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75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3.1 BB: Network Infrastructure Management | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#36(07)0296
Meeting #36, 4 – 7 June 2007, Busan, KOREA
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID Telecom Management Methodology - Unique_ID 35051
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.4x (OAM8) - OAM&P Rel 8
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-070672
Meeting #52, Xián, CHINA, 02 - 06 April 2007 revision of S5-050287
Work Item Description
Title:
Telecom Management Methodology UID_35051
Acronym: OAM8
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): No
1 3GPP Work Area
X
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
OAM&P 8 (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning), Feature: OAM8
3 Justification
Telecom Management capabilities and functions evolve continuously because for example, new functions are added to manage new kind of nodes introduced into the network, more efficient functions and capabilities are introduced, new technologies are added, old technologies are not longer used. There is a constant need to enhance and further develop the methodology for the evolved Telecom Management area.
To spread the way of working for Telecom Management, the methodology developed by 3GPP is promoted outside 3GPP. The use of the same or similar methodology to develop management capabilities for the various networks would facilitate the integration of these systems and networks where telecom is a part of. Therefore there are some dependencies on external bodies, e.g. 3GPP2, ITU-T and ETSI that are using a methodology that is common to 3GPP. The needs from these external bodies have to be taken into account.
Requirements methodology is developed jointly with ITU-T and ETSI. That work needs to be finished.
IS methodology is being developed jointly with ITU-T and ETSI. Also this work needs to be finished.
SS methodology needs to be developed jointly with ITU-T and ETSI.
The methodology for XML technology was started in Rel-7 and needs to be completed.
In Rel-7 the SOAP technology was introduced. The methodology for how to use it needs to be developed, so that the same problems do not occur as for XML.
It is still not clear how vendor specific extensions shall be done for XML.
4 Objective
To complete the joint methodology for Requirements and IS together with ITU-T and ETSI.
To develop a joint methodology for SS together with ITU-T and ETSI.
To finish the started methodology for XML.
To develop a methodology for SOAP.
To develop a methodology for vendor specific extensions for XML.
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None
9 Impacts
Affects:
UICC apps
ME
AN
CN
Others
Yes
X
X
No
X
X
Don't know
X |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale (to be updated at each plenary) | New specifications
[If Study Item, one TR is anticipated]
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.275
MMTel Charging
SA5
SA#41 Sep 2008
SA#43 Mar 2009
Affected existing specifications
[None in the case of Study Items]
Spec No.
CR
Subject
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.298
Add MMTel ASN.1 structure
Update Section 5.2.3 subsystem level CDR definitions with supplementary service data type
SA#43 Mar 2009
32.299
Add MMTel AVPs and descriptions
Define supplementary service AVPs, AVP codes, value types and flag rules. Provide detailed description for supplementary service AVPs
SA#43 Mar 2009
11 Work item rapporteur(s)
GARDELLA, Maryse (Alcatel-Lucent)
12 Work item leadership
SA5
13 Supporting Companies
Alcatel-Lucent, Verizon Wireless, Nortel, Motorola
14 Classification of the WI (if known)
Study Item (no further information required)
Feature (go to 14a)
Building Block (go to 14b)
X
Work Task (go to 14c) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14c The WI is a Work Task: parent Building Block | UID_390010 EPC Data Definitions |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 9 Impacts | Affects:
UICC apps
ME
AN
CN
Others
Yes
No
X
X
X
X
X
Don't know |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 1 3GPP Work Area | Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
OAM&P 8 (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning), Feature: OAM8
3 Justification
Circuit is a logic link between two exchange network nodes which bear the user data such as voice, e.g. 64K slot of one 2M E1. Traffic route represents the route via which bearer flow to a specific destination.
To learn the detailed circuit connection relationship between network nodes and traffic route configuration status of the CN CS, bearer transport network related NRM need to be defined, such as circuit, traffic route, etc.
4 Objective
Define Bearer Transport Network (BTN) related NRM applicable to CN CS of UMTS.
Add BTN relative NRM definition of the CN CS to 32.63x Configuration Management (CM); Core network resources IRP.
