Datasets:
Devilishcode
/
hacking

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
 Community
text
stringlengths
0
1.99k
aadcdn-msftauth-84311529.websecuritynotice.com. IN A 80.240.25.169
r4-res-office365-55e5273a.websecuritynotice.com. IN A 80.240.25.169
r4-res-office365-84311529.websecuritynotice.com. IN A 80.240.25.169
............................................................................
However, in 2025, "KIM" was sloppy and used the main domain only:
http://www.websecuritynotices.com/request.php?i=amhraW0xQGtsaWQub3Iua3I=
(The "i" parameter is the base64 encoded email of the recipient. In this
case 'jhkim1@klid.or.kr'.)
In January 2025, this domain pointed to the IP 104.167.16.97.
In March 2025, the domain download.sponetcloud.com resolved
to the same IP.
There is its sibling on virustotal: sharing.sponetcloud.com
The following URLs are associated with this domain:
https://sharing.sponetcl…MUBzcG8uZ28ua3I=
https://sharing.sponetcloud.com/bigfile/v1/urls/view?\
shareto=aGFudGFlaHdhbkBzcG8uZ28ua3I=
The parameters are again base64 encoded, are decode to 'lme2761@spo.go.kr'
and 'hantaehwan@spo.go.kr'. Both targets in the South Korean Government
Prosecution Office.
The same email addresses (and many more) show up on "KIM's" VPS in the file
request_log.txt:
hantaehwan@spo.go.kr
paragon74@spo.go.kr
baekdu475@spo.go.kr
[...]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Or is this a false-flag threat actor?
"KIM" may have deliberately pointed some of his domains to IP addresses
that were previously known to be associated with Kimsuky.
For example, nid-security.com has the following DNS hosting history:
............................................................................
nid-security.com. IN A 27.255.80.170 (observation date: 2024-11-05)
nid-security.com. IN A 45.133.194.126 (observation date: <= 2025-05-09)
nid-security.com. IN A 185.56.91.21
nid-security.com. IN A 192.64.119.241
*.nid-security.com. IN A 45.133.194.126
lcs.nid-security.com. IN A 27.255.80.170
lcs.nid-security.com. IN A 45.133.194.126
nid.nid-security.com. IN A 27.255.80.170
nid.nid-security.com. IN A 45.133.194.126
www.nid-security.com. IN A 45.133.194.126
rcaptcha.nid-security.com. IN A 27.255.80.170
rcaptcha.nid-security.com. IN A 45.133.194.126
zwkd3e3wbc.nid-security.com. IN A 45.133.194.126
............................................................................
The phishing log on the VPS, dated 2 December 2024, shows this domain:
https://nid.nid-security.com/bigfileupload/download?\
h=UJw39mzt3bLZOESuajYK1h-G1UlFavI1vmLUbNvCrX80-\
AtVgL7TIsphr1hlrvKOdOR-dbnMHVV7NJ4N
During this month, the domain resolved to 45.133.194.126. Was 27.255.80.170
a red herring?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last fun-fact. When registering the websecuritynotices.com domain name the
"Kimsuky" member had his email address visible in SOA records. lol
websecuritynotices.com IN SOA ns4.1domainregistry.com dysoni91.tutamail.com
--[ References
[#1] https://image.ahnlab.com/atip/content/atcp/2023/10/20231101_Kimsuky_OP.-Covert-Stalker.pdf
[#2] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/stamparm/maltrail/refs/heads/master/trails/static/malware/apt_kimsuky.txt
[#3] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/27.255.80.170/relations
[#4] https://medium.com/s2wblog/kimsuky-disguised-as-a-korean-company-signed-with-a-valid-certificate-to-distribute-troll-stealer-cfa5d54314e2
[#5] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/07/12/from-cookie-theft-to-bec-attackers-use-aitm-phishing-sites-as-entry-point-to-further-financial-fraud/
[#6] https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/large-scale-aitm-attack-targeting-enterprise-users-microsoft-email-services
[#7] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BRANDEFENSE/IoC/refs/heads/main/AiTM%20Phishing%20Campaign%20IoC's.txt
[#8] https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/kimsuky-deploys-translatext-target-south-korean-academia
[#9] https://www.ahnlab.com/ko/contents/content-center/32030
[#10] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-connect-secure-vpn-zero-day?hl=en
[#11] https://www.synacktiv.com/sites/default/files/2024-01/synacktiv-pulseconnectsecure-multiple-vulnerabilities.pdf
[#12] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement?hl=en
[#13] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/china-nexus-exploiting-critical-ivanti-vulnerability
[#14] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938
[#15] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/china-nexus-espionage-orb-networks
[#16] https://bafybeih65no5dklpqfe346wyeiak6wzemv5d7z2ya7nssdgwdz4xrmdu6i.ipfs.dweb.link/
[#17] http://fckilfkscwusoopguhi7i6yg3l6tknaz7lrumvlhg5mvtxzxbbxlimid.onion/
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=---------=[ A learning approach on exploiting CVE-2020-9273 ]=---------=|
|=------------------=[ an use-after-free in ProFTPd ]=------------------=|