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cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 4.2 Document Part Organization
| Editor's Note: The part structure of 33.129 should be re-visited when the maturity of the project warrants it, and likely not settle to its final form until the project is ~80%+ along.
• Part 1 - Common
Part 1 of TS 33.129 contains the general framework of LI SCAS. This part contains descriptions of threats and attacks, but not any tests.
• Part 2 - NF-Embedded LI functions
Part 2 of TS 33.129 contains SCAS tests for LI functions that are embedded in network functions - i.e., their lifecycle is inexorably tied to a network function. Inevitably, a tension exists because access control to the network function and access control to the embedded LI function have to be separated. Most tests in this part exercise the implementation of this separation.
• Part 3 - Non-NF-Embedded LI functions
Part 3 of TS 33.129 contains SCAS tests for LI functions that are stand-alone - i.e., not associated with any network functions. This separation tends to reduce security considerations when compared to embedded functions. The figure below reflects examples of stand-alone LI functions.
• Part 4 - Mediation and Delivery Function (MDF)
Part 4 of TS 33.129 contains SCAS tests that apply to the Mediation and Delivery Function (MDF).
• Part 5 - Administration Function (ADMF)
Part 5 of TS 33.129 contains SCAS tests that apply to the LI Administration Function (ADMF).
Figure 4.2-1: TS 33.129 parts coverage
The LEMF is outside the scope of the present document series, but attributes of the LEMF (such as delivery paths in the MDF) are.
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cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5 Security Elements
| |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.1 Assets
| 5.1.1 Assets Overview
Assets are categorized more granularly than functional blocks. These are the specific elements that, if exposed or influenced, could compromise LI.
Table 5.1.1-1: Asset definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
AS-TARGET-01
Target Identifier(s)
E.g., IMSI, MSISDN, IP address, used to define or tag a target in the system.
2
AS-LI-CREDS-02
LI Access Credentials
Tokens, passwords, certificates used to authenticate LI operations.
3
AS-NF-03
Network Function
Over and above SA3 general assumptions, e.g., log states, memory artifacts, ephemeral labels.
4
AS-NETWORK-SERVICE-04
Network Service
Normal functioning of a network service.
5
AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
LI Function
LI function internal state and artifacts - e.g., job queues, service status, inter-process calls.
6
AS-LI-PRODUCT-06
LI Product Delivery Link
Continuity (interruptions), quality (jitter, timing anomalies) of the delivery of LI product, between POIs and MDF, or MDF and LEMF.
7
AS-LEMF-07
LEMF Attributes
LEMF attributes, such as IP address, domain names, paths, etc.
8
AS-USER-PATTERN-08
Network User Behavior Attributes
Application or flow-level characteristics that may affect network user attributes (e.g., privacy).
9
AS-CRYPTO-STORE-09
Crypto Store
System-trusted certificate lists, keystores, or chains.
10
AS-API-CONF-10
API or Configuration State
Network API configuration artifacts.
11
AS-LI-PRODUCT-11
LI Product
LI content or metadata.
5.1.2 Detailed Asset Descriptions
5.1.2.1 Target Identifiers
Asset Code: AS-TARGET-01
Asset Name: Target Identifiers
Asset Description:
These are the identifiers used to tag or define interception subjects within the network, such as IMSI, MSISDN, IP addresses, MAC addresses, or session tokens. They represent the direct linkage between a legal warrant and its technical enforcement. Exposure of these identifiers may allow unauthorized parties to determine the existence or identity of surveillance targets. Even indirect inference, such as recognizing frequent lookups of a particular subscriber's IMSI, could compromise the confidentiality of an LI operation. As such, these identifiers must be protected across all stages of LI provisioning and delivery.
5.1.2.2 LI Access Credentials
Asset Code: AS-LI-CREDS-02
Asset Name: LI Access Credentials
Asset Description:
These are the authentication elements used to authorize and secure LI operations. They may include passwords, API tokens, client certificates, SSH keys, or internal authorization grants. If compromised, they could allow an attacker to impersonate an authorized LI system or operator, potentially activating or modifying interceptions, disabling audit trails, or extracting sensitive data. The scope of access these credentials enable makes them high-risk, warranting isolation, short rotation intervals, and hardware-based protection where possible (e.g., HSM-backed keystores).
5.1.2.3 Network Function
Asset Code: AS-NF-03
Asset Name: Network Function
Asset Description:
A network function (NF) encompasses any virtualized or physical function that plays a role in packet handling, control signaling, or service delivery. Beyond SA3’s baseline assumptions, this asset includes ephemeral internal states, such as memory artifacts, temporary routing rules, and runtime labels, that may be visible to co-located workloads or side-channel analysis. An attacker compromising an NF could potentially observe or disrupt LI-related actions indirectly, especially in service-based architectures where functions communicate over open or loosely controlled interfaces.
5.1.2.4 Network Service
Asset Code: AS-NETWORK-SERVICE-04
Asset Name: Network Service
Asset Description:
This can be thought of simplistically as a chain of network functions. However, this category includes the end-to-end behavior of services delivered by the network, including latency, throughput, jitter, and session continuity. Deviations in these metrics, if correlated with LI activity, could enable detection of interception events, particularly by observant external agents or passive observers. An LI system that degrades network services in a distinguishable way may inadvertently disclose its presence. Ensuring uniform service behavior, whether or not interception is active, is critical to undetectability requirements.
5.1.2.5 LI Function
Asset Code: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Asset Name: LI Function
Asset Description:
This asset represents the internal mechanisms and runtime state of the LI function itself. It includes service status flags, job queues, inter-process communication, service mesh labels, and other operational artifacts. Exposure of this state, even in logs, metrics, or crash dumps, could reveal active or planned LI operations, or offer an attacker insights into provisioning timing and volume. The integrity of this component is essential to ensure lawful provisioning, reliable delivery, and resistance to insider threats.
5.1.2.6 LI Product Delivery
Asset Code: AS-LI-PRODUCT-06
Asset Name: LI Product Delivery
Asset Description:
This refers to the delivery chain that carries LI content and Intercept Related Information (IRI) from network function Points of Interception (POIs) to the mediation function (MDF), and from there to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF). Attributes of this path, such as timing consistency, jitter, delays, retransmissions, or packet loss, can serve as side-channel indicators. Disruptions in delivery may undermine undetectability or signal to adversaries that surveillance is occurring. High availability, quality-of-service masking, and traffic normalization are essential to protect this asset.
5.1.2.7 LEMF Attributes
Asset Code: AS-LEMF-07
Asset Name: LEMF Attributes
Asset Description:
This includes the IP address, domain name, or network path of the LEMF endpoint. If the LEMF is statically assigned or its routing patterns are predictable, adversaries may correlate traffic to or from the LEMF to active surveillance. This can compromise the confidentiality of LI recipients and potentially enable network mapping of enforcement infrastructure. Protection of this asset includes obfuscation, dynamic addressing, and encrypted transport.
5.1.2.8 Network User Behavior
Asset Code: AS-USER-PATTERN-08
Asset Name: Network User Behavior Attributes
Asset Description:
These are behavioral signatures or application-layer patterns associated with end users. They may include traffic types, flow durations, usage spikes, or session frequency. If LI functions inadvertently introduce changes to these patterns, such as additional latency, altered timing, or injected traffic, it may be possible to detect surveillance through behavioral analysis. Conversely, behavioral data may also be used to infer target identities if not adequately decoupled. Safeguards should include behavior-preserving interception, noise injection, and usage anonymization.
5.1.2.9 Crypto Store
Asset Code: AS-CRYPTO-STORE-09
Asset Name: Crypto Store
Asset Description:
This includes keystores, certificate chains, and lists of trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs) used within LI systems or the broader network. A compromised certificate store could allow an attacker to issue fraudulent credentials, intercept or forge LI traffic, or break TLS-protected communication. Certificate stores must be tightly controlled, auditable, and isolated from other runtime environments. Particular care should be taken when sharing trust anchors between LI and non-LI systems.
5.1.2.10 API or Configuration State
Asset Code: AS-API-CONF-10
Asset Name: API or Configuration State
Asset Description:
This encompasses the current state and metadata of network APIs, configuration templates, or orchestrator settings used in service delivery. Improper exposure may include target-specific parameters, interception flags, or routing modifications indicative of active LI sessions. Even passive reads of this state can reveal the operational context of LI functions. Configuration drift, race conditions, or excessive verbosity in status endpoints must be mitigated to avoid exposing this asset.
5.1.2.11 LI Product
Asset Code: AS-LI-PRODUCT-11
Asset Name: LI Product
Asset Description:
The LI product comprises content (e.g., voice, SMS, data) and metadata (e.g., call records, IP flow info) delivered as IRI to the LEMF. This is among the highest-value assets in the system and the direct object of the lawful interception operation. Any compromise, whether through leakage, mis-delivery, or tampering, can breach both confidentiality and chain-of-custody requirements. It must be protected in transit and at rest using strong cryptographic measures, secure transport channels, and rigorous access logging.
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cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.2 Attackers
| 5.2.1 Attackers Overview
Attackers can be human or automated. The following table lists the attackers considered in the present multi-part document.
Table 5.2-1: Attacker definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
AT-INTERNAL-01
Internal administrator
Has privileged access to network functions or management interfaces but no LI authorization. May be, for example:
• A log auditor
• A config manager
• A general platform admin
• A network analytics observer
• A data center operator
Editor's Note: consider exploding this in sub-categories
2
AT-EXTERNAL-02
External agent
Has no legitimate access to any internal network interface (although may have access to an external interface such as an end user). May exploit e.g., exposed APIs, timing, network resources.
3
AT-AUTO-AI-03
Automated or AI Agent
Operates at higher scales, capable of fast deep analysis and pattern detection or timing inference.
4
AT-PASSIVE-04
Passive Observer
Non-real-time observer with access to historical data, can compare pre and post provisioning states, correlate metrics across tenants/users.
5
AT-COMPROMISED_NF-05
Compromised NF
An attacker has taken control of an NF and uses it as a pivot point to attack other NFs in the same "perimeter".
Editor's Note: Be mindful to not limit attacker to "casual" level - include well-resourced attackers in every test analysis
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.2.2 Detailed Attacker Descriptions
| 5.2.2.1 Internal Administrator
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-01
Attacker Name: Internal Administrator
Attacker Description:
An internal administrator refers to a human actor with privileged access to core network systems, but without explicit authorization to access or manage Lawful Interception (LI) functions. This attacker may hold legitimate operational roles, such as log auditor, configuration manager, infrastructure administrator, or analytics engineer, and typically has routine access to sensitive systems, including logging platforms, telemetry pipelines, or network orchestration tools. Due to proximity and privilege level, this attacker is capable of indirect inference or misuse of general-purpose tools to extract sensitive LI-related insights. These threats are particularly insidious because they originate from trusted roles within the perimeter. Editor's Note: Sub-categorization may be warranted to reflect functional boundaries and privilege tiers.
5.2.2.2 Internal Administrator Granular Breakdown
5.2.2.2.1 Internal Log Auditor
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-LOG-01
Attacker Name: Internal Log Auditor
Attacker Description:
This attacker has legitimate access to system and application logs for operational, compliance, or troubleshooting purposes. While not authorized for LI access, they may infer surveillance activity by observing timing correlations, unusual service requests, or log entries tied to specific identifiers. Because log data often spans multiple services and timestamps, the log auditor can piece together patterns across different layers, particularly when logs are insufficiently redacted or when metadata about LI functions is leaked due to poor segregation. The risk is elevated in environments where centralized observability tools are broadly accessible. Importantly, such individuals may not always be direct employees of the CSP; they may include contractors, outsourced service providers, or regulatory agency auditors. The presence of third parties with log visibility adds further complexity to managing access boundaries and ensuring strict compartmentalization of LI-related activity.
5.2.2.2.2 Internal Configuration Manager
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-CONFIG-02
Attacker Name: Internal Configuration Manager
Attacker Description:
This internal actor has control over or visibility into network and service configuration interfaces, such as provisioning databases, orchestration tools, or infrastructure-as-code systems. While they may not intentionally target LI systems, their access could expose sensitive artifacts like target identifiers, service activation records, or routing behaviors that indirectly reveal LI activity. A misconfiguration, audit bypass, or direct misuse of privilege could lead to the exposure or tampering of LI-related parameters. This attacker is especially dangerous when configuration changes are not subject to strict role-based access control and change logging.
5.2.2.2.3 Internal Infrastructure/Platform Administrator
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-INFRA-03
Attacker Name: Internal Infrastructure/Platform Administrator
Attacker Description:
An infrastructure administrator manages underlying compute, storage, and networking resources. They typically have root-level access to virtual machines, containers, or Kubernetes clusters where LI functions may reside. While this actor may not understand the semantics of LI operations, their access allows for memory inspection, storage snapshotting, or inter-process observation that could compromise confidentiality. Their role sits beneath LI in the stack, creating a high-privilege threat vector. This risk is heightened in cloud-native environments with shared platforms or insufficient tenant isolation.
5.2.2.2.4 Internal Analytics or Monitoring Observer
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-OBSERVE-04
Attacker Name: Internal Analytics or Monitoring Observer
Attacker Description:
This attacker uses monitoring dashboards, telemetry pipelines, or data visualization tools to analyze network performance and user behavior. Although not involved in LI, they may observe outliers, such as sudden QoS changes, endpoint redirection, or anomalous traffic patterns, that align with surveillance activities. Their access is typically read-only, but because they work across many users and services, they can form inferences at scale. If monitoring tools lack data masking or correlation protections, this actor could indirectly deanonymize LI operations.
5.2.2.2.5 Internal Facilities or Data Center Operator
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-DATACENTER-05
Attacker Name: Internal Facilities or Data Center Operator
Attacker Description:
This role includes physical or environmental access, such as rack technicians, cabling engineers, or maintenance personnel. Though easily overlooked, data center operators may intercept or observe physical indications of LI provisioning (e.g., device identifiers, port activation, or localized power usage). If surveillance workloads are not obfuscated within broader platform operations, these actors could observe installation patterns or hardware identifiers tied to LI. This threat is particularly relevant in private or hybrid data centers where physical separation is minimal and operator duties cross tenant boundaries.
5.2.2.3 External Agent
Attacker Code: AT-EXTERNAL-02
Attacker Name: External Agent
Attacker Description:
An external agent is a threat actor entirely outside the administrative domain of the Communication Service Provider (CSP). This entity lacks any legitimate access to internal network functions or LI systems, but may attempt to exploit publicly exposed services, such as user-facing APIs, mobile access interfaces, or Internet-exposed network resources. Attacks may include techniques such as timing analysis, metadata harvesting, endpoint compromise, or denial-of-service strategies. While the external agent has the least direct access, the increasing attack surface from 5G cloud-native and multi-access edge architectures can make this attacker class surprisingly effective, especially when combined with reconnaissance automation.
5.2.2.4 Automated or AI Agent
Attacker Code: AT-AUTO-AI-03
Attacker Name: Automated or AI Agent
Attacker Description:
An automated or AI-driven attacker is a non-human agent capable of processing vast quantities of data in real time or near-real time. These agents leverage machine learning, pattern recognition, or inference engines to discover anomalies, detect provisioning patterns, or identify LI-related events across large data streams. Whether deployed internally or externally, this attacker type can operate continuously, scaling beyond human capacity, and is particularly effective in identifying subtle timing correlations, job queue patterns, or service quality variations. Such agents may be adversarially trained and can pose a significant risk in hybrid environments where observability is distributed.
5.2.2.5 Passive Observer
Attacker Code: AT-PASSIVE-04
Attacker Name: Passive Observer
Attacker Description:
A passive observer is an attacker who does not interfere with live operations but gains access to historical data, telemetry, or pre/post-state snapshots. This actor may compare logs, traces, or service states before and after suspected LI provisioning to infer the presence of surveillance activities. Passive observers may exist within the CSP’s environment or in adjacent systems such as logging infrastructure or analytics data lakes. While they do not actively engage in attacks, their ability to correlate changes over time, particularly across multi-tenant environments, makes them a notable threat, especially when data retention and separation controls are weak.
5.2.2.6 Compromised Network Function
Attacker Code: AT-COMPROMISED_NF-05
Attacker Name: Compromised Network Function (NF)
Attacker Description:
This attacker class represents a network function that has been overtaken, either fully or partially, by an adversary. The compromised NF operates under the control of the attacker and can serve as a pivot point to reach LI systems, intercept provisioning messages, or disrupt internal communications. It may impersonate trusted roles, inject misleading telemetry, or undermine confidentiality by leaking sensitive artifacts. Compromised NFs are especially dangerous in service-mesh architectures where trust boundaries are often implicit. Lateral movement across internal APIs or through shared memory spaces between co-located functions increases the threat radius substantially.
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3 Threats
| |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.1 Threats Overview
| The following table contains named threat types. Each SCAS test can point to one or more.
Table 5.3.1-1: Threat definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
T-LOG-01
Log leak
LI activity generates logging artifacts observable by non-LI authorized parties.
2
T-CONFIG-02
Config leak
LI activity is inferred by analysing config files extracted before and after LI provisioning.
3
T-RES-CPU-03
LI leak via CPU side channel 1
LI activity is inferred by analysing CPU utilization levels, method 1.
4
T-RES-CPU-04
LI leak via CPU side channel 2
LI activity is inferred by analysing CPU utilization levels, method 2.
5
T-RES-NET-05
LI leak via network flow side channel
LI activity is inferred by analysing network bandwidth utilization levels.
6
T-TIMING-06
LI detection via timing anomalies.
Detection of LI via timing anomalies.
7
T-TIMING-07
MDF-LEMF LI Product Flow Detection
Detection of MDF to LEMF LI product flow via timing anomalies.
8
T-INTERRUPTION-08
POI-MDF Link Failure
Link-level interruption between POI and MDF used to infer presence or behaviour of LI functions.
9
T-SESSION-COUNT-09
Session count
LI detection by session count analysis.
10
T-INTERFACE-SEC-10
Interface security
Allowance of insecure (non-TLS) connections.
11
T-FEATURE-11
Unnecessary features
Unnecessary features increase the attack surface.
12
T-SERVICE-12
Unnecessary services
Unnecessary services increased the attack surface.
"Simple MISconfiguration"
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2 Detailed Threat Descriptions
| |
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.1 Log Leak
| Threat Code: T-LOG-01
Threat Name: Log Leak
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Certain system or network logs may unintentionally record details of Lawful Interception (LI) operations, such as interface initialization, provisioning events, or errors specific to LI services. If such logs are accessible to non-LI-authorized users or monitoring systems, this could result in the detection of LI activity, violating confidentiality and undetectability requirements.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.2 Config Leak
| Threat Code: T-CONFIG-02
Threat Name: Config Leak
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Configuration files or system state snapshots taken before and after LI provisioning may reveal changes indicative of interception functionality, such as new interfaces, active LI modules, or altered routing behaviors. If such configurations are accessible to unauthorized administrators or third-party tools, they may be used to infer the existence or target of an LI operation.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.3 LI Leak via CPU Side Channel 1
| Threat Code: T-RES-CPU-03
Threat Name: LI Leak via CPU Side Channel (Pattern A)
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: LI operations may cause observable variations in CPU utilization due to additional processing, packet duplication, or encryption tasks. If an attacker monitors CPU resource usage patterns over time and correlates spikes or periodicity with specific events, it may be possible to infer the presence of active LI functions or associated targets.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.4 LI Leak via CPU Side Channel 2
| Threat Code: T-RES-CPU-04
Threat Name: LI Leak via CPU Side Channel (Pattern B)
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: A refined side-channel analysis leveraging advanced statistical or machine learning methods may identify LI-related process signatures at a lower resolution or across virtualized environments. Unlike direct CPU utilization spikes, this method relies on deeper behavioral fingerprinting (e.g., cache usage, execution timing patterns), which may allow even more covert inference of LI presence.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.5 LI Leak via Network Flow Side Channel
| Threat Code: T-RES-NET-05
Threat Name: LI Leak via Network Flow Side Channel
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: LI systems typically duplicate or redirect traffic to an MDF or mediation device. This may introduce subtle, but detectable changes in bandwidth utilization, jitter, or packet duplication observable from within the network or via flow records (e.g., NetFlow, sFlow). An attacker monitoring network flow metadata may detect patterns associated with interception activity.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.6 LI Detection via Timing Anomalies
| Threat Code: T-TIMING-06
Threat Name: LI Detection via Timing Anomalies
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: The addition of LI processing steps (e.g., duplication, filtering, routing to MDF) can result in increased latency or jitter during communication sessions. An attacker may detect the presence of LI by statistically analyzing round-trip times or response behaviors that differ from baseline behavior when LI is not active.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.7 MDF–LEMF LI Product Flow Detection
| Threat Code: T-TIMING-07
Threat Name: MDF–LEMF LI Product Flow Detection via Timing
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: The flow of intercepted traffic (IRI or CC) from the MDF to the LEMF may generate detectable timing patterns, especially if LI sessions are rare or traffic volume fluctuates. Observers with visibility into network patterns or inter-domain timestamps could detect and potentially correlate this flow with LI activities, violating the principle of transparency.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers; AS-LI-PRODUCT-11 LI Product
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.8 POI–MDF Link Failure
| Threat Code: T-INTERRUPTION-08
Threat Name: POI–MDF Link Failure
Threat Category: Denial of Service
Threat Description: A network or logical interruption between the Point of Interception (POI) and the MDF may unintentionally reveal the existence of LI. If LI sessions degrade differently from normal user sessions under such link failure conditions, an attacker could induce or observe faults to probe for LI presence or behavior.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers; AS-LI-PRODUCT-11 LI Product
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.9 Session Count
| Threat Code: T-SESSION-COUNT-09
Threat Name: LI Detection via Session Count
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Provisioning of LI may introduce additional sessions (e.g., replicated flows, internal signaling) that appear in session monitoring tools or access logs. If the session count increases in a predictable manner during LI activation, an unauthorized observer could infer LI activity simply by counting active or historical sessions.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.10 Interface Security
| Threat Code: T-INTERFACE-SEC-10
Threat Name: Interface Security Misconfiguration
Threat Category: Tampering / Information Disclosure
Threat Description: If LI-related interfaces (e.g., between POI, MDF and LEMF) are not properly secured using cryptographic protocols such as TLS, an attacker may eavesdrop on or manipulate LI product traffic. This threatens both confidentiality and integrity of intercepted data and may result in exposure of sensitive law enforcement operations.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.11 Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Features
| Threat Code: T-FEATURE-11
Threat Name: Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Features
Threat Category: Information Disclosure / Misuse of Resources
Threat Description: Default-enabled but unnecessary software or hardware features may remain active after installation or commissioning. Attackers may exploit these dormant features (e.g., debugging functions, unused interfaces, auxiliary services) to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, or collect sensitive information. Such features increase the system’s attack surface and may be leveraged for reconnaissance or direct compromise.
Threatened Asset: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05, AS-API-CONF-10
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 5.3.2.11 Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Services
| Threat Code: T-SERVICE-12
Threat Name: Unauthorized Use of Unnecessary Services
Threat Category: Information Disclosure / Misuse of Resources
Threat Description: After installation, supplier-preset, local, or network-accessible services may remain active that are not required for the LI system’s intended operation. Attackers can exploit these services to gain unauthorized access, consume resources, or leverage unpatched configurations. Unnecessary services expand the system’s attack surface and may provide footholds for compromise, particularly if they lack hardened security configurations.
