Datasets:
Devilishcode
/
hacking

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
 Community
text
stringlengths
0
1.99k
The /bak/ subdirectory contains older version of some of the files.
----[ 2.4 Android Toybox
Drop Location: home/user/Downloads/toybox/third_party_toybox
KIM is heavily working on ToyBox for Android. It seems to have diverged
from ToyBox's official GitHub repository near commit id
896fa846b1ec8cd4895f6320b56942f129e54bc9. We have not investigated what
the many ToyBox modifications are for.
The community is invited to dissect this further.
----[ 2.5 Ivanti Control aka RootRot-NG
Drop Location: mnt/hgfs/Desktop/ivanti_control
We present the source code of the client to access the threat actor's
backdoor. It is somewhat related to RootRot [#12] and perhaps [#11].
The twist is that the payload is base64-encoded and send directly in the
cookie variable (and not in a GET or POST variable).
This request will reply with "HIT" if the backdoor is running:
............................................................................
curl -ksi --cookie "DSPSALPREF=cHJpbnRmKCJISVQiKTsK" \
"https://HOST/dana-na/auth/setcookie.cgi"
............................................................................
----[ 2.6 Bushfire
Drop Location: /mnt/hgfs/Desktop/exp1_admin.py
(The file is also included in ivanti-new-exp-20241220.zip)
This is an Ivanti exploit, possibly for CVE-2025-0282, CVE-2025-0283, or
CVE-2025-22457 and the payload installs a backdoor.
Mandiant recently discovered the payload in the wild. They attribute the
activity to UNC5221, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor [#13].
The exp1_admin.py uses the same iptable commands that Mandiant discovered
in the wild.
The exploit comes with documentation, which, when translated, reads:
>>> "contact us if the exploit fails" <<<
It may be an indication that there is code sharing and support happening
between these two state actors.
The payload also allows remote access to a compromised system.
The interesting part is at line 2219, where the keys/magics are generated:
* The key has 206^4 different combinations only (<31 bit strength).
* The magic has (26*2 + 10)^3 different combinations (<18 bit strength).
The encryption happens at line 85, and is....XOR, using a 31 bit key :>
Line 335, function `detect_door()` can be used to remotely scan for the
backdoor.
Notable is that only the magic (but not the key) is used to "knock" the
backdoor.
The magic is transmitted in the first 24 bits of the Client-Random in the
TLS Client-Hello message. The chances that an ordinary Client-Random has the
first 24-bit of this constellation are about 1 in 70.
Meme Alert! There is a "All-your-bases-are-belong-to-us" in the code:
>>>> "The target doesn't exist backdoor!" <<<
----[ 2.7 Spawn Chimera and The Hankyoreh
Drop Location: mnt/hgfs/Desktop/New folder/203.234.192.200_client.zip
The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.
The IP 203.234.192.200 belongs to https://hani.co.kr (The Hankyoreh), a
liberal newspaper from South Korea.
The client.py at line 152 shows the port knocking method: It hides again
inside the TLS-Client-Hello, in the 32 byte ClientRandom field, but with a
new twist:
The first 4 bytes must be the correct crc32 of the remaining 28 bytes.
............................................................................
random = os.urandom(28)
client_hello[15:43] = random
jamcrc = int("0b"+"1"*32, 2) - zlib.crc32(random)
client_hello[11:15] = struct.pack('!I', jamcrc)
............................................................................
We invite the community to investigate further.
--[ 3. Identifying Kimsuky