news%2CSaudi+Arabia%2CUnited+Arab+Emirates%2CMiddle+East+and+north+Africa%2CHouthis", "https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/3661cb4bdb00289fc8c549d79e094e128a1b7f40/109_0_3281_1969/master/3281.jpg?width=465&dpr=1&s=none" ...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Guardian staff" ]	2022-04-07T00:00:00	Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi says a newly established council will lead negotiations with Iranian-backed Houthis	en	https://assets.guim.co.u…e-touch-icon.svg	the Guardian	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/exiled-yemen-president-steps-aside-amid-hopes-over-truce-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi	Yemen’s exiled president has stepped aside and transferred his powers to a presidential council as international and regional efforts to end the country’s long-running civil war gained momentum with a two-month truce. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, major players in the conflict, appear to have had a role in Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s decision, quickly welcoming it with a pledge of $3bn (£2.3bn) in aid. The head of the new council has close ties to Riyadh. Whether the switch will expedite an end to the grinding war remains to be seen, as UN-sponsored negotiations have been at an impasse and fighting, airstrikes and missile attacks continued until late last month. The Houthis did not immediately comment on Hadi’s announcement. Hadi said the newly established council would run the internationally recognised government and lead negotiations with the Iranian-backed Houthis, according to a statement aired on state-run media. The move is meant to unify the anti-Houthi camp after years of infighting and disputes, and was almost certainly orchestrated in Riyadh, where Yemeni factions were meeting over the past week to discuss efforts to end the war. “With this declaration a presidential leadership council shall be established to complete the implementation of the tasks of the transitional period. I irreversibly delegate to the presidential leadership council my full powers,” Hadi declared on Yemen’s state-run TV. Hadi also sacked the vice-president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a powerful military figure, and delegated Ahmar’s powers to the presidential council. The presidential council is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi enjoys close ties with Saudi Arabia and other political groups inside Yemen, including the powerful Islah party – the transnational Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in Yemen. The council has seven members, including Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, head of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council – an umbrella group of heavily armed and well-financed militias propped up by the UAE since 2015. Sheikh Sultan al-Aradah, the powerful governor of energy-rich Marib province, was also named a member of the council. So was Tariq Saleh, a militia leader and nephew of the late president who has close ties with the UAE. Hadi was named president of Yemen in 2012 with a mission to oversee a democratic transition following its Arab spring uprising that ended Saleh’s longtime rule. However, the Houthis, a religious movement turned rebel militia, allied with Saleh and seized the capital Sana’a in 2014, forcing Hadi and his government into exile in Saudi Arabia. Months later, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition and entered the war to try to restore Hadi’s government to power. The conflict has in recent years become a regional proxy war that has killed more than 150,000 people, including more than 14,500 civilians. It has also created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Welcoming Hadi’s move, Saudi Arabia urged the presidential council to embark on UN-led negotiations with the Houthis to find a “political, final and comprehensive” settlement to the conflict, according to the state-run Saudi Press Agency. The powerful Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has also met with the council head and its members, according to Saudi state-run TV. The warring sides announced a two-month ceasefire earlier this month, the first nationwide truce in Yemen in six years. Hadi’s announcement came as Yemeni talks called by the Saudi-based Gulf Cooperation Council entered their final day on Thursday. The Houthis boycotted the GCC-facilitated efforts because they are taking place in Saudi Arabia, their adversary’s territory.
8955	dbpedia	2	50	https://globerovers.com/sanaa-yemen/	en	Yemen's Ancient City in a Time	https://i0.wp.com/glober…naa-houses-5.jpg	https://i0.wp.com/glober…naa-houses-5.jpg	[ "https://globerovers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/TopBanner1-1900x350.jpg", "https://globerovers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/TopBanner1-1900x350.jpg", "https://i0.wp.com/globerovers.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Yemen-Sanaa-houses-8.jpg?resize=800%2C535&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/globerovers.com/wp-cont...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Peter Steyn - Editor, GlobeRovers", "Peter Steyn - Editor" ]	2022-07-06T20:22:59+07:00	Sana'a, capital of Yemen and one of the oldest continuously-inhabited cities in the world. A besieged city living in a time-warp. Join us and go back in time!	en	https://globerovers.com/…GR-favicon-1.jpg	GlobeRovers	https://globerovers.com/sanaa-yemen/	3.9K Reading Time: 6 minutes Sana’a, the Yemeni capital, is of the oldest continuously-inhabited cities in the world (others being Jericho in Palestine, as well as Damascus and Aleppo in Syria and Arbil in Iraq’s Kurdistan). The city is believed to have been founded by Shem, the son of Noah – the guy who built an ark and survived the biblical flood. Sana’a used to be the capital of only North Yemen before the reunification in 1990. Why Travel to Sana’a in Yemen? The low-down: Sana’a is a city like few others. Here even the most experienced travellers get some form of culture shock – the feeling that you are from Mars and everybody knows it. It is an amazing city, but will be off-limits for a while unless you are totally nuts! The brightest highlight: Just being in Yemen is already an amazing experience. To walk around the city and meeting the locals, seeing them doing their daily chores. Incredible! Intrepid destination: Absolutely, totally intrepid. Now off-limits to most. Globerovers score (10 is the highest): I love intrepid places and Sana’s, just like the rest of Yemen I was lucky to explore before the current wars, was such an eye-opener. I can’t give Sana’a less than 9.8 out of 10! The Sana’a Culture Shock As you drive from the airport to the city, your culture shock slowly builds up and exhilarates you as you enter the city. Don’t be too scared. Check in at one of the cosy guesthouses in the historical part of the city of Sana’a. Once you have dropped off your bag and signed the hotel register, head out the door right into the action of old Sana’a. You are in for a real treat. It’s a time warp! While you may not know what Sana’a looked like a hundred years ago, you will be totally convinced that time has not changed here in all that time. Almost everybody still wears their traditional clothing. Men generally wear the thawb, or thobe, an ankle-length garment similar to a robe and usually having long sleeves. An izaar, a lower garment, is typically donned underneath. As a symbolic decoration, the jambiya, a short curved blade dagger is typically worn by men above the age of 14 as an accessory on a belt. While you may think time has been standing still here for 100 years – think again. These men are very brand conscious. The jambiya comes in many brands which, depending on the brand, vary from 1,000 Yemeni rials (US$5) up to 30 million Yemeni rials (US$140) or even more. The Women of Sana’a All women have to cover up every part of their body. The majority of local women wear the black niqaab, which is a headscarf that only allows their eyes to be seen. The niqaab face covering forms part of the sartorial hijab, the head covering. However, some women prefer to wear the chadari rather than the niqaab. A chadari has a fine grille over the eyes that the woman looks through. Women stay at home to take care of household chores and raise the kids. All stores are staffed exclusively by qat-chewing men. Yemeni women do not hold many economic, social or cultural rights. The combination of a high level of illiteracy, traditional culture and religion, restricts women to their homes so few are seen in public. When they leave home, they must be chaperoned by a family member and enter and exit the bazaar very quickly. The Qat-Chewing Men of Sana’a Men staff all stores, including those that sell women’s clothing. Men chew qat non-stop. Qat, or khat, is a flowering plant native to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Qat chewing has a history as a social custom dating back thousands of years and it is still very much alive around the Arabian Peninsula, in particular in Yemen. The World Health Organisation (WHO) classified it as a drug of abuse in 1980 as it can produce mild-to-moderate psychological dependence though it is not considered to be seriously addictive. Many Yemeni men, including teens, chew qat non-stop. They can easily be spotted with a big bulge in one cheek and a small plastic bag with green leaves in hand. What to See in Sana’a Once you are in the old city, where you should be staying in one of the cosy guesthouses, just walk around and explore the many old buildings, markets, and museums. This is not a tourist city so don’t expect any tourist facilities. Even the museums are very basic. The shops are fascinating. The market area is a sight from a different era. Think back to a hundred years ago. Time has stood still here, as it has all across Yemen. Among the highlights of Sana’a are: Bab al-Yemen – the gate leading into the Old City, which is surrounded by ancient walls. Great Mosque of Sana’a – one of the oldest mosques in the world. Al Saleeh Mosque – one of the largest mosques in the world. National Museum – located in a former palace. Military Museum – with many artefacts related to the Yemeni military. Dar al-Hajar – home of the Rock Palace of an Imam of Yemen north of Sana’a. North of Sana’a – picturesque rock villages such as Kawkaban, Thula, and Al Mahwit. In central Yemen at the Hadhramaut Valley, lies Shibam Hadhramaut is justifiably described as “the oldest skyscraper city in the world” or “the Manhattan of the desert”, and is one of the oldest examples of city planning based on the principle of vertical construction. The people are generally friendly and as long as you blend into your environment with both your clothing and your behaviour, you should be fine. Dress absolutely conservatively in dark clothes and be respectful in all situations. Taking photos of kids and men without prior permission is acceptable, but be humble and thankful to your subjects. Avoid taking photos of women, or at least do it extremely discreetly. Taking photos of young girls is generally acceptable but it is best to first ask permission from the girl and or the parents. Venturing outside the old walled city is rewarding too, in particular the markets where, once again, you need to blend in with your local environment as much as possible. As the culture shock flares up from time to time, just stand still and take it in until you feel comfortable again to continue walking. Current Travel Warnings The current (2022) travel advisory is as follows: “Due to the ongoing war, Sana’a and all of Yemen is off-limits to foreign travellers”. In Sana’a you can travel freely but you need road permits for basically every journey outside the capital. Foreigners that are found to be in places they are not allowed, without a guide or without the right documents, risk detention or may even face terrorism and spying charges. It’s not something to take lightly; even if you are a backpacker, get in touch with a travel agency and arrange a tour and the necessary permits. Many of the roadside checkpoints are controlled by the army, police, or even local tribes, some of which some are friendly, some unfriendly. The travel agencies know the situation on the ground, which can be different from village to village. Sana’a has suffered from endless wars, famine, and even endless rains and floods! The August 2020 Flooding of Sana’a On August 10th, 2020, this report was published by Al Jazeera News: The houses in Yemen’s UNESCO-listed Old City of Sana’a are collapsing due to heavy rains, as months of floods and storms assail a country already reeling from war, food shortages, and disease. The distinctive brown and white mud-brick houses of Sanaa’s historic neighbourhoods, which date from before the 11th century, have long been under threat from conflict and neglect. Muhammad Ali al-Talhi’s house partially collapsed on Friday as heavy rain battered Sanaa, leaving the family, including six women and six children, homeless. “Everything we had is buried,” he said surrounded by ancient debris and mud, appealing for help to find shelter. Aqeel Saleh Nassar, deputy head of the Historic Cities Preservation Authority, said people were not maintaining these old buildings as they had done in the past, leading to cracks and structural weakening. It is a thrilling experience to wander through the streets of Sana’a. Try to make friends with the locals and hopefully you will be invited into their homes to experience their way of life, or even to attend a wedding! It is truly fascinating! Here are a few of the photos I captured during my visit in 2007: ☛ Read more: All Posts about Yemen ☛ Read more: Yemen – Where Time Stands Still ☛ Read more: Unique Rock Villages of Yemen ☛ Read more: Yemen’s Hadhramaut Valley
8955	dbpedia	2	11	https://yemenlg.org/governorates/capital-sanaa/	en	Local Governance in Capital City of Sana’a, Yemen – maps, data and resources	https://yemenlg.org/wp-c…-social-wide.jpg	https://yemenlg.org/wp-c…-social-wide.jpg	[ "https://yemenlg.org/wp-content/themes/yemenlg/images/logo-berghof-foundation-png-gray.png", "https://yemenlg.org/wp-content/themes/yemenlg/images/logo-pdf-yemen-gray.png", "https://yemenlg.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/22-485x480.png", "https://yemenlg.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/11-633x480.png", "http...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Berghof Foundation" ]	2020-06-29T16:01:23+00:00	A map of districts, data on the economy, local governance, access to basic services, demographics and related resources for Sana'a capital city, located in in the western part of Yemen.	en	https://yemenlg.org/wp-c…ages/favicon.png	Local Governance in Yemen: Resource Hub	https://yemenlg.org/governorates/capital-sanaa/	Economy The public sector is the largest employer in the city, with tens of thousands of jobs in the central and local administration. Industrial and commercial activities are also present. The city’s industrial production is dominated by light industry, especially textile, clothing, shoes, home products, and plastics. Heavy industry includes steel and other metal production. Handicraft production is also an important source of income. Jewellery, traditional daggers and belts, brassware, and agricultural tools continue to be produced in small workshops in the city. Sana’a is an important commercial center with large wholesale and retail sectors focused on a number of markets and malls. Real estate and construction are also an important sector in the city. Sana’a was once the center of the Yemeni tourism industry. The Old City of Sana’a is a UNESCO World Heritage site. Tourism has virtually ceased during the war. The capital governorate historically had the highest share of local revenue in its local authority budget, reflecting its importance as an industrial and commercial center in the national economy. Seventy-two percent of its 2014 budget was funded from central grants and subsidies, and 28% from local revenues. The main sources of local revenue came from citywide shared revenues and taxes, notably sales tax, zakat, income tax, and profit tax. The city also derived income from assets and sales of goods and services. Following the establishment of the General Zakat Authority by the de facto authorities, the city of Sana’a stands to lose zakat, previously an important source of income. In 2014, the poverty rate in Sana’a city was 13.4%. More recent estimates suggest the rate has spiked to almost 80% as the suspension of government salaries has hit the public sector workforce in the capital, and rampant inflation and the general implosion of the economy have taken their toll. Local governance The local council of the city of Sana’a is composed of 20 councilors in addition to the appointed mayor of the city. There are seven vacant seats in the council, with four deceased councilors and three who are abroad, leaving 13. The local council does not convene regularly and its meetings are confined to the administrative board consisting of the mayor, the secretary general of the council, and heads of the three committees. As for the executive offices, they are functioning regularly despite the lack of salaries and the shortage of operational budgets. Access to basic services There are nearly 3 million people (approximately 80% of the population) in need of assistance in Sana’a city. Sixty-four percent of them are in dire need (status December 2022). Health services are available in public hospitals and health facilities, which rely on support from donor organizations and fees charged for services. Even with donor support, services are at a bare minimum and do not meet the needs of the population. Large numbers of IDPs – approximately 250.000 (status December 2022) – who have fled to Sana’a from other governorates have placed additional strain on health services and other infrastructure. Next to the governorate of Sa’adah, the capital has sustained the highest number of airstrikes and 227 schools have been damaged. Teachers are not receiving regular monthly salaries in the city, which has disrupted education. There are attempts to run some of the schools in the governorate on a fee basis, but parents have largely rejected these efforts. Teachers receive a small stipend from the de facto authorities. As of 2017, 70% of households in Sana’a city had access to potable water. Water services in the city have been damaged by airstrikes and have been only partially restored. The sewage system does not cover all districts. Demographics District Size (km2) Population (Female) Population (Male) Population (Total) Old City 2 61,479 68,868 130,348 Shu’aub 15 208,334 235,788 444,122 Azal 15 105,992 118,770 224,761 Assafi’yah 10 97,944 122,143 220,086 As Sabain 31 274,139 325,593 599,732 Al Wahdah 8 70,976 85,930 156,906 At Tahrir 3 54,457 69,417 123,874 Ma’een 11 271,517 330,670 602,180 Al-Thowarah 22 150,467 177,851 328,318 Bani Al Harith 269 220,591 245,423 466,015 TOTAL 385 1,515,889 1,780,453 3,296,342 Figures are based on the 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview Yemen, OCHA. Population figures include the number of IDPs and residents. Resources relevant to Capital City of Sana’a
8955	dbpedia	3	26	https://www.britannica.com/place/Yemen	en	Yemen \| History, Map, Flag, Population, Capital, War, & Facts	https://cdn.britannica.c…3/Flag-Yemen.jpg	https://cdn.britannica.c…3/Flag-Yemen.jpg	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/85/5785-004-B65441FA/Flag-Yemen.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/88/5788-004-DEDCA0DC/Yemen-map-boundaries-cities-locator.jpg", "https://cd...	[]	[]	[ "Yemen", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "Manfred W. Wenner", "Robert Burrowes" ]	1999-07-26T00:00:00+00:00	Yemen, an arid and mostly mountainous country situated at the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. This article provides a geographical and historical treatment of Yemen, including maps, statistics, and a survey of its people, economy, and government.	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/place/Yemen	Yemen, country situated at the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. It is mostly mountainous and generally arid, though there are broad patches with sufficient precipitation to make agriculture successful. The people speak various dialects of Arabic and are mostly Muslims (see Islam). The history, culture, economy, and population of Yemen have all been influenced by the country’s strategic location at the southern entrance of the Red Sea—a crossroads of both ancient and modern trade and communications routes. In the ancient world, the states that occupied the area known today as Yemen controlled the supply of such important commodities as frankincense and myrrh and dominated the trade in many other valuable items, such as the spices and aromatics of Asia. Because of its fertility as well as its commercial prosperity, Yemen was the location of a number of ancient kingdoms; for that same reason, it was known to the ancient Romans as Arabia Felix (Latin: “Fortunate Arabia”) to distinguish it from the vast forbidding reaches of Arabia Deserta (“Desert Arabia”). Later, Yemen was the place where coffee (Arabic: qahwah) was first cultivated commercially, and, before the introduction of coffee plants to other parts of the world, it was long the sole source of that precious bean. The present Republic of Yemen came into being in May 1990, when the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) merged with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). By stipulation of the unification agreement, Sanaa, formerly the capital of North Yemen, functions as the political capital of the country, while Aden, formerly the capital of South Yemen, functions as the economic centre. The two components of Yemen underwent strikingly different histories: whereas North Yemen never experienced any period of colonial administration at the hands of a European power, South Yemen was a part of the British Empire from 1839 to 1967. The contemporary borders are largely a product of the foreign policy goals and actions of Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Saudi Arabia. Postunification Yemen has been burdened by chronic corruption and economic hardship. Divisions based on religion, tribalism, and geography continue to play an important role in Yemeni politics, sometimes leading to violence. Even during the age of colonial hegemony, Yemen remained for the most part one of the most secluded regions of the world. Much the same can be said today; few outsiders travel Yemen’s rugged hinterland, many parts of which have been little influenced by central government authority. It is perhaps this splendid isolation that has captivated the imagination of many from abroad. For all its remoteness, Yemen is likewise a country of great physical beauty, photogenic and picturesque, with a life and verdancy in the highlands unlike that found elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula. Walter B. Harris, a journalist and traveler, visited Yemen in 1892. One of the first Westerners to see many parts of the country, he recounted his impressions in the book A Journey Through the Yemen, in which he says: Nothing can be imagined more beautiful than the scenery of the mountains of the Yemen. Torn into all manner of fantastic peaks, the rocky crags add a wildness to a view that otherwise possesses the most peaceful charms. Rich green valleys, well timbered in places, and threaded by silvery streams of dancing water; sloping fields, gay with crops and wildflowers; the terraced or jungle-covered slopes,—all are so luxuriant, so verdant, that one’s ideas as to the nature of Arabia are entirely upset. Well known as is, and always has been, the fertility of this region, its extent is almost startling, and it can little be wondered at that Alexander the Great intended, after his conquest of India, to take up his abode in the Yemen.
8955	dbpedia	3	71	https://adst.org/2015/02/yemen-and-the-war-on-terror/	en	Yemen and the War on Terror – Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training	https://adst.org/wp-cont…ogo.a.small_.jpg	https://adst.org/wp-cont…ogo.a.small_.jpg	[ "https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ADST_Text_logo.a.small_.jpg", "http://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/yemeni-soldier-200x257.jpg", "http://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/9-11-pentagon.jpg", "http://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/yemen-map-1.gif", "http://adst.org/wp-content/upload...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://adst.org/wp-cont…ogo.a.small_.jpg		https://adst.org/2015/02/yemen-and-the-war-on-terror/	The ongoing political tumult in Yemen threatens to undermine the country as well as American counterterrorism efforts in the region. In August 2014, unrest led to Houthi militias taking over Sana’a and the formation of a new unity government, which included a range of Yemeni factions. This, however, did not last long because of a political impasse caused by the Houthis, an anti-American Shiite minority. President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had previously been Vice President under Ali Saleh, and his cabinet resigned in January 2015. For the U.S., the road to partnership with Yemen was not an easy one, and its loss could be devastating as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is just one of the many formidable threats in the region. After the first Gulf War, bilateral relations had been poor, leading Washington to terminate most of its military and economic assistance programs. Moreover, the U.S. was unsure just what the Yemeni government had known about the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole. All that changed with the arrival of Ambassador Edmund Hull soon after September 11th. At the time, many thought Yemen might just be Washington’s next target, after Afghanistan, given that al Qaeda had made Yemen an important part of its terrorist network. This made Yemenis uneasy, to say the least. However, Hull saw Yemen as a partner and worked with President Saleh to hammer out cooperative agreements on counterterrorism as well as economic development. Hull faced interagency squabbles, a difficult president, and an assassination attempt to get the final product of a successful counterterrorism program with Yemen. Go here to read about Ambassador Hull’s experience on 9/11. Read Mike Metrinko’s biting assessment of the investigation of the Cole bombing and about the 1962 civil war in North Yemen. “Relations were difficult, to say the least” HULL: I should say a word about taking leave of Washington. Since I was primarily preoccupied with counterterrorism, I realized that it would be important to make the rounds in Washington; at Langley [CIA headquarters], with the FBI, the National Security Council and DOD [Department of Defense] because counterterrorism can only be addressed as interagency issue. And it so happened I was having my meetings in DOD on September 11…. I recall arriving at the Pentagon early in the morning and in the midst of going through the security checks overhearing from a TV monitor that an aircraft had flown into the World Trade Center in New York…. We went ahead with the meeting nevertheless and discussed the situation in Yemen, our future cooperation and about 30 minutes into the meeting, we felt the impact of the Boeing 737 hitting the Pentagon.… The primary U.S. interest in Yemen was the interest of counterterrorism, and Yemen had been identified by Al Qaeda as an important node in their international network. Al Qaeda used Yemen not only as a base to launch attacks in Yemen, e.g. the USS Cole attack, but also as a location to support attacks elsewhere in the world, notably the East African attack [on U.S. embassies]. The linkages also included linkages to the 9/11 attacks. In fact, one of the pieces of evidence which linked Al Qaeda to 9/11 attacks was obtained in Yemen by a very astute FBI agent who in questioning of people detained in Yemen related to the Cole attack helped establish Al Qaeda’s responsibility for 9/11. Yemen had been ruled by President Saleh for 25 years. Saleh had come to power as a young colonel. No one had given him much chance of lasting. There had been a number of coup d’état before his takeover and most expected those to continue, but Saleh proved them wrong and proved to be a very wily politician who had established control over a very difficult political situation. The difficulty derives in part from a relatively weak central government and very strong tribes especially in the north of the country. Saleh had, in addition, pulled off the remarkable feat of uniting northern Yemen with southern Yemen and that had happened in the early ‘90s in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union when the Marxists in Aden found themselves without a patron, with very few political options and had agreed to unity with the North. That unity had been challenged in the mid-90s when the South attempted to secede, but Saleh successfully defeated that secession and kept the country unified. He relied in that on tribal support from the North and also support from the mujahidin, the Islamic fundamentalist fighters who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Therefore, there were very important and very significant links between the government in Sana’a and this radical group. That was what was giving the FBI and the Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) a great deal of concern in investigating the Cole attack because the question was to what extent were government officials complicit in the al Qaeda attack against the USS Cole. Economically the Hunt Oil Company of Texas had a discovered modest amount of oil in the Ma’rib area of Yemen. That’s the northeast part of Yemen, and they had constructed an oil pipeline across Yemen to a point on the Red Sea above Hodeida. That was Yemen’s economic lifeline. Some 90% of Yemen’s hard currency was derived from the sale of that oil. Otherwise, Yemen was the odd man out in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries had a great deal of money and very little population therefore very high per capita income. Yemen was the opposite. It had very little national income and a very large population and therefore it was a country that was among the poorest and least developed in the world. Q: When you went out there, how stood relations with the United States? Yemen was not supportive in the first Gulf War. It was in opposition. HULL: Indeed. In the ‘90s, Yemen had a seat on the Security Council and was one of the few countries that voted against the UN Security Council resolution authorizing Operation Desert Storm. As a direct consequence of that, [then Secretary of State] Jim Baker had largely terminated our military and our economic assistance programs in Yemen. Relations had gone into a deep freeze. Of course, with the attack on the Cole and with the suspicion in the CIA, FBI and NCIS about possible official complicity, relations were difficult, to say the least. There was much speculation in the American media and in some circles in Washington that Yemen should be a future target in the War on Terror. After we had dealt with Afghanistan, Yemen was a prime candidate for future U.S. military operations. Interagency Squabbles I had been to Yemen the previous year in my capacity as acting Director for Counterterrorism, and I had on that occasion met President Saleh, Prime Minister Iryani, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, and some of the military. I had also talked with Ambassador [Barbara] Bodine, at that time our Ambassador there. I had also been in touch with the FBI and NCIS ever since the Cole attack itself. So I had a very good sense of how the investigation had occurred and the substantive results of the investigation. It was a mixed picture. The FBI had gone into Yemen and at that time the investigation was being led by John O’Neill, a legendary figure in counterterrorism. The FBI had gone into Aden with the expectation that they could operate as they had in East Africa, in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam where they had been given a blank check by the governments and really, pretty much a free hand. [Read Ambassador Prudence Bushnell’s account of the Embassy Nairobi bombing] It was a very different situation in Yemen. Of course, Arab and Islamic countries had a great sensitivity to American presence, to American dictates and in this case of course, the government had connections they were very sensitive. So they frankly had things to hide. The investigation really preceded by fits and starts. Our Ambassador, Barbara Bodine tried very, very hard to press it, but John O’Neill wanted an even more confrontational approach. That sparked a conflict of two very strong personalities, and Ambassador Bodine eventually denied John O’Neill country clearance [permission from the embassy to U.S. government officials to enter the country on official business] to pursue the investigation, and the FBI had to send an alternate lead for the investigation. That had surfaced in The Washington Post. Secretary [Colin] Powell was not happy with State Department and the FBI squabbling surfacing in the media, and one of my objectives on arriving in Yemen was to get a team effort and a more productive investigation. The investigation had moved from Aden to Sana’a. While in Aden, the FBI felt itself as much a target as investigators and the level of paranoia was very high indeed. They brought that attitude with them to Sana’a. They would not sleep in hotels. They slept on the compound in a makeshift dormitory. They would go outside the embassy compound only for investigation purposes and for as little time as possible. There was a great deal of friction between the Diplomatic Security elements who insisted on providing protection and the FBI, which wanted very much to protect itself by a much more overt show of force. One of my early undertakings was to sit down with all involved and to hammer out arrangements so the investigation could be pursued. In that regard I had a couple of advantages. I had very good friends in the FBI from the interagency process, the Counterterrorism Security Group process, so I really came to Sana’a with a good reputation. We were able to come to an understanding, and they knew clearly that pursuing the investigation and getting results from the investigation was one of the highest priorities that I had as Ambassador. We were greatly assisted by the post-9/11 atmosphere because there was a great deal of sympathy for the United States government. We received many expressions of sympathy and condolences from ordinary Yemenis as well as official Yemenis and so in that propitious environment we were able to press the investigation and to get Yemeni cooperation in a number of ways, including handing over of significant amounts of documents and other evidence that was even allowed to be removed to Washington for processing by the FBI laboratories. So we’re in a situation where the investigation was showing very gratifying results and moods brightened and cooperation within the embassy and between the embassy and the Yemeni security organs was prospering. Q: I talked with Mike Metrinko who was there before you got there. You had the State Department security people, you had the FBI and the Navy investigators. All these people had different views of the situation. They were running around, driving on the sidewalks and they were sort of hostile to each other and making a hell of a lot of enemies among just ordinary people. It was a bureaucratic mess, and they were armed. HULL: Mike was talking about this situation in Aden. He had deployed to Aden and, as I said, paranoia was added to legitimate threat. Yes, the situation was teetering on the brink of being out of control, and there was a real mix of people overreacting. Great damage being done. There was a lot of talent and high motivation, but the trick was to bring it together in a team effort…. It was the Ambassador’s job to take all this talent and put it together in a team so that people would feel comfortable with each other and that we would show more results. That was our approach. The investigation eventually lead to trials in Yemen and convictions of the key al Qaeda participants. In this regard, there’s much to be said because in between there were jail breaks and recaptures…but the bottom line was the Yemenis eventually, with a great deal of help from the FBI and NCIS, were able to convict and sentence the perpetrators. Al Qaeda’s main effort was directed against the embassy. They had links to Eastern Africa but the most active plotting was to attack the embassy or failing that, other American targets. We knew this from intelligence that we were gathering through various means, intelligence that proved quite reliable, if piecemeal. Initially, in 2001 and 2002 it was really a question of whether with the cooperation of the Yemenis, we would get al Qaeda or whether al Qaeda would get us. “I went out on a limb and expressed my opinion that Yemen was a ‘partner’ and not a ‘target’” The Yemeni government in the aftermath of 9/11 said the right things. Saleh had sent a private message to President Bush pledging support. Soon after I arrived in a national holiday speech, Saleh had reiterated publicly that support. But the whole question was whether or not they could convert that rhetorical support into practical cooperation and show results. So we really needed to do so, and we also needed to resolve this issue of whether in the War on Terror Yemen was going to be a target of the United States or whether it was going to be a partner of the United States. There was a great deal of speculation in the Western media that it was going to be the former, which caused the Yemenis great nervousness. I was asked about this early on at a town hall meeting held for American citizens in Yemen…. I went out on a limb and expressed my opinion that Yemen was a “partner” and not a “target” and that we would get much better results through that partnership than otherwise. This was reported, as I knew it would be, in the international media, and I never heard any kind of rebuke from Washington, so at least at that stage I was going to get enough slack to explore a counterterrorism partnership with the Yemeni government. We had from Saleh, both a private and the public pledges of support, so as Ambassador my priority was to convert that into practical action. When I made my initial call on the President… I was given an early opportunity to raise specific issues…. In that discussion, I handed President Saleh a memorandum in which we detailed for him two individuals who were playing leading roles in al Qaeda in Yemen. One was Abu Ali, who was really the godfather of al Qaeda in Yemen, and the second was Abu Assem, who was a Saudi and who was the primary financier for al Qaeda operations in Yemen. I asked the President for assistance in either capturing or killing these specific individuals. We agreed that we would establish a special channel to pursue this objective, and we were therefore launched as quickly as possible. On the intelligence front, of course, there was this defense vs. offense game going on. We knew al Qaeda wanted to attack the embassy or American targets and therefore we had to initially strengthen our defenses. When I arrived, the embassy was shut down. The same authorized departure that made it impossible for my wife to accompany me to Yemen had caused most of the embassy operations to close and people were at home. This over a long period debilitated our operations and so an initial objective was to get the embassy more secure and get people back to work…. I gave priority to the security of the compound…. We got the embassy back to work, but the authorized departure had sent home the majority of people. We had no public diplomacy, we had no economic section. I think at the time we had one political officer. We were really limping along. A Plan for Public Diplomacy between the U.S. and Yemen First, we had to get some cooperation going because public diplomacy is rarely effective in the abstract. You really need the right policy and the right programs and then you can convey them through public diplomacy. Al Qaeda was enjoying quasi sanctuaries in Ma’rib, Jowf and Shabwa. We needed to be able to get into those areas to function there and to gain the support of the tribes. President Saleh provided me an opening for this…. He made a plea with me to undertake economic assistance, development efforts in these deprived areas. This was exactly what I was looking for, a presidential invitation for us to do something in these difficult, remote areas. I did research on the tribes… and it seemed to me that the problem was we had a vicious circle in places like Ma’rib. You had bad governance which led to an alienated population, which led to continuing violence, which led to discouraging any kind of investment, which meant unemployment, which meant more violence and fed into the government ignoring the area and back to bad governance. What it seemed to me was we needed to replace that vicious circle with a virtuous circle: improving the governance of the area, attracting developmental investment, foreign investment, creating jobs, improving services, strengthening governance and then around and around. I came up with a PowerPoint presentation…. I needed some way to get it reality-checked with the President, and I chose for that his political adviser, Abdul Karim Al-Iriani, who is perhaps the most brilliant man in Yemen, a former Prime Minister and a former Foreign Minister. He came from a long line of intellectuals and judges and was himself extremely well-educated. He had a Ph.D. from Yale, and was one of the few individuals who could deal with President Saleh without personal fear. So I took my approach to Abdul Karim, explained that this was my thinking generated by the President’s request and asked him to take a look at it and see if it was suitable. “The documents had caused a political firestorm. I thought my days in Sana’a were numbered.” Now about this time another significant event occurred… There was a possibility of President Saleh being invited to Washington. In conjunction with the visit then, Al Iriani (at left) had proposed that we also take a look at some kind of memorandum of understanding on the issue of counterterrorism whereby each side would lay out what it could do for the other in the various areas of military cooperation, intelligence cooperation, and economic development, etc. It was not meant to be a legally binding agreement or a detailed enumeration, but rather to put down broad principles that could serve as a basis. I agreed to take a crack at drafting such an agreement and after doing so sent it back to Washington for its opinion and also made a copy available to Al Iriani for him to take a look at. The following Friday… I got a phone call while in the car that President Saleh wanted to see me urgently. I… found an absolutely irate President Saleh, who proceeded to take me to task for the plan and for the “treaty” that I had proposed. It took me a little bit of time before I realized what had happened. The documents that I given Al Iriani for his private reaction had been sent on to the Presidency and then the Presidency had sent them onto the Cabinet and they had caused a political firestorm. I had never seen the President quite this irate before and I honestly thought that my days in Sana’a were numbered and that I would be deemed persona non grata in short order. President Saleh ranted for a considerable amount of time. When he finally calmed down, I very quietly went through the origin of both documents that the President had been generated by his request to me, that the proposed memorandum of understanding had been Al Iriani’s idea. If either or both were objectionable, we could toss them in the wastebasket. I had no need for them, but I was trying to meet a Yemeni request in both regards. That gave Saleh pause and put it in a different light. He still said nothing good about Plan Ma’rib, but he did say he wanted to think more about the memo of understanding. Clearly, the problem with Plan Ma’rib was the starting point for the vicious circle was that it was “bad governance”– a point that could be argued easily by the fact that the governor of the province had been exiled from Sana’a for keeping private prisons and his corruption, and he was well-known for being a drunk. In any case, that was put aside and instead after some consideration by the President, a green light was given to pursuing the memorandum of understanding. President Saleh goes to Washington [President Saleh] made the trip — it was late November 2001 so two months after 9/11. I had preceded him back to Washington and had hoped to find Washington focused on Plan Ma’rib and the proposed memorandum of understanding. Indeed, there were interagency meetings to discuss the memorandum of understanding, but I soon realized that neither of these proposals stood any chance of serious consideration. There was still a very strong camp in Washington that considered Yemen a target rather than a partner in the War on Terror and who were interested in browbeating Yemenis or taking forceful measures…. I was left in the delicate position of the President coming with no serious Washington engagement on the memorandum. Saleh quite unintentionally provided me my exit strategy from this embarrassment because on his arrival in Washington he called me over to the hotel where he was staying and said that he had changed his mind on the memorandum and that he was not prepared to sign it, but the Foreign Minister could sign it. In response to which I said that was not the original understanding, that we should put the memorandum of understanding aside and focus the visit on the meetings and more general understandings. So quite quickly of course, the whole issue of signing anything went away. Saleh went around Washington and met with all of the significant people in the new administration. The meetings were hit and miss. Saleh at times was good, but at other times really insisted on talking about issues to which Yemen was marginal. For example, with Secretary Powell he used the majority of the meeting talking about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and we risked having the visit confirm in Washington’s mind the image of Saleh as an unreliable partner in the obsession which was Washington’s at that time — quite naturally the War on Terror. As we approached the Oval Office meeting, I met with my colleagues in the Yemeni government… and very candidly assessed that unless we focused President Saleh on terrorism in the Oval Office and made sure that he and President Bush had a meeting of minds, the visit would not be productive. “Who is this guy and what do I want from him?” I was also given the opportunity to pre-brief President Bush in the Oval Office. We had about 15 minutes before the meeting…. President Bush, when we walked into the Oval Office, got up from his desk, came toward us and said, “Who is this guy and what do I want from him?” Secretary Powell turned to his Ambassador, and I had a chance, in about 45 seconds, to lay out what was involved in Yemen and what was involved with President Saleh and encourage the President to be very direct, very clear about what we wanted, to mention specifically al Qaeda’s leadership, Abu Ali and Abu Assem, and to reach a partnership with President Saleh that together we would eliminate al Qaeda’s basic operation in Yemen. That was an objective the President understood easily and could identify with…. President Bush would be well advised to pre-empt any discussion because in President Saleh’s past meeting with President Clinton, Saleh had begun and half an hour had really been wasted with Saleh giving a long, meandering lecture to President Clinton about Middle East politics. So armed with that President Bush did seize the initiative and as soon as President Saleh was seated, laid out his interest in the War on Terror, that he wanted a partnership with Yemen, but that we needed to go after al Qaeda and that al Qaeda had faces and we needed to go after the individuals. President Saleh responded vigorously, also very directly, said we are in pursuit of these individuals, we will have them soon, “we will butcher them,” which was language that the Oval Office was not adverse to hearing at that stage in the War on Terror. So in the short space of some 35 or 40 minutes the two Presidents had reached a meeting of minds, and we left the Oval Office. As Ambassador, I thought I had a very good basis for pursuing my front on the War on Terror. It was very much the case, particularly in DOD and some people in the NSC (National Security Council) — there was almost a preference that Yemenis would be obstinate and give us an excuse to take forceful action. Langley, however, was much more sophisticated and all along preferred cooperation, as did the FBI, so as Ambassador it was really my job to manage these forces and to get enough of a result coming out of a cooperative track so that those back in Washington who wanted forceful action didn’t have reason to pursue that…. Yemen goes after al Qaeda operatives – to no avail You’ll recall that President Saleh told President Bush that he was pursuing and surrounding our two primary targets, Abu Ali (at right) and Abu Assem. In mid-December Saleh called over and asked to see the Chief of Station [top CIA representative at post]. My response was that if anyone was going to see the President, it would be the Ambassador, and I felt very strongly about this because I have seen in other places in the Middle East where the Chief of Station had established a relationship directly with the head of state and where the Ambassador and the State Department were excluded and I was not going to have that happen in Yemen. So I said there could be a meeting but it would be with the Ambassador. So he relented, we had a meeting in the Ministry of Defense, unusually because they normally had it in the Presidential palace. Saleh told us that there was an operation being mounted to act against our two identified targets. Abu Ali was in a good location just outside Marib. Abu Asim was identified in Jowf to the north. He invited us to follow the operations, and we wished him good luck and we proceeded to a very intense couple of days as the Yemenis undertook this. Unfortunately, the Yemeni had very little surgical counterterrorism capability so these operations turned into very clumsy, very noisy military operations involving armored vehicles, mass movements of troops. It wasn’t very surprising that when they showed up at Abu Ali’s compound on December 18 he was long gone. They got permission from the tribes to check it and verified that he was no longer there and that incident ended disappointingly, but not disastrously. The operation in Jowf, however, was not so fortunate. There the Yemeni military surrounded the compound and while they were negotiating with the tribesmen to check it for Abu Assem (below), a Yemeni Air Force jet overflew the compound and broke the sound barrier, which the tribesmen took to be the beginning of an assault and therefore they opened up on the Yemeni military and killed 18. Of course, the target was long gone so the operation had great casualties and was for naught. We were depressed when we got this news back in the embassy and felt very bad indeed for the Yemenis who had suffered losses and for the opportunities that had been missed because this meant that in the future these targets would be very hard to find. It was somewhat of a surprise to me then to learn that the reaction in Washington was one of encouragement. We had notified Washington that this was in train. They were following it very closely as well and the fact that the Yemenis had spilled their own blood in pursuit of these terrorist targets was a stronger argument for a potential partnership than any words that we could have had and very interestingly, the reaction in Washington for the first time was that we had serious prospects for working with government of Yemen against al Qaeda…. Increased counterterrorism cooperation — with drawbacks and successes We arrived in Aden, met with President Saleh. President Saleh again was at the top of his game, reiterated what he had said in the Oval Office, said that the December 18 setback did not deter him. He was as determined as ever to eliminate al Qaeda and whatever the U.S. decided he was going to pursue that objective…. Washington made the policy decisions to engage with the Yemenis in a serious fashion and that involved both a military track and an intelligence track. We started to get a bit of economic assistance that we could use in the remote tribal areas. We began to build the embassy back up, including the public diplomacy capability. The central part of this was a training effort of the Yemeni Special Forces which was their designated counterterrorism unit and this was commanded by Ahmed Saleh, President Saleh’s son. They had been trained by the Jordanians so we weren’t starting from scratch, and we had U.S. military trainers, both Marines and Army Special Forces coming into Sana’a and working with the Yemeni Special Operations Forces. That turned out to be an extremely frustrating undertaking. The Yemenis were still extraordinarily suspicious of us and when our people came in and the equipment came in they insisted on vigorous inspections including of highly sensitive equipment and they were very high tensions between the American trainers and the Yemeni trainees because they suspected each had ulterior motives. The situation became more even more complicated when the Yemenis started to impede diplomatic pouches. We defined virtually anything as such, anything we wanted to slap a sticker on saying “diplomatic pouch,” including very large pallets of equipment, electronic or otherwise. The Yemenis defined diplomatic pouches as the being orange bags in which things were put in. So we had an extremely frustrating situation where the Yemeni would allow in weapons intended for their forces, but equipment that we needed for our purposes would be obstructed. We also had a problem in that the Yemeni Special Forces — as it became clearer and clearer — that in effect, we were training a praetorian guard for the President rather than an active counterterrorism unit. Fortunately, we had at the same time been working with the Central Security Forces under Colonel Yahia al Saleh, the President’s nephew, and Minister of Interior Alimi. There we found a totally different picture. We found a great deal of trust, we found commitment on the Yemeni side and we found a willingness to engage in the terrorist fight. So although our efforts with the Special Forces didn’t pan out, our efforts with the Central Security Forces had very good results. We were developing other options at the time over these months because Washington was pressing to show results. The Afghan situation had gone well over a matter of months. We were still in the planning stage for Iraq. Washington wanted some other victory to show on the War on Terror, and Yemen was a candidate for that. And that’s when we entered into discussions with President Saleh about deploying the armed Predator as another option in going against the al Qaeda target, which led, in November 2002, to a successful strike against Abu Ali who was in a car heading back to Marib, and he was eliminated. Q: Was there ever an option for al Qaeda to just leave Yemen? HULL: Al Qaeda had invested a great deal in Yemen and was not about to give up that investment. They had in August of 2002 a plot well advanced to attack the U.S. Embassy with rockets, and we were fortunate in that the rocket they were preparing for the attack misfired killing one of the al Qaeda operatives and severely injuring a second one. It was that mistake by al Qaeda in August that short-circuited their plan. Then working with the Yemenis at the crime scene we made the connection to al Qaeda and regained the initiative so that the following November we were able to eliminate the head of Al Qaeda by the strike in Marib. “One of their decisions was to mount an assassination attempt against the American Ambassador — me” After al Qaeda lost its leadership, there began a long continuing campaign to take out other key al Qaeda operatives. Of course, while we were doing this in Yemen, it was being done more generally in the Gulf, e.g. in the UAE [United Arab Emirates]. Bin Laden lost his key operative for the peninsular region so between what we were doing outside of Yemen and what we were doing inside of Yemen, al Qaeda was being steadily degraded. But they were not totally defanged. One of their decisions in the aftermath of the successful operation against Abu Ali was to mount an assassination attempt against the American Ambassador — me. They had a cell of very experienced operatives dedicated to that mission for the better part of 2002. We had a great deal of security. Our most important tactic was to be unpredictable, to have no set pattern, to alter our routes, our times. I remember I had a Monday evening bridge game. The Regional Security Officer came to me and complained that it was entirely too predictable and so on occasion I would spend Monday afternoon at the defense attaché’s apartment so I could make my bridge game without making the transit predictably on Monday evening. The plot against me involved an attack against my motorcade and the plan was to stake out two intersections to the right and to the left of the embassy (at left) because when we came out of the embassy we had to either turn right or left and about a block down the road in either direction there were intersections which the attackers planned to stage at and then either using a rocket or a vehicle bomb to attack my vehicle. They got to the stage of the surveillance and planning. Before they were able to execute the attack, the Central Security Forces, the Minister of Interior, got information as to the location of the key plotter, who was then set to flight. They were never able to execute the attack. “The partnership was established on firm ground” We were very actively pursuing the issue of democracy and human rights, which was another major effort of the administration. There was an election, parliamentary elections scheduled for Yemen for 2003, coincidental with the invasion of Iraq by the Americans. Saleh considered postponing those elections but in the end went ahead with them. They were extremely well organized…. We were providing financial assistance to that effort. We were working with all the parties in Yemen, the ruling party, the Socialist party and the Islamic party…. and the elections were a significant success and a step forward for Yemen. Largely as a result of them, Freedom House that year moved Yemen from the category of “not free” to “partly free.” The Yemenis subsequently sponsored a large conference in Sana’a co-sponsored by the Europeans to which they invited both official and nonofficial representatives from across the Arab world and it was a remarkable conference that produced a Declaration of Sana’a putting these representatives formally on record in promoting democracy in the Middle East. I had not taken it very seriously. I thought the words had little significance without practical implementation. Washington, at least the NSC, saw it in a different light…. For the first time in my tenure as Ambassador, the first subject raised by the NSC was not terrorism, but rather it was democracy. They were aware of Yemen’s elections, they were aware of the Declaration of Sana’a and were very interested in using that declaration to further promotion of democracy in the Middle East. Therefore, it was not a total surprise when I received a phone call several months later from the National Security Council wanting to invite President Saleh to the Sea Island Summit of the G-8 which President Bush was hosting and which would have as its theme promoting democracy. For Saleh that meeting, those meetings in Washington were really somewhat of a victory lap because by that time al Qaeda’s operations in Yemen had been virtually shut down. Our counterterrorism cooperation was broadly speaking well established, and there was virtually no one left in Washington who any longer debated the question of whether Yemen should be a target or a partner. The partnership was really established on firm ground.