Threatened Asset: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05, AS-API-CONF-10
6 Common Tests
6.1 Supply Chain
6.1.1 Vendor
6.1.1.1 Normal Vendor-Supported Products
Requirement Name: Vendor-Supported Products
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Software and hardware of the system must be covered by security vulnerability support from the supplier.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_SUPPLIER_VULN_MONITORING
Purpose:
Validate that the supplier provides continuous vulnerability monitoring, timely advisories, and effective updates for all in-use software and hardware.
Pre-Conditions:
1. A complete system inventory (hardware and software, with versions) is available.
2. Supplier documentation regarding security support policy and timelines is available.
3. The system under test is currently within the vendor’s standard support phase.
Execution Steps:
1. The tester obtains a list of recent Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) relevant to the in-use products from a third party independent of the vendor.
2. The tester verifies that advisories from the supplier match public CVE disclosures (cross-check NVD, vendor PSIRT, and CERT feeds).
3. The tester uses an automatic tool to scan for all CVEs affecting the product.
4. The tester verifies that the supplier provides either a patch or documented mitigation within a reasonable timeframe (e.g., within published SLA).
5. The tester checks that the update/mitigation can be applied or has been applied to the deployed version without loss of security support.
Expected Results:
1. Supplier advisories cover all known CVEs relevant to the products in use.
2. Advisories are timely and consistent with industry disclosure best practices.
3. Updates or mitigations are available and applicable to the deployed system.
Expected Format of Evidence:
The following are acceptable:
1. Document what tool was used to automatically scan for CVEs.
2. Copy of supplier advisories.
3. Cross-reference table (inventory vs. CVE database vs. supplier feed).
4. Patch/mitigation bulletin and applied change record.
5. Plain-language conclusion confirming supplier monitoring and patching.
6.1.1.2 Open-Source Products
Requirement Name: Vendor-Supported Products
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Software and hardware of the system must be covered by security vulnerability support from the supplier.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_OPEN_SOURCE_VULN_SUPPORT
Purpose:
Ensure open-source components are covered by a reliable vulnerability management program (community or designated third party).
Pre-Conditions:
1. Inventory identifies open-source components in the system.
2. Evidence exists of an active community or commissioned third party maintaining vulnerability advisories.
3. Mailing lists, public trackers, or equivalent communication channels are accessible.
Execution Steps:
Note: the following shall be performed for each artifact.
1. The tester identifies open-source components in the Inventory.
2. The tester queries the community/project tracker for recent vulnerability advisories.
3. The tester selects one CVE from the tracker.
4. The tester verifies that either a patch release or mitigation note was published.
5. The tester checks that the patch/mitigation can be integrated into the deployed version in use.
Expected Results:
1. Vulnerability monitoring exists and is demonstrably active.
2. Advisories are consistent with public CVE disclosures.
3. Patches/mitigations are available for exploitable vulnerabilities.
Expected Evidence:
The following are acceptable:
1. Extracts from project mailing lists/trackers.
2. CVE reference with matching advisory.
3. Patch or workaround instructions.
4. Plain-language conclusion whether open-source support is reliable and comprehensive.
6.1.1.3 Trusted Sources
Requirement Name: Trusted sources
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: All software used on the system (firmware, OS, libraries, applications, appliances, containers) must be obtained from trusted sources (official supplier channels, authorized distributors, or official provisioning servers with validated cryptographic protection).
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_TRUSTED_SOURCES
Purpose:
Ensure software is only obtained from official supplier channels, authorized distributors, or trusted provisioning servers.
Pre-Conditions:
1. Inventory of software/firmware to be obtained.
2. Supplier documentation of official distribution channels exists and is obtained.
3. Access to logs of package managers or download clients is available.
Execution Steps:
Note: the following shall be performed for each artifact.
1. Attempt to download artifacts from an official supplier server with HTTPS/sFTP.
2. Validate TLS certificate/host key against supplier reference values.
3. Prefer(?) cryptographically signed/hashed artifacts where available. Editor's Note: Question: Allow variance or not?
4. Negative test: attempt download from a non-authorized mirror or staging server with invalid cert; confirm abort. Editor's Note: Answer to the previous question affects this.
Expected Results:
1. Only artifacts from trusted sources are accepted. Editor's Note: Answer to the previous question affects this.
2. Certificates/keys validated; untrusted endpoints blocked.
3. Signed/hashed artifacts are used in preference to unprotected ones.
Expected Evidence:
1. Download logs with FQDN/IP and TLS details.
2. Certificate/host key validation records.
3. Supplier list of approved channels cross-referenced with observed downloads.
4. Plain language conclusion.
6.1.1.4 Integrity
Requirement Name: Integrity checking
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: All software used on the system (e.g., firmware, OS, libraries, applications, appliances, containers) must be verified for integrity before installation (e.g., supplier-provided hashes, signatures, Certificate of Authenticity on physical media)
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_INTEGRITY_CHECKING
Purpose:
Ensure downloaded software is integrity-verified using supplier-provided checksums or signatures.
Pre-Conditions:
1. Supplier-provided checksum/signature available.
2. Verified trust anchors for signature validation exist and are accessible.
3. Local verification tools available (sha256sum, gpg, etc.) are available.
Execution Steps:
1. Compute cryptographic hash of the artifact; compare with supplier reference from an independent channel.
2. If available, verify cryptographic signature (e.g., GPG/X.509).
3. Negative test A: modify artifact (bit flip); confirm hash/signature fails.
4. Negative test B: attempt to install artifact with forged signature; confirm block/failure.
Expected Results:
1. Hash/signature verification passes before install.
2. Any mismatch or invalid signature aborts install.
Expected Evidence:
1. Hash verification output.
2. Signature verification transcript (key fingerprint, issuer, validity).
3. Plain language conclusion.
6.1.1.5 Feature Deactivation
Requirement Name: Feature Deactivation
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Features that are not required in the software and hardware used shall be deactivated.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05, AS-API-CONF-10
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01, AT-EXTERNAL-02
Threat reference: T-INTERFACE-SEC-10, T-FEATURE-11
Test case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_FEATURE_DEACTIVATION
Purpose:
During the initial installation of software, default-activated services that are not necessary for the operation and functionality of the specific system shall be disabled. These features typically cannot be uninstalled individually but must be deactivated via configuration settings. Disabled features shall remain permanently inactive across reboots.
Similarly, unnecessary hardware functions (e.g., unused interfaces) must be permanently disabled during initial commissioning.
Inactive features reduce the system’s attack surface and minimize opportunities for unauthorized access, manipulation, or information leakage.
Pre-Conditions:
1. A complete system inventory (software modules, hardware interfaces) exists.
2. Documentation from suppliers listing configurable features is available.
3. Access to system configuration and runtime verification tools is available.
Execution Steps:
1. Enumerate all enabled software features and hardware interfaces at installation/commissioning.
2. Compare enumerated list with operational requirements; mark unnecessary features.
3. Disable each unnecessary feature via configuration (software) or BIOS/firmware settings (hardware).
4. Reboot/restart the system; verify disabled features remain inactive.
5. Attempt negative tests:
a. Access a disabled service or interface and confirm rejection.
b. Re-enable a disabled feature without explicit administrator action, and confirm block/failure.
6. Cross-check runtime logs and monitoring to ensure no activation after reboot.
Expected Results:
1. Only features required for LI system operation remain active.
2. Disabled features remain inactive across reboots and cannot be accessed.
3. Negative tests confirm blocked access or failure of unauthorized re-enablement.
Expected Evidence:
1. Inventory with list of active vs. disabled features.
2. Configuration files or screenshots showing deactivation.
3. Runtime verification output after reboot.
4. Logs confirming rejected access to disabled features.
5. Plain-language conclusion confirming permanent deactivation.
f6.1.1.6 Service Deactivation
Requirement Name: Service Deactivation
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Only services necessary for system operation may remain active. All supplier-preset, local, or network-accessible services that are not required for the LI system (e.g., default web servers or file-sharing daemons that are not part of LI operation) shall be disabled immediately after installation. Further, less secure management protocols (e.g., Telnet, FTP) shall be removed in favor of more secure alternatives.
Disabled services shall remain inactive across system restarts.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05, AS-API-CONF-10
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01, AT-EXTERNAL-02
Threat reference: T-INTERFACE-SEC-10, T-FEATURE-11
Test case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_SERVICE_DEACTIVATION
Purpose:
Unnecessary services increase the system’s attack surface and risk of compromise, particularly since such services are rarely optimized for secure operation.
Pre-Conditions:
1. Inventory of all services running after system installation exists.
2. Documentation identifying required services for LI system operation is available.
3. Access to system configuration and runtime service status is available.
Execution Steps:
1. Enumerate all running services after installation.
2. Compare list with documented operational requirements, and mark unnecessary services.
3. Disable identified services via configuration or package management.
4. Reboot the system; verify disabled services do not restart.
5. Negative test: attempt to connect to a disabled service remotely or locally; confirm access is denied.
Expected Results:
1. Only necessary services remain active.
2. Disabled services remain inactive across restarts.
3. Unauthorized attempts to access disabled services fail.
Expected Evidence:
1. Inventory with required vs. disabled service list.
2. Service configuration files or screenshots showing deactivation.
3. Logs confirming rejection of access attempts.
4. Plain-language conclusion confirming that unnecessary services remain disabled.
6.1.1.7 Standardized Cryptographic Algorithms and Primitives
Requirement Name: Standard Cryptographic Primitives
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Only standardized cryptographic algorithms and primitives published by accredited organizations shall be used.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_STANDARDIZED_CRYPTO_ALGORITHMS
Purpose:
All cryptographic algorithms, primitives, protocols, and parameters used in development and integration shall conform to standards published by accredited bodies (e.g., ETSI, SOGIS, NIST, ISO/IEC, IETF, BSI). Any deviation shall be itemized and justified.
Pre-Conditions:
1. Approved cryptographic policy/whitelist (algorithms, modes, curves, key sizes, digests, KDFs/MACs from e.g., ETSI, SOGIS, NIST, ISO/IEC, IETF, BSI) is available.
2. Inventory of crypto dependencies (libs, HSMs, protocol stacks) is available.
3. Access to code/configs/binaries and running services exists.
Execution Steps:
1. Extract crypto usages from code/configs/binaries (static analysis, grep, library settings).
2. Enumerate supported/negotiated ciphers on network services (e.g., testssl.sh, nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers).
3. Compare against the whitelist and accredited standards.
4. Negative: attempt to enable a disallowed algorithm/mode (e.g., RC4, MD5, SHA-1 signatures, 3DES, RSA-1024) and confirm the pipeline or config hardening blocks it.
Expected Results:
1. Only approved algorithms are present/negotiable; deprecated/non-standard options are disabled.
2. Attempts to enable disallowed crypto are rejected by Continuous Integration/policy or runtime controls.
Expected Evidence:
1. List of accreditation bodies and standards used
2. Whitelist policy + mapping table.
3. Scanner outputs and config snippets showing allowed sets.
4. Logs showing rejection of disallowed algorithms.
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.8 Use of Well-Established and Up-to-Date Crypto Libraries
| Requirement Name: Standard Crypto Libraries
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Well-established and up-to-date cryptographic libraries must be used to implement cryptographic algorithms. The use of self-implemented cryptographic methods is prohibited unless explicitly required, in which case such implementations must follow industry best practices.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test Case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES
Purpose:
Ensure that only well-established and up-to-date cryptographic libraries are used. Self-implemented cryptographic methods shall be avoided unless justified.
Pre-Conditions:
1. Approved crypto library whitelist (e.g., Botan, Bouncy Castle, GnuTLS, OpenSSL, wolfCrypt) is defined and available.
2. Inventory of crypto dependencies (source code, third-party libraries, protocol stacks, HSMs) is available.
3. Access to build environment, code repositories, and runtime binaries is granted.
Execution Steps:
1. Identify and extract all cryptographic function calls from source code and binaries (static analysis, code review, dependency scanners).
2. Cross-check identified crypto usages against the whitelist of approved libraries.
3. Verify library versions against latest available patched releases (e.g., OpenSSL Security Advisory, distro package versions).
4. Negative: Introduce a self-implemented crypto routine (e.g., custom AES, SHA-1 hash function, RC4 fallback) and verify that security review/Continuous Integration policy blocks or flags it.
Expected Results:
1. Only approved and up-to-date crypto libraries are used.
2. Deprecated, self-implemented, or unapproved crypto code is absent or explicitly documented and justified under supervision.
3. Vulnerable or outdated library versions are flagged for update.
Expected Evidence:
1. List of approved crypto libraries and current versions.
2. Dependency scanner output or inventory including crypto libraries.
3. Security advisories mapping showing libraries are up-to-date.
4. Logs or CI reports showing rejection of self-implemented crypto functions.
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.9 Replaceable Cryptographic Modules
| Requirement Name: Modular Cryptographic Implementations
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Cryptographic methods must be implemented in replaceable modules. Static implementations are prohibited, as they hinder corrections, replacements, and upgrades in the event of security incidents, evolving threats (e.g., quantum computing), or changing performance requirements. Implementations must allow seamless substitution of algorithms and provide sufficient hardware resources to support stronger cryptographic methods.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test Case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_REPLACEABLE_CRYPTO_MODULES
Purpose:
Verify that cryptographic methods are implemented in modular, replaceable components such that algorithms, key lengths, or libraries can be substituted without requiring major redesign or system downtime.
Pre-Conditions:
1. System architecture documentation describing cryptographic module boundaries is available.
2. Inventory of cryptographic libraries and their integration points is available.
3. Test environment with ability to swap crypto libraries/configurations is set up.
Execution Steps:
1. Inspect software design and code for modular integration of cryptographic functions (e.g., plugin, API, or dynamic linking approach).
2. Attempt replacement of an existing crypto library with an alternative approved one (e.g., replace OpenSSL with GnuTLS, or update a library version).
3. Validate system operation with substituted algorithm or key length.
4. Negative: attempt to hard-code or statically link crypto algorithm implementations and verify that this is detected and flagged.
Expected Results:
1. Cryptographic functions are implemented as replaceable modules (dynamic, configurable, or API-based).
2. System continues to operate correctly after replacing an algorithm or library.
3. Statically embedded or hard-coded cryptographic implementations are absent or flagged as non-compliant.
4. Hardware resources (e.g., CPU, HSM, accelerator capacity) are sufficient to handle stronger crypto algorithms when required.
Expected Evidence:
1. Architecture documentation showing modular crypto design.
2. Test logs or CI outputs demonstrating successful swap of crypto libraries/algorithms.
3. Configuration or build scripts showing dynamic linking or pluggable crypto modules.
4. Negative test evidence showing static or hard-coded crypto is rejected.
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.10 Configurable and Exchangeable Cryptographic Methods
| Requirement Name: Configurable Cryptographic Methods
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: Applications must support configuration of cryptographic methods and provide functions to exchange encryption algorithms. Deactivation and modification capabilities (e.g., cipher suite adjustments) must be built during development. Functions to exchange encryption algorithms (re-encryption) apply only to persistent data storage, not to transport encryption. This enables substitution of broken schemes due to new attacks or future computing architectures.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test Case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_CONFIGURABLE_CRYPTO_METHODS
Purpose:
Verify that cryptographic methods are configurable and that applications can exchange encryption algorithms for persistent data storage. Ensure that cipher suite modification and algorithm substitution functions are implemented and usable.
Pre-Conditions:
1. Documentation of configurable crypto parameters and supported cipher suites is available.
2. Test data sets in persistent storage encrypted with an initial algorithm (e.g., AES-128-CBC) are prepared.
3. Administrative access to application configuration and key management is available.
Execution Steps:
1. Inspect code/configuration interfaces for crypto parameterization (cipher suites, key lengths, modes).
2. Modify crypto configuration to deactivate or change cipher suites (e.g., remove AES-128-CBC, enable AES-256-GCM).
3. Perform re-encryption of stored data from one algorithm to another.
4. Verify that transport encryption (e.g., TLS sessions) does not expose runtime re-encryption functions.
5. Negative: attempt re-encryption of transport sessions and confirm it is unsupported.
Expected Results:
1. Application supports enabling/disabling and modification of cryptographic methods at configuration level.
2. Re-encryption of persistent data from one algorithm to another is successful.
3. Transport encryption is not subject to runtime re-encryption functions.
4. Attempts to re-encrypt transport sessions are rejected.
Expected Evidence:
1. Configuration documentation and sample settings for cryptographic method changes.
2. Test logs showing cipher suite modification and successful re-encryption of persistent data.
3. Screenshots/configuration outputs verifying AES-128-CBC replaced with AES-256-GCM (or equivalent).
4. Negative test results confirming re-encryption of transport encryption is blocked.
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.11 Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery Separation
| Requirement Name: CI/CD Separation
Requirement Reference: TBD
Requirement Description: The CI/CD chain must be separate from systems that use it; there must exist no shared hosts/components/networks.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: TBD
Threat reference: TBD
Test Case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_COMMON_CI/CD_SEPARATION
Purpose:
The goal of this test is to verify that the CI/CD chain is fully separated from software/systems that use it (tenants), and that no tenant workloads (including jobs executed on runners) can reach or use CI/CD internal components (e.g., Source Code Management Database, runner management endpoints, internal message bus, package registry internals, artifact storage internals, management UIs).
Pre-Conditions:
1. CI/CD chain (e.g., GitLab/Gitea, runners, artifact store, container registry, internal DB/message bus) is deployed on hosts/subnets not shared with tenant systems.
2. At least one tenant project with functioning pipelines and a non-privileged runner scoped to that project/group exists.
3. The following CI/CD internals identified with network/host inventory exist:
a. SCM application nodes (control plane/API/UI)
b. SCM internal DB (e.g., PostgreSQL)
c. Runner management/control interfaces
d. Internal message bus/queues (if any)
e. Artifact store internal endpoints (not the public download URL)
f. Container/package registry internal endpoints
g. Admin/management interfaces (UI/API)
4. Network policy documents are available (firewall rules, ACLs, security groups, service mesh policies).
5. Admin credentials for CI/CD are separate from tenant accounts.
6. A “probe job” template the lab can run in a tenant pipeline (non-privileged) to attempt egress connections (TCP/UDP/HTTP(S)).
Execution Steps:
1. Host & Network Separation Check
a. Collect host inventory: confirm CI/CD nodes and tenant application nodes are distinct (no shared VMs/nodes).
b. Collect subnet/VLAN/Security Group definitions: CI/CD internals isolated from tenant subnets.
c. If Kubernetes is used, verify no shared Kubernetes namespaces or nodes between CI/CD control plane/runners and tenant apps.
2. Identity & Role Separation Check
a. Verify CI/CD admin accounts are not used for tenant repos or pipelines.
b. Verify runner registration tokens/credentials are not exposed in tenant projects.
c. Confirm tenant maintainers cannot access CI/CD system/global settings.
3. Network Reachability (Active) from Tenant Job
Using the probe job in a tenant pipeline (non-privileged runner):
a. Attempt TCP/UDP connections to each CI/CD internal component (list from Preconditions #3).
b. Attempt HTTP(S) GET/POST to CI/CD admin/management endpoints and runner management endpoints.
c. Attempt DNS resolution of internal hostnames (if split-DNS is used).
d. Attempt access to SCM internal DB (e.g., TCP 5432) and message bus ports.
e. Attempt access to artifact/registry internal endpoints (not public URLs).
f. Record results (connectivity blocked/allowed, HTTP status codes, TLS handshake outcomes).
4. Runner Boundary Enforcement
a. Inspect runner configuration: ensure no “privileged” or host-mounted sensitive paths that could expose CI/CD internals (e.g., docker.sock, host networking).
b. Validate runner scope: project/group-scoped; not shared globally with CI/CD internals.
c. If Kubernetes executors are used, validate network policies (no egress to CI/CD internals; default-deny/explicit-allow only to public endpoints required for builds).
5. Administrative Surface Isolation
a. From a tenant maintainer account, attempt to reach admin areas (system settings, user management, runner admin pages).
b. Verify HTTP(S) returns 403/404 or redirects to login without privilege escalation.
6. Logging & Detection
a. Confirm that blocked access attempts from the probe job are logged by Firewall/Web Application Firewall/service-mesh (and optionally alerted).
b. Verify CI/CD app logs show no successful privileged access from tenant identities.
7. Exception Handling (Self-Hosting Code Only, No Self-Deployment)
a. Create a repo that stores CI/CD deployment code (e.g., Ansible/Terraform) inside the CI/CD.
b. Ensure pipelines that would deploy/redeploy the CI/CD are disabled or blocked (e.g., protected branch rules, approval gates that prohibit execution, or policy-as-code denying these jobs).
c. Attempt to run a deployment pipeline; verify it is prevented per policy (store/test allowed; deploy not allowed).
Expected Results:
1. Host/Network:
a. No shared compute nodes between CI/CD internals and tenant systems.
b. CI/CD internal subnets not routable from tenant runners/namespaces (default-deny in place).
2. Identity/Role:
a. Tenant identities cannot view/modify CI/CD global settings, runners, or secrets.
b. Runner tokens/registrations are compartmentalized; no cross-tenant leakage.
3. Reachability:
a. All direct connections from tenant jobs to CI/CD internals fail (SYN blocked, TLS handshake fails, HTTP 403/404 for public edges).
b. DNS for internal hostnames not resolvable from tenant jobs.
4. Runner Boundary:
a. Runners are non-privileged for tenant projects; no host networking, no docker.sock, no sensitive mounts (any volume/pipe/socket/device a runner job mounts that could give it control of the host, access to CI/CD internals, or long-lived secrets/credentials beyond that job’s scope).
b. Runner scope does not include CI/CD administrative projects or org level.
5. Admin Surface:
a. Tenant maintainers cannot access admin/management pages or APIs.
6. Logging:
a. Blocked attempts are recorded with source project/runner identity and destination component; optional alert raised.
7. Exception (Self-Hosting Code):
a. Storing/testing CI/CD deployment code is allowed.
b. Any attempt to deploy CI/CD from within CI/CD is blocked by policy/gates; evidence shows prevented execution.
8. General:
a. If any internal endpoint is reachable from tenant jobs, this is a FAIL (a requirement violation).
b. Pay special attention to “hidden” internals exposed by misconfigured service discovery, sidecars, or shared node-locals (e.g., metadata services, registries on host network).
c. For Kubernetes: verify NetworkPolicy/CNI enforces default-deny egress from runner pods.
Expected Evidence:
1. Host inventory (screenshots/exports) showing no shared hosts.
2. Network diagrams and effective firewall/security-group/service-mesh policies.
3. Runner configuration exports (executor type, privileges, scopes).
4. Pipeline logs from probe job showing connection failures & HTTP statuses.
5. CI/CD audit logs confirming no admin access by tenant identities.
6. Security device logs (Firewall/Web Application Firewall/service-mesh) showing blocked flows with timestamps.
7. Policy-as-code or CI settings demonstrating blocked self-deployment attempts (and the failed pipeline run).
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.12 Log Leak of LI Identifiers During LI Provisioning
| Requirement Name: Confidentiality of LI Identifiers
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126: R6.6 - 30 Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties
Requirement Description: General-purpose logs must not contain Lawful Interception (LI) identifiers or other sensitive LI information. Only LI-protected audit logs, only accessible to LI-cleared personnel, may contain such details.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-LOG-01
Test Case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_LOG_IDENTIFIER_LEAK_PROVISIONING
Purpose:
Validate that LI identifiers and LI-specific events are not written during provisioning activities to general-purpose system or application logs accessible by non-LI-authorized administrators.
