scripts/data_ext5.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""SecureCodePairs v1.2.0 extension records (part 5): Python deep pack (SCP-000211+).

Brings Python to a deep, varied pack. Every record is built with json-safe
helpers so there are no backslash-escape pitfalls in the source file.
"""
import json
from typing import List, Dict

L = []  # type: List[Dict]


def rec(**kw):
    L.append(kw)


# 1. pickle.loads RCE
rec(id="SCP-000211", language="Python", framework="Flask",
    title="Unsafe pickle load of user upload",
    description="A Flask endpoint unpickles a client-supplied blob, enabling RCE.",
    owasp="A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-502", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
    severity="Critical", difficulty="Intermediate",
    vulnerable_code='@app.route("/load", methods=["POST"])\ndef load():\n    data = request.files["f"].read()\n    obj = pickle.loads(data)  # Vulnerable: RCE\n    return jsonify(obj)',
    secure_code='@app.route("/load", methods=["POST"])\ndef load():\n    data = request.files["f"].read()\n    obj = json.loads(data)  # Secure: no code execution\n    return jsonify(obj)',
    patch='--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-    obj = pickle.loads(data)  # Vulnerable: RCE\n+    obj = json.loads(data)  # Secure: no code execution',
    root_cause="pickle.loads executes arbitrary code during deserialization.",
    attack="Attacker uploads a pickle that runs os.system('...').",
    impact="Remote code execution.", fix="Use JSON or signed, schema-validated formats.",
    guideline="Never unpickle untrusted data.",
    tags=["deserialization", "flask", "python", "rce"],
    metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "form_field", "auth_required": False})

# 2. YAML full load
rec(id="SCP-000212", language="Python", framework="FastAPI",
    title="YAML full load of untrusted config",
    description="A FastAPI service parses uploaded YAML with yaml.load (full), enabling RCE.",
    owasp="A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-502", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
    severity="Critical", difficulty="Intermediate",
    vulnerable_code='import yaml\ndef parse(body: bytes):\n    return yaml.load(body)  # Vulnerable: arbitrary object construction',
    secure_code='import yaml\ndef parse(body: bytes):\n    return yaml.safe_load(body)  # Secure: no arbitrary objects',
    patch='--- a/parse.py\n+++ b/parse.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-    return yaml.load(body)\n+    return yaml.safe_load(body)',
    root_cause="yaml.load allows arbitrary Python object construction.",
    attack="Upload YAML with !!python/object/apply to run code.",
    impact="Remote code execution.", fix="Use yaml.safe_load.",
    guideline="Use safe_load for untrusted YAML.",
    tags=["deserialization", "fastapi", "python", "rce"],
    metadata={"domain": "Microservices", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False})

# 3. MD5 password hash
rec(id="SCP-000213", language="Python", framework="Flask",
    title="Weak password hashing (md5)",
    description="A Flask app stores MD5 password hashes without salt.",
    owasp="A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-916", mitre_attack="T1600 - Weaken Encryption",
    severity="High", difficulty="Beginner",
    vulnerable_code='import hashlib\ndef hash_pw(pw):\n    return hashlib.md5(pw.encode()).hexdigest()  # Vulnerable: fast + unsalted',
    secure_code='import bcrypt\ndef hash_pw(pw):\n    return bcrypt.hashpw(pw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()  # Secure: slow + salt',
    patch='--- a/auth.py\n+++ b/auth.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-    return hashlib.md5(pw.encode()).hexdigest()\n+    return bcrypt.hashpw(pw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()',
    root_cause="MD5 is fast and unsalted; trivially cracked.",
    attack="Rainbow tables / cracking recover passwords.",
    impact="Credential compromise.", fix="Use bcrypt/argon2 with per-user salt.",
    guideline="Hash passwords with slow, salted KDFs.",
    tags=["crypto", "flask", "python", "passwords"],
    metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False})

