#!/usr/bin/env python3 """SecureCodePairs v1.2.0 extension records (part 5): Python deep pack (SCP-000211+). Brings Python to a deep, varied pack. Every record is built with json-safe helpers so there are no backslash-escape pitfalls in the source file. """ import json from typing import List, Dict L = [] # type: List[Dict] def rec(**kw): L.append(kw) # 1. pickle.loads RCE rec(id="SCP-000211", language="Python", framework="Flask", title="Unsafe pickle load of user upload", description="A Flask endpoint unpickles a client-supplied blob, enabling RCE.", owasp="A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-502", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application", severity="Critical", difficulty="Intermediate", vulnerable_code='@app.route("/load", methods=["POST"])\ndef load():\n data = request.files["f"].read()\n obj = pickle.loads(data) # Vulnerable: RCE\n return jsonify(obj)', secure_code='@app.route("/load", methods=["POST"])\ndef load():\n data = request.files["f"].read()\n obj = json.loads(data) # Secure: no code execution\n return jsonify(obj)', patch='--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n- obj = pickle.loads(data) # Vulnerable: RCE\n+ obj = json.loads(data) # Secure: no code execution', root_cause="pickle.loads executes arbitrary code during deserialization.", attack="Attacker uploads a pickle that runs os.system('...').", impact="Remote code execution.", fix="Use JSON or signed, schema-validated formats.", guideline="Never unpickle untrusted data.", tags=["deserialization", "flask", "python", "rce"], metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "form_field", "auth_required": False}) # 2. YAML full load rec(id="SCP-000212", language="Python", framework="FastAPI", title="YAML full load of untrusted config", description="A FastAPI service parses uploaded YAML with yaml.load (full), enabling RCE.", owasp="A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-502", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application", severity="Critical", difficulty="Intermediate", vulnerable_code='import yaml\ndef parse(body: bytes):\n return yaml.load(body) # Vulnerable: arbitrary object construction', secure_code='import yaml\ndef parse(body: bytes):\n return yaml.safe_load(body) # Secure: no arbitrary objects', patch='--- a/parse.py\n+++ b/parse.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n- return yaml.load(body)\n+ return yaml.safe_load(body)', root_cause="yaml.load allows arbitrary Python object construction.", attack="Upload YAML with !!python/object/apply to run code.", impact="Remote code execution.", fix="Use yaml.safe_load.", guideline="Use safe_load for untrusted YAML.", tags=["deserialization", "fastapi", "python", "rce"], metadata={"domain": "Microservices", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False}) # 3. MD5 password hash rec(id="SCP-000213", language="Python", framework="Flask", title="Weak password hashing (md5)", description="A Flask app stores MD5 password hashes without salt.", owasp="A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-916", mitre_attack="T1600 - Weaken Encryption", severity="High", difficulty="Beginner", vulnerable_code='import hashlib\ndef hash_pw(pw):\n return hashlib.md5(pw.encode()).hexdigest() # Vulnerable: fast + unsalted', secure_code='import bcrypt\ndef hash_pw(pw):\n return bcrypt.hashpw(pw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode() # Secure: slow + salt', patch='--- a/auth.py\n+++ b/auth.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n- return hashlib.md5(pw.encode()).hexdigest()\n+ return bcrypt.hashpw(pw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()', root_cause="MD5 is fast and unsalted; trivially cracked.", attack="Rainbow tables / cracking recover passwords.", impact="Credential compromise.", fix="Use bcrypt/argon2 with per-user salt.", guideline="Hash passwords with slow, salted KDFs.", tags=["crypto", "flask", "python", "passwords"], metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False}) # 4. DEBUG=True prod rec(id="SCP-000214", language="Python", framework="Django", title="Django DEBUG=True in production", description="A Django settings file enables DEBUG in production, leaking stack traces.", owasp="A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-209", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application", severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner", vulnerable_code='DEBUG = True # Vulnerable: leaks tracebacks in prod', secure_code='DEBUG = os.environ.get("DJANGO_DEBUG", "False") == "True" # Secure: off by default', patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-DEBUG = True\n+DEBUG = os.environ.get("DJANGO_DEBUG", "False") == "True"', root_cause="DEBUG on in production exposes internals.", attack="Trigger error to read settings and source.", impact="Info disclosure.", fix="Default DEBUG off; enable per env.", guideline="Never run DEBUG=True in production.", tags=["config", "django", "python", "info-leak"], metadata={"domain": "Backend", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False}) # 5. Clickjacking middleware disabled rec(id="SCP-000215", language="Python", framework="Django", title="Clickjacking protection disabled", description="A Django app removes the X-Frame-Options / clickjacking middleware.", owasp="A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-1021", mitre_attack="T1185 - Browser Session Hijacking", severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner", vulnerable_code='MIDDLEWARE = [m for m in MIDDLEWARE if "ClickjackingMiddleware" not in m] # Vulnerable', secure_code='MIDDLEWARE = MIDDLEWARE + ["django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware"] # Secure', patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-MIDDLEWARE = [m for m in MIDDLEWARE if "ClickjackingMiddleware" not in m]\n+MIDDLEWARE = MIDDLEWARE + ["django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware"]', root_cause="Clickjacking middleware removed.", attack="Frame the page to trick clicks.", impact="UI redress.", fix="Keep X-Frame-Options middleware; set DENY/SAMEORIGIN.", guideline="Enable clickjacking protection.", tags=["clickjacking", "django", "python", "config"], metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False}) # 6. Reflected XSS via flash rec(id="SCP-000216", language="Python", framework="Flask", title="Reflected XSS via flash message", description="A Flask route renders a flash message containing user input without escaping.", owasp="A03:2021 - Injection", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-79", mitre_attack="T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript", severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner", vulnerable_code='flash("Hello " + request.args.get("name")) # Vulnerable: reflected\nreturn render_template("hi.html")', secure_code='name = escape(request.args.get("name", "")) # Secure: escape\nflash("Hello " + name)\nreturn render_template("hi.html")', patch='--- a/views.py\n+++ b/views.