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2ef05ec | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 | #!/usr/bin/env python3
"""SecureCodePairs v1.2.0 extension records (part 5): Python deep pack (SCP-000211+).
Brings Python to a deep, varied pack. Every record is built with json-safe
helpers so there are no backslash-escape pitfalls in the source file.
"""
import json
from typing import List, Dict
L = [] # type: List[Dict]
def rec(**kw):
L.append(kw)
# 1. pickle.loads RCE
rec(id="SCP-000211", language="Python", framework="Flask",
title="Unsafe pickle load of user upload",
description="A Flask endpoint unpickles a client-supplied blob, enabling RCE.",
owasp="A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-502", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
severity="Critical", difficulty="Intermediate",
vulnerable_code='@app.route("/load", methods=["POST"])\ndef load():\n data = request.files["f"].read()\n obj = pickle.loads(data) # Vulnerable: RCE\n return jsonify(obj)',
secure_code='@app.route("/load", methods=["POST"])\ndef load():\n data = request.files["f"].read()\n obj = json.loads(data) # Secure: no code execution\n return jsonify(obj)',
patch='--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n- obj = pickle.loads(data) # Vulnerable: RCE\n+ obj = json.loads(data) # Secure: no code execution',
root_cause="pickle.loads executes arbitrary code during deserialization.",
attack="Attacker uploads a pickle that runs os.system('...').",
impact="Remote code execution.", fix="Use JSON or signed, schema-validated formats.",
guideline="Never unpickle untrusted data.",
tags=["deserialization", "flask", "python", "rce"],
metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "form_field", "auth_required": False})
# 2. YAML full load
rec(id="SCP-000212", language="Python", framework="FastAPI",
title="YAML full load of untrusted config",
description="A FastAPI service parses uploaded YAML with yaml.load (full), enabling RCE.",
owasp="A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-502", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
severity="Critical", difficulty="Intermediate",
vulnerable_code='import yaml\ndef parse(body: bytes):\n return yaml.load(body) # Vulnerable: arbitrary object construction',
secure_code='import yaml\ndef parse(body: bytes):\n return yaml.safe_load(body) # Secure: no arbitrary objects',
patch='--- a/parse.py\n+++ b/parse.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n- return yaml.load(body)\n+ return yaml.safe_load(body)',
root_cause="yaml.load allows arbitrary Python object construction.",
attack="Upload YAML with !!python/object/apply to run code.",
impact="Remote code execution.", fix="Use yaml.safe_load.",
guideline="Use safe_load for untrusted YAML.",
tags=["deserialization", "fastapi", "python", "rce"],
metadata={"domain": "Microservices", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False})
# 3. MD5 password hash
rec(id="SCP-000213", language="Python", framework="Flask",
title="Weak password hashing (md5)",
description="A Flask app stores MD5 password hashes without salt.",
owasp="A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-916", mitre_attack="T1600 - Weaken Encryption",
severity="High", difficulty="Beginner",
vulnerable_code='import hashlib\ndef hash_pw(pw):\n return hashlib.md5(pw.encode()).hexdigest() # Vulnerable: fast + unsalted',
secure_code='import bcrypt\ndef hash_pw(pw):\n return bcrypt.hashpw(pw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode() # Secure: slow + salt',
patch='--- a/auth.py\n+++ b/auth.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n- return hashlib.md5(pw.encode()).hexdigest()\n+ return bcrypt.hashpw(pw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()',
root_cause="MD5 is fast and unsalted; trivially cracked.",
attack="Rainbow tables / cracking recover passwords.",
impact="Credential compromise.", fix="Use bcrypt/argon2 with per-user salt.",
guideline="Hash passwords with slow, salted KDFs.",
tags=["crypto", "flask", "python", "passwords"],
metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False})
# 4. DEBUG=True prod
rec(id="SCP-000214", language="Python", framework="Django",
title="Django DEBUG=True in production",
description="A Django settings file enables DEBUG in production, leaking stack traces.",
owasp="A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-209", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner",
vulnerable_code='DEBUG = True # Vulnerable: leaks tracebacks in prod',
secure_code='DEBUG = os.environ.get("DJANGO_DEBUG", "False") == "True" # Secure: off by default',
patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-DEBUG = True\n+DEBUG = os.environ.get("DJANGO_DEBUG", "False") == "True"',
root_cause="DEBUG on in production exposes internals.",
attack="Trigger error to read settings and source.",
impact="Info disclosure.", fix="Default DEBUG off; enable per env.",
guideline="Never run DEBUG=True in production.",
tags=["config", "django", "python", "info-leak"],
metadata={"domain": "Backend", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False})
# 5. Clickjacking middleware disabled
rec(id="SCP-000215", language="Python", framework="Django",
title="Clickjacking protection disabled",
description="A Django app removes the X-Frame-Options / clickjacking middleware.",
owasp="A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-1021", mitre_attack="T1185 - Browser Session Hijacking",
severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner",
vulnerable_code='MIDDLEWARE = [m for m in MIDDLEWARE if "ClickjackingMiddleware" not in m] # Vulnerable',
secure_code='MIDDLEWARE = MIDDLEWARE + ["django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware"] # Secure',
patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-MIDDLEWARE = [m for m in MIDDLEWARE if "ClickjackingMiddleware" not in m]\n+MIDDLEWARE = MIDDLEWARE + ["django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware"]',
root_cause="Clickjacking middleware removed.",
attack="Frame the page to trick clicks.",
impact="UI redress.", fix="Keep X-Frame-Options middleware; set DENY/SAMEORIGIN.",
guideline="Enable clickjacking protection.",
tags=["clickjacking", "django", "python", "config"],
metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False})