8955	dbpedia	3	30	https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/	en	Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them?	https://www.brookings.ed…513615561397.jpg	https://www.brookings.ed…513615561397.jpg	[ "https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/container-ships-unloading-port-long-beach-la.jpg?quality=75&w=500", "https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Shutterstock_81632899.jpg?quality=75&w=500", "https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2034/08/20240813_THP_ImmigrationCNIP_Workers_...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Bruce Riedel", "Daniel L. Byman", "Allison Minor", "Kevin Huggard", "Bruce Jones" ]	2017-12-18T17:32:42+00:00	For over two and a half years, the United States has supported Saudi Arabia in a war against the Houthi movement in Yemen. The war has created the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world and threatens to turn into the largest famine in decades. Yet very few Americans know who the Houthis are.	en	https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/themes/brookings/assets/images/favicons/favicon.ico	Brookings	https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/	For over two-and-a-half years, the United States has supported Saudi Arabia in a war against the Houthi movement in Yemen. The war has created the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world and threatens to turn into the largest famine in decades. Yet very few Americans know who the Houthis are, what they stand for, and why they are our de facto enemies. Two administrations have backed the war against the Houthis without a serious campaign to explain why Americans should see them as our enemies. Yemeni politics are incredibly complex and volatile—rather than get drawn into a quagmire against an enemy they hardly know, the United States and its partners should get serious about finding a political solution. What you need to know First and foremost, the Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, or Zaydiyyah. Shiite Muslims are the minority community in the Islamic world and Zaydis are a minority of Shiites, significantly different in doctrine and beliefs from the Shiites who dominate in Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere (often called Twelvers for their belief in twelve Imams). The Zadiyyah take their name from Zayd bin Ali, the great grandson of Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, whom all Shiites revere. Zayd bin Ali led an uprising against the Umayyad Empire in 740, the first dynastic empire in Islamic history, which ruled from Damascus. Zayd was martyred in his revolt, and his head is believed to be buried in a shrine to him in Kerak, Jordan. Zaydis believe he was a model of a pure caliph who should have ruled instead of the Umayyads. The Houthis have made fighting corruption the centerpiece of their political program, at least nominally. The distinguishing feature of Zayd’s remembered biography is that he fought against a corrupt regime. Sunnis and Shiites agree that he was a righteous man. The Zaydi elevate him to be the epitome of a symbol of fighting corruption. The Houthis have made fighting corruption the centerpiece of their political program, at least nominally. The Zaydi do not believe in ayatollahs like the Twelver Shiites—who are the Shiite sect in Iran and most of the Muslim world—nor do they practice the other Twelver doctrine of taqqiyah (dissimulation), which permits one to disguise his or her faith for self-protection. In short, they are a very different sect than the Iranian version of Shiism that Americans have come to know since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Followers of Zayd established themselves in north Yemen’s rugged mountains in the ninth century. For the next thousand years, the Zaydis fought for control of Yemen with various degrees of success. A succession of Zaydi Imams ruled the community and Zaydis were the majority of the population in the mountains of the north. They fought against both the Ottomans and the Wahhabis in the 18th and 19th centuries. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, a Zaydi monarchy took power in North Yemen called the Mutawakkilite Kingdom. The ruler, or imam, was both a secular ruler and a spiritual leader. Their kingdom fought and lost a border war with Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, losing territory to the Saudi state. They also enjoyed international recognition as the legitimate government of North Yemen. Their capital was in Taiz. In 1962, an Egyptian-backed revolutionary military cabal overthrew the Mutawakkilite king and established an Arab nationalist government with its capital in Sanaa. With Soviet assistance, Egypt sent tens of thousands of troops to back the republican coup. The Zaydi Royalists fled to the mountains along the Saudi border to fight a civil war for control of the country. Saudi Arabia supported the royalists against Egypt. Israel also clandestinely backed the Zaydi Royalists. The war ended in a republican victory after the Saudis and Egyptians resolved their regional rivalry after the 1967 war with Israel and lost interest in the Yemen civil war. A Zaydi republican general named Ali Abdullah Saleh came to power after a succession of coups in 1978. Saleh ruled—or misruled—Yemen for the next 33 years. He united north and south Yemen in 1990, tilted toward Iraq during the 1991 Kuwait war, and survived a Saudi-backed southern civil war in 1994. He had complicated relations with both Riyadh and Washington, but by the late 1990s was generally aligned with both against al-Qaida. The al-Qaida attack on the USS Cole in late 2000 in Aden drew the Americans closer to Saleh, although his cooperation against al-Qaida was always incomplete. The Houthis emerged as a Zaydi resistance to Saleh and his corruption in the 1990s led by a charismatic leader named Hussein al Houthi, from whom they are named. They charged Saleh with massive corruption to steal the wealth of the Arab world’s poorest country for his own family, much like other Arab dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. They also criticized Saudi and American backing for the dictator. 2003: The tipping point The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 deeply radicalized the Houthi movement, like it did many other Arabs. It was a pivotal moment. The Houthis adopted the slogan: “God is great, death to the U.S., death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam,” in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The group also officially called itself Ansar Allah, or supporters of God. It was a turning point largely unrecognized outside Yemen, another unanticipated consequence of George Bush’s Iraq adventures. Hezbollah, the Shiite movement in Lebanon which successfully expelled the Israeli army from the country, became a role model and mentor for the Houthis. Although different kinds of Shiites, the two groups have a natural attraction. Hezbollah provided inspiration and expertise for the Houthis. Iran was a secondary source of support, especially since the Houthis and Iranians share a common enemy in Saudi Arabia. After 2003, Saleh launched a series of military campaigns to destroy the Houthis. In 2004, Saleh’s forces killed Hussein al Houthi. The Yemeni army and air force was used to suppress the rebellion in the far north of Yemen, especially in Saada province. The Saudis joined with Saleh in these campaigns. The Houthis won against both Saleh and the Saudi army, besting them both again and again. For the Saudis, who have spent tens of billions of dollars on their military, it was deeply humiliating. The Houthis won against both Saleh and the Saudi army, besting them both again and again. The Arab Spring came to Yemen in 2011. The Houthi movement was one part of the wide national uprising against Saleh. It was primarily concerned with advancing the narrow interests of the Zaydi community, not surprisingly. When Saleh was replaced by a Sunni from the south—Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who had been Saleh’s vice president at the behest of the Saudis—the Houthi response was predictable. They were critical of the process and of Hadi. A national dialogue was instituted to address the future of Yemen after Saleh, with regional and international assistance. It proposed a federal solution with six provinces with some autonomy. The Zaydi-dominated north got two landlocked entities, which the Houthis argued was gerrymandered against them. In 2014, they began colluding with Saleh against Hadi secretly. Even by the standards of Middle East politics, it was a remarkable and hypocritical reversal of alliances by both the Houthis and Saleh. Much of the army remained loyal to Saleh and his family, so together with the Houthis the two had a preponderance of force in the country. Hadi was deeply unpopular and seen as a Saudi stooge. The war After months of gradually moving into the capital Sanaa, it fell to the rebel alliance in January 2015, just as King Salman ascended to the throne in Riyadh. The Houthis opened direct civilian air traffic between Sanaa and Tehran, Iran promised cheap oil for Yemen, and rumors of more Iran-Houthi cooperation spread quickly. The main port at Hodeidah fell to the Houthi forces and they began marching to take Aden, the capital of the south and the largest port on the Indian Ocean. For the Saudi king and his 29-year-old defense minister and son Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), it was a nightmare. A traditional enemy with ties to their regional foe was taking over the country on their southern belly. The strategic straits at the Bab al Mandab could be in the Houthis’ hands. It was a very difficult challenge for an untried team in the royal palace. For the Obama administration, the picture was more complicated. American intelligence officials said that Iran was actually trying to discourage the Houthis from seizing Sanaa and openly toppling Hadi. Iran preferred a less radical course, but the Houthi leadership was drunk with success. Moreover, Undersecretary of Defense Michael Vickers said on the record in January that Washington had a productive informal intelligence relationship with the Houthis against al-Qaida. He suggested that the cooperation could continue. The Saudis chose to go to war to support Hadi and prevent the Houthi-Saleh rebellion from consolidating control of the country. Operation Decisive Storm began in March 2015, MBS taking the public lead in promising early victory for the Saudis. They forged a coalition to back them including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and other traditional Saudi allies. Two refused to join: Oman, Yemen’s neighbor, and Pakistan, whose parliament voted unanimously against the war. Obama backed the Saudi war. In the choice between the Saudi ally and the Houthis, the president—not surprisingly—took the side of a 70-year old alliance. U.S. and U.K. support is essential to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), which is equipped with American and British aircraft. The RSAF has dropped tons of American and British munitions on Yemen since. Almost three years later, the Saudi air and naval blockade of Houthi-controlled territory has created a humanitarian disaster, with millions of Yemenis at dire risk of starvation and disease. The Saudi-led coalition has tightened the blockade and gradually gained more territory, although Hadi has little if any control over the territory recovered from the rebels. He resides in Riyadh. All sides are credibly accused of war crimes. Saleh broke with his putative ally this month, signaled to Riyadh that he was flipping sides again, and was killed days later. The Houthis won the battle for Sanaa but are isolated from the rest of Yemeni politics and political parties. Riyadh portrays them as Iranian puppets, but many Yemenis see them as patriots fighting the country’s traditional enemy Saudi Arabia and America, Israel’s defender. Houthi propaganda plays to the line that Yemen is under attack by a Saudi-American-Israeli conspiracy. A major consequence of the war is to push the Houthis and Iran and Hezbollah closer together. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley underscored that point, perhaps unintentionally, when she presented compelling evidence of Iranian support for the Houthis missile attacks on Saudi and Emirati targets last week. With their own cities under constant aerial bombardment, the Houthis are firing missiles at Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, with Tehran’s technological assistance. The war costs Tehran a few million dollars per month, while it costs Riyadh $6 billion per month. Tehran and the Houthis are playing with fire, of course. If a missile hits Riyadh, Jeddah, or Abu Dhabi and kills dozens or more, the pressure for retaliation against Iran will be significant. The Trump administration is poorly designed to provide cooling counsel. This brief and simplified account of the background of the Houthis should underscore how complex Yemeni politics are and how volatile they can be. Saleh called running Yemen to be akin to dancing on the heads of snakes. It is a foolish place for Americans to be drawn into a war and a quagmire against an enemy they hardly know. The administration has recently called for an easing of the blockade. It’s time to get serious about a political solution, not to wade deeper into quicksand.
8955	dbpedia	2	1	https://www.britannica.com/place/Sanaa	en	Sanaa \| History, Population, & Facts	https://cdn.britannica.c…n-background.jpg	https://cdn.britannica.c…n-background.jpg	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/49/139549-004-C114ED2A/Sanaa-Al-Salih-Mosque-Yemen-background.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/85/19685-004-5F46254A/Sanaa-Yemen.jpg", "htt...	[]	[]	[ "Sanaa", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica" ]	1998-07-20T00:00:00+00:00	Sanaa, city, capital of Yemen. It is situated at the western foot of Mount Nuqum, at an elevation of more than 7,200 feet (2,200 metres) above sea level, in the western part of the country.	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/place/Sanaa	Sanaa national capital, Yemen Arabic: Ṣanʿāʾ or Sana Recent News Aug. 13, 2024, 6:18 AM ET (AP) Yemen’s Houthis seized UN rights office in Sanaa, UN official says July 21, 2024, 1:21 PM ET (AP) Israel shoots down a missile fired from Yemen hours after a deadly Israeli strike on Houthi rebels July 20, 2024, 7:58 PM ET (AP) Israeli military says it has struck Houthi targets in Yemen in response to attacks Sanaa, city, capital of Yemen. It is situated at the western foot of Mount Nuqum, at an elevation of more than 7,200 feet (2,200 metres) above sea level, in the western part of the country. Sanaa has for many centuries been the chief economic, political, and religious centre of the Yemen Highlands. The city’s name means “fortified place.” History Sanaa is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world, although an exact date for its establishment is unknown. According to Yemeni legend, it was founded by Shem, one of the three sons of Noah. It occupies the site of the ancient pre-Islamic stronghold of Ghumdān, which may date to the 1st and 2nd century bce. Sanaa was an Arabian centre for Christians and Jews before it was converted to Islam by ʿAlī, fourth caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, in 632 ce. The city’s history as a Muslim centre is one of sporadic rivalry between the heterodox Zaydī (see Zaydiyyah) imams (leaders) and rival dynasties; the Zaydī imamate, whose original capital was at Ṣaʿdah in the north, lasted, with frequent interruptions, from the 9th century to 1962. There was a sharp decline in the city’s fortunes in the 12th–15th century, as successive conquerors of Yemen set up their capitals in other cities. During the reign of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn Ṭāhir of the Ṭāhirid dynasty in the early 16th century the city was embellished with many fine mosques and madrassas (Islamic theological schools). Britannica Quiz World Capitals Quiz Nominally under Ottoman sovereignty from the mid-16th century, Sanaa was effectively controlled by the imams from the early 17th century to 1872; only then did the Ottomans succeed in capturing and holding the city. Civil strife between the Ottomans and the imams continued until 1911, when a treaty gave the latter almost total autonomy. Sanaa became the national capital of independent Yemen after Ottoman defeat in World War I. Under the imam Aḥmad (reigned 1948–62), the capital was moved south to Taʿizz, but Sanaa again became the capital with the 1962 revolution and the proclamation of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). The revolution ousted the Zaydī imamate and opened Sanaa to political and cultural change, but it also sparked an eight-year civil war. In 1990 Sanaa became the unified country’s capital when the North Yemen merged with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). The contemporary city The old city is surrounded by a massive wall 20–30 feet (6–9 metres) high, pierced by numerous gates. Most notable architecturally is the Yemen Gate (Bāb al-Yaman), renamed Liberty Gate after the revolution of 1962. Old Sanaa includes 106 mosques, 12 hammams (baths), and 6,500 houses, all built before the 11th century ce. Multistoried tower houses, built of dark basalt stone and brick, are decorated with intricate frieze work and beautiful carved windows. Sanaa’s most notable mosque, Al-Jamīʿ al-Kabīr (Great Mosque), contains a sacred shrine that was once a principal object of Zaydī veneration. The old souks (Arabic suqs, marketplaces) begin at Bāb al-Yaman and extend northward past the Great Mosque. The area is called Sūq al-Milh (Salt Market) but consists of many smaller souks selling a wide variety of goods. Northwest of the old city is the former summer palace of the imam, perched on a steep rock outcrop overlooking the Wadi Dharr. The garden suburb of Rawḍah, due north of Sanaa, has a fine mosque in the Moorish style. Qāʿ al-Yahūd (Jewish Quarter), a walled ghetto in the western part of the city, was long a centre for the practice of traditional crafts, such as fine gold and silver metalwork and embroidery. Virtually all the capital’s Jews emigrated to Israel in 1949–50, dealing an almost fatal blow to the handicraft economy. Sanaa’s traditional isolation was mitigated by the opening (1961) of an all-weather road to the port of Al-Ḥudaydah to the southwest; the road was funded by China. Another highway leads to Taʿizz, which is linked to the old port of Mocha (Al-Mukhā), now little-used. Sanaa’s international airport is at nearby Al-Raḥabah. In addition to the city’s function as a regional trade centre, modern industry has been stimulated by foreign assistance; a cotton textile mill built by the Chinese (opened 1966) is particularly important. Many of the city’s residents are government workers. Several houses and public buildings in and around the capital were damaged in the civil war of 1962–70. The University of Sanaa was established in 1970. Get a Britannica Premium subscription and gain access to exclusive content. Subscribe Now In the late 20th century Sanaa’s population grew exponentially, from roughly 35,000 in the early 1960s to more than 400,000 by the mid-1980s; its greater metropolitan area (urban agglomeration) exceeded 1,000,000 in the early 21st century. The city has expanded in all directions with the increase in population, but Old Sanaa, reduced to one-tenth of the city’s population and area, was neglected until the 1980s, when UNESCO and the Yemeni government initiated efforts to preserve and repair the walled city. In 1986 it was designated a World Heritage site. Pop. (2004) 1,707,586; (2009 est.) 2,022,867. This article was most recently revised and updated by Adam Augustyn.
8955	dbpedia	0	12	https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi	en	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/totalwar-ar/images/7/70/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi.jpg/revision/latest?cb=20200922171436	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/totalwar-ar/images/7/70/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi.jpg/revision/latest?cb=20200922171436	[ "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/totalwar-ar/images/e/e6/Site-logo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210601140724", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/totalwar-ar/images/e/e6/Site-logo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210601140724", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/totalwar-ar/images/7/70/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi.jpg/revision/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Historica Wiki" ]	2024-07-12T14:06:28+00:00	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (1 September 1945-) was Vice President of Yemen from 3 October 1994 to 27 February 2012 (succeeding Ali Salem al-Beidh and preceding Khaled Bahah) and President of Yemen from 27 February 2012 (succeeding Ali Abdullah Saleh). Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was born in al-Wade'a, Aden...	en	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/totalwar-ar/images/4/4a/Site-favicon.ico/revision/latest?cb=20210601140725	Historica Wiki	https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (1 September 1945-) was Vice President of Yemen from 3 October 1994 to 27 February 2012 (succeeding Ali Salem al-Beidh and preceding Khaled Bahah) and President of Yemen from 27 February 2012 (succeeding Ali Abdullah Saleh). Biography[] Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was born in al-Wade'a, Aden Protectorate on 1 September 1945, and he joined the South Yemeni military in 1964 and was trained in Egypt and the USSR before becoming a Major-General. In 1986, he and President Ali Nasir Muhammad fled to North Yemen amid the South Yemeni Civil War, and he sided with President Ali Abdullah Saleh during the 1994 civil war. Following the war, he became Vice President of Yemen under Saleh, and, following Saleh's overthrow in 2012, he was elected President of Yemen as the sole candidate running to succeed him. He supported the creation of a federal and decentralized government, and he also set about reforming the Yemeni Army. Hadi made fighting al-Qaeda a top priority, but he soon faced a three-front war against the Salafist al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Shi'ite Houthi rebels, and pirates in the Gulf of Aden. In September 2014, the Houthis captured Sanaa, and, on 18 January 2015, Hadi was forced to resign by the Houthi rebels. However, he fled to the Saudi capital of Riyadh via Aden and convinced Saudi Arabia and its allies to intervene against the Houthis, leading to the start of the Yemeni Civil War.
8955	dbpedia	3	10	https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q57480	en	Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi	https://upload.wikimedia…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…_Mansur_Hadi.jpg	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/70/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi.jpg/220px-Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi.jpg", "https://login.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1", "https://www.wikidata.org/static/images/footer/wikimedia-button.svg", "https://www.wikidata.org/static/images/foote...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	President of Yemen from 2012 to 2022	en	/static/apple-touch/wikidata.png		https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q57480	President of Yemen from 2012 to 2022 Mansour Hadi President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi Abdorabuh Mansour Hadi edit
8955	dbpedia	0	45	https://www.ft.com/stream/03384869-f1dc-334c-8799-d42be18589c3	en	Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi	https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/ftlogo-v1%3Abrand-ft-logo-square-coloured?source=update-logos&format=svg	https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/ftlogo-v1%3Abrand-ft-logo-square-coloured?source=update-logos&format=svg	[ "https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/http%3A%2F%2Fprod-upp-image-read.ft.com%2Fb983e884-ca63-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0?source=next&fit=scale-down&dpr=2&width=240", "https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/http%3A%2F%2Fprod-upp-image-read.ft.com%2Fbd7eb8cc-d9e4-11e7-9504-59efdb70...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2019-09-01T10:00:27+00:00		en	https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/ftlogo-v1%3Abrand-ft-logo-square-coloured?source=update-logos&format=svg		https://www.ft.com/stream/03384869-f1dc-334c-8799-d42be18589c3
8955	dbpedia	3	51	https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13586.doc.htm	en	Yemen at ‘Crucial Moment’, Says Special Envoy, Stressing Need for Political Approach to Ending Conflict	https://press.un.org/themes/custom/un3_press/favicon.ico	https://press.un.org/themes/custom/un3_press/favicon.ico	[ "https://press.un.org/themes/custom/un3/un3_base/images/logos/UN_logo_en.svg", "https://press.un.org/sites/default/files/styles/thumbnail/public/uploads/2024/01/SC_Round-Up_2022_thumbnail.jpeg?itok=ugaJiSpG", "https://press.un.org/sites/default/files/styles/thumbnail/public/uploads/2024/01/GA77_thumbnail.jpeg?i...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2018-11-16T12:00:00+00:00	Delivering impassioned pleas on behalf of 14 million civilians teetering on the edge of famine in Yemen, senior United Nations and civil society leaders today briefed a largely unified Security Council on political and humanitarian steps forward, emphasizing that a new “window of hope” has now opened in that country’s devastating and overlooked war.	en	/themes/custom/un3_press/favicon.ico		https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13586.doc.htm	Country’s Delegate Details Government’s Actions to Relieve Humanitarian Situation Delivering impassioned pleas on behalf of 14 million civilians teetering on the edge of famine in Yemen, senior United Nations and civil society leaders today briefed a largely unified Security Council on political and humanitarian steps forward, emphasizing that a new “window of hope” has now opened in that country’s devastating and overlooked war. “Never has so much international attention and energy been given to this crisis, and rightly so,” said Martin Griffiths, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen. Welcoming the light recently shed on the situation, he reminded Council that the situation nevertheless remains the world’s largest humanitarian disaster with an ongoing fight against famine, civilians dying from preventable diseases and an economy on the verge of collapse. “This is a crucial moment,” he said, noting that he has spent the last two months seeking support from the warring parties for an updated version of a framework for negotiations. Outlining the contents of that newly-emerged framework — including the establishment of principles and parameters for United Nations-led, inclusive Yemeni political negotiations, a set of interim security and political arrangements to end fighting, the return of Sana'a’s friendly relations with neighbouring countries and a restoration of State institutions — he said he plans to visit Yemen next week to draw attention to the continued need for a pause in fighting. Welcoming the recent announcement by Yemen President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi of plans to move swiftly towards a political solution, he urged Council members to seize the current momentum and pursue a comprehensive and inclusive settlement to the conflict. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, recalled his October warning to the Council that a grave economic crisis and escalating conflict had pushed Yemen closer to famine than ever before. Shortly afterwards, an alert was issued that the world’s largest food security emergency faces a “catastrophic deterioration”. In that regard, he reiterated the five priority requests he previously delivered to the Council, namely: A cessation of hostilities in and around infrastructure on which aid operations and commercial importers rely; the protection of food and essential goods; a larger and faster injection of foreign exchange into the economy; an increase in funding and support for the humanitarian operation; and the parties’ full and open engagement with the Special Envoy. The World Food Programme’s (WFP) Executive Director, David Beasley, emphasized that the words “heart breaking” and “tragic” do not do the conflict in Yemen justice. Describing his recent trip to the country, he said “soft words” cannot properly illustrate what is happening to civilians there — the stuff of nightmares, horror, deprivation and misery. Noting that the value of the Yemeni rial has dropped by 235 per cent since January 2015, he said the price of basic food staples has doubled in the last eight months while household incomes are declining. Meanwhile, Yemen — unlike other conflict-affected countries — cannot grow its own food, and there are 3.6 million more hungry people in the country than three months ago. Rasha Jarhum, Founder and Director of the Peace Track Initiative Yemen, said children’s cries in Yemen go unnoticed as the conflict parties continue to use weapons in populated areas. Underlining the severe impacts on Yemeni women and girls, she said rapes and child marriages are soaring. Women have been assaulted by Houthi gangs and have had family members abducted. Calling for an immediate ceasefire, she also called for a ban on the arms and mines flowing into Yemen as well as on the recruitment of child soldiers. Peacekeepers from totally neutral States should be deployed to Yemen and the results of the National Dialogue should guide a transition to peace, she said. As Council members took the floor, many underscored that while delegations are often divided on issues before them, today they stand largely united on the situation in Yemen. Speakers around the table agreed on the need for urgent political progress, while also voicing support for the Special Envoy’s political plans and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator’s five priority requests. Some welcomed the initiative to relaunch political negotiations in Stockholm, Sweden, at the end of November, while others urged their fellow Council members to use their individual and collective leverage to bring the parties to the table. The United Kingdom’s delegate, welcoming the strong coordination between the United Nations units and civil society represented in the Chamber today, said the appalling situation on the ground calls for redoubled efforts to relieve humanitarian suffering and a political solution to the crisis. Urging the parties to engage constructively with the Special Envoy to pave the way for formal negotiations, she said her delegation – as the penholder for the issue – plans to take advantage of the current window of opportunity by bringing a draft resolution in support of the five points before the Council next week. “What men have created, men can resolve,” she stressed. Kuwait’s representative joined other speakers in expressing hope that all the parties to Yemen’s conflict will commit to engaging in the upcoming negotiations in Stockholm in good faith and without any strings attached. However, in September, similar hopes were dashed, and the conflict continued unabated. The deeply troubling humanitarian situation — including the looming threat that 14 million people may soon be caught up in a famine — requires the Council to act and the international community to support the efforts of Yemen’s legitimate Government to prevent a further devaluation of the rial. “Humanitarian suffering in some cases is the fruit of deliberate attempts to prevent the delivery of assistance,” he stressed, citing instances where aid convoys have been purposely delayed or ransacked. The representative of France declared: “There is a window of opportunity today that the Council must seize” by demanding an end to hostilities and supporting the political plan backed by the Special Envoy. Also warning of the threats of famine, a large-scale cholera epidemic and a risk that generations of Yemenis will be deprived of an education. Responding to the Under-Secretary-General’s five requests must be the Council’s top priority he stressed that all humanitarian and medical staff must also be protected and be able to plan and implement their operations in a secure environment. France stands willing to draft a Council resolution addressing both the humanitarian situation and the need to reach a lasting, global and inclusive solution to the conflict. Yemen’s representative, describing action taken by his Government to help relieve the humanitarian situation, cited efforts to increase the rial’s value, stem oil smuggling and allow citizens to pay a reasonable rate for vital supplies. While food importation has been facilitated through credit measures, Houthi militias have set fire to food warehouses and have held hospital patients hostage. Calling on the international community to put pressure on the Houthis to end the blocking of resources and the use of civilians as human shields, he said what has hurt Yemen’s people the most is that those militia’s crimes go ignored while the perpetrators continue to recruit child soldiers, besiege cities and avoid peace talks. Against that backdrop, the Council must do more than simply denounce the situation. Concrete action is needed, he stressed, noting that opportunities still exist to achieve peace based on Gulf Cooperation Council agreements. Also speaking today were representatives of the Russian Federation, Côte d’Ivoire, Sweden, Peru, Poland, United States, Ethiopia, Bolivia, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, Netherlands and China. The meeting began at 3:02 p.m. and ended at 5:36 p.m. Briefings MARTIN GRIFFITHS, Special Envoy for the Secretary-General for Yemen, welcomed that today Yemen is no longer “the forgotten war” that is has long been. “Never has so much international attention and energy been given to this crisis, and rightly so,” he said, stressing that Yemen remains the world’s largest humanitarian disaster with an ongoing fight against famine, civilians dying from preventable diseases and an economy on the verge of collapse. Expressing support for efforts to pursue the five requests presented by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator in October as a road map forward, he said the Council has consistently called on the parties to avoid a further humanitarian catastrophe. However, the situation remains fragile and unstable, including in the port city of Hodeidah. Noting that he will visit that city next week to draw attention to the need for a continued pause in fighting, he welcomed the recent announcement by Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, President of Yemen, that he plans to move swiftly towards a political solution. To that aim, he announced his intention to swiftly convene the parties, emphasizing that “we are close to resolving the preparatory issues to make this happen”. He expressed gratitude to members of the coalition for agreeing to the proposed logistical arrangements, as well as to the Government of Oman for its agreement to facilitate the medical evacuation of some injured Yemenis out of Sana’a city. “This is a crucial moment for Yemen,” he stressed, noting that he has spent the last two months seeking support from the parties for an updated version of the framework for negotiations. Emphasizing that the framework is in line with the Council’s requirements and the new realities of the conflict, he said that while the plan is his vision, “it is not mine alone”. Indeed, every conversation and negotiation that has gone before is reflected in the document, on which he said he will seek the Council’s endorsement as soon as both parties have formally agreed to its terms. Outlining the plans laid out in the proposed framework, he said it establishes the principles and parameters for United Nations-led, inclusive Yemeni negotiations to end the war and restart a political transition process. Among other elements, it includes a set of interim security and political arrangements which will allow for an end to fighting, the return of Yemen’s friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the restoration of State institutions. “The framework reflects in fact and words the resolutions of this Council,” he said, adding: “My task is to fashion a road towards principled compromise which allows the people of Yemen to live in peace again.” Warning that further conflict is not yet off the table, he said for a political settlement to be sustainable it must be inclusive and enjoy the support of the Yemeni people. Actors in the south of the country, in particular, will have a crucial role in safeguarding outcomes of the peace process being worked out now. “It is vital to secure their buy-in,” he stressed. Noting that he had hoped to be able to present to the Council today with a signed agreement on a detainee exchange — which would have marked the first formal signed agreement between the parties — he expressed hope that those arrangements will be reached in the coming days, sending a “timely message of hope” to the people of Yemen. Urging the parties to come together without any precondition under his auspices to jointly address Yemen’s dire economic situation, including the rapid deterioration of the Yemeni rial — he said that issue remains the main cause of the famine. “This is beyond confidence-building measures,” he said, noting that it is the parties’ moral obligation to take action. In that vein, he pledged to soon convene a meeting of the Central Bank of Yemen to be facilitated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an agreed action plan. “We must seize this positive momentum on Yemen,” he concluded, noting that it provides a crucial opportunity to pursue a comprehensive and inclusive settlement to the conflict. MARK LOWCOCK, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, reminded that on 23 October he warned the Security Council “a grave economic crisis and escalating conflict had pushed Yemen closer to famine than ever before”. Shortly afterwards, the Famine Early Warning System Network issued an alert stating the world’s largest food security emergency faces a “catastrophic deterioration” threatening significant loss of life for many of the millions in crisis. Citing the two famines declared this century — Somalia in 2011 and South Sudan in 2017 — he noted that most fatalities occur before famine is declared and takes hold, which is “what we are trying to prevent”. Yemen already faces mass hunger and has avoided famine thus far for two reasons: first, due to the world’s largest aid operation, undertaken by the United Nations and humanitarian agencies and reaching almost 8 million Yemenis every month; and second, Member States have acted when the risk of famine has risen, as is again the case. He called for a series of urgent actions beginning with a cessation of hostilities around aid infrastructure and facilities; violence has instead recently escalated, with nearly 800 separate incidents of shelling, clashes and air strikes, including around Hodeidah. Targets included hospitals, sending some patients fleeing while still connected to medical devices. He stated 30 per cent of Hodeidah’s population is “barely surviving”, including a quarter of the children. Some humanitarian operations have been scaled back as staffers have also left. Other urgent actions include protecting the supply of food and essential goods; injecting foreign exchange and paying salaries and pensions; increasing funding and support to the aid operation; and calling all belligerents to work with the Special Envoy to end the conflict, he said. Some efforts have been made, with Saudi Arabia depositing $200 million to strengthen the Yemeni rial, and donors providing $2.3 billion for the 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan (nearly 80 per cent of estimated requirements). However, he said the five actions must be seen as a package and called for support on all of them. DAVID BEASLEY, Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), recalling his recent three-day trip to Yemen, said that “soft words” will not do justice to what is happening to mothers and fathers and boys and girls in the country. What he has seen is the stuff of nightmares, horror, deprivation and misery. While the country has suffered for years, it is now on the brink of catastrophe, with all of humanity to blame. “The conditions the Yemenis are enduring would not exist at all if stubborn men would just sit down and talk instead of shoot.” Addressing the economic impact of the crisis, he said the value of the Yemeni rial has dropped by a 235 per cent since January 2015, wiping out two-thirds of the currency’s purchasing power. In the last eight months, the price of basic food staples has doubled, all while household incomes are declining. For a country dependent on imports for basic needs, the situation is disastrous, particularly as it cannot — unlike South Sudan and Zimbabwe — grow its own food. This is the primary reason why hunger is increasing dramatically, he explained, warning that nearly half the country is just one step away from famine. The monitoring systems of WFP show that there are 3.6 million more hungry people in Yemen than three months ago. Currently, the Programme is helping approximately 8 million people a month and, as of early November, several food shipments are en route to various ports in the country. Starvation is on the horizon unless circumstances immediately change, he warned. With the economic crisis accelerating the scale of the damage, humanitarian assistance must be combined with an all-out effort to restore Yemen’s economy. Humanitarian assistance alone cannot reverse the dire situation. But as that work begins, the warring parties must guarantee access in and out of the port of Hodeidah. Indeed, if the port shuts down without alternatives, there will be a catastrophe, he said before calling for much greater access throughout the country, as well as expedited clearances for shipments, visas and equipment. Urging the international community to stop the war and rescue Yemen’s economy, he said the words ‘heart-breaking’ and ‘tragic’ do not do the situation justice. RASHA JARHUM, Founder and Director of the Peace Track Initiative Yemen, said that children’s cries are going unnoticed as the parties to the conflict continue to use terrible weapons in populated areas, including air attacks by the coalition supporting the Government and mines by the Houthis, which not only kill and maim but also obstruct humanitarian aid. Women in particular were suffering. Before the conflict, Yemeni women were already in a subsidiary position, following the start of the conflict rapes and child marriages are soaring. Women have been assaulted by Houthi gangs and have had family members abducted. “We as women have the highest stake in peace,” she said. For that reason, women’s groups are actively working on the ground and in many sectors. Describing some of those activities, she said the Women in Support of Abductees Group has gotten hundreds released as compared to the United Nations-sponsored group, which has been unsuccessful thus far. The Yemen National Dialogue promoted by the Security Council was critical in addressing women’s issues and should be re-established. Women are now excluded from negotiating processes, and they must be meaningfully represented at all levels of the process. There is no sustainable peace without an inclusive process, she warned. She called for an immediate ceasefire starting with the ending of the coalition bombardment and relocation of all armed groups outside of populated areas. To protect civilians and allow delivery of humanitarian goods, she urged bans on arms inflows, on mines and on child recruitment and called for the start of reintegration programmes for child soldiers. Peacekeepers from neutral States should be deployed to Yemen and the results of the National Dialogue results should be used to guide a transition to peace. Supporting Mr. Lowcock’s five points, she also called for the integration of gender concerns into all support and development plans, and implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. She called, in addition, for the Government to report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Support to the efforts of grassroots women activists in Yemen is critical for a durable peace, she stressed. Statements KAREN PIERCE (United Kingdom), welcoming coordination by the United Nations units and civil society represented in the Chamber today, said that the appalling situation on the ground called for redoubled efforts to relieve humanitarian suffering, which in turn requires a political solution to the crisis. The parties need to engage constructively with the Envoy to pave the way to formal negotiations. Bringing the framework back to the Council is also a welcomed step. It was critical to involve women in the negotiations, as requested by all the speakers today. Agreeing that there is a window of opportunity at the moment, she called for action to take advantage of it and pledged, as penholder for the issue, to bring a draft supporting Mr. Lowcock’s five points before the Council next week. “What men have created, men can resolve,” she stressed. MANSOUR AYYAD SH. A. ALOTAIBI (Kuwait) expressed hope that all parties will commit to engaging in negotiations in Sweden, in good faith and without any strings attached. However, in September, similar hopes were dashed and the conflict continued unabated. Noting that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have been the victims of ballistic missile attacks launched from inside Yemen’s borders, he called on the Houthis to refrain from any measures that would undermine the legal prerogatives of Yemen’s legitimate Government. The deeply troubling humanitarian situation — including the looming threat that 14 million people may soon be caught up in a famine — requires the Council to take action and the international community to support the legitimate Yemeni Government’s efforts to prevent a further devaluation of the riyal. “Humanitarian suffering in some cases is the fruit of deliberate attempts to prevent the delivery of assistance,” he stressed, citing instances where aid convoys have been purposely delayed or ransacked. Kuwait stands ready to participate in the Secretary-General’s planned conference in February 2019 as well as to help facilitate the various parties’ travel to Stockholm for negotiations, he said. FRANÇOIS DELATTRE (France) said that the world has the collective responsibility — and now the chance — to end the war. “There is a window of opportunity today that the Council must seize” by demanding an end to hostilities and supporting the political plan backed by the Special Envoy, he stressed. Still, recent bombings and clashes continued to jeopardize civilian lives and the delivery of humanitarian aid is still being blocked. There is also the threat of famine, a large-scale cholera epidemic and a risk that generations of Yemenis will be deprived of an education. Emphasizing the need for a military pause, he nevertheless stressed that “everyone knows that we need to go further”. Responding to the Under-Secretary-General’s five requests must be the Council’s top priority, including ensuring humanitarian imports and supporting the stabilization and recovery of the Yemeni economy. Humanitarian and medical staff must also be protected and be able to plan and implement their operations in a secure environment. Welcoming efforts to draw up a unified humanitarian plan jointly backed by all relevant United Nations agencies, he also expressed support for renewed negotiations, telling the Special Envoy that “France is resolutely at your side” and stands willing to draft a Council resolution addressing both the humanitarian situation and the need to reach a lasting, global and inclusive solution to the conflict. DMITRY A. POLYANSKIY (Russian Federation) welcomed the reduction of violence around the port of Hodeidah and called for a similar reduction of clashes across all of Yemen. Hailing progress towards bring the parties together, he said that while the divide between them will be difficult to overcome, the Russian Federation stands ready to support the negotiation process. Moscow has long called for a negotiated political solution to Yemen’s crisis. Condemning indiscriminate strikes against civilian targets and ballistic missile attacks, he also expressed concern that much of Yemen’s population is hungry and lacks access to medical care. “Humanitarian assistance to Yemenis must be one of the main areas of our work,” he said, adding that it must be provided on a non-discriminatory basis. While the Russian Federation is providing assistance, improving the situation through humanitarian aid will not be possible. A political solution is required, and all parties must support the Special Envoy’s efforts to those ends. Noting that the ongoing war only serves to strengthen some terrorist groups which have taken root in the south of Yemen, he voiced hope that the threats of force and sanctions will give way to peaceful negotiations and a comprehensive security framework for all States of the Middle East. GBOLIÉ DESIRÉ WULFRAN IPO (Côte d’Ivoire), expressing deep concern over the intensification of fighting in Yemen and its humanitarian consequences, paid tribute to the United Nations agencies and organs for their efforts to end the deadly clashes and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Also highlighting the initiatives of the international community aimed at ending the crisis, he reaffirmed support for the work of the Special Envoy and urged the parties to observe the ceasefire in Hodeida and to engage in frank negotiations while making necessary compromises. He called for the Council to act in unity to enable a peaceful solution to the crisis in the interest of the people of Yemen. OLOF SKOOG (Sweden), paying tribute to all humanitarian personnel working in Yemen and noting the deteriorating humanitarian conditions there, said that, in seizing current opportunities, an urgent focus must be put on ending the fighting and getting the parties to the table. Political consultations led by the Special Envoy are the best chance to reach a turning point, move toward a political solution and alleviate the suffering. Fully supporting the five interventions outlined by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, she urged all with influence to call upon the parties to engage in good faith with the Envoy’s political consultations and implement a cessation of hostilities. Humanitarian and commercial access must be ensured. Confidence-building measures must be put in place regarding Sana’a airport, the Central Bank and the matter of prisoners, to name a few. The futile war in Yemen has been going on too long, she stated, stressing that a united and active Security Council in support of humanitarian and political action can make a difference. GUSTAVO MEZA-CUADRA (Peru), expressing deep concern over the cycles of destruction and uneasy calm in Yemen while the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, voiced his tribute and full support to humanitarian workers in the country, calling for unobstructed humanitarian access there. The parties must prioritize protections of civilians and engage constructively in efforts to bring about a political solution. In that context, the Council must unite to support the five points of Mr. Lowcock and the road map of the Special Envoy. He pledged to support a Council resolution that aims to end one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. JOANNA WRONECKA (Poland) said that thinking the conflict can be solved by military means is a delusion. She urged all parties to show goodwill, flexibility and a readiness to compromise and engage with the Special Envoy without preconditions. She also called upon all relevant stakeholders to make progress on confidence-building measures and to participate in the next round of consultations under the auspices of the United Nations. The catastrophic humanitarian situation in Yemen and its continued deterioration of security conditions require decisive and unified action by the Council. She said she remained gravely alarmed by the recent escalation of fighting in the city of Hodeidah and urged both the Houthis and the coalition to immediately deescalate and cease all military activities in the whole governorate. Hodeidah constitutes a critical supply chain for humanitarian and commercial deliveries and any disruption of this lifeline will contribute to the spread of famine, she warned. JONATHAN R. COHEN (United States) said today’s briefings bring devastating clarity to the situation in Yemen, but also underscore what is already known ‑ that the only solution to that country’s man-made crisis is a political one. Renewing his call on the parties to engage with the Special Envoy as soon as possible and on all Council members to assist, he said the parties must stop arguing about the terms of negotiations and commit to working with the Special Envoy towards a solution. Calling on the Houthis to promptly agree to participate in the upcoming talks in Stockholm, he said all parties must protect the flow of commercial goods into Yemen. Thousands of civilians are threatened by the current fighting and it is growing harder to bring supplies from the port to those who need them. He also called for an end to all obstructions and threats against journalists and aid workers. Noting that the United States will continue to provide critical humanitarian aid ‑ which must be supplied, regardless of the state of negotiations – he emphasized that while the Council remains deeply divided on many issues, it stands united on Yemen. All members agree that the time for political progress is now, and they support the political plans and the five priority requests. In addition, he said, all Council members should use their individual and collective influence to bring the parties to the table. HAILESELASSIE SUBBA GEBRU (Ethiopia) said that, while there had been a marked increase in clashes in Hodeidah governorate at the beginning of the month, the intensity of the violence has now been reduced. Reports indicate that the coalition has halted its military operations there, he said, expressing hope that this will lead to a sustained ceasefire. Underscoring that the international community should act to stop the violence and prevent an imminent humanitarian catastrophe, he noted that this could be achieved by fully supporting the continued diplomatic endeavours of the Special Envoy who continues to make preparations for the upcoming round of consultations to revive the political talks. The continued and sustained de-escalation of violence is vital in order to create an enabling environment for the political process, he said. VERÓNICA CORDOVA SORIA (Bolivia), reaffirming her support to the Special Envoy’s efforts to bring about a political solution in Yemen, said that the international community should be ashamed of what is happening in the country as it is an example of an extreme malfunction of the multilateral system. If action is not taken today, individuals on the Council should feel an extra dose of shame. Consideration of where the missiles and bombs that cut apart civilians come from must also be undertaken. The supply of weapons must be halted. The placing of mines, in addition, must stop, particularly since they obstruct humanitarian access. Describing the results of attacks on hospitals, she reminded the parties that any attacks on such civilian facilities may amount to crimes against humanity. As a military attack on Hodeidah would be a humanitarian catastrophe, she called for the end of the struggle over the port city. The Council, she stressed, must make it crystal clear to the parties that compliance with Security Council resolutions is obligatory, along with engaging with negotiations under the Special Envoy with no strings attached. AMPARO MELE COLIFA (Equatorial Guinea) said that the situation in Yemen is so alarming that it requires the immediate attention of the international community. Expressing deep concern over insecurity of civilians who have been rendered hopeless by years on end of deteriorating conditions, she called on the parties to the conflict to respect international humanitarian law, of which thousands of violations have already been recorded. In that context, there must be an immediate humanitarian pause. She paid tribute to humanitarian workers who are struggling to get aid delivered and to fighting the cholera epidemic. Affirming full support to the proposals of the Special Envoy, she called on the Council to act with unity in support of his work and that of the Emergency Relief Coordinator. KAIRAT UMAROV (Kazakhstan) said that prior to a possible meeting in Sweden of parties involved in the conflict there had been a surge of violence in the Hodeidah governorate. He called on all parties to safeguard civilian lives, prevent deaths and injuries, allow freedom of movement and protect hospitals, clinics and schools, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law. He also urged all parties to find compromises and reject unilateral decisions that could harm the peace process. The search for a peaceful resolution to the conflict should be intensified and an urgent universal ceasefire must be reached without preconditions. A key role in the process belongs to the Special Envoy; his efforts to find a political solution should be supported. A revamped regional approach is needed to uphold the ceasefire and promote the peace process, he said, commending the Special Envoy’s attempts to involve different States in the Middle East and the Gulf region. KAREL VAN OOSTEROM (Netherlands) said that the end of extreme hunger in Yemen ultimately depends on collective political will. The situation is compounded by interference with United Nations depots and continued air strikes and shelling, which have damaged critical civilian infrastructure as well as water, sanitation and health facilities. Depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival and starving them intentionally as a method of warfare is not permissible and may even constitute a war crime, he said. It is the responsibility of the Council to take a firm stance against the persistent violations of international humanitarian law seen in Yemen. Furthermore, humanitarian access should not be politicized by the parties to the conflict. The international community should continue to raise its voice against impunity, and perpetrators must be held accountable, he said. It is time to focus on fighting the famine and finding a political solution to the conflict. MA ZHAOXU (China), Council President for November, spoke in his national capacity, underscoring that all issues in Yemen can only be resolved through political channels. The international community should respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yemen and promote dialogue among the parties, he said, welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to establish a dialogue between the parties and urging full participation in those discussions. The representative of Yemen, thanking all humanitarian workers in his country, particularly those on the ground including women, affirmed that the situation there is deteriorating and the cause of the crisis must be addressed. He described actions taken by his Government to try and relieve the situation of the people, such as those that have resulted in an increase in the value of the country’s currency and said that new legislation has stemmed oil smuggling and allowed citizens to pay a reasonable rate for vital supplies. Food importation has been facilitated through credit measures, and supplies have been distributed to all those in need included Houthis. He called on humanitarian agencies to buy foodstuffs in the local markets and take other measures to strengthen the economy. He welcomed, in that context, support from friendly countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which he said has provided millions of dollars monthly for those purposes. Meanwhile, Iran continues to provide missiles and mines that devastate his people. He called for the international community to put pressure on the Houthi militias to end the blocking of resources and the use of civilians as human shields. What hurt the Yemeni people most, he said, is that the crimes of the militias are being ignored, while they avoid peace talks, recruit children as soldiers to besiege cities and to kidnap journalists and activists. Noting Mr. Beasley’s evocation of famine, he said Houthis have set fire to food warehouses and have held hospital patients hostage. He named children who had been killed by Houthi militias, among the dozens he said were killed daily in their attacks. The Government on the other hand, having reached agreements on prisoners through the Special Envoy, stands ready to accept all proposals to bring an end to the conflict. In that context, the Council must do more than simply denounce the situation; there must be concrete action on the ground. There are still opportunities to reach peace on the basis of the Gulf Cooperation Council documents and other previous agreements. He reiterated support for negotiations through the Special Envoy to achieve peace so that dignity, peace and prosperity can be restored to his people. His country will never, however, accept Iranian influence or the replication of Tehran’s system in the country. He pleaded for the Council to help put an end to struggle in Yemen once and for all.