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n-flash("Hello " + request.args.get("name"))\n+name = escape(request.args.get("name", ""))\n+flash("Hello " + name)\n return render_template("hi.html")', root_cause="User input echoed into flash without escaping.", attack="name= executes.", impact="XSS.", fix="Escape on output; rely on autoescaping.", guideline="Escape user input in messages.", tags=["xss", "flask", "python", "injection"], metadata={"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False}) # 7. Missing admin dependency (authz bypass) rec(id="SCP-000217", language="Python", framework="FastAPI", title="Missing dependency in admin router (authz bypass)", description="A FastAPI admin route omits the admin-role dependency.", owasp="A01:2021 - Broken Access Control", owasp_api="API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-862", mitre_attack="T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application", severity="Critical", difficulty="Advanced", vulnerable_code='@app.delete("/admin/user/{uid}")\nasync def delete(uid: int): # Vulnerable: no admin check\n repo.remove(uid)', secure_code='@app.delete("/admin/user/{uid}")\nasync def delete(uid: int, admin: AdminUser = Depends(require_admin)): # Secure\n repo.remove(uid)', patch='--- a/admin.py\n+++ b/admin.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n-async def delete(uid: int):\n+async def delete(uid: int, admin: AdminUser = Depends(require_admin)):\n repo.remove(uid)', root_cause="Admin dependency missing on destructive route.", attack="Unauthenticated admin action.", impact="Privilege escalation.", fix="Attach role dependency.", guideline="Always enforce admin deps on admin routes.", tags=["authorization", "fastapi", "python", "broken-access-control"], metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "path_param", "auth_required": True}) # 8. Hardcoded SECRET_KEY rec(id="SCP-000218", language="Python", framework="Django", title="Hardcoded secret key", description="A Django project hardcodes SECRET_KEY in settings.", owasp="A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-798", mitre_attack="T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files", severity="High", difficulty="Beginner", vulnerable_code='SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-abc123" # Vulnerable', secure_code='SECRET_KEY = os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"] # Secure: from env/secret', patch='--- a/settings.py\n+++ b/settings.py\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-abc123"\n+SECRET_KEY = os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"]', root_cause="Secret in source.", attack="Forge sessions/signed cookies.", impact="Auth bypass.", fix="Load from env/secret manager.", guideline="Externalize SECRET_KEY.", tags=["secrets", "django", "python", "config"], metadata={"domain": "Backend", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False}) # 9. subprocess shell injection rec(id="SCP-000219", language="Python", framework="Flask", title="Command injection in subprocess", description="A Flask route passes user input to a shell via os.popen.", owasp="A03:2021 - Injection", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-78", mitre_attack="T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter", severity="High", difficulty="Beginner", vulnerable_code='@app.route("/ping")\ndef ping():\n host = request.args.get("host")\n out = os.popen("ping -c1 " + host).read() # Vulnerable', secure_code='@app.route("/ping")\ndef ping():\n host = request.args.get("host", "")\n if not re.match(r"^[\\w.-]+$", host): return abort(400) # Secure: validate\n out = subprocess.run(["ping", "-c1", host], capture_output=True).stdout', patch='--- a/ping.py\n+++ b/ping.py\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n- out = os.popen("ping -c1 " + host).read()\n+ if not re.match(r"^[\\w.-]+$", host): return abort(400)\n+ out = subprocess.run(["ping", "-c1", host], capture_output=True).stdout', root_cause="Shell string concatenation with user input.", attack="host=1.2.3.4;cat /etc/passwd executes.", impact="Command injection / RCE.", fix="Use argument list; validate input.", guideline="Avoid shell; pass arg arrays.", tags=["command-injection", "flask", "python", "rce"], metadata={"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False}) # 10. Open redirect via next param rec(id="SCP-000220", language="Python", framework="FastAPI", title="Open redirect via next param", description="A FastAPI login redirects to a next parameter without validation.", owasp="A01:2021 - Broken Access Control", owasp_api="", owasp_llm="", cwe="CWE-601", mitre_attack="T1566 - Phishing", severity="Medium", difficulty="Beginner", vulnerable_code='@app.get("/login")\nasync def login(next: str = ""):\n return RedirectResponse(next or "/") # Vulnerable', secure_code='@app.get("/login")\nasync def login(next: str = ""):\n if next and next.startswith("/") and not next.startswith("//"): # Secure\n return RedirectResponse(next)\n return RedirectResponse("/")', patch='--- a/login.py\n+++ b/login.py\n@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n- return RedirectResponse(next or "/")\n+ if next and next.startswith("/") and not next.startswith("//"):\n+ return RedirectResponse(next)\n+ return RedirectResponse("/")', root_cause="Unvalidated next redirect.", attack="next=//evil.com phishing.", impact="Phishing.", fix="Allowlist relative paths.", guideline="Validate next redirects.", tags=["open-redirect", "fastapi", "python", "phishing"], metadata={"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "query_param", "auth_required": False}) RECORDS_EXT5 = L