Pre-Conditions:
1. LI functionality is activated and operational in the system under test.
2. A general-purpose logging subsystem (e.g., syslog, journald, or vendor-specific log service) is enabled.
3. A test operator has LI clearance and can initiate LI operations.
4. A test operator has administrator-level access to general-purpose logs but no LI clearance (to simulate risk exposure).
Execution Steps:
1. Initiate an LI session (e.g., activate an intercept, provision target identifiers).
2. Trigger LI-related events likely to produce logs (e.g., provisioning errors, interface restarts).
3. Collect all general-purpose logs from the system during and after LI operations.
4. Inspect logs for presence of LI identifiers (e.g., IMSI, MSISDN, warrant ID, intercept ID).
5. Repeat under different conditions (normal activation, error cases, reconfiguration).
Expected Results:
1. General-purpose logs contain no LI identifiers or warrant information.
2. LI events in general-purpose logs, if present, are limited to non-sensitive metadata (e.g., “LI subsystem error” without identifiers).
3. Detailed LI logs with identifiers are only recorded in LI-protected audit logs, accessible to LI-cleared personnel.
Expected Evidence:
1. Copy of collected general-purpose logs during LI activity.
2. Annotated inspection showing absence of LI identifiers.
3. Copy of LI-protected logs confirming that identifiers are only stored in the restricted audit facility.
4. Plain-language conclusion affirming compliance.
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.13 Log Leak of LI Identifiers During Communication Time
| Requirement Name: Confidentiality of LI Identifiers
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126: R6.6 - 30 Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties
Requirement Description: General-purpose logs must not contain sensitive LI information. Only LI-protected audit logs, only accessible to LI-cleared personnel, may contain such details. When identifiers of intercepted targets appear in general-purpose logs (e.g., as part of routine signaling or service activity), no additional information shall indicate that the subscriber is subject to Lawful Interception.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-LOG-01
Test Case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_LOG_IDENTIFIER_LEAK_RUN_TIME
Purpose:
Validate that general-purpose logs, while possibly containing subscriber identifiers as part of normal service records, do not contain information or markers that reveal LI surveillance activity.
Pre-Conditions:
1. LI provisioning is active for a target identifier in the system under test.
2. General-purpose logging (e.g., network event logs, call detail records, session initiation logs) is enabled and accessible to administrators without LI clearance.
3. The target subscriber initiates communication (e.g., call setup, session initiation, messaging).
Execution Steps:
1. Provision a target identifier for interception in the LI system.
2. Have the target subscriber initiate multiple communications (e.g., calls, sessions, messages).
3. Collect general-purpose logs generated during these communications.
4. Inspect logs for signs of surveillance context, such as:
a) Explicit LI-related flags, tags, or annotations.
b) Error messages referencing LI functions.
c) Duplicated or anomalous log entries indicating redirection or duplication of traffic.
5. Compare log entries of intercepted subscriber activity with log entries of non-intercepted subscribers for consistency.
Expected Results:
1. General-purpose logs contain only routine identifiers and service-related information (e.g., IMSI, MSISDN, session IDs).
2. No indication is present that the subscriber is under interception (no LI flags, tags, error codes, or, particularly, duplicate entries).
3. Log patterns for intercepted subscribers are indistinguishable from non-intercepted subscribers.
4. Surveillance-related records are only present in LI-protected audit logs.
Expected Evidence:
1. Copies of general-purpose logs showing intercepted and non-intercepted subscriber activities.
2. Annotated analysis demonstrating that intercepted subscriber logs do not reveal surveillance status.
3. Copy of LI-protected logs showing that surveillance records are confined to the restricted LI audit domain.
4. Plain-language conclusion confirming that LI activity remains undetectable in general-purpose logs.
|
cf76cbf41e68a296435512370813ffeb | 33.129-1 | 6.1.1.14 Log Segregation
| Requirement Name: Segregation of LI Logging
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126: R6.6 - 30 Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties
Requirement Description: LI audit and operational logs must be segregated from all non-LI logging subsystems. Access to LI logs must be restricted to LI-cleared personnel only.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: TBD
Test Case:
Test Name / ID: TC_LI_LOG_SEGREGATION
Purpose:
Validate that the LI logging subsystem is logically and physically segregated from non-LI (general purpose) logs, ensuring that LI log data cannot be accessed through non-LI interfaces or roles.
Pre-Conditions:
1. LI subsystem is deployed and active.
2. General-purpose system logging (e.g., syslog, journald, platform management logs) is operational.
3. LI-specific logging facility is configured and accessible only to LI-cleared roles.
4. Test operators possess two distinct roles: one LI-cleared and one non-cleared administrative account.
Execution Steps:
1. Generate LI-related events (e.g., provisioning, activation, LI delivery errors).
2. Generate non-LI system events (e.g., user login, system health checks, configuration updates).
3. Collect logs from both the LI logging subsystem and the general logging subsystem.
4. Attempt to access LI logs using the non-cleared administrator role.
5. Verify log storage segregation (e.g., separate file paths, databases, log streams).
6. Inspect general logs for any LI log entries, references, or cross-linkages.
Expected Results:
1. LI log data is stored in a distinct, access-controlled subsystem.
2. LI logs are not visible through general log collectors, APIs, or management tools.
3. Non-LI logs do not contain pointers, cross-references, or metadata revealing LI activity.
4. Access attempts to LI logs by non-cleared roles are denied and auditable.
Expected Evidence:
1. Copies of LI and non-LI log directories or service configuration showing segregation.
2. Access-control matrix demonstrating that only LI-cleared roles can access LI logs.
3. Screen captures or outputs of denied access attempts from non-cleared accounts.
4. Plain-language conclusion confirming effective segregation of LI and non-LI logging domains.
Annex <A> (normative):
<Normative annex for a Technical Specification>
Start each annex on a new page.
Annexes are labelled A, B, C, etc. and designated either "normative" or "informative" depending on their content.
Normative annexes only to appear in Technical Specifications. Use style "Heading 8".
Annex <B> (informative):
Vulnerability/Compromise Spectrum
B.1 Vulnerability/Compromise Spectrum
Table B.1-1: Vulnerability/Compromise Spectrum
Code
Name
Description
Notes
Test IDs Failed
Criticality
(None,
Low,
Medium,
High,
Critical)
1
LI capability exists
The presence of an installed LI capability was detected.
e.g., on disk, but not running
2
LI capability characterization
Capabilities of the installed LI function were extracted.
e.g., capacity numbers, in terms of targets provisionable or bandwidth available for LI
3
LI running state detection
Detected that LI is currently running on the Target of Evaluation (TOE).
4
LI running instance characterization
Capabilities of the running instance of LI were extracted, such as number of targets provisionable, etc.
e.g., number of current taps
5
LI running state manipulation
LI was either started or stopped against normal procedures.
6
LI topology
Extracted network/physical location of other functions that may (do?) contain LI capability.
e.g., information about other POIs, MDFs, ADMFs, or even LEMFs
7
Target ID extracted
A (any) target ID was extracted.
without a priori choice of target
8
Specific target ID detected
A specific target ID was detected on the TOE.
with a priori choice of target
9
IRI extracted
IRI was extracted pertaining to any current target ID on the TOE.
without a priori choice of target
10
Content extracted
Content was extracted pertaining to any current target ID on the TOE.
without a priori choice of target
11
Specific target IRI extracted
IRI was extracted pertaining to a specific target ID on the TOE.
with a priori choice of target
12
Specific target content extracted
Content was extracted pertaining to a specific target ID on the TOE.
with a priori choice of target
13
One new target was inserted
A new target inserted outside normal procedures.
14
Multiple targets inserted
More than one target inserted outside normal procedures.
pathway to LI DOS
15
Full target list extracted
A complete list of target IDs on the TOE was extracted.
16
IRI of all targets extracted
IRI pertaining to all targets was extracted.
17
Content of all targets extracted
Content pertaining to all targets was extracted.
18
Control of non-LI functionality achieved through LI entry
Control of TOE functionality outside LI was achieved.
Editor's notes (Apr 7 call):
* Add DELETION (targets, IRI, content),
* modify (INSERT/DELETE) delivery endpoints
* insert before 7: access/token compromise/privilege escalation
EDITORS NOTES:
Parking Lot
0. Find a way to publish an implementation/configuration guide to state "the obvious", e.g. 33.128 Annex, or its own document, etc.
1. Think about a test for trust domain crossing. If a (non-LI) network function is required to take some action on behalf of LI and does not have a POI, this creates a security concern.
2. Test that POI code and data are not accessible from outside the enclave.
3. Inter-LEA confidentiality. Is there a way to test it explicitly, or do we rely on inference from a subset of tests.
Annex <C>:
<Informative annex title for a Technical Report>
Informative annexes in Technical Reports do not use "(informative") in the title, since all annexes in TRs are informative. Use style "Heading 9" in TRs.
Annex <D> (informative):
Bibliography
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
The Bibliography is optional. If it exists, it shall follow the last technical annex in the document.
The following material, though not specifically referenced in the body of the present document (or not publicly available), gives supporting information.
Bibliography format
<Publication>: "<Title>".
Annex <E> (informative):
Index
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
The Index is optional. If it exists, it shall immediately precede the Changes history annex.
Generate the index using MS Word's index field feature.
Annex <F> (informative):
Change history
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
This is the last annex for TS/TSs which details the change history using the following table.
This table is to be used for recording progress during the WG drafting process till TSG approval of this TS/TR.
For TRs under change control, use one line per approved Change Request
Date: use format YYYY-MM
CR: four digits, leading zeros as necessary
Rev: blank, or number (max two digits)
Cat: use one of the letters A, B, C, D, F
Subject/Comment: for TSs under change control, include full text of the subject field of the Change Request cover
New vers: use format [n]n.[n]n.[n]n
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-07
SA3#98-LI
s3i250357
-
-
-
First introduction of the baseline to the group.
0.0.8
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 1 Scope
| This permanent document describes the principle and the working method of the Inter Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs), the scope, reference and output of each individual IGC and the overall time plan.
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 2 Working method of the technical Inter-Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs)
| TSG-SA has a responsibility of technical co-ordination within 3GPP. TSG-S2 has been allocated a task to divide the feature descriptions defined by TSG-S1 to a Building blocks or Work packages based on System architecture and elaborate a project plan.
Therefore Inter Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs) are created. The outcome of the IGCs should be a draft 3GPP wide project plan for each feature, defining the work that is needed and proposing the responsible WGs/TSGs and a time schedule. These draft project plans will become 3GPP project plans after they have been approved by all relevant WGs/TSGs and finally by TSG-SA. The project plans will be elaborated with all concerned working group of the technical subject, where from each working group a contact person is nominated.
The task of the IGCs is not to perform any technical work of substance on the technical issue (e.g. as architectural work).
The method of working of the IGC meetings shall be mainly by email or tele-conferencing.
For each IGC, a permanent document is maintained comprising
• Work identified to fullfill the requirements
• List of all the deliverables applicable to the subject
Note that a deliverable can be applicable to more than one technical project co-ordination subject
• Time plan
for Release 99 and subsequently for future releases.
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 3 List of IGCs
| 0 General
Coordinator: Alain Sultan, MCC (alain.sultan@etsi.fr)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC
1 Bearer Services and QoS
Chair: Oscar Lopez-Torres, T-Mobil (Oscar.Lopez@t-mobil.de)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC/Bearer&QoS
reflector address: 3GPP_TSG_SA_IGC_Bearer&QoS@list.etsi.fr
2 GSM/UMTS Interoperation and Mobility Management
Chair: François Courau, Alcatel (francois.courau@alcatel.fr)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC/GUinterop&MM
reflector address: 3GPP_TSG_SA_IGC_GUinterop&MM@list.etsi.fr
3 Location based services (LCS) and Cell Broadcast Services (CBS)
Chair: - LCS: Jan Kåll, Nokia (jan.kall@NOKIA.COM)
- CBS: Martin Güntermann, Mannesmann
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC/LCS
reflector address: 3GPP_TSG_SA_IGC_LCS@list.etsi.fr
4 Packet Architecture and Circuit Architecture
Chair: Ulrich Dropmann, Siemens (Ulrich.Dropmann@ICN.SIEMENS.DE)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC/PS&CS
reflector address: 3GPP_TSG_SA_IGC_PS&CS@list.etsi.fr
5 Security
Chair: Chris Pudney, Vodafone (chris.pudney@VF.VODAFONE.CO.UK)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC/Security
reflector address: 3GPP_TSG_SA_IGC_Security@list.etsi.fr
6 Services and Service platforms
Chair: Rob Schmersel, Ericsson (Rob.Schmersel@era.ericsson.se)
Site: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG2_Arch/IGC/Services
reflector address: 3GPP_TSG_SA_IGC_Services@list.etsi.fr
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4 Scope of the IGCs
| |
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.1 Bearer Services and QoS
| [editor's note: the scope has to be revised to reflect more clearly that the IGC is only supervising the groups and not providing the actual technical work]
The scope is to provide a consistent definition of the Services and Bearer Services mapping throughout the system: UMTS bearers, bearer management in the control and user planes, for the circuit switched and packet domains.
Regarding QoS, the scope is to provide a comprehensive QoS model and mapping of parameters for the different interfaces, reference points, and layers (a two-dimensional approach) throughout the system.
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.2 GSM/UMTS Interoperation and Mobility Management
| [editor's note: to be further elaborated by the IGC chairman]
Consistent UMTS/GSM interoperation
Mobility handling within the system, RRC and MM interaction, MAP, consistent mobility management
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.3 Location based services (LCS) and Cell Broadcasting Services(CBS)
| The UMTS LCS and CBS inter group co-ordination ad hoc group shall co-ordinate the work on location services in UMTS and ensure that all 3GPP groups relevant for location services get involved in a timely manner. The ongoing work in T1P1.5 on GSM LCS Phase II shall be taken in account as well.
The UMTS LCS and CBS inter group co-ordination ad hoc group shall also co-ordinate the work on cell broadcasting services in UMTS and ensure that all 3GPP groups relevant for cell broadcasting services get involved in a timely manner.
The LCS and CBS ad hoc group shall evaluate the UMTS location services and cell broadcast services in order to identify what issues are to be standardized and what are the appropriate Work Groups for this and set up a time plan for the work.
The Location services feature in UMTS is mainly a release 2000 issue, but the LCS and CBS ad hoc shall also seek to identify what LCS system functions should be included in Release 99 and the affected WGs and specifications.
The Cell Broadcast Service (CBS) is a release 99 requirement and shall be provided seamlessly (as far as the user or the users terminal equipment is concerned) across the UMTS and GSM network in order to guarantee the continuity of the corresponding GSM services in UMTS.
LCS and CBS ad hoc reports to TSG SA WG2.The UMTS LCS IGC shall coordinate the work on location services in UMTS and ensure that all 3GPP groups relevant for location services get involved in a timely manner. The ongoing work in T1P1.5 on GSM LCS Phase II shall be taken in account as well.
The LCS IGC shall evaluate the UMTS location services in order to identify what issues are to be standardized and what are the appropriate Work Groups for this and set up a time plan for the work.
LCS in UMTS is mainly a release 2000 issue, but the LCS IGC ad hoc shall also seek to identify what LCS system functions should be included in Release 99 and the affected WGs and specifications.
LCS IGC ad hoc reports to TSG SA WG2.
Locationing and the location based services shall be considered.
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.4 Packet Architecture and Circuit Architecture
| The technical scope of the “packet and circuit architecture IGC” is to work on the architecture of the packet and circuit domain and protocols.
It contains the following main areas:
1. The identification of new entities and interfaces of the overall system architecture
2. The determination of the principle protocol stacks of the user and control plane
3. Call control/session management related control plane issues
Examples of issues are of the area of “packet and circuit architecture” are (without indication of whether R99 and R00 issue):
• Multimedia architectural issues
• Multicall issues
• Location of the transcoder in the core network
• Identification of new interworking scenarios
• Evolving interworking functions to other networks
• Control plane architecture of the UTRAN
Not part of the “packet and circuit architecture” area are
architectural questions clearly associated with one of the other technical areas (Location Based Services, Services and Service platforms, Mobility Management&GSM/UMTS interoperation, Security, Bearer&QoS).
The IP/packet domain architecture and protocols
The PSTN/ISDN domain architecture and protocols
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.5 Security
| This ad hoc group is intended to produce, maintain and monitor the work plan for the delivery of a consistent security specifications for release 99.
The work items being progressed in TSG-S3 are listed in the table below. Each work item addresses a particular security issue and is assigned a particular priority which includes whether or not the feature or mechanism should be specified in Release 99. This table is an updated version of a table presented to TSG-S#4 in Tdoc SP-99284.
Table 2 : Priorities of security work items assigned by TSG-S3
Work item
Priority
1
User identity confidentiality
The specification of an enhanced mechanism to help guard against active attacks against user identity confidentiality on the radio interface is essential in R99. Note that only the transport mechanism needs to be specified. The exact mechanism to protect the user identity can be home operator dependent. The specification of algorithm requirements and interfaces is also essential for R99, although the algorithms themselves can be home operator dependent and do not need to be specified.
2
Authentication and key agreement
The specification of an enhanced mechanism to help guard against active attacks on the radio interface is essential for R99. Furthermore, the specification of algorithm requirements and interfaces is also essential for R99, although the algorithms themselves can be home operator dependent and do not need to be specified.
3
Access link integrity protection
This is a new security mechanism in UMTS introduced to help guard against active attacks on the radio interface. The specification of the message authentication mechanism is essential in R99.
4
Access link confidentiality
The GSM ciphering mechanism cannot be used in the new access network and the GSM algorithms are unsuitable. The specification of a new ciphering mechanism and algorithm is essential in R99.
5
Network-wide encryption
Appropriate ‘hooks’ must be provided in the R99 specification so that network-wide encryption can be introduced in later releases. It may be possible to re-use the algorithm for ciphering in the UTRAN. If a new algorithm is required then its specification can be left to later releases providing that appropriate ‘hooks’ are incorporated into the R99 specification.
6
User equipment identification
TSG-S have recommended that TSG-S3 specify a secure mechanism in R99. The mechanism will require manufacturers to secure terminal identities and associated authentication data.
7
Core network signalling security
Although this is a high priority item, it is recognised that implementable specifications might not be achievable in R99. A cipher algorithm designed by ETSI SAGE for this purpose called BEANO is already available. Off-the-shelf algorithms are likely to be suitable for the message authentication functions.
8
Fraud information gathering system
The GSM mechanism can be used. Enhancements will be considered in later releases.
9
USIM application security
The GSM mechanisms can be used. Enhancements will be considered in later releases.
10
Visibility and configurability
An encryption indicator should be included in R99. Other items are of lower priority and will be considered in later releases.
11
Mobile Execution Environment Security
The GSM mechanisms will be enhanced in R99.
12
Location services
Specification of privacy mechanism is essential in R99. Can be largely based on GSM Location Services privacy mechanisms.
13
Lawful interception architecture
The specification of a lawful interception architecture is essential in R99. This architecture can be largely based on the GSM/GPRS architecture.
14
IP security
Impact not fully understood. Priority is unclear.
Owing to the requirements for both CS and PS ‘handover’ between UMTS and GSM and to the requirements to be able to perform roaming between GSM and UMTS networks, for all these items, dual mode UMTS/GSM operational aspects need to be considered.
Consistent security architecture
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 4.6 Services and Service platforms
| The 3GPP Services and Service Platforms IGC is responsible for the following activities:
• establish a common understanding in 3GPP of the VHE and OSA work to be carried out for stage2 and 3 in 3GPP Release99;
• identify the appropriate working groups for carrying out the VHE and OSA work and ensure these groups get involved in a timely manner;
• coordinate the work on VHE and OSA in 3GPP;establish a time plan for the work.
WAP, VHE, Camel, OSA, Mexe, the consistent service and service generation platform concept
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 5 Overall time plan
| [Ed. note: scope to be provided by the rapporteur]
Meeting
Date
Activity
SA2#9
October 25-29, 1999
Define overall workplan. Start work on identifying requirements and issues related to architectural and functional aspects as compared to R99 (TR 23.ywz)
SA2#10
Nov 29 –Dec 3, 1999
Identify additional requirements from architectural and functional aspects as compared to R99 (TR 23.ywz). Start definition of R00 documents.
SA1#6
Nov 29 - Dec 3, 1999
Start work on R00 Stage 1
SA#6
December 15-17, 1999
R99 finalized.
SA2#11
January 24-28, 2000
Refined version of TR. Review draft Stage 1 description. Start Project Plan work. Continue definition of R00 documents.
SA1#7
Feb 7-11, 2000
Refine R00 stage 1.
SA2#12
March 6-9, 2000
TR v 1.0.0. Review R00 Stage 1 description . Continue Project Plan work. Finilize definition of R00 documents. Based on the TR, start the CR process for S2’s technical specifications.
SA#7
March 15-17, 2000
R00 Stage 1 stable.
SA2#13
May 22-26, 2000
Work on TR discontinued. Finalize Project Plan work. Finalize definition of R00 documents. Continue the CR process.
SA#8
June 21-23, 2000
R00 Stage 2 at least 80% complete. Project Plan approved. Definition of R00 documents approved.
SA2#14
September 4-8, 2000
Finilize R00 Stage 2 work.
SA#9
September 27-29, 2000
R00 work approved.
SA2#15
November 13-17, 2000
Start R01 work.
SA#10
December 13-15, 2000
R00 approved.
|
6487dfe513b60123776855ad6d67a5a9 | 30.801 | 6 Change history
|
Version
Date
Subject/Comments
0.0.0
July 1999
Creation of document
0.1.0
August 1999
Inclusion of comments from SA2#7
0.2.0
September, 4th 1999
Inclusion of results from SA2#8: addition of scope of IGC Security, Bearer and QoS, PS and CS architecture, Services and Service Platform, LCS.
0.3.0
September, 23rd 1999
Addition of the chapter 3, deletion of the Annex on "Proposed Structure for all Inter Group Co-ordination work plans"
1.0.0
October, 7th 1999
Prepared for presentation to TSG SA#5 (content identical to v.0.0.3, except for some minor editorial corrections)
1.1.0
December, 2nd 1999
Addition of Overall time plan (as agreed in S2-99C16) and incorporation of BCS material
|
c3e756be2cf10e873aefa14b6b740064 | 30.504 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification;
2 Introduction
The present document shall provide a work plan and study items as agreed within the 3GPP TSG RAN working group 4.
For the FDD mode, as proposed in the input paper of R4-99160 the items shown in that document absolutely need to be finalised by the Japanese regulatory organisation, Telecommunications Technical Council of Japan, by the end of June 1999 so that MPT will be able to legislate on schedule for the regulation for the 3G system of Japan.
For the TDD mode, some deviations in achieving the intermediate milestones are shown, compared to FDD. However, it is strictly intended to have the same final milestone kept for TDD as for FDD..
3 Meeting Schedule
The milestones used in this document are based on the following meeting schedule.
Year 1999
WG4 #4 : May 10 – May 12, Kista Stockholm, Sweden
WG4 #5 : June 14 – June 16, Miami Florida, USA
RAN #4 : June 17 – June 18, ditto
WG4 #6 : July 26 – July 29, South Queensferry Scotland, UK
WG4 #7 : September 7 – September 10, Makuhari Chiba, Japan
RAN #5 : October 6 – October 8, Kyongju, Korea
WG4 #8 : October 26 – October 29, Sophia Antipolis, France
WG4 #9 : December 6 7 – December 910, Bath, UK
RAN #6 : December 15 13 – December 1715, Sophia AntipolisNice, France
Year 2000
WG4 #10 : January 18 – January 21, San Jose, California, USA
WG4 #11 : February 28 – March 3, TBD
RAN #7 : March 13 – March 15, Madrid, Spain
WG4 #12 : May 22 – May 26, TBD
RAN #8 : June 19 – June 21, Dusseldorf, Germany
WG4 #13 : September 11 – September 16, TBD
RAN #9 : September 25 – September 27, TBD
WG4 #14 : November 27 – November 30, TBD
RAN #10 : December 11 – December 13, TBD, USA
Note that some of the future meetings have been re-scheduled.