8955	dbpedia	0	3	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423	en	Yemen: Why is the war there getting more violent?	https://ichef.bbci.co.uk…4c9009d87964.jpg	https://ichef.bbci.co.uk…4c9009d87964.jpg	[ "https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/A62D/production/_91914524_1f324077-3512-4d8a-a7d4-516a434895b0.jpg", "https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/DEF8/production/_99808075_gettyimages-140058878.jpg", "https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/09ED/production/_91914520_gettyimages-469585538.jpg", ...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "BBC News", "www.facebook.com" ]	2014-09-23T11:35:53+00:00	A conflict between the Saudi-backed government and the rebel Houthi movement is devastating Yemen.	en		BBC News	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423	The warring sides in Yemen are swapping hundreds of prisoners - a move which has built hopes for a permanent ceasefire between the Saudi-backed government forces and the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. The eight year-long civil war has led to the deaths of thousands of Yemenis, and created a major humanitarian crisis. In 2011, a popular uprising in Yemen forced its long-standing authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. However, the new president was overwhelmed with Yemen's economic problems, and security problems such as attacks by jihadists. Furthermore, most of Yemen's armed forces felt more loyalty to the ousted president than they did to Mr Hadi. Yemen's neighbour Saudi Arabia was alarmed by the prospect of the Houthis taking control of Yemen, fearing it would become a satellite of Saudi Arabia's rival, Iran. In March 2015, it and other Arab states began an air campaign aimed at ousting the Houthis and restoring Mr Hadi's government. The coalition received logistical and intelligence support from the US, UK and France. In August 2015, coalition ground troops landed in the port city of Aden and drove the Houthis out of the south of Yemen. However, they could not dislodge them from Sanaa or the north of the country. Yemen's official government is now in Aden, while President Hadi himself is based in Saudi Arabia. The Houthis allied with the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to form a "political council" to govern the area under their control. However, in December 2017, Saleh broke with the Houthis and called for his followers to fight them. Saleh was killed and the Houthis defeated his forces. In 2018, the Saleh loyalists joined the Saudi-led coalition. Together, they launched a major offensive against the Houthis to recapture the Red Sea city of Hudaydah. The port there is the principal lifeline for millions of Yemenis at risk of famine. After six months of fierce fighting, the two sides agreed a truce in the city. In 2021, the Houthis launched an attack on Marib, the government's last stronghold in the north and the centre of an oil-rich province. Fighting escalated in March this year across the province, forcing thousands of people to flee their homes. The Houthis have attacked targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE with ballistic missiles and drones, targeting sites including oil installations but also injuring civilians. Saudi and US officials have accused Iran of smuggling weapons such as drones to the Houthis, in violation of a UN arms embargo. Iran has denied the allegation. The Saudi-led coalition has carried out thousands of air strikes which have killed tens of thousands of people, according to the UN. These include "double tap" attacks, in which the first strike hits a group of enemy troops and the second one hits the people who go to their rescue. The UN says both sides in the civil war may have committed war crimes. Both sides deny the allegation. The UN estimated that by the start of 2022, the conflict in Yemen had caused over 377,000 deaths, with 60% the result of hunger, lack of healthcare and unsafe water. It says more than 11,000 children are known to have been killed or wounded as a direct result of the fighting. Yemen has also suffered from one of the largest cholera outbreaks ever recorded, with 2.5 million suspected cases and about 4,000 related deaths since 2016.
8955	dbpedia	3	8	https://www.fcnl.org/issues/middle-east-iran/saudi-led-war-yemen-frequently-asked-questions	en	The Saudi-led War in Yemen: Frequently Asked Questions	https://www.fcnl.org/sit…ba59b2fee7_o.jpg	https://www.fcnl.org/sit…ba59b2fee7_o.jpg	[ "https://www.fcnl.org/themes/custom/fcnl2020/logo.svg", "https://www.fcnl.org/sites/default/files/styles/landscape_1170/public/2021-11/22340906563_ba59b2fee7_o.jpg?h=cc198e8e&itok=ywh9DyEg", "https://www.fcnl.org/themes/custom/fcnl2020/assets/img/FCNL.NoTag.Blue.svg", "https://widgets.guidestar.org/Transparen...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2024-04-09T13:20:46-04:00	Yemen’s political instability began after a 2011 Arab Spring uprising that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power since 1990.	en	/themes/custom/fcnl2020/favicon.ico	Friends Committee On National Legislation	https://www.fcnl.org/issues/middle-east-iran/saudi-led-war-yemen-frequently-asked-questions	Yemen War Background \| The Saudi Blockade \| The Houthis and Iran \| Congressional Action Yemen War Background How did the Yemen war start? Yemen’s political instability began after a 2011 Arab Spring uprising that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power since 1990. Then-Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi became Yemen’s interim president for what was supposed to be a two-year term, during the transition to a more representative form of government with regular elections. Yemen’s political instability began after a 2011 Arab Spring uprising that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In 2014, Yemeni frustration with rampant corruption, unemployment, and rising fuel prices led to unrest across Yemen, including calls for an independent Southern Yemen. Taking advantage of the situation, the Houthis – a political and armed movement that originated from the Houthi tribe — entered Sana’a in September with the assistance of ex-president Saleh and put Hadi under house arrest. In 2015, with the stated goal of restoring Hadi to power, Saudi Arabia joined forces with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and formed a coalition of nine Arab countries. The coalition was backed by the United States, United Kingdom (UK), France, and Canada. Saudi Arabia framed the conflict in sectarian terms, insisting that Iran was supporting the Houthis. In March 2015, the Saudi-led coalition began conducting airstrikes and imposing a naval blockade against Yemen, indiscriminately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. What was Saudi Arabia’s motivation to wage war in Yemen? Saudi leaders backed Hadi for many reasons. They were alarmed by the rise of the Houthis at Saudi Arabia’s southern border, who they said were backed by Saudi Arabia’s main regional competitor, Iran. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait off the coast of Yemen is a critical oil shipping lane that links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and the Saudis wanted to ensure they were in control of it. This sea route facilitates the movement of millions of barrels of oil per day for Saudi Arabia and is critical to the world’s oil supply. The Yemen war served the political ambitions of then Saudi Defense Minister, and now crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, who used the conflict to gain national recognition and consolidate power. Lastly, control over Yemen would allow Saudi Arabia to construct an oil pipeline from its southern border through Yemen’s eastern province, Al Mahra, into the Indian Ocean. The pipeline would ease Saudi Arabia’s dependence on shipping oil through the Strait of Hormuz, which borders Iran. What is the U.S. role in this conflict? The Saudi-led coalition’s war on Yemen has received almost unwavering military support and weapons sales from the United States, UK, France, and other Western countries. In 2015, the Obama administration accommodated Saudi Arabia’s request for military backing of the coalition’s war on Yemen. Such backing included targeting assistance and logistical support for coalition airstrikes, midair refueling for Saudi warplanes, spare parts transfers, and billions of dollars in weapons sales. On Feb. 4, 2021, President Biden announced that the United States would end support for the coalition’s offensive operations in Yemen. Unfortunately, the administration has not clearly defined what constitutes “offensive operations”, and important aspects of U.S. complicity remain. The administration verified that ongoing support includes maintenance and intelligence sharing for warplanes conducting airstrikes and enforcing an air and sea blockade of Yemen. It remains unclear what, if any, other forms of military support the United States continues to provide to the coalition, as the administration has so far refused to answer a set of detailed questions posed by 41 members of Congress in a February 2021 letter seeking clarity on U.S. involvement in the war. Why has the United States historically supported the Saudis? In 1945, President Roosevelt met King Abdul Aziz on a naval destroyer in the Suez Canal and unofficially began the U.S.-Saudi partnership with a handshake. Under the agreement, Saudi Arabia would receive U.S. security assistance in exchange for granting the United States access to Saudi oil, tied to the U.S. dollar. Every U.S. president since has agreed to continue this security cooperation, which was strengthened after the Islamic Revolution in Iran and again during the first Gulf war. But the relationship is losing strategic importance as the United States imports less than 7% of its petroleum from Saudi Arabia. Following the gruesome assassination of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the humanitarian crisis caused by the Saudi-led war and blockade in Yemen, Americans began to grow more skeptical of Saudi Arabia. A December 2021 poll showed that a strong majority of Democratic and Republican voters opposed President Biden’s recent $650 million weapons sale to Saudi Arabia, even when presented with the administration’s argument that these were for defensive purposes. Bipartisan, bicameral majorities in Congress successfully voted several times during the Trump administration to terminate U.S. involvement in the war. During a nationally televised presidential debate, candidate Joe Biden promised to make the Saudi Crown Prince a “pariah.” Is there more than one war in Yemen? Yes, the United States is also involved in counterterrorism operations in Yemen against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP emerged in 2009, after the Yemeni and Saudi branches of Al Qaeda merged into one organization. The United States began airstrikes against AQAP soon after its formation, as part of the “Global War on Terror.” The United States has conducted 376 drone strikes in Yemen, which have killed between 125 and 151 civilians. According to data from the think tank New America, the United States has conducted 376 drone strikes in Yemen, which have killed between 125 and 151 civilians, and have killed between 1,390 and 1,779 people overall. The United States’ drone strikes against AQAP is viewed by lawmakers as a separate from the Saudi-led coalition war against the Houthis. Though still a contested legal matter, the Executive Branch has claimed these operations against AQAP are authorized under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). About the Saudi Blockade How does Saudi Arabia’s blockade of Yemen contribute to the humanitarian crisis there? For nearly seven years, Saudi Arabia has imposed an air and sea blockade on Yemen that has restricted the flow of vital commercial and humanitarian goods into the country. The United Nations estimated that by the end of 2021, the war in Yemen led to the deaths of at least 377,000 Yemenis and pushed over 16 million Yemenis to the edge of famine. Over 60% of the deaths were due to disruptions in access to food, water, and medicine. Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel has described the ongoing Saudi blockade as “an offensive military operation that kills civilians.” Saudi Arabia’s restrictions on the entry of commercial and humanitarian goods have been a leading driver of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, where 400,000 children are at risk of dying of malnutrition this year, and the country is being pushed towards “the biggest famine in modern history.” Since January 2021, Saudi Arabia has severely restricted fuel imports, greatly hindering food shipments and hospitals’ ability to function. What has been the humanitarian impact of Saudi Arabia’s air blockade of Yemen’s Sana’a airport? Commercial flights in and out of Sana’a Airport, Yemen’s main international airport, have been halted by Saudi Arabia since 2016. These flight restrictions have blocked medical evacuations of tens of thousands of critically ill Yemeni civilians and prevented vital medicines and medical supplies from entering the country. Tragically, many Yemenis with chronic health issues, such as cancer, have needlessly suffered and died waiting for potentially life-saving medical evacuations and medicine. According to the humanitarian organization CARE, the nearly complete halt to medical supplies and equipment entering through Sana’a airport, combined with restrictions on fuel through Yemen’s Red Sea ports, has caused a doubling of prices of some medicine, putting it out of reach for most of the population. What is the impact of the Saudi blockade on fuel imports? The Saudi-led coalition’s restrictions on fuel imports are a key driver of the economic crisis, making basic needs unaffordable. The naval blockade enables the Saudis to control the entry of ships carrying fuel into Yemeni ports. Statistics from the UN show that Saudi Arabia is severely restricting the entry of fuel to amounts far below Yemen’s needs. In November 2021, Saudi Arabia allowed only 3% of the fuel Yemen needs each month into the country, and in December only 5%. Without fuel, food and medicine can’t be transported throughout the country, jeopardizing the health of millions of Yemenis. Fuel shortages also prevent hospitals from operating at full capacity. World Food Program Director David Beasley pleaded to the UN Security Council last year that the “blockade must be lifted, as a humanitarian act. Otherwise, millions more will spiral into crisis.” Is the Saudi blockade of Yemen’s ports needed to prevent Iranian weapons from reaching the Houthis? No. In 2015, the United Nations established an inspection and verification mechanism that ensures that ships docking at Yemen’s ports are not carrying weapons. All commercial vessels are inspected and approved by the UN in Djibouti before being allowed to berth in Yemen’s Red Sea ports. In April 2021, U.S. Special Envoy Tim Lenderking acknowledged that the mechanism “works quite well.” The import restrictions on UN-approved vessels imposed by Saudi Arabia and the Hadi government are a tactic of economic warfare that seeks to gain leverage over the Houthis through starvation and deprivation of civilian populations. What has the Biden administration said about the blockade? In its first several months, the Biden administration said nothing publicly about the blockade, even as the UN sounded the alarm over the impact of Saudi Arabia’s tightening restrictions on fuel imports. When pressed by reporters, a State Department spokesman claimed that “food and commodities are getting through, so it is not a blockade.” UN World Food Program director David Beasley has repeatedly spoken about the urgent need to lift the blockade. However, in response to mounting pressure from Congress, the media, humanitarian groups, and civil society, U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen, Tim Lenderking, said that commodities and humanitarian assistance must be allowed to enter into Yemen unimpeded and that “Saudi Arabia must not stand in the way.” When asked by Rep. Ted Lieu (CA-33) what if any leverage the administration is prepared to use to compel Saudi Arabia to lift its restrictions, Lenderking could not say. And though Lenderking testified that restrictions on commodities into Yemen’s ports should be taken “off the table” as a bargaining chip and “should not be a factor in political discussions,” the administration endorsed a Saudi ceasefire offer in March 2021 that explicitly sought to use the blockade as leverage to elicit Houthi concessions. Who has spoken out about the blockade? UN World Food Program director David Beasley has repeatedly spoken about the urgent need to lift the blockade. In April 2021, Beasley flew to Washington and reportedly “impressed upon lawmakers the urgency of lifting the blockade ‘immediately.’” Following the April briefing, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks (NY-05) and a bipartisan group of members of the Middle East subcommittee sent a letter urging the administration to pressure Saudi Arabia to lift the blockade. 76 members of the House, led by Rep. Debbie Dingell (MI-12), and 16 Senators, led by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (MA), sent similar letters, as did a coalition of over 70 national advocacy organizations and more than a dozen celebrities. Senators Bob Menendez (NJ), Jack Reed (RI), and Chuck Schumer (NY) wrote a letter in July 2021 calling for an end to restrictions on Yemen’s ports, and in December 2021, Senators Elizabeth Warren (MA) and Rand Paul (KY) and Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY-14) and Nancy Mace (SC-01) sent a letter calling on Saudi Arabia to open Sana’a airport. About the Houthis and Iran Who are the Houthis? The Houthi movement, otherwise known as Ansar Allah (which translates to Supporters of God), primarily belongs to the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam. The Houthi political movement emerged in the early 1990s as the “Believing Youth” in Saada and was led by Hussein Al-Houthi. The main objective of the movement was to revive Zaydi Islam in the face of the perceived spread of Saudi-exported Wahabi ideology in Yemen. In early 2004, the Houthis, who opposed the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003 and condemned Saleh’s alliance with the United States, became an armed movement and proceeded to fight six wars against the Saudi-backed Saleh government in Yemen. Surprisingly, in 2014, the Houthis formed an alliance with former president Saleh after he was removed from office. Together, they seized the capital Sana’a and put President Hadi under house arrest in January 2015. Houthi forces have committed horrific human rights abuses throughout the course of the war, including firing artillery indiscriminately into cities such as Taizz, killing and wounding civilians, and launching indiscriminate ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia. There is not a lot of reliable data or polling about the popularity the Houthis have among the Yemeni population it governs. However, over the course of the war, more and more Yemenis have left the south and moved to Houthi-held territory in search of safety and greater economic stability. The U.S. media and lawmakers often refer to the Ansar Allah-led government in Sana’a as the “Iran-backed Houthis rebels.” The official narrative in the United States about the Houthis is often oversimplified, as the government in Sana’a reflects a coalition. The Supreme Political Council includes Ansar-Allah and former President Saleh’s political party, the General People’s Council. The government in Sana’a is also supported by many local tribes in Yemen. Haven’t the Houthis also committed human rights violations? Houthi forces in Yemen have also carried out grave violations of human rights, as well as possible war crimes in attacks against civilians. Actions by Houthi de facto authorities have also exacerbated the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the country by interfering with and impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. U.S. government criticism and response to Houthi violations in Yemen rightly have been pronounced and consistent. The same cannot be said for the U.S. response to abuses by Saudi forces, which has been muted in comparison and has not led to a cut-off of military aid. Violations by Houthi forces do not serve as a justification for continuing U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and do not change U.S. obligations under international law. What is Iran’s involvement in the Yemen war? While it is true that Iran has provided weapons and training to the Houthis each year, Iran’s support is often exaggerated. Iran spends far less than the hundreds of billions of dollars Saudi Arabia spends annually backing Hadi forces. A significant portion of Houthi weaponry has been generated locally by defeating Saudi-backed forces, looting army stockpiles, taking weapons from militia tribes, and purchasing on the black market. Saudi Arabia’s policy has no prospect of achieving its stated objectives and is creating a humanitarian catastrophe. Seven years of indiscriminate airstrikes and an air and sea blockade on Yemen, as well as Saudi Arabia’s attempts to isolate the Houthis and avoid good-faith diplomacy, have only emboldened the Houthis and increased their domestic popularity. The Houthis now govern territory with over 80% of the country’s population and are closer to Iran now than before the war. Saudi Arabia’s policy has no prospect of achieving its stated objectives and is creating a humanitarian catastrophe through its collective punishment of Yemen. Do Houthi cross-border attacks on targets on Saudi Arabia constitute a legitimate reason for continued U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition? Over the course of the Yemen war, the Houthis have conducted drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia, which have been condemned by the United States and the international community. These cross-border attacks are often cited as a reason the United States must continue to send military support to Saudi Arabia. However, if the Saudis were to end their bombardment and blockade of Yemen, the Houthis would have no incentive to risk provoking their powerful neighbor into further attacks. If the Saudis ended their military aggression towards Yemen, the Houthis would be unlikely to conduct additional cross-border attacks. The best way to protect the Saudis from Houthi missiles is to end Saudi involvement in Yemen. The best way to protect the Saudis from Houthi missiles is to end Saudi involvement in Yemen. The rate and intensity of Houthi attacks have only increased over time as the Houthis have gained strength and the Saudis have tightened the blockade, demonstrating the failure of the Saudi approach. Continued U.S. support for Saudi aggression will neither weaken the Houthis nor bring the war to a quicker end. Instead, the United States and Saudi Arabia must demonstrate their commitment to diplomacy, international law, and human rights by lifting the blockade and ending the aerial bombardment of Yemen. Would labeling the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) affect humanitarian access and the peace process in Yemen? Yes. While the Houthis share much blame, alongside the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, for horrific human rights violations in Yemen, an FTO designation would do nothing to address these concerns. It would, however, prevent the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance to millions of innocent people, greatly hurt the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and further undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Rather than being a catalyst for peace, FTO designations are a recipe for more conflict and famine, while unnecessarily further undermining U.S. diplomatic credibility. It is more likely that these designations will convince the Houthis that their goals cannot be achieved at the negotiating table. Moreover, commercial shippers are already reluctant to import to Yemen given the high risk of delays, costs, and risks of violence. An FTO designation on the Houthis would only increase this level of risk for commercial entities and further place the vital work of humanitarian and peacebuilders at risk. Even if humanitarian exemptions are permitted, financial institutions, shipping firms, and insurance companies, along with aid organizations, are likely to find the risk of potential violations to be too high. As a result, these entities would dramatically scale down or even end their involvement in Yemen – a decision that would have indescribably severe human consequences. About Congressional Action What can Congress and the administration do to bring about an end to the blockade? As a top foreign policy priority, the Biden administration must use its vast leverage to encourage Saudi Arabia to immediately and unconditionally lift the blockade and reach a nationwide ceasefire to end the conflict. Members of Congress should continue to call on the administration to do so while working to pass a new Yemen War Powers Resolution prohibiting all forms of U.S. support for the blockade and other offensive operations of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. How has the 117th Congress attempted to end U.S. complicity in the Saudi-led war on Yemen? There were two key congressional votes on Yemen in 2021. The first was Rep. Ro Khanna’s (CA-17) amendment to the FY22 National Defense Authorization Act to end U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led war on Yemen. It passed the House with 219 votes. 11 Republicans supported it and 11 Democrats opposed it. The amendment was stripped out of the final bill during conference negotiations between the House and Senate. There were two key congressional votes on Yemen in 2021. The second vote was a joint resolution of disapproval, led by Sens. Rand Paul (KY), Mike Lee (UT), and Bernie Sanders (VT), to block the Biden administration’s announced sale of $650 million in new weapons to Saudi Arabia. While the resolution failed to pass 30-67, the vote still showed momentum to end U.S. complicity in the war. A majority of Senate Democrats voted for it, including Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (NY) and Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (IL). Many senators told FCNL staff that they believed that these air-to-air munitions were defensive in nature and that they still supported ending U.S. complicity in offensive operations, including by terminating spare parts and maintenance for Saudi warplanes. Have past congressional efforts to end U.S. complicity in the war had a tangible impact on the humanitarian situation and peace talks? In 2019, Senators Bernie Sanders (VT), Mike Lee (UT), and Chris Murphy (CT), made Senate history by passing S.J.Res.7, the War Powers Resolution to end U.S. military involvement in the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen. This was the first time since the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973 that both chambers of Congress passed a War Power Resolution. The advocacy effort for this legislation mobilized hundreds of thousands of activists all over the country to produce a bipartisan majority in the House and Senate. Its congressional passage pushed the UAE to draw down its military forces in Yemen, spurred a reduction in cross-border attacks by the Saudis and Houthis, led to the Hodediah ceasefire, and revived negotiations between the warring parties. But after the veto, Yemen suffered a breakdown in diplomacy, an uptick in violence, and a continuation of hostilities. What is the War Powers Resolution? The War Powers Resolution of 1973, otherwise known as the War Powers Act, is a federal law passed in response to executive overreach that enabled U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War. It was intended to provide a framework for Congress’s check on presidential power to use military force without congressional consent. The War Powers Resolution has three main parts. The President must get a declaration of war or specific authorization from Congress before sending troops overseas unless the United States or its armed forces are attacked. If the President initiates hostilities, these can only last 60 days and must then be terminated unless Congress authorizes their continuation. If there is no declaration of war or specific statutory authorization passed within 60 days, Congress can require the president to end U.S. participation in hostilities at any time Any member of the House or Senate, regardless of committee assignment, can invoke section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution and get a full floor vote on whether to require the president to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities. Under the procedural rules written into the War Powers Act, these bills receive a special expedited status that requires Congress to make a full floor vote within 15 legislative days of their introduction. This provision is especially useful because it allows members of Congress to force important debates and votes on the president’s use of military force and Congressional war authority.
8955	dbpedia	3	84	https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/war-yemen/	en	The war in Yemen may not end anytime soon – GIS Reports	https://www.gisreportson…ke_aftermath.jpg	https://www.gisreportson…ke_aftermath.jpg	[ "https://www.gisreportsonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Mazel-Zvi-485x540.png", "https://www.gisreportsonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/sanaa_airstrike_aftermath.jpg", "https://www.gisreportsonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/hadi-1140x760.jpg", "https://www.gisreportsonline.com/wp-content/upload...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Lisa Lüdtke" ]	2019-08-09T16:07:00+02:00	Fuelled by Saudi Arabia and Iran, the war in Yemen does not seem to come to an end. The UN negotiations failed to provide a meaningful change.	en	https://www.gisreportson…e-touch-icon.png	GIS Reports	https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/war-yemen/	Few prospects for an end to the war in Yemen Iran and Saudi Arabia have taken advantage of a conflict fueled by regional and religious rivalries to fight a proxy war in Yemen. United Nations attempts to broker a cease-fire have failed, and everyday Yemenis are suffering. Both sides have powerful motives to keep the war going. A civil war fueled by regional and religious rivalries is raging in Yemen, one of the world’s poorest countries. On one side is the Houthi minority backed by Iran, on the other the government backed by Saudi Arabia and its Arab coalition. Yemen has essentially become a battlefield in a proxy war – Iran against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states – leading to one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The population is in urgent need of relief; a cholera outbreak which has already claimed many lives threatens to turn into a full-blown epidemic. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (also known as ISIS or Daesh) are using the resulting chaos to develop and launch deadly terrorist attacks on both sides. The United Nations’ attempts to broker a cease-fire after years of bloodshed have failed. No one has managed to find a political solution and stop the carnage. The Stockholm Agreement reached under UN auspices last December between the Houthis and the central government mainly deals with the creation of a secure zone in the port city of Hodeida for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The plan was poorly executed and has not led to the expected dialogue. The roots of the conflict are embedded in the long history of the country, nearly the size of France, which at the beginning of the 20th century was still divided between the Ottoman-ruled north and the British-ruled south. The Houthis made up 50 percent of the northern population and belong to the Zaidi stream of Shia Islam. The Zaidis were the dominant religious group in the north for nearly 1,000 years. A secular military coup, backed by Egypt, overthrew the last Zaidi imam in 1962. The ensuing civil war lasted eight years. Civil war In 1990 North and South Yemen united to form the Republic of Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Zaidi and president of North Yemen since 1978, became president of the new country. Zaidis represented only 35 percent of the new country’s population but remained the majority in the northern Saada governorate, parts of the west, and in the capital of Sanaa. Tensions soon developed with the central government, which the Zaidis accused of discrimination. A cease-fire was achieved in 2010, but with the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, Houthis again protested against the regime. One of their leaders, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, launched the Ansar Allah (defenders of Allah) movement to restore their former preeminence. Ensuing clashes with security forces escalated into open war. Al-Houthi was killed in 2004. His father took over, and later his brother, Abdul-Malik, who currently leads the group. Ansar Allah fighters, and all Zaidis, now call themselves Houthis, after these leaders. A cease-fire was achieved in 2010, but with the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, Houthis again protested against the regime. Bowing to international pressure, President Saleh resigned and was replaced by Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. As the sole candidate, he was formally elected in 2012. Nevertheless, the Houthis refused to acknowledge him, claiming he was pursuing the same discriminatory policies toward them. In the ensuing chaos, they took over the Saada region, bordering Saudi Arabia, and began pushing south. This is when Iran allegedly began aiding them. President Hadi attempted to reach a compromise, creating a “committee for national dialogue and the drafting of a new constitution.” However, it failed to satisfy the demands of all the parties. Militants faithful to the ousted President Saleh joined forces with the Houthis in the fight against President Hadi’s army, until Mr. Saleh decided to defect. He was assassinated by the Houthis in December 2017. Iran’s role With its covert aid to the Houthi insurgency, Iran saw the conflict’s potential to undermine its rival, Saudi Arabia, and support the creation of a Shia crescent in the Middle East. The central government accused the rebels of not only abandoning their Zaidi heritage and getting closer to traditional Shia, but also of subverting republican principles and working to impose a religious regime. Iran still denies that it is aiding the Houthis, though the facts show a different picture. It is now known that before the start of the rebellion Tehran was giving the Houthis $15-20 million a year, disguised as religious and cultural assistance. At first, the Houthis had neither sophisticated weapons nor the means to manufacture them. Iran then started supplying the Houthis with weapons and ammunition, later smuggling in missiles and drones, military advisors and raw materials for local manufacturing. Hezbollah’s Unit 3800, tasked with training terrorists outside of Lebanon, sent advisors to instruct Houthi fighters. Iran uses go-betweens and camouflage to continue supplying the Houthis. Saudi vessels and U.S. Navy ships patrolling the region have intercepted ships carrying Iranian weapons. In 2014, fighting intensified and the Houthis took the capital, Sanaa. President Hadi was forced to resign and fled to Saudi Arabia. The following year, the Houthis took the port of Aden, which commands the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb strait. They also took the cities of Taez and Hodeida, the latter of which hosts the largest port in the southern Red Sea and is the main hub for transporting goods to the rest of the country. The Houthis were now threatening shipping in the Red Sea, a conduit for a huge amount of international trade, including oil supplies. This development provoked great concern among countries along the coast, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Sudan and Djibouti. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia lent its support to the Yemeni government forces. Saudi coalition Saudi Arabia was now feeling the heat, surrounded by armed Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah and pro-Iranian Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. It assembled a coalition of seven other countries – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan and Morocco – to defeat the Houthis and restore stability to Yemen. A naval blockade was imposed on Yemeni ports and Saudi air raids targeted Houthi strongholds. A significant armed Emirati ground force was sent in, while Sudan and some other members dispatched token forces. Egypt took over patrolling the Red Sea to ensure free passage to the Suez Canal, but refrained from taking an active part in the fighting. Qatar was ousted from the coalition in 2017 as a result of the crisis with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Morocco left in 2019 following tensions with Saudi Arabia. Recently, Riyadh’s staunch ally, the UAE, has been reducing its troop numbers, perhaps fearing further deterioration of relations with Iran and wanting to reinforce its own defense. The United States is giving the coalition logistical and intelligence support. It has also increased its arms sales. U.S. military activity in Yemen dates back to 2000, after the suicide attack carried out by al-Qaeda on the USS Cole while in the port of Aden. Seventeen sailors were killed and 39 injured. It has since maintained forces in Yemen to harass al-Qaeda cells in the southeast of the country, eliminating the leaders responsible for the Cole attack through a series of drone strikes. The Houthis refused to implement the resolution – and the coalition continued its attacks against them. The Jamal Khashoggi affair, as well as the deepening humanitarian crisis and the mass killing of civilians in Yemen, have led to heightened criticism of Saudi Arabia in the American media, and the U.S. Congress has expressed its displeasure with American intervention and arms sales to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. It has twice passed bills requiring the president to obtain Congressional authorization prior to further action in Yemen. President Donald Trump has vetoed both, stating that the situation in Yemen presents a clear and present danger to American interests and those of its allies. In May 2019 he signed new arms sales in excess of $8 billion to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The United Kingdom and France also sell arms to these countries, and also face increasingly vocal criticism in the media and from civic groups. The Saudi-led coalition forces soon overtook Aden and most of the territories conquered by the Houthis in the southwest of the country but failed to retake Sanaa and the port of Hodeida. President Hadi hastened to return to Aden from Saudi Arabia where he had taken refuge, declared it a provisional capital, resumed his functions and asked the UN for help in redressing the country’s ills. In April 2015, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2216, providing for the use of force to implement its decisions. The resolution calls for an immediate halt to violence and demands that Houthis evacuate conquered territories, free the prisoners they hold and hand over weapons taken from various security forces. It also reasserted the embargo on the sale of weapons to the Houthis and their supporters. Lastly, it reaffirmed the legitimacy of President Hadi. Not surprisingly, the Houthis refused to implement the resolution, and the coalition continued its attacks against them. President Hadi returned to Saudi Arabia, where he remains to this day. Humanitarian disaster Low-grade warfare is still ongoing, with coalition forces mainly relying on airpower. They are not always effective, often hitting civilians and destroying government buildings. In the war-torn country, the humanitarian situation is dire. According to a February 2019 briefing to the UN Security Council by UN emergency relief coordinator Mark Lowcock, 80 percent of the population – some 24 million people – need humanitarian assistance. About 20 million require help in securing food or medical services. Half of that number is “just a step away from famine,” while more than 3 million people, including 2 million children, are acutely malnourished. Some 18 million lack clean water and access to sanitation. Both sides of the conflict show the same disregard for international law and the disastrous state of the economy. The UN did manage to bring relief to some 8 million people, but oppressive bureaucracy, attacks on aid workers and movement restrictions prevent assistance from reaching those who need it most. Last June, the country teetered on the brink of an even greater humanitarian disaster. Houthi forces, frustrated by their inability to progress, intensified their launch of missiles and explosive-laden drones on oil installations and Saudi airports. In retaliation, the coalition decided to take the port at Hodeida, through which most Iranian military assistance is smuggled (despite the embargo). A deep-seated lack of trust between the parties is the main stumbling block. The UN and other relief organizations warned that an attack on the town would lead to a massacre of civilians, closing the port and stopping the transfer of food and humanitarian aid to the rest of the country. Even the U.S. opposed the move; Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for a cease-fire and the U.S. Air Force stopped refueling coalition planes over Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE hoped for a swift victory, cutting the Houthis off from the port, which also served as their home base. But they failed, unable to dislodge the Houthis from either town or port. Intense pressure from UN special envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths brought both sides to the negotiating table. At a meeting in Stockholm, they agreed on three points: 1) a cease-fire in Hodeida and the nearby ports of Salif and Ras Issa, as well as a redeployment of warring factions (this was supposed to include opening and securing a humanitarian corridor for the transfer of aid to desperate and starving populations); 2) establishing a process for the exchange of prisoners; and 3) supplying food to the people of Taez, after a three-year siege. Unfortunately, these conditions were couched in ambiguous terms open to diverse interpretations. For the Houthis, “redeployment” did not mean withdrawing from Hodeida to the surrounding areas. Under strong UN pressure, the Houthis agreed to redeploy only around the two nearby ports. The rest of the agreement is not being implemented at all. A deep-seated lack of trust is the main stumbling block. Open sore Is there any hope for a political resolution? Judging from the Houthis’ determination to continue fighting, further negotiations seem far off. Iran, the Houthis’ main sponsor, will not willingly allow the war to end as long as its conflict with the U.S. remains unresolved and sanctions remain in place. It sees the fight against Saudi Arabia through its Houthi proxies as an important tool to pressure the West. Do the Houthis still believe they can rule Yemen again, or at least establish an autonomous Zaidi zone? They have yet to declare their political demands, apart from an end to discrimination and participation in the government. These could be achieved through democratic elections, since they represent more than a third of the population and would have a decisive influence in parliament. Is Iranian influence so great that they have become its puppets at the expense of their own interests? The Stockholm Agreement will be the test. As long as it remains unimplemented, there will be no negotiations. As to the Saudi-led coalition, in almost four years of fighting it has been unable to defeat the Houthis. It has been weakened by the war, but that will not stop its intervention. There is no light at the end of the tunnel for the suffering people of Yemen. Their country will remain a dangerous open sore, a pawn in the cynical war waged by Iran while the West dithers, refusing to act.
8955	dbpedia	2	27	https://www.crosswordsolver.org/clues/y/yemens-capital.65288	en	Yemen's capital Crossword Clue Answers	https://a.crosswordsolve…avicon-32x32.png	https://a.crosswordsolve…avicon-32x32.png	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Yemen's capital crossword clue? Find the answer to the crossword clue Yemen's capital. 3 answers to this clue.	en	https://a.crosswordsolver.org/favicon.ico		https://www.crosswordsolver.org/clues/y/yemens-capital.65288	Below are possible answers for the crossword clue Yemen's capital. If you're still haven't solved the crossword clue Yemen's capital then why not search our database by the letters you have already!
8955	dbpedia	0	69	https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-emergency-saudi-arabia-and-the-war-in-yemen	en	Genocide Emergency: Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen	https://static.wixstatic…67a0cca4~mv2.jpg	https://static.wixstatic…67a0cca4~mv2.jpg	[ "https://static.wixstatic.com/media/e5b74f_c50b7ea3116d43338c8d20a600a145ab.png/v1/fill/w_96,h_42,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,blur_2,enc_auto/e5b74f_c50b7ea3116d43338c8d20a600a145ab.png", "https://static.wixstatic.com/media/3f2e91_7b3b78e81c0249afb2ab8d32f9c83b96~mv2.jpg/v1/fill/w_115,h_43,al_c,q_80,usm_0.66_1.0...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Sarah Kane \| Genocide Watch", "Sarah Kane", "Genocide Watch" ]	2021-02-10T18:40:31.877000+00:00	Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto leader of the kingdom [Cliff Owen/AP]Saudi Arabia's military intervention in Yemen has created what the U.N. calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in the world." South and North Yemen united in 1990 after centuries of separation. The current war in Yemen began in 2014 when Houthis from northern Yemen, a largely Shi'a movement supported by Iran, took control of Sana'a, the capital of Yemen. The internationally recognized government retreated to Aden in southern Ye	en	https://static.wixstatic…f821f7%7Emv2.png	genocidewatch	https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-emergency-saudi-arabia-and-the-war-in-yemen	Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto leader of the kingdom [Cliff Owen/AP] Saudi Arabia's military intervention in Yemen has created what the U.N. calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in the world." South and North Yemen united in 1990 after centuries of separation. The current war in Yemen began in 2014 when Houthis from northern Yemen, a largely Shi'a movement supported by Iran, took control of Sana'a, the capital of Yemen. The internationally recognized government retreated to Aden in southern Yemen. In March 2015, at the request of Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Sunni-majority Arab League states formed a coalition to support Hadi's military campaign to retake control of northern Yemen. Saudi intervention in Yemen has included massive airstrikes. Over a third have targeted civilian areas, including hospitals, homes, markets, schools, and mosques, directly killing over 12,000 civilians. Only half of hospitals continue to operate. Saudi naval blockades have cut off food supplies. Thousands of children have died of starvation. A cholera epidemic afflicted 800,000 civilians and killed thousands. Eighty percent of the population depends on humanitarian relief. The Yemeni Archive and Oxfam report that the Saudi-led coalition has systematically destroyed 130 bridges essential for delivery of humanitarian aid. Houthis have also prevented food aid from reaching populations in areas they control. At least 233,000 civilians have died in Yemen's civil war. Bombing of civilians and blockades of food aid are war crimes. The United States and United Kingdom are complicit in these war crimes. The U.S. and U.K. sell Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates the advanced aircraft and laser-guided Raytheon bombs used to kill civilians, despite a U.S. Congressional prohibition on such sales. Secretary of State Pompeo, President Trump, and other American policy makers authorized sales of these weapons with knowledge that they would be used to kill civilians. These American officials could be tried for war crimes. Within Saudi Arabia, Shi'a Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and other non-Muslims have no freedom to practice their religions. Saudi Arabia prohibits public worship of religions other than Islam. Although the right to worship in private is recognized by law, it is not always respected in practice. Shia Muslims are significantly limited in their ability to build mosques. Saudi women's and human rights activists are arrested, subjected to pre-determined trials and given lengthy prison sentences. Shi'a Muslims face employment discrimination. School curricula and books still contain anti-Shi'a and anti-Jewish rhetoric, even after reforms implemented in 2018-2019. Saudi Arabia is a police state. Mohammed Bin Salman has his critics murdered. The assassination of Jamal Khashoggi is the most notorious example. Security forces kill protestors, e.g., in protests against the demolition of a historic neighborhood in Awamiya. Torture is standard practice in Saudi jails and prisons. Genocide Watch considers Saudi Arabia to be at Stage 8: Persecution for its treatment of Shi'a Muslims domestically and Stage 9: Extermination for its war crimes and blockade of food aid in Yemen. Genocide Watch recommends:
8955	dbpedia	0	68	https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-01-01/the-houthis-from-yemeni-militia-to-threat-against-global-trade-in-the-red-sea.html	en	The Houthis, from Yemeni militia to threat against global trade in the Red Sea	https://imagenes.elpais.…3da90&width=1200	https://imagenes.elpais.…3da90&width=1200	[ "https://static.elpais.com/dist/resources/images/logos/primary/el-pais.svg", "https://imagenes.elpais.com/resizer/v2/TLGJNKOEWFLMVHZNUDOACCIZ3I.jpg?auth=1436ae278897be8dbbdb32916d0782351ed6d8cf52c361d86a88563e1213da90&width=414 414w,https://imagenes.elpais.com/resizer/v2/TLGJNKOEWFLMVHZNUDOACCIZ3I.jpg?auth=1436ae...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Trinidad Deiros Bronte" ]	2024-01-01T00:00:00	The attacks on a crucial commercial artery under the pretext of solidarity with Gaza have increased the regional weight of the fundamentalist group, which controls nearly 30% of the Arab country	en	https://static.elpais.com/dist/resources/images/favicon.ico	EL PAÍS English	https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-01-01/the-houthis-from-yemeni-militia-to-threat-against-global-trade-in-the-red-sea.html	The capture of a mega-ship sailing unladen towards the Suez Canal on November 19 — the Galaxy Leader, now turned into a fairground attraction where Yemenis take selfies — has since the beginning of the war in Gaza been the most spectacular action carried out by the Houthi militia, the fundamentalist group that has declared the opening of “a third front” against Israel in the Red Sea and that controls about 30% of Yemen’s territory. The hijacking of that transport ship — linked to Israeli billionaire Abraham Ungar — by a squadron of hooded men carrying Yemeni and Palestinian flags using an old helicopter was striking, but also innocuous. The only people harmed so far are the British company that owns the vessel, and the 25 unfortunate crew members who are still being held hostage on the ship. Nor have any of the 100 or so drone and missile attacks on other ships in the Red Sea that the U.S. has blamed on the Houthis resulted in any deaths or major property damage. These “limited” attacks, says Luciano Zaccara, a professor at Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Center, have been enough, however, for this militia to demonstrate “the vulnerability of the world’s sea lanes.” The fear of new attacks in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal has “put the world economy in check” and forced Washington to announce an international mission to protect shipping in the area, after the most important shipping companies announced the suspension of the transit of their vessels through a waterway by which 10% of international trade circulates. The strategy of the Houthis — members of what their main sponsor, Iran, describes as the “axis of resistance” to the United States and Israel, which also includes Hamas and the Lebanese Shiite militia-party Hezbollah — “can be seen as the best move to support Hamas, put pressure on Israel, and save face for not being able to do much more [to stop the war in Gaza],” says a report by the Washington-based Foreign Policy Research Institute. These attacks can also be analyzed as an attempt to increase the battered legitimacy of the militia in the eyes of its own population and on a regional scale, due to its involvement in the war in Yemen and its reactionary and repressive character. To this end, the Houthis are now presenting themselves as a champion of the Palestinian cause, which enjoys almost unanimous support among Arab populations. “Especially in Yemen,” says Leyla Hamad, a Yemeni journalist, via telephone. Hamad considers that the group’s quest for legitimacy has ideological motives, but is aimed above all at the Houthi militia’s attempt to increase its weight as a regional actor at a time when it is negotiating a definitive peace agreement with its nemesis in the conflict that has shaken Yemen for nine years: Saudi Arabia, the other side in a war that the United Nations considers “forgotten.” Riyadh is seeking a ceasefire that would make the de facto truce it has maintained with the Houthi rebels since 2022 definitive. This would allow the Saudi regime to concentrate on its ambitious agenda of internal reforms, known as Vision 2030 and championed by Saudi strongman and crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. The Believing Youth The real name of the Houthi militia is Ansar Allah (Supporters of God), although it is better known by the clan name of its first leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. Founded in the 1990s, its origin was as a religious group, the Believing Youth, which aspired to revive the branch of Shia Islam known as Zaydism, professed by a third of the more than 33 million inhabitants of Yemen, and to improve the living conditions of this minority. The group, which took up arms in 2003 against dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, joined peaceful protests in 2011 to force the autocrat from power. Meanwhile, they continued to arm themselves and seize territory. In 2015, the Houthis seized the capital, Sana’a, and deposed Saleh’s successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who ended up in exile in Saudi Arabia. A year later, Riyadh assumed the lead of an international coalition to restore Hadi to power. Saudi backing for Yemen’s internationally recognized government, coupled with Tehran’s support for the Houthis, caused the conflict to escalate into a proxy war that the two countries turned into a chessboard in their struggle for regional hegemony. At least 250,000 Yemenis were killed, 4.5 million were displaced and half of the population suffered a severe famine which the UN defined as “the worst humanitarian crisis” in the world. The latest negotiations between the Houthis and the Saudis to put a definitive end to their armed confrontation ended without result in September. In this context, the Gaza war has offered the Yemeni rebels what Hamad describes as an opportunity to “establish themselves as a relevant regional actor, with an agenda of their own, at a time when the final peace agreement with Saudi Arabia is being negotiated.” No international response When Yemeni insurgent attacks began in the Red Sea, a Houthi spokesman stated that they would only target ships owned by Israelis or bound for Israeli ports. The fear of the major shipping lines is that any vessel passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea, will be attacked. That fear has, however, turned out to be relative. On Wednesday, most of the ships owned by one of the lines that had announced its withdrawal from the Red Sea — Denmark’s Maersk, the world’s second-largest by cargo volume — were sailing back to Suez. However, as reported by Reuters, an attack on a container ship on Sunday led Maersk to interrupt shipping in the area for 48 hours. “The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are in reality a nuisance that has not harmed Israel,” says Fernando Carvajal, a member of the UN Group of Experts for Yemen between 2017 and 2019. The researcher maintains that the U.S. naval deployment, called Operation Prosperity Guardian, has a merely “defensive” character, aimed at showing “a commitment by Washington” without having to “attack the Houthis in Yemen,” something that is not in the interest of “Israel or the U.S., nor, above all, Saudi Arabia,” he explains by telephone from Los Angeles. Hamad agrees that the actions of the Yemeni rebels have not resulted in an “immediate” response because “all the actors, including the U.S., are aware that an open conflict in the Red Sea is not desirable.” The Houthi militia controls a large part of Yemen’s Red Sea coast. The United Nations estimates that they have some 100,000 supporters, although not all of them are combatants. Their main supplier of training and weapons is Iran, which provides them with drones, intelligence, and “even missiles with a range of 1,200 kilometers,” notes Carvajal. Their model is Hezbollah and their motto: “Death to America, death to Israel, cursed be the Jews, victory for Islam.” However, the UN expert considers that the Houthis, rather than defending the Palestinian cause, “are served by the war” and are using this “narrative” to acquire the position of strength they seek. An analysis by Italian researcher Eleonora Ardemagni, published by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, agrees: “By opening a front in the Red Sea, the Houthis are exploiting the war between Hamas and Israel to divert attention from their authoritarian regime, broaden popular support, and increase their regional prestige. This allows them to reinforce pressure on Saudi Arabia for further concessions in bilateral ceasefire talks. The Houthis are banking on the fact that neither the Saudi kingdom nor the United States will react firmly against them.”
8955	dbpedia	2	26	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/3/7/yemen-president-considers-aden-countrys-capital	en	Yemen president considers ‘Aden country’s capital’	https://www.aljazeera.co…esize=1200%2C675	https://www.aljazeera.co…esize=1200%2C675	[ "https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/fefb1b062567418a9b38b828a21e3351_18.jpeg?resize=770%2C513&quality=80", "https://www.aljazeera.com/static/media/aj-footer-logo.bac952ad.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "News", "Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi", "Middle East", "Yemen" ]	null	[ "Al Jazeera" ]	2015-03-07T00:00:00	Aide to President Hadi says southern port city became capital as soon as Houthis seized Sanaa.	en	/favicon_aje.ico	Al Jazeera	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/3/7/yemen-president-considers-aden-countrys-capital	Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who fled to Aden after escaping from the Houthi armed group controlling Sanaa, considers the southern port city to be Yemen’s capital, a top aide said. “Aden became the capital of Yemen as soon as the Houthis occupied Sanaa,” the aide quoted Hadi as saying in reference to their takeover of the capital several months ago. The remarks about Aden reflect Hadi’s determination to hold out against Houthi efforts to extend their influence, but are purely symbolic because moving the capital requires a change to the constitution. Aden, the country’s second largest city, was capital of a once independent south Yemen, before unification in 1990, when Sanaa became the unified country’s capital. Several Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, have already moved their embassies to Aden after an exodus of foreign diplomats from Sanaa in February over security concerns. But the United States, the first to close its mission in Sanaa, has said it will not do so although it continues to back Hadi. In Sanaa, the Houthis named a “presidential council” after Hadi and Prime Minister Khalid Bahah tendered their resignations in January in protest at what critics branded an attempted coup. After fleeing house arrest in Sanaa, Hadi resurfaced in Aden where he retracted his resignation. Bahah remains trapped in the capital. On Saturday, Hadi said that the Houthis had demanded 135 top government jobs and the vice-presidency for one of their leaders, Saleh al-Sammad. They also demanded that 35,000 armed men be integrated into the armed forces and 25,000 into the police. Escape from Sanaa Tensions have been running high in Aden in recent days, as special forces suspected of links to the Houthis readied defences against an anticipated assault by Hadi loyalists. The special forces commander in Aden, Abdel Hafez al-Saqqaf, has also defied a decree by Hadi sacking him, and said he will only follow orders from the presidential council in Sanaa. His men have cut roads leading to their headquarters near Aden’s international airport and set up barricades, saying they fear an assault by the Popular Resistance Committees, loyal to Hadi. On Saturday, Hadi also recalled how he escaped his Sanaa residence through a tunnel linking it to the nearby house of one of his sons and travelled to Aden using back roads. The Houthis overran Sanaa in September and have since exerted their influence over several other areas. The Shia group has long complained of marginalisation and fought the government between 2004 and February 2010.