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14a The WI is a Feature: List of building blocks under this feature | (list of Work Items identified as building blocks) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14b The WI is a Building Block: parent Feature | UID_370059 IMS Multimedia Telephony and Supplementary Services (Acronym: IMSTSS) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 1 3GPP Work Area * | X
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2 Classification of WI and linked work items | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2.0 Primary classification * | This work item is a … *
Study Item (go to 2.1)
Feature (go to 2.2)
Building Block (go to 2.3)
X
Work Task (go to 2.4) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2.1 Study Item | Related Work Item(s) (if any]
Unique ID
Title
Nature of relationship
Go to §3. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2.2 Feature | Related Study Item or Feature (if any) *
Unique ID
Title
Nature of relationship
Go to §3. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2.3 Building Block | Parent Feature (or Study Item)
Unique ID
Title
TS
340064
OAM Network Infrastructure Management (OAM8-NIM)
This work item is … *
Stage 1 (go to 2.3.1)
Stage 2 (go to 2.3.2)
Stage 3 (go to 2.3.3)
Test spec (go to 2.3.4)
Other (go to 2.3.5)
2.3.1 Stage 1
Source of external requirements (if any) *
Organization
Document
Remarks
Go to §3.
2.3.2 Stage 2 *
Corresponding stage 1 work item
Unique ID
Title
TS
Other source of stage 1 information
TS or CR(s)
Clause
Remarks
If no identified source of stage 1 information, justify: *
Go to §3.
2.3.3 Stage 3 *
Corresponding stage 2 work item (if any)
Unique ID
Title
TS
Else, corresponding stage 1 work item
Unique ID
Title
TS
Other justification
TS or CR(s)
Or external document
Clause
Remarks
If no identified source of stage 2 information, justify: *
Go to §3.
2.3.4 Test spec *
Related Work Item(s)
Unique ID
Title
TS
Go to §3.
2.3.5 Other *
Related Work Item(s)
Unique ID
Title
Nature of relationship
TS / TR
Go to §3.
2.4 Work task *
Parent Building Block
Unique ID
Title
TS |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3 Justification * | The XML definitions for the IRPs below were not specified in Rel-8. These definitions are required for implementation of a Rel-8 Notification Log IRP. It is not possible to log the notifications generated by Rel-8 implementations of these IRPs. Furthermore, these XML definitions are needed in the specification of SOAP Solution Sets for these IRPs. Without these XML definitions it will not be possible to complete the Rel-9 WI “IRP SOAP Solution Sets continuation from Rel-8 (OAM9) (UID_440065)”. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 4 Objective * | The objective is to create the missing specifications listed below. These specifications are needed to support a Rel-8 Notification Log implementation. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 5 Service Aspects | None. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 6 MMI-Aspects | None. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 7 Charging Aspects | None. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 8 Security Aspects | None. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 9 Impacts * | Affects:
UICC apps
ME
AN
CN
Others
Yes
X
X
No
X
X
X
Don't know |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale * | New specifications *
[If Study Item, one TR is anticipated]
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
TS 32.125
“Telecommunication management; Advanced Alarm Management (AAM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); ”
SA5
SA#46
SA#46
TS 32.355
“Telecommunication management; Communication Surveillance (CS) Integration Reference Point (IRP)”
SA5
SA#46
SA#46
TS 32.505
“Telecommunication management; Self-Configuration of Network Elements Integration Reference Point (IRP)”
SA5
SA#46
SA#46
TS 32.535
“Telecommunication management; Software management Integration Reference Point (IRP)”
SA5
SA#46
SA#46
Note that this is related also to the Rel-9 WID “Management of software entities residing in Network Elements UID_420031” which will need 32.535 to create 32.537 as proposed in that WID.
Affected existing specifications *
[None in the case of Study Items]
Spec No.
CR
Subject
Approved at plenary#
Comments
TS 32.150
Add XML file format definition into IRP concepts (today it only includes RS, IS, SS), as agreed in S5-093318
Telecommunication management; Integration Reference Point (IRP) Concept and definitions
TS 32.153
Add XML template and XML definition and usage guidelines, as agreed in S5-093318
Telecommunication management; Integration Reference Point (IRP) technology specific templates, rules and guidelines
TS 32.335
Add missing XML namespaces to tables and import in schema.
Telecommunication management; Notification Log (NL) Integration Reference Point (IRP); eXtensible Markup Language (XML) solution definitions
11 Work item rapporteur(s) *
Shuqiang Huang (ZTE), huangsq@ZTE.COM.CN
Work item leadership *
SA5
13 Supporting Individual Members *
Supporting IM name
Ericsson
Nokia Siemens Networks
Huawei
ZTE |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3.2 BB: Performance Management | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#36(07)0301
Meeting #36, 4 – 7 June 2007, Busan, KOREA
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID IP bearer network Performance measurement definitions - Unique_ID 35061
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.4x (OAM8) - OAM&P Rel 8
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-071047
Meeting SA5#53, 07 - 11 May 2007, Sophia Antipolis, FRANCE revision of S5-050297
Work Item Description
Title:
IP bearer network Performance measurement definition UID_35061
Acronym: OAM8
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): No.
