Datasets:
Devilishcode
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hacking

Dataset card Data Studio Files
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- Lots of passwords in `mnt/hgfs/Desktop/fish_25327/vps20240103.docx`.
Including E-Mail and VPS passwords (working).
* root / 1qaz2wsx
* dysoni91@tutamail.com / !QAZ4rfv!@#$
* https://sg24.vps.bz:4083 / center2025a@tutamail.com / H4FHKMWMpX8bZ
* https://monovm.com / dysoni91@tutamail.com / dr567h%a"G6*m
- See fish-url.txt & generator.php to learn about password re-use patterns.
The second dump:
----------------
- Server name: vps1735811325, hosted at vps.bz
- Server was used for various spearphising campaigns
- Noticeable are the SSL certificates and auth.log. The source code for
phishing attacks are discussed further below.
----[ 1.1 - Defense Counterintelligence Command (dcc.mil.kr)
Drop Location: vps/var/www/html/
The Defense Counterintelligence Command (DCC) is an intelligence
organization of the South Korean Armed Forces.
The DCC is primarily responsible for intelligence missions such as
clandestine and covert operations, and counterintelligence.
The logs show a phishing attack against the dcc.mil.kr as recently as
three days ago.
The same logs contain The Supreme Prosecutor Office (spo.go.kr), korea.kr,
daum.net, kakao.com, and naver.com. It should be noted that the Admin-C
for dcc.mil.kr is registered to hyuny1982@naver.com.
............................................................................
grep -Fhr 'dcc.mil.kr' log | uniq
jandy3912@dcc.mil.kr_amFuZHkzOTEyQGRjYy5taWwua3I=
di031111@dcc.mil.kr_ZGkwMzExMTFAZGNjLm1pbC5rcg==
didcdba@dcc.mil.kr_ZGlkY2RiYUBkY2MubWlsLmty
jhcgod88@dcc.mil.kr_amhjZ29kODhAZGNjLm1pbC5rcg==
chanchan0616@dcc.mil.kr_Y2hhbmNoYW4wNjE2QGRjYy5taWwua3I=
yib100@dcc.mil.kr_eWliMTAwQGRjYy5taWwua3I=
Dsc808@dcc.mil.kr_RHNjODA4QGRjYy5taWwua3I=
[...]
............................................................................
The tools used in this attack are discussed under 2.1 (Generator).
----[ 1.2 - Access to South Korea Ministry of foreign Affairs repository
A copy of South Korean Ministry of foreign affairs email platform was found
inside a file named: mofa.go.kr.7z. The source code was likely taken very
recently:
............................................................................
1923 Apr 1 07:15 .gitignore
96 Apr 1 07:15 .gitmodules
4096 Apr 1 07:15 kebi-batch/
4096 Apr 1 07:15 kebi-core/
4096 Apr 1 07:15 kebi-resources/
4096 Apr 1 07:15 kebi-web-admin/
4096 Apr 1 07:15 kebi-web-archive/
4096 Apr 1 07:15 kebi-web-mail/
4096 Apr 1 07:15 kebi-web-mobile/
4096 Apr 1 07:16 kebi-web-parent/
7528 Apr 1 07:16 pom.xml
14099 Apr 1 07:15 README.txt
............................................................................
Given the format of the files, this is probably a dump from a GitHub
repository which appears to be parts of an email server. The source code
contains multiple references to government domains:
............................................................................
./kebi-web-parent/mail/document/info.txt
/home/ksign/agent
http://email.mofa.go.kr:8080/mail/sso?type=login
http://mail.mofa.go.kr:8080/mail/sso?type=unseenMails
http://email.mofa.go.kr:8190/mail/sso?type=login
http://mail.mofa.go.kr:8080/mail/sso?type=unseenMails
............................................................................
----[ 1.3 - Access to the internal South Korean Gov network
It appears that KIM maintains access to internal South Korean Government
Network systems. There is a project named onnara_auto, which contains
several interesting files.
The project appears to be tools to query internal government servers.
For instance, a file named: /onnara_auto/log/log-20250511.log has the
following entries:
............................................................................
[horedi179] get onnara9.saas.gcloud.go.kr at 11/05/2025 19:41:23
[horedi179] main_job:Session 6112b9bc-5a2a-4abd-a907-aaec4b19e2ed does not \