8955	dbpedia	0	29	https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi	en	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/ucp-internal-test-starter-commons/images/a/aa/FandomFireLogo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210713142711	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/ucp-internal-test-starter-commons/images/a/aa/FandomFireLogo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210713142711	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/86/Abd_Rabbuh_Mansur_Hadi_2013.jpg/180px-Abd_Rabbuh_Mansur_Hadi_2013.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/44/Hadi_2.jpg/180px-Hadi_2.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/69/Secretary_Kerry_and_Yemeni_Presid...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Military Wiki" ]	2024-07-29T22:27:06+00:00	Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi (‘Abdrabbuh Manṣūr Hādī; Arabic language: عبدربه منصور هادي‎ Yemeni pronunciation: [ˈʕæbdˈrɑb.bu mænˈsˤuːr ˈhæːdi]; born 1 September 1945) is a Yemeni politician and former Field Marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces. He has been the President of Yemen since 27 February...	en	/skins-ucp/mw139/common/favicon.ico	Military Wiki	https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Abdrabbuh_Mansur_Hadi	Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi (‘Abdrabbuh Manṣūr Hādī; Arabic language: عبدربه منصور هادي‎ Yemeni pronunciation: [ˈʕæbdˈrɑb.bu mænˈsˤuːr ˈhæːdi]; born 1 September 1945) is a Yemeni politician and former Field Marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces. He has been the President of Yemen since 27 February 2012, and was Vice President from 1994 to 2012.[2] Between 4 June and 23 September 2011, Hadi was the acting President of Yemen while Ali Abdullah Saleh was undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia following an attack on the presidential palace during the 2011 Yemeni uprising.[3] On 23 November, he became Acting President again, after Saleh moved into a non-active role pending the presidential election "in return for immunity from prosecution". Hadi was "expected to form a national unity government and also call for early presidential elections within 90 days" while Saleh continued to serve as President in name only.[4] Mansour Hadi was chosen as a president for a two-year transitional period on February 21, 2012, in an election in which he was the only candidate. His mandate was extended for another year in January 2014.[5] However, he remained in power after the expiration of his mandate.[6] On 22 January 2015, he was forced to resign by the Houthis after a mass protest against his decision to raise the fuel subsidies and due to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 2011 Revolution. Subsequently, the Houthis and the supporters of Saleh seized the presidential palace and placed Hadi under house arrest. A month later, he escaped to his hometown of Aden, rescinded his resignation, and denounced the Houthi takeover as an unconstitutional coup d'état. The Houthis named a Revolutionary Committee to assume the powers of the presidency, as well as the General People's Congress, Hadi's own political party.[7] On 25 March 2015, after the beginning of the Yemeni Civil War, Hadi fled Yemen in a boat as Houthi forces advanced on Aden.[8] He arrived in Riyadh the next day, as Saudi Arabia began a bombing campaign in support of his government.[9] He returned to Aden in September 2015, as Saudi-backed government forces recaptured the city.[10] In late 2017, he was reportedly residing in Riyadh under house arrest.[11] Early life and education[] Hadi was born in 1945 in Thukain, Abyan, a southern Yemeni governorate.[12] He graduated from a military academy in the Federation of South Arabia in 1964.[13] In 1966 he graduated after receiving a military scholarship to study in Britain, but does not speak English.[12] In 1970, he received another military scholarship to study tanks in Egypt for six years. Hadi spent the following four years in the Soviet Union studying military leadership. He occupied several military posts in the army of South Yemen until 1986, when he fled to North Yemen with Ali Nasser Mohammed, president of South Yemen, after Ali Nasser's faction of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party lost the 1986 civil war.[14] Career[] Hadi played a low-profile role during the Aden Emergency. Following the independence of South Yemen, he rose to prominence in the new military, reaching the rank of Major General.[13] He remained loyal to President Ali Nasser Mohammed during the South Yemen Civil War, and followed him into exile in neighboring North Yemen. During the 1994 civil war in Yemen, Hadi sided with the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and was appointed as Minister of Defense.[13] In this role he led the military campaign against the Democratic Republic of Yemen.[15] Following the war he was promoted to Vice President on 3 October 1994, replacing Ali Salim Al-Beidh, who had resigned and fought against the government during the civil war.[citation needed] President of Yemen[] [] Main article: Yemeni presidential election, 2012 Hadi was the sole candidate in the presidential election that was held on 21 February 2012. His candidacy was backed by the ruling party, as well as by the parliamentary opposition. The Electoral Commission reported that 65 percent of registered voters in Yemen voted during the election. Hadi won with 100% of the vote and took the oath of office in Yemen's parliament on 25 February 2012.[16] He was formally inaugurated as the president of Yemen on 27 February 2012, when Saleh resigned from the presidency and formally ceded power to Hadi.[17] Political reform[] In March 2013 the National Dialogue Conference was conceived as a core part of the transition process and is intended to bring together Yemen's diverse political and demographic groups to address critical issues.[18] In January 2014, Hadi pushed delegates at the conference to break a deadlock on key issues and bring the talks to an overdue close. When those in attendance finally agreed on a final few points, he launched into an impassioned speech that led to a spike in his popularity. It was agreed that Yemen would shift to a federal model of government in the future, a move which have been proposed and forcefully backed by Hadi.[19] For many Yemenis, particularly in northwestern Yemen, this decentralization was less attractive. This mountainous region is the poorest of Yemen and decentralization would mean that it would receive less money from the central government. Relevant here is that the overwhelming majority of Yemen's population has resided in this area for many years.[20] Indeed, the 'decentralization' of Yemen along the lines proposed by the Saudi-imposed Hadi regime threatened Yemen's long-term economic and political independence; scholar Isa Blumi points out that "To any rational observer, the idea of developing Yemen into six disproportionate regions with enormous autonomy was a blatant effort to benefit foreign interests and subdue the rebellious populations through poverty and administrative obscurity."[20] Indeed, if the Saudi-American decentralization 'road map to peace' is implemented, Yemen's oil wealth would be confined almost entirely to the provinces of Hadhramawt and Saba', Yemen's two least populated provinces.[21] Blumi goes on to point out that "This would make bribing the few thousands of eligible 'residents' with a tiny portion of the oil revenue (no longer flowing to the central state) easy, while creating an enormous windfall for those hoping to steal Yemen's wealth."[21] They also didn't like that the new regional borders would rob them of access to the sea. Military[] In a move to unify the Armed Forces of Yemen which suffered from split since the Yemeni Revolution, Hadi began reforming the Military. He issued Presidential decree No.104 of December 2012 reorganizing the Military into 5 main branches: Air Force, Army (Ground Force), Navy and Coastal Defence, Border Troops and Strategic Reserve Forces, which includes the Special Operation Command, the Missile Defence Command and the Presidential Protective Forces. The Strategic Reserve Forces replaces the Republican Guard.[22] Security issues[] See also: 2012 Sana'a bombing From his early days at office, Hadi advocated fighting Al-Qaida as an important goal. In a meeting with British Foreign Secretary, William Hague in his first days at office Hadi said "We intend to confront terrorism with full force and whatever the matter we will pursue it to the very last hiding place".[23] The Yemeni military has suffered from sharp divisions since Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar defected in late March 2011 amid protests demanding the ouster of Hadi's predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The military protests extended to the Republican Guard based in the south of Sana'a when dozens from the Fourth Brigade closed down southern entrances to the capital city and demanded the firing of the brigade's commander, Mohammad Al-Arar, and his general staff.[23] In an interview in September 2012 to the Washington Post, Hadi warned that his country, still reeling from the popular uprising that ousted Saleh, risks a descent into a civil war "worse than Afghanistan" should an upcoming months-long national dialogue fail to resolve the state's deep political and societal rifts. He also said that Yemen was facing "three undeclared wars" conducted by al Qaeda, pirates in the Gulf of Aden, and Houthi rebels in the north, and that Iran was supporting these adversaries indirectly without giving further details.[24] Houthis, on their side, complained of murder attacks on their delegates to the NDC.[25] Rebel takeover and civil war[] Hadi was forced to agree to a power-sharing deal after the fall of Sana'a to the rebel umbrella organization Ansar Allah in September 2014. Also known as the Houthis, these revolutionaries refused to participate in the "unity government", although they continued to occupy key positions and buildings in Sana'a and hold territory throughout northern Yemen. Hadi was further humiliated when the General People's Congress ousted him as its leader and rejected his cabinet choices on 8 November 2014.[26] It is important to note that the Houthis' pretext for entering Sana'a' and deposing Hadi was to reverse an apparent breach of the Hadi government's mandate by unilaterally declaring an extension of its power beyond the two-year intermediary period actually set by the GCC and the United States.[27] They also accused the president of seeking to bypass a power-sharing deal signed when they seized Sanaa in September, and say they are also working to protect state institutions from corrupt civil servants and officers trying to plunder state property.[28] Three days after Hadi's resignation (21 January 2015), the Houthis took over the presidential palace.[29] Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah tendered their resignations to parliament which reportedly refused to accept them.[30] Then the Yemeni cabinet was dissolved.[31] Hadi and his former ministers remained under virtual house arrest since their resignations.[32] United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for Hadi to be restored as president after the Houthis installed themselves as the interim government in February 2015.[32][33] According to Houthi-controlled state media, Hadi reaffirmed on 8 February that his resignation was "final" and could not be withdrawn.[34] However, after leaving Sana'a and traveling to his hometown of Aden on 21 February, Hadi gave a speech in which he presented himself as Yemen's president and said the actions taken by the Houthis since 21 September were unconstitutional and invalid.[35][36] On 26 March 2015 Saudi state TV Al Ekhbariya reported that Hadi arrived at a Riyadh airbase and was met by Saudi Arabia Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud as Saudi Arabia and its allies launched airstrikes in Yemen against the Houthis in the 2015 military intervention in Yemen. His route from Aden to Riyadh was not immediately known.[37] On 25 March 2017 a court in the Houthi-controlled Sana'a sentenced Hadi and six other government officials to death in absentia for "high treason", which meant "incitement and assistance" to Saudi Arabia and its allies".[38][39] The sentence was announced by the Houthi-controlled Saba News Agency.[38] References[] []
8955	dbpedia	3	9	https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis	en	Who are Yemen's Houthis?	https://www.wilsoncenter…shutterstock.jpg	https://www.wilsoncenter…shutterstock.jpg	[ "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/assets/images/wilson-quarterly.svg", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/logo.svg?v=20210609", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/assets/images/program-logos/the-islamists.svg", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Iran is widely accused of backing the Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite movement that has been fighting Yemen’s Sunni-majority government since 2004.	en	/core/misc/favicon.ico	Wilson Center	https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis	Iran is widely accused of backing the Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite movement that has been fighting Yemen’s Sunni-majority government since 2004. The Houthis took over the Yemeni capital Sanaa in September 2014 and seized control over much of north Yemen by 2016. Yemeni officials and Sunni states have repeatedly alleged that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah have provided arms, training, and financial support to the Houthis. But Iranian and Hezbollah officials have denied or downplayed the claims. The United States, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, has presented physical evidence of Iranian arms transfers to the group. Houthi-Saudi Tensions The Houthi movement emerged in northern Yemen in the 1990s, in part, as a reaction to rising Saudi financial and religious influence. In November 2009, the Houthis crossed into Saudi Arabia amid their rebellion against Yemen’s central government. For the first time, the Saudi army deployed abroad without an ally. The Saudis launched air strikes against the rebels and engaged in ground skirmishes. More than 130 Saudis died. The next major round of Saudi-Houthi fighting began in March 2015. A coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) launched airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. The war between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government and its supporters dragged on, despite U.N. efforts to broker peace talks. Tensions between the Saudi-led coalition and Iran escalated sharply on November 4, 2017, when a ballistic missile was fired at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, the first time a ballistic missile had come so close to the capital since the start of the war. The Saudi Defense Ministry claimed that it had intercepted the missile. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir called the attack an act of war by Iran. “It was an Iranian missile, launched by Hezbollah, from territory occupied by the Houthis in Yemen,” he said. U.S. President Donald Trump also accused the Islamic Republic. “A shot was just taken by Iran, in my opinion, at Saudi Arabia…and our system knocked the missile out of the air,” he said. Tehran rebuffed the Saudi and U.S. claims as “false, irresponsible, destructive and provocative.” In Lebanon, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah refuted allegations of the group’s involvement as “silly” and “completely baseless.” In response to the attack, Saudi Arabia imposed a near-total blockade on Yemen. The situation further deteriorated when the Houthis killed ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 4, 2017. Saleh had officially aligned with the Houthis in May 2015, helping them gain control over much of northern Yemen. But the alliance was shaky at best. In August, one of Saleh’s top advisers was shot and killed following a confrontation with the Houthis. On December 2, Saleh publicly split from the Houthis, seeking a “new page” with the Saudi-led coalition. “I call upon the brothers in neighboring states and the alliance to stop their aggression, lift the siege, open the airports and allow food aid and the saving of the wounded and we will turn a new page by virtue of our neighborliness,” he said. Two days later he was killed by Houthi rebels in a roadside ambush. Iranian officials celebrated Saleh’s death. Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of Iran’s nuclear program and a former foreign minister, said that Saleh got what he deserved, Fars News Agency reported. A senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Saleh’s death would help the Yemeni people “determine their own fate” free of Gulf influence. “The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia conspiracy was foiled by the people of Yemen,” Ali Akbar Velayati said. In 2018, Houthi missile attacks on Saudi Arabia became increasingly common. The group also grew increasingly bold in its choice of targets. It damaged a Saudi oil tanker in July 2018. The fighting exacerbated what the United Nations called the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis.” More than 23 million people – 80 percent of Yemen’s population – needed humanitarian aid and protection, the U.N. reported. On September 14, 2019, the Houthis claimed credit for drone attacks on two key oil installations in Saudi Arabia. But U.S. intelligence presented to the U.N. Security Council reportedly demonstrated that the attack originated from within Iran, not Yemen. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of perpetrating the “unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply.” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif dismissed the U.S. claims in a tweet. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MD4M1j76wWA The Houthis widened the scope of the conflict in early 2022 by targeting UAE with drones and ballistic missiles. Emirati and U.S. military forces intercepted two ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis toward Abu Dhabi on January 24. The 2,000 U.S. troops housed at Al Dahfra Air Base sheltered in bunkers and fired Patriot missiles in response. A Houthi spokesperson warned that the UAE had “become an unsafe country.” The following is an overview of the Houthi movement, including its origins, religious inspiration and alleged links to Iran. Where are the Houthis from? What role have they played in Yemen's history? The Houthis are a large clan originating from Yemen’s northwestern Saada province. They practice the Zaydi form of Shiism. Zaydis make up around 35 percent of Yemen’s population. A Zaydi imamate ruled Yemen for 1,000 years, before being overthrown in 1962. Since then, the Zaydis – stripped of their political power – have struggled to restore their authority and influence in Yemen. In the 1980s, the Houthi clan began a movement to revive Zaydi traditions, feeling threatened by state-funded Salafist preachers who established a base in Houthi areas. Not all Zaydis, however, align with the Houthi movement. Houthi insurgents have clashed with Yemen’s government for more than a decade. Since 2011, the Houthi movement has expanded beyond its Zaydi roots and become a wider movement opposed to the central government. The insurgents have also begun referring to themselves as Ansarullah, or “Party of God.” How does Zaydism compare to the type of Shiism practiced in Iran? Like other Shiites, Zaydis believe that only descendants of the Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali, have the right to lead the Muslim community as imams - divinely-appointed successors of the Prophet. Most adherents of Zaydism reside in Yemen, and Zaydis make up around eight percent of the world’s 70 million Shiites. But the Zaydis are distinct from the “Twelver” form of Shiism practiced by the majority of the world’s Shiites, including most Shiites in Iran. Twelver Shiites believe the twelfth imam, whom they consider infallible, disappeared in 874AD and will one day return to usher in an age of justice as the Mahdi, or promised one. In the Mahdi’s absence, Twelver Shiites believe clerics can substitute for his authority on certain issues. The faithful are obliged to obey the clerics’ religious rulings, a power transferred to Iran’s theocracy after the 1979 revolution. Zaydis, also known as “Fivers,” believe that Zayd, the great-grandson of Ali, was the rightful fifth imam. But Twelver Shiites consider Zayd’s brother, Mohammad al Baqir, the fifth imam. The Zaydis do not recognize the later Twelver imams, and instead believe anyone related to Ali is eligible to lead the Muslim community. They also reject the Twelver doctrine that the imam is infallible. The Houthis’ close connections to Iran, however, seem to have led to an increase in Twelver influence. “Twelver Shiite practices that are novel to Yemen are increasingly being incorporated into religious practice; for example, the commemoration of Ashura was publicly celebrated by Houthi supporters en masse for the first time in 2017, and Yemeni Shiites now openly observe Eid al-Ghadir, a Shiite religious celebration rumored to have been practiced mostly in secret previously,” according to Sama’a Al-Hamdani. The movement’s leadership has close ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah. Who is supporting the Houthis? How? Iranian officials have supported the Houthis’ cause and compared the group to Hezbollah. “Iran supports the rightful struggles of Ansarullah in Yemen and considers this movement as part of the successful Islamic Awakening movements,” Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, said in October 2014. But Tehran has repeatedly denied providing arms, funds or training to the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has long accused Iran of arming the Houthis to fight a proxy war. “We are worried about…the tendencies of Iran in the region, which is one of the leading elements implanting instability in the region,” the late Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al Faisal, said in 2015. In October 2016, a U.S. admiral said that U.S. Navy and allied nations’ warships had intercepted five weapons shipments from Iran to the Arabian Peninsula since April 2015. The shipments reportedly included anti-tank missiles, sniper rifles and thousands of AK-47 automatic rifles. “These accusations are totally false,” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Ghasemi (left) said in response. In April 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that Iran supports the Houthis’ “attempted overthrow of the government by providing military equipment, funding, and training, thus threatening Saudi Arabia’s southern border.” In November 2017, however, Revolutionary Guards commander Maj. Gen. Ali Jafari claimed that “Iran’s assistance is at the level of advisory and spiritual support.” Tensions over Iranian support of the Houthis escalated in late 2017. In November, Saudi Arabia charged Iran with an act of war for a missile fired at the Saudi capital by the Houthis in Yemen. Iran denied any links to the attack. But remnants of four ballistic missiles fired into Saudi Arabia by the Houthis on May 19, July 22, July 26 and November 4, 2017 appear to have been designed and manufactured by Iran, according to a confidential U.N. report from November 2017. "The United States welcomes this report, as should every nation concerned about Iranian expansion," U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said on December 14, in front of the remains of a missile allegedly fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia. "It was made in Iran, then sent to Houthi militants in Yemen. From there it was fired at a civilian airport, with the potential to kill hundreds of innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia." The Qiam is thought to have a maximum range of nearly 500 miles. Iranian officials and Houthi leaders denied the U.S. allegations. "After three years of war, America suddenly finds evidence that Iran supports the Houthis," a Yemeni spokesman said, according to Reuters. "America did not find any evidence in all the missiles fired from Yemen until now. The story is clear. They want to give Arabs a story to divert their attention from Jerusalem. Instead being angry at Israel, they wave the Iranian boy," he added. On December 21, the U.S. State Department echoed Haley's allegations. "There is a very key relationship between the Iranians and the Houthis," Tim Lenderking, deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, said. "I don’t want to overstate it. I don’t want to suggest that the Houthis operate entirely at the behest of the Iranians. But it’s an important relationship and one that the Iranians are able to exploit." Lenderking encouraged reporters to visit the display of missile remains and other military equipment that Haley highlighted the previous week. In January 2018, a U.N. report concluded Iran had violated an arms embargo by failing to prevent the Houthis from obtaining Iranian missiles. Iran did not comment on the U.N. panel report, but Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif denied U.S. claims of Tehran's missile support once again in a series of tweets in late January 2018. Less than two weeks later, however, Houthi spokesman Mohammad Abdul Salam met with Zarif in Tehran. Abdul Salam updated Zarif on the current conditions in Yemen. Zarif outlined Iran's four-point peace plan for Yemen and stressed the need for an immediate end to the war. He also called for the immediate shipment of humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians. In February 2018, the United States, Britain, and France drafted a U.N. resolution that condemned Iran for violating the Yemen arms embargo by failing to prevent the Houthis from obtaining Iranian missiles. Russia vetoed the resolution. The Houthis stepped up their attacks on Saudi Arabia in the following months. In late March 2018, the rebels fired seven missiles at Saudi Arabia in one night and resulted in the of an Egyptian resident. A few weeks later, they struck a Saudi oil tanker in international waters west of Yemen's Hodeidah port. A mid-April 2018, a missile targeting the Saudi capital Riyadh prompted a U.S. response. The State Department condemned the attack and blamed Iran for its alleged Houthi support. "We support the right of our Saudi partners to defend their borders against these threats, which are fueled by the Iranian regime’s dangerous proliferation of weapons and destabilizing activities in the region," said State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif accused the United States of fabricating evidence related to the displayed missile parts recovered from Saudi Arabia. One featured logo was from the Standard Institute of Iran, which regulates consumer goods, not weapons, Zarif told the Associated Press during a visit to New York in late April 2018. “It’s a sign of quality,” Zarif said. “When people want to buy it, they look at whether it’s been tested by the Standard Institute of Iran that your cheese puffs are good, your cheese puffs will not give you a stomach ache. I mean, nobody will put the logo of the Standard Institute of Iran on a piece of missile.” In November 2018, the State Department claimed that Iran’s support for the Houthis had deepened. Brian Hook, the special envoy for Iran, unveiled a sampling of weapons allegedly manufactured in Iran and transferred to Yemen, including a Sayyad 3C surface-to-air missile with a range of 46 miles and two types of anti-tank guided missiles. Hook also said components of a Shahed 123 drone were recovered in Yemen. That model is likely a predecessor of the Shahed 129, which flies at a medium altitude and can endure long missions. In January 2019, the U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen reported that the Houthis were gaining access to increasingly advanced drone technology. “The unmanned aerial vehicles continued to be used in significant numbers in Yemen, implying that the Houthi forces retained access to the critical components, such as engines, guidance systems, from abroad that are necessary to assemble and deploy them.” The experts warned that the Houthis gained access to an additional drone in mid-2018 with the potential range of up to 932 miles. “It would give credence to the claims by the Houthis that they have the capability to hit targets such as Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Dubai,” they wrote. The panel also highlighted the wide use of “suicide or kamikaze drones,” drones fitted with explosives that crash into their targets. The report noted that the most-commonly used Houthi drone was the Qasef-1, first seen in the field in 2016, which is similar to the Iranian-made Ababil-2/T suicide drone. In February 2022, U.S. Central Command implicated Iran in providing advanced weaponry to the Houthis after they fired ballistic missiles at Abu Dhabi. “Medium range ballistic missiles that were fired from Yemen and entered UAE were not invented, built, designed in Yemen,” General Kenneth McKenzie told reporters. “All that happened somewhere else. So I think we certainly see the Iranian connection to this.” The Houthis have other sources of support, however. They have reportedly received funding from local supporters and sympathetic charities as well as from illegal trade. What are the Houthis' political views? The Houthis do not promote a coherent ideology, and their political platform is vague and contradictory. The original Houthi insurgents desired to imitate Hezbollah, to have power without actually ruling. “The Houthis have always been on the outside. They've been a militia group that's now starting to dabble in politics,” Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen, who studied and lived in the country for years, told NPR’s “Fresh Air” in April 2015. “And they don't really know how to rule.” The Houthi emblem only offers a broad view of the group’s views. It is made of up entirely of the following phrases, “God is great, Death to America, death to Israel, damnation to the Jews, victory to Islam.” But the Houthis’ Hezbollah-like denunciation of the United States and Israel often seems “largely for show,” according to Les Campbell at the National Democratic Institute. Their ties to former president Saleh threaten to expose the group as “just another group sharing in the spoils of corruption.” The Houthis’ Zaydi roots do not necessarily dictate their approach to politics. Their leaders have claimed they are not attempting to revive the Zaydi imamate, but rather to seek greater political inclusion. Since 2011, they have used nationalist and populist language in their messaging rather than framing themselves as a strictly Zaydi movement. And they have cultivated a range of Sunni political allies. The Houthis participated in the U.N.-sponsored National Dialogue Conference from 2013 to 2014. While they did not reject the reform agenda in principle, the Houthis opposed proposals to convert Yemen into a six-region federalist state. The proposal would link Saada with Sanaa, but the Houthis want Saada to be its own autonomous region. What are the roots of the Houthis' conflict with the central government? Hussein Abdreddin al Houthi, a prominent Zaydi cleric and member of parliament from 1993 to 1997, became a strong critic of President Ali Abudllah Saleh in the 1990s. He accused the government of aligning too closely with the United States and Israel. Tensions mounted further after President Saleh reportedly cut funding to Hussein al Houthi in 2000. Frustrated by the Zaydis’ poor political and economic status, he began rallying supporters for anti-government demonstrations in the early 2000s. The government issued a warrant for al Houthi’s arrest, and his followers began clashing violently with security forces. Al Houthi was killed by security forces in 2004. Since then, his relatives and supporters have waged six uprisings against the government, known as the Houthi wars. President Saleh accused Iran of supporting the rebellions. The Houthis signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2010, but joined the Arab Spring protests against Saleh one year later. How did the Houthis rise to power? After months of protests, President Saleh ceded power to his deputy, Abd Rabbuh Mansour al Hadi in November 2011. But Hadi enjoyed little popular support in Yemen, and the Houthis took advantage of the power vacuum in the north. From 2012-2013, they gained followers and allies. They consolidated their territorial control, pushing south towards Sanaa. In September 2014, the Houthis took over the capital. They initially agreed to a U.N.-brokered peace deal that required them to withdraw from Sanaa following the formation of a unity government. But in January, the Houthis rejected the government’s newly drafted constitution and took over the presidential palace. President Hadi and his government resigned on January 22. The next month, the Houthis announced that a five-member presidential council would replace Hadi. Hadi fled south to Aden and revoked his resignation, declaring himself the legitimate president of Yemen. In response, Houthi insurgents began bombing Hadi’s Aden headquarters. At Hadi’s request, Saudi Arabia – along with a coalition of nine other Sunni nations – began launching airstrikes against Houthi positions on March 26. The Houthis remained defiant. “Our fighters will not evacuate from the main cities or the government institutions,” Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al Houthi said on April 19. “Anyone who thinks we will surrender is dreaming.” On April 21, Saudi officials announced the end of the campaign, known as operation “Decisive Storm,” claiming they had successfully degraded the Houthis’ military infrastructure. The Houthis also agreed to meet several U.N. demands, including releasing the Yemeni Defense Minister, whom they were holding captive. But Saudi Arabia resumed airstrikes two days later, and the first month of the campaign had neither driven the Houthis from Sanaa nor restored Hadi to power. Multiple attempts at peace talks organized by the United Nations failed. The first two attempts were in Switzerland in June and December 2015. The United Nations tried again in Kuwait in April 2016, but discussions broke down in August and fighting between the Houthis and pro-government forces resumed. As of March 2017, seven ceasefire agreements had been broken in the conflict. In December 2017, after 30 months of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, the Houthi’s were largely in control of northern Yemen. In December 2018, the warring parties met in Stockholm, Sweden, for the first talks in two years. They agreed to a ceasefire, prisoner exchange and coalition troop withdrawal from the port of Hodeidah, which handles the majority of imports. But the truce broke down by early 2019. In April 2022, the Houthis and the Yemeni government agreed to two-month truce brokered by the United Nations. The United States and Iran welcomed the first nationwide ceasefire since 2016. In June 2022, the warring parties agreed to extend it for another two months. “The truce represents a significant shift in the trajectory of the war and has been achieved through responsible and courageous decision making by the parties,” Hans Grundberg, the U.N. special envoy for Yemen, said in a statement. What is the relationship between Houthis and other Islamists in Yemen? The Houthis have a tense relationship with Islah, a Sunni Islamist party with links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Islah claims the Houthis are an Iranian proxy, and blames them for sparking unrest in Yemen. The Houthis, on the other hand, have accused Islah of cooperating with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). After the Houthis took over Sanaa in September 2014, Islah initially took a few steps towards reconciliation. In November, top Islah and Houthi leaders met to discuss a political partnership. Islah called on the Houthis to cease attacks on Islah members and to release Islah prisoners. In December, the United Nations and Gulf Cooperation Council brokered a deal between the two groups to cease hostilities. But clashes between the Houthis and Islah continued. In the first four months of 2015, the Houthis kidnapped dozens of Islah party leaders and raided their offices. By April, more than 100 Islah leaders were detained by the Houthis. Tensions increased after Islah declared support for the Saudi-led airstrikes. The Houthis are also at odds with Sunni extremist groups. On March 20, 2015, an ISIS affiliate calling itself the Sanaa Province claimed responsibility for suicide bomb attacks on two Zaydi mosques that killed at least 135 people and injured more than 300 others. The group issued a statement that said “infidel Houthis should know that the soldiers of the Islamic State will not rest until they eradicate them.” AQAP denied involvement in the mosque attacks, but has frequently targeted the Houthis. In April 2015, the group claimed responsibility for three suicide attacks that killed dozens of Houthis in Abyan, al Bayda’, and Lahij. AQAP has reportedly partnered with southern tribes to fight the Houthis. Who are their leaders? Abdul Malik al Houthi, brother of Hussein al Houthi, has been the group’s spiritual, military, and political leader since 2007. Little is known of his personal life, and he makes few public appearances. His brother-in-law, Youssef al Midani, is the deputy leader. Abdul Malik’s two brothers, Yahia and Abdul-Karim, are also senior leaders of the movement. On April 14, 2015, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on Abdul Malik al Houthi for engaging in acts that “threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.” The same month, the U.N. Security Council imposed an arms embargo against the Houthis and blacklisted Abdul Malik al Houthi. On January 10, 2021, the Trump administration announced that it would designate the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The State Department accused Iran’s Revolutionary Guards of providing missiles, drones and training to the Houthis in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran “continues to thwart the efforts of the United Nations and friendly countries to solve the crisis peacefully and end the conflict,” Pompeo said in a statement. The designation went into effect on January 19, 2021 – a day before Trump’s term ended. The Biden administration, however, revoked the listing less than a month later. “We have listened to warnings from the United Nations, humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among others, that the designations could have a devastating impact on Yemenis’ access to basic commodities like food and fuel,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on February 12, 2021. He clarified that senior Houthi leaders – Abdul Malik al Houthi, Abd al Khaliq Badr al Din al Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim – would remain sanctioned as individuals. The group was removed from the terrorist lists on February 16, 2021. Timeline: The Houthis in Yemen 2014 Sept. 21-22: Houthi rebels stormed Sanaa and seized government buildings. The United Nations brokered a deal requiring President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to form a new government. Nov. 1: Houthi rebels attacked the al Islah party headquarters in the southwestern city of Ibb. Nov. 7-8: Hadi announced a new cabinet, but the Houthis rejected it. Nov. 28: Houthi rebels and al Islah reached a deal agreeing to cease hostilities, but clashes between the groups continued. Dec. 14: Houthi rebels blew up a building belonging to al Islah in Sanaa. Dec. 20: Dozens of protestors gathered in Sanaa to demand that Houthi rebels leave the capital. Houthis respond by abducting activist Shadi Khasrouf, who participated in the protests. 2015 Jan. 22: Hadi resigned under pressure from the Houthi rebels. March 20: Suicide attacks targeting two Houthi mosques in Sanaa killed more than 130 people and injured more than 300 others. March 26: Saudi Arabia began launching airstrikes in Yemen in coordination with a 10-nation coalition. Sept. 22: Hadi returned to Aden, on major city on Yemen’s southern coast, after the Houthis were driven out. Oct. 15: The Houthis fired a Scud missile that landed near Khamis Mushayt, close to a Saudi air force base. In response, Saudi planes bombed targets in Sanaa. Dec. 15: U.N.-sponsored peace talks began in Geneva, Switzerland and a ceasefire went into effect in Yemen. 2016 Jan. 7: Iran claimed that Saudi warplanes attacked Iran’s embassy in Sanaa. The Saudi-led coalition and Yemen’s government denied that the embassy building was targeted. April 21: U.N.-backed talks began in Kuwait between the Houthis and Hadi’s government. Aug. 7: U.N.-backed talks in Kuwait concluded without an agreement between the Houthis and Hadi’s government. Oct. 19-21: The Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition agreed to a 72-hour ceasefire, allowing for civilian access to humanitarian aid. The ceasefire held for three days, and Saudi-led coalition airstrikes recommenced shortly after the truce expires. Oct. 27: U.N. Yemen envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed proposed a new peace plan aimed at ending the conflict. It called for members of the internationally-recognized Hadi government to step down or accept diminished roles in exchange for a Houthi withdrawal from major cities. Oct. 31: U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, called for an end to indiscriminate Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen. Nov. 29: The Houthis and members of the ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress formed a new 35-minister government based in Sanaa. 2017 Jan. 18: A Houthi strike killed six civilians in the central city of Taiz, just one day after the killing of six other civilians outside of the city. Jan. 23: Yemeni government forces seized control of the Red Sea port of Mokha after launching an assault against the port and pushing out Houthi rebels. Jan. 30: Three Houthi suicide boats reportedly attacked a Saudi frigate off the Hodeida port in the Red Sea, killing two crew members and wounding three others. On the following day, the Houthis claimed that they had launched a ballistic missile at a Saudi-led coalition military base on the Red Sea island of Zuqar. Feb. 22: The Houthis launched a missile at a military camp outside of Mokha and killed a senior Yemeni army general. March 25: A court in Houthi-controlled territory sentenced President Hadi and six other government officials in absentia to death for “high treason.” May 19: The Houthis said that they fired a ballistic missile towards Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh. The Saudi-led coalition said that it intercepted the missile some 124 miles west of the city. May 30: Oman mediated between the Saudi-backed Hadi government and the Houthi rebels over a U.N. plan for peace talks. June 5: The Houthis banned the U.N. special envoy, Cheikh Ahmed, for allegedly abandoning his neutrality and not respecting U.N. resolutions, according to Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Salam. June 15: Houthi rebels fired a missile at an Emirati ship carrying medical supplies in the Red Sea. One person was injured in the attack. The United Nations urged warring parties in Yemen to agree to a U.N.-negotiated deal over the management of port city Hodeidah and resuming government salary payments. June 17: The Saudi-backed Yemen government agreed to the U.N. two-point solution regarding the Hodeidah port. July 22: The Houthis fired a Burkan-2 ballistic missile at an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia. July 26: Houthi rebels launched a Scud missile at an oil facility near the port city of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. July 29: The Houthis claimed an attack on an Emirati ship off the western coast of Yemen. But no casualties or damage were reported. Aug. 23: Houthi fighters called their main ally, ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh, “evil” and condemn his description of them as a “militia.” The statement highlighted a growing rift between Saleh and the Houthis. Aug. 24: Saleh held a massive rally in Sanaa to celebrate 35 years since the founding of his General People’s Congress (GPC) party. Aug. 27: A colonel and close adviser to Saleh was killed in clashes with Houthi rebels at a check-point in Sanaa’s southern neighborhood of Hadda. Aug. 31: Former president Saleh demanded the arrest of the Houthi gunmen who killed his close adviser. Early September: Leaders from Saleh’s GPC party and the Houthis met to fix the rift between both groups. Sept. 24: President Hadi said that a military solution could solve Yemen’s crisis. “The military solution is the more likely one for the Yemen crisis in light of the intransigence of the Houthi and Saleh coup militias which continue to take orders from Iran,” Hadi said in an interview on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. Sept. 25: The Houthis detained a U.S. citizen in Sanaa. Oct. 1: The Houthis claimed that they shot down a U.S. surveillance drone in the capital of Sanaa. Oct. 29: Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir said that Iran was blocking peace efforts in Yemen and was still smuggling weapons to the Houthis. Nov. 4: Saudi Arabia said that it intercepted a ballistic missile near King Khaled Airport in Riyadh that was fired from Yemen. Saudi Arabia later blamed Iran for the Houthi missile attack on Riyadh airport. Nov. 7: Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Jubeir charged Iran with an act of war following the Houthi missile attack on Riyadh. The Saudi-led coalition closed all air, land and sea ports Yemen to stem the flow of supplies and arms to the Houthis from Iran. Nov. 8: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that the Houthi missile attack on Saudi Arabia was a reaction to Saudi aggression. “How should the Yemeni people react to bombardment of their country. So, they are not allowed to use their own weapons? You stop the bombardment first and see if the Yemenis would not do the same,” Rouhani said. The White House condemned the Houthi missile attack on Saudi Arabia that occurred on November 4. Nov. 12: The Houthis threatened to attack warships and oil tankers in retaliation for Saudi Arabia closing Yemen’s ports. Nov. 22: The Saudi-led coalition said it was going to reopen Yemen’s Hodeida port to allow humanitarian aid through to the capital of Sanaa. Nov. 24: Remnants of four ballistic missiles fired into Saudi Arabia by the Houthis appear were designed and manufactured in Iran, a confidential U.N. report said. Dec. 2: Saleh publicly split with the Houthis. He called for a “new page” in his relationship with the Saudi-led coalition. Dec. 4: Saleh was killed by the Houthis in a roadside ambush near Sanaa. Dec. 19: Saudi Arabia intercepted a ballistic missile over southern Riyadh. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, which was targeting the royal Yamama Palace in the capital. No damage was reported. 2018 Jan. 9: Houthi rebels threatened to block the Red Sea shipping lane if the Saudi-led coalition kept moving towards the Hodeidah port. “If the aggressors keep pushing toward Hodeidah and if the political solution hits wall, there are some strategic choices that will be taken as a no return point, including blocking the international navigation in the Red Sea,” the Houthis’ political council chief, Saleh al-Samad, said. Jan. 10: The Saudi-led coalition said that it foiled an attack on a Saudi oil tanker by Houthi fighters near the Hodeidah port. The coalition destroyed a boat carrying explosives headed towards the tanker, coalition spokesman Colonel Turki al Maliki said. Jan. 11: The Houthis fired a ballistic missile at a special forces camp and a facility housing helicopter gunships in the Saudi border province of Najran. Saudi air defense forces shot down the missile mid-air without any casualties, Colonel Maliki said. Jan. 12: A U.N. panel concluded that Iran violated an arms embargo imposed on Yemen by failing to prevent the Houthi rebels from obtaining Iranian missiles. The report did not say that Tehran had directly supplied missiles to the Houthi rebels, but said the Islamic Republic was in "noncompliance" with Resolution 2216, for failing to keep such weapons out of Yemen. Jan. 16: Houthi rebels said that they fired a short-range ballistic missile toward a regional airport in the Saudi border province of Jizan. Saudi defense forces said that they shot down the missile over Jizan. “This hostile action by the Houthi group, which is backed by Iran, proves the Iranian regime's continuous support for the armed Houthi group by providing them with capabilities, which is in violation of U.N. resolutions,” a spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition said. Jan. 18: The Houthis fired a missile into the border province of Najran in Saudi Arabia. The missile targeted an air defense operations center and inflicted heavy damage to an air defense base in the Khadhra crossing point. Jan. 25: Danny Lavon Burch, a U.S. citizen held captive by Houthi rebels since September 2017, was released and taken to Oman. He was accompanied to Oman by Mohammed Abdel-Salam, a senior Houthi leader. Jan. 30: Houthi rebels said that they fired a long-range ballistic missile at King Khaled International Airport in Riyadh. It was the second time that the Houthis targeted the Saudi airport. Feb. 10: Houthi spokesman Mohammad Abdul Salam met with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Tehran. Zarif outlined Iran's four-point peace plan for Yemen and stressed the need for an immediate stop to the war. He also called for the immediate shipment of humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians. The Arab coalition's Patriot air defense systems intercepted a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis from the Ras Kutayb area in the Hodeidah province. The missile was destroyed before reaching its intended target, suspected to be Mokha city in the western Yemeni province of Taiz. Feb. 12: Major General Gameel al Mamari, a high-ranking Houthi official, defected to the Yemeni army. He had been a spokesman for the Houthis' air defense forces and a deputy director of the military forum, a group of high-ranking army officers in Sanaa. Feb. 13: The Houthis agreed to join a new round of peace talks with the General People's Congress party in Oman. The peace talks were to take place as soon as a new U.N. Peace Envoy to Yemen was announced. Senior Houthi field commander Abu Taha al Ghalisi was killed by pro-government forces’ shelling Houthi positions in the southwestern city of Taiz. Ghalisi was responsible for leading Houthi forces north of Taiz. Feb. 14: The Saudi military repelled a cross border attack by Houthi rebels in the southern border town of Nathran. Around 25 Houthi militants were reportedly killed. Saudi helicopters also destroyed three Houthi military vehicles. It was the second cross--border attack by the Houthis in less than a week. Feb. 16-26: The United States, Britain and France drafted a U.N. Security Council resolution that condemned Iran for failing to stop its ballistic missiles from falling into the hands of the Houthis. The draft also called for renewed U.N. sanctions on Yemen and would allow the Security Council to impose targeted sanctions for “any activity related to the use of ballistic missiles in Yemen.” Russia vetoed the resolution. The U.N. Security Council subsequently passed a Russian-drafted resolution that renewed the embargo and panel's mandate but omitted the Iran-Houthi issue. Feb. 21: Mohammed Ali al Houthi submitted a letter to the United Nations to end the three-and-a-half-year war. The document, titled “An Initiative to End the Tragedies Caused by the Aggression on Yemen,” criticized the U.N. Security Council for failing “to prevent the interference and aggression against Yemen as well as the massacres committed daily against the Yemeni citizens.” The letter also included proposals for ending the conflict, such as forming a reconciliation committee, presidential and parliamentary elections, international guarantees to begin reconstruction and compensation for damages, and preventing any aggression from foreign countries against Yemen. Feb. 27: The Houthis refused to sign a U.N.