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- The work/home/user/.cache/vmware/drag_and_drop/ folder contains files that
KIM was moving between his Windows and Linux machines. These files include
cobalt strike loaders and reverse shells written in powershell. A compiled
version of Onnara code as well as Onnara modules for proxying into the
government network and more.
- In the directory work/home/user/.config/google-chrome/Default/ are many
interesting files (.com.google.Chrome*) which give us some insights on
interests, search habits, and accessed websites by "KIM". From these we
can learn that he is often concerned with cobalt strike (CS) survival,
wondering why Kunming is in the Center of Central Inspection Team, and is
a big fan of a variety of GitHub projects. He also frequents freebuf.com,
xaker.ru, and uses Google translator to read
accessibility-moda-gov-tw.translate.goog (translating from taiwanese).
- The file voS9AyMZ.tar.gz and Black.x64.tar.gz need a closer look. The
binary hashes are not known to virustotal but the names look inviting:
- 2bcef4444191c7a5943126338f8ba36404214202 payload.bin
- e6be345a13641b56da2a935eecfa7bdbe725b44e payload_test.bin
- 3e8b9d045dba5d4a49f409f83271487b5e7d076f s.x64.bin
- His bash_history shows SSH connections to computers on his local network.
- Pete Hegseth would say "He is currently clean on OPSEC"
--[ 2. The Artifacts
This section analyzes six of Kimsuky's backdoors and artifacts. This work is
neither complete nor finished. It is a start to get you excited and learn
how Kimsuky operates and what tools they are using.
----[ 2.1 Generator vs Defense Counterintelligence Command
Drop Location: vps/var/www/html/
The phishing tool exposes a https website (the phishing-website) under a
domain name similar to one that the victim knows and trusts. The victims
at dcc.mil.kr are then sent a link to the phishing-website. The attacker
then hopes that the victim will enter their login credentials into the
phishing-website.
The final redirection of the victim is away from the phishing-website and
to an URI on the legitimate website. It is an URI that always throws
a login-error. This is a targeted attack and the attacker had to find
such an URI on the legitimate website of https://dcc.mil.kr.
The benefit of this "trick" is that the victim will see an error from
https://dcc.mil.kr (which he knows and trusts) even though his credentials
were submitted to the phishing-website.
-[ config.php:
Contains a long IP black list (and other blacklists) so that companies
like Trend Micro and Google are unable to find the phishing site.
-[ generator.php:
This is the remote admin interface to administrate the phishing attack. It
is accessible via a configurable password. However, the cookie is hardcoded
and the admin-interface can be accessed without a password and by setting
the cookie instead:
............................................................................
curl -v --cookie "HnoplYTfPX=x" https://phishing-site/generator.php
............................................................................
It's trivial to scan the Internet and find phishing results:
............................................................................
curl -v --cookie "HnoplYTfPX=x" https://phishing-site/logs.php
............................................................................
----[ 2.2 Tomcat remote Kernel Backdoor
Drop location: mnt/hgfs/Desktop/tomcat20250414_rootkit_linux234/
This is a kernel level remote backdoor. It allows an attacker to access a
host remotely and hide. The drop contains the client (tcat.c), the server
side LKM (vmwfxs.mod.c) and userland backdoor (master.c).
The client communicates with the victim's server via (direct) TCP. The LKM
sniffs for any TCP connection that matches a specific TCP-SEQ + IP-ID
combination (see below). The LKM communicates via `/proc/acpi/pcicard` with
its companion master.c userland backdoor.
The master password is `"Miu2jACgXeDsxd"`.
The client uses `"!@nf4@#fndskgadnsewngaldfkl"`.
The script `tomcat20250414_rootkit_linux2345/config.sh` dynamically creates
new secret IDs and strings for every installation and saves them to
install.h. The master password is hardcoded and does not change.
-[ work/common.c:
Compiled into the client and the master. It contains many old private keys.
The newer backdoor generates these keys dynamically
(see `install_common.c`).
-[ lkm - vmwfxs.mod.c:
The is the "stub" of the LKM to hook the needed kernel functions.
-[ lkm - main.c:
Process, network-connection, and file hiding takes place here.