4 Work Plan
Table 4 shows the agreed work plan for the TSG RAN WG4 and document status as well as of the issuance of this document.
Table 4:Work Plan
Specification number
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
25.101 - UE TX & RX (FDD)
1
2
3
25.104 - BTS TX & RX (FDD)
1
2
3
25.102 - UE TX & RX (TDD)
1
2
3
(1)
25.105 - BTS TX & RX (TDD)
1
2
3
(1)
25.103 - RF parameters
1
2
3
(2), (3)
25.133 - Support of RF parameters in Radio Resource Management (FDD)
2
3
(3)
25.123 - Support of RF parameters in Radio Resource Management (TDD)
2
3
(3)
25.141 - BS Conformance Test (FDD)
1
2
3
25.142 - BS Conformance Test (TDD)
1
2
3
25.113 - BS EMC
1
2
3
(2)
25.941 - Document Structure
1
2
3
25.942 - RF System Scenarios
1
2
3
Notes:
• 1 means the document is agreed as version 1.0.0 at RAN WG4
• 1 (underlined) means the document has already been agreed as version 1.0.00 at RAN WG4
• 2 means the document is agreed as version 2.0.0 at RAN WG4
• 2 (underlined) means the document has already been agreed as version 2.0.0 at RAN WG4
• 3 means the document is approved as version 3.0.0 at TSG RAN
• 3 (underlined) means the document has already been approved as version 3.0.0 at TSG RAN
• The version numbers must be understood based on the explanation in the section 8 “Document/version numbering” of the Report of the TSG-RAN meeting #3 [RP-99305].
(1) Milestone for version 3 has been brought in to be in line with PCG#2(99)21 in ver 1.1.0.
(2) (2) Agreed at the WG4 #7 meeting to push back the milestone for version 3 as seen in the table.
(3) Agreed at the WG4 #8 meeting to split 25.103 into two separate specifications, which are 25.133 for FDD and 25.123 for TDD.
5 Study Item
A table “Study Items for 25.xyz” shows all the items that have not been agreed or are tbd in that particular document as of the issuance of this 30.504 document. A mark X indicates that the marked item needs to be agreed and fixed by the indicated milestone. Moreover, X-marked milestones for the FDD mode are absolute deadlines.
5.1 25.101 (UE TX & RX for FDD)
Table 5-1 shows the agreed study items for the 25.101 specification document.
Table 5-1:Study Items for 25.101
Items
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
Frequency Bands and Channel Assignment
• TX-RX frequency separation
X
TX characteristics
• Max output power
X
• Closed loop power control in DL
X
• Power control steps
X
• Adjacent Channel Leakage Ratio (ACLR)
X
(1)
• Modulation Accuracy
X
• Peak code Domain error
X
RX characteristics
• Static reference sensitivity level
X
• Maximum input level
X
• Adjacent Channel Selectivity (ACS)
X
• Blocking characteristics
X
• Spurious response
X
• Intermodulation characteristics
X
Performance Requirement
• Test Environment (Packet switched data)
X
• Demodulation in non fading channel
X
• Demodulation of DTCH
X
• Inter-cell Soft Handover
X
• RX Synch. Characteristics
X
• Timing Characteristics
X
Notes:
• (1) Milestone was moved from WG4 #4 to WG4 #5 in ver 0.0.2.
5.2 25.104 (BTS TX & RX for FDD)
Table 5-2 shows the agreed study items for the 25.104 specification document.
Table 5-2:Study Items for 25.104
Items
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
Frequency Bands and Channel Assignment
• TX-RX frequency separation
X
TX characteristics
• BS Max output power
X
Extreme conditions
• Frequency Stability
X
• Output Power Dynamics
X
• Adjacent Channel Leakage Ratio (ACLR)
X
• Spurious Emissions
X
• Transmit Intermodulation
X
• Modulation Accuracy
X
• Peak code Domain error
X
RX characteristics
• Reference Sensitivity level
X
• Maximum frequency Deviation for Receiver Performance
X
• Dynamic Range
X
• Adjacent Channel Selectivity (ACS)
X
• Blocking characteristics
X
• Spurious response
X
• Intermodulation characteristics
X
• Spurious Emissions
X
Performance Requirement
• Performance in AWING Channel
X
• Performance in Multipath Fading Channels
X
5.3 25.102 (UE TX & RX for TDD)
Table 5-3 shows the agreed study items for the 25.102 specification document.
Table 5-3:Study Items for 25.102
Items
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
Frequency Bands and Channel Assignment
• Frequency Bands
X
TX characteristics
• Max output power
X
• UE frequency stability
X
• Open loop power control UL
X
• Closed power control UL
X
• Power control steps
X
• Power control cycles per second
X
• Minimum transmit output power
X
• Transmit on/off ratio/DTX
X
• Adjacent Channel Leakage Ratio (ACLR)
X
• Transmit intermodulation
X
• Modulation Accuracy
X
RX characteristics
• Static reference sensitivity level
X
• Maximum input level
X
• Adjacent Channel Selectivity (ACS)
X
• Blocking characteristics
X
• Spurious response
X
• Intermodulation characteristics
X
• Spurious emissions
X
Performance Requirement
• Test Environment
X
• Demodulation in non fading channel
X
• Demodulation of PCH/FACH/DTCH
X
• Multi-Link Performance
X
• RX Synch. Characteristics
X
• Interfrequency handover
X
• Timing Requirements
X
5.4 25.105 (BTS TX & RX for TDD)
Table 5-4 shows the agreed study items for the 25.105 specification document.
Table 5-4:Study Items 25.105
Items
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
Frequency Bands and Channel Assignment
• Frequency Bands
X
TX characteristics
• Max output power
X
Extreme Conditions
• UE Frequency Stability
X
• Open Loop Power Control UL
X
• Closed Power Control UL
X
• Power control steps
X
• Power Control Steps per Second
X
• Minimum Transmit Output Power
X
• Transmit on/off ratio/DTX
X
• Adjacent Channel Leakage Ratio (ACLR)
X
• Intermodulation Characteristics
X
• Modulation Accuracy
X
RX characteristics
• Static reference sensitivity level
X
• Maximum input level
X
• Adjacent Channel Selectivity (ACS)
X
• Blocking characteristics
X
• Spurious response
X
• Intermodulation characteristics
X
• Spurious Emissions
X
Performance Requirement
• Test Environment
X
• Demodulation in non fading channel
X
• Demodulation of PCH/FACH/DTCH
X
• Multi-Link Performance
X
• RX Synch. Characteristics
X
• Interfrequency handover
X
• Timing Characteristics
X
5.5 25.103 (RF Parameters)
Table 5-5 shows a first draft proposal for an updated version of study items for the 25.103 specification document.
Table 5-5:Study Items for 25.103
Items
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
Idle Mode Tasks (FDD)
Cell Selection Scenario
• Cell selection delay – Text
X
• Cell selection delay - Value
X
Cell Re-Selection Scenario
• Cell re-selection delay – Text
X
• Cell re-selection delay – Value
X
• Cell List Size – Text
X
• Cell List Size – Value
X
• Maximum number of cells to be monitored – Text
X
• Maximum number of cells to be monitored – Value
X
• Cell Re-selection reaction time – Text
X
• Cell Re-selection reaction time – Value
X
RF Parameters used for Cell Re-Selection
X
PLMN Selection and Re-Selection Scenario – Text
X
PLMN Selection and Re-Selection Scenario – Values
X
Location Registration Scenario – Text
X
Location Registration Scenario – Values
X
Idle Mode Tasks (TDD)
Cell Selection Scenario
• Cell selection delay – Text
X
• Cell selection delay - Value
X
Cell Re-Selection Scenario
• Cell re-selection delay – Text
X
• Cell re-selection delay – Value
X
• Cell List Size – Text
X
• Cell List Size – Value
X
• Maximum number of cells to be monitored – Text
X
• Maximum number of cells to be monitored – Value
X
• Cell Re-selection reaction time – Text
X
• Cell Re-selection reaction time – Value
X
• RF Parameters used for Cell Re-Selection
X
PLMN Selection and Re-Selection Scenario – Text
X
PLMN Selection and Re-Selection Scenario – Values
X
Location Registration Scenario – Text
X
Location Registration Scenario – Values
X
RRC Connection Mobility
Handover 3G to 3G
FDD Soft/Softer Handover
• Maximum number of cells to be monitored – Text
X
• Maximum number of cells to be monitored – Value
X
• Measurement reporting delay – Text
X
• Measurement reporting delay – Value
X
• Active set dimension – Text
X
• Active set dimension – Value
X
• Active set update time interval – Text
X
• Active set update time interval – Value
X
• Frame offset Measurement Accuracy – Text
X
• Frame offset Measurement Accuracy – Value
X
FDD Inter-Frequency Handover
• Maximum number of cells/frequencies to be monitored – Text
X
• Maximum number of cells/frequencies to be monitored – Value
X
• Measurement reporting delay – Text
X
• Measurement reporting delay – Value
X
• Frame offset Measurement Accuracy – Text
X
• Frame offset Measurement Accuracy – Value
X
FDD/TDD Handover
• Requirements –Text
X
• Requirements - Values
X
• RF Parameters
X
TDD/TDD Handover
• Requirements –Text
X
• Requirements- Values
X
• RF Parameters
X
Radio Link Management
Link adaptation
• Link adaptation delay minimum requirement – Value
X
• Link adaptation accuracy minimum requirement – Value
X
Cell Update
X
URA Update
X
Admission Control (FDD)
X
Admission Control (TDD)
X
Radio Access Bearer Control (FDD)
X
Radio Access Bearer Control (TDD)
X
Dynamic Channel Allocation (FDD)
X
Dynamic Channel Allocation (TDD)
X
Radio Link Surveillance (FDD)
X
Radio Link Surveillance (TDD)
X
Radio Link Measurement Requirements – Text
X
Radio Link Measurement Requirements – Values
X
Radio Link Failure Requirements – Text
X
Radio Link Failure Requirements – Values
X
[Editor’s note: The above table was developed by the editor of the TS 25.103.]
5.6 25.141 (BS Conformance Test for FDD)
Table 5-6 shows the identified study items for the 25.141 specification document.
Table 5-6:Study Items for 25.141
Items
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
General test conditions and declarations
• BTS Configurations
X
Transmitter
• Base station maximum output power
X
• Frequency stability
X
• Clock Frequency accuracy
X
• Output power dynamics
X
• Transmitted RF carrier power versus time
X
• Output RF spectrum emissions
X
• Transmit intermodulation
X
Receiver characteristics
• General
X
• Test conditions and measurement methods
X
• Dynamic range
X
• Adjacent Channel Selectivity (ACS)
X
• Blocking characteristics
X
• Spurious response
X
• Spurious emissions
X
Performance requirement
• BS Dynamic reference sensitivity performance
X
[Editor’s note: The above table was developed by the editor based on the open item list included in TS 25.141 V1.0.4.]
5.7 25.142 (BS Conformance Test for TDD)
Table 5-7 shows the identified study items for the 25.142 specification document.
Table 5-7:Study Items for 25.142
Items
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
Transmitter characteristics
• Maximum output power
X
• Frequency stability
X
• Output power dynamics
X
• Transmitted ON/OFF ratio
X
• Output RF spectrum emissions
X
• Transmit intermodulation
X
• Modulation accuracy
X
Receiver characteristics
• Reference sensitivity level
X
• Dynamic range
X
• Adjacent Channel Selectivity (ACS)
X
• Blocking characteristics
X
• Spurious response
X
• Intermodulation characteristics
X
• Spurious emissions
X
• Timing advance (TA) requirements
X
Performance requirement
• Dynamic reference sensitivity performance
X
[Editor’s note: The above table was developed by the editor of the TS 25.142.]
5.8 25.113 (BS EMC)
Table 5-8 shows the identified study items for the 25.113 specification document.
Table 5-8:Study Items for 25.113
Items
WG4 #4
WG4 #5
RAN #4
WG4 #6
WG 4 #7
RAN #5
WG4 #8
WG4 #9
RAN #6
Remarks
Definitions, symbols and abbreviations
• Definition of: Loss of service & Loss of call
X
• Definition of:Transient phenomena & Continuous phenomena
X
Test Conditions
X
Performance Assessment
X
Performance Criteria
• Number of tests
X
• Self recovery
X
Applicability Overview
X
[Editor’s note: The above table was developed by the editor based on the open item list included in TS 25.113 V1.1.1.]
6 Open Item for Release 1999
A table in the following sub-sections shows all the open items that have been agreed in each specification document as of the issuance of the most updated documents. The contents are subject to change depending on further studies.
6.1 TS25.101 (UE TX & RX for FDD)
Table 6-1 shows the identified open items for the 25.101 specification document.
Table 6-1:Open Items for 25.101
Section number
Section description
Status
3.1
Definitions
Definition of average power ….
5.2
Frequency bands
The deployment of TDD in the 1920 MHz to 1980 MHz band is an open item
6.6.2.2
Adjacent Channel Leakage power Ratio (ACLR)
The possibility is being considered of dynamically relaxing the ACLR requirements for User Equipment(s) under conditions when this would not lead to significant interference (with respect to other system scenario or UMTS operators). This would be carried out under network control, primarily to facilitate reduction in UE power consumption.
6.4.2.1.1
Power control steps minimum requirement
The timing requirement for power control steps is FFS
6.4.2.1.1
Power control steps minimum requirement
The current text does not cover the case where a power command is a multiple of the step size defined in 6.4.3
RAN WG1 is currently;
• Analyzing the benefits of introduction of smaller step sizes (<1 dB>as an option
• Investigating the benefits of emulated step size which imply that changes in the output power occurs at a rate lower than the one defined in 6.4.5
6.8.3
Peak code domain error
Outstanding
7
Receiver characteristic
All tables need change due to harmonization and changes to the downlink measurement channels in measurement. Note that the requirements are unchanged.
6.2 TS25.104 (BTS TX & RX for FDD)
Table 6-2 shows the identified open items for the 25.104 specification document.
Table 6-2:Open Items for 25.104
Section number
Section description
Status
6.2.1
Base station max output power
Minimum requirement in extreme conditions is ffs.
6.3
Frequency accuracy
Should there also be an accuracy requirement on the clock rate? Alternatives are to either tie the clock rate to the frequency accuracy or to have a separate clock rate requirement.
6.4.2
Power control dynamic range
The need for this parameter to be specified should be confirmed.
The power control dynamic range necessary as a minimum requirement needs to be reviewed.
6.4.3
Total power dynamic range
The total power dynamic range necessary as a minimum requirement needs to be reviewed.
6.4.5
Primary CPICH power
Value is TBD. Details of the path loss estimation method is under study in WG1.
6.6.1
Occupied bandwidth
Measurement bandwidth for the total integrated power is ffs.
Is this section still required?
6.6.2.3
Protection outside a licensee’s frequency block
This requirement needs to be reviewed in content and application, since it is a regional requirement (FCC part 24.)
The current text is based closely on FCC part 24. It may be possible to clarify the requirement (to allow more consistent testing) by including parameters which are specific to UTRA, including:
• defining requirement as an absolute value.
• Defining the minimum carrier spacing from the edge of the licensee’s frequency block.
• Defining the –26dB bandwidth of the emission.
Defining the resolution bandwidth in the first 1MHz (the requirement would appear to be about 45kHz or greater; is it possible to perform this measurement with this value of resolution bandwidth?)
6.6.3.3.2
Co-existence with GSM 900; co-located base stations
Scenario calculations should be performed to confirm the requirement, currently –[98]dB.
6.6.3.4.2
Co-existence with DCS 1800; co-located base stations
Scenario calculations should be performed to confirm the requirement, currently –[98]dB.
6.8.2
Modulation accuracy
Further consideration is needed, especially for the multicode case.
6.8.3
Peak code domain error
The requirement is ffs.
7.1
General
Definition of requirements for antenna diversity is ffs.
7.3
Dynamic range
The requirement (BER/FER, value and channel type) is ffs.
The effect of applying mast head LNAs to the dynamic range specification is ffs.
8
Performance requirement
Values are TBD.
Requirements for BS without dual receiver diversity is ffs.
6 or 8
Transmit diversity
Specification text for SSDT requirement is needed, unclear in what section or possibly in TS 25.103.
6.3 TS25.102 (UE TX & RX for TDD)
Table 6-3 shows the identified open items for the 25.102 specification document.
Table 6-3:Open Items for 25.102
Section number
Section description
Status
3
Definitions, Symbols, Abbreviations
Update required
5.2
Frequency bands
The deployment of TDD in the 1920 MHz to 1980 MHz band is an open item.
6.6.2.2.1
ACLR, Minimum requirement
The possibility is being considered of dynamically relaxing the ACP requirements for User Equipment(s) under conditions when this would not lead to significant interference (with respect to other system scenario or UMTS operators). This would be carried out under network control, primarily to facilitate reduction in UE power consumption.
6.7.2.1
Spectrum emission mask
Requirements for other than UE power class 21dBm
6.7.2.2
ACLR
Requirements for other than UE power class 21dBm
6.8
Transmit Intermodulation
Requirements for other than UE power class 21dBm
6.9.3
Peak Code Domain Error
Requirement to be defined.
7.5
ACS
Value in square brackets
7.9
Spurious Emissions
Values in square brackets
8
Performance Requirement
Values are TBD, update of structure needed.
Annex E2
Service Implementation Capabilities
For further study
6.4 TS25.105 (BTS TX & RX for TDD)
Table 6-4 shows the identified open items for the 25.105 specification document.
Table 6-4:Open Items for 25.105
Section number
Section description
Status
3
Definitions, symbols and abbreviations
Update needed
6.3
Frequency stability
Should there also be an accuracy requirement on the clock rate ? Alternatives are to either tie the clock rate to the frequency accuracy or to have a separate clock rate requirement.
6.4.3
Power control dynamic range
Redundant requirement included. The need for this parameter to be specified should be confirmed.
6.4.6
Power control cycles per second
Adaptation to 15 slots per frame needed, depending on WG1 specification, requirement needed ?
6.4.7
Perch channel power
Requirement for reference power in the cell is TBD.
6.6.2.1
Spectrum mask
Not included
6.6.2.2
ACLR
Values in square brackets
6.6.3.2.2
Co-existence with GSM 900; co-located base stations
Scenario calculations should be performed to confirm the requirement, currently [-98] dB.
6.6.3.3.2
Co-existence with GSM 1800; co-located base stations
Scenario calculations should be performed to confirm the requirement, currently [-98] dB.
7.3
Dynamic Range
Value in square brackets
7.4
ACS
Requirement is TBD.
7.8
Spurious Emissions
Values in square brackets
8
Performance Requirement
Values are TBD.
Requirement for BS without dual receiver diversity is ffs.
6.5 TS25.133 (Support of RF Parameters in Radio Resource Management for FDD)
Table 6-5 shows the identified open items for the 25.133 specification document.
Table 6-5:Open Items for 25.133
Section number
Section description
Status
[Editor’s note: The above table needs input from the editor of this specification]
6.6 TS25.123 (Support of RF Parameters in Radio Resource Management for TDD)
Table 6-6 shows the identified open items for the 25.123 specification document.
Table 6-6:Open Items for 25.123
Section number
Section description
Status
[Editor’s note: The above table needs input from the editor of this specification]
6.7 TS25.141 (BTS Conformance test for FDD)
Table 6-7 shows the identified open items for the 25.141 specification document.
Table 6-7:Open Items for 25.141
#
Section
Section description
Current status
Remarks
1
2
References
Shall be filled in later.
Some are added. (May not exhaustive)
2
3.1
Definitions
To be filled in later.
Some are added. (May not exhaustive)
3
3.2
Symbols
To be properly defined later.
Editorial. Shall be filled in later if needed
12
6.2.1
Base station maximum output power
Table 6.2.-1 and Table 6.2-2 should be filled in.
Remove Editor’s note, since measuring the total power is enough.
(Working assumption for power ratio for each channel shall be taken from AH1-DL discussion in Aug.30.)
13
6.3
Frequency stability
Test conditions shall be revised properly.
Adding draft text for it.
Q.1: Should Signal to be measured be modulated?
Q2: If it is the case, what kind of channel structure defined?
Q3: Are there any need to defiene “Frequency measuring equipment” as a “wide-bande frequency counter”?
14
6.4.2
Power control steps
There are some TBD parameters in the test conditions.
Revise description.
Q1: How to measure a particular DPCH shall be sprcified.
Q2: By what method (can spectrum analyzer do this?) shall be specified.
15
6.4.2.2
Minimum requirement
- Step size torelance is ffs.
To define the transmitter power as “code domain power” is ffs.
16
6.4.3
Power control dynamic range
There are some TBD parameters in the test conditions.
17
6.4.4
Minimum transmit power
There are some TBD parameters in the test conditions.
18
6.4.5
Total power dynamic range
There are some TBD parameters in the test conditions.
19
6.4.6
Power control cycles per second
There are some TBD parameters in the test conditions.
20
6.5
Transmitted RF carrier power versus time
Table 6.5-1 should be filled in.
21
6.5.4
Primary CPICH power
There are some TBD parameters in the test conditions.
22
6.6.1
Occupied bandwidth
Texts for measurement method are needed.
Table 6.6-1 should be filled in.
23
6.6.3
Spurious emissions
There are some TBD parameters in the test conditions. Table 6.6-3 and Table 6.6-4 should be filled in.
24
6.7
Transmit intermodulation
There are some TBD parameters in the test conditions. Further input for co-located cellular systems are needed.
34
8.2.1
Performance in AWGN channel
- BER (or FER) measurement method should be defined.
- There are some TBD parameters in Table 8.2-1
- Add description in Annex-A. Baseline text is taken from Annex A in [5].
(- Table 8.2-1 still requires further study.)
35
8.2.2.4[6.4.1.3]
Uplink power control
Text for this section is needed.
36
8.2.2.5[6.4.1.4]
Soft handover performance
FFS.
38
8.2.2.2
Performance without TPC
There are some TBD parameters in the table.
39
8.2.2.3
Performance with TPC
There are some TBD parameters in the table.
44
6.2.1.1
Test Conditions and measurement method
Which part of the code shll be measured should be specified.
45
6.4.2.1
Test conditions and measurement method
<Editor’s note: In whichh symbol rate, should measurement done shall be specified.>
46
6.4.2.1
Test conditions and measurement method
<Editor’s note: In whichh symbol rate, should measurement done shall be specified.>
47
6.4.3.1
Test conditions and measurement method
<Editor’s note: In whichh symbol rate, should measurement done shall be specified.>
48
6.4.4.1
Test conditions and measurement method
<Editor’s note: In whichh symbol rate, should measurement done shall be specified.>
49
6.4.5.1
Test conditions and measurement method
<Editor’s note: In whichh symbol rate, should measurement done shall be specified.>
50
6.4.6.1
Test conditions and measurement method
<Editor’s note: In whichh symbol rate, should measurement done shall be specified.>
51
6.9
Clock Frequency accuracy
Conformance requirement for it is F.F.S.