-negotiated peace agreement with the Hadi government, outgoing U.N. envoy to Cheikh Ahmed said. The Houthis rejected security arrangements that required them to pull out of cities and hand over weapons to a neutral military committee. “It became clear that the Houthis were not prepared to make concessions on the proposed security arrangements. This has been a major stumbling block towards reaching a negotiated solution,” Ahmed said in his last briefing to the U.N. Security Council. March 1: Coalition airstrikes killed more than 100 Houthi rebels and injured dozens of fighters in the western Hodeidah district. March 25: The Houthis fired seven missiles at four Saudi cities: three at the capital Riyadh, one at the southwest city of Khamis Mushait, one at southern Najran and two at Jizan. The Houthi Ministry of Defense claimed that the missiles hit seven different targets inside Saudi Arabia, including four airports. But the Saudi coalition said that all the missiles were intercepted and destroyed. Fragments from the intercepted missiles killed an Egyptian resident. It is the first death on Saudi soil since the military intervention began in 2015. March 29: Houthi rebels fired a ballistic missile from the northern Yemeni province of Saada at the Saudi city of Jizan. Air defenses intercepted the missile before it could strike its target. March 30: The Yemeni army destroyed a Houthi weapons stockpile in Saada province. The strike coincided with a coalition raid on Houthi militias in the northern province. Houthi militants had launched a ballistic missile at Saudi Arabia from the province the night before. March 31: Saudi air defense forces intercepted a missile fired by the Houthis. The missile targeted a Saudi National Guard base in the southern city Najran, a rebel-run news agency reported. An Indian resident was injured by falling debris in the attack. April 2: Saleh al Samad, the head of the Houthi Political Council in Sanaa, said that the rebels were “ready to buy weapons from any country that wants to sell to us, be it Russia or Iran.” But he demanded that the weapons be delivered to Sanaa to bypass the coalition blockade. Samad made the comments during a graduation ceremony speech for Houthi military cadets in Sanaa. April 3: Houthi rebels struck a Saudi Arabian oil tanker with a missile west of Hodeidah in international waters. A coalition warship intervened and escorted the tanker, which sustained minimal damage, northwards. The Houthis said that the attack was in response to a coalition airstrike on the rebel-held Hodeidah port that killed 14 people, including women and children, the day before. April 4: Saudi Arabia intercepted a Houthi missile that was launched at southern Jizan. April 6: The Houthis fired a missile at the southern city Najran, Saudi Arabia. Saudi defense forces intercepted the missile. No damage or casualties were reported. April 11: The Houthis launched a Burkan 2-H ballistic missile at the Saudi capital Riyadh and also targeted oil facilities in southern Najran and Jizan, according to the rebel's Al Masirah television network. The missile traveled more than around 500 miles into Saudi Arabia before it was intercepted by Saudi air defenses. The Saudi-led coalition said that it had also shot down two drones in southern Saudi Arabia. The Houthis claimed they targeted some areas with Qasif-1 drones. April 12: Saudi air defense forces intercepted a Houthi missile targeting southern Jizan. April 13: “As long as the aggression continues, our military capabilities will grow and develop,” Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the rebel group, warned . The Houthis also fired a missile at Saudi Arabia for the third day in a row. The missile targeted southern Jizan but was intercepted by Saudi defense systems. April 15: Iran supplied the Houthis with drones used to attack Saudi Arabia, the Hadi government alleged. The drones were “made in Iran” and it was “impossible to manufacture them locally,” Yemen's internationally-recognized government said. April 19: The Houthis reportedly shot down a U.S. drone over Hodeidah. Saleh al Sammad, the head of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was killed in Saudi airstrikes on Hodeidah province, Al Masirah TV reported. Mahdi al Mashat was elected as Sammad's successor. “This crime will not break the will of our people and state ... [and] will not pass without accountability,” Abdul Malik al Houthi said. “The forces of this aggression led by Washington and the Saudi regime are legally responsible for such a crime and all its implications.” April 22: The Houthis fired a ballistic missile at southern Najran. Saudi air defenses intercepted the missile, “but the shrapnel scattered over residential areas and cause a fire at a farm belonging to a citizen, without causing any injuries,” the Saudi Press Agency said. April 23: Saudi Arabia intercepted two ballistic missiles at a Saudi Aramco oil production facility in southern Jizan. The Houthis claimed responsibility. April 24: Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif accused the United States of fabricating evidence that Houthi missiles launched against Saudi Arabia were manufactured in Iran. April 26: Saudi Arabia intercepted four ballistic missiles from Houthi rebels over southwestern Jizan. Falling debris from the interception killed one person. April 29: The Houthis vowed to intensify rocket attacks on Saudi Arabia and said that they were manufacturing their own ballistic missiles. Three Saudi soldiers died in clashes with the Houthis along the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border, the Saudi Press Agency said. May 3: The U.N. envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, arrived in Omani to meet with Houthi officials to try and revive peace talks. May 6: Houthi rebels launched two ballistic missiles at Najran. Saudi air defense forces intercepted the missiles. Debris from the missiles fell on residential neighborhoods but no injuries or damage were reported. “This hostile action by the Houthi militias proves the continued involvement of the Iranian regime,” Saudi coalition spokesman Col. Turki al Maliki said. May 9: The Houthis fired missiles at economic targets in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia intercepted one missile, and another missile landed in an uninhabited area in the desert south of the capital. May 11: Some 40 Houthis were killed during clashes with Yemeni forces outside the city of Hodeidah. May 14: Houthi rebels launched a ballistic missile at a Saudi Aramco facility in southern Jizan province. The missile landed in the open desert and no damage was inflicted, the Saudi-led coalition said. May 19: Saudi Arabia intercepted ballistic missiles from the Houthis, which were targeting the city of Khamis Mushait. May 22: The United States sanctioned five Iranians it said provided Yemen's Houthis with technical expertise and weaponry to launch attacks against Saudi Arabia. May 29: Yemeni forces advanced within 20 kilometers of the Houthi-held Hodeidah port. June 13: Heavy fighting resumed in the Durayhimi district south of the Hodeidah port after the Houthi rebels failed to meet a UAE deadline to surrender the port. The Saudi-UAE-backed coalition said that it had plans to ensure the provision of humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians, even though most aid arrived through the port. The U.N. called for an emergency meeting to discuss the worsening humanitarian crisis. June 19: Government forces seized the Hodeidah port from the Houthi rebels. The government needed control of the port to protect shipping routes and prevent the Houthis from smuggling weapons into the country. June 25: The Saudi-led coalition announced that it had killed eight members of Hezbollah in the battle against the Houthis. Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite militia and political party supported by Iran, had previously denied accusations that it was providing assistance to the rebels. July 1: The UAE paused its military campaign on Hodeidah to allow U.N. peace negotiations to be “fully explored.” The United Nations met with leaders of both parties to the civil war and suggested that an international body might assume management of Hodeida port through the negotiations. July 5: The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 17,350 households (over 121,000 people) had been displaced from Hodeidah in the month of June by renewed air attacks on the port city by the Saudi-led coalition. Approximately 80,000 received food and medical aid from humanitarian aid workers, but the report warned that only half of the displaced children could attend school. July 25: Houthi rebels attacked a Saudi oil tanker in the Red Sea. The Saudi-led coalition claimed that the tanker was only slightly damaged “due to immediate intervention of the Coalition's fleet.” July 29: The Saudi-led coalition abandoned the July 1 ceasefire and renewed airstrikes on the Hodeidah port city in response to the attack on Saudi oil tankers. Saudi Arabia also announced that it would suspend shipments through the Bab al Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important waterways for shipping, until the waterway was safe from similar attacks. The coalition had not made any progress in securing the port city since it launched the campaign on June 12. July 31: The Houthis promised to suspend attacks in the Red Sea for two weeks to support peace negotiations. Mohammed Ali al Houthi suggested that the ban on attacks could be extended if the Saudi-led coalition reciprocated. July 31: A roadside bombing in Aden wounded Aref Ahmed Ali, a prominent member of the Islah party. Three other members of Yemen’s branch of the Muslim brotherhood were also wounded. Aug. 2: A series of explosions around Hodeidah killed 55 civilians and injured 170 more. The blasts hit crowded population centers, including a fish market and the area surrounding al Thawra hospital. Saudi Arabia blamed the Houthi rebels in a letter to the United Nations and demanded immediate disarmament and enforcement of U.N. resolutions. Aug. 7: An investigation by the Associated Press found that the Saudi-led coalition had cut numerous deals with al Qaeda militants in Yemen, paying the fighters to retreat or recruiting them to the coalition. The deals reportedly allowed the coalition to claim victories over their enemies without engaging in combat. Aug. 9: A coalition airstrike on Saada killed at least 29 children and wounded 30 more when it hit a school bus. Houthi-run Al-Masirah TV reported even higher numbers. The coalition defended its actions and claimed that it does not target civilians despite several accusations from human rights groups. Aug. 31: The US military seized over 1,000 smuggled rifles from ships around the Gulf of Aden. The ships were bound for Yemen, and the sailors aboard were handed over to the Saudi-backed government after the U.S. Navy discovered the arms cache. Sept. 9: U.N. peace talks collapsed when the Houthi delegation claimed that logistical difficulties prevented them from attending the talks. The Yemeni delegation accused the United Nations of giving the Houthis excuses to ignore a U.N. resolution. Sept. 12: The Yemeni army, assisted by the Saudi coalition, seized two roads near Hodeidah from the Houthi rebels. The move cut off two of the Houthi’s main supply routes into the city and followed a renewal of airstrikes on the rebel forces. Sept. 25: The Saudi-led coalition agreed to open a humanitarian aid corridor between Hodeidah and Sanaa, two rebel strongholds in Yemen. The coalition worked with the United Nations to get supplies to starving civilians. Oct. 2: Saudi Arabia transferred $200 million to Yemen’s Central Bank to stabilize the currency amidst the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Millions of Yemenis were already close to starving, and the currency freefall threatened even more civilians with famine. Saudi Arabia hoped to boost local economies and slow the devaluation of the rial. Oct. 3: The Houthis released two sons of the late President Saleh in Sanaa after detaining the men for 10 months. The Houthi media agency said that the brothers were released by a pardon from the Supreme Political Council after mediation by the Sultan of Oman. Oct. 13: President Hadi fired Prime Minister Ahmed bin Dagher and appointed Mae’en Abdulmalik Said as his replacement. The former Minister of Public Works was charged with revitalizing the collapsing economy. Oct. 24: An airstrike reportedly killed at least 16 civilians and wounded 12 in Hodeidah province. The Saudi-led coalition hit a vegetable packaging factory in Bayt al Faqih. Nov. 2: The Saudi-led coalition announced that it had bombed an air base near the Sanaa airport. A Houthi media outlet counted 30 airstrikes on the base and surrounding area. The coalition claimed that the Houthi rebels were using the base to launch ballistic missiles and drones, and that no commercial flights or humanitarian aid efforts were affected by the attack. Nov. 18: In response to demands from the United Nations and a pause in Saudi attacks on Hodeidah, the Houthi rebels promised to stop missile attacks on the Saudi-led coalition. The group said it would agree to a ceasefire if the coalition was ready for peace. Nov. 20: Outbreaks of street fighting and airstrikes around Hodeidah ended a day-long ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels. Residents described the fighting as the worst yet. Dec. 2: The United Nations helped evacuate 50 wounded Houthi soldiers to Oman for treatment. The Saudi-led coalition explained the evacuation as a “confidence-building measure” ahead of a second attempt at peace talks in Sweden. Dec. 13: U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres joined the final day of Yemeni peace talks in Sweden. Negotiations produced a prisoner swap, resumed oil and gas trade, reopened the Sanaa airport, and paid civilian salaries, but control of the Hodeidah port remained a pressing issue. The Houthis wanted the port to be neutral while the coalition forces insisted on government control over the port. They eventually agreed to a ceasefire and a second round of peace talks in January. 2019 Jan. 10: A Houthi drone attack on the al Anad base killed six soldiers and wounded 12 others, ending a short ceasefire negotiated with the U.N. in December. Jan. 15: The second round of U.N. peace talks fell apart when both sides refused to sit down with the other after reports that both had violated the ceasefire agreement. Jan. 17: The U.N. delegation overseeing the truce was fired upon in Hodeidah. An armored vehicle carrying Patrick Cammaert was struck, although no one was injured. Both the Houthis and the coalition blamed each other for the attack. Jan. 19: The Saudi-led coalition attacked Sanaa, further eroding prospects for a peace agreement. A coalition spokesman claimed that the airstrikes targeted Houthi military facilities, which the rebels used to launch drone attacks. Feb. 5: A round of negotiations in Amman, Jordan focused on prisoner exchanges as a critical first step in the peace process. UN Special Envoy Griffiths said that a list of thousands of prisoners would be given to the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations. March 18: A report by the Norwegian Refugee Council found that the average number of civilian casualties in Yemen had doubled since the U.N. ceasefire was instituted in December. While violence in Hodeidah had decreased, increased attacks in other parts of the country had offset that reduction. April 2: Doctors Without Borders reported that the cholera outbreak in Yemen was the worst in history with some 1.4 million cases. April 16: President Trump vetoed a Senate resolution that proposed to withdraw American support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. May 11: The Houthi forces began to remove troops from the Saleef port in Hodeidah as a “show of commitment” to the UN-negotiated peace agreement. This was the first concession towards the agreement the Houthis made, although the Saudi coalition claimed it was a facade intended to boost the Houthi’s standing at future meetings. May 15: Fighting resumed in Hodeidah just days after the Houthis had reportedly pulled troops out of the port. May 25: President Hadi acccused U.N. Special Envoy Griffiths of siding with the Houthis. In a letter, he claimed Griffiths had treated the Houthis as legitimate government and that Griffiths had not held the Houthis accountable for fulfilling their promises under previous agreements. June 3: The Saudi-led coalition captured the leader of the Yemeni ISIS affiliate along with three other ISIS members. June 15: The Houthis launched a drone strike on Saudi Arabia’s Abha airport, the most recent of several drone and missile strikes on Saudi territory. Another strike on the Saudi Jizan airport killed 26 on June 12. June 20: A British court ruling on arms sales to Saudi Arabia declared the use of British weapons in Yemen illegal. The historic ruling recognized a breach of international humanitarian law, setting a precedent for challenging the arms trade and reducing Western support for either party to the civil war. Aug. 4: The Houthis reached an agreement with the World Food Programme (WFP), which allowed the U.N. aid organization to resume deliveries in rebel-held areas. The WFP had previously accused the rebels of stealing and misusing aid deliveries and suspended aid, affecting an estimated 850,000 people. Sept. 2: Saudi-backed coalition forces bombed a prison just south of Sanaa, killing at least 60. The coalition claimed that it was targeting a weapons stash in accordance with international humanitarian law, but Houthi media said that many of the prisoners killed were due to be released in a negotiated prison swap. The Houthis accused the coalition of war crimes. It was the deadliest attack to date in 2019. Sept. 10: Houthi militants and coalition representatives agreed to establish a de-escalation center in Hodeidah. The center, which would be overseen by the United Nations, would host “liaison and coordination officers” from both sides. Sept. 26: After clashes with separatists supported by the UAE in Aden, the Yemeni government announced that it would move the interim capital to Ataq “until the liberation of Aden and Sanaa.” Sept. 30: The Houthis announced that they would unconditionally release 350 prisoners who were listed in the prisoner exchange deal both parties had signed in December. The rebels claimed to have captured thousands of Saudi troops a few days earlier, but still asked their opponents to reciprocate the goodwill gesture and release their own prisoners. Oct. 14: Saudi forces retook Aden, ending the standoff between the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and southern separatists supported by the UAE. The UAE had begun withdrawing troops from the city a few days earlier. Nov. 5: The Saudi-backed Yemeni government signed an agreement with southern separatists intended to end coalition infighting. The Riyadh agreement called for power-sharing, a cabinet with equal representation from the north and the south, and contributions to national security from both groups. Nov. 13: Officials from both the Saudi-backed coalition and Houthi rebels said that the two sides engaged in indirect peace talks. Oman facilitated the discussions via video conference and through European intermediaries, and said that they focused on interim goals. Nov. 25: A U.S. warship seized a significant cache of Iranian weapons bound for Yemen’s Houthi rebels. A U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard boarding team interdicted the weapons during a flag verification of a small wooden boat in the northern Arabia Sea. “An initial investigation indicates that these advanced missile components are of Iranian origin,” the Pentagon said. On December 5, the U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, revealed that components of anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, air defense missiles, and anti-tank missiles were found. “The weapon components comprise the most sophisticated weapons seized by the U.S. Navy to date during the Yemen conflict,” he said. 2020 Feb. 13: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said that it had seized a large cache of Iranian-made weapons from a dhow in the Arabian Sea. The military equipment, which included surface-to-air-missiles and anti-tank missiles, was “identical” to the weapons systems captured by the United States in the northern Arabian Sea in November, according to the CENTCOM statement. The United States “assessed” that those arms were produced by Iran and bound for Yemen’s Houthis in violation of a U.N. Security Council embargo on supplying arms to the rebels. Feb. 17: The United Nations announced that the coalition and rebels had agreed on the first “package” of prisoners to be swapped. July 8: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that U.S. and partner forces had seized Iranian arms bound for Houthi rebels in Yemen. The weapons – including 200 rocket-propelled grenades, more than 1,700 AK rifles and various types of missiles – were found on a boat off the coast of Yemen on June 28. It was the third arms shipment interdicted by the United States since November 2019. Aug. 26: The Southern Transitional Council (STC), Yemen’s southern separatists, withdrew from the Riyadh Agreement. The STC cited military escalation and crumbling public services for its withdrawal from the agreement, which was backed by the Saudis and intended to end violence within the anti-Houthi coalition. Oct. 15: The Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition began a two-day prisoner swap. The U.N. brokered the exchange of more than 1,000 prisoners with support from International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Yemen. The ICRC’s Middle East director, Fabrizio Carboni, described the event as “a good first step towards building the confidence needed between parties to the conflict.” Oct. 29: The U.S. Justice Department filed a complaint to forfeit two shipments of Iranian missiles bound for Yemen, as well as 1.1 million barrels of oil intended for Venezuela. The missiles were seized by the U.S. in November 2019 and February 2020, and the oil was captured in August 2020. The arms were allegedly sent by the Revolutionary Guards. Nov. 25: The Houthis allowed the United Nations to assess for repairs a decaying oil tanker that has been stranded off the Yemeni coast since 2015. The tanker was moored in Houthi territory, but the surrounding ocean is controlled by the Saudi coalition, preventing the Houthis from selling the oil. A spill from the vessel could cause a significant environmental disaster and could shut down Yemen’s main Hodeidah port. Dec. 18: The Saudi-led coalition announced a new cabinet in the internationally-recognized government that will share power between the northern and southern separatists. This new government, headed by Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik, united the anti-Houthi factions in Yemen whose conflicts have limited U.N efforts to establish a ceasefire. Dec. 30: The Aden International Airport was hit by a large explosion, killing 26 and injuring at least 50. The attack came shortly after the new cabinet had landed at the airport and was followed by another explosion near the presidential palace. Yemeni Information Minister Moammar al Eryani blamed the Houthis for the explosions, but the Houthis denied responsibility. 2021 Jan. 10: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would list the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity. The designations will provide additional tools to hold the Houthis accountable for “terrorist acts, including cross-border attacks threatening civilian populations, infrastructure, and commercial shipping.” The U.S. sanctions were scheduled to go into effect on January 19, the last full day of the Trump administration. Aid agencies worried that the designations and sanctions would disrupt their supply chains and aid flows; Pompeo’s statement asserted that the U.S. Department of the Treasury will issue special operational licenses to humanitarian groups. Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al Houthi denounced the move as “terrorist" policy. The Houthis “reserve the right to respond to any designation issued by the Trump administration or any administration.” Feb 7: The Houthis launched a campaign to capture Marib Governorate, a stronghold of the Yemeni government. Marib is strategically significant because it is the center of gas and oil production. The battle for control of Marib has continued since this date. Feb. 10: The Houthis launched four bomb-laden drones at Abha International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia. One civilian plane caught fire. Feb. 12: The Biden administration announced that the terrorist designation of the Houthis would be revoked on February 16. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that its decision would ensure that U.S. policies do not impede aid efforts. “By focusing on alleviating the humanitarian situation in Yemen, we hope the Yemeni parties can also focus on engaging in dialogue.” But Washington “remains clear-eyed about Ansarallah’s malign actions,” Blinken added. He said that the three Houthi leaders - Abdul Malik al Houthi, Abd al Khaliq Badr al Din al Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim - designated as terrorists by the Trump administration would remain sanctioned. Nov. 11: The Houthis had detained an unspecified number of Yemeni security guards who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, the State Department announced. A “majority” of the staff had been released. The State Department urged the Houthis to release the remaining guards, vacate the compound and return seized property. Dec. 25: An unspecified projectile killed two people in a store in Jazan in southern Saudi Arabia. Riyadh blamed the Houthis. On the same day, the Saudi-led coalition launched an airstrike against weapons storehouses at a Houthi camp in Ajama near Sanaa in Yemen. At least three people were reportedly killed and six others were injured. 2022 Jan 3: The Saudi-led coalition accused the Houthis of “piracy” after they seized an Emirati-flagged vessel, the Rwabee, in the Red Sea. The coalition said that the ship carried medical supplies from a dismantled field hospital. But the Houthis claimed that they found military supplies aboard. They aired footage of rifles, military-style rafts and trucks. Jan 17: The Houthis claimed responsibility for what appeared to be a drone attack that killed three people and wounded six in Abu Dhabi. An initial report stated that small flying objects fell and may have sparked a blast that destroyed three oil tankers and started a fire at the airport. The Houthis said that five ballistic missiles and a “large number” of drones were used in the operation. In response, the Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes on Sanaa. At least 12 people were killed and 11 were injured, according to Al Masirah, a television station run by the Houthis. The attack targeted a residential neighborhood, according to Human Rights Watch. Jan 20: The Saudi-led coalition launched a late-night airstrike on a telecommunications building in Hodeida that knocked out the internet across Yemen until January 25. Jan 21: The Saudi-led coalition conducted airstrikes on a Houthi detention facility in Saada in northern Yemen. A local human rights organization reported that 82 people were killed and 162 were injured. Houthi forces reportedly shot detainees who tried to escape. Medical workers said that 16 of the dead and 35 of the injured were shot. Jan 24: Emirati and U.S. military forces intercepted two ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis toward Abu Dhabi. The some 2,000 U.S. troops housed at Al Dahfra Air Base sheltered in bunkers and fired Patriot missiles in response. The Houthis claimed that they had launched drones and ballistic missiles at several sites, including the base. “We warn foreign companies and investors to leave the Emirates!" Yehia Sarei, the Houthi military spokesman, said. “This has become an unsafe country!” The attack marked a serious escalation in tensions. Feb. 7: General Kenneth McKenzie, the head of U.S. Central Command, said that the United States would help strengthen UAE defenses. He implicated Iran in providing advanced weaponry to the Houthis. “Medium range ballistic missiles that were fired from Yemen and entered UAE were not invented, built, designed in Yemen,” McKenzie told reporters before arriving in Abu Dhabi. “All that happened somewhere else. So I think we certainly see the Iranian connection to this.” March 25: A large fire was ignited at an oil depot in Jeddah a day before the start of the Formula 1 Saudi Arabian Grand Prix. The Houthis claimed to have launched missiles at Aramco facilities and drones at two refineries. Formula 1 decided to hold the races despite the attack. April 2: A two-month ceasefire between the Houthis and the Yemeni government went into effect after U.N.-brokered peace talks. The United States and Iran welcomed the first nationwide truce since 2016. June 2: The Houthis and the Yemeni government agreed to extend the U.N.-brokered ceasefire for another two months. “The truce represents a significant shift in the trajectory of the war and has been achieved through responsible and courageous decision making by the parties,” Hans Grundberg, the U.N. special envoy for Yemen, said in a statement. He said that he would work with the warring parties to reach a political settlement and end the war. Cameron Glenn from the U.S. Institute of Peace, the primary author of this article, originally published it in 2015. Garrett Nada and Mattisan Rowan from the U.S. Institute of Peace updated this report.
8955	dbpedia	0	2	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/22/profile-yemens-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi	en	Profile: Yemen’s Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi	https://www.aljazeera.co…esize=1200%2C675	https://www.aljazeera.co…esize=1200%2C675	[ "https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/2011112410120720734_20.jpeg?resize=570%2C380&quality=80", "https://www.aljazeera.com/static/media/aj-footer-logo.bac952ad.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "News", "Middle East", "United States", "US & Canada", "Yemen" ]	null	[ "Al Jazeera" ]	2015-02-22T00:00:00	Yemen’s post-uprising leader had been grappling with a Shia rebel movement and al-Qaeda since he took office in 2012.	en	/favicon_aje.ico	Al Jazeera	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/22/profile-yemens-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi	Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who resigned in January as Yemen’s president amid pressure from Shia Houthi rebels, assumed office in 2012 after spending 17 years as vice-president. Hadi was elected president after protests lasting nearly a year against former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, but he set about governing a country beset by a host of problems, including a Shia rebel movement and a growing threat from al-Qaeda. A sole candidate in the referendum-like elections held in 2012, the Sunni politician’s ascendency to power saw Yemen become the first Arab Spring nation where an uprising led to a negotiated settlement. The vote was a condition of the power-transition deal signed by Saleh in 2011 after mass protests calling for him to step aside. Under the deal, brokered by the Gulf Co-operation Council made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Saleh transfered constitutional powers to Hadi, who he had appointed as vice-president in 1994. The 68-year-old former soldier from Yemen’s south was considered by most as the consensus candidate. But two major opposition groups – the separatist Southern Movement and the Houthi rebels – boycotted the poll. The uprising’s main proponents had asked Yemenis to support Hadi and posters of the vice-president were plastered on buildings and streets in the capital Sanaa. Hadi had local, regional and international support and was a respected leader with a vision for the future. When news of the presidential poll came, crowds in Sanaa chanted “Hadi, take the key, the slaughterer’s rule has ended”, a reference to Saleh’s leadership. Yemen’s Nobel Peace laureate Tawakkul Karman had urged Yemenis to vote for Hadi, saying his election would mark “the fruit of the popular youth uprising”. Hadi was expected to launch a national dialogue, the first step in the transitional period that sought to end in legislative and presidential elections within two years. But many Yemenis had expressed concern over the role of the country’s security forces, a major challenge Hadi had to deal with. Security forces remained under the control of Saleh’s sons and nephews, and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred during the crackdown on protests. Hadi was sworn in as Saleh returned home from the US where he received treatment for injuries sustained in an attack on his palace. Many feared his return would stock tensions but US President Barack Obama had voiced support for Hadi’s new leadership. Obama said in a letter that he looked forward to deeper relations between the two nations and promised that the US would be “a strong and reliable partner”. He wrote that Yemen would become a symbol of political transformation “when people resist violence and unite under a common cause”. Saleh’s critics had repeatedly accused the veteran leader of intentionally allowing al-Qaeda to expand its influence in the country’s lawless south and east to demonstrate that only he can fight the spread of terror.
8955	dbpedia	3	50	https://www.cato.org/commentary/yemen-shattered-us-helped-saudis-break-it	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
8955	dbpedia	0	52	https://presspartners.org/letter-from-yemen-will-the-world-know-about-our-suffering/	en	Letter From Yemen: ‘Will the world know about our suffering?’	https://presspartners.or…view-199x300.jpg	https://presspartners.or…view-199x300.jpg	[ "https://presspartners.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/afpp-logo.png", "https://presspartners.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/afpp-logo.png", "https://i0.wp.com/presspartners.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Malak-Yemen-Interview.jpg?resize=333%2C502&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/presspartners.org/wp-content/uploads...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2015-07-03T21:34:56+00:00	By Malak Shaher It’s been four years since I was working at the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette as an Alfred Friendly Fellow. The experience improved my professional skills in many ways. After I came…	en	https://presspartners.org/wp-content/themes/candidate/fav.ico	Alfred Friendly Press Partners	https://presspartners.org/letter-from-yemen-will-the-world-know-about-our-suffering/	By Malak Shaher It’s been four years since I was working at the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette as an Alfred Friendly Fellow. The experience improved my professional skills in many ways. After I came back to Yemen, I continued working as a journalist before I worked in communications with a couple of national and international NGOs in Yemen. It’s been two years and a half since I joined MSF/Doctors Without Borders in Yemen. MSF is an international independent medical organization that operates in more than 70 countries. In Yemen, it operates in eight of the 21 governorates. I am the field communications officer here. Well, the locals here call me “the MSF journalist” as they see me taking pictures and interviewing doctors, patients and people. You must have heard about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Yemen after internal battles were followed by Saudi coalition airstrikes. The coalition airstrikes started in late March after Yemeni President Rabbuh Mansur Hadi went to Saudi Arabia asking for military support to force the Houthis to withdraw from the cities they have controlled by force. The Houthis are a group of armed Shiite Yemenis from Sa’ada governorate who rebelled against the Yemeni government in 2004. Several wars have been fought between them and the state. After controlling Sa’ada, the closest Yemeni governorate to Saudi Arabia, in 2011, Houthis started advancing to the south. In the south, there is ground fighting between Houthis and an ex-president forces from one hand and other groups allied to Hadi from the other hand. Saudi Arabia sought the support of other countries to help force the Houthis to withdraw. Since March 26 and into the summer, the airstrikes have been targeting Houthi locations and houses of Houthi leaders all over the country. In return, Houthis are sending missiles into Saudi Arabia. It’s worth mentioning that people believe that the Houthis are supported by Iran, although both they and Iran are denying this. Almost three months since the beginning of the war, nothing has been achieved by any of the parties except for ruining the lives of civilians. The ground fighting between several armed groups in Yemen and the airstrikes have made normal life for thousands of civilians impossible. Hundreds of people have been injured; others have lost their homes, jobs, relatives, or their own lives. People cannot access health facilities, patients with chronic diseases cannot get their medication as pharmacies have run out of drugs due to the embargo imposed on Yemen. Women deliver babies at home with unskilled attendants. Prices for food, water and other commodities have increased due to the shortage of fuel caused by the embargo. Many schools have closed. Thousands of Yemenis have lost their jobs and thousands have not received their salaries since March as banks are closed in the areas where the ground fighting is intense. Life has stopped in many places and contagious diseases have started to spread. We, the Yemenis do not know when is this going to end. So, this is the situation in Yemen. As I mentioned in the beginning of this dispatch, I work as a communications officer with MSF. I write stories about patients, staff and other people and about the medical aid the organization is providing. I reply to journalists, manage media interviews with our spokespeople, and send updates to the media about the situation and the organization’s activities in the areas where we have operations. As MSF, we denounce the targeting of civilians, patients and health workers. We have been calling all parties to not hinder access to health care and to “set up robust and unobstructed channels for air, sea and land access, in order to provide civilians with what they need to fend for themselves and to survive.” Yet, there is another kind of war, which is the media war. MSF has been manipulated many times by several media outlets allying with the different parties who are at war. Many media outlets contact MSF and ask questions just to show the other party is wrong. The majority of the media in Yemen is biased and affiliated to political parties and those at war with each other. Some journalists try to use MSF as a tool to accuse the other party of violating humanitarian laws. The media allied to the Houthis, for instance, only refer to the number of injured who fell due to the coalition airstrikes. Similarly, the coalition-supported media only focus on the areas where civilians were badly affected by the ground fights between Houthis and the southern fighters. You can hardly find any neutral local media in Yemen. The full picture is missing most of the time and very few journalists are presenting the fact that the civilians, wherever they exist in Yemen, are the real victims of all this violence. When MSF is manipulated or when wrong news about MSF is spread, we call the journalist to clarify the news reports, share the clarification with all the media and share this through MSF’s social media channels as well. But we are still manipulated by journalists and social media activists who only use one part of the story. Yet as an independent medical organization, MSF treats patients, regardless of their backgrounds, according to medical ethics. International media that are not linked to any of the groups in conflict, or supported by Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia or other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, are normally not biased and more professional. They usually try to find a way to provide the full picture. Yet, the embargo prevents many of them from coming into the country. Tens of journalists have contacted us to inform us they are doing their best to come into the country to report about the situation and MSF activities. There have been very few journalists who managed to make it to Yemen as of the end of June. Those who arrive to Aden by boat from Djibouti cannot go to the north because the roads are blocked by the fighting. And those who can make it to the north by boat or plane cannot go to the south for the same reason. I am now in Amran governorate, north of the Yemeni capital Sana’a. MSF supports a hospital here with doctors, surgeons, midwives, medications and a referral system. We also have mobile clinics providing general consultations for IDPs who have fled their homes fearing the fighting or the airstrikes. The people here lack food and proper shelter. A few days ago, Matthieu Aikins and Sebastiano Tomada, a reporter and a photographer working with the Rolling Stone, visited Sa’ada and Amran and interviewed MSF staff & patients to get to know our medical activities and to see the situation of the IDPs. While Matthieu was interviewing one of our doctors, a man approached me and asked: “Are they well-known? Will the world know about our suffering? Will the war stop?” Malak Shaher is a 2011 Alfred Friendly Press Fellow from Yemen who was assigned to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette between April 2011 and August 2011. Twitter: https://twitter.com/MalakShaher \| Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/malak.shaher
8955	dbpedia	0	44	https://english.news.cn/20240206/24f81c11882b4cae88ae26908343cad3/c.html	en	New prime minister appointed in Yemen amid dire challenges			[ "https://english.news.cn/20240206/24f81c11882b4cae88ae26908343cad3/zxcode_2024020624f81c11882b4cae88ae26908343cad3.jpg", "https://english.news.cn/2021newxl/images/20210928_rightShareFb_v1.png", "https://english.news.cn/2021newxl/images/20210928_rightShareTw_v1.png", "https://english.news.cn/2021newxl/images/2...	[]	[]	[ "Yemen", "Prime Minister", "Appointment" ]	null	[]	2024-02-06T00:00:00	New prime minister appointed in Yemen amid dire challenges-	en			null	ADEN, Yemen, Feb. 5 (Xinhua) -- Yemen's ongoing civil war took a new turn on Monday as the Presidential Leadership Council appointed Foreign Minister Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak as the country's new prime minister, according to the state-run Saba news agency. The council's chairman issued an official decree appointing Bin Mubarak to replace Maeen Abdulmalik, who was named a presidential advisor. Bin Mubarak is a seasoned politician who previously served as chief of staff under former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in 2014. That same year, he was offered the position of prime minister but declined. Since late 2014, Yemen has been embroiled in a civil war between Iran-backed Houthis and Saudi-backed government forces. The Houthis seized control of key northern regions, including the capital Sanaa. Bin Mubarak himself was briefly kidnapped by the Houthi group in 2015. After his release, he went on to serve as Yemen's Ambassador to the United States, followed by Foreign Minister starting in 2020. In a statement, Bin Mubarak said he assumed the new role "with determination to achieve tangible results for the Yemeni people during these difficult times," calling for unity and efforts between the government and state institutions to serve the nation responsibly. He stressed the need to uphold the rule of law while addressing the many challenges facing Yemen. He noted that his government will seek regional and international partnerships to establish peace and security in the country. Bin Mubarak takes on the role of prime minister at a time when Yemen faces immense economic and humanitarian challenges. Years of civil war have led to a deterioration of the economy, with soaring inflation and the collapse of the Yemeni currency. Infrastructure across the country lies in ruins, while poverty and food insecurity affect millions of Yemenis. On Saturday, the Yemeni riyal plunged to a new record low, breaking 1,650 against one U.S. dollar, as the country's currency crisis continues to worsen. The continued conflict between Houthis and government forces has displaced over 4 million people and left 80 percent of the population in need of humanitarian assistance. Despite repeated attempts toward ceasefire and peace deals, a political solution remains elusive. The country is also split between the Houthi-held north and the internationally recognized government in the south. Bringing stability to Yemen will require urgent measures to shore up the failing economy, address fuel and food shortages, rebuild decimated infrastructure and public services, and establish lasting peace. With the nation split in two and a complex array of factions vying for power, Bin Mubarak faces a monumental task of restoring unity and finding an inclusive political settlement, according to local observers. ■
8955	dbpedia	3	11	https://apnews.com/article/houthis-yemen-middle-east-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-272f0f343116c4a9f0224af96f2169e7	en	Yemen’s president steps aside amid efforts to end war	https://dims.apnews.com/dims4/default/6a4e4cd/2147483647/strip/true/crop/2622x1475+0+137/resize/1440x810!/quality/90/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fstorage.googleapis.com%2Fafs-prod%2Fmedia%2Ffd735b4a5e2242988db282c366c77d4b%2F2622.jpeg	https://dims.apnews.com/dims4/default/6a4e4cd/2147483647/strip/true/crop/2622x1475+0+137/resize/1440x810!/quality/90/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fstorage.googleapis.com%2Fafs-prod%2Fmedia%2Ffd735b4a5e2242988db282c366c77d4b%2F2622.jpeg	[ "https://assets.apnews.com/fa/ba/9258a7114f5ba5c7202aaa1bdd66/aplogo.svg", "https://dims.apnews.com/dims4/default/94c503b/2147483647/strip/true/crop/640x236+0+0/resize/320x118!/quality/90/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.apnews.com%2Fc3%2F4c%2F65482a7b452db66043542c093eaf%2Fpromo-2x.png 1x,https://dims.apnews.com/dims4/...	[]	[]	[ "United Nations", "Africa", "Civil wars", "Saudi Arabia", "United Arab Emirates", "General news", "Sanaa", "Riyadh", "Middle East", "Yemen", "Houthis", "Religion" ]	null	[ "Ahmed Al-Haj", "Samy Magdy" ]	2022-04-07T19:17:12+00:00	Yemen’s exiled president has stepped aside and transferred his powers to a presidential council. Thursday's development comes as international and regional efforts to end the country’s long-running civil war recently gained momentum with a two-month truce.	en	/apple-touch-icon.png	AP News	https://apnews.com/article/houthis-yemen-middle-east-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-272f0f343116c4a9f0224af96f2169e7	SANAA, Yemen (AP) — Yemen’s exiled president stepped aside and transferred his powers to a presidential council Thursday, as international and regional efforts to end the country’s long-running civil war gained momentum with a two-month truce. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, major players in the war, appear to have had a role in President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s decision, quickly welcoming it with a pledge of $3 billion in aid. The head of the new council has close ties to Riyadh. It remains to be seen how the development will impact Yemen’s grinding conflict. A Saudi-led coalition of which the UAE is a member has for years been fighting the Iran-backed Houthi rebels to restore Hadi’s government to power. So far, U.N. mediation efforts have yielded little fruit, and fighting, airstrikes and missile attacks had been escalating in the war until the cease-fire took effect. Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Salam dismissed any significance of the new council. The rebels have in the past benefited from squabbles among their rivals. “Our Yemeni people are not concerned with any illegitimate decisions made by illegitimate parties beyond their borders,” Abdul-Salam tweeted. Peter Salisbury, Yemen expert at the International Crisis Group, described the power transfer as the “most consequential shift in the inner workings of the anti-Houthi bloc since war began.” Hadi, 76, said the newly established council will run the government and lead negotiations with the Houthis, according to a statement aired on state-run media. The development, which could unify the anti-Houthi camp after years of infighting and disputes, was almost certainly orchestrated in Riyadh where Yemen’s pro-government and pro-Saudi factions have been meeting over the past week to discuss efforts to end the war. “I irreversibly delegate to the Presidential Leadership Council my full powers,” Hadi declared on Yemen’s state-run TV. He also sacked Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a powerful military figure, and delegated al-Ahmar’s powers to the presidential council. The council is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an advisor to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of late strongman President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Al-Alimi enjoys close ties with Saudi Arabia and the powerful Islah party — Yemen’s branch of the transnational Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood. Yemen’s civil war started in 2014, when the Houthis seized the capital of Sanaa, forcing Hadi and his government into exile in Saudi Arabia. Months later, the Saudi-led coalition entered the war to try to restore Hadi’s government to power — but the war over the years turned into a stalemated proxy conflict with neither side winning. Hadi’s exile distanced him from events on the ground, with his Saudi backers preventing him from returning to Yemen and the southern port city of Aden — the new seat of the exiled government — allegedly over safety issues. His administration was accused of gross mismanagement and government employees largely went without salaries. Separately, Aden became the scene of infighting among the coalition when UAE-backed separatists briefly overtook the city in 2019. A Riyadh-brokered deal later that year attempted to reconcile the separatists and Hadi’s forces but power struggles have persisted. Hadi’s rule was also undermined by the UAE’s influence in the territories nominally under his control. The UAE trained, financed and armed militias in Yemen and set up prisons. Yemen’s war has killed more than 150,000 people, including over 14.500 civilians, and created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. This month, the warring sides announced a two-month cease-fire — the first nationwide truce in Yemen in six years — starting with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Saudi Arabia welcomed Hadi’s move and urged the presidential council to embark upon U.N.-led negotiations with the Houthis to find a “political, final and comprehensive” settlement to the conflict, according to the state-run Saudi Press Agency. Powerful Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has also met with the council head and its members, Saudi state-run TV reported. The council has seven other members, including Aydarous al-Zubaidi, head of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council — an umbrella group of heavily armed militias propped up by the UAE since 2015. Also in the council are Sheikh Sultan al-Aradah, the powerful governor of energy-rich Marib province, and Tariq Saleh, a militia leader and nephew of the late president with close ties to the UAE. Another member is Abdel-Rahman Abu Zarah, commander of UAE-backed Giants Brigades, which played a crucial role recently in repelling the Houthi offensive on the central city of Marib. Hadi was named president of Yemen in 2012 with a mission to oversee a democratic transition following its Arab Spring uprising that ended Saleh’s longtime rule. Separately, talks hosted by the Saudi-based Gulf Cooperation Council over the Yemeni war entered their final day on Thursday. The Houthis have boycotted the GCC efforts because they were taking place in Saudi Arabia, their adversary’s territory. A number of countries welcomed the change in Yemen’s leadership, with Egypt, Jordan and France expressing support for the presidential council. The Arab League and the European Union both said they hoped it could help the country further towards peace. At the United Nations, spokesman Stephane Dujarric thanked Saudi Arabia and the UAE for their $3 billion in aid to Yemen and expressed U.N.'s readiness to work with the presidential council, “as well all the Yemeni parties, to reach a lasting truce and a sustainable, inclusive and negotiated settlement to the Yemen conflict.” ___ Magdy reported from Cairo. Associated Press writers Noha ElHennawy in Cairo and Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations contributed to this report.
