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public function findUserByPersistenceCode(string $code): ?UserInterface
{
$persistence = $this->findByPersistenceCode($code);
return $persistence ? $persistence->user : null;
}
...........................................................................
I would recommend that MySQL addresses the type juggle in case other ORMs
dynamically generate SQL queries and factor in the value types when
generating the WHERE clause.
--[ 5. Final Words
This vulnerability was a real edge case and resulted from a comedy of
quirks/errors to obtain a powerful authentication bypass. There are caveats
though, the attacker will need wait for someone to login to the target
system before they can run their attack. Additionally, the attacker will
not know which user logged in. As such, it is ideal to chain it with a
code injection that is user independent. In the future I *may* detail the
code injection component as it is equally interesting and bypasses some
built in mitigations.
--[ 6. References
[0]: https://cartalyst.com/manual/sentinel/2.0
[1]: https://thephp.website/en/issue/php-type-system/
|=------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-----------------=[ APT Down - The North Korea Files ]=-----------------=|
|=------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=--------------------------=[ Saber + cyb0rg ]=--------------------------=|
|=-----------------------=[ saber_res@riseup.net ]=-----------------------=|
|=-----------------=[ 5bc524352881851934d4a88eb8c1682c ]=-----------------=|
Note by PHRACK STAFF:
A responsible disclose was attempted with South Korea. The full article, dump
and release schedule was shared ahead of publishing:
* 16th of June 2025, Informed Defense Counterintelligence Command
* 26th of June 2025, Response by clearbear001 (dcc.mil.kr? vague.)
* 16th of July 2025, Response by operation-dl (who is this?)
* 17th of July 2025, Informed kisa.or.kr
* 17th of July 2025, Informed Ministry of Unification
* 17th of July 2025, Informed LG Uplus Corp
* 18th of July 2025, Informed KrCERT
* 15th of August 2025, Proton disables whistleblower's email account.
* 16th of August 2025, Proton disables author's email account.
The only replies were from anonymous individuals (clearbear001/operation-dl).
We advised them to inform KISA and KrCERT. Communication then ended abruptly.
An appeal was filed with Proton. Proton replied: "your account will cause
further damage to our service, therefore we will keep the account suspended".
Proton ignored any further request for clarification (Proton was used only
for email and only to communicate with South Korea).
Proton's legal department was contacted (8 times), but they never responded.
--[ Table of Contents
0 - Introduction
F - Dear Kimsuky, you are no hacker
1 - The Dumps
1.1 - The Defense Counterintelligence Command (dcc.mil.kr)
1.2 - Access to South Korea Ministry of foreign Affairs
1.3 - Access to internal South Korean Gov network
1.4 - Miscellaneous
2 - The artifacts
  2.1 - Generator vs Defense Counterintelligence Command
  2.2 - TomCat remote Kernel Backdoor
  2.3 - Private Cobalt Strike Beacon
  2.4 - Android Toybox
  2.5 - Ivanti Control aka RootRot-NG
  2.6 - Bushfire
  2.7 - Spawn Chimera and The Hankyoreh Newspaper
3 - Identifying Kimsuky
3.1 - Operation Covert Stalker
3.2 - GPKI Stolen Certificates
3.3 - Similar Targets
3.4 - Hypothesis on AiTM attack against Microsoft users
3.5 - Is KIM Chinese?
3.6 - Fun Facts and laughables
--[ 0. Introduction
This article analyses the dump of data from a APT's workstation. In
particular the data and source code retrieved from the workstation
belonging to threat actor actively targeting organizations in South Korea
and Taiwan.
We believe this to be a member of North Korea's "Kimsuky" group [#14].
---