# 6. Reflected XSS via flash
rec(id="SCP-000216", language="Python", framework="Flask",
title="Reflected XSS via flash message",
description="A Flask route renders a flash message containing user input without escaping.",
owasp="A03:2021 - Injection", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-79", mitre_attack="T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript",
severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner",
vulnerable_code='flash("Hello " + request.args.get("name")) # Vulnerable: reflected\nreturn render_template("hi.html")',
secure_code='name = escape(request.args.get("name", "")) # Secure: escape\nflash("Hello " + name)\nreturn render_template("hi.html")',
patch='--- a/views.py\n+++ b/views.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n-flash("Hello " + request.args.get("name"))\n+name = escape(request.args.get("name", ""))\n+flash("Hello " + name)\n return render_template("hi.html")',
root_cause="User input echoed into flash without escaping.",
attack="name=<script>steal()</script> executes.",
impact="XSS.", fix="Escape on output; rely on autoescaping.",
guideline="Escape user input in messages.",
tags=["xss", "flask", "python", "injection"],
metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False})
# 7. Missing admin dependency (authz bypass)
rec(id="SCP-000217", language="Python", framework="FastAPI",
title="Missing dependency in admin router (authz bypass)",
description="A FastAPI admin route omits the admin-role dependency.",
owasp="A01:2021 - Broken Access Control", owasp_api="API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-862", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
severity="Critical", difficulty="Advanced",
vulnerable_code='@app.delete("/admin/user/{uid}")\nasync def delete(uid: int): # Vulnerable: no admin check\n repo.remove(uid)',
secure_code='@app.delete("/admin/user/{uid}")\nasync def delete(uid: int, admin: AdminUser = Depends(require_admin)): # Secure\n repo.remove(uid)',
patch='--- a/admin.py\n+++ b/admin.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n-async def delete(uid: int):\n+async def delete(uid: int, admin: AdminUser = Depends(require_admin)):\n repo.remove(uid)',
root_cause="Admin dependency missing on destructive route.",
attack="Unauthenticated admin action.",
impact="Privilege escalation.", fix="Attach role dependency.",
guideline="Always enforce admin deps on admin routes.",
tags=["authorization", "fastapi", "python", "broken-access-control"],
metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "path_param", "auth_required": True})
# 8. Hardcoded SECRET_KEY
rec(id="SCP-000218", language="Python", framework="Django",
title="Hardcoded secret key",
description="A Django project hardcodes SECRET_KEY in settings.",
owasp="A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-798", mitre_attack="T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files",
severity="High", difficulty="Beginner",
vulnerable_code='SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-abc123" # Vulnerable',
secure_code='SECRET_KEY = os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"] # Secure: from env/secret',
patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-abc123"\n+SECRET_KEY = os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"]',
root_cause="Secret in source.",
attack="Forge sessions/signed cookies.",
impact="Auth bypass.", fix="Load from env/secret manager.",
guideline="Externalize SECRET_KEY.",
tags=["secrets", "django", "python", "config"],
metadata={"domain": "Backend", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False})
# 9. subprocess shell injection
rec(id="SCP-000219", language="Python", framework="Flask",
title="Command injection in subprocess",
description="A Flask route passes user input to a shell via os.popen.",
owasp="A03:2021 - Injection", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-78", mitre_attack="T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter",
severity="High", difficulty="Beginner",
vulnerable_code='@app.route("/ping")\ndef ping():\n host = request.args.get("host")\n out = os.popen("ping -c1 " + host).read() # Vulnerable',
secure_code='@app.route("/ping")\ndef ping():\n host = request.args.get("host", "")\n if not re.match(r"^[\\w.-]+$", host): return abort(400) # Secure: validate\n out = subprocess.run(["ping", "-c1", host], capture_output=True).stdout',
patch='--- a/ping.py\n+++ b/ping.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n- out = os.popen("ping -c1 " + host).read()\n+ if not re.match(r"^[\\w.-]+$", host): return abort(400)\n+ out = subprocess.run(["ping", "-c1", host], capture_output=True).stdout',
root_cause="Shell string concatenation with user input.",
attack="host=1.2.3.4;cat /etc/passwd executes.",
impact="Command injection / RCE.", fix="Use argument list; validate input.",
guideline="Avoid shell; pass arg arrays.",
tags=["command-injection", "flask", "python", "rce"],
metadata={"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False})
# 10. Open redirect via next param
rec(id="SCP-000220", language="Python", framework="FastAPI",
title="Open redirect via next param",
description="A FastAPI login redirects to a next parameter without validation.",
owasp="A01:2021 - Broken Access Control", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="",
cwe="CWE-601", mitre_attack="T1566 - Phishing",
severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner",
vulnerable_code='@app.get("/login")\nasync def login(next: str = ""):\n return RedirectResponse(next or "/") # Vulnerable',
secure_code='@app.get("/login")\nasync def login(next: str = ""):\n if next and next.startswith("/") and not next.startswith("//"): # Secure\n return RedirectResponse(next)\n return RedirectResponse("/")',
patch='--- a/login.py\n+++ b/login.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n- return RedirectResponse(next or "/")\n+ if next and next.startswith("/") and not next.startswith("//"):\n+ return RedirectResponse(next)\n+ return RedirectResponse("/")',
root_cause="Unvalidated next redirect.",
attack="next=//evil.com phishing.",
impact="Phishing.", fix="Allowlist relative paths.",
guideline="Validate next redirects.",
tags=["open-redirect", "fastapi", "python", "phishing"],
metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False})
RECORDS_EXT5 = L
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