52
6.6.2.1
Spectrum emission mask
Test conditions and measurement methods are FFS. Description of minimum requirement shall be simplified.
6.8 TS25.142 (BTS Conformance test for TDD)
Table 6-8 shows the identified open items for the 25.142 specification document.
Table 6-8:Open Items for 25.142
Section number
Section description
Status
[Editor’s note: The above table needs input from the editor of this specification]
6.9 TS25.113 (BTS EMC)
Table 6-9 shows the identified open items for the 25.113 specification document.
Table 6-9:Open Items for 25.113
Section number
Section description
Status
3.1
Definition of:
Loss of service
Loss of call
Contributions invited.
3.1
Definition of:
Transient phenomena
Continuous phenomena
Editor to check if any generally accepted definition already exists
4
New text to be proposed by correspondence following WG4#7
5
New text to be proposed by correspondence following WG4#7
6.1, 6.2
Number of tests
The number of different bearers which need to be tested needs to be defined.
6.2
Self recovery
Conditions for “System operation self-recoverable” need to be defined.
7
New text to be approved by correspondence to identify relevant sections of Annex A for phenomena
7 Work Item for Release 2000
History
Document history
Date
Version
Comment
May 11th, 1999
0.0.1
Initial version as R4-99251 based on R4-99190 and R4-99252.
June 3rd, 1999
0.0.2
Revised the items pointed out at the WG4 #4 meeting.
Incorporated the Study Items shown in R4-99253.
June 16th, 1999
1.0.0
Table 5.5 was revised to incorporate agreed part of R4-99316.
July 15th, 1999
1.0.1
Minor editorial changes incorporated.
July 24th, 1999
1.1.0
Milestone change incorporated to be in line with PCG#2(99)21.
August 25th, 1999
1.2.0
Revised the meeting schedule for #9 meeting as agreed at #6 meeting and updated Table 4:Work Plan.
September 8th, 1999
1.3.0
Incorporated the following pages.
5.6 25.141 (BS CONFORMANCE TEST FOR FDD)
5.7 25.142 (BS CONFORMANCE TEST FOR TDD)
5.8 25.113 (BS EMC)
September 30th, 1999
1.4.0
Editorial error in Table 4 corrected.
Milestone change incorporated as agreed at the WG4 #7 meeting.
Updated the following pages.
5.5 25.103 (RF Parameters)
5.7 25.142 (BS CONFORMANCE TEST FOR TDD)
5.8 25.113 (BS EMC).
October 7th, 1999
1.4.0
Noted by TSG-RAN#5
October 27th, 1999
2.0.0
Table 4 updated to reflect the result of TSG RAN #5.
Meeting schedule for year 2000 incorporated.
December 5th, 1999
2.1.0
Meeting schedule for year 2000 updated.
December 10th, 1999
2.2.0
Table 4 updated to reflect the split of 25.103.
Created a new section of “6. Open Item for Release 1999” and text changes proposed in R4-99907 except the table for 25.103 were incorporated into that section.
Created a new section of “7. Work Item for Release 2000” with no content.
October 7th, 1999
1.4.0
Noted by TSG-RAN#5
Editor for 30.504 Work Plan and Study Items is:
Masaaki Iwasa
Motorola Japan Limited
Tel. : +81 (0)3 3280 8435
Fax : +81 (0)3 3440 3105
Email : RTY868@email.mot.com
This document is written in Microsoft Word 97.
|
27beca56e63e2e84b7c4306bba73a041 | 25.831 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification.
1 Scope
The scope of this Technical Report is to list technical features and functions of UTRAN (Study Items) that are currently assumed by TSG RAN WG3 to be outside the scope of UMTS Release 99, but that should be considered for future releases. Agreed technical descriptions of these features and functions are also included to the extent they are available.
2 References
The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies.
• A non-specific reference to an ETS shall also be taken to refer to later versions published as an EN with the same number.
[1] TS 25.433 UTRAN Iub interface NBAP Signalling Specification
[2]
3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the [following] terms and definitions [given in ... and the following] apply.
3.2 Symbols
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
4 Study item list
[Editor's Note: This chapter should include the list of the study items, i.e. the features and functions of UTRAN outside the scope of UMTS Release 99].
The study items outside the scope of UMTS Release 99 are the following (non exhaustive):
• Parallelism in the execution of NBAP procedures.
•
5 Parallelism in the execution of NBAP procedures
5.1 Feature/Function description and status
[Editor's Note: This section should include the description of the feature/function related to the study item and its status].
In release 99, it is a working assumption that there is only one ongoing procedure per UE context i.e. one NBAP procedure cannot be executed as long as another NBAP procedure for the same UE is still on going.
5.2 In further releases, it will be possible to have more than one on going NBAP procedure for a given UE, depending on the on going and the new procedures. Benefits and details are to be clarified.Impacts on specifications
5.2.1 Impacted specifications
[Editor's Note: This section should list the TSG RAN WG3 specifications, which are impacted by the feature/function].
Impacted RAN WG3 specifications are:
• TS 25.433 (NBAP Specification) [1]
5.2.2 Impacts on TS 25.433 (NBAP Specification)
[Editor's Note: This subsection should include agreed modifications, text and figures needed for that specification].
The following text is included in chapter 8.
8.x. Procedure management
Table x shows the support for parallel procedure execution by the NBAP protocol.
New
procedure
Ongoing
procedure
RL-
Setup
RL-Addition
RL-
Reconf (unsync)
RL-
Reconf
(Sync)
RL-
Deletion
RL-Setup
Not applicable
Not possible
RL-Addition
RL-Reconf (unsync)
Supported
RL-Reconf
(sync)
Not supported
RL-Deletion
Note: it is up to an implementation to actually support the parallelism offered by the NBAP protocol. Since all procedures are initiated by an RNC, this RNC can choose not to use the offered parallelism. A simple node_B implementation might choose to execute all procedures sequentially.
5.2.3 Impacts on specification 2
[Editor's Note: This subsection should include agreed modifications, text and figures needed for that specification].
6 Feature/Function description and status
[Editor's Note: This section should include the description of the feature/function related to the study item and its status].
6.1 Impacts on specifications
6.1.1 Impacted specifications
[Editor's Note: This section should list the TSG RAN WG3 specifications which are impacted by the feature/function].
6.1.2 Impacts on specification 1
[Editor's Note: This subsection should include agreed modifications, text and figures needed for that specification].
6.1.3 Impacts on specification 2
[Editor's Note: This subsection should include agreed modifications, text and figures needed for that specification].
7 Study item 2
8 History
Document history
V0.0.1
1999-05
Initial Specification Structure
V0.0.2
1999-06
Addition of study item 1 "Parallelism in the execution of NBAP procedures" according to RAN WG3#4 meeting, based on tdoc R3-99449.
V0.0.2
1999-06
Noted by TSG-RAN
Editor for 3GPP RAN TS 25.831 is:
Nicolas Drevon
Alcatel
Tel.: +33 1 3077 0916
Fax : +33 1 3077 9430
Email : nicolas.drevon@alcatel.fr
This document is written in Microsoft Word version 7/97.
|
fd9931b60fc241f651706643f1ed6e48 | 33.900 | 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control.
| y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification;
2 Introduction
This document is intended to offer security guidance to those involved in 3GPP systems. All specifications have to take into account the cost and feasibility of security features and functions. Inevitably, some compromise is necessary, and so it is important to realise where possible risks and threats may exist. The document describes those security issues that have been identified in the formulation of the standards.
3 Scope
The present document gives a general description of the security architecture and features of 3rd Generation Security. It is intended to provide an overview of security, for detailed explanation and the actual standards the reader is referred to the appropriate standards.
It also serves the purpose of identifying the potential risks and threats that have been highlighted and require careful consideration when implementing a third generat6ion mobile system.
The document attempts to identify whether the security features and mechanism provided in the latest version of the 3G security architecture specification {1} address the 2G security weaknesses.
4 References
Reference to an ETS shall also be taken to refer to later versions published as an EN with the same number.
[1] 3G TS 33.102, 3G Security; Security Architecture, version 3.0.0
[2] 3G TS 33.120, 3G Security; Security Principles and Objectives, version 3.0.0
[3] 3G TS 21.133, 3G Security; Security Threats and Requirements, version 3.0.01
5 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations
5.1 Definitions
5.2 Symbols
5.3 Abbreviations
6 A brief overview of 3GPP Security
3GPP security was based on GSM security, with the following important changes:
• A change was made to defeat the false base station attack. The security mechanisms include a sequence number that ensures that the mobile can identify the network.
• Key lengths were increased to allow for the possibility of stronger algorithms for encryption and integrity.
• Mechanisms were included to support security within and between networks.
• Security is based within the switch rather than the base station as in GSM. Therefore links are protected between the base station and switch.
• Integrity mechanisms for the terminal identity (IMEI) have been designed in from the start, rather than that introduced late into GSM.
• The authentication algorithm has not been defined, but guidance on choice will be given.
• When roaming between networks, such as between a GSM and 3GPP, only the level of protection supported by the smart card will apply. Therefore a GSM smart card will not be protected against the false base station attack when in a 3GPP network.
7 Counteracting envisaged 3G attacks
Many of the security enhancements required to 2G systems are intended to counteract attacks which were not perceived to be feasible in 2G systems. This includes attacks that are, or are perceived to be, possible now or very soon because intruders have access to more computational capabilities, new equipment has become available, and the physical security of certain network elements is questioned.
In order to perform the attacks the intruder has to possess one or more of the following capabilities:
• Eavesdropping. This is the capability that the intruder eavesdrops signalling and data connections associated with other users. The required equipment is a modified MS.
• Impersonation of a user. This is the capability whereby the intruder sends signalling and/or user data to the network, in an attempt to make the network believe they originate from the target user. The required equipment is again a modified MS.
• Impersonation of the network. This is the capability whereby the intruder sends signalling and/or user data to the target user, in an attempt to make the target user believe they originate from a genuine network. The required equipment is modified BS.
• Man-in-the-middle. This is the capability whereby the intruder puts itself in between the target user and a genuine network and has the ability to eavesdrop, modify, delete, re-order, replay, and spoof signalling and user data messages exchanged between the two parties. The required equipment is modified BS in conjunction with a modified MS.
• Compromising authentication vectors in the network. The intruder possesses a compromised authentication vector, which may include challenge/response pairs, cipher keys and integrity keys. This data may have been obtained by compromising network nodes or by intercepting signalling messages on network links.
The first capability is the easiest to achieve the following capabilities are gradually more complex and require more investment by the attacker. Therefore, in general, an intruder having a certain capability is assumed also to have the capabilities positioned above that capability in the list. The first two capabilities were acknowledged in the design of 2G systems. 3G security however should thwart all five types of attacks.
In the following we consider several attacks to 3G systems which may not have been fully addressed in 2G systems and attempt to identify whether the security features and mechanisms provided in the latest version of the 3G security architecture specification counteracts each of these attacks.
7.1 Denial of service
We distinguish between the following denial of service attacks:
7.1.1 User de-registration request spoofing
Description:
An attack that requires a modified MS and exploits the weakness that the network cannot authenticate the messages it receives over the radio interface. The intruder spoofs a de-registration request (IMSI detach) to the network. The network de-registers the user from the visited location area and instructs the HLR to do the same. The user is subsequently unreachable for mobile terminated services.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
Integrity protection of critical signalling messages protects against this attack. More specifically, data authentication and replay inhibition of the de-registration request allows the serving network to verify that the de-registration request is legitimate.
7.1.2 Location update request spoofing
Description:
An attack that requires a modified MS and exploits the weakness that the network cannot authenticate the messages it receives over the radio interface. Instead of the de-registration request, the user spoofs a location update request in a different location area from the one in which the user is roaming. The network registers in the new location area and the target user will be paged in that new area. The user is subsequently unreachable for mobile terminated services.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
Integrity protection of critical signalling messages protects against this attack. More specifically, data authentication and replay inhibition of the location update request allows the serving network to verify that the location update request is legitimate.
7.1.3 Camping on a false BS
Description:
An attack that requires a modified BS and exploits the weakness that a user can be enticed to camp on a false base station. Once the target user camps on the radio channels of a false base station, the target user is out of reach of the paging signals of the serving network in which he is registered.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: No
The security architecture does not counteract this attack. However, the denial of service in this case only persists for as long as the attacker is active unlike the above attacks which persist beyond the moment where intervention by the attacker stops. These attacks are comparable to radio jamming which is very difficult to counteract effectively in any radio system.
7.1.4 Camping on a false BS/MS
Description:
An attack that requires a modified BS/MS and exploits the weakness that a user can be enticed to camp on a false base station. A false BS/MS can act as a repeater for some time and can relay some requests in between the network and the target user, but subsequently modify or ignore certain service requests and/or paging messages related to the target user.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: No
The security architecture does not prevent a false BS/MS relaying messages between the network and the target user, nether does it prevent the false BS/MS ignoring certain service requests and/or paging requests. Integrity protection of critical message may however help to prevent some denial of service attacks, which are induced by modifying certain messages. Again, the denial of service in this case only persists for as long as the attacker is active unlike the above attacks, which persist beyond the moment where intervention by the attacker stops. These attacks are comparable to radio jamming which is very difficult to counteract effectively in any radio system.
7.2 Identity catching
We identify the following types of attacks against the user identity confidentiality:
7.2.1 Passive identity catching
Description:
A passive attack that requires a modified MS and exploits the weakness that the network may sometimes request the user to send its identity in cleartext.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
The identity confidentiality mechanism counteracts this attack. The use of temporary identities allocated by the serving network makes passive eavesdropping inefficient since the user must wait for a new registration or a mismatch in the serving network database before he can capture the user’s permanent identity in plaintext. The inefficiency of this attack given the likely rewards to the attacker would make this scenario unlikely. (Note however that the permanent identity may be protected in the event of new registrations or serving network database failure in order to guard against more efficient active attacks.)
7.2.2 Active identity catching
Description:
An active attack that requires a modified BS and exploits the weakness that the network may request the MS to send its permanent user identity in cleartext. An intruder entices the target user to camp on its false BS and subsequently requests the target user to send its permanent user identity in cleartext perhaps by forcing a new registration or by claiming a temporary identity mismatch due to database failure.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
The identity confidentiality mechanism counteracts this attack by using an encryption key shared by a group of users to protect the user identity in the event of new registrations or temporary identity database failure in the serving network. Note however that the size of the groups should be chosen carefully: too small and the group identify may compromise the user identity itself; too large and the group encryption key might be vulnerable to attack.
7.3 Impersonation of the network
We identify the following attacks with the objective of impersonating a genuine network. The ultimate aim of such attacks is usually to eavesdrop on user data (see section 2.4), or to send the user information that he subsequently believes to originate from a genuine network or user with whom he is connected through that network.
7.3.1 Impersonation of the network by suppressing encryption between the target user and the intruder
Description:
An attack that requires a modified BS and that exploits the weakness that the MS cannot authenticate messages received over the radio interface. The target user is enticed to camp on the false BS. When the intruder or the target user initiates a service, the intruder does not enable encryption by spoofing the cipher mode command. The intruder maintains the call as long as it is required or as long as his attack remains undetected.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
A mandatory cipher mode command with message authentication and replay inhibition allows the mobile to verify that encryption has not been suppressed by an attacker.
7.3.2 Impersonation of the network by suppressing encryption between the target user and the true network
Description:
An attack that requires a modified BS/MS and that exploits the weakness that the network cannot authenticate messages received over the radio interface. The target user is enticed to camp on the false BS/MS. When a call is set-up the false BS/MS modifies the ciphering capabilities of the MS to make it appear to the network that a genuine incompatibility exists between the network and the mobile station. The network may then decide to establish an un-enciphered connection. After the decision not to cipher has been taken, the intruder cuts the connection with the network and impersonates the network to the target user.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
A mobile station classmark with message authentication and replay inhibition allows the network to verify that encryption has not been suppressed by an attacker.
7.3.3 Impersonation of the network by forcing the use of a compromised cipher key
Description:
An attack that requires a modified BS and the possession by the intruder of a compromised authentication vector and thus exploits the weakness that the user has no control upon the cipher key. The target user is enticed to camp on the false BS/MS. When a call is set-up the false BS/MS forces the use of a compromised cipher key on the mobile user. The intruder maintains the call as long as it is required or as long as his attack remains undetected.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
The presence of a sequence number in the challenge allows the USIM to verify the freshness of the cipher key to help guard against forced re-use of a compromised authentication vector. However, the architecture does not protect against force use of compromised authentication vectors which have not yet been used to authenticate the USIM. Thus, the network is still vulnerable to attacks using compromised authentication vectors which have been intercepted between generation in the authentication centre and use or destruction in the serving network.
The user must trust the SN (transitively via the HE) to handle authentication vectors securely. For instance, an attacker with a false BS may work in collusion with an SN to intercept unused authentication vectors, or the SN may expose itself to undue risks because it stockpiles large numbers of authentication vectors before they need to be used.
7.4 Eavesdropping on user data
We identify the following attacks with the objective of eavesdropping on user data which is transmitted through the genuine network to the intended recipient.
7.4.1 Eavesdropping on user data by suppressing encryption between the target user and the intruder
Description:
An attack that requires a modified BS/MS and that exploits the weakness that the MS cannot authenticate messages received over the radio interface. The target user is enticed to camp on the false BS. When the target user or the intruder initiates a call the network does not enable encryption by spoofing the cipher mode command. The attacker however sets up his own connection with the genuine network using his own subscription. The attacker may then subsequently eavesdrop on the transmitted user data.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
A mandatory cipher mode command with message authentication and replay inhibition allows the mobile to verify that encryption has not been suppressed by an attacker.
7.4.2 Eavesdropping on user data by suppression of encryption between the target user and the true network
Description:
An attack that requires a modified BS/MS and that exploits the weakness that the network cannot authenticate messages received over the radio interface. The target user is enticed to camp on the false BS/MS. When the target user or the genuine network sets up a connection, the false BS/MS modifies the ciphering capabilities of the MS to make it appear to the network that a genuine incompatibility exists between the network and the mobile station. The network may then decide to establish an un-enciphered connection. After the decision not to cipher has been taken, the intruder may eavesdrop on the user data.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
Message authentication and replay inhibition of the mobile’s ciphering capabilities allows the network to verify that encryption has not been suppressed by an attacker.
7.4.3 Eavesdropping on user data by forcing the use of a compromised cipher key
Description:
An attack that requires a modified BS/MS and the possession by the intruder of a compromised authentication vector and thus exploits the weakness that the user has no control the cipher key. The target user is enticed to camp on the false BS/MS. When the target user or the intruder set-up a service, the false BS/MS forces the use of a compromised cipher key on the mobile user while it builds up a connection with the genuine network using its own subscription.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
The presence of a sequence number in the challenge allows the USIM to verify the freshness of the cipher key to help guard against forced re-use of a compromised authentication vector. However, the architecture does not protect against force use of compromised authentication vectors, which have not yet been used to authenticate the USIM. Thus, the network is still vulnerable to attacks using compromised authentication vectors, which have been intercepted between generation in the authentication centre and use and destruction in the serving network.
The user must trust the SN (transitively via the HE) to handle authentication vectors securely. For instance, an attacker with a false BS may work in collusion with an SN to intercept unused authentication vectors, or the SN may expose itself to undue risks because it stockpiles large numbers of authentication vectors before they need to be used.
7.5 Impersonation of the user
7.5.1 Impersonation of the user through the use of by the network of a compromised authentication vector
Description:
An attack that requires a modified MS and the possession by the intruder of a compromised authentication vector which is intended to be used by the network to authenticate a legitimate user. The intruder uses that data to impersonate the target user towards the network and the other party.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
The presence of a sequence number in the challenge means that authentication vectors cannot be re-used to authenticate USIMs. This helps to reduce the opportunity of using a compromised authentication vector to impersonate the target user. However, the network is still vulnerable to attacks using compromised authentication vectors, which have been intercepted between generation in the authentication centre and use and destruction in the serving network.
The user must trust the SN (transitively via the HE) to handle authentication vectors securely. For instance, an attacker with a false BS may work in collusion with an SN to intercept unused authentication vectors, or the SN may expose itself to undue risks because it stockpiles large numbers of authentication vectors before they need to be used.
7.5.2 Impersonation of the user through the use by the network of an eavesdropped authentication response
Description:
An attack that requires a modified MS and exploits the weakness that an authentication vector may be used several times. The intruder eavesdrops on the authentication response sent by the user and uses that when the same challenge is sent later on. Subsequently, ciphering has to be avoided by any of the mechanisms described above. The intruder uses the eavesdropped response data to impersonate the target user towards the network and the other party.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
The presence of a sequence number in the challenge means that authentication vectors cannot be re-used to authenticate USIMs.
7.5.3 Hijacking outgoing calls in networks with encryption disabled
Description:
This attack requires a modified BS/MS. While the target user camps on the false base station, the intruder pages the target user for an incoming call. The user then initiates the call set-up procedure, which the intruder allows to occur between the serving network and the target user, modifying the signalling elements such that for the serving network it appears as if the target user wants to set-up a mobile originated call. The network does not enable encryption. After authentication the intruder cuts the connection with the target user, and subsequently uses the connection with the network to make fraudulent calls on the target user’s subscription.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Partly
Integrity protection of critical signalling messages protects against this attack. More specifically, data authentication and replay inhibition of the connection set-up request allows the serving network to verify that the request is legitimate. In addition, periodic integrity protected messages during a connection helps protect against hijacking of un-enciphered connections after the initial connection establishment. However, hijacking the channel between periodic integrity protection messages is still possible, although this may be of limited use to attackers. In general, connections with ciphering disabled will always be vulnerable to some degree of channel hijacking.
7.5.4 Hijacking outgoing calls in networks with encryption enabled
Description:
This attack requires a modified BS/MS. In addition to the previous attack this time the intruder has to attempt to suppress encryption by modification of the message in which the MS informs the network of its ciphering capabilities.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
Integrity protection of critical signalling messages protects against this attack. More specifically, data authentication and replay inhibition of the MS station classmark and the connection set-up request helps prevent suppression of encryption and allows the serving network to verify that the request is legitimate.
7.5.5 Hijacking incoming calls in networks with encryption disabled
Description:
This attack requires a modified BS/MS. While the target user camps on the false base station, an associate of the intruder makes a call to the target user’s number. The intruder acts as a relay between the network and the target user until authentication and call set-up has been performed between target user and serving network. The network does not enable encryption. After authentication and call set-up the intruder releases the target user, and subsequently uses the connection to answer the call made by his associate. The target user will have to pay for the roaming leg.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Partly
Integrity protection of critical signalling messages protects against this attack. More specifically, data authentication and replay inhibition of the connection accept message allows the serving network to verify that the request is legitimate. In addition, periodic integrity protected messages during a connection helps protect against hijacking of un-enciphered connections after the initial connection establishment. However, hijacking the channel between periodic integrity protection messages is still possible, although this may be of limited use to attackers. In general, connections with ciphering disabled will always be vulnerable to some degree of channel hijacking.
7.5.6 Hijacking incoming calls in networks with encryption enabled
Description:
This attack requires a modified BS/MS. In addition to the previous attack this time the intruder has to suppress encryption.
Does 3G security architecture counteract the attack: Yes
Integrity protection of critical signalling messages protects against this attack. More specifically, data authentication and replay inhibition of the MS station classmark and the connection accept message helps prevent suppression of encryption and allows the serving network to verify that the connection accept is legitimate.