8955	dbpedia	2	0	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanaa	en	Wikipedia	https://upload.wikimedia…emen_%287%29.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…emen_%287%29.jpg	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/51/Sanaa%2C_Yemen_%287%...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2002-06-16T22:16:41+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanaa	Capital and largest city of Yemen For other uses, see Sanaa (disambiguation). Not to be confused with Sena, Yemen or Saana. Capital city in Capital's secretariat, Yemen Sanaa (Arabic: صَنْعَاء‎, Ṣanʿāʾ [sˤɑnʕaːʔ], Yemeni Arabic: [ˈsˤɑnʕɑ]; Old South Arabian: 𐩮𐩬𐩲𐩥 Ṣnʿw), also spelled Sana'a and Sana, is the capital and largest city of Yemen and the capital of the Sanaa Governorate. The city is not part of the Governorate but forms the separate administrative district of ʾAmānat al-ʿĀṣimah (أَمَانَة ٱلْعَاصِمَة‎). According to the Yemeni constitution, Sanaa is the capital of the country,[3] although the seat of the Yemeni government moved to Aden, the former capital of South Yemen, in the aftermath of the Houthi occupation. Aden was declared as the temporary capital by then-president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in March 2015.[4] At an elevation of 2,300 metres (7,500 ft),[5] Sanaa is one of the highest capital cities in the world and is next to the Sarawat Mountains of Jabal An-Nabi Shu'ayb and Jabal Tiyal, considered to be the highest mountains in the Arabian Peninsula and one of the highest in the region. Sanaa has a population of approximately 3,292,497 (2023), making it Yemen's largest city.[6] As of 2020, the greater Sanaa urban area makes up about 10% of Yemen's total population.[7] The Old City of Sanaa, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, has a distinctive architectural character, most notably expressed in its multi-story buildings decorated with geometric patterns. In the conflict that raged in 2015, explosives hit UNESCO sites in the old city.[8][9] The Al Saleh Mosque, the largest in the country, is located in the southern outskirts of the city. Sanaa has been facing a severe water crisis,[10] with water being drawn from its aquifer three times faster than it is replenished. The city is predicted to run completely out of water by around 2030, making it the first national capital in the world to do so. Access to drinking water is very limited in Sanaa, and there are problems with water quality.[11] History [edit] See also: Timeline of Sanaa Ancient period [edit] According to Islamic sources, Sanaa was founded at the base of the mountains of Jabal Nuqum[5] by Shem, the son of Noah,[12][13][14] after the latter's death. The name Sanaa is probably derived from the Sabaic root ṣnʿ, meaning "well-fortified".[15][16][17] The name is attested in old Sabaean inscriptions, mostly from the 3rd century CE, as ṣnʿw.[15] In the present day, a popular folk etymology says that the name Sanaa refers to "the excellence of its trades and crafts (perhaps the feminine form of the Arabic adjective aṣnaʿ)".[15] The 10th-century Arab historian al-Hamdani wrote that Sanaa's ancient name was Azāl, which is not recorded in any contemporary Sabaean inscriptions.[15] The name "Azal" has been connected to Uzal, a son of Qahtan, a great-grandson of Shem, in the biblical accounts of the Book of Genesis.[18] Al-Hamdani wrote that Sanaa was walled by the Sabaeans under their ruler Sha'r Awtar, who also arguably built the Ghumdan Palace in the city. Because of its location, Sanaa has served as an urban hub for the surrounding tribes of the region and as a nucleus of regional trade in southern Arabia. It was positioned at the crossroad of two major ancient trade routes linking Ma'rib in the east to the Red Sea in the west.[14] Appropriately enough for a town whose name means "well-fortified", Sanaa appears to have been an important military center under the Sabaeans.[15] They used it as a base for their expeditions against the kingdom of Himyar further south, and several inscriptions "announce a triumphant return to Sanaa from the wars."[15] Sanaa is referred to in these inscriptions both as a town (hgr) and as a maram (mrm), which, according to A. F. L. Beeston, indicates "a place to which access is prohibited or restricted, no matter whether for religious or for other reasons".[15] The Sabaean inscriptions also mention the Ghumdan Palace by name.[15] When King Yousef Athar (or Dhu Nuwas), the last of the Himyarite kings, was in power, Sanaʽa was also the capital of the Axumite viceroys.[citation needed] Later tradition also holds that the Abyssinian conqueror Abrahah built a Christian church in Sanaa.[15] Islamic era [edit] From the era of Muhammad (ca. 622 CE) until the founding of independent sub-states in many parts of the Yemen Islamic Caliphate, Sanaa persisted as the governing seat. The Caliph's deputy ran the affairs of one of Yemen's three Makhalifs: Mikhlaf Sanaʽa, Mikhlaf al-Janad, and Mikhlaf Hadhramaut. The city of Sanaa regularly regained an important status, and all Yemenite States competed to control it.[citation needed] Imam Al-Shafi'i, the 8th-century Islamic jurist and founder of the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, visited Sanaa several times. He praised the city, writing La budda min Ṣanʻāʼ, or "Sanaa must be seen." In the 9th–10th centuries, it was written of the city that "the Yem separate from each other, empty of ordure, without smell or evil smells, because of the hard concrete [adobe and cob, probably] and fine pastureland and clean places to walk." Later in the 10th-century, the Persian geographer Ibn Rustah wrote of Sanaa, "It is the city of Yemen; there cannot be found ... a city greater, more populous or more prosperous, of nobler origin or with more delicious food than it." In 1062, Sanaa was taken over by the Sulayhid dynasty led by Ali al-Sulayhi and his wife, the popular Queen Asma. He made the city capital of his relatively small kingdom, which also included the Haraz Mountains. The Sulayhids were aligned with the Ismaili Muslim-leaning Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt, rather than the Baghdad-based Abbasid Caliphate that most of Arabia followed. Al-Sulayhi ruled for about 20 years but he was assassinated by his principal local rivals, the Zabid-based Najahids. Following his death, al-Sulayhi's daughter, Arwa al-Sulayhi, inherited the throne. She withdrew from Sanaa, transferring the Sulayhid capital to Jibla, where she ruled much of Yemen from 1067 to 1138. As a result of the Sulayhid departure, the Hamdanid dynasty took control of Sanaʽa.[19] Like the Sulayhids, the Hamdanids were Isma'ilis.[15] In 1173, Saladin, the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, sent his brother Turan-Shah on an expedition to conquer Yemen. The Ayyubids gained control of Sanaʽa in 1175 and united the various Yemeni tribal states, except for the northern mountains controlled by the Zaydi imams, into one entity.[19] The Ayyubids switched the country's official religious allegiance to the Sunni Muslim Abbasids. During the reign of the Ayyubid emir Tughtekin ibn Ayyub, the city underwent significant improvements. These included the incorporation of the garden lands on the western bank of the Sa'ilah, known as Bustan al-Sultan, where the Ayyubids built one of their palaces.[20] However, Ayyubid control of Sanaa was never very consistent, and they only occasionally exercised direct authority over the city.[15] Instead, they chose Ta'izz as their capital, while Aden was their principal income-producing city. While the Rasulids controlled most of Yemen, followed by their successors, the Tahirids, Sanaa largely remained in the political orbit of the Zaydi imams from 1323 to 1454 and outside the former two dynasties' rule.[21] The Mamelukes arrived in Yemen in 1517. Ottoman era [edit] The Ottoman Empire entered Yemen in 1538, when Suleiman the Magnificent was Sultan.[22] Under the military leadership of Özdemir Pasha, the Ottomans conquered Sanaa in 1547.[21] With Ottoman approval, European captains based in the Yemeni port towns of Aden and Mocha frequented Sanaa to maintain special privileges and capitulations for their trade. In 1602, the local Zaydi imams led by Imam al-Mu'ayyad reasserted their control over the area,[22] and forced out Ottoman troops in 1629. Although the Ottomans fled during al-Mu'ayyad's reign, his predecessor al-Mansur al-Qasim had already vastly weakened the Ottoman army in Sanaʽa and Yemen.[21] Consequently, European traders were stripped of their previous privileges.[22] The Zaydi imams maintained their rule over Sanaa until the mid-19th century when the Ottomans relaunched their campaign to control the region. In 1835, Ottoman troops arrived on the Yemeni coast under the guise of Muhammad Ali of Egypt's troops.[22] They did not capture Sanaa until 1872, when their troops led by Ahmed Muhtar Pasha entered the city.[21] The Ottoman Empire instituted the Tanzimat reforms throughout the lands they governed. In Sanaa, city planning was initiated for the first time, new roads were built, and schools and hospitals were established. The reforms were rushed by the Ottomans to solidify their control of Sanaʽa to compete with an expanding Egypt, British influence in Aden, and imperial Italian and French influence along the coast of Somalia, particularly in the towns of Djibouti and Berbera. The modernization reforms in Sanaa were still very limited, however.[23] North Yemen period [edit] In 1904, as Ottoman influence was waning in Yemen, Imam Yahya of the Zaydi Imams took power in Sanaa. In a bid to secure North Yemen's independence, Yahya embarked on a policy of isolationism, avoiding international and Arab world politics, cracking down on embryonic liberal movements, not contributing to the development of infrastructure in Sanaa and elsewhere and closing down the Ottoman girls' school. As a consequence of Yahya's measures, Sanaa increasingly became a hub of anti-government organization and intellectual revolt.[23] In the 1930s, several organizations opposing or demanding reform of the Zaydi imamate sprung up in the city, particularly Fatat al-Fulayhi, a group of various Yemeni Muslim scholars based in Sanaʽa's Fulayhi Madrasa, and Hait al-Nidal ("Committee of the Struggle.") By 1936, most of the leaders of these movements were imprisoned. In 1941, another group based in the city, the Shabab al-Amr bil-Maruf wal-Nahian al-Munkar, called for a nahda ("renaissance") in the country as well as the establishment of a parliament with Islam as the instrument of Yemeni revival. Yahya largely repressed the Shabab and most of its leaders were executed following his son Imam Ahmad's inheritance of power in 1948.[23] That year, Sanaa was replaced with Ta'izz as capital following Ahmad's new residence there. Most government offices followed suit. A few years later, most of the city's Jewish population emigrated to Israel.[24] Ahmad began a process of gradual economic and political liberalization, but by 1961, Sanaa was witnessing major demonstrations and riots demanding quicker reform and change. Pro-republican officers in the North Yemeni military sympathetic of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt's government and pan-Arabist policies staged a coup overthrowing the Imamate government in September 1962, a week after Ahmad's death.[23] Sanaa's role as a capital was restored afterward. [24] Neighboring Saudi Arabia opposed this development and actively supported North Yemen's rural tribes, pitting large parts of the country against the urban and largely pro-republican inhabitants of Sanaa.[23] The North Yemen Civil War resulted in the destruction of some parts of the city's ancient heritage and continued until 1968, when a deal between the republicans and the royalists was reached,[24] establishing a presidential system. Instability in Sanaa continued due to continuing coups and political assassinations until the situation in the country stabilized in the late 1970s.[23] The new government's modernization projects changed the face of Sanaa: the new Tahrir Square was built on what had formerly been the former imam's palace grounds, and new buildings were constructed on the north and northwest of the city. This was accompanied by the destruction of several of the old city's gates, as well as sections of the wall around it.[25] After the end of the civil war in 1970, Sanaa began to expand outward.[25] This was a period of prosperity in Yemen, partly due to the massive migration of Yemeni workers to the Gulf states and their subsequent sending of money back home. At first, most of the new development was concentrated around central areas like al-Tahrir, the modern centre; Bi'r al-Azab, the Ottoman quarter; and Bab al-Yaman, the old southern gate. However, this soon shifted to the city's outskirts, where an influx of immigrants from the countryside established new neighborhoods. Two areas in particular experienced major growth during this period: first, the area along Taizz Road in the south, and second, a broader area on the west side of the city, between Bi'r al-Azab and the new avenue called Sittin.[26] A new ring road, built in the 1970s on the recommendation of the United Nations Development Programme, encouraged land speculation and further contributed to the rapid expansion of Sanaa.[25] Sanaa's new areas were physically different from the quarters of the old city. Many of the Yemenis who had migrated to the Gulf states had worked in construction, where they had become well-acquainted with Western and Egyptian techniques. When they returned to Yemen, they brought those techniques with them. New construction consisted of concrete and concrete block houses with multi-lite windows and plaster decorations, laid out in a grid pattern. Their amenities, including independence from extended families and the possibility of owning a car, attracted many families from the old city, and they moved to the new districts in growing numbers. Meanwhile, the old city, with its unpaved streets, poor drainage, lack of water and sewer systems, and litter (from the use of manufactured products, which was becoming increasingly common), was becoming increasingly unattractive to residents. Disaster struck in the late 1970s — water pipes were laid to bring water into the old city, but there was no way to pipe it out, resulting in huge amounts of groundwater building up in the old city. This destabilized building foundations and led to many houses collapsing.[25] 21st century [edit] Following the unification of Yemen, Sanaa was designated capital of the new Republic of Yemen. It houses the presidential palace, the parliament, the supreme court, and the country's government ministries. The largest source of employment is provided by governmental civil service. Due to massive rural immigration, Sanaa has grown far outside its Old City, but this has placed a huge strain on the city's underdeveloped infrastructure and municipal services, particularly water.[23] Sanaa was chosen as the 2004 Arab Cultural Capital by the Arab League. In 2008, the Al Saleh Mosque was completed. It holds over 40,000 worshippers. In 2011, Sanaa, as the Yemeni capital, was the centre of the Yemeni Revolution, in which President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted. Between May and November, the city was a battleground in what became known as the 2011 Battle of Sanaa. On May 21, 2012, Sanaa was attacked by a suicide bomber, resulting in the deaths of 120 soldiers. On January 23, 2013, a drone strike near Al-Masna'ah village killed two civilians, according to a report[27] issued by Radhya Al-Mutawakel and Abdulrasheed Al-Faqih and Open Societies Foundations. Houthi control (2014–present) [edit] Main article: Houthi takeover in Yemen On September 21, 2014, during the Houthi insurgency, the Houthis seized control of Sanaa. On June 12, 2015, Saudi-led airstrikes targeting Shiite rebels and their allies in Yemen destroyed historic houses in the middle of the capital. A UNESCO World Heritage Site was severely damaged.[28] On October 8, 2016, Saudi-led airstrikes targeted a hall in Sanaa where a funeral was taking place. At least 140 people were killed and about 600 were wounded. After initially denying it was behind the attack, the Coalition's Joint Incidents Assessment Team admitted that it had bombed the hall but claimed that this attack had been a mistake caused by bad information.[29] In May 2017, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, an outbreak of cholera killed 115 people and left 8,500 ill.[30] In late 2017, another Battle of Sanaa broke out between the Houthis and forces loyal to former President Saleh, who was killed. On May 17, 2022, the first commercial flight in six years took off from Sanaa International Airport as part of a UN-brokered 60-day truce agreement struck between the Houthis and the internationally-recognized government the prior month.[31] Geography and climate [edit] Natural setting [edit] Sanaa is located on a plain of the same name, the Haql Sanaa, which is over 2,200m above sea level. The plain is roughly 50–60 km long north–south and about 25 km wide, east–west, in the area north of Sanaa, and somewhat narrower further south. To the east and west, the Sanaa plain is bordered by cliffs and mountains, with wadis coming down from them. The northern part of the area slopes gently upward toward the district of Arhab, which was historically known as al-Khashab. Much of the Sanaa plain is drained by the Wadi al-Kharid, which flows northward, through the northeastern corner of the plain, towards al-Jawf, which is a broad wadi that drains the eastern part of the Yemeni highlands. The southern part of the plain straddles the watershed between the al-Kharid and the Wadi Siham, which flows southwest towards the Yemeni Tihama.[33] Sanaa itself is located at the narrowest part of the plain, nestled between Jabal Nuqum to the east and the foothills of Jabal An-Nabi Shu'ayb, Yemen's tallest mountain, to the west. The mountain's peak is 25 km (16 mi) west of Sanaa.[33] Because of this position, with the city sandwiched between mountains to the east and west, most of Sanaa's expansion in recent decades has been along a north-south axis.[34] Jabal Nuqum rises about 500 metres (1,600 feet) above Sanaa.[33] According to the 10th-century writer Al-Hamdani, the mountain was the site of an iron mine, although no trace of it exists today; he also mentions a particular type of onyx which came from Nuqum.[33] Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi described a dam located at Nuqum; its location is not known.[33] This dam probably served to divert the waters coming down from the western face of the mountain and prevent them from flooding the city of Sanaa.[33] Such a flood is known to have happened in 692 (73 AH), before the dam was built, and it is described as having destroyed some of Sanaa's houses.[33] Despite its proximity to the city, Jabal Nuqum does not appear to have been fortified until 1607 (1016 AH), when a fort was built to serve as a lookout point to warn of potential attackers.[33] The main mountain stronghold during the Middle Ages was Jabal Barash, further to the east.[33] Parts of the Sanaa plain have signs of relatively recent volcanic activity (geologically speaking), with volcanic cones and lava fields. One such area is located to the north, on the road to the Qa al-Bawn, and the next plain to the north, located around 'Amran and Raydah. The modern route between the two plains passes to the west of Jabal Din, a volcanic peak that marks the highest point between the two plains, although in medieval times the main route went to the east of the mountain.[33] Architecture [edit] Sanaa's Old City is renowned for its tower houses, which are typically built from stone and fired brick and can reach up to 8 stories in height. The doors and windows feature are decorated with plaster openings. They traditionally housed a single extended patrilineal family, with new floors being built as sons married and had children of their own. (New buildings would also sometimes be built on adjacent land.) The ground floor was typically used as grain storage and for housing animals. Most families no longer keep either animals or grain, so many homeowners set up shops on the ground floor instead. (This often leads to conflict with building inspectors, since doing so is prohibited by law.)[25] Meanwhile, the uppermost story, called the mafraj, is used as a second reception room and hosts afternoon qat chewing sessions.[15] Tower houses continue to be built in Sanaa, often using modern materials; often they are built from concrete blocks with decorative "veneers" of brick and stone.[25] These "neo-traditional" tower houses are found in newer districts as well as the old city.[26] Most new residences built in Sanaa, though, use newer styles of architecture. The most common are "new villas", which are low-rise houses with fenced yards; they are especially common in the southern and western parts of the city. The other main archetype is smaller, "Egyptian-style" houses, which are usually built with reinforced concrete. These are most commonly found in the northern and eastern parts of Sanaa.[26] Several tower houses in Sanaa Tower houses Closer view of a single tower house, showing the plaster decoration Street scene in the 1960s, showing newer concrete-based architecture Sanaa Archaeological Library, showing a mix of styles: the windows evoke those of old tower houses, while the materials and structure are essentially modern. Contemporary monument in Sanaa, as-Sab'in street Cityscape [edit] Generally, Sanaʽa is divided into two parts: the Old City District ("al-Qadeemah") and the new city ("al-Jadid.") The former is much smaller and retains the city's ancient heritage and mercantile way-of-living while the latter is an urban sprawl with many suburbs and modern buildings. The newer parts of the city were largely developed in the 1960s and onward when Sanaʽa was chosen as the republican capital.[24] In recent decades, Sanaa has grown into a multipolar city, with various districts and suburbs serving as hubs of commercial, industrial, and social activity. Their development has generally been unplanned by central authorities. Many of them were initially set up by new arrivals from rural areas. Increasing land prices and commercial rents in the central city has also pushed many residents and commercial establishment outwards, towards these new hubs. Souks have been especially important in the development of these areas.[26] Neighbourhoods [edit] Old City [edit] The Old City of Sanaʽa[32] (Arabic: مَدِيْنَة صَنْعَاء ٱلْقَدِيْمَة, romanized: Madīnat Ṣanʿāʾ Al-Qadīmah) is recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The old fortified city has been inhabited for more than 2,500 years and contains many intact architectural sites. The oldest, partially standing architectural structure in the Old City of Sanaʽa is Ghumdan Palace. The city was declared a World Heritage Site by the United Nations in 1986. Efforts are underway to preserve some of the oldest buildings some of which, such as the Samsarh and the Great Mosque of Sanaʽa, is more than 1,400 years old. Surrounded by ancient clay walls that stand 9–14 metres (30–46 ft) high, the Old City contains more than 100 mosques, 12 hammams (baths), and 6,500 houses. Many of the houses resemble ancient skyscrapers, reaching several stories high and topped with flat roofs. They are decorated with elaborate friezes and intricately carved frames and stained-glass windows. British writer Jonathan Raban visited in the 1970s and described the city as fortress-like, its architecture and layout resembling a labyrinth", further noting "It was like stepping out into the middle of a vast pop-up picture book. Away from the street, the whole city turned into a maze of another kind, a dense, jumbled alphabet of signs and symbols."[citation needed] One of the most popular attractions is Suq al-Milh (Salt Market), where it is possible to buy salt along with bread, spices, raisins, cotton, copper, pottery, silverware, and antiques. The 7th-century Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr (the Great Mosque) is one of the oldest mosques in the world. The Bāb al-Yaman[32] ("Gate of the Yemen") is an iconized entry point through the city walls and is more than 1,000 years old. A commercial area of the Old City is known as Al Madina where development is proceeding rapidly. In addition to three large hotels, there are numerous stores and restaurants. The area also contains three parks and the President's palace. The National Museum of Yemen is located here. Traditionally, the Old City was composed of several quarters (hara), generally centred on an endowed complex containing a mosque, a bathhouse, and an agricultural garden (maqshama). Human waste from households was disposed of via chutes. In the mountain air, it dried fairly quickly and was then used as fuel for the bathhouse. Meanwhile, the gardens were watered using gray water from the mosque's ablution pool.[25] One of these quarters was Qa' al-Yahud, or the Jewish Quarter, located on the Western side of the old city. It had a distinct architecture that was defined by buildings with larger floor plans, houses which had the main socializing room elevated to the top of the house, and tended to be shorter than the standard houses of the city.[35] Al-Tahrir [edit] Al-Tahrir was designed as the new urban and economic hub of Sanaa during the 1960s. It is still the symbolic centre of the city, but economic activity here is relatively low. In the 21st century, development here pivoted more towards making it a civic and recreational centre.[26] Bi'r al-Azab [edit] An old Ottoman and Jewish quarter of Sanaa[26] located to the west of the old city, Bi'r al-Azab was first mentioned in historical sources in 1627 (1036 AH), in the Ghayat al-amanni of Yahya ibn al-Husayn.[33] As part of central Sanaa, Bi'r al-Azab was one of the areas where new development was first concentrated during the 1970s. Today, it is mostly a residential and administrative district, with embassies, the office of the Prime Minister, and the chamber of deputies being located here.[26] Others [edit] The area roughly between the two main circular roads around the city (Ring Road and Sittin) is extremely active, with a high population density and very busy souks. These areas are crossed by major commercial thoroughfares such as al-Zubayri and Abd al-Mughni Street, and are extensively served by public transport. Particularly significant districts in this area include al-Hasabah in the north, Shumayla in the south, and Hayil in the west.[26] Al-Hasabah was formerly a separate village as described by medieval writers al-Hamdani and al-Razi, but by the 1980s it had become a suburb of Sanaa.[33] The southwestern area on both sides of Haddah Road is a generally affluent area with relatively more reliable access to utilities like water and sanitation. Many residents originally moved here from Aden after Yemeni reunification in 1990. Since the 1990s, there has been development of high-rise buildings in this area.[26] Administration [edit] In 1983, as Sanaa experienced an explosion in population, the city was made into a governorate of its own, called Amanat al-Asimah ("the Capital's Secretariat"), by Presidential Decree No. 13.[7] This governorate was then subdivided into nine districts in 2001, by Presidential Decree No. 2; a tenth district, Bani Al Harith District, was added within the same year.[7] However, the exact legal status of the new Amanat al-Asimah Governorate, and the hierarchy of administrative authority, was never made clear.[7] Since then, the city of Sanaa has encompassed the following districts: Old City District Al Wahdah District As Sabain District Assafi'yah District At Tahrir District Ath'thaorah District Az'zal District Bani Al Harith District Ma'ain District Shu'aub District Climate [edit] Sanaʽa features a cold desert climate (Köppen: BWk).[36] Sanaʽa sees on average 265 mm (10.43 in) of precipitation per year. Due to its high elevation, however, temperatures are much more moderate than many other cities on the Arabian Peninsula; average temperatures remain relatively constant throughout the year in Sanaa, with its coolest month being January and its warmest month July. Even considering this, as a result of its lower latitude and higher elevation, UV radiation from the sun is much stronger than in the hotter climates further north on the Arab peninsula. The city seldom experiences extreme heat or cold. Some areas around the city, however, can see temperatures fall to around −9 °C (16 °F) or −7 °C (19 °F) during winter. Frost usually occurs in the early winter mornings, and there is a slight wind chill in the city at elevated areas that causes the cold mornings to be bitter, including low humidity. The sun warms the city to the high 20–22 °C (68–72 °F) during the noontime but it drops drastically after nightfall to a low around 3–4 °C (37–39 °F). The city experiences many microclimates from district to district because of its location in the Sanaa basin and uneven elevations throughout the city. Summers are warm and it can cool swiftly at night, especially after rainfall. Sanaa receives almost all of its annual rainfall from April to August. Rainfall amounts vary from year to year; some years could see 500–600 mm (20–24 inches) of rainfall, while others barely get 150 mm (5.9 inches). High temperatures have increased slightly during the summer over the past few years, while low temperatures and winter temperatures have also risen over the same period. Culture [edit] See also: Culture of Yemen Music [edit] Sanaa has a rich musical tradition and is particularly renowned for the musical style called al-Ghina al-San'ani (Arabic: الغناء الصنعاني al-ġināʾ aṣ-Ṣanʿānī), or "the song of Sanaa", which dates back to the 14th century and was designated as a UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2003.[40] This style of music is not exclusive to Sanaa, and is found in other areas of Yemen as well, but it is most closely associated with the city.[40] It is one of about five regional genres or "colors" (lawn) of Yemeni music, along with Yafi'i, Laheji, Adeni, and Hadhrami.[41] It is often part of social events, including the samra, or evening wedding party, and the magyal, or daily afternoon gathering of friends.[40] The basic format consists of a singer accompanied by two instrumentalists, one playing the qanbus (Yemeni lute) and the other playing the sahn nuhasi, which is a copper tray balanced on the musician's thumbs and played by being lightly struck by the other eight fingers.[40] Lyrics are in both classical Arabic and Yemeni Arabic and are known for their wordplay and emotional content.[40] Singers often use melismatic vocals, and the arrangements feature pauses between verses and instrumental sections.[41] Skilled performers often "embellish" a song's melody to highlight its emotional tone.[40] In the earliest days of the recording industry in Yemen, from 1938 into the 1940s, Sanaani music was the dominant genre among Yemenis who could afford to buy records and phonographs (primarily in Aden).[41] As prices fell, Sanaani-style records became increasingly popular among the middle class, but at the same time, it began to encounter competition from other genres, including Western and Indian music as well as music from other Arab countries.[41] The earliest Sanaani recording stars generally came from wealthy religious families.[41] The most popular was 'Ali Abu Bakr Ba Sharahil, who recorded for Odeon Records; other popular artists included Muhammad and Ibrahim al-Mas, Ahmad 'Awad al-Jarrash, and Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Makkawi.[41] Theatre [edit] Main article: Theatre in Yemen Yemen has a rich, lively tradition of theatre-going back at least a century. In Sanaa, most performances take place at the Cultural Center[42] (Markaz al-Thaqafi),[43] which was originally designed as an auditorium instead of a theatre. It "possesses only the most basic of lighting and sound equipment, and the smallest of wings"[42] and lacks space to store props or backdrops. Yet despite the scarce resources, "dramatic talent and creativity abound"[42] and productions draw large, enthusiastic crowds who react on the action onstage with vigor: "uproarious laughter at clever lines, and deafening cheers for the victorious hero, but also occasional shouts of disagreement, cries of shock when an actor or actress breaks a taboo or expresses a controversial opinion."[42] Katherine Hennessey draws attention to the fact that Yemeni women act alongside men onstage, write and direct plays (Nargis Abbad being one of the most popular), and make up a significant part of audiences, often bringing their children with them. She contrasts all these factors to the other countries on the Arabian peninsula: places like Qatar or Saudi Arabia have extensive resources and fancier facilities, but not much of a theatrical tradition, and casts and audiences are often segregated by gender.[42] Since Yemeni reunification in the early 1990s, the government has sponsored annual national theatre festivals, typically scheduled to coincide with World Theatre Day on March 27. In the 21st century, the actors and directors have increasingly come from Sanaa.[42] In 2012, in addition to the festival, there was a national theatre competition, sponsored by Equal Access Yemen and Future Partners for Development, featuring theatre troupes from around the country. It had two rounds; the first was held in six different governorates, and the second was held in Sanaa.[43] Sanaa's theatre scene was disrupted by war and famine in the 2010s; additionally, since the Houthis gained control of the city in 2014, they "have imposed strict rules on dress, gender segregation, and entertainment in the capital." In December 2020, however, a performance was held in Sanaa by one troupe, to offer respite and entertainment to people in a city suffering from the civil war and the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Directed by Mohammad Khaled, the performance drew a crowd of "dozens of men, women and children."[44] Sports [edit] Football is the most popular sport in Sanaʽa. The city is home to the Ali Muhesen Stadium, home of the Yemen national football team, and is mostly used for football matches. The stadium holds 25,000 people. Zoo [edit] Like Ta'izz Zoo, this zoo held fauna caught in the wild, such as the Arabian leopard, as well as imported animals such as African lions and gazelles.[45] The lions were thought to be of Ethiopian origin, but a phylogeographic test demonstrated them to be different from captive Ethiopian lions kept at Addis Ababa Zoo, and more similar to lions from Eastern and Southern Africa.[46] Qat [edit] There is a daily practice of Qat chewing which exists within the city of Sana'a. Qat is a type of plant with stimulant-like qualities. This daily practice occurs in a mafraj, which is a room designated for Qat chewing. Qat comes in three different varieties, Ahmar, Abiad, and Azraq, (translated to red white, and blue) with Ahmar being considered of the highest quality, and Abiad being considered the weakest. According to a foreign resident, the Qat from the North of Sana'a is the most prized of the Qat grown locally. This daily chewing tradition starts in the Qat market, with the leaves used for a particular day being bought day of use.[47] Demographics [edit] Historical populationYearPop.±% p.a.191118,000[48]— 192125,000[49]+3.34%193125,000+0.00%194080,000+13.80%1963100,000+0.97%1965110,000+4.88%1975134,600[50]+2.04%1981280,000+12.98%1986427,505+8.83%1994954,448+10.56%20011,590,624+7.57%20041,748,000[51]+3.19%20051,937,451[21]+10.84%20233,769,615[52]+3.77% The city's population growth soared from the 1960s onward as a result of mass rural migration to the city in search of employment and improved standard of living.[24] Sanaʽa is the fastest-growing capital city in the world with a growth rate of 7%,[53] while the growth rate of the nation as a whole is 3.2%.[54] About 10% of the population resides in the Old City, while the remainder lives in the outside districts.[24] The three large administrative districts in increasing population size are Shu'ub (شعوب), Ma'in (معيت), and As-sab'in (السبعين), with populations of about 500,000, 630,000, and 730,000 respectively.[52] The population in Sanaa is very young, with almost 60% of people in the Amanat al-Asimah Governorate being under 18 years old.[7] The population also skews slightly male, with a male-to-female ratio of 1.10.[52] A majority of Sanaa's inhabitants practice Zaydi Islam, while Sunnis and Isma'ilis are minority groups.[55] Sunnis tend to be most concentrated in the newer parts of the city, reflecting an influx of new residents from the countryside since the late 20th century.[55] Social class [edit] Before the revolution of 1962, Sanaani society was divided into a fairly well-defined hierarchy of social classes.[56] There were five major groups: ranked from highest to lowest, they were the sayyids, the qadis, the mansibs (plural: manasib), the Bani Khumis (also called the muzayyin), and the akhdam.[56] Since then, the system of social class has changed significantly in the context of market capitalism.[56] At the top of the traditional social order were the sayyids, who claimed descent from Muhammad and were therefore seen as the legitimate ruling class.[56] Right below them were the qadis, who similarly claimed descent from "an original class of judges".[56] Because of their elite status, the sayyids were the main targets of the 1962 revolution, but they and the qadis continue to wield a strong cultural influence today.[56] Below these elite groups were the manasib, whose name literally means "dignity", "rank", or "position".[56] These included artisans employed in "honourable" trades, such as metalsmiths (for gold, silver, copper, and iron), carpenters, dyers, builders and masons, plumbers, turners (i.e. lathe operators), porters, painters of inscriptions, and makers of weapons, hookahs, or mattresses.[56] Although these trades were seen as somewhat demeaning for members of the upper classes to take part in, they were still fairly respectable and in some cases sayyids or qadis would engage in them as a main source of income.[56] The manasib were generally considered to have tribal ancestry and martial connotations, and they were the ones who were mustered to defend the city when it was attacked.[56] The Bani Khumis, literally the "sons of the fifth", were the ones who took part in trades that the three higher-ranked classes refused to work in.[56] These included cobblers, tanners, makers of leather sheaths, saddlers, brickmakers, butchers, barbers, bath attendants, coffee house proprietors, brass founders, and vegetable gardeners.[56] Below the Bani Khumis were the akhdam, the lowest social class, who were mostly street sweepers.[56] This traditional class hierarchy began to change rapidly in the decades after the 1962 revolution.[56] Particularly during the 1970s, there was a shift towards a new social hierarchy that was based not on birthright but on wealth.[56] For example, working in commerce (such as qat merchants or café proprietors) was traditionally looked down upon by upper classes like sayyids and qabilis (i.e. tribesmen), but as it became increasingly lucrative during the 1970s, it was increasingly seen as respectable and now some members of the traditional upper classes are willing to engage in these trades.[56] (This does not extend to all profitable trades, though — butchering, for example, still has a stigma despite bringing in a fair amount of money.)[56] This shift has been far more pronounced in Sanaa, a big city where resources are most concentrated than in rural areas (where old social divisions are much more strongly maintained today).[56] Some of the contributing factors to the shift included the new education system, modeled on Egypt's; widespread migration of Yemeni men to other, oil-rich Arab states; and greater integration of Yemen into the global economy.[56] Jewish community [edit] Jews have been present in Yemen since the 5th century BCE and form part of the historic Jewish diasporas.[57] In Sanaʽa, Jews had initially settled within the enclosed citadel, known as al-Qaṣr, near the ruins of the old tower known as Ghumdan Palace, but were evicted from there in the late 6th century by the ruling monarch, and moved to a different section of the city, known as al-Marbaki (also called the Falayhi Quarter). From there, they again uprooted and were made to settle in the section of the city known as al-Quzali, and eventually moved and settled in the neighborhood of al-Sa'ilah. In 1679, during the Mawza Exile, they were once again evicted from their place of residence. Upon returning to the city in 1680, they were given a plot of land outside of the city walls, where they built the new Jewish Quarter, al-Qāʻ (now Qāʻ al-ʻUlufi), and where they remained until the community's demise in the mid-20th century.[58] In 1839 the Reverend Joseph Wolff, who later went to Bukhara to attempt to save Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stoddart and Captain Arthur Conolly, found in Yemen, near Sana'a, a tribe claiming to be descendants of Jehonadab.[59] After the creation of the political State of Israel in 1948, about 49,000 (of an estimated 51,000) of Yemenite Jews were airlifted to Israel, almost 10,000 of whom were from Sanaʽa (see the English-language book Jews and Muslims in lower Yemen: a study in protection and restraint, 1918–1949). There was then essentially no Jewish population in Sanaʽa until the Shia insurgency broke out in northern Yemen in 2004. The Houthis directly threatened the Jewish community in 2007, prompting the government of President Saleh to offer them refuge in Sanaʽa. As of 2010 , around 700 Jews were living in the capital under government protection.[60] In April 2017, it was reported that 40 of the last 50 Jews were in an enclave next to the American Embassy in Sana'a, and they were subject to threats of ethnic cleansing by the Houthis.[61] On 28 April 2020 Yemenite Minister Moammer al-Iryani remarked the fate of the last 50 Jews in Yemen is unknown.[62] On 16 July 2020 5 Jews were allowed to leave Yemen by the Houthi leaving 33 Jews in the country.[63] In July 2020 the Mona Relief reported on their Website that as of July 19, 2020 of the Jewish population in Yemen, there were only a "handful" of Jews in Sana'a.[64] Economy [edit] Historically, Sanaʽa had a mining industry. The hills around Sanaʽa were mined for onyx, chalcedony, and cornelian.[65] The city also traded in agricultural products and due to being on the route from Aden towards the greater Arab world, was also a main market for imported western goods.[65] The city was also known for its metalwork, which the British described as "famous" in the early 20th century, but declining in popularity.[66] As of 1920, Sanaʽa was described by the British as being "well supplied with fruit and grapes, and has good water."[67] As the capital city of Yemen, nearly 40% of jobs in Sanaʽa are in the public sector.[34] The city is also an important centre for commerce and industry in Yemen.[34] Additionally, like many other cities in the developing world, Sanaʽa has a large informal sector that is estimated to constitute 32% of nongovernmental employment as of 2002.[34] By far the largest area of the economy, both in terms of the number of businesses and jobs, is in commerce and small services.[34] As of 2004, 58.9% of all establishments and 31.3% of all jobs in Sanaa belong to this category.[34] Another major category is general administration, which only makes up 0.8% of employers but has 18.0% of workers, making it the second largest in that regard.[34] Manufacturing is the third-largest category by both measures, with about 12% for both.[34] Sanaa also has a higher concentration of hotels and restaurants than elsewhere in the country.[34] About 62% of jobs in Sanaa are working for private, locally owned enterprises, followed by state-owned enterprises which employ 31%.[34] Waqfs, private foreign-owned companies, and private joint ventures make up the rest in that order, with none employing more than 2%.[34] Sanaa's economy is large compared to its population: as of 2004, it was home to only 9% of Yemen's population but 16% of the country's businesses and 22% of its formal-sector jobs.[34] The average size of a business establishment in Sanaa is small, at 3.88 employees on average; however, this is higher than the national average of 2.87 and only Aden has a higher average of 6.88 employees.[34] Between 1992 and 2006, 39% of all new formal-sector jobs in Yemen were created in Sanaa, along with 33% of new business establishments.[34] In terms of jobs created, Sanaa is ahead of all other governorates in Yemen by a factor of three.[34] Poverty and income inequality [edit] While Sanaa has a vibrant, diverse economy with more jobs being created than anywhere else in Yemen, it also has the highest concentration of poverty in the country.[34] It is home to 6.5% of the country's total poor population and 23% of the poor urban population.[34] About 15% of the city's population lives below the national poverty line as of 2007.[34] There are also many people living just above the poverty line who are still in a relatively precarious financial position.[34] High unemployment is another problem; by some estimates, as much as 25% of Sanaa's potential workforce is unemployed.[34] Income inequality is also increasing: from 1998 to 2005, the Gini coefficient for Sanaa increased from 37% to 44%: a 21% increase, the highest in the country.[34] High inflation, low per capita income growth, and disproportionate gains by the rich have contributed to a middle class squeeze in Sanaa's middle class since the 1980s.[34] Challenges facing local businesses [edit] A 2005 survey of 488 Yemeni firms by the Mitsubishi Research Institute included a subset of 175 firms in Sanaa.[34] They reported similar challenges in doing business with firms throughout the country.[34] In particular, corruption is a problem in their dealings with the government, and hefty bribes are often a necessity.[34] Certain businesses can use their connections to dodge taxes and regulations, which puts other businesses at a disadvantage because they have to abide by the rules.[34] Long delays for customs clearances, especially for imports, are ubiquitous, and over 70% of the surveyed firms reported that they had made extra-legal payments to customs officials.[34] Financial constraints also confront many entrepreneurs in Sanaa: the cost of bank credit is also prohibitively high, and loan guarantees often comes with heavy demands that are difficult to meet.[34] Shortcomings in municipal infrastructure are another problem: for example, because access to electricity is unreliable, many firms have to install their own backup generators.[34] Energy [edit] Before the civil war, Yemen's electricity was primarily supplied by the Ma'rib gas-fired power plant, which came online in 2009 and supplied 27 to 40 percent of the country's electricity while active.[7] (Before that, the power came from six diesel power plants in Sanaa itself.)[7] The Ma'rib plant is connected to the Bani Hushaysh substation by a power line with a capacity of 400 kV, and the Bani Hushaysh substation is then connected to substations in Dhahban and Hizyaz by two 132-kV lines.[7] However, the Ma'rib-Sanaa power line was frequently targeted by attacks; there were 54 attacks on the power line between 2010 and 2013.[7] The Ma'rib plant ceased operations in 2015.[7] The Dhahban and Hizyaz substations also have generating capacity in addition to being supplied by the Ma'rib plant.[7] The Dhahban station is the main one in Sanaa; located 10 km northwest of the city, it had an original generating capacity of 20 MW, with another 30 MW installed during the 2000s, bringing the total to 50 MW.[7] The Hizyaz station consists of three power plants: the first, with a capacity of 30 MW, was completed in 2002.[7] Another 60 MW plant was added in 2004, and then in 2007 the third plant, with a capacity of 30 MW, was also completed.[7] While most of prewar Sanaa was connected to the electrical grid, including at least partial coverage in most of the city's 35 informal settlements, access to electricity was unreliable.[7] Power outages were common, and one 2011 report suggested that electricity was only available for one hour per day.[7] The civil war has severely impacted the energy sector in Yemen, due to several factors including damage from attacks, lack of funding for maintenance, and fuel shortages.[7] As of 2018, 43% of Sanaa's energy assets were destroyed, while another 38% had suffered partial damage; in addition, 81% of the facilities were not functioning.[7] As a result, the public power supply in Sanaa has become almost nonexistent: of the daily 500 MW electricity demand in the city, the city receives 40 MW.[7] The public electricity supply is now mostly or entirely supplied by the Hizyaz station, whose capacity has been reduced to 7 MW.[7] Public grid access covers around 2% of the population, mostly in nearby neighborhoods, and it is expensive for consumers.[7] Private services using their generators also sell electricity to customers; they cover another 2.8% and cost about as much as the public supply.[7] The largest share of electrical supply in Sanaa came from privately owned solar panels and diesel generators, which together covered 30% of the population.[7] Solar power rapidly gained popularity in Yemen in 2015, and in 2016, it became the leading source of electricity in the country.[7] Prices of fuel and diesel in Yemen have risen dramatically since the start of the war; current prices are 150% of what they were in 2017.[7] The most recent crisis in Sanaa came in September 2019, leading to days-long lines at gas stations.[7] Black market prices can be three times higher than the official ones, leaving many unable to afford fuel.[7] Education [edit] Sanaa is relatively well-educated among Yemeni cities, and much more than the country as a whole.[34] Private education is highly desired by more affluent residents, but access to it is nowhere near as good as in other capital cities in the region.[34] Each of Sanaa's districts has its educational district, with several government schools in each one.[68] The war in Yemen has severely affected education in Sanaa.[68] After the internationally recognized government relocated the national bank from Sanaa to Aden in 2016, it stopped paying salaries to public-sector employees in Houthi-controlled areas.[68] Many teachers quit teaching because of this, and they were replaced by inexperienced volunteers.[68] Sanaa University was established in 1970 to prepare Yemenis to work as teachers.[69] As of 1984 it remained the only higher education institute in Yemen.[69] In that time its enrolment had grown from 68 students in 1970–71 to around 9,700 in 1983–84.[69] During its early years, Sanaa University was largely financed by Kuwait, and most professors, administrators, and teaching materials came from Kuwait as well.[69] As of the 1980s, most professors came from Ain Shams University in Cairo.[69] At that time, 10% of students at the university were female.[69] The university's academic year consists of two 18-week semesters as well as an 8-week summer session.[69] As of 1984, instruction was in Arabic in all faculties except for the Faculty of Science, where it was done in English.[69] The then-planned Faculties of Engineering and Medical Sciences were also planned to have instruction done in English.[69] As of 1984, one in five freshmen at Sanaa University went on to graduate in four years (the statistic for students who graduated after more than four years was not given).[69] Health [edit] As of October 2016, there are 88 health facilities in the Sanaa metro area.[7] These include 5 primary-level health units (covering 1,000–5,000 people each), 56 health centres (covering over 50,000 people each — higher than the national average of 36,340, as well as the recommended standard of 5,000–20,000 per health centre), and 19 hospitals (covering on average some 390,000 people, over twice the recommended amount of 150,000 each).[7] The hospitals have on average 6.9 beds per 10,000 people, which is slightly above the national average of 6.2 but well below the recommended minimum of 10.[7] As of 2016 there are also 25 ambulances in the city.[7] As of 2019, 77 healthcare facilities in Sanaa are supported by Health Cluster partners, including provision of outpatient consultations, medical interventions, fuel and water support, and staff training.[7] Sanaa's healthcare providers also serve people from surrounding governorates.[7] It is one of two Yemeni cities offering tertiary healthcare services.[7] The largest of the country's 6 blood transfusion centres is located at Sanaa's As-Sabeen Maternal Hospital.[7] Additionally, most of Yemen's 40 providers of psychiatric care are located in Sanaa as of 2016.[7] The ongoing conflict has severely affected the health sector in Sanaa.[7] In 2018, the total cost of damage to the health sector in Sanaa was estimated to be between 191 million and US$233 million.[7] As of 2016, there was a ratio of 20 healthcare workers for every 10,000 people; this ratio had decreased to 14 by 2018, well below the World Health Organization's recommended minimum of 22 health staff per 10,000 people.[7] There are severe shortages of medicines in Sanaa, with 57 types of cancer medicines and 8 kidney dialysis medicines being commercially unavailable.[7] Those medicines that are available are subjected to large price increases.[7] On 27 April 2018, As-Sabeen Maternal Hospital was hit by an airstrike and made inoperational.[7] As of 2020, no information is available about its status.[7] Additionally, the closure of Sanaa International Airport to commercial flights in August 2016 prevented Yemenis from traveling abroad to receive specialized medical treatment unavailable in the country.[7] Before it shut down, an estimated 7,000 Yemenis traveled through the airport to do so, including treatment for heart, kidney, and liver conditions, blood conditions, and cancer.[7] Sanaa has been hit hard by the ongoing cholera outbreak in Yemen since 2016, with Bani al-Harith District reporting the highest number of cases in January–August 2019.[7] The Amanat al-Asimah governorate also had the second-highest number of measles cases in Yemen in 2019, behind only Saada Governorate.[7] Coronavirus [edit] In May 2020, during the coronavirus pandemic, the local Houthi authorities responded by closing down several markets and locking down streets in 10 districts after suspected cases rose.[70] At the same time, however, they have been suppressing all information about the scale of the outbreak, refusing to release positive test results and intimidating medical staff, journalists, and families to prevent them from speaking out about cases.[70] Speaking about the coronavirus testing results, one official quipped, "When it's negative, they give the results to us."[70] As of May 2020, the only hospital in Sanaa that has the full capacity to treat coronavirus is the Kuwait University Hospital.[70] An influx of patients entered this hospital in the first week of May, and health workers believe many of them had coronavirus; Houthi authorities never revealed the test results, but an internal document from 4 May 2020, showing three positive test results, was circulated widely on social media.[70] Transport and communications [edit] Transport in Sanaa is divided by gender, with a slight majority (51%) of male commuters using public transport and a similar majority (56%) of women travelling on foot.[7] In both cases, using personally-owned cars was less prevalent than public transport (51% vs. 29% for men, and 25% vs. 20% for women).[7] Use of bicycles and motorcycles is less; only 5% of male commuters and a negligible percentage of female commuters reported using them as primary modes of transport.[7] Public transport in Sanaa is primarily informal, with most vehicles being privately owned.[7] Common passenger vehicles include microbuses (dababs), which in 2005 were estimated to number 4-7,000 in Sanaa; minibuses ("nuss-bus"), estimated at 5,500–7,300; and taxis, which are more common at around 33,000.[7] Public transport in the city center is well-developed, with frequently available bus and minibus services and several bus terminals (most terminals are informal), but the Sanaa outskirts are poorly served by comparison and often people "must walk long distances to reach one of the major roads."[7] Most routes are short, meaning that longer north–south trips require switching buses multiple times.[7] Additionally, the number of buses on the roads can vary from day to day, since bus driver licenses do not require drivers to operate on a regular schedule.[7] This can lead to long waiting times.[7] There are also coaches to major cities such as Aden and Taiz. Sanaa has an extensive road network, which is where most formal investment has taken place.[7] The city's roads are mostly north–south, with two major ring roads traversing the city.[7] The highest volumes of traffic are within the inner ring road.[7] Roads are often congested, which is compounded by the fact that many of the city's 33,000 taxi cabs often operate empty, and there is a high level of air pollution as a result.[7] This air pollution is exacerbated by the fact that, like Mexico City or Kathmandu, Sanaa is located in an upland "bowl" surrounded by mountains, which creates thermal inversions that trap pollutants.[34] Sanaa has the most traffic accidents in Yemen, with 2,898 in 2013, more than twice as many as Ta'izz (which had the second-highest total).[7] Contributing factors include lax enforcement of traffic laws, lack of traffic signals, lack of pedestrian crossings, and bad parking practices (for example, double parking is common, even when there are available parking spaces nearby).[7] The number of traffic accidents plummeted in 2015 by more than 50%, as the escalation of the conflict in Yemen led to reduced mobility, as well as fuel shortages which led to decreased use of personal vehicles.[7] In 2017, the Saudi blockade of Yemen caused fuel costs to rise by over 100% in Sanaa, crippling transport systems and making it even harder for people to access clean water, food, and healthcare.[71] By August 2019, the price of diesel had reached 430 riyals per liter, which was a 186.7% increase from the pre-war price; at the same time, the price of gasoline had risen to 365 riyals per liter, which was a 143.3% increase over the same period.[7] Air transport [edit] Sanaa International Airport is Yemen's main domestic and international airport, handling 80% of all air passengers in the country in 2007.[7] The airport sustained heavy damage during the ongoing conflict in Yemen,[7] and has been closed for commercial flights since August 2016.[71][7] This has prevented many Yemenis from being able to travel abroad to receive medical treatment.[7] In addition, at the start of the Saudi blockade, the Sanaa airport was completely shut down for 16 days until being reopened to humanitarian flights on the 22nd of November. A new Sanaa Airport started construction in 2008 but stopped in 2011 and has not resumed since.[71] Yemenia, the national airline of Yemen, has its head office in Sanaa.[72] Communications [edit] Main article: Telecommunications in Yemen Most of Yemen's telecommunications infrastructure is located in Sanaa, as are most of the country's telecommunications companies.[7] The Internet was first launched in Yemen in 1996, but it was used by under 5% of the population until 2007.[7] The percentage of Yemenis using the internet nationwide has increased from 1.25% in 2006 to 26.72% in 2017.[7] In Sanaa, the main internet service provider is YemenNet, which was launched in 2002 and is the only network offering 3G services.[7] Internet cafes are popular among Sanaa residents, many of whom cannot afford the high cost of subscription fees and purchasing necessary equipment.[7] They are especially popular with university students, who use publicly available information on the internet to supplement their studies.[7] The first all-female internet cafe in Sanaa opened in 2013.[7] As of 2017, the city of Sanaa had 407 internet cafes, which was almost a third of the total in Yemen.[7] A survey of 45 internet cafes in 2018 reported that 38 were fully or partially operating, while 7 were permanently closed.[7] One of them was operating on solar power, which provided 18 hours of electricity per day.[7] Water and sanitation [edit] Yemen is one of the world's most water-scarce countries, and Sanaa could be the first national capital in the world to completely exhaust its water supply.[73] The city is located on the Tawilah aquifer, which was first identified in 1972. The aquifer has a natural recharge rate of 42 Mm3/a, much of which comes from the periodic outflow of water from the surrounding wadis onto the Sanaa plain. There is not much refill from rainfall. In 1995, water extraction from the aquifer exceeded the natural recharge rate by around 300%.[11] More recent estimates are higher, suggesting 400–500%.[7] This has caused groundwater levels to drop by 6 to 8 metres annually,[7] to the point that many wells have to be drilled as far down as 2,600 to 3,900 feet.[73] It is estimated that, with a slightly lower rate of depletion, the aquifer will be completely exhausted by around 2030.[73][11] As much as 90% of Yemen's water use is in agriculture, with irrigated farmland increasing from 37,000 hectares in 1970 to 407,000 in 2004.[73] Before the 1970s, traditional agricultural practices had a sustainable balance of use and recharge.[11][73] Household water in Sanaa was supplied by shallow wells, and the relative scarcity of water led to people using gray water for watering gardens. Meanwhile, agriculture in the surrounding rural areas was watered by rainfall, with terracing and flood diversion systems making as much as possible out of the limited rainwater.[11] However, after the introduction of deep tube wells[73] and the identification of the Tawilah aquifer,[11] there was an explosion of agriculture in the Sanaa area.[11][73] By 1995, there were over 5,000 wells in the Sanaa area;[11] as of 2010, the number was about 13,500.[73] At the same time, traditionally grown, drought-resistant crops have been largely replaced by more water-intensive cash crops such as citrus, bananas,[73] grapes, vegetables,[11] and especially qat, which as of 2010 accounted for 6% of Yemen's entire GDP.[73] In the Sanaa area, 27% of all farmland was dedicated to growing qat;[11] By 2010, the number had increased to around 50%.[73] In the city of Sanaa itself, there was a continuous expansion of tap water supply under the National Water and Sanitation Authority (NSWA) through the end of the 1990s, but it was outpaced by the city's growth. The public water supply only served 40–50% of Sanaa residents by 2000.[11] The percentage has decreased in recent years: in 2009, it was estimated that 55% of residents were connected to the public water supply; in 2018, only 43% did.[7] For residents without access to the municipal water network, the only option for drinking water is from tanker trucks, which is expensive.[34] Access to tap water is also inconsistent between neighborhoods, and even in places where there is public water, water pressure can be too low, resulting in unreliable access for some households.[11] Most households have access to water for less than one full day per week.[7] There are also problems with pipe leakage, with estimates ranging from 40% to 60% of water being lost due to leaks.[7] Additionally, there are problems with water quality in Sanaa due to wastewater getting into water pipes and also leaching down into the aquifer.[11] A 2018 study found the water exceeded the limits for dissolved solids and coliform bacteria, including E. coli.[7] Sana'nis tend to view the city's tap water as contaminated, choosing instead to buy filtered water in containers for drinking and cooking, which costs significantly more.[11] Private kiosks using reverse osmosis to filter poor-quality groundwater are also popular.[73] As of 2009, the average domestic water consumption in Sanaa was just 30 to 50 liters per day, which is far below the usual amount for city dwellers in the Middle East.[34] In the pre-modern era, Sanaa used an irrigation called ghayls. These ran from external towns in peripheral areas and brought water into the city. They were responsible for much of Sanaa's water supply for most of its history.[74] Wastewater management [edit] The sewer systems in Sanaa is over 500 kilometres long.[7] There are two activated sludge water treatment plants in the city: the main one, in Bani al-Harith District, was commissioned in 2000 and has a daily capacity of 50,500m3; the second, in al-Hashishiyah, is much smaller with a capacity of 500m3 and is dedicated to collecting wastewater from tankers.[7] No damage was reported to the Bani al-Harith water treatment plant as of 2018, and it remains in operation, although overloaded and with some equipment in poor condition.[7] The al-Hashishiyah facility has been out of operation since the start of the conflict.[7] Only 40% of Sanaa's population is connected to wastewater services as of 2018 (down from 45% in 2014), and over half of the population relies on private cesspits for wastewater disposal.[7] The wastewater is then either absorbed into the ground or pumped out by either the city's Wastewater and Sanitation Local Corporation or by private services.[7] Of Sanaa's 35 informal settlements, only two (Madhbah and Bayt Maiyad) are connected to the city's sewer system, while most of the others rely on cesspits.[7] In one, Suq Shamlan, sewage is dumped in an open hole.[7] Solid waste management [edit] It is estimated that 1500 tonnes of solid waste are generated each day in the Sanaa metro area.[7] The city is mainly serviced by the al-Azraqayn landfill, which also serves the surrounding Sanaa Governorate as well as 'Amran Governorate.[7] The landfill has been in operation since the 1970s and has almost reached full capacity.[7] There is no base or surface sealing at the site, so the leachate is not captured.[7] A facility for the treatment of healthcare waste exists at the al-Azraqayn landfill; the first of its type in Yemen, it was expected to open in March 2015, but due to the ongoing conflict and lack of electricity, the opening was delayed indefinitely.[7] Since the escalation of the Yemeni civil war in 2015, the Azraqayn landfill has no longer been operating at full capacity.[7] Waste collection was reduced to 30 trips per month, and only some of the collected waste made it from the transfer station to the landfill.[7] The waste processing building at the al-Azraqayn site was destroyed in 2015, and the landfill's weighbridge is damaged and not operational.[7] As of 2018, almost a third of the city's garbage trucks had been damaged during the fighting and another 18% were not operational.[7] Most Sanaa neighborhoods in 2018 reported insufficient coverage by waste management services.[7] As of 2018, the city's waste collection services cover 70% of the city's population, which is higher than al-Hudaydah (50%) but lower than Aden (80%).[7] As of August 2015, the city of Sanaa employed 19 people as waste pickers for use in recycling: 4 at al-Azraqayn and 15 (12 men and 3 boys) at Sanaa Transit Station.[7] International relations [edit] Twin towns and sister cities [edit] Gallery [edit] Houses in old Sana'a. Ibex and Bull were sacred animals in ancient Yemen. Yemenis put Ibex or Bull horns at top of houses to protect from evil eyes.[79] A house in Sana'a House with traditional ''Qamariah'' A dome in old Sana'a Night streetscene in Sanaʽa Narrow street in Sanaa Tower houses in Sanaa Tower houses in Sanaa Ground-level view of a tower house See also [edit] Yemen portal Mahwa Aser Sanaʽa manuscript – fragments from over 1,000 early Quranic codices, discovered at the Great Mosque in Sanaʽa in 1972. Yemeni Revolution Jabal Tiyal, another high mountain nearby References [edit] Further reading [edit]
8955	dbpedia	3	31	https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0227/Profile-Yemen-s-new-president-Abed-Rabbo-Mansour-Hadi	en	Profile: Yemen's new president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi	https://images.csmonitor…standard_900x600	https://images.csmonitor…standard_900x600	[ "https://www.csmonitor.com/extension/csm_base/design/csm_design/images/csm-logo-200.svg", "https://www.csmonitor.com/extension/csm_base/design/standard/images/apple-touch-icon.png", "https://www.csmonitor.com/extension/csm_base/design/csm_design/images/csm-logo-100.svg", "https://www.csmonitor.com/extension/c...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Tom A. Peter", "The Christian Science Monitor" ]	2012-02-27T13:13:44-05:00	Mr. Hadi is a relative unknown in Yemen, despite serving as former President Saleh's deputy for 17 years.	en	/extension/csm_base/design/standard/images/favicon.ico	The Christian Science Monitor	https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0227/Profile-Yemen-s-new-president-Abed-Rabbo-Mansour-Hadi	A relative unknown has taken the helm of Yemen, where citizens are hoping for real change after 33 years under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the West is seeking improved stability to contain a resurgent Al Qaeda. The newly inaugurated Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi joined Mr. Saleh for a farewell ceremony today, marking the departure of the fourth autocrat since the Arab Spring began. Mr. Hadi, who won an uncontested election last week, now stands tasked with holding together a fragile nation further strained by a year of protests. The Arab world's poorest country, Yemen has long been beset by dire economic challenges, a southern secessionist movement, restive Houthi rebels in the north, powerful tribal rivalries, and the terrorist franchise Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Although Hadi served as Saleh's deputy for 17 years, many Yemenis describe him as a figure who has remained largely in the shadows. That has perhaps given him a small window to gain the support of a country largely fed up with Saleh, but it has also left many uncertain about the future of their nation. “Over the years he’s been a weak man in terms of personality. We haven’t seen him do anything for the country,” says Osama Shamsan, a student protester in Sanaa. He describes Hadi as a “statue,” always present, but always in the background of Yemeni politics. “But is he going to step up now? What is he going to do?” Yemeni analysts say that throughout his career, Hadi never had strong political ambitions and happened into his positions, rather than obtaining them through political maneuvering. “Hadi has a quiet personality,” says Najeeb Ghallab, a political researcher in Sanaa. “He didn’t have plans or ambitions to become the vice president.” Similarly, in a country where regime insiders, defected military leaders, and powerful tribal sheikhs have been seen as jockeying for power in a post-Saleh country, Hadi wasn't seen as angling for the presidency. A southerner who avoids the spotlight Hadi started his career in the military, during which time he spent a considerable amount of time training abroad. He received two years of officer training at Britain's Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, obtained a graduate degree from the Nasser Military Academy in Egypt, and trained with the Soviet military. The experience is likely to pay off as the US will likely continue to lean heavily on Hadi and the Yemeni military as they continue to pursue AQAP, whose largely ineffective attacks on Western targets have nevertheless raised significant concern in Washington. At his swearing-in ceremony on Saturday, Hadi pledged to continue fighting militants, calling it a “patriotic and religious duty.” During the nation’s civil war, in which the south rebelled against Saleh's unification of Yemen, Hadi – a southerner – stayed loyal to the president and was appointed vice president several months later, in October 1994. Hadi’s ability to avoid the spotlight and any controversial public stances made him an attractive candidate to oversee the nation during its post-Saleh transition. “I think being on the sideline benefited him because not many people could identify him with something bad or something so terribly wrong to the point that they could not support him,” says Khalid Al-Akwaa, director of the Center of Public Administration Development at Sanaa University. “He’s been around, but he has not been around.” Originally from the south, Hadi may find difficulty winning over those in his birthplace as there is some criticism that he did not do enough to help the region as vice president. During much of Saleh’s rule, the south complained that it was too often neglected by politicians in Sanaa and a secessionist movement has taken root there. Still, Hadi is likely to enjoy a small window of time in which he has the support of a majority of Yemenis, if for no other reason than he is not Saleh. Overseeing a new constitution, military reform Over the course of his two-year term, he will be tasked with overseeing the drafting of a new constitution, military reforms, and a referendum that will pave the way to competitive elections. The question on many Yemenis’ minds now is: After so many years in the shadows, will their new president possess the necessary political will and strength to stop those from Saleh’s inner circle who still hold positions of power here from inhibiting the reform process? Additionally, some Yemenis say he may struggle to make substantive changes because the nation has not produced a cohesive plan for how to address the nation’s problems. “I’m not optimistic that a change will happen, because there is a lack of a national plan of what Yemen needs in the coming two years,” says Abdullah Bashir, publisher of Al-Jumhoor, a weekly newspaper in Sanaa.