# 4. DEBUG=True prod
rec(id="SCP-000214", language="Python", framework="Django",
    title="Django DEBUG=True in production",
    description="A Django settings file enables DEBUG in production, leaking stack traces.",
    owasp="A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-209", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
    severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner",
    vulnerable_code='DEBUG = True  # Vulnerable: leaks tracebacks in prod',
    secure_code='DEBUG = os.environ.get("DJANGO_DEBUG", "False") == "True"  # Secure: off by default',
    patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-DEBUG = True\n+DEBUG = os.environ.get("DJANGO_DEBUG", "False") == "True"',
    root_cause="DEBUG on in production exposes internals.",
    attack="Trigger error to read settings and source.",
    impact="Info disclosure.", fix="Default DEBUG off; enable per env.",
    guideline="Never run DEBUG=True in production.",
    tags=["config", "django", "python", "info-leak"],
    metadata={"domain": "Backend", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False})

# 5. Clickjacking middleware disabled
rec(id="SCP-000215", language="Python", framework="Django",
    title="Clickjacking protection disabled",
    description="A Django app removes the X-Frame-Options / clickjacking middleware.",
    owasp="A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-1021", mitre_attack="T1185 - Browser Session Hijacking",
    severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner",
    vulnerable_code='MIDDLEWARE = [m for m in MIDDLEWARE if "ClickjackingMiddleware" not in m]  # Vulnerable',
    secure_code='MIDDLEWARE = MIDDLEWARE + ["django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware"]  # Secure',
    patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-MIDDLEWARE = [m for m in MIDDLEWARE if "ClickjackingMiddleware" not in m]\n+MIDDLEWARE = MIDDLEWARE + ["django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware"]',
    root_cause="Clickjacking middleware removed.",
    attack="Frame the page to trick clicks.",
    impact="UI redress.", fix="Keep X-Frame-Options middleware; set DENY/SAMEORIGIN.",
    guideline="Enable clickjacking protection.",
    tags=["clickjacking", "django", "python", "config"],
    metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False})

# 6. Reflected XSS via flash
rec(id="SCP-000216", language="Python", framework="Flask",
    title="Reflected XSS via flash message",
    description="A Flask route renders a flash message containing user input without escaping.",
    owasp="A03:2021 - Injection", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-79", mitre_attack="T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript",
    severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner",
    vulnerable_code='flash("Hello " + request.args.get("name"))  # Vulnerable: reflected\nreturn render_template("hi.html")',
    secure_code='name = escape(request.args.get("name", ""))  # Secure: escape\nflash("Hello " + name)\nreturn render_template("hi.html")',
    patch='--- a/views.py\n+++ b/views.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n-flash("Hello " + request.args.get("name"))\n+name = escape(request.args.get("name", ""))\n+flash("Hello " + name)\n return render_template("hi.html")',
    root_cause="User input echoed into flash without escaping.",
    attack="name=<script>steal()</script> executes.",
    impact="XSS.", fix="Escape on output; rely on autoescaping.",
    guideline="Escape user input in messages.",
    tags=["xss", "flask", "python", "injection"],
    metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False})

# 7. Missing admin dependency (authz bypass)
rec(id="SCP-000217", language="Python", framework="FastAPI",
    title="Missing dependency in admin router (authz bypass)",
    description="A FastAPI admin route omits the admin-role dependency.",
    owasp="A01:2021 - Broken Access Control", owasp_api="API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-862", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
    severity="Critical", difficulty="Advanced",
    vulnerable_code='@app.delete("/admin/user/{uid}")\nasync def delete(uid: int):  # Vulnerable: no admin check\n    repo.remove(uid)',
    secure_code='@app.delete("/admin/user/{uid}")\nasync def delete(uid: int, admin: AdminUser = Depends(require_admin)):  # Secure\n    repo.remove(uid)',
    patch='--- a/admin.py\n+++ b/admin.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n-async def delete(uid: int):\n+async def delete(uid: int, admin: AdminUser = Depends(require_admin)):\n    repo.remove(uid)',
    root_cause="Admin dependency missing on destructive route.",
    attack="Unauthenticated admin action.",
    impact="Privilege escalation.", fix="Attach role dependency.",
    guideline="Always enforce admin deps on admin routes.",
    tags=["authorization", "fastapi", "python", "broken-access-control"],
    metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "path_param", "auth_required": True})