8 Network issues
8.1 Security policy
8.1.1 Access control policy
Access control policy with respect to 3GPP network elements should be consistent with general access control policy as defined in the particular operator’s security policy. As a basis, the following rules should apply:
1. In granting users access rights to 3GPP networks elements or supporting IT systems the following principles should be followed:
• every employee should only have access to those resources necessary for the completion of the work-related tasks set,
• the “positive access control” principle should be applied, meaning it shall be assumed that an employee is authorised to carry out only those operations for which he has obtained authority,
• The right of access to resources should be granted only at the moment when it is actually necessary and should be rescinded when no longer necessary for the completion of work-related tasks.
2. Operator’s employees should be made responsible for the secure storing and use of access control executive components entrusted to them (badges, cards). Access control executive components should not be stored together with a computer used to access the network element or IT system.
3. Every user of a given system should be provided with an identification (log-in name, account name) that is unique within the framework or the Company. The following principles apply:
• a user’s identification on its own should not be sufficient for granting access authority,
• an identification should not give any indication of the user’s authority within the system,
• The use of forms of group identification should only be admissible in exceptional circumstances.
Granting of full or very wide rights of access to resources should be limited and strictly controlled.
8.2 Secure network elements interconnection
3GPP network elements must provide means for remote management, maintenance and communication with IT systems (e.g. the billing system). Often an operator’s corporate computer network is used for this purpose. This considerably lower infrastructure costs but poses significant security threats for 3GPP system entities. If no security is applied, usually each user of corporate network can try to access remotely a 3GPP network element, provided its network address is known.
As a principle, 3GPP network elements should be separated, at least logically, from an operator’s corporate computer network. A unique username and password should identify each employee who is authorised to access to network element. Proper application and system logs should be maintained, reviewed and protected.
Remote access to network entities should be, subject to the operator’s security policy, protected from eavesdropping and session hijacking.
Physical access to 3GPP network elements should be controlled by appropriate physical security measures. It is advisable that physical location of network elements be treated as protected information.
8.3 Communications node security
To countermeasure the threats described in this document an operator should define and implement proper security measures. The following section specifies the desirable security features that any 3GPP Network Element (NE), Network System (NS), Operations System (OS) or Data Communications Network (DCN) should provide in order to reduce the risk of potentially service affecting security compromises. The term “3GPP node” in the following section is used to imply a NE, NS, OS, or a DCN and its nodes.
8.3.1 Identification
Each operations related process running in the 3GPP node should be associated with the corresponding user-ID (so that an audit trail can be established if there is a need).
The 3GPP node should disable a user-ID if it has remained inactive (i.e., never used) over a specified time period.
8.3.2 Authentication
All Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P) input ports of the 3GPP node (including direct, dial-up and network access) should require authentication of a session requester, without any provision for a bypass mechanism.
A single stored password entry (e.g., in a password file) should not be allowed to be shared by multiple user-IDs. However, the 3GPP node should not prevent a user from choosing (unknowingly) a password that is already being used by some other user. Nor should the 3GPP node volunteer this information to either user.
Passwords should be stored in a one-way encrypted form, and should not be retrievable by any user including managers or administrators (of system and security). Also, there should be no clear text display (on a device such as a screen, typewriter, or printer) of a password at any time (e.g., login, file dump, etc.).
The 3GPP node should allow passwords to be user changeable (requiring re-authentication), and should require that the user change it the first time he/she establishes a session with the password assigned to him/her. The default should be non-trivial in nature, ideally random.
The password should have an “ageing” feature, and it should have a complexity requirement to make it not easily guessed. The 3GPP node should not accept common words or names as valid passwords. Also, it should not allow a recently obsolete password to be readily reselected by the said user.
8.3.3 System Access Control
The 3GPP node should not allow access to any session requester unless identified and authenticated. There should be no default mechanism to circumvent it.
The 3GPP node should not allow any session to be established via a port that is not authorised to accept input commands. For example, if an output port receives a login request, the 3GPP node should not respond.
The entire login procedure should be allowed to be completed without interruption, even if incorrect parameters (such as an incorrect user-ID or an incorrect password) are entered, and no “help message” should be transmitted to the session requester as to whom part of the authentication is incorrect. The only information to be conveyed at the end of the login attempt is that the login is invalid.
After a specified number of incorrect login attempts carried out in succession, the 3GPP node should lock out the channel and raise an alarm in real time for the administrator.
Before the session begins, the 3GPP node should provide a warning message explicitly alerting the user of the consequences of unauthorised access and use.
At the beginning of the session, the 3GPP node should display the date and time of the user’s last successful access and the number of unsuccessful attempts, if any, that have been made to establish a session since the last successful access.
There should be a “time-out” feature - i.e., the 3GPP node should disconnect or re-authenticated users after a specified time interval during which no messages were exchanged. Also, there should be a mechanism for user-initiated keyboard locking.
The 3GPP node should provide a mechanism to end a session through a secure logoff procedure. If a session gets interrupted due to reasons such as time-out, power failure, link disconnection, etc., the port should be dropped immediately.
For dial-up access over untrusted channels, authentication involving one time passwords should be required (e.g., smart card, etc.).
8.3.4 Resource Access Control
Access to resources should be controlled on the basis of “privilege” (i.e., access permission) associated with user-ID and channel. It should not be based on a “password” associated with the access function, because that password will have to be necessarily shared among all users requiring such access. Neither should encryption be used as a primary access control mechanism (though encryption may be used to enhance it).
The granularity of resource access control should be such that for each resource it should be possible to grant (or deny) access privilege to any single user (or a prescribed group of users). For example, the control should be adequately fine-grained so that user access and channel access can be restricted on the basis of commands, database views (i.e., objects), records (i.e., object instances), and fields (i.e., attributes).
If external entities - e.g., customers, are allowed access to the resources, each 3GPP node’s resource (e.g., proprietary data) should be protected from access by unauthorised persons.
Executable/loadable/fetchable software should be access controlled for overwrite, update, and execution rights.
8.3.5 Accountability and Audit
The 3GPP node should generate a security log containing information sufficient for after-the-fact investigation of loss or impropriety.
The security log should be protected from unauthorized access. No user should be allowed to modify or delete a security log. There should be no mechanism to disable the security log. There should be an alarm in real time if the security log does not function properly.
The security log should, as a minimum, record events such as:
• all sessions established,
• invalid user authentication attempts,
• unauthorized attempts to access resources (including data and transactions),
• changes in users’ security profiles and attributes,
• changes in access rights to resources,
• changes in the 3GPP node security configuration,
• And modification of 3GPP node software.
For each such event, the record should, as a minimum, include date and time of event, initiator of the event such as: user-ID, terminal, port, network address, etc., names of resources accessed, and success or failure of the event.
Actual or attempted passwords should not be recorded in the security log
There should be audit tools to produce exception reports, summary reports, and detailed reports on specifiable data items, users, or communication facilities.
8.3.6 Security Administration
The 3GPP node should support functions for the “management” of security related data (e.g., security parameters such as user-IDs, passwords, privileges, etc.) as “separate” from other user functions. Security administration should be reserved only for an appropriate administrator.
The administrator should be able to display all currently logged-in users as well as a list of all authorised user-IDs.
The administrator should be able to independently and selectively monitor, in real time, the actions of any one or more users based on respective user-IDs, terminals, ports, or network addresses.
The administrator should be able to identify all resources owned by or accessible to any specific user along with the associated access privileges.
The administrator should be able to enter, edit, delete or retrieve all attributes of a user-ID (except for a password, which should not be retrievable).
The administrator should limit the use of a “null password” during system login on a per user or per port basis (i.e., during new release installation).
The administrator should be able to save the security log for safe storage, so that it is not written over when the buffer is full.
All security parameters (e.g., password-ageing interval, time-out interval, and various alarm conditions) should be specifiable and adjustable by the administrator. This implies that the 3GPP node should not have any security parameters hard coded.
8.3.7 Documentation
Any 3GPP node supplier/vendor should provide documentation on security considerations for administrators, operators, and users. They can be stand-alone documents or sections incorporated in appropriate vendor manuals.
The administrator’s guide should contain items such as: functions and privileges that need to be controlled to secure the facility, proper usage of security audit tools, procedures for examining and maintaining audit files, procedures for periodic saving and backup of security logs, recommendations on setting the minimum access permissions on all files, directories, and databases, guidelines on security assessment techniques.
The operator’s guide should contain procedures necessary to initially start the 3GPP node in a secure manner and to resume secure operation after any lapse that may have occurred.
The user’s guide should describe the protection mechanisms that are non-transparent to the user, should explain their purpose, and provide guidelines on their use. It should not contain any information that could jeopardise the security of the 3GPP node if made public.
Passwords should be stored in a one-way encrypted form, and should not be retrievable by any user including managers or administrators (of system and security). Also, there should be no clear text display (on a device such as a screen, typewriter, or printer) of a password at any time (e.g., login, file dump, etc.).
The 3GPP node should allow passwords to be user changeable (requiring reauthentication), and should require that the user change it the first time he/she establishes a session with the password assigned to him/her. The default should be non-trivial in nature, ideally random.
9 Inter Network Security
9.1 Signalling system Number 7
Mobile networks primarily use Signaling System no. 7 (SS7) for communication between networks for such activities as authentication, location update, and supplementary services and call control. The messages unique to 3GPP are MAP messages.
The security of the global SS7 network as a transport system for signaling messages e.g. authentication and supplementary services such as call forwarding is open to major compromise.
The problem with the current SS7 system is that messages can be altered, injected or deleted into the global SS7 networks in an uncontrolled manner.
In the past, SS7 traffic was passed between major PTO’s covered under treaty organization and the number of operators was relatively small and the risk of compromise was low.
Networks are getting smaller and more numerous. Opportunities for unintentional mishaps will increase, as will the opportunities for hackers and other abusers of networks.
With the increase in different types of operators and the increase in the number of interconnection circuits there is an ever-growing loss of control of security of the signaling networks.
There is also exponential growth in the use of interconnection between the telecommunication networks and the Internet .The IT community now has many protocol converters for conversion of SS7 data to IP, primarily for the transportation of voice and data over the IP networks. In addition new services such as those based on IN will lead to a growing use of the SS7 network for general data transfers.
There have been a number of incidents from accidental action, which have damaged a network. To date, there have been very few deliberate actions.
The availability of cheap PC based equipment that can be used to access networks and the ready availability of access gateways on the Internet will lead to compromise of SS7 signaling and this will effect mobile operators.
The risk of attack has been recognised in the USA at the highest level of the President’s office indicating concern on SS7. It is understood that the T1, an American group is seriously considering the issue.
For the network operator there is some policing of incoming signaling on most switches already, but this is dependent on the make of switch as well as on the way the switch is configured by operators.
Some engineering equipment is not substantially different from other advanced protocol analysers in terms of its fraud potential, but is more intelligent and can be programmed more easily.
The SS7 network as presently engineered is insecure. It is vitally important that network operators ensure that signaling screening of SS7 incoming messages takes place at the entry points to their networks and that operations and maintenance systems alert against unusual SS7 messages. There are a number of messages that can have a significant effect on the operation of the network and inappropriate messages should be controlled at entry point.
Network operators network security engineers should on a regular basis carry out monitoring of signaling links for these inappropriate messages. In signing agreements with roaming partners and carrying out roaming testing, review of messages and also to seek appropriate confirmation that network operators are also screening incoming SS7 messages their networks to ensure that no rouge messages appear.
In summary there is no adequate security left in SS7. Mobile operators need to protect them selves from attack from hackers and inadvertent action that could stop a network or networks operating correctly.
Operators should note that HPLMN control over a subscriber roaming in a VPLMN using different MAP release could be limited. To avoid this, operators should assure that their roaming partners use the current MAP version, as specified by the 3GPP Association.
10 Intra network security
10.1 3GPP Network elements and interfaces
Unauthorised, local or remote access to 3GPP network elements can result in access to confidential data stored by system entities, unauthorised access to services and resources, misuse of the network element to gain access to data or services or denial of service. The following section gives an outline of potential threats related to attacks on 3GPP network elements and recommendations.
10.1.1 Home Location Register - HLR
An unauthorised access to HLR could result in activating subscribers not seen by the billing system, thus not chargeable. Services may also be activated or deactivated for each subscriber, thus allowing unauthorised access to services or denial of service attacks. In certain circumstances it is possible to use Man-Machine (MM) commands to monitor other HLR user’s action - this would also often allow for unauthorised access to data.
An operator should not rely on the fact that an intruder’s knowledge on particular vendor’s MM language will be limited. Those attacks can be performed both by external intruders and by operator’s employees.
Access control to HLRs should be based on user profiles, using at least a unique username and a password as authentication data. Remote access to HLR should be protected from eavesdropping, source and destination spoofing and session hijacking. An operator may therefore wish to limit the range of protocols available for communication with HLR..
10.1.2 Authentication Centre - AuC
An intruder who gains direct access to an AuC can effectively clone all subscribers whose data he had access to.
Number of employees having physical and logical access to AuC should be limited. From security point of view it is then reasonable to use an AuC which is not integrated with HLR.
Operators should carefully consider the need for encryption of AuC data. Some vendors use default encryption, the algorithm being proprietary and confidential. It should be noted that strength of such encryption could be questionable.
If decided to use an add-on ciphering facility, attention should be paid to cryptographic key management. Careless use of such equipment could even lower AuC security.
Authentication triplets can be obtained from AuC by masquerading as another system entity (namely HLR). The threat is present when HLR and AuC are physically separated.
10.1.3 Mobile Switching Centre - MSC
An MSC is one of the most important nodes of any 3GPP network. It handles all calls incoming to, or originating from subscribers visiting the given switch area. Unauthorised, local or remote, access to an MSC would likely result in the loss of confidentiality of user data, unauthorised access to services or denial of service for large numbers of subscribers.
It is strongly recommended that access to MSCs is restricted, both in terms of physical and logical access. It is also recommended that their physical location is not made public.
When co-located, several MSCs should be independent (i.e. separated power, transmission,) in order to limit the impacts from accidents on one particular MSC (e.g. fire).
10.1.4 3GPP network interfaces
An intruder gaining access to 3GPP network interfaces would primary gain access to information sent on the interface targeted. However, playing denial-of-service attacks would also be feasible - dependent on how the interface is technically realised (e.g. cable or wireless).
Telecommunication networks are usually designed with necessary redundancy, allowing for reconfiguration in case of loss of a link or links. From security point of view it is particularly important to foresee alternate connection paths where links vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks (e.g., microwave links susceptible to jamming) are in use.
10.1.5 Billing system / Customer Care system
Billing/customer care systems are critical for maintaining the business continuity of a 3GPP Operator.
Unauthorised access to the billing or customer care system could result in
• loss of revenue due to manipulated CDRs (on the mediation device/billing system level)
• unauthorised applying of service discounts (customer care system level), unauthorised access to services (false subscriptions)
• and even denial of service - by repeated launching of resource - consuming system jobs.
Attention should be paid to the fact that access rights to the billing/customer care system are often granted to temporary employees.
As 3GPP network operators should introduce proper access control mechanisms, coherent with the Operator’s general security policy. In particular, it would be advisable to:
• Control the access to the billing data on the database level.
• All users of the billing system should be authenticated by the billing database and access rights should be granted by the database upon successful authentication. Relaying on the application-to-database authentication leaves the database open for a skilled attacker.
• Review the activation process.
The same employee should not carry out both tasks; data verification should involve a trusted employee. Activation should be made only upon confirmation of the person verifying the data entered.
11 User Module and Smart Card
If a 3GPP SIM is integrated on a multi-application smart card, there should be sufficient guarantees that the Ki cannot be read or used by any application other than the 3GPP application. Also there should be clear and secure procedures for placing applications and information on the smart card, ensuring that 3GPP information cannot be changed in an unauthorised way. There should be clear responsibilities and procedures for dealing with stolen or malfunctioning cards.
The importance of secure management of Ki’s is already detailed above. In addition it is important that SIM status lists are kept up to date and that operators define measures to detect and investigate the misuse of SIMs. There should be procedures to replace SIMs, for example at the end of their validity period, and to deal with stolen SIMs. It is particularly important that individual operators devise and operate secure SIM management processes with their SIM suppliers and throughout the SIM distribution channel.
12 Algorithms
12.1 Authentication algorithm
3GPP does not define a standard authentication algorithm, allowing operators to choose their own versions, which comply with the published standards. However, in order to help operators guidelines are available as to how to develop a suitable algorithm. The authentication algorithm is contained within the smart card.
The individual key for each IMSI must be chosen to be random, and must be protected in order to prevent the user from being duplicated. Throughout the security process Ki should be protected.
12.2 Confidentiality algorithm
3GPP defines a standard confidentiality algorithm, which is contained within all mobiles, and protects user data from the mobile to the serving node. This is not only over the radio path as in GSM, but also continues back over the links to the serving node.
The confidentiality algorithm, called Kasumi, is expected to be published.
13 Services
There are many value-added services within the ETSI standards, which will sometimes, when wrongly implemented or interpreted, can be used for fraud.
For example, call forwarding can be set which will then allow calls made to a mobile to be sent to expensive destination numbers. This could be done, for example, by ringing a mobile customer and getting them to put in a call forward number themselves by persuading them that they are testing the mobile.
Many other similar problems exist, such as follow-me services, voicemail, and explicit call transfer. It is to expected that as the services offered by 3GPP become more complex (and include for example Internet connectivity, packet data services as well as MExE which runs code on the mobile, and Java multi application smart cards) then the problem can only become worse.
Operators should ensure that they look carefully at every new network feature and service product to ensure that such problems will not occur in their networks.
13.1 Location services
The location service feature in 3GPP depends on the accuracy of the mechanism used within the mobile equipment. It cannot be though of as accurate, as the mobile software can be modified, or the GPS (Global Positioning System by Satellite) could be displaced by a differential input.
13.2 Mobile Execution Environment - MExE
The ability to remotely modify remote and run code on a mobile clearly introduces a security risk. In the case of MExE it is up to the user to determine if a possible security risk is introduced, and stop the action from taking place. It is to be expected that a smart attacker will be able to introduce code that will fool a user into setting up services or connection that will compromise them or result them in losing money.
14 Index
15
16 History
Document history
1.0.0
Oct 1999
Publication as first draft to 3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security
1.1.0
Nov 1999
Presented at No 6 for information
1.2.0
Jan 2000
Presented at No 10 for comment
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies additional architecture support of Ambient IoT for the support of Rel-19 AIoT Devices defined in TS 23.369 [3] in Topology 2 based on the RRC-based option as described in clause 8.1.3.3 of TR 23.700‑13 [7] and support for new AIoT Devices that will support the DO-A traffic type as described in the "RAN WID Solutions for Ambient IoT (Internet of Things) in NR Phase 2" RP-251885 [9] and "RAN SID Study on enhancements for solutions for Ambient IoT (Internet of Things) in NR outdoor for active devices" RP-251884 [8].
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 22.369: "Service requirements for Ambient power-enabled IoT".
[3] 3GPP TS 23.369: "Architecture support for Ambient power-enabled Internet of Things; Stage 2".
[4] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2".
[5] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2".
[6] 3GPP TS 23.503: "Policies and Charging control framework for the 5G System; Stage 2.
[7] 3GPP TR 23.700‑13: "Study on Architecture support of Ambient power-enabled Internet of Things".
[8] 3GPP RP-251884: "New SID on enhancements for solutions for Ambient IoT (Internet of Things) in NR outdoor for active devices".
[9] 3GPP RP-251885: "New WID on Solutions for Ambient IoT (Internet of Things) in NR Phase 2".
[10] 3GPP TR 38.848: "Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; Study on Ambient IoT (Internet of Things) in RAN".
[11] 3GPP TS 33.369: "Security aspects of ambient IoT services in 5G".
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Definition format (Normal)
<defined term>: <definition>.
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 3.2 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Abbreviation format (EW)
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 4 Architectural Assumptions and Requirements
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 4.1 Architectural Assumptions
| The following traffic types for AIoT Device are to be studied:
- DT: Device-terminated;
- DO-DTT: Device-originated - device-terminated triggered; and
- DO-A: Device-originated - autonomous.
Common architectural assumptions:
- Architecture reference models defined in TS 23.369 [3] are used as the baseline architecture for this study.
- The AIoT Device is agnostic to topologies, i.e. Topology 1 and Topology 2.
Architectural assumptions for support of Topology 2 for Key Issue#1:
- No Rel-19 AIoT Device impact is expected.
- The following topology as defined in TR 38.848 [10] is assumed:
- BS <--> intermediate node <--> Ambient IoT Device: Only a UE can act as an intermediate node which is under the network control
- Only Indirect Connectivity (i.e. NG-RAN <-> AMF <-> AIOTF) is applied.
- The support of Topology 2 in this study is based on the RRC-based option and the interim conclusions of Rel-19 in TR 23.700-13 [7] is the baseline.
Architectural assumptions for support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices:
- The AIoT Device is agnostic to Topology 1 architecture types, i.e. Direct Connectivity architecture and Indirect Connectivity architecture.
NOTE 1: Coordination with RAN WGs is required to determine the AIoT Device capabilities in relation to system level of functionality (considering e.g. traffic scenarios, connectivity topologies, etc.).
NOTE 2: The security aspects for Ambient IoT require coordination with SA WG3.
NOTE 3: The charging aspects for Ambient IoT will be studied by SA WG5.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 4.2 Architectural Requirements
| The following architectural requirements are applicable to this study:
- Solutions shall build on the 5G System architectural principles as in TS 23.501 [4], including flexibility and modularity for newly introduced functionalities.
- The enhancements to support topology 2 shall not impact Rel-19 AIoT devices.
- Solutions shall build on the AIoT architectural principles as in TS 23.369 [3].
- Support for AIoT Services needs to adhere to the nature of the AIoT Devices (e.g. ultra-low complexity, cost and resource-constrained).
NOTE: Privacy protection and other security aspects will be coordinated with SA WG3.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 5 Key Issues
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: support AIoT services under the RRC-based option for UE Reader connectivity
| NOTE 1: Only CM-CONNECTED with RRC_CONNECTED UE Reader is in the scope.
Only the following aspects will be included:
- How to perform and revoke authorization of UE Readers.
NOTE 2: Rel-19 interim conclusion in TR 23.700-13 [7] should be used as basis for UE Reader authorization.
- Potential impact from how the NG-RAN node and UE reader selection can be performed.
NOTE 3: The aspect of NG-RAN node and UE reader selection requires coordination with RAN WG3.
- Whether and how the AIOTF can provide the information of the UE readers to the NG-RAN node to assist NG-RAN for UE reader selection.
NOTE 4: Rel-19 interim conclusion in TR 23.700-13 [7] should be used as basis for this key issue. No Rel-19 AIoT Device impact from this key issue is expected.
NOTE 5: Conclusions of this KI will be coordinated with RAN WGs.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
| This key issue will study the system architecture to support DO-A capable Ambient IoT Devices in Topology 1 and Topology 2.
The following aspects will be studied:
- How the AIoT Device informs the network of its presence autonomously (e.g. an AIoT Device initiated registration-like procedure) and what are the triggers for the DO-A capable device to inform the network of its presence.
- Whether and how to consider power consumption of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices.
- How an AIoT Device sends data to the AIOTF autonomously.
- Support for routing the data received by AIOTF from an AIoT Device to an AF.
- Whether and how to enhance the Inventory and Command procedures defined in TS 23.369 [3] to support DO-A capable AIoT Devices.