8955	dbpedia	3	66	https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/saudi-arabias-yemeni-quagmire	en	Saudi Arabia’s Yemeni Quagmire	https://www.wilsoncenter…n_quagmire_1.jpg	https://www.wilsoncenter…n_quagmire_1.jpg	[ "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/assets/images/wilson-quarterly.svg", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/themes/custom/wilson/logo.svg?v=20210609", "https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/styles/publication/public/media/images/publication/saudi_arabia_yemen_quagmire_1.jpg", "https://www...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	The Saudi-led Arab coalition fight to defeat Iranian-backed Houthi rebels who took over Yemen early this year has turned into a bloody and costly quagmire. After nine months of fighting, the two sides have reached a military stalemate. Under strong U.S. and international pressure, Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies began holding talks on December 15 under U.N. auspices with their Houthi enemies at a secret location in Switzerland to explore a way out of their impasse.	en	/core/misc/favicon.ico	Wilson Center	https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/saudi-arabias-yemeni-quagmire	Riyadh—The devastating war in Yemen is turning into a costly quagmire for Saudi Arabia, which has been leading a coalition of nine Arab states on a risky military venture since March to crush Iranian-backed Houthi rebels who seized control of Yemen early this year. The Saudi objective to achieve a clear military victory now seems increasingly unrealistic. In addition, the Saudis are coming under intense pressure from the Obama administration, which has been providing the Arab coalition with intelligence and war materiel, to end the conflict through "peaceful political means." Pursuit of this elusive goal gets underway today, December 15, in Switzerland when the two warring sides will meet to talk about a way out of the impasse. Both have agreed to a seven-day ceasefire, but past attempts to achieve a similarly limited truce quickly failed. A lot is at stake for the ruling Saudi royal family. The Saudis are determined to demonstrate to Iran, their chief regional rival, that they have the military might to defeat its Houthi allies and block its efforts to establish a foothold on the kingdom's vulnerable southern border. The war has also sharpened the two countries' sectarian rivalry since the Houthis belong to an offshoot of Shi’ism, the dominant religion of Iran. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is the birthplace of Islam and regards itself as the religious leader of the Arab world's majority Sunni population. Inside the House of Saud, the failure to achieve a military victory in Yemen could well damage the political career of the ambitious 30-year-old defense minister, Mohammed bin Salman, the son of King Salman. He is also deputy crown prince and leader of the family's "hawks," who are out to prove the kingdom's military prowess as they pursue Arab world leadership. However, the war has reached a military stalemate and Yemen is on the brink of famine after the deaths of 5,900 combatants and civilians. The cost of sustaining the air, ground, and sea operation is said to have reached $200 million a day, though it is unclear how much of this the Saudis are footing on their own. The Obama administration has just approved the Saudi purchase of $1.3 billion in munitions despite accusations by some Democrats in Congress and international human rights groups that the Saudi-led coalition bombings have inflicted massive collateral damage on civilian targets like factories, hospitals, schools, homes, and even wedding parties. Most of the war materiel is for more bombs, including 12,000 unguided “dumb” and 8,000 laser-guided “smart” ones, plus 1,500 bunker-busters. Forces loyal to the internationally recognized government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and supported by the Saudi-led coalition have taken back the southern port city of Aden and four neighboring provinces. But the Houthis and allied army units still loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, ousted as a result of an uprising in 2011, still hold the north of the country, including the capital, Sana’a. The Saudi-led offensive pushing north from Aden has become bogged down over its attempt to break the Houthi siege of Taiz, 150 miles south of Sana’a. But even its ability to secure Aden with the help of troops from the United Arab Emirates and Sudan has come into question after the assassination by a massive roadside car bomb on December 6 of its governor, General Jaafar Mohammed Saad. The Islamic State took credit, but Saudi and diplomatic sources here suspect the real culprit to be agents loyal to former president Saleh, a canny manipulator of friends and foes alike during his 34 years in power. In response to the deteriorating security situation in Aden, Saudi Arabia is rushing special counterterrorism troops there to protect the Hadi government, which presently has its headquarters there. It is not just Aden where its authority is being challenged, however. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken over the southeastern province of Hadhramaut and is expanding into Lahij province north of Aden. The even more extremist Islamic State is also steadily expanding its influence. So far, the Saudi coalition has avoided taking on AQAP or the Islamic State because it has been focusing on rolling back the forces of the Houthis and Saleh. But the Saudis are well aware of al-Qaeda’s longtime objective because the House of Saud has dealt with its terrorist attacks inside the kingdom for four years before driving them into Yemen. Saudi travails in pursuing a military victory are now partly due to disagreements with the UAE, its main coalition partner, over reliance on a militia from a Yemeni faction, al-Islah, which is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Emirati government has imprisoned scores of its members for allegedly seeking its overthrow. In Yemen, Emirati soldiers found themselves obliged to work with al-Islah militiamen both in Mareb and Taiz provinces because they are the chief Saudi allies there. The Emirati state minister for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, on November 22 put out a tweet claiming Taiz would already have been "liberated" from the Houthi siege "had it not been for the failure of al-Islah and the Muslim Brotherhood to act." As a result, the UAE has cut in half the number of its troops engaged in the ground war to 2,000, most of whom have withdrawn from the front line and are now concentrated in and around Aden. In their place, the Emirates has been sending in hundreds of mercenaries from Colombia, six of whom were reported on December 9 to have been killed together with their Australian commander fighting the Houthis in Taiz province. Other Arab reinforcements are on their way. Morocco has just announced it is sending 1,500 troops, and Sudan, which already has a force of 850, has pledged to send thousands more. The coalition spokesman, Brigadier General Ahmed Asiri, denied there was a military stalemate and pointed to the successes so far of Yemeni forces loyal to the Hadi government in liberating "70 percent" of the country. But he played down the importance of retaking the capital, calling it "a small point" compared to the Saudi overall of objective of assuring "a secure and stable Yemen." The Saudi-backed Hadi government, meanwhile, has become virtually split in two, with Vice President Khaled Bahah rejecting a recent Hadi cabinet reshuffle and building his own constituency, apparently with the intention of eventually challenging the president's leadership. Hadi is believed to be less willing to strike a compromise with the Houthis than Bahah. The negotiations starting today, December 15, at a secret location in Switzerland under UN auspices are aimed at implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2216. This resolution calls for the forces of the Houthis and Saleh to withdraw from all the cities and territory they have conquered, hand back their heavy weapons taken from the army, and resume a national dialogue over a plan for a new federal state that the Houthis rejected last year. The Houthis have said they accept the UN resolution as the basis of talks but raised questions about how it would be implemented. They have also proposed that Vice President Bahah, but not President Hadi, return to Sana’a to organize new elections within six months. Among the many thorny issues standing in the way of a settlement is the nature of a transitional government, what authority would take control of surrendered heavy weapons, and, above all, the fate of Saleh. The Saudis and their allies want him removed from the political scene and sent into exile permanently. U.S. diplomats working on finding a way out of the impasse have suggested either Ethiopia or Morocco as his new home. But Saleh has long resisted exile and reportedly wants new amnesty from prosecution, similar to the one given to him in return for his giving up power in 2012. Given the deep distrust between the two sides and their respective accumulated grievances against each other after nine months of war, the prospects for a settlement through "peaceful political means" do not seem bright. But it is also true that the two sides have reached a military stalemate that may make them more amenable now to striking a compromise. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Wilson Center.
8955	dbpedia	1	90	https://sputnikglobe.com/person_Abd_Rabbuh_Mansour_Hadi/	en	Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi	https://cdn1.img.sputnik…/logo-social.png	https://cdn1.img.sputnik…/logo-social.png	[ "https://mc.yandex.ru/watch/26863203", "https://cdn1.img.sputnikglobe.com/img/105640/39/1056403980_0:291:5760:3548_600x0_80_0_0_62a7f995484111a6596b8df37e760136.jpg", "https://cdn1.img.sputnikglobe.com/img/105799/37/1057993763_0:291:5760:3548_600x0_80_0_0_e55b3f1dc1ddf552fcea4a5e116f252f.jpg", "https://cdn1.i...	[]	[]	[ "abd rabbuh mansour hadi", "abd rabbuh mansour hadi news", "abd rabbuh mansour hadi today's news" ]	null	[]	null	Read today's latest news on the topic Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi: Arab Coalition Strikes Yemen's Al Hodeidah - Source, Yemeni Conflict 'Direct Threat' to All Persian Gulf States - Emir of Kuwait	en	https://cdn1.img.sputnik…avicon-57x57.png	Sputnik International	https://sputnikglobe.com/person_Abd_Rabbuh_Mansour_Hadi/	Access to the chat has been blocked for violating the rules . You will be able to participate again through:∞. If you do not agree with the blocking, please use the feedback form The discussion is closed. You can participate in the discussion within 24 hours after the publication of the article.
8955	dbpedia	0	33	https://www.nationalgeographic.com/pages/article/150331-yemen-saudi-arabia-iran-houthis-asia-world	en	As Yemen Descends Into Chaos, Key Questions and Answers	https://i.natgeofe.com/n…_16x9.jpg?w=1200	https://i.natgeofe.com/n…_16x9.jpg?w=1200	[ "https://i.natgeofe.com/n/e76f5368-6797-4794-b7f6-8d757c79ea5c/ng-logo-2fl.png?w=109&h=32", "https://i.natgeofe.com/n/566464fd-31a7-4ea5-85ac-c6c42bc2ce83/01houthiyemen.jpg", "https://i.natgeofe.com/n/b6be8661-08f2-46ff-acd4-fb310d54528c/02houthiyemen.jpg", "https://i.natgeofe.com/n/174e20fe-accb-4d04-ae7f-22...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2015-03-31T20:57:44+00:00	Making sense of a growing conflict that involves a bewildering number of players	en	https://assets-cdn.natio…ns/mask-icon.svg	Pages	https://www.nationalgeographic.com/pages/article/150331-yemen-saudi-arabia-iran-houthis-asia-world	The recent surge of violence in Yemen has spiraled into a crisis that extends far beyond the nation's borders. After Shiite militias swept across the country and forced Yemen's president, a Sunni, into exile, Saudi Arabia responded with air strikes. Ten other countries are providing fighter jets for the assault, and the U.S. is helping with logistics. The conflict involves a bewildering number of domestic players, including the Shiite rebels and their backer, Yemen's ousted dictator; southern Sunni secessionists; and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. (Read more about Yemen's deep divisions.) Here's a primer on the country, its confusing crisis, and why so many other countries have a stake in its outcome: What is the fighting in Yemen all about? Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, has been pushed to the brink of civil war by a confrontation between a Shiite rebel group and forces loyal to Yemen's president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, a Sunni from the southern port of Aden. In recent months, the Houthis have advanced across the country. They seized control of Sanaa, the capital, last September, and forced Hadi to take refuge in Aden four months later. This month, they entered Aden and Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia. The fighting is now seen by many as a proxy war between the Saudis, who back Hadi, and Iran, which is suspected of supporting the Houthis, though there's no hard evidence of that. In late March Saudi Arabia launched air strikes against Houthi positions in Aden with the aim of restoring Hadi as president. Who are the Houthis? The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God) are affiliated with one of the oldest branches of Shiite Islam, called Zaidism. This branch emerged in Yemen in the eighth century A.D. and was named after Zayd ibn Ali, the grandson of Hussein ibn Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's grandson. Today about 35 percent of the country is Zaidi. Their stronghold is Saada Governate, in the northwest corner of the country. The Houthis have expressed animosity against the United States, Israel, and the Jews—repeatedly threatening Yemen's tiny Jewish community, which was protected under the last government. What's their beef? The Houthis—named after their founder, Hussein Badr al Din al Houthi—launched their first rebellion in 2004, against Yemeni longtime strongman-president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. They were demanding more autonomy for their northern enclave, which is one of the poorest and most neglected corners of Yemen. Saleh unleashed Yemen's army, which killed al Houthi and destroyed Sadah [the capital of Saada], but only made the Houthis more determined to continue their struggle. Three subsequent revolts were also put down, the last one in 2010. How did they rebound? In 2011, the Arab Spring spread to Yemen. Demonstrators—including many Houthis— filled the streets of Sanaa and other cities, demanding the resignation of Saleh, a corrupt figure who ruled the country with the support of Yemen's most powerful tribe. When the tribe joined the protesters in the streets, Saleh was forced to resign in February 2012 and his vice president, Hadi, was installed as his successor. Hadi inherited a weak and divided security apparatus and was never able to assert control over the fragmented country. A National Dialogue Conference last year created a new constitution and set up a six-region federal system, but the Houthis declared they were unhappy with the deal and vowed to resume their rebellion. What happened to Saleh? The 2011 agreement, brokered by regional powers, that forced Saleh to relinquish power had one glaring weakness: It didn't compel him to leave the country. Saleh continued to meddle in Yemeni politics, undermining President Hadi by making alliances with his political enemies and retaining the loyalty of about half the country's security forces. When the Houthis began advancing from the north, the ousted strongman saw that an alliance with his former mortal enemies could pave his way back to power. Does the United States have a stake in this? It does, not only because Yemen is located on the Gulf of Aden, a strategic shipping lane between Arabia and Africa, but also because the country has nurtured one of the world's most dangerous Islamic terrorist groups: al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. AQAP has established sanctuaries in mountainous provinces east of Aden, carried out terrorist attacks in Yemen, and expanded its reach abroad: U.S.-born AQAP militant Sheikh Anwar al Awlaki planned a series of terrorist operations targeting the U.S. before he was killed by a U.S. drone in September 2011. The brothers Said and Cherif Kouachi both received training at an AQAP base in Yemen's Marib Governate before executing the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015. Both Saleh and Hadi cooperated with the U.S. on counterterrorism, sharing intelligence and attacking AQAP on the ground. But in the current chaos, AQAP—which considers the Shiite rebels to be apostates—has been able to regroup and has launched a series of devastating attacks in Yemen. What exactly has been Saudi Arabia's role in Yemen? Saudi Arabia, Yemen's next-door neighbor, fears a resurgence of Islamist terrorism if the country slides deeper into war, and is also determined to prevent Shiite Iran from gaining more influence in the region. Earlier this month the kingdom launched Operation Decisive Storm to rescue Yemen's deposed government, drawing together eight other Sunni-dominated countries: Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Sudan. All have provided jet aircraft to bomb Houthi strongholds. The United States, which considers Saudi Arabia its strongest and most vital Arab ally—and which had regarded Saudi Arabia as a reliable ally in the war against AQAP—is providing logistical and intelligence support. What happens next? In the short term, expect the death toll to climb as the coalition's bombing campaign and al Qaeda terrorist attacks intensify; at least 40 civilians were killed in an air strike on an internally displaced persons' camp in northern Yemen on March 30. In the longer term, Yemen faces further chaos and disintegration. Since the Houthis began their advance last year, a Sunni separatist movement in the south, Hirak, has gained momentum. The Sunni-dominated south, which existed as an independent state between 1967 and 1990 and lost a civil war against Saleh's army in 1994, is likely to step up its push for secession even if the Saudis drive the Houthis out of Aden and restore President Hadi to nominal power. That raises the prospect of more young, disaffected Sunnis joining forces with radical Islamists to further their goals. Whatever happens, the real winner in Yemen's tragedy is likely to be al Qaeda. Follow Joshua Hammer on Facebook.
8955	dbpedia	3	5	https://newlinesmag.com/argument/yemens-great-enabler-departs/	en	Yemen’s Great Enabler Departs	https://newlinesmag.com/…oads/Hadiweb.jpg	https://newlinesmag.com/…oads/Hadiweb.jpg	[ "https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=864379585153152&ev=PageView&noscript=1", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/themes/cgpolicy/images/NEW-NL-Logo-Horizontal-Black-Grey.svg", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/themes/cgpolicy/images/NL-Logo-Black.svg", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/uploads/farea-web-80x80...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Farea Al-Muslimi" ]	2022-05-05T11:02:00+00:00	The former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi was a ‘painful friend’ to have – and a worse president	en	https://newlinesmag.com/…ground-32x32.jpg	New Lines Magazine	https://newlinesmag.com/argument/yemens-great-enabler-departs/	One might be taken in by former Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, until meeting him in person. A very “adi” — mediocre — guy, not somebody whose words convey new knowledge or provoke deeper thought in the listener. That is how I felt walking out of his house in Sanaa in January 2014. At 23 years old, all I gained from the encounter was the courage to smoke in front of my father that afternoon, after he had seen me on the news sitting down with our president. Nothing in Hadi’s speeches or public remarks in the years since has changed my impression, which I came to learn was shared by many others who met him. Now that Hadi has departed, replaced by a presidential council, it’s time to consider his legacy. And what a pointless lack of legacy it is. For a man who led a country and its people for a decade, there are precious few achievements to point to. Hadi resembles no world leaders so much as former Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika — an ill and often absent president, removed by his own government — and Afghanistan’s Ashraf Ghani, a corrupt figurehead, who fled the country. Like Hadi, my generation got some sort of agency out of the Yemeni revolution of 2011. After more than 33 years of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hadi embodied our newly gained ability to imagine more than one president in our lifetime. We were so taken by the possibility of change that 6.6 million Yemenis — 65% of eligible voters — turned out to vote for Hadi in a one-candidate election in 2012. Some friends chuckled at me for taking part in such a “fake election.” But we were desperate to find a way forward and for a leader who would bear out our aspirations for our country and navigate it through what was to be a brief transitional phase so that Yemen could be spared the bloody path we saw Syria careening down every day. Little did we know, or could we even imagine, that Hadi would take us on a catastrophic combination of Syrian, Libyan, Somali and Iraqi routes. That’s why many Yemenis feel Hadi has stabbed them in the back twice over, once through incompetence and a tolerance for corruption, and then again by allowing the country to be dragged into civil and proxy wars. He spent eight of his 10 years as Yemen’s “transitional” president living outside the country, abusing his power by indulging corrupt relatives and allies, granting his sons the decidedly unconstitutional authority to manage and meddle in state matters and showing little interest in appeals from Yemenis to ease their burdens. Throughout these years, Hadi, from outside Yemen, encouraged people to fight and die to preserve his status as Yemen’s “legitimate” president. His circle of advisers didn’t hesitate to uphold and repeat that dubious claim of legitimacy — and kept repeating it for years beyond his mandate, right up until the moment Hadi was finally forced out of office on April 7. At that point, those same advisers scrambled to secure their own interests. For all of these reasons, Hadi’s departure was not celebrated most by his Houthi opponents in Sanaa. Rather, it was by those who fought the Houthis under the banner of Hadi’s “legitimate” government. The mood lightened considerably in many gatherings in Marib and Shabwa governorates, this year’s key battleground, where sheikhs and residents discussed the changes during nightly Ramadan get-togethers, where qat, a plant chewed as a stimulant, is shared. But speaking to people across the country, there is a sense that at least with Hadi’s departure, things may actually move again. Governing Yemen requires someone who is actually in Yemen and interested in governing. Beyond all of that, and to our Yemen Arab Spring generation specifically, Hadi will always be viewed as the man who transformed opportunities into problems and dreams into nightmares. That is his legacy to the generation behind the 2011 revolution. We dreamed of Yemenis truly practicing democracy and taking our country forward; for many, having demanded these dreams become reality is their biggest regret in life. It was a dream to have a truly national dialogue, but Hadi and his aides abused the process of the 2013-14 National Dialogue Conference so horribly — by manipulating representation and outcomes, violating conference bylaws, buying loyalties — that it ended with a civil war. It was a dream to have the support of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries with sufficient resources and authority to make the transitional period succeed. Yet Hadi abused that relationship for personal interests to the extent his indulgent hosts, who justified their destructive role in Yemen’s war on Hadi’s request for intervention, eventually lost patience, kicking him out of office and effectively changing the locks by installing a command council to replace the presidency. It was a humiliating, though sadly unsurprising, end. The Saudis, it seems, learned what Yemeni business owner Khaled Abdulwahid knows all too well. Asked recently in Aden what it meant to have a lifelong friend like Hadi, he grimaced: “It is very painful.” Even those who did not like how Hadi’s departure was orchestrated understood why — and how — the Saudis did it. “They came to us for something that we have been asking for, for too long,” Abdullah Al-Namani, head of the Tadhamon political party and an MP, told me a few days after signing Hadi’s concession document. “How can you say ‘no’ to something you know is what you both want and need?” It was painful, but the only right thing. Hadi left no one any choice. For 18 years, Hadi held the most boring job in a presidential system: vice president. He accepted the title from Saleh in 1994, even though it came with little to no respect, and he made a career out of chairing inconsequential committees, cutting ceremonial ribbons and passing greetings to people from a boss who barely took notice of him. Even as president, that was the most consistent role he played; an enabler, of anyone or anything. In the south, he was an enabler for the British army (he and his family served as guards for the British Colony during their occupation of Yemen) and later for the Soviet-sponsored Marxist state. And when Saleh took the decision to invade the south in 1994, it was Hadi, a southerner, who led his troops against the south and on the side of Saleh. After the war, Hadi agreed to be the most senior southerner in Saleh’s government — enabling Saleh’s horrible political formula that allowed Saleh to dominate the country while claiming to act in the name of all Yemenis. He later colluded with whoever was in charge of Yemen, be it the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islah party, or the Houthis or those waging the Saudi war for eight long years. In his early days as president, it took people a while to fully absorb the fact he was president. Hadi didn’t enjoy mixing with people much or being in front of TV cameras. For months, his house in Sanaa continued to be referred to as “the VP’s house.” A running joke in Sanaa at the time was that on the day of his inauguration as a president, Hadi told his wife “Congratulations. Tomorrow, you will be the First Lady.” The second day, the joke went, his wife packed her stuff and moved to Saleh’s house — because not even Hadi’s own wife could imagine him as president. Hadi was “the coincidence president.” A powerful Arab Spring uprising had just shaken Saleh’s republican throne, an uprising so powerful even he, the wiliest of politicians, could not survive it. But Saleh hoped to place an “enabler” on the throne, so that he could maintain his power. Two names were floated at the time. Saleh’s prime minister by then, Ali Mujawaer, politely declined. And Rashad Alimi — now the head of the presidential council — was unpopular in those circles loyal to Saleh. Hence, the safest pick was Hadi. The Americans also liked the idea of a vice president taking over from a struggling president (an idea they also supported in Syria, Iraq before 2003 and elsewhere). Thus, all the stars in Yemen aligned for a Hadi presidency. During this time, in the early years of his presidency, even Hadi’s aides struggled to meet with him, and he was said to be obsessed with foreign support and more accessible to foreign dignitaries. With President Vladimir Putin, he would speak in Russian, which he learned during his time studying in Russia. Hadi was meeting with Western diplomats almost daily in his first year; multiple aides said he firmly believed that only the United States mattered. While Hadi was still in Sanaa early in his presidency, senior Yemeni officials, including some ministers, told me that they had to go through the British or U.S. ambassadors to get a meeting with him. He met with his own party leadership little more than a handful of times in the three years he worked from inside Yemen. Hadi earned a reputation during his years as Saleh’s deputy and as president for being willing to do or accept anything that would ensure he maintained his position. Between 2012 and 2014, he essentially surrendered to the Islamist Islah party, liberally appointing its members to run state institutions so they would protect his seat in power. And when the time came, Hadi handed Sanaa to the Houthis in the September 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement, surmising that even if a militia controlled the capital, he could still negotiate himself a place within it. The Houthis, however, had no interest in sharing Sanaa, or power overall, and Hadi fled the capital in early 2015, first to Aden and then via Oman to Riyadh. He quickly adapted to his new lifestyle in his Riyadh safe haven, where aides and close friends described him during those years as satisfied to merely sleep in and enjoy lunch and semi-fresh qat, as well as the songs of Muhammed Murshed Nagi and Faisal Alawi, two of his favorite singers. Hadi showed the same traits while president-in-exile as he had in Sanaa. Early on in Riyadh, he dismissed, or at best sidelined, advisers and ministers who disagreed with him, and he left daily decision-making to a close inner circle that included his adult sons. In February 2022, Hadi’s aide Abdulaziz Al-Maflahi told me he had last met personally with Hadi four years earlier, on being sworn in as an adviser to the president. Hadi also turned the Balhaf refinery in Shabwa governorate over to the United Arab Emirates in 2015, while he was on good terms with the Emiratis, to use as a military base. And he accepted, at times even encouraged, Saudi disregard for protocol as long he was allowed to stay comfortably in place. He signed off on many documents and orders that violated Yemen’s sovereignty, such as ceding control of the country’s air space to Saudi Arabia. Multiple military commanders told me they had received a written document that instructed them to take orders directly from Fahd bin Turki, the Saudi commander of coalition forces in Yemen until 2020, as if they had come from Hadi himself. As the former governor of Hadramawt, Ahmed bin Breik, once told me: “Hadi just wants to sit on that chair. If you in some way can give him that, even for an extra day, he will do whatever you want.” For weeks, months and years, the Saudis waited for their “guest” to leave. According to more than one Yemeni and Saudi source, more than once between 2018 and 2022, the Saudis politely offered to build him a palace anywhere in Yemen, including near the border or even on the Saudi side of it. But the man was happiest in Riyadh, far from Yemen and Yemenis. Hadi never made the slightest effort on issues he arguably could have handled easier from Riyadh, such as stopping the expulsion from Saudi Arabia of Yemeni workers, whose earnings are a lifeline for so many Yemeni families and communities. Tens of thousands of Yemeni workers — some in businesses mere minutes from Hadi’s palace in Riyadh — lost their jobs or were forced to leave the country because of Saudization, the policy of replacing foreign workers with Saudi citizens. Their remittances were the last main source of hard currency in Yemen. The mass expulsion of so many workers arguably did more harm to the country than the war itself. Instead, Hadi’s rare conversations with his host King Salman involved self-interested appeals to his host’s commitment to traditional Arab hospitality. During a 2017 meeting in Mecca, Hadi requested qat be allowed into his palace daily and, in a telephone call a few years later, he asked King Salman to allow him more time in his luxury accommodations in Riyadh, according to more than one source familiar with the call’s content. It took years until the Saudis realized there was a problem with the announced goal of their operation in Yemen to restore the legitimate Hadi government to its place in the capital Sanaa: Hadi himself had no intention of returning to anywhere in Yemen. Hadi was, in many ways, the worst ally to have. And the perfect enemy. He was happy with any compromise, any loss, as long as he stayed in power. Even if he was in exile, his seat of power was located in a Riyadh palace, as insulated from the realities of war back home — one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, let’s not forget — as it was from Riyadh’s scorching desert heat. He would do anything to maintain it. On April 7, the scene for Hadi in Riyadh, and for millions of Yemenis, was very different from, and much more difficult than, a decade ago. Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis have died in this war to restore legitimacy to a government led by a man who was not interested in serving them and their needs. Yemen is plagued by militias and in the grip of war economies. An entire generation transformed from being proud to, at best, gripped by guilt for daring to demand democracy and true reform. Yemen has endured so much. And yes, Hadi is far from being responsible for it alone. In a war as long and brutal as Yemen’s, there is plenty of blame to go around, from the reckless sectarianism of the Houthis to the meddling of countries in the region. And, most certainly, there were our own mistakes as youths demanding change that played a part in this fate. Our immaturity and political naivete don’t give us a pass. We could have done much better and acted more responsibly, in so many ways. Still, Hadi was the center of it all, powerfully placed during the peak of the hopes and through the seemingly bottomless lows. Everyone was willing to move the ship of state forward, except its assigned captain. Fast forward 10 years from beautiful Sanaa to Riyadh, where Hadi was summoned the night of April 6 to see the Saudi deputy defense minister, Khaled bin Salman. Hours later, in a brief, prerecorded statement, he ceded power to a presidential council. Hadi’s handover took 10 years, not two as initially planned, and he didn’t hand over to a president elected by the Yemeni people as promised in February 2013. Rather, power transferred to eight men agreeable to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including political and tribal foes Hadi had fired in the past, enemies who had tried to kill him more than once, and some allies who had advised him and negotiated on his behalf throughout the war. It took many Yemenis by surprise, all except the handful involved in preparing the text, but for many, Hadi had abandoned them long ago. And, despite any pain, friends as well as foes were ready for Hadi’s chapter to end.
8955	dbpedia	3	70	https://www.arabnews.com/node/1883521/middle-east	en	US: Hadi-led authority is Yemen’s only legitimate government, but Houthis cannot be ignored	https://www.arabnews.com…ng?itok=zrCA7nge	https://www.arabnews.com…ng?itok=zrCA7nge	[ "https://mena-gmtdmp.mookie1.com/t/v2/learn?tagid=V2_605775&src.rand=[timestamp]", "https://www.arabnews.com/sites/all/themes/narabnews/assets/img/45-logo-mobile-new.png?21sa12", "https://www.arabnews.com/sites/all/themes/narabnews/assets/img/45-logo-mobile-new.png?21sssa12", "https://www.arabnews.com/sites/d...	[]	[]	[ "Jubail", "Al-Ahsa", "Al-Kharj", "Taif", "Qatif", "oil", "Dammam", "Abha", "Asir", "Yanbu", "islam", "jobs", "sports", "Khalij times", "gulf news", "saudi gazette", "Riyadh", "Tabuk", "Mecca", "Medina", "AlMadinah", "Jeddah", "Makkah", "Hail", "Mecca", "Makkah", "...	null	[ "Saeed Batati" ]	2021-06-26T03:23:21	ALEXANDRIA: Washington considers the Yemeni government led by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi as the nation’s only legitimate government, but also deals with the Iran-backed Houthis because they are in control of parts of the country and the people there, the US Department of State told Arab News on Friday. “The United States, like the rest of the international community,	en	https://www.arabnews.com…iles/index23.png	Arab News	https://www.arabnews.com/node/1883521/middle-east	ALEXANDRIA: Washington considers the Yemeni government led by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi as the nation’s only legitimate government, but also deals with the Iran-backed Houthis because they are in control of parts of the country and the people there, the US Department of State told Arab News on Friday. “The United States, like the rest of the international community, recognizes the Republic of Yemen government, which is the only legitimate, internationally recognized government in Yemen,” it said. “The Houthis control people and territory and must be dealt with. They are real, political actors in Yemen.” The assurance from Washington of its support for the Yemeni government came a day after US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking sparked a furor when he said that his country “recognizes” the Houthis as a legitimate force in Yemen. “I have spoken on a number of occasions about the legitimacy of the Houthis, which is to say that the United States recognizes them as a legitimate actor,” he said during an online roundtable discussion on Thursday, arranged by the National Council on US-Arab Relations. “We recognize them as a group that has made significant gains.” Lenderking’s remarks were “a clear coup against local, Arab and international resolutions” that recognize the Yemeni government’s authority Ahmed Ayedh, Marib Press editor Asked whether it is realistic that the Houthis will bow to US demands that they stop fighting, given they possess large numbers of weapons and continue to have the upper hand on battlefields, Lenderking said that some elements within the Houthi leadership have expressed a commitment to peace, and Washington encourages the group to engage with peace efforts. “I hope and encourage the Houthis to support the UN-led process and the efforts that are underway to support peace and the political transition,” he said. The Yemeni government, politicians and journalists expressed dismay over his remarks. A senior government official, who asked not to be named, told Arab News that the Yemeni foreign minister and the speaker of the parliament had contacted officials at the US embassy in Yemen asking for clarification, which came on Friday morning. Meanwhile Yemenis expressed outrage on social media and in the local media about what they perceived as a shift in US policy on the Houthis. Ahmed Ayedh, the editor of Marib Press news site, described the Lenderking’s remarks as “a clear coup against local, Arab and international resolutions” that recognize the Yemeni government’s authority, and called on the authority to boycott him. The US State Department said the envoy’s words were taken out of context. As well as reiterating the support of the US government for the Yemeni government, it slammed the Houthis for escalating their military operations. “We remain concerned that the Houthis are more focused on waging war and exacerbating the suffering of Yemeni citizens than they are on being part of the resolution to the conflict,” it said. The Houthis viewed the perceived shift in US tone as a victory and vowed to press ahead with their “resistance.” Without specifically mentioning the Lenderking’s comments, Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, president of the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee, demanded that the international community deal with the group as the sole, legitimate representatives of Yemen. “Thanks to God, Yemen has won due to its steadfastness and strength that achieved its legitimacy and independence,” he said in a message posted on Twitter. Muammar Al-Eryani, Yemen’s information minister, said on Friday that the Houthis interpret the international community’s “soft” handling of the war in Yemen and human rights abuses by the rebels as a green light to push ahead with their military operations. In a message posted on Twitter, he said the Houthi militia considers the international response as “encouragement for its aggression and military escalation, killings of Yemenis and violations of human rights.” He denounced the militia’s terrorist activities, which he said threaten regional and international security, disrupt peace efforts and exacerbate the human suffering in the country.
8955	dbpedia	0	25	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/yemen-s-hadi-has-no-regrets-about-seeking-saudi-help/1207407	en	Yemen’s Hadi has no regrets about seeking Saudi help	https://cdnuploads.aa.co…02b.jpg?v=130956	https://cdnuploads.aa.co…02b.jpg?v=130956	[ "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnassets.aa.com.tr/assets/newVersion/images/logo.png", "https://cdnuploads.aa.com.tr/uploads/Contents/2018/07/18/thumbs_b_c_531392e70e4d7c89f616441d520fe02b.jpg?v=130956"...	[]	[]	[ "Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi", "Arab coalition", "Decisive Storm", "Houthi", "Saudi Arabia", "war", "Anadolu Ajansı" ]	null	[]	null	In interview with BBC, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi hails Saudi-led coalition’s ongoing support against Houthi rebels - Anadolu Ajansı		https://cdnassets.aa.com…avicon-32x32.png		https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/yemen-s-hadi-has-no-regrets-about-seeking-saudi-help/1207407	By Mohamed al-Samei SANAA Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi says he has no regrets about requesting help from a Saudi-led coalition cobbled together in 2015 to help his government fight the Houthi rebel group. In a late Tuesday interview with the BBC, Hadi described the Saudi-led coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm as one of the most “successful” military operations ever undertaken in the Arab world. “I do not regret this decision at all,” he said. “Otherwise, we would not have liberated parts of the country from Aden to [the eastern province of] Al-Mahra.” “Without the support of the coalition, these areas would still be under the control of the Houthis,” he added. Hadi went on to assert: “If Decisive Storm had not happened, it would have been the beginning of a major civil war lasting even longer than the conflict in Somalia [that began in 1991 and remains ongoing].” Yemen has been wracked by war since 2014, when Shia Houthi rebels overran much of the country, including Sanaa. The loss of the capital forced Hadi and his government to take up temporary residence in Yemen’s coastal city of Aden. The conflict escalated in 2015 when Saudi Arabia and its Sunni-Arab allies -- accusing the Houthis of serving as Iranian proxies -- launched a massive air campaign in Yemen aimed at rolling back Houthi gains and shoring up Hadi’s pro-Saudi government. UN-sponsored peace talks held in Kuwait the following year failed to end the destructive conflict. The violence has devastated Yemen’s infrastructure, including water and sanitation systems, prompting the UN to describe the situation as “one of the worst humanitarian disasters of modern times”.
