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The conclusion that the threat actor belongs to Kimsuky was made after a
series of artifacts and hints were found, that when analysed revealed
a pattern and signature that was too exact of a match to belong to
anyone else.
Among these hints is the system's "locale"-setting set to Korean, along
with several configuration files for domain names that were previously tied
to Kimsuky's infrastructure and attacks. There are similarities between
the dumped code and the code from their previous campaigns.
Another recurring detail was the threat actor's strict office hours, always
connecting at around 09:00 and disconnecting by 17:00 Pyongyang time.
----[ 3.1 - Operation Covert Stalker
Operation Covert Stalker[#1] is the name given by AhnLab to a
months-long spear-phishing campaign conducted by North Korea
against individuals (journalists, researchers, politicians...)
and organizations in South Korea.
The web server configuration for a domain associated with this
attack was found on the threat actor's system.
............................................................................
SSLCertificateFile /etc/letsencrypt/live/nid-security.com/cert.pem
............................................................................
Drop location:
work/mnt/hgfs/Desktop/New folder/vps1/sites-available/default-ssl.conf
The domain nid.nid-security.com[#2] resolved to 27.255.80.170 on
2024-11-05[#3] which also corresponded to another file containing
comments to explain how to obtain a certificate for that domain.
Drop location:  work/mnt/hgfs/Desktop/New folder/readme.txt
----[ 3.2 - GPKI Stolen Certificates
In early 2024, a new malware written in Go and labelled Troll Stealer was
discovered by S2W[#4]. This malware has the ability to steal GPKI
(Government Public Key Infrastructure) certificates and keys that
are stored on infected devices.
GPKI is a way for employees of the South Korean government to sign
documents and to prove their authenticity.
The threat actor had thousands of these files on his workstation.
............................................................................
subject=C=KR, O=Government of Korea, OU=Ministry of Unification,
OU=people, CN=Lee Min-kyung
issuer=C=KR, O=Government of Korea, OU=GPKI, CN=CA131100001
............................................................................
Drop location:
work/home/user/Desktop/desktop/uni_certs && work/home/user/Downloads/cert/
The threat actor developed a Java program to crack the passwords protecting
the keys and certificates.
............................................................................
136박정욱001_env.key Password $cys13640229
041▒Φ├ó┐╡001_env.key Password !jinhee1650!
041▒Φ├ó┐╡001_sig.key Password ssa9514515!!
[...]
............................................................................
Drop location: work/home/user/Downloads/cert/src/cert.java
----[ 3.3 Similar Targets
Our threat actor has attacked the same targets that were previously
attributed to attacks by Kimsuky.
-[ Naver
Naver Corporation is a South Korean conglomerate offering a wide range of
services. A search engine (the most used in the country), Naver Pay (mobile
payment service), Naver Maps (similar to Google Maps), email services, and
so on.
Naver has a history of being targeted by North Korea. In 2024, Zscaler
discovered a new Google Chrome extension called TRANSLATEXT developed by
Kimsuky[#8]. This extension can inject arbitrary JS scripts when visiting
specific pages. Upon visiting `nid.naver.com` - the Naver login page - the
extension injects `auth.js` into the browser to steal the login
credentials.
The phishing attack described in section 2.1 uses the domain
`nid.navermails.com` as its main URL. This domain has been found to be
associated with Kimsuky by Ahnlab[#9].
-[ Ministry of Unification
A regular target of Kimsuky is the South Korean Ministry of Unification.
The attacker used the cracked passwords from the GPKI and crafted a custom
worldlist for brute forcing.
The log files show that these passwords were tried against the ministry's
domain.