- Naiotf, Namf and Nnef interface enhancements to support DO-A capable AIoT Device.
NOTE 1: The conclusions from Key Issue #1 are the basis for supporting DO-A capable AIoT Devices in topology 2 in this key issue.
NOTE 2: Coordination with RAN WGs is required.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6 Solutions
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.0 Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues
Key Issues
Solutions
Key Issue #1
Key Issue #2
#1
X
#2
X
#3
X
#4
X
#5
X
#6
X
#7
X
#8
X
#9
X
#10
X
#11
X
#12
X
#13
X
#14
X
#15
X
#16
X
#17
X
#18
X
#19
X
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1 Solution #1: Enable 5G delivery AIoT device initiated traffic
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1.0 High-level solution principles
| The key technical principles proposed in this solution are summarized below:
1. AIoT Device Profile Enhancement: The AIoT Device Profile is extended to include additional information, such as AF/NEF associations and the device's registration status.
2. Device Registration Requirement: Each AIoT Device must be registered with the 5G network to enable support for DO-A traffic.
3. Energy-Aware Communication Initiation: An AIoT Device may initiate communication when sufficient energy is available from non-RF sources. The device can also request the network to supply energy for subsequent transmissions by indicating its Active Time.
4. Redundant Traffic Management: The NG-RAN can identify and suppress redundant transmissions originating from multiple readers, indicating which reader is selected for subsequent forwarding. Readers maintain a local device context to prevent unnecessary traffic duplication.
5. Per-Device Session Context at AIOTF: The AIOTF maintains a session context for each device, including session IDs that allow subsequent messages to bypass repeated authorization and NEF discovery, improving efficiency.
6. Timestamp-Based Deduplication and Data Integrity: Each message carries a timestamp to enable detection and elimination of duplicate data, supporting network-side data cleaning and ensuring consistency.
NOTE: The feasibility of using timestamp depends on the RAN WGs.
7. NEF Selection Based on Device Profile: The AIOTF determines the appropriate NEF for forwarding traffic based on the AIoT device profile and the requested AF.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1.1 Description
| The introduction of Device Oriented-Autonomous (DO-A) traffic type addresses a significant gap in AIoT networks, where devices initiate communication autonomously based on available energy resources. This capability was not supported in previous releases and is now within the scope of this Release. The proposed solution outlines a series of procedures that enable efficient handling of DO-A traffic, ensuring optimized network resource utilization.
Key Procedures:
1. AIoT Device Profile enhancement: the AIoT device profile stored in the ADM is enhanced to also include supported AF IDs along with their corresponding NEF IDs and the AIoT device registration status.
2. Registration and Context Creation: AIoT devices register with the network by sending their device ID, which is encapsulated and forwarded through network elements for security validation. Upon successful authentication, the device profile is updated and a context is created, detailing registration status and access permissions.
3. DO-A Traffic Initiation: When an AIoT device has sufficient energy, it autonomously initiates communication by sending a DO-A request message. This message includes device identification, a timestamp for data management and an Active Time parameter indicating communication duration capability.
4. Traffic Routing and Optimization: The network elements, including AIoT readers and NG-RAN, manage traffic routing, ensuring efficient handling of DO-A messages. Duplicate data is identified and managed using timestamps and session IDs are allocated for ongoing communications.
5. Authorization and Forwarding: The AIOTF verifies device context and authorizes traffic based on stored profile data. It forwards authorized traffic to the appropriate NEF, which then communicates with the requested AF.
6. Session Management: Subsequent communications utilize allocated session IDs, streamlining authorization processes and enabling direct traffic forwarding to known NEFs.
This proposal aims to enhance AIoT network functionality by supporting autonomous device communication, optimizing energy use and improving network efficiency.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1.2 Procedures
|
Figure 6.1.2-1: Procedure for Enable 5G delivery AIoT device initiated traffic
0. The AIoT device profile per an AIoT device is provisioned in the ADM (AIoT specific UDM). The AIoT device profile includes the following parameters:
- AIoT Device Permanent ID: Uniquely identifies the AIoT Device.
- Last known AIOTF information: Indicates the last known AIOTF that served the AIoT device, or unknown.
- AF ID together with NEF ID: Indicates which AFs the AIoT device is allowed to access and which NEFs are used for communication with the AFs.
- Registration status: Indicates if the AIoT device is already registered with the network or not.
1. The AIoT device performs registration by sending a message containing its AIoT device ID to the AIoT reader. The reader forwards this message to the NG-RAN, which then passes it to the AIOTF for security validation. Upon successful authentication, the AIOTF updates the device profile status with the ADM, which responds with the updated profile data, including AF and NEF IDs and provides a registration response message, which includes the registration result indicating whether it was successful or not to the AIoT device via the NG-RAN as well as the AIoT reader.
2. The AIOTF generates the AIoT device context which includes whether it is registered, which AFs it can access and which NEFs should be used to communicate with the AFs.
3. When the AIoT device has something to send the network and has enough energy to do so, it initiates communication by sending the DO-A (Device Oriented-Autonomous) request message. This message includes the AIoT device ID (e.g. temporary ID, if it has been allocated by the network during the registration already) for the network to identify the AIoT device, timestamp indicating when this message was initiated and the AIoT NAS message for the actual communication with the network and the AF (data consumer). The timestamp is later used by the network to perform data cleaning (e.g. removing data duplications). And the AIoT device ID and timestamp are not part of the AIoT NAS message to ensure they are understood by the AIoT reader and NG-RAN for proper traffic routing and optimization. The AIoT device also includes an Active Time parameter, which indicates how long the device can remain active to communicate with the network for subsequent messages. This Active Time can be zero if the AIoT device only had enough energy to send a single DO-A message.
4. The AIoT reader forwards the AIoT NAS message encapsulated over RRC to the serving NG-RAN. Additionally, the AIoT reader may send its AIoT reader ID and the received AIoT device ID and timestamp.
5. The NG-RAN optionally checks if multiple AIoT readers are forwarding the same AIoT DO-A traffic from the same AIoT device by verifying the AIoT device ID, timestamp and AIoT reader ID. This helps avoid sending the same traffic to the network multiple times unnecessarily.
NOTE: Energy, Active Time and reader selection aspects depend on RAN WGs.
6. In the RRC response message, the NG-RAN optionally includes the information indicating whether the AIoT reader is selected for the subsequent communications or not. Based on this indication, the AIoT reader can determine whether to keep forwarding the DO-A traffic from the same AIoT device. If it determines not to continue, it shall no longer forward any traffic received from the same A-IoT device for the same AIoT session. The selected AIoT reader locally stores the AIoT device context information including the Active Time.
7. The NG-RAN forwards the AIoT device ID, timestamp and the message carrying the AIoT NAS message to the AMF over the N2 UL message and the AMF subsequently forwards the received AIoT NAS message to the responsible AIOTF over the SBI interface.
8. The AIOTF verifies if an AIoT device context exists for the device identified by the AIoT device ID. If absent, it retrieves the AIoT device permanent ID and requests the ADM for the device profile data using this ID. Upon obtaining the profile data, the AIOTF authorizes the device to send DO-A traffic to the requested AF by matching the AF ID in the AIoT NAS message with those in the profile data. If duplicate data from the same device is received, the AIOTF retains only one instance based on the timestamp. It then allocates an AIoT session ID for future communications and updates the device context data as necessary.
9. Based on the AIoT device profile data, the AIOTF determines which NEF to forward the AIoT DO-A traffic to and forwards it, including the AIoT device ID, data and AF ID.
10. The NEF forwards the received traffic to the requested AF, including the AIoT device ID and data.
11. In response to the message in step 7, the AIOTF sends an message carrying the AIoT device AIoT device ID and the AIoT NAS message over the N2 DL message. The AIoT NAS message contains the allocated session ID.
12. The NG-RAN forwards the message to the AIoT reader selected in step 5 over RRC.
13. The AIoT reader provides the DO-A response message to the AIoT device, including the received AIoT NAS message. The AIoT reader provides energy separately or together with the response message if the Active Time stored in the AIoT device context information is shorter than the time required to send the response and the network needs further messages from the AIoT device.
14. When the AIoT device wants to send additional data to the same AF it previously sent data to, the AIoT device includes the allocated session ID in the AIoT NAS message. This message is forwarded to the AIOTF using the same mechanisms explained in steps 4 to 7.
15. When the session ID is included in the AIoT NAS message and is valid, the AIOTF may skip the authorization checking and NEF discovery processes.
16. The AIOTF directly issues the notification message towards the known NEF.
17. The NEF forwards the received traffic to the requested AF, including the AIoT device ID and data.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.1.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| AIoT Device:
- Energy Management: The AIoT device autonomously initiates communication based on its energy harvesting capabilities.
- Timestamp support: The AIoT device provides time information indicating when the DO-A message was sent.
AIoT Reader:
- The AIoT reader forwards DO-A messages.
- It may provide energy to AIoT devices if needed.
- The reader manages session continuity based on network indications.
AIOTF:
- The AIOTF performs authorization checks to ensure devices are permitted to send DO-A traffic to specific AFs.
- Allocation of session IDs for subsequent communications streamlines the process and reduces overhead for repeated authorizations.
- Timestamp verification helps manage duplicate data.
ADM:
- The ADM maintains detailed device profiles, including registration status and access permissions.
- Efficient retrieval and updating of device profiles are necessary to support the proposed procedures.
NG-RAN:
- The NG-RAN may need to implement mechanisms for selecting AIoT readers based on traffic patterns and device context.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2 Solution #2: AIoT services support for DO-A capable AIoT Devices
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2.0 High-level Solution Principles
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 "Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices".
The solution combines registration-like procedure and data transfer procedure and is based on the following general principles to support AIoT services for DO-A capable AIoT Devices:
- The DO-A capable AIoT Device initiates registration-like procedure autonomously when it has pending data to be sent to the network.
- After registration-like procedure, the AIOTF uses the Command Procedure as defined in TS 23.369 [3] to read the AIoT data from the AIoT Device and sends the AIoT data to the AF via the NEF.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2.1 Description
| This solution is applicable to both the Direct Connectivity and the Indirect Connectivity architectures as defined in TS 23.369 [3].
For a DO-A (Device-originated - autonomous) capable AIoT Device, the device originated traffic is triggered by the AIoT Device itself for, e.g. sending data to the network.
The principles of this solution are as follows:
- When a DO-A capable AIoT Device has pending data to be sent to the network, the AIoT Device sends Registration Request to the AIOTF.
- The AIOTF authorizes and authenticates the AIoT Device and sends Registration Accept to the AIoT Device.
- The AIOTF uses the Command Procedure as defined in TS 23.369 [3] to read the AIoT data from the AIoT Device.
- The AIOTF sends the AIoT data received from the AIoT Device to the AF via the NEF.
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2.2 Procedures
| Figure 6.2.2-1 describes the DO-A Procedure.
Figure 6.2.2-1: DO-A Procedure
0. AIoT Device obtains radio resource for D2R message.
Editor's note: How AIoT Device obtains radio resource for D2R message is FFS and is to be decided by RAN WGs.
1. The AIoT Device sends the AS D2R message (Registration Request) to the NG-RAN. The AS D2R message includes the AIOTF selection information including PLMN ID and/or NID and/or Third Party ID which is used by the NG-RAN to select the AIOTF. The Registration Request message is an AIoT NAS message and includes the AIoT Device ID and the Pending data indication indicating there is pending AIoT data in the AIoT Device.
NOTE 1: The AS layer message in this step and the following steps are to be defined by RAN WGs.
2. The NG-RAN selects the AIOTF based on the AIOTF selection information received in step 1.
Editor's note: Further details on AIOTF selection is FFS.
3. The NG-RAN sends the Uplink AIoT information message (Registration Request) to the AIOTF directly or via an AMF.
4. The AITOF performs Authorization and authentication procedure for the AIoT Device.
NOTE 2: Security aspects are to be defined by SA WG3.
5. The AIOTF sends the Downlink AIoT information message (Registration Accept, AIOTF AIoT Device NGAP ID) to the NG-RAN directly or via the AMF.
6. The NG-RAN sends the AS R2D message (Registration Accept) to the AIoT Device. The Registration Accept message is an AIoT NAS message.
7. Based on the Pending data indication received, the AIOTF sends the Command Request message (NAS Command Request, AIOTF AIoT Device NGAP ID, Size of the Command Response message) to the NG-RAN directly or via the AMF. The NAS Command Request is Read Request. The AIOTF AIoT Device NGAP ID is used by the NG-RAN to determine the AIoT device context in NG-RAN.
Editor's note: Other triggers for the Command Request are FFS.
Editor's note: How AIOTF derives the parameters included in the NAS Command Request is FFS.
Editor's note: Whether Registration Accept and NAS Command Request are separate or can be combined is FFS.
8. The NG-RAN sends the AS R2D message (NAS Command Request) to the AIoT Device.
9. The AIoT Device sends the D2R message (NAS Command Response) to the NG-RAN. The NAS Command Response is Read Response and includes the AIoT data.
10. The NG-RAN sends the Command Response message (NAS Command Response, AIOTF AIoT Device NGAP ID) to the AIOTF directly or via the AMF. The AIOTF determines the AIoT device context by the AIOTF AIoT Device NGAP ID received.
11. The AIOTF reports the AIoT data to the AF via the NEF.
Editor's note: Details on routing of AIoT data from the AIOTF to the AF via the NEF is FFS.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.2.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| Editor's note: This clause captures impacts on existing services, entities and interfaces.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3 Solution #3: Support of Sensor Data Collection
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution addresses KI #2. It includes a Service Request from AF to 5GS, Parameter Configuration for the service and Data Transfer for the service
|
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3.1 Description
| The solution is based on the following assumptions:
- Sensor Data Collection Service utilizes Periodic DO-A Sensor Data Collection Service from Device including AF, AIOTF and AIoT Device. It uses Read/Write command type with the parameter Period or separate command types.
- Sensor Data Collection Service utilizes Periodic DO-A Sensor Data Transfer (Device, AIoT Reader, AIOTF).
- Sensor Data Collection Service Parameters can be pre-configured on AioT Devices or configured by AF. For example, Sensing Period and StartTime.
- The AIoT Reader maintains (Device ID and Correlation ID) context for every periodic behaviour.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3.2 Procedures
| The procedure is shown in Figure 6.3.2-1. It includes Service Request from AF to 5GS, Parameter Configuration for the Service and Data Transfer for the Service.
Figure 6.3.2-1: Sensor Data Collection Procedure
1. Step 1 to step 6 of Procedure for Command in clause 6.2.3 of TS 23.369 [3] with additional parameters. AF sends AIoT Command Request to NEF. In includes Device(s) Info, Location (External), AF Transaction ID, Command Type Read, Sensing Result Offset, Length, Period and Sensing Parameters ([Sensing Period Offset, Period], [StartTime Offset, Now/time/Off]). Sensing Parameters are optional. NEF selects AIOTF and then NEF sends AIoT Command Request to AIOTF. AIOTF checks AF Authorization by retrieving AF Authorization Profile in ADM. AIOTF sends AIoT Command Response to NEF. It includes Status (Success/Failure), Transaction ID. NEF sends AIoT Command Response to AF. It includes Status (Success/Failure), AF Transaction ID.
2. Step 7 to step 10 of Procedure for Inventory in clause 6.2.2 of TS 23.369 [3]
3. AIOTF retrieves Device Profile Data Including DO-A Capability. If the device does not support DO-A Capability, steps 15 to 19 are skipped.
4a~8a, 4b~8b. Parameter configuration with Write Command can be done instead of parameter configuration included in steps 4~8.
4. AIOTF sends AIoT Command Request to AIoT Reader. This includes Device ID (temporary), (Reader ID), Command Type Read, Correlation ID, Sensing Result Offset, Length, Period and Sensing Parameters ([Sensing Period Offset, Period], [StartTime Offset, Now/time/Off]). AIoT Reader stores Correlation ID with AIoT Device ID as context data.
5. AIoT Reader sends AIoT Command Request to AIoT Device. This includes Device ID (temporary), (Reader ID), Command Type Read, Correlation ID, Sensing Result Offset, Length, Period and Sensing Parameters ([Sensing Period Offset, Period], [StartTime Offset, Now/time/Off]). When 4a~8a, 4b~8b are done, Sensing Parameters are omitted.
6. When AIoT Device receives Period with Command Type Read, it starts periodic Read behavior based on the Period value. When AIoT Device receives Sensing Parameters, it sets the parameters to the device.
For example, it sets Sensing Period to a specific Period and/or sets StartTime to Now, a specific time, or Off. If StartTime is set to Now, the device reads and report Sensor Result immediately and every Period.
If StartTime is set to a specific time, then the device reads and reports Sensor Result at that time and every Period after that.
If StartTime is set to Off, the device reads and reports Sensor Result once, then stops periodic reading and transfer.
7. AIoT Device sends AIoT Command Response to AIoT Reader. This includes Device ID (temporary) and Sensing Result.
8. AIoT Reader sends AIoT Command Response to AIOTF. This includes Device ID (temporary), Sensing Result and Correlation ID. AIoT Reader retrieves Correlation ID with AIoT Device ID from the stored context.
9. AIOTF sends AIoT Command Notify to NEF. This includes Device ID (permanent), Sensing Result and Transaction ID. AIOTF retrieves Transaction ID with Correlation ID from the stored context.
10. NEF sends AIoT Command Notify to AF. This includes Device ID (permanent), Sensing Result and AF Transaction ID. NEF retrieves AF Transaction ID with Transaction ID from the stored context.
11. Every Period, when the energy is enough, the device reads and reports Sensor Result. Depending on the size of the report, the radio resource allocation procedure may vary.
Editor's note: How the AIoT Device supports timer is FFS.
12. AIoT Device sends AIoT Command Report to AIoT Reader. This includes Device ID (temporary), Sensing Result.
13. AIoT Reader sends AIoT Command Report to AIOTF. This includes Device ID (temporary), Sensing Result and Correlation ID. AIoT Reader retrieves Correlation ID with AIoT Device ID from the stored context. If the context is not stored, AIoT Reader sends AIoT Command Report with Device ID (temporary), Sensing Result and temp-Correlation ID, which AIoT Reader generates as indication of empty Correlation ID.
14. AIOTF sends AIoT Command Notify to NEF. This includes Device ID (permanent), Sensing Result and Transaction ID. AIOTF retrieves Transaction ID with Correlation ID from the stored context. If step 13 includes temp-Correlation ID, AIOTF retrieves Transaction ID with Device ID (temporary).
15. NEF sends AIoT Command Notify to AF. This includes Device ID (permanent), Sensing Result, AF Transaction ID. NEF retrieves AF Transaction ID with Transaction ID from the stored context.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.3.3 Impacts on services, entities and interfaces
| Impacts on existing entities:
AIOTF:
- Receives AIoT Command Request for Sensor Data Collection Service from AF through NEF.
- Performs Inventory procedure and then sends Read Command Request with Period and Sensing Parameters.
- Performs Inventory procedure and then sends Write Command Request with Sensing Parameters.
- Retrieves Device Profile Data including DO-A Capability. If the device does not support DO-A Capability, AIOTF skips DO-A related steps.
- Receives AIoT Command Report from Device(s) through AIoT Reader(s) and delivers it to the AF through the NEF.
- Sends AIoT Command Notify to AF via NEF.
ADM:
- Supports the AIoT Device profile, including DO-A Capability.
AIoT Reader:
- Supports the AIoT TempID handling, including Device ID and Correlation ID mapping and maintains the mapping context.
- Supports DO-A procedure for AIoT Command Report from AIoT Device(s).
AIoT Device:
- Supports DO-A procedure for AIoT Command Report from AIoT Device.
- Reads and reports Sensing Data to AIoT Reader periodically via the DO-A procedure.
- Supports timer.
- Considers energy status for its behaviour.
- Sets Sensing Parameters and behave according to the Sensing Parameters.
- Performs radio resource allocation procedure depending on the size of the report.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4 Solution #4: Architecture enhancements to support DO-A capable devices
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution proposes call flows to support registration and handling of DO-A capable devices. The solution builds upon an AF request that is to be carried out more than once. The core network uses legacy inventory procedure to find Ambient IoT devices. The Ambient IoT devices indicates their support for registration in the inventory response. The core network registers the device and after that keeps the path back to AF alive.
In addition, a UE capability like procedure is provided so that the core network can ask each device for supported features.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.1 Description
| The Ambient IoT devices of type 2b/c may be able to initiate communication independently with the help of DO-A traffic. This solution builds on the principle that the Ambient IoT device indicates support for registration in response to an AIoT paging message. The support for registration may also be seen as an indication for support of DO-A communication.
Registration like procedure is proposed, to ensure the operator can properly control which devices are allowed to send data in the licensed spectrum owned by the operator.
The solution does not take a stance on whether the reader prefers to use regular paging or activate DO-A resources for the Ambient IoT device.
Further the solution proposes a complementary procedure allowing the network to ask the Ambient IoT device for supported features. This may be helpful if Ambient IoT devices are to support many features and/or if the Ambient IoT device subscription on network side is minimalistic. Another aspect being considered is that features may not always be available, if the battery is low, DO-A communication may not be possible, the device may not have enough power to use an attached sensor etc.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2 Procedures
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2.1 Ambient IoT device registration and DO-A execution
|
Figure 6.4.2.1-1: Ambient IoT device registration and DO-A execution
1. The AF sends Nnef_AIoT_Inventory/Command Request (DO-A dependent service request) to the NEF with a service request that is dependent on DO-A. For example, regular reporting of temperature, etc.
2. NEF selects AIOTF as specified in TS 23.369 [3].
3. Naiotf_AIOT_Inventory/Command request (DO-A dependent service request) is sent to the selected AIOTF.
4. The AIOTF determines registration is required based on the service being DO-A dependent.
5. AIOTF sends NGAP Inventory Request message (Inventory request transfer (A-IoT Device Identification Requested, Follow on Command Indication)) to the reader.
6. NGAP Inventory Response ().
7. AIoT paging occurs.
8. Ambient IoT NAS Inventory Response message (Registration capability indication, Ambient IoT device ID) is sent to the reader from the Ambient IoT device. The registration capability indication is used to indicate to the network this device is capable of registration. It may also be seen as an implicit indication the Ambient IoT device support DO-A communication.
Editor's note: Whether security is required to protect the registration capability indication is FFS.
9. NGAP Inventory Report message (Inventory Report Transfer (Ambient IoT NAS Inventory Response message (Registration capability indication, Ambient IoT device ID), RAN A-IoT Device NGAP ID) is sent from reader to AIOTF.
10. Based on receiving the registration capability indication, the AIOTF determines to attempt registering the Ambient IoT device.
11. The AIOTF sends Nadm_Registration request message (Ambient IoT device ID, AIOTF ID) to the ADM.
12. The ADM determines Ambient IoT device is authorized to register with the network. For example, this can be based on subscription data.
13. Upon successful authorization, the ADM register the AIOTF ID for the Ambient IoT device in the ADM.
14. The ADM sends Nadm_Registration response message (Ambient IoT device ID, result) to the AIOTF, providing the result of the registration attempt.
15. The AIOTF sends NGAP Command Request message (Command request transfer(RAN A-IoT Device NGAP ID, Keep context indication, A-IoT NAS PDU (Command (Registration accept)))) to the reader. Keep context indication is used as an expansion of follow on command indication. Since the DO-A communication may occur over a long time, the reader needs to be able to route DO-A communication over potentially a long time.