1 3GPP Work Area
X
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
OAM&P 8 (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning), Feature: OAM8
3 Justification
Standardising performance measurements can bring a unified criterion for operators to evaluate the performance of networks provided by different vendors. With the evolution of RAN and All-IP Networks, it is very important to measure the performance of IP network between any two among RNCs, SGSNs, GGSNs, MGWs and MSC Servers. At present, 3GPP does not have performance measurements for it . Hence, it is necessary for us to look into ways to define these measurements.
This WT proposes to widen the scope of TS 32.32x TestIRP to include 3GPP support of IP network performance measurements either by reference to existing measurements from other standards bodies or by initiating an effort in those standards bodies to include the counters that we would identify in this WT. IP performance mainly deals with the time delay, jitter, packet loss etc between any two NEs.
Some of the IP network performance measurements methods have been defined in other standard bodies, such as IETF, so their work can be used as reference.
4 Objective
Include support of Performance Measurement Counters for IP bearer network in TS 32.32x Test IRP either by reference to existing measurements from other standards bodies (ITU-T, IETF) or by initiating an effort in those standards bodies to include the counters that we would identify in this WT.
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3.3 BB: Trace Management | This BB has been created in the 3GPP Work Plan in order to host the CT1 Work Task
UID_11067 Service Level Tracing in IMS (OAM8-Trace) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3.4 OAM&P Studies (OAM8-Study) UID_340067 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#36(07)0307
Meeting #36, 4 – 7 June 2007, Busan, KOREA
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID Study of Element Operations Systems Function (EOSF) definition - Unique_ID 35065
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 11.28 (OAM-Study) - OAM&P Studies
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-071048
Meeting SA5#53, 7-11 May 2007, Sophia Antipolis, France
Work Item Description
Title:
Study of Element Operations Systems Function (EOSF) definition UID_35065
Acronym: OAM-Study
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): Yes
1 3GPP Work Area
X
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
OAM&P Rel-8 Studies (OAM-Study), UID_340067
3 Justification
In the Logical Layered Architecture (LLA) of TMN, Network OSFs (N-OSF) are concerned with the management function on network level, and Element OSFs (E-OSF) with the management function on network element level. These two logical layers respectively play the role of network management function.
The Element Management System developed by vendors may mainly cover network management functions described in E-OSF and or N-OSF.
3GPP TS 32.101 also state that the Element Manager (EM) has two aspects of function, element management and sub-network management. However, 3GPP 32.xxx series does not provide a clear definition for Element OSF which can help operators and vendors clarify what are required and can be used as a guide when they deploy network.
It is necessary to state that EM provided by vendor is an entity, which implement E-OSF logical functions and may or may not implement N-OSF functions and even more. The Network Management System (NMS) may or may not direct access to NE and implement part of E-OSF. This scenario (i.e. whether NMS implement or not any E-OSF and whether EM implement any N-OSF or not ) is outside the 3GPP standardization scope. The mapping rule between physical entities (e.g. EMS, NMS) and logical function entities (e.g. E-OSF and N-OSF) is outside of this WID scope.
The definition of E-OSF specification has to be based on the network operating and maintaining experience and consider the potential application environment of UMTS network. Up to now the existing specification from 3GPP may not enough as a guideline for the products. More E-OSF detail function definition is necessary to be defined in a TR as a reference for operator and vendor.
4 Objective
The intention of this TR is to identify and define what will be needed in the E-OSFs. The intention of this TR is not to define new requirements for the eventual standardization of new Interface IRP and/or NRM IRP and/or System Context.
This WI proposes to define the E-OSFs including the following main aspects.
-Define functional scope of Element OSF (E-OSF)
-Define functional requirement of Elements OSF (E-OSF)
-Define the usage (use case) of the result of this WID.
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 4 Feature: Charging Management small Enhancements (CH8) UID_350016 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#35(07)0077
Meeting #35, 12 - 15 March 2007, Lemesos, Cyprus
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: R8 WID Online charging correlation
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 13 Proposed New WIDs (not part of an existing feature)
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-070315
Meeting SA5#51, 22 - 26 Jan 2007, Seville, ES
Work Item Description
Title
Online charging correlation UID_350038
Acronym: CH8
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): No
1 3GPP Work Area
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
Charging Management small Enhancements (CH8) (Unique_ID 350016)
3 Justification
3GPP Technical Specification 32.240 (Charging architecture and principles) provides the possibility to aggregate and correlate charging information produced by different domains (e.g. IMS, PS) and different sources (e.g. x-CSCF, GGSN, etc.). This intra-domain and inter-domain correlation is specified for the offline charging method. However, such functionality is not offered for online charging. The Online Charging System (OCS) which performs event/session based charging, credit control and rating features collects charging events at the bearer level, the IMS level and at the service level. On the one hand, by controlling the network and application usage separately, the OCS is not able to apply special charging handling to one charging level against the other (e.g. zero rate bearer usage when an IMS session is active). On the other hand, when multiple services are rendered simultaneously to the subscriber, the OCS is not able to perform service bundling of these services.