# 8. Hardcoded SECRET_KEY
rec(id="SCP-000218", language="Python", framework="Django",
    title="Hardcoded secret key",
    description="A Django project hardcodes SECRET_KEY in settings.",
    owasp="A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-798", mitre_attack="T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files",
    severity="High", difficulty="Beginner",
    vulnerable_code='SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-abc123"  # Vulnerable',
    secure_code='SECRET_KEY = os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"]  # Secure: from env/secret',
    patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-abc123"\n+SECRET_KEY = os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"]',
    root_cause="Secret in source.",
    attack="Forge sessions/signed cookies.",
    impact="Auth bypass.", fix="Load from env/secret manager.",
    guideline="Externalize SECRET_KEY.",
    tags=["secrets", "django", "python", "config"],
    metadata={"domain": "Backend", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False})

# 9. subprocess shell injection
rec(id="SCP-000219", language="Python", framework="Flask",
    title="Command injection in subprocess",
    description="A Flask route passes user input to a shell via os.popen.",
    owasp="A03:2021 - Injection", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-78", mitre_attack="T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter",
    severity="High", difficulty="Beginner",
    vulnerable_code='@app.route("/ping")\ndef ping():\n    host = request.args.get("host")\n    out = os.popen("ping -c1 " + host).read()  # Vulnerable',
    secure_code='@app.route("/ping")\ndef ping():\n    host = request.args.get("host", "")\n    if not re.match(r"^[\\w.-]+$", host): return abort(400)  # Secure: validate\n    out = subprocess.run(["ping", "-c1", host], capture_output=True).stdout',
    patch='--- a/ping.py\n+++ b/ping.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n-    out = os.popen("ping -c1 " + host).read()\n+    if not re.match(r"^[\\w.-]+$", host): return abort(400)\n+    out = subprocess.run(["ping", "-c1", host], capture_output=True).stdout',
    root_cause="Shell string concatenation with user input.",
    attack="host=1.2.3.4;cat /etc/passwd executes.",
    impact="Command injection / RCE.", fix="Use argument list; validate input.",
    guideline="Avoid shell; pass arg arrays.",
    tags=["command-injection", "flask", "python", "rce"],
    metadata={"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False})

# 10. Open redirect via next param
rec(id="SCP-000220", language="Python", framework="FastAPI",
    title="Open redirect via next param",
    description="A FastAPI login redirects to a next parameter without validation.",
    owasp="A01:2021 - Broken Access Control", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
    cwe="CWE-601", mitre_attack="T1566 - Phishing",
    severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner",
    vulnerable_code='@app.get("/login")\nasync def login(next: str = ""):\n    return RedirectResponse(next or "/")  # Vulnerable',
    secure_code='@app.get("/login")\nasync def login(next: str = ""):\n    if next and next.startswith("/") and not next.startswith("//"):  # Secure\n        return RedirectResponse(next)\n    return RedirectResponse("/")',
    patch='--- a/login.py\n+++ b/login.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n-    return RedirectResponse(next or "/")\n+    if next and next.startswith("/") and not next.startswith("//"):\n+        return RedirectResponse(next)\n+    return RedirectResponse("/")',
    root_cause="Unvalidated next redirect.",
    attack="next=//evil.com phishing.",
    impact="Phishing.", fix="Allowlist relative paths.",
    guideline="Validate next redirects.",
    tags=["open-redirect", "fastapi", "python", "phishing"],
    metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False})

RECORDS_EXT5 = L