16. The reader sends Reader 2 device message (A-IoT NAS PDU (Registration accept)) to the Ambient IoT device.
17. The AIOTF sends NGAP Command Request message (Command request transfer (RAN A-IoT Device NGAP ID, DO-A service indication, A-IoT NAS PDU (DO-A dependent service request payload))) to the reader. The DO-A service indication may be used by the reader to determine whether to activate DO-A or do regular paging for the DO-A service.
18. Execute the DO-A dependent service request. How the reader and Ambient IoT device configures is out of scope for this solution. After this, the Ambient IoT device can send data autonomously.
Editor's note: Data delivery details are FFS.
Editor's note: RAN working group coordination is required to determine context storage aspects in gNB.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.2.2 AIoT device capability syncronization
| Editor's note: It is FFS whether this procedure is needed.
Figure 6.4.2.2-1: AIoT device capability synchronization
1. The AIOTF sends NGAP Command Request message (Command request transfer (RAN A-IoT Device NGAP ID, first A-IoT NAS PDU (Command (AIoT device capability request indication)))) to the reader. The AIOT device capability request indication in the command is used by the Ambient IoT device to determine to send AIoT device capability container information element.
2. The reader sends Reader 2 device message (first A-IoT NAS PDU (AIoT device capability request indication)))) to the Ambient IoT device.
3. The Ambient IoT device sends Device to reader message (second A-IoT NAS PDU (AIoT device capability container information element) to the reader. The AIoT device capability container information element can indicate support for DO-A, power saving features, security capabilities, available sensor(s) etc.
4. The reader sends NGAP Command response message (Command Response Transfer (AIoT device capability container information element), RAN A-IoT Device NGAP ID) to the AIOTF.
5. The AIOTF sends Nadm_DM_Update Request (Ambient IoT device ID, AIoT device capabilities) to the ADM with the purpose of registering the AIoT device capabilities with the subscription data of the Ambient IoT device.
6. The ADM sends Nadm_DM_Update Response (result) to the AIOTF.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.4.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| AIOTF:
- Support registration of AIoT devices.
- Support AIoT capabilities.
Reader:
- Context handling for DO-A devices.
ADM:
- Registration.
- AIOT device capabilities.
AIoT device:
- Registration.
- AIOT device capabilities.
- DO-A.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5 Solution #5: DO-A procedure with configured routing information
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution aims to resolve KI#2 to support DO-A Capable AIoT Devices, the following principles are followed in this solution:
- This solution has reused the architecture defined in clause 4.2.2 of TS 23.369 [3]. This solution is applied to both direct connectivity and indirect connectivity for Topology 1.
- The AIoT Device is not required to perform the registration procedure first before sending the DO-A data.
- AIoT Device sends the DO-A routing information along with the DO-A message for AIOTF to find the proper AF.
- AF subscribes to the DO-A Data notify by sending a Subscribe Request to the AIOTF (optionally via the NEF).
- AIOTF derives the corresponding AF according to the routing information in the NAS DO-A Data Transfer Request message and the context generated in DO-A data subscribe procedure.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.1 Description
| This solution resolves KI#2 for support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices.
This solution has the following assumptions:
1) AIoT Device is pre-configured or configured by the network with DO-A routing information.
2) AIoT Device sends the DO-A routing information along with the DO-A message for AIOTF to find the proper AF.
3) The NG-RAN selects the correlated AIOTF according to AIOTF information in the temp ID if a temp ID is included in the D2R AS message.
4) AF subscribes to the DO-A Data notify by sending a Subscribe Request to the AIOTF (optionally via the NEF). AIOTF updates AIoT DO-A Profile in ADM with the associated AF subscription.
5) AIOTF receiving the DO-A data can query the ADM to find the DO-A data associated AIOTF(s) and forward the received DO-A data to the associated AIOTF(s).
6) AIOTF derives the corresponding AF according to the routing information in the NAS DO-A Data Transfer Request message and the associated (AF) Transaction ID used in DO-A data subscribe procedure.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2 Procedures
| |
e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2.1 DO-A data subscribe procedure
|
Figure 6.5.2-1: Figure for DO-A data subscribe procedure
1. The AF sends the DO-A data subscribe request to NEF with AF ID and target AIoT device information to subscribe for the notification of the DoA data.
2. NEF performs AIOTF selection based on the target AIoT device information.
3. The NEF sends the DO-A data subscribe request to the selected AIOTF with a Transaction ID.
4. The AIOTF authorizes the AF request to check whether the AF is allowed to subscribe to DO-A delivery, based on the AF authorization data stored in the ADM.
5. If authorization succeeded, the AIOTF updates AIoT DO-A Profile in ADM with the associated AF subscription.
6. If the AIOT device is not pre-configured, the AIOTF allocates the routing information for the DO-A data transfer and configure the AIOT device via e.g. AIoT Command procedure defined in clause 6.2.2 of TS 23.369 [3]. In this step, the AIOTF may also allocate a Temp ID to AIoT Device for NAS DOA Data Transfer.
7. AIOTF sends response to the NEF with a Transaction ID for the DO-A data subscribe request.
8. NEF sends response to AF with AF Transaction ID for the DO-A data subscribe request.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.2.2 DO-A data transfer procedure
|
Figure 6.5.2-2: Procedure for DO-A procedure with configured routing information
0. DoA routing information (e.g. AF ID or AIOTF allocated DO-A association ID) at the AIoT device side or configured by the network as defined in clause 6.5.2.1. Security information for DO-A traffic may also be pre-configured or configured along with the DoA routing information.
Editor's note: DO-A traffic security mechanism will be determined by SA WG3.
1. The AIoT Device decides to trigger a DO-A message (e.g. detecting DO-A trigger broadcast signal, etc.).
Editor's note: DO-A trigger broadcast signal is further defined in RAN WGs.
2. The AIoT Device sends the AS D2R message (Temp ID, NAS DOA Data Transfer Request message (DO-A data, AIoT device ID, routing information)) to the NG-RAN. AIoT device ID may be a permanent Device ID or Temp Device ID. The temp ID is also provided in the AS D2R message if the AIOTF has allocated a Temp ID to AIoT Device during or after the Command procedure, or during the previous DO-A Data Transfer procedure.
3. The NG-RAN allocates an NGAP ID for the AIoT device and forwards the NAS DO-A Data Transfer Request message in Initial DO-A message to the AIOTF. If a temp ID is included AS D2R message, the NG-RAN can select the AIOTF according to the temp ID. If the temp ID is not included in AS D2R message or the AIOTF derived from the AIOTF in the temp ID can not be selected, the NG-RAN can select an AIOTF which can serve the AIoT Device. The selected AIOTF can query the ADM to find the DO-A data associated AIOTF(s) and forward the received DO-A data to the associated AIOTF(s)
Editor's note: Whether and how temp ID can be used to find the AIOTF is FFS.
4. Upon receiving the Initial DO-A Message, the AIOTF performs a device check with device profile data retrieved from the ADM to validate the AIoT device.
Editor's note: Details for device check for DO-A Data Transfer procedure will be determined by SA WG3.
5. After the successful device check, the AIOTF derives the corresponding AF according to the routing information in the NAS DO-A Data Transfer Request message and the associated Transaction ID received in step 3 of clause 6.5.2.1. The AIOTF sends the Naiotf_AIoT_Data Transfer message including the DO-A data and AIoT Device ID to the NEF.
6. The NEF invokes the AIoT_Data Transfer service to forward the DO-A data to the AF according to the AF Transaction ID and AF ID used in DO-A data subscribe procedure.
7. The AF sends the AIoT_Data Transfer_Response to NEF with AIoT device ID and the response to the DoA data, which may include further data or acknowledgments related to the DO-A Data Transfer process.
8. The NEF invokes AIoT_Data Transfer_Response to AIOTF. The message includes the DO-A data response and related AIoT device ID.
9. The AIOTF allocates an NGAP ID for the AIoT device and sends DL NAS message to NG-RAN with the DO-A data response. In this step, the AIOTF may also allocate a Temp ID to AIoT Device NAS DOA Data Transfer Response message.
Editor's note: Whether inventory procedure for the DL NAS messages transfer is needed is FFS.
10. The NG-RAN sends the AS R2D message to the AIoT device including the NAS message.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.5.3 Impacts on services, entities and interfaces
| The solution has impacts on the following entities:
AIoT Device:
- Support to initiate DO-A message transfer procedure and send routing information along with the DO-A data.
AIOTF:
- Support to route the DO-A message to proper NEF/AF according to the routing information.
NG-RAN:
- Support to select the AIOTF based on the temp ID if provided by the AIoT device.
- Support to establish NGAP connection with AIOTF for DO-A message transfer.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6 Solution #6: Support Reporting operator triggered by events without registration for DO-A capable AIoT Devices
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6.0 High-level Solution Principles
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 "Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices".
AIoT device sends report message when triggered by events, includes pending data, power on, device specific events (e.g. temperature higher than a threshold). The information for the device specific events can be provisioned by AF via Command operation, e.g. writing the threshold to the AIoT device.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6.1 Description
| This solution is applicable to both the Direct Connectivity and the Indirect Connectivity architectures as defined of TS 23.369 [3].
For a DO-A capable AIoT Device, the device is triggered by events to report its presence and/or send data to the network.
The principles of this solution are as follows:
- No registration-like procedure needed for the DO-A capable AIoT Device.
- The AIOTF for routing the DO-A report and the AIOTF for inventory and command operations can be different.
- The events triggered DO-A report includes target AF and may include data from the AIoT Device.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6.2 Procedures
| Figure 6.6.2-1 describes the Reporting procedure from DO-A capable AIoT Device.
Figure 6.6.2-1: DO-A device reporting procedure
0. The AIoT device is pre-configured with target AF information, e.g. FQDN, by the owner of the AIoT device for routing the information in the Report Request. Allowed AF(s) may be pre-configured in the AIoT device profile data in ADM. The information for device specific events may be provisioned by the AF using the Command operation, e.g. write a sharehold related to a device specific event to the AIoT device.
NOTE 1: The allowed AF(s) in the ADM can be changed via OAM. The target AF information may be configured by the owner of the device via Inventory and Command operator.
1. The AF subscribes to the NEF with the AF information and optional the service area. The NEF selects AIOTF(s), e.g. based on pre-configuration or the service area and subscribes to the selected AIOTF(s).
NOTE 2: It is assumed all the AIOTFs serving the service area and/or serving the AF are subscribed by the NEF.
2. The AIoT device is triggered by events, e.g. pending data, power on, or device specific events.
3. The AIoT device sends D2R message including AIoT NAS Report Request (Device ID, target AF, [data]) to the RAN Reader. In case there are pending data in the AIoT device, the data is included in the AIoT NAS Report Request message.
Editor's note: How the AIoT device sends the D2R message to the RAN Reader is FFS.
Editor's note: Whether the solution is applicable for UE Reader case is FFS.
NOTE 3: Security aspects related to the Device ID and the data protection are to be defined by SA WG3.
4. The NG-RAN selects an AIOTF, e.g. based on local policy or pre-configuration.
5. The NG-RAN sends a N2 request message (indirect) or AIOT2 request message (direct) including the Reader ID and the AIOT NAS Report Request message towards the selected AIOTF.
6. The AIOTF requests authorization data from ADM.
7. The AIOTF authorizes the Report Request from the device, e.g. based on whether the target AF is in the allowed AF(s) per the device, per the group of the device, or per the network, whether the device is allowed to initiate Report Request, whether the location is allowed to send the report per the device, etc. If the authorization of report from the AIoT device is successful, goes to step 8, otherwise goes to step 9 with proper cause value.
8. The AIOTF maps the Reader ID into location information and sends a Notify (Device ID, location info, [data]) message towards the AF via the NEF based on the target AF. The NEF forwards the Notify message towards the AF.
9. The AIOTF responds to the RAN Reader.
The AIOTF may update the last known reader information in the AIoT device profile data in the ADM.
10. The RAN Reader sends R2D message to the AIoT Device.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.6.3 Impacts on Services, Entities and Interfaces
| Editor's note: This clause captures impacts on existing services, entities and interfaces.
AIoT Device:
- Support initiate Report Request procedure triggered by events.
NG-RAN:
- Support AIOTF selection.
AIOTF:
- Support Report Request authorization.
- Support sending Device ID, location information and optional data to target AF indicated in the Report Request.
NEF:
- Support managing AF sessions for AIOT service between AFs and AIOTFs.
ADM:
- Support providing authorization data to AIOTF when requested.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7 Solution #7: DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution is for Key Issue #2, corresponding to bullet 3: How an AIoT Device sends data to the AIOTF autonomously. It includes DO-A procedure to send data to the AIOTF, get network resource/assistance information to initial DO-A procedure and DO-A policy information which describe when will perform the DO-A procedure.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7.1 Description
| This solution is for Key Issue #2, corresponding to bullet 3: How an AIoT Device sends data to the AIOTF autonomously.
This solution is to support for an DO-A Capable AIoT Device autonomously originated DO-A procedure to send data to the AIOTF and support for routing the received data by AIOTF to AF.
The main points are as following:
- The DO-A Capable AIoT Devices support autonomously originating DO-A procedure to send data to the AIOTF.
- The DO-A Capable AIoT Device has pre-configurated network resource/assistance information(e.g. frequency, Qos, Resource Expiration Date, etc) for autonomously originating DO-A procedure; or support to receive the network resource information/assistance information (e.g. frequency, QoS, Resource Expiration Date, etc) from the network for autonomously originating DO-A procedure, using by AIoT write commands or new AIoT service, or network system information, etc.
NOTE 1: How to get and the details of the network resource/assistance information for autonomously originating DO-A procedure will be coordinated with RAN WG2.
- When the DO-A Capable AIoT Device will autonomously originate DO-A procedure to send data, is based on the DO-A policy information. The DO-A policy information may be received from network or AF via the network, which send by AF using AIoT write commands or some new AIoT service. Or the DO-A policy information can be pre-configurated in the AIoT device or UICC if have.
- The DO-A policy information may include:
- Target information: identify where and which AF the DOA data sends/routes to by AIoT device, for example AF identify, etc.
- Service policy: describe when and how the AIoT device autonomously originated to send DOA data, such as: 9:00 am every day, when the timer expired, the upper layer initials, etc.
NOTE 2: The details of DO-A policy are coordinated between the operator and AF vender, which is out of 3GPP scope.
- The DO-A Capable AIoT Device supports to autonomously originating procedure to send data to the AIOTF and support for routing the received data by AIOTF. The procedure may include: security data, target information and the data information. The security data is used for the network authentication AIoT device; and the target information is used to identify where and which AF the DOA data sends/routes to, for example AF identify, etc; the data information is the real data which the AIoT device wants to send for AF.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7.2 Procedures
| The following figure presents a DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices for Topology 1 and Topology 2.
Figure 6.7.2-1: DO-A procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
0-a. DO-A Capable AIoT Devices may be pre-configured with network resource/assistance information(e.g. frequency, QoS, Resource Expiration Date, etc) for autonomously originating DO-A procedure.
0-b. DO-A Capable AIoT Devices may be pre-configured with DO-A policy information for autonomously originating DO-A procedure.
NOTE 1: How information is configured into AIoT device is out of scope of 3GPP.
NOTE 2: How to get and the details of the network resource/assistance information for autonomously originating DO-A procedure will be coordinated with RAN WG2.
1. AF sends like DO-A service request to NEF via AIoT write command or new AIoT Service, it may include following parameters: AIoT devices ID, AF ID, DO-A policy information, etc.
- DO-A policy information may include:
- Target information: identify where and which AF the DOA data sends/routes to by AIoT device, for example AF identify, etc.
- Service policy: describe when and how the AIoT device autonomously originated to send DOA data, such as: 9:00 am every day, when the timer expired, the upper layer initials, etc.
NOTE 3: The details of DO-A policy are coordinated between the operator and AF vender, which is out of 3GPP.
2. AIOTF/NEF receives the DO-A service request from AF and will check the authorization of AF and the authorization of DO-A Capable of AIoT devices based on the subscription in ADM. If it is allowed, the network function(e.g. AIOTF or RAN/UE reader) will send the network resource information/assistance information(e.g. frequency, QoS, Resource Expiration Date, etc) for DO-A Capable of AIoT devices autonomously originating DO-A procedure. DO-A Capable of AIoT devices receives these network resource information/assistance information.
3. AIOTF/NEF sends the DO-A policy information from AF to DO-A Capable of AIoT devices. DO-A Capable of AIoT devices receives these DO-A policy information.
4. DO-A Capable of AIoT devices store these receiving network resource and/or DO-A policy information for DO-A procedure from network.
5. When DO-A policy information is applied, for example: the timers from the DO-A policy information expired, the DO-A Capable of AIoT device performs the DO-A procedure.
6. The DO-A Capable of AIoT device sends DO-A data to network/AF via RAN/UE Reader, using the storing or pre-configured network resource. The procedure may include: security data, target information and the data information. The security data is used for the network authentication AIoT device; and the target information is used to identify where and which AF the DOA data sends/routes to, for example AF identify, etc; the data information is the real data which the AIoT device wants to send for AF.
7. RAN/UE Reader routes the DO-A Data from AIoT device to AF via AIOTF based on the target information provided by AIoT device or other solutions.
Editor's note: How the RAN/UE Reader routes the DO-A Data to AF will be coordinated with solutions for KI 2 bullet of "Support for routing the data received by AIOTF from an AIoT Device to an AF", or be FFS.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.7.3 Impacts on services, entities and interfaces
| NEF:
- Supports AF to provide DO-A policy information;
AIOTF:
- Supports to receive DO-A data from DO-A capable AIoT Device and route for AF.
- Supports to provide network resource/assistance information(e.g. frequency, Resource Expiration Date, etc) for AIoT Device DO-A procedure.
RAN Reader or UE Reader:
- Supports to receive DO-A data from DO-A capable AIoT Device and route for AIOTF.
- Supports to provide network resource/assistance information(e.g. frequency, Resource Expiration Date, etc) for AIoT Device DO-A procedure.
AIoT Device:
- Pre-configured or stores network resource/assistance information(e.g. frequency, Resource Expiration Date, etc) and/or DO-A policy information.
- Performing DO-A procedure once it is needed to send DO-A data.
- Support DO-A Policy(e.g. timer).
NOTE: How the AIoT device support DO-A Policy, e.g. timer, is up to UE implementation.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.8 Solution #8: Service Procedure for DO-A Capable AIoT Devices
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.8.0 High-level solution Principles
| This solution addresses Key Issue #2 "Support of DO-A Capable AIoT Devices", especially the following aspects:
- How the AIoT Device informs the network of its presence autonomously (e.g. an AIoT Device initiated registration-like procedure) and what are the triggers for the DO-A capable device to inform the network of its presence.
- How an AIoT Device sends data to the AIOTF autonomously.
- Support for routing the data received by AIOTF from an AIoT Device to an AF.
The solution defines two types of DO-A messages sent from the AIoT Device: one is initiating message which is used to determine the serving AIOTF for the AIoT Device; another is DO-A data transfer message which is used to transfer AIoT data from the AIoT Device to the AF through the core network.
This solution also proposes call flows for initiating message and DO-A data transfer message. In addition, an AF subscription procedure is provided so that the AF can subscribe the AIoT data from a specific AIOT Device.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.8.1 Description
| The Ambient IoT devices of type 2b/c may initiate communication independently with DO-A traffic. This solution is applicable to both the Direct Connectivity and the Indirect Connectivity architectures for Topology 1.
The principles of this solution are as follows:
- Two types of DO-A messages sent from the AIoT Device: one is initiating message which is used to determine the serving AIOTF for the AIoT Device; another is DO-A data transfer message which is used to transfer AIoT data from the AIoT Device.
- The procedure for initiating message to determine the serving AIOTF for the AIoT Device is proposed.
- The procedure for DO-A data transfer from the AIoT Device is proposed.
- The procedure for AF subscription for the AIoT data from a specific AIoT Device is proposed.
- The ADM is used to store the serving AIOTF for the AIoT Device and the subscription relationship between the AIoT Device and the AF.
- The AIOTF stores the subscription relationship between the AIoT Device and the AF and sends the AIoT data received from the AIoT Device to the AF via the NEF.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.8.2 Procedures
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.8.2.1 Initiating message and data transfer procedure
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Figure 6.8.2.1-1: Initiating message and data transfer procedure
0. The AIoT Device decides to trigger an initiating message based on some conditions, e.g. the AIoT Device needs to report AIoT data such as sensing data detected, the time for periodic reporting arrives, or the AIoT Device moves to a new position. In this stage the AIoT Device has no serving AIOTF available.
Editor's note: Whether using registration like procedure instead of this initiating message procedure is FFS.
1. The AIoT Device sends the initiating message to the NG-RAN. The initiating message includes the AIoT Device ID information, optional pending data transfer indication.
2. The NG-RAN selects the serving AIOTF for the AIoT Device, taking into account the Device ID information, the PLMN ID and NID and/or the AIoT area which this AIoT Device belongs to.
3. The NG-RAN sends the initiating message to the selected AIOTF directly (for direct connectivity option) or via an AMF (for indirect connectivity option); the initiating message includes the AIoT Device ID information.
4. The AIOTF discovers the serving ADM and interacts with the ADM to fetch the subscription information and may update the AIoT Device information stored in the ADM.
5. The ADM updates the AIoT Device information and the Device's serving AIOTF information.
6. The AIOTF sends the initiating message response with the serving AIOTF ID to the NG-RAN directly or via the AMF.
Editor's note: The details of AIoT Device or Temporary ID used in the initiating request/response message is FFS.
7. The NG-RAN sends the initiating message response with the serving AIOTF ID to the AIoT Device. The AIoT Device stores the serving AIOTF ID
8. The AIoT Device decides to trigger an AIoT data transfer message when the AIoT Device needs to report AIoT data such as sensing data detected, or the time for periodic reporting arrives.
9. The AIoT Device sends the data transfer message to the NG-RAN. The data transfer message includes the AIoT Device ID information, the AIoT data and its serving AIOTF ID.
10. The NG-RAN sends the data transfer message to the indicated AIOTF.
11. The AIOTF sends the data transfer message response to the AIoT Device through NG-RAN.
12. The AIOTF finds the AF subscribing to the AIoT data of the AIoT Device and then transmits the data transfer message to the NEF which serves the AF. The AF subscribing procedure is described in clause 6.8.2.2.
NOTE: The ADM may store the information of the subscription relationship between an AF and the AIoT Device; in this case, the AIOTF interacts with the ADM to fetch this subscription information.
13. The NEF transmits the data transfer message to the AF.
14. The AF may send back the data transfer message response to the AIOTF through the NEF.
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e1a24e188a6c7563b060dc3d59e35fb2 | 23.700-30 | 6.8.2.2 AF subscription procedure
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Figure 6.8.2.2-1: AF subscription procedure
1. If an AF decides to subscribe the AIoT data from a specific AIoT Device, the AF sends a subscription request to the NEF. The subscription request includes the AIoT Device ID, AF ID.
2. The NEF discovers an ADM based on the AIoT Device ID and interacts with the selected ADM to fetch the serving AIOTF for this AIoT Device.
NOTE: The ADM may store the information of the subscription relationship between the AF and the AIoT Device.
3. The NEF transmits the subscription request to the AIOTF serving the AIoT Device. The subscription request includes the AIoT Device ID, AF ID.
4. The AIOTF stores the information of the subscription relationship between the AF and the AIoT Device.
5. The AIOTF sends the subscription response to the NEF to indicate the subscription request successes or fails.
6. The NEF transmits the subscription response the AF.
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