8955	dbpedia	2	47	https://www.facebook.com/PlsOlive/videos/a-million-person-demonstration-in-the-capital-of-yemen-sanaa-in-support-of-pales/510001158021787/	en	A million-person demonstration in the capital of Yemen, Sanaa, in support of Palestine and the resistance in Gaza.	https://scontent.xx.fbcd…cpQA&oe=66C8F202	https://scontent.xx.fbcd…cpQA&oe=66C8F202	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	A million-person demonstration in the capital of Yemen, Sanaa, in support of Palestine and the resistance in Gaza.	de	https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/yT/r/aGT3gskzWBf.ico		https://www.facebook.com/PlsOlive/videos/a-million-person-demonstration-in-the-capital-of-yemen-sanaa-in-support-of-pales/510001158021787/
8955	dbpedia	1	53	https://english.news.cn/20240206/24f81c11882b4cae88ae26908343cad3/c.html	en	New prime minister appointed in Yemen amid dire challenges			[ "https://english.news.cn/20240206/24f81c11882b4cae88ae26908343cad3/zxcode_2024020624f81c11882b4cae88ae26908343cad3.jpg", "https://english.news.cn/2021newxl/images/20210928_rightShareFb_v1.png", "https://english.news.cn/2021newxl/images/20210928_rightShareTw_v1.png", "https://english.news.cn/2021newxl/images/2...	[]	[]	[ "Yemen", "Prime Minister", "Appointment" ]	null	[]	2024-02-06T00:00:00	New prime minister appointed in Yemen amid dire challenges-	en			null	ADEN, Yemen, Feb. 5 (Xinhua) -- Yemen's ongoing civil war took a new turn on Monday as the Presidential Leadership Council appointed Foreign Minister Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak as the country's new prime minister, according to the state-run Saba news agency. The council's chairman issued an official decree appointing Bin Mubarak to replace Maeen Abdulmalik, who was named a presidential advisor. Bin Mubarak is a seasoned politician who previously served as chief of staff under former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in 2014. That same year, he was offered the position of prime minister but declined. Since late 2014, Yemen has been embroiled in a civil war between Iran-backed Houthis and Saudi-backed government forces. The Houthis seized control of key northern regions, including the capital Sanaa. Bin Mubarak himself was briefly kidnapped by the Houthi group in 2015. After his release, he went on to serve as Yemen's Ambassador to the United States, followed by Foreign Minister starting in 2020. In a statement, Bin Mubarak said he assumed the new role "with determination to achieve tangible results for the Yemeni people during these difficult times," calling for unity and efforts between the government and state institutions to serve the nation responsibly. He stressed the need to uphold the rule of law while addressing the many challenges facing Yemen. He noted that his government will seek regional and international partnerships to establish peace and security in the country. Bin Mubarak takes on the role of prime minister at a time when Yemen faces immense economic and humanitarian challenges. Years of civil war have led to a deterioration of the economy, with soaring inflation and the collapse of the Yemeni currency. Infrastructure across the country lies in ruins, while poverty and food insecurity affect millions of Yemenis. On Saturday, the Yemeni riyal plunged to a new record low, breaking 1,650 against one U.S. dollar, as the country's currency crisis continues to worsen. The continued conflict between Houthis and government forces has displaced over 4 million people and left 80 percent of the population in need of humanitarian assistance. Despite repeated attempts toward ceasefire and peace deals, a political solution remains elusive. The country is also split between the Houthi-held north and the internationally recognized government in the south. Bringing stability to Yemen will require urgent measures to shore up the failing economy, address fuel and food shortages, rebuild decimated infrastructure and public services, and establish lasting peace. With the nation split in two and a complex array of factions vying for power, Bin Mubarak faces a monumental task of restoring unity and finding an inclusive political settlement, according to local observers. ■
8955	dbpedia	3	32	https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis	en	Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering	https://www.cfr.org/site…020/02/Yemen.jpg	https://www.cfr.org/site…020/02/Yemen.jpg	[ "https://www.cfr.org/themes/custom/cfr_theme/src/assets/images/cfr-coc-icon.png", "https://www.cfr.org/themes/custom/cfr_theme/src/assets/images/cfr-tgh-icon.png", "https://www.cfr.org/themes/custom/cfr_theme/src/assets/images/cfr-store.png", "https://www.cfr.org/themes/custom/cfr_theme/src/assets/images/cfr-...	[]	[]	[ "Middle East and North Africa", "Yemen", "Saudi Arabia", "Wars and Conflict", "Humanitarian Crises", "Political Transitions" ]	null	[ "Kali Robinson" ]	2015-04-29T12:12:55-04:00	Yemen’s internal divisions and a Saudi-led military intervention have spawned an intractable political, military, and humanitarian crisis.	en	//cdn.cfr.org/themes/custom/cfr_theme/favicon-32x32.png	Council on Foreign Relations	https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis	Introduction Yemen, a small country on the Arabian Peninsula, has become the site of grievous civilian suffering amid an intractable civil war. Many analysts say the fighting, now seven years old, has turned into a proxy war: Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who overthrew the Yemeni government, are pitted against a multinational coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The involvement of other combatants, including militant Islamist groups and separatists backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has complicated the picture. More From Our Experts The conflict has displaced more than four million people and given rise to cholera outbreaks, medicine shortages, and threats of famine. The warring parties observed a monthslong cease-fire in 2022, raising hopes for a political solution to the conflict, but that October, they failed to extend the truce. What are Yemen’s divisions? More on: Middle East and North Africa Yemen Saudi Arabia Wars and Conflict Humanitarian Crises Yemen has long struggled with religious and cultural differences between its north and south and the legacy of European colonialism. The modern Yemeni state was formed in 1990 with the unification of the U.S.- and Saudi-backed Yemeni Arab Republic, in the north, and the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, in the south. Ali Abdullah Saleh, a military officer who had ruled North Yemen since 1978, assumed leadership of the new country. Daily News Brief A summary of global news developments with CFR analysis delivered to your inbox each morning. Weekdays. The World This Week A weekly digest of the latest from CFR on the biggest foreign policy stories of the week, featuring briefs, opinions, and explainers. Every Friday. Think Global Health A curation of original analyses, data visualizations, and commentaries, examining the debates and efforts to improve health worldwide. Weekly. By entering your email and clicking subscribe, you're agreeing to receive announcements from CFR about our products and services, as well as invitations to CFR events. You are also agreeing to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use. However, just four years after unification, southern separatists seceded for several months and reemerged in 2007 as the Southern Movement, which has continued to press for greater autonomy within Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an Islamist militant group, and the related Ansar al-Sharia insurgent group have captured territory in the south and east. The Houthi movement, whose base is among the Zaydi Shiites of northern Yemen, rose up against Saleh’s government six times between 2004 and 2010. The United States lent its support to Saleh beginning in the early 2000s, when counterterrorism cooperation against al-Qaeda and affiliate groups became Washington’s overriding regional concern. In 2000, al-Qaeda in Yemen, a group that would later become AQAP, conducted a suicide attack on a U.S. Navy warship, the USS Cole, in the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen U.S. service members were killed in the bombing. Since then, the United States has provided Yemen more than $850 million in military aid, according to the online database Security Assistance Monitor. More From Our Experts Rights groups persistently charged [PDF] that Saleh ran a corrupt and autocratic government. As the popular protests of the 2011 Arab Spring spread to Yemen, the president’s political and military rivals jockeyed to oust him. While Yemeni security forces focused on putting down protests in urban areas, AQAP made gains in outlying regions. Under escalating domestic and international pressure [PDF], Saleh stepped aside in 2012 after receiving assurances of immunity from prosecution. His vice president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, assumed office as interim president in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional organization based in Saudi Arabia, and backed by the United States. As part of the GCC’s timetable for a transition, the UN-sponsored National Dialogue Conference (NDC) convened 565 delegates in 2013 to formulate a new constitution agreeable to Yemen’s many factions. But the NDC ended with delegates unable to resolve disputes over the distribution of power. More on: Middle East and North Africa Yemen Saudi Arabia Wars and Conflict Humanitarian Crises What caused the current crisis? Several factors widened these political divisions and led to full-scale military conflict. Fuel price hikes. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which had extended to Yemen a $550 million loan premised on promises of economic reforms, Hadi’s government lifted fuel subsidies in 2014. The Houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base with its criticisms of the UN transition, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. Hadi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated party al-Islah held counterrallies. Houthi takeover. The Houthis captured much of Sanaa by late 2014. Reneging on a UN peace deal, they consolidated control of the capital and continued their southward advance. Hadi’s government resigned under pressure in January 2015 and Hadi later fled to Saudi Arabia. Military division. Military units loyal to Saleh aligned themselves with the Houthis, contributing to their battlefield success. Other militias mobilized against the Houthi-Saleh forces, aligning with those in the military who had remained loyal to the Hadi government. Southern separatists ramped up their calls for secession. Saudi intervention. In 2015, with Hadi in exile, Riyadh launched a military campaign—primarily fought from the air—to roll back the Houthis and restore the Hadi administration to Sanaa. Who are the parties involved? The Houthi movement, named for a religious leader from the Houthi clan and officially known as Ansar Allah, emerged in the late 1980s as a vehicle for religious and cultural revivalism among Zaydi Shiites in northern Yemen. The Zaydis are a minority in the Sunni Muslim–majority country but predominant in the northern highlands along the Saudi border. The Houthis became politically active after 2003, opposing Saleh for backing the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq but later allying with him after his resignation as president. This alliance was a tactical one: Saleh’s loyalists opposed Hadi’s UN-backed government and, feeling marginalized in the transition process, sought to regain a leading role in Yemen. Saleh won the allegiance of some members of Yemen’s security forces, tribal networks, and political establishment. But in 2017, after Saleh shifted his support to the Saudi-led coalition, he was killed by Houthi forces. Iran is the Houthis’ primary international backer and has reportedly provided them with military support, including weapons. Hadi’s government also accused Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese ally, of aiding the Houthis. Saudi Arabia’s perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy rather than an indigenous movement has driven Riyadh’s military intervention. But many regional specialists say that Tehran’s influence is likely limited, especially given that Iranians and Houthis adhere to different schools of Shiite Islam. Experts also say Iran’s sway could shrink as Saudi-Iranian relations warm following a China-mediated rapprochement in early 2023. Some analysts expect Iranian weapons transfers to the Houthis to decline. At Hadi’s behest in 2015, Saudi Arabia cobbled together a coalition of Sunni-majority Arab states: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). By 2018, the coalition had expanded to include forces from Eritrea and Pakistan. They launched an air campaign against the Houthis with the aim of reinstating Hadi’s government. For Riyadh, accepting Houthi control of Yemen would mean allowing a hostile neighbor to reside on its southern border, and it would mark a setback in its long-standing contest with Tehran. After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most significant military role in the coalition, contributing some ten thousand ground troops, mostly in Yemen’s south. However, the UAE removed most of them after entering into conflict with its coalition allies in 2019, when it backed the separatist Southern Transitional Government (STC), which captured Aden. That November, Hadi and the STC president signed the Riyadh Agreement, which affirms that the factions will share power equally in a postwar Yemeni government. The separatists reneged on the deal for several months in 2020, but eventually they joined a unity government with equal representation of northerners and southerners. Though the formation of a government signaled progress in bridging Yemen’s internal divisions, it did little to accelerate peace talks. In April 2022, Hadi ceded power to a governing council and fired a deputy scorned by the Houthis in hopes that the rebels would return to the negotiating table. Although the U.S. Congress has been divided on the matter [PDF], the United States has backed the Saudi-led coalition, as have France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. U.S. interests include security of Saudi borders; free passage in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the choke point between the Arabian and Red Seas and a vital artery for the global transport of oil; and a government in Sanaa that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism programs. But uproar over civilian deaths in coalition air campaigns, which often use U.S.-made weapons, and Saudi Arabia’s role in the 2018 killing of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi led the United States and other Western powers to limit some weapons sales and refueling of coalition aircraft. Lawmakers have also raised concerns that U.S.-made weapons are falling into the hands of AQAP and Houthi fighters. Still, the United States is Saudi Arabia’s largest arms supplier, and President Donald Trump thrice vetoed bills that would have halted arms sales to Saudi Arabia. President Joe Biden said he would end U.S. support for the coalition’s military offensive, including the sale of weapons, and signaled a shift to diplomacy by appointing a special envoy to Yemen. Yet, U.S. defense contractors still oversee the servicing of Saudi aircraft that carry out offensive operations, and the administration has approved the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia for defense purposes. Shortly after taking office, Biden reversed the Trump administration’s last-minute designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group, citing the move’s potential damage to aid deliveries in Yemen. What is the role of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? AQAP, in Yemen since the early 1990s, has benefited from the more recent chaos. In 2015, it captured the coastal city of Mukalla and released three hundred inmates, many believed to be AQAP members, from the city’s prison. The militant group expanded its control westward to Aden and seized parts of the city before coalition forces recovered much of the region in 2016. AQAP has also provided Yemenis in some areas with security and public services unfulfilled by the state, which has strengthened support for the group. The U.S. State Department warns that Yemen’s instability has weakened long-running counterterrorism efforts [PDF], which rely heavily on air strikes. The Barack Obama administration conducted an estimated 185 strikes over eight years, while the Trump administration launched nearly 200 in its four years. These air strikes have killed several high-level AQAP members, including former leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi and top official Jamal al-Badawi, who was allegedly involved in the USS Cole bombing. But the U.S. strikes have also resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred civilians, watchdog groups say. For years, AQAP vied for influence with the Houthis and the self-declared Islamic State, especially in the central al-Bayda Governorate. The Islamic State marked its 2015 entrance into Yemen with suicide attacks on two Zaydi mosques in Sanaa, which killed close to 140 worshippers. Though the group has claimed other high-profile attacks, including the assassination of Aden’s governor in late 2015, its following lags behind that of AQAP. In 2021, the United Nations estimated that the Islamic State had hundreds of fighters [PDF] in Yemen, while AQAP had around seven thousand [PDF] as of mid-2020. Opposition from the Houthis has reportedly debilitated both groups, but experts warn against discounting their possible resurgence. What has the humanitarian impact been? With around three-quarters of its population living in poverty, Yemen has long been the Arab world’s poorest country, and its humanitarian crisis has been called one of the worst in the world. Disease runs rampant; suspected cholera cases passed two hundred thousand [PDF] in 2020. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is harder to assess, since there is no comprehensive caseload data. Some twelve thousand cases have been reported to the World Health Organization, but health analysts say the actual count is likely much higher. Moreover, many countries cut back on critical aid to Yemen amid the crush of the pandemic, leading the United Nations to reduce food rations for some eight million Yemenis in January 2022. Three out of four Yemenis require humanitarian aid and protection, and four million are internally displaced [PDF], according to the UN refugee agency. The situation has worsened under a yearslong de facto land, sea, and air blockade imposed by coalition forces, which has obstructed the flow of vital supplies of food and medicine and helped drive up prices of essential goods. Under the 2022 cease-fire, prices dropped significantly, but with the expiration of the truce, many Yemenis fear that high costs will return. The UN Development Program estimates that more than 370,000 people have died as a result of the war, with indirect causes such as lack of food, water, and health services causing almost 60 percent of deaths. In addition, the United Nations has found [PDF] that both Houthi and coalition forces have knowingly attacked civilian targets in violation of international law. This includes the destruction of a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders in 2015. Torture, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances are among the other alleged war crimes perpetrated by both sides. What are the prospects for a solution to the crisis? UN-backed peace negotiations have made limited progress. The 2018 Stockholm Agreement averted a battle in the port city of Hodeidah, a vital hub for aid; but there has been little success in implementing the accord’s provisions, which includes the exchange of more than fifteen thousand prisoners and the creation of a joint committee to de-escalate violence in the city of Taiz. Observers worry that friction among regional actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is prolonging the war. Conditions deteriorated in late 2019, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for a missile attack on Saudi oil facilities. UN monitors concluded that the Houthis did not carry out the attack, while the Saudi-led coalition blamed Iran.
8955	dbpedia	1	93	https://www.longwarjournal.org/tags/abdrabbuh-mansur-hadi	en	FDD's Long War Journal	https://www.longwarjourn…-2-1024x1024.jpg		[ "https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/FDDLWJ_Logo_Condensed_web_color_v01.png", "https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/President_Ali_Abdullah_Saleh-1.jpg", "https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/GenerationJihad_Logo_Redesign_v07_3000px-2-1024x1024.jpg...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Alexandra Gutowski" ]	null		en			null	The assassination of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh follows a strain in the opportunistic cooperation between his forces and the Houthis.
8955	dbpedia	0	30	https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/	en	Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them?	https://www.brookings.ed…513615561397.jpg	https://www.brookings.ed…513615561397.jpg	[ "https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/container-ships-unloading-port-long-beach-la.jpg?quality=75&w=500", "https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Shutterstock_81632899.jpg?quality=75&w=500", "https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2034/08/20240813_THP_ImmigrationCNIP_Workers_...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Bruce Riedel", "Daniel L. Byman", "Allison Minor", "Kevin Huggard", "Bruce Jones" ]	2017-12-18T17:32:42+00:00	For over two and a half years, the United States has supported Saudi Arabia in a war against the Houthi movement in Yemen. The war has created the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world and threatens to turn into the largest famine in decades. Yet very few Americans know who the Houthis are.	en	https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/themes/brookings/assets/images/favicons/favicon.ico	Brookings	https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/	For over two-and-a-half years, the United States has supported Saudi Arabia in a war against the Houthi movement in Yemen. The war has created the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world and threatens to turn into the largest famine in decades. Yet very few Americans know who the Houthis are, what they stand for, and why they are our de facto enemies. Two administrations have backed the war against the Houthis without a serious campaign to explain why Americans should see them as our enemies. Yemeni politics are incredibly complex and volatile—rather than get drawn into a quagmire against an enemy they hardly know, the United States and its partners should get serious about finding a political solution. What you need to know First and foremost, the Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, or Zaydiyyah. Shiite Muslims are the minority community in the Islamic world and Zaydis are a minority of Shiites, significantly different in doctrine and beliefs from the Shiites who dominate in Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere (often called Twelvers for their belief in twelve Imams). The Zadiyyah take their name from Zayd bin Ali, the great grandson of Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, whom all Shiites revere. Zayd bin Ali led an uprising against the Umayyad Empire in 740, the first dynastic empire in Islamic history, which ruled from Damascus. Zayd was martyred in his revolt, and his head is believed to be buried in a shrine to him in Kerak, Jordan. Zaydis believe he was a model of a pure caliph who should have ruled instead of the Umayyads. The Houthis have made fighting corruption the centerpiece of their political program, at least nominally. The distinguishing feature of Zayd’s remembered biography is that he fought against a corrupt regime. Sunnis and Shiites agree that he was a righteous man. The Zaydi elevate him to be the epitome of a symbol of fighting corruption. The Houthis have made fighting corruption the centerpiece of their political program, at least nominally. The Zaydi do not believe in ayatollahs like the Twelver Shiites—who are the Shiite sect in Iran and most of the Muslim world—nor do they practice the other Twelver doctrine of taqqiyah (dissimulation), which permits one to disguise his or her faith for self-protection. In short, they are a very different sect than the Iranian version of Shiism that Americans have come to know since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Followers of Zayd established themselves in north Yemen’s rugged mountains in the ninth century. For the next thousand years, the Zaydis fought for control of Yemen with various degrees of success. A succession of Zaydi Imams ruled the community and Zaydis were the majority of the population in the mountains of the north. They fought against both the Ottomans and the Wahhabis in the 18th and 19th centuries. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, a Zaydi monarchy took power in North Yemen called the Mutawakkilite Kingdom. The ruler, or imam, was both a secular ruler and a spiritual leader. Their kingdom fought and lost a border war with Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, losing territory to the Saudi state. They also enjoyed international recognition as the legitimate government of North Yemen. Their capital was in Taiz. In 1962, an Egyptian-backed revolutionary military cabal overthrew the Mutawakkilite king and established an Arab nationalist government with its capital in Sanaa. With Soviet assistance, Egypt sent tens of thousands of troops to back the republican coup. The Zaydi Royalists fled to the mountains along the Saudi border to fight a civil war for control of the country. Saudi Arabia supported the royalists against Egypt. Israel also clandestinely backed the Zaydi Royalists. The war ended in a republican victory after the Saudis and Egyptians resolved their regional rivalry after the 1967 war with Israel and lost interest in the Yemen civil war. A Zaydi republican general named Ali Abdullah Saleh came to power after a succession of coups in 1978. Saleh ruled—or misruled—Yemen for the next 33 years. He united north and south Yemen in 1990, tilted toward Iraq during the 1991 Kuwait war, and survived a Saudi-backed southern civil war in 1994. He had complicated relations with both Riyadh and Washington, but by the late 1990s was generally aligned with both against al-Qaida. The al-Qaida attack on the USS Cole in late 2000 in Aden drew the Americans closer to Saleh, although his cooperation against al-Qaida was always incomplete. The Houthis emerged as a Zaydi resistance to Saleh and his corruption in the 1990s led by a charismatic leader named Hussein al Houthi, from whom they are named. They charged Saleh with massive corruption to steal the wealth of the Arab world’s poorest country for his own family, much like other Arab dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. They also criticized Saudi and American backing for the dictator. 2003: The tipping point The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 deeply radicalized the Houthi movement, like it did many other Arabs. It was a pivotal moment. The Houthis adopted the slogan: “God is great, death to the U.S., death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam,” in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The group also officially called itself Ansar Allah, or supporters of God. It was a turning point largely unrecognized outside Yemen, another unanticipated consequence of George Bush’s Iraq adventures. Hezbollah, the Shiite movement in Lebanon which successfully expelled the Israeli army from the country, became a role model and mentor for the Houthis. Although different kinds of Shiites, the two groups have a natural attraction. Hezbollah provided inspiration and expertise for the Houthis. Iran was a secondary source of support, especially since the Houthis and Iranians share a common enemy in Saudi Arabia. After 2003, Saleh launched a series of military campaigns to destroy the Houthis. In 2004, Saleh’s forces killed Hussein al Houthi. The Yemeni army and air force was used to suppress the rebellion in the far north of Yemen, especially in Saada province. The Saudis joined with Saleh in these campaigns. The Houthis won against both Saleh and the Saudi army, besting them both again and again. For the Saudis, who have spent tens of billions of dollars on their military, it was deeply humiliating. The Houthis won against both Saleh and the Saudi army, besting them both again and again. The Arab Spring came to Yemen in 2011. The Houthi movement was one part of the wide national uprising against Saleh. It was primarily concerned with advancing the narrow interests of the Zaydi community, not surprisingly. When Saleh was replaced by a Sunni from the south—Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who had been Saleh’s vice president at the behest of the Saudis—the Houthi response was predictable. They were critical of the process and of Hadi. A national dialogue was instituted to address the future of Yemen after Saleh, with regional and international assistance. It proposed a federal solution with six provinces with some autonomy. The Zaydi-dominated north got two landlocked entities, which the Houthis argued was gerrymandered against them. In 2014, they began colluding with Saleh against Hadi secretly. Even by the standards of Middle East politics, it was a remarkable and hypocritical reversal of alliances by both the Houthis and Saleh. Much of the army remained loyal to Saleh and his family, so together with the Houthis the two had a preponderance of force in the country. Hadi was deeply unpopular and seen as a Saudi stooge. The war After months of gradually moving into the capital Sanaa, it fell to the rebel alliance in January 2015, just as King Salman ascended to the throne in Riyadh. The Houthis opened direct civilian air traffic between Sanaa and Tehran, Iran promised cheap oil for Yemen, and rumors of more Iran-Houthi cooperation spread quickly. The main port at Hodeidah fell to the Houthi forces and they began marching to take Aden, the capital of the south and the largest port on the Indian Ocean. For the Saudi king and his 29-year-old defense minister and son Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), it was a nightmare. A traditional enemy with ties to their regional foe was taking over the country on their southern belly. The strategic straits at the Bab al Mandab could be in the Houthis’ hands. It was a very difficult challenge for an untried team in the royal palace. For the Obama administration, the picture was more complicated. American intelligence officials said that Iran was actually trying to discourage the Houthis from seizing Sanaa and openly toppling Hadi. Iran preferred a less radical course, but the Houthi leadership was drunk with success. Moreover, Undersecretary of Defense Michael Vickers said on the record in January that Washington had a productive informal intelligence relationship with the Houthis against al-Qaida. He suggested that the cooperation could continue. The Saudis chose to go to war to support Hadi and prevent the Houthi-Saleh rebellion from consolidating control of the country. Operation Decisive Storm began in March 2015, MBS taking the public lead in promising early victory for the Saudis. They forged a coalition to back them including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and other traditional Saudi allies. Two refused to join: Oman, Yemen’s neighbor, and Pakistan, whose parliament voted unanimously against the war. Obama backed the Saudi war. In the choice between the Saudi ally and the Houthis, the president—not surprisingly—took the side of a 70-year old alliance. U.S. and U.K. support is essential to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), which is equipped with American and British aircraft. The RSAF has dropped tons of American and British munitions on Yemen since. Almost three years later, the Saudi air and naval blockade of Houthi-controlled territory has created a humanitarian disaster, with millions of Yemenis at dire risk of starvation and disease. The Saudi-led coalition has tightened the blockade and gradually gained more territory, although Hadi has little if any control over the territory recovered from the rebels. He resides in Riyadh. All sides are credibly accused of war crimes. Saleh broke with his putative ally this month, signaled to Riyadh that he was flipping sides again, and was killed days later. The Houthis won the battle for Sanaa but are isolated from the rest of Yemeni politics and political parties. Riyadh portrays them as Iranian puppets, but many Yemenis see them as patriots fighting the country’s traditional enemy Saudi Arabia and America, Israel’s defender. Houthi propaganda plays to the line that Yemen is under attack by a Saudi-American-Israeli conspiracy. A major consequence of the war is to push the Houthis and Iran and Hezbollah closer together. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley underscored that point, perhaps unintentionally, when she presented compelling evidence of Iranian support for the Houthis missile attacks on Saudi and Emirati targets last week. With their own cities under constant aerial bombardment, the Houthis are firing missiles at Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, with Tehran’s technological assistance. The war costs Tehran a few million dollars per month, while it costs Riyadh $6 billion per month. Tehran and the Houthis are playing with fire, of course. If a missile hits Riyadh, Jeddah, or Abu Dhabi and kills dozens or more, the pressure for retaliation against Iran will be significant. The Trump administration is poorly designed to provide cooling counsel. This brief and simplified account of the background of the Houthis should underscore how complex Yemeni politics are and how volatile they can be. Saleh called running Yemen to be akin to dancing on the heads of snakes. It is a foolish place for Americans to be drawn into a war and a quagmire against an enemy they hardly know. The administration has recently called for an easing of the blockade. It’s time to get serious about a political solution, not to wade deeper into quicksand.
8955	dbpedia	3	6	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/exiled-yemen-president-steps-aside-amid-hopes-over-truce-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi	en	Exiled Yemen president steps aside as truce raises hopes of end to war	https://i.guim.co.uk/img…abb05640df06da5f	https://i.guim.co.uk/img…abb05640df06da5f	[ "https://sb.scorecardresearch.com/p?c1=2&c2=6035250&cv=2.0&cj=1&cs_ucfr=0&comscorekw=Yemen%2CWorld+news%2CSaudi+Arabia%2CUnited+Arab+Emirates%2CMiddle+East+and+north+Africa%2CHouthis", "https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/3661cb4bdb00289fc8c549d79e094e128a1b7f40/109_0_3281_1969/master/3281.jpg?width=465&dpr=1&s=none" ...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Guardian staff" ]	2022-04-07T00:00:00	Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi says a newly established council will lead negotiations with Iranian-backed Houthis	en	https://assets.guim.co.u…e-touch-icon.svg	the Guardian	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/exiled-yemen-president-steps-aside-amid-hopes-over-truce-abd-rabbu-mansour-hadi	Yemen’s exiled president has stepped aside and transferred his powers to a presidential council as international and regional efforts to end the country’s long-running civil war gained momentum with a two-month truce. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, major players in the conflict, appear to have had a role in Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s decision, quickly welcoming it with a pledge of $3bn (£2.3bn) in aid. The head of the new council has close ties to Riyadh. Whether the switch will expedite an end to the grinding war remains to be seen, as UN-sponsored negotiations have been at an impasse and fighting, airstrikes and missile attacks continued until late last month. The Houthis did not immediately comment on Hadi’s announcement. Hadi said the newly established council would run the internationally recognised government and lead negotiations with the Iranian-backed Houthis, according to a statement aired on state-run media. The move is meant to unify the anti-Houthi camp after years of infighting and disputes, and was almost certainly orchestrated in Riyadh, where Yemeni factions were meeting over the past week to discuss efforts to end the war. “With this declaration a presidential leadership council shall be established to complete the implementation of the tasks of the transitional period. I irreversibly delegate to the presidential leadership council my full powers,” Hadi declared on Yemen’s state-run TV. Hadi also sacked the vice-president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a powerful military figure, and delegated Ahmar’s powers to the presidential council. The presidential council is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi enjoys close ties with Saudi Arabia and other political groups inside Yemen, including the powerful Islah party – the transnational Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in Yemen. The council has seven members, including Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, head of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council – an umbrella group of heavily armed and well-financed militias propped up by the UAE since 2015. Sheikh Sultan al-Aradah, the powerful governor of energy-rich Marib province, was also named a member of the council. So was Tariq Saleh, a militia leader and nephew of the late president who has close ties with the UAE. Hadi was named president of Yemen in 2012 with a mission to oversee a democratic transition following its Arab spring uprising that ended Saleh’s longtime rule. However, the Houthis, a religious movement turned rebel militia, allied with Saleh and seized the capital Sana’a in 2014, forcing Hadi and his government into exile in Saudi Arabia. Months later, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition and entered the war to try to restore Hadi’s government to power. The conflict has in recent years become a regional proxy war that has killed more than 150,000 people, including more than 14,500 civilians. It has also created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Welcoming Hadi’s move, Saudi Arabia urged the presidential council to embark on UN-led negotiations with the Houthis to find a “political, final and comprehensive” settlement to the conflict, according to the state-run Saudi Press Agency. The powerful Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has also met with the council head and its members, according to Saudi state-run TV. The warring sides announced a two-month ceasefire earlier this month, the first nationwide truce in Yemen in six years. Hadi’s announcement came as Yemeni talks called by the Saudi-based Gulf Cooperation Council entered their final day on Thursday. The Houthis boycotted the GCC-facilitated efforts because they are taking place in Saudi Arabia, their adversary’s territory.
8955	dbpedia	3	24	https://www.npr.org/2022/04/09/1091859815/yemens-president-steps-down-in-effort-to-end-7-year-civil-war	en	Yemen's president steps down in effort to end 7-year civil war	https://media.npr.org/in…e-s1400-c100.jpg	https://media.npr.org/in…e-s1400-c100.jpg	[ "https://media.npr.org/chrome_svg/npr-logo.svg", "https://media.npr.org/chrome/programs/logos/morning-edition.jpg", "https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2019/02/26/we_otherentitiestemplatesat_sq-cbde87a2fa31b01047441e6f34d2769b0287bcd4-s100-c85.png", "https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2019/02/26/we_otherentitiest...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Scott Simon" ]	2022-04-09T00:00:00	Scott Simon speaks to Yemen analyst Nadwa Al-Dawsari about the Yemeni president's transfer of power and its significance.	en	https://media.npr.org/ch…icon-180x180.png	NPR	https://www.npr.org/2022/04/09/1091859815/yemens-president-steps-down-in-effort-to-end-7-year-civil-war	SCOTT SIMON, HOST: The president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, stepped down this week in an effort to end a bitter seven-year civil war. He transferred his power to a presidential council on Thursday that will replace his decade-long reign. Yemen's been embroiled in what's basically a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Iran-backed Houthi rebels fighting a Saudi-led coalition there. More than 14,000 civilians have been killed in the war, which has set off one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Nadwa Al-Dawsari is a Yemeni analyst and nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute who joins us. Thanks so much for being with us. NADWA AL-DAWSARI: Thanks, Scott, for having me. SIMON: How significant do you find this transfer of power by the president of Yemen? AL-DAWSARI: It's very significant, and it came as a surprise to many of us Yemenis. SIMON: Could it lead to an end of violence and maybe the civil war? AL-DAWSARI: That's a far-fetched assumption. In reality, this has been a Saudi-UAE arrangement imposed on Yemenis. None of the participants in the Riyadh conference knew about it. Even members of the presidential council did not know that they were selected. And even Hadi did not know until that night. He was practically forced to transfer his powers, which is not a bad thing. Hadi was an extremely incompetent and corrupt leader. And because of his lack of leadership, we've been in a political and military stalemate. Having said that, there are two sets of, you know, challenges. One, the Houthis do not recognize the council. They never recognized Hadi. They basically called the council a recycle of Saudi mercenaries. The Houthis are not interested in ending the violence, and that's one of the major problems that will face this council and any efforts to reach peace. On the other hand also, members of the council - there are eight - they come from different backgrounds. They have different objectives. So it will be challenging to bring them together, to agree on issues, and they will have to agree on major issues. SIMON: Yeah. AL-DAWSARI: These members have been handpicked by the Saudis and the Emiratis, so they will be more accountable to their regional backers more than the Yemeni people. What happens when they disagree? Is Yemen going to become even a platform for proxy war between the Saudis and the Emiratis? - and how that will manifest in Yemen. So I think it's too early to be optimistic. SIMON: The U.S., of course, is a major supplier of weapons to Saudi Arabia, which has fueled the violence in the war. Does the United States have a have a role now? AL-DAWSARI: The problem with the U.S. are two things. The U.S. is selling weapons to the Saudis and the Emiratis unconditionally. The U.S. should have put conditions on selling the weapons, not only on - you know, that these weapons should not be used to harm civilians, but also that there should have been a plan, a clear plan by the Saudis and the Emiratis about their military intervention in Yemen. The second problem with the U.S. role is that the U.S. does not have leverage on the Houthis. And that's a problem because the Houthis are the main obstacle to peaceful negotiations. SIMON: Do you see any event occurring over the next few weeks or development that could let us know if the new coalition is - the presidential council is working out? AL-DAWSARI: There's been some rumors that there has been some back-channel agreements between the Houthis and the Saudis. I wouldn't be surprised if it happens because clearly, the Saudis are very desperate to leave Yemen and their role in the country. They just want the cross-border attacks to stop. So we might see something like that. We might not see something like that. So that's something to watch for. SIMON: Nadwa Al-Dawsari is a Yemeni analyst and nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute. Thanks so much for being with us. AL-DAWSARI: Thank you. Copyright © 2022 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information. NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.
8955	dbpedia	1	4	https://newlinesmag.com/argument/yemens-great-enabler-departs/	en	Yemen’s Great Enabler Departs	https://newlinesmag.com/…oads/Hadiweb.jpg	https://newlinesmag.com/…oads/Hadiweb.jpg	[ "https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=864379585153152&ev=PageView&noscript=1", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/themes/cgpolicy/images/NEW-NL-Logo-Horizontal-Black-Grey.svg", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/themes/cgpolicy/images/NL-Logo-Black.svg", "https://newlinesmag.com/wp-content/uploads/farea-web-80x80...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Farea Al-Muslimi" ]	2022-05-05T11:02:00+00:00	The former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi was a ‘painful friend’ to have – and a worse president	en	https://newlinesmag.com/…ground-32x32.jpg	New Lines Magazine	https://newlinesmag.com/argument/yemens-great-enabler-departs/	One might be taken in by former Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, until meeting him in person. A very “adi” — mediocre — guy, not somebody whose words convey new knowledge or provoke deeper thought in the listener. That is how I felt walking out of his house in Sanaa in January 2014. At 23 years old, all I gained from the encounter was the courage to smoke in front of my father that afternoon, after he had seen me on the news sitting down with our president. Nothing in Hadi’s speeches or public remarks in the years since has changed my impression, which I came to learn was shared by many others who met him. Now that Hadi has departed, replaced by a presidential council, it’s time to consider his legacy. And what a pointless lack of legacy it is. For a man who led a country and its people for a decade, there are precious few achievements to point to. Hadi resembles no world leaders so much as former Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika — an ill and often absent president, removed by his own government — and Afghanistan’s Ashraf Ghani, a corrupt figurehead, who fled the country. Like Hadi, my generation got some sort of agency out of the Yemeni revolution of 2011. After more than 33 years of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hadi embodied our newly gained ability to imagine more than one president in our lifetime. We were so taken by the possibility of change that 6.6 million Yemenis — 65% of eligible voters — turned out to vote for Hadi in a one-candidate election in 2012. Some friends chuckled at me for taking part in such a “fake election.” But we were desperate to find a way forward and for a leader who would bear out our aspirations for our country and navigate it through what was to be a brief transitional phase so that Yemen could be spared the bloody path we saw Syria careening down every day. Little did we know, or could we even imagine, that Hadi would take us on a catastrophic combination of Syrian, Libyan, Somali and Iraqi routes. That’s why many Yemenis feel Hadi has stabbed them in the back twice over, once through incompetence and a tolerance for corruption, and then again by allowing the country to be dragged into civil and proxy wars. He spent eight of his 10 years as Yemen’s “transitional” president living outside the country, abusing his power by indulging corrupt relatives and allies, granting his sons the decidedly unconstitutional authority to manage and meddle in state matters and showing little interest in appeals from Yemenis to ease their burdens. Throughout these years, Hadi, from outside Yemen, encouraged people to fight and die to preserve his status as Yemen’s “legitimate” president. His circle of advisers didn’t hesitate to uphold and repeat that dubious claim of legitimacy — and kept repeating it for years beyond his mandate, right up until the moment Hadi was finally forced out of office on April 7. At that point, those same advisers scrambled to secure their own interests. For all of these reasons, Hadi’s departure was not celebrated most by his Houthi opponents in Sanaa. Rather, it was by those who fought the Houthis under the banner of Hadi’s “legitimate” government. The mood lightened considerably in many gatherings in Marib and Shabwa governorates, this year’s key battleground, where sheikhs and residents discussed the changes during nightly Ramadan get-togethers, where qat, a plant chewed as a stimulant, is shared. But speaking to people across the country, there is a sense that at least with Hadi’s departure, things may actually move again. Governing Yemen requires someone who is actually in Yemen and interested in governing. Beyond all of that, and to our Yemen Arab Spring generation specifically, Hadi will always be viewed as the man who transformed opportunities into problems and dreams into nightmares. That is his legacy to the generation behind the 2011 revolution. We dreamed of Yemenis truly practicing democracy and taking our country forward; for many, having demanded these dreams become reality is their biggest regret in life. It was a dream to have a truly national dialogue, but Hadi and his aides abused the process of the 2013-14 National Dialogue Conference so horribly — by manipulating representation and outcomes, violating conference bylaws, buying loyalties — that it ended with a civil war. It was a dream to have the support of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries with sufficient resources and authority to make the transitional period succeed. Yet Hadi abused that relationship for personal interests to the extent his indulgent hosts, who justified their destructive role in Yemen’s war on Hadi’s request for intervention, eventually lost patience, kicking him out of office and effectively changing the locks by installing a command council to replace the presidency. It was a humiliating, though sadly unsurprising, end. The Saudis, it seems, learned what Yemeni business owner Khaled Abdulwahid knows all too well. Asked recently in Aden what it meant to have a lifelong friend like Hadi, he grimaced: “It is very painful.” Even those who did not like how Hadi’s departure was orchestrated understood why — and how — the Saudis did it. “They came to us for something that we have been asking for, for too long,” Abdullah Al-Namani, head of the Tadhamon political party and an MP, told me a few days after signing Hadi’s concession document. “How can you say ‘no’ to something you know is what you both want and need?” It was painful, but the only right thing. Hadi left no one any choice. For 18 years, Hadi held the most boring job in a presidential system: vice president. He accepted the title from Saleh in 1994, even though it came with little to no respect, and he made a career out of chairing inconsequential committees, cutting ceremonial ribbons and passing greetings to people from a boss who barely took notice of him. Even as president, that was the most consistent role he played; an enabler, of anyone or anything. In the south, he was an enabler for the British army (he and his family served as guards for the British Colony during their occupation of Yemen) and later for the Soviet-sponsored Marxist state. And when Saleh took the decision to invade the south in 1994, it was Hadi, a southerner, who led his troops against the south and on the side of Saleh. After the war, Hadi agreed to be the most senior southerner in Saleh’s government — enabling Saleh’s horrible political formula that allowed Saleh to dominate the country while claiming to act in the name of all Yemenis. He later colluded with whoever was in charge of Yemen, be it the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islah party, or the Houthis or those waging the Saudi war for eight long years. In his early days as president, it took people a while to fully absorb the fact he was president. Hadi didn’t enjoy mixing with people much or being in front of TV cameras. For months, his house in Sanaa continued to be referred to as “the VP’s house.” A running joke in Sanaa at the time was that on the day of his inauguration as a president, Hadi told his wife “Congratulations. Tomorrow, you will be the First Lady.” The second day, the joke went, his wife packed her stuff and moved to Saleh’s house — because not even Hadi’s own wife could imagine him as president. Hadi was “the coincidence president.” A powerful Arab Spring uprising had just shaken Saleh’s republican throne, an uprising so powerful even he, the wiliest of politicians, could not survive it. But Saleh hoped to place an “enabler” on the throne, so that he could maintain his power. Two names were floated at the time. Saleh’s prime minister by then, Ali Mujawaer, politely declined. And Rashad Alimi — now the head of the presidential council — was unpopular in those circles loyal to Saleh. Hence, the safest pick was Hadi. The Americans also liked the idea of a vice president taking over from a struggling president (an idea they also supported in Syria, Iraq before 2003 and elsewhere). Thus, all the stars in Yemen aligned for a Hadi presidency. During this time, in the early years of his presidency, even Hadi’s aides struggled to meet with him, and he was said to be obsessed with foreign support and more accessible to foreign dignitaries. With President Vladimir Putin, he would speak in Russian, which he learned during his time studying in Russia. Hadi was meeting with Western diplomats almost daily in his first year; multiple aides said he firmly believed that only the United States mattered. While Hadi was still in Sanaa early in his presidency, senior Yemeni officials, including some ministers, told me that they had to go through the British or U.S. ambassadors to get a meeting with him. He met with his own party leadership little more than a handful of times in the three years he worked from inside Yemen. Hadi earned a reputation during his years as Saleh’s deputy and as president for being willing to do or accept anything that would ensure he maintained his position. Between 2012 and 2014, he essentially surrendered to the Islamist Islah party, liberally appointing its members to run state institutions so they would protect his seat in power. And when the time came, Hadi handed Sanaa to the Houthis in the September 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement, surmising that even if a militia controlled the capital, he could still negotiate himself a place within it. The Houthis, however, had no interest in sharing Sanaa, or power overall, and Hadi fled the capital in early 2015, first to Aden and then via Oman to Riyadh. He quickly adapted to his new lifestyle in his Riyadh safe haven, where aides and close friends described him during those years as satisfied to merely sleep in and enjoy lunch and semi-fresh qat, as well as the songs of Muhammed Murshed Nagi and Faisal Alawi, two of his favorite singers. Hadi showed the same traits while president-in-exile as he had in Sanaa. Early on in Riyadh, he dismissed, or at best sidelined, advisers and ministers who disagreed with him, and he left daily decision-making to a close inner circle that included his adult sons. In February 2022, Hadi’s aide Abdulaziz Al-Maflahi told me he had last met personally with Hadi four years earlier, on being sworn in as an adviser to the president. Hadi also turned the Balhaf refinery in Shabwa governorate over to the United Arab Emirates in 2015, while he was on good terms with the Emiratis, to use as a military base. And he accepted, at times even encouraged, Saudi disregard for protocol as long he was allowed to stay comfortably in place. He signed off on many documents and orders that violated Yemen’s sovereignty, such as ceding control of the country’s air space to Saudi Arabia. Multiple military commanders told me they had received a written document that instructed them to take orders directly from Fahd bin Turki, the Saudi commander of coalition forces in Yemen until 2020, as if they had come from Hadi himself. As the former governor of Hadramawt, Ahmed bin Breik, once told me: “Hadi just wants to sit on that chair. If you in some way can give him that, even for an extra day, he will do whatever you want.” For weeks, months and years, the Saudis waited for their “guest” to leave. According to more than one Yemeni and Saudi source, more than once between 2018 and 2022, the Saudis politely offered to build him a palace anywhere in Yemen, including near the border or even on the Saudi side of it. But the man was happiest in Riyadh, far from Yemen and Yemenis. Hadi never made the slightest effort on issues he arguably could have handled easier from Riyadh, such as stopping the expulsion from Saudi Arabia of Yemeni workers, whose earnings are a lifeline for so many Yemeni families and communities. Tens of thousands of Yemeni workers — some in businesses mere minutes from Hadi’s palace in Riyadh — lost their jobs or were forced to leave the country because of Saudization, the policy of replacing foreign workers with Saudi citizens. Their remittances were the last main source of hard currency in Yemen. The mass expulsion of so many workers arguably did more harm to the country than the war itself. Instead, Hadi’s rare conversations with his host King Salman involved self-interested appeals to his host’s commitment to traditional Arab hospitality. During a 2017 meeting in Mecca, Hadi requested qat be allowed into his palace daily and, in a telephone call a few years later, he asked King Salman to allow him more time in his luxury accommodations in Riyadh, according to more than one source familiar with the call’s content. It took years until the Saudis realized there was a problem with the announced goal of their operation in Yemen to restore the legitimate Hadi government to its place in the capital Sanaa: Hadi himself had no intention of returning to anywhere in Yemen. Hadi was, in many ways, the worst ally to have. And the perfect enemy. He was happy with any compromise, any loss, as long as he stayed in power. Even if he was in exile, his seat of power was located in a Riyadh palace, as insulated from the realities of war back home — one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, let’s not forget — as it was from Riyadh’s scorching desert heat. He would do anything to maintain it. On April 7, the scene for Hadi in Riyadh, and for millions of Yemenis, was very different from, and much more difficult than, a decade ago. Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis have died in this war to restore legitimacy to a government led by a man who was not interested in serving them and their needs. Yemen is plagued by militias and in the grip of war economies. An entire generation transformed from being proud to, at best, gripped by guilt for daring to demand democracy and true reform. Yemen has endured so much. And yes, Hadi is far from being responsible for it alone. In a war as long and brutal as Yemen’s, there is plenty of blame to go around, from the reckless sectarianism of the Houthis to the meddling of countries in the region. And, most certainly, there were our own mistakes as youths demanding change that played a part in this fate. Our immaturity and political naivete don’t give us a pass. We could have done much better and acted more responsibly, in so many ways. Still, Hadi was the center of it all, powerfully placed during the peak of the hopes and through the seemingly bottomless lows. Everyone was willing to move the ship of state forward, except its assigned captain. Fast forward 10 years from beautiful Sanaa to Riyadh, where Hadi was summoned the night of April 6 to see the Saudi deputy defense minister, Khaled bin Salman. Hours later, in a brief, prerecorded statement, he ceded power to a presidential council. Hadi’s handover took 10 years, not two as initially planned, and he didn’t hand over to a president elected by the Yemeni people as promised in February 2013. Rather, power transferred to eight men agreeable to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including political and tribal foes Hadi had fired in the past, enemies who had tried to kill him more than once, and some allies who had advised him and negotiated on his behalf throughout the war. It took many Yemenis by surprise, all except the handful involved in preparing the text, but for many, Hadi had abandoned them long ago. And, despite any pain, friends as well as foes were ready for Hadi’s chapter to end.
8955	dbpedia	3	49	https://berghof-foundation.org/news/where-next-for-peacebuilding-in-yemen	en	Video: Where next for peacebuilding in Yemen	https://berghof-foundati…1904214118-2.jpg	https://berghof-foundati…1904214118-2.jpg	[ "https://berghof-foundation.org/images/content/_1000x571_crop_center-center_82_line/stock-photo-taiz-yemen-july-a-picture-of-the-historic-cairo-castle-overlooking-the-city-of-taiz-1904214118-2.jpg", "https://berghof-foundation.org/images/content/_1000x571_crop_center-center_82_line/2022_Sudan-protest_picture-alli...	[ "https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/5jA58NvvvgA?controls=0" ]	[]	[ "yemen", "political dialogue support", "taiz", "yemen truce" ]	null	[ "Berghof Foundation", "psdhtml.me" ]	null	Watch the video of our online panel discussion where experts reflected on our work in Yemen over the past ten years, and what’s next.	en	/assets/misc/favicon.png	Berghof Foundation	https://berghof-foundation.org/news/where-next-for-peacebuilding-in-yemen	AR EVENT Video: Where next for peacebuilding in Yemen Reflections from a decade of political dialogue support Watch the video of our online panel discussion where experts reflected on our work in Yemen over the past ten years, and what’s next. This year has witnessed significant shifts in the conflict in Yemen. A truce between Yemen’s internationally recognised government and Ansar Allah brokered by the United Nations in April is holding, resulting in the longest period of relative calm since the conflict began over seven years ago. President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had been in posit for over a decade, transferred power to the newly established Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), following the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) conference in Riyadh. Several visits by diplomats over recent months to Yemen also provided potential promise to the peace process, however, many questions remain. 2022 also marks a decade of partnership between the Political Development Forum Yemen (PDF-Yemen) and the Berghof Foundation, who have been working together since 2012 to support political dialogue among Yemeni actors from across the country. We held an expert discussion on analysing the lessons learnt from this ten-year-long engagement throughout the different stages of the Yemeni peace and dialogue processes and asked what the future holds for Yemen. Where next for peacebuilding in Yemen: Reflections from a decade of political dialogue support Wednesday, 28 September 2022 15:00 CEST (ics, ical) Online event via Zoom This event was held in Arabic and English with simultaneous translation. Welcome remarks by Philip Holzapfel, Deputy Head of Mission at the German Embassy in Baghdad Speakers: Maeen Al Obeidi, Local Coordinator, PDF-Yemen Ali Saif Hassan, Director, PDF-Yemen Oliver Wils, Head of MENA Department, Berghof Foundation Moderated by: Nadia Al Kawkabani, Programme Manager, PDF-Yemen and Sonja Neuweiler, Senior Advisor, MENA Department, Berghof Foundation. Our decade-long engagement in Yemen has involved facilitating hundreds of meetings, workshops and seminars at local, national and regional levels, with the participation of a wide range of Yemeni stakeholders – all with the aim of creating meaningful space for conflict transformation. The Berghof Foundation and PDF-Yemen are now implementing a joint political dialogue support programme based on a multi-track approach political at both national and regional levels, combined with projects aimed at strengthening inclusive local governance and community safety in governorates across Yemen. This event reflected on what lessons can be learnt from this long-term engagement in Yemen, as well as sought to establish the most urgent needs and challenges whether the truce is extended or not. Key PDF-Yemen colleagues, who have been involved from the early stages of our cooperation, alongside Yemeni peacebuilders and international diplomats, reflected on the past ten years and analysed lessons learnt of advancing the peace process from the short-to-long term. Media contact