As such correlation functionality needs to be defined for online charging.
4 Objective
As per the above justification, it is required to update the charging specifications as follows:
• Update the OCS internal architecture to combine the EBCF (Event Based Charging Function) and SBCF (Session Based charging Function) into a single OCF (Online Charging Function) that performs both event and session based charging. This allows to optimize the handling of correlation.
• Introduce a correlation function within the OCS as part of the above OCF which would be implement the service logic for correlation
• Introduce a context monitoring function that defines a context related to the multiple sessions/services activated by a user simultaneously
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
This is a charging work item.
8 Security Aspects
None |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14c The WI is a Work Task: parent | Feature UID_370059 IMS Multimedia Telephony and Supplementary Services (Acronym: IMSTSS)
BB: UID_370062 IMS Multimedia Telephony Service (Acronym: IMS-MMTel) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 11 Work item rapporteurs | Gavin WONG, Vodafone (gavin.wong (at) vodafone.com) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 12 Work item leadership | SA5 |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 13 Supporting Companies | Vodafone, Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, Huawei, Nokia Siemens Networks, Orange |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14 Classification of the WI (if known) | Study Item (no further information required)
Feature (go to 14a)
Building Block (go to 14b)
X
Work Task (go to 14c) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 5 Feature: 3G Long Term Evolution - Evolved Packet System RAN part UID_20068 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 5.1 BB: E-UTRAN Data Definitions UID_390001 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#37(07)0617
Meeting #37, 17 - 20 September 2007, Riga, LATVIA
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID on Subscriber and Equipment Trace for eUTRAN and EPC (OAM8) - OAM&P Rel 8
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.22 (OAM8) - OAM&P Rel 8
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-071346
Meeting SA5#54, 25 - 29 June 2007, Orlando, FL USA
Work Item Description
Title
Subscriber and Equipment Trace for eUTRAN and EPC UID_370001
Acronym: E-UTRAN-OAM
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): No
1 3GPP Work Area
X
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
• LTE
• SAE
3 Justification
The use cases for the existing Subscriber and Equipment trace are valid also for eUTRAN and EPC. Therefore shall the existing Subscriber and Equipment Trace function and the Trace IRP be upgraded to include eUTRAN and EPC.
4 Objective
Include the eUTRAN and EPC nodes and interfaces in the Subscriber and Equipment Trace function and the Trace IRP.
Also the new requirements from TR 32.816 (Study on Management of LTE and SAE) are to be included.
• Work is needed in RAN3, CT1, CT4
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
Not known |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 6 Feature: 3GPP System Architecture Evolution Specification - Evolved Packet System (non RAN aspects) UID_320005 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 6.1 BB: EPC Data Definitions UID_390010 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#38(07)0737
Meeting #38, 03 - 06 December 2007, Cancun, MEXICO
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: New WID on EPC NRM IRP
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.21 (SAES) - 3GPP System Architecture Evolution Specification - Evolved Packet System (non RAN aspects)
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-071964
Meeting SA5#56, 22 - 26 Oct 2007, Guangzhou, CHINA
Work Item Description
Title
EPC Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP) UID_380037
Acronym: EPC-OAM
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): No
1 3GPP Work Area
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
UID_320005 3GPP System Architecture Evolution Specification - Evolved Packet System (non RAN aspects)
UID_340036 Study of Management for LTE and SAE (draft TR 32.816) under OAM8-Studies
UID_340063 OAM&P 8 (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning) - OAM8
3 Justification
The Evolved Packet Core (EPC) is defined by 3GPP with different Network Elements from the UTMS Core Network.
The Network Resource Model (NRM) of the UTMS Core Network is not applicable to EPC.
The Evolved Packet Core (EPC) system needs to be managed. 3GPP network management paradigm necessitates the standardization of the representations of various managed resources. The standardization of the EPC system managed resources is captured in the so-called EPC Network Resource Model (NRM).
The EPC architecture and capabilities evolve from those defined for UTMS Core Network. The management of the EPC system should also evolve from that for managing the UTMS Core Network. In particular, the NRM for EPC should align and resemble those specified for the Core managed network resources.
The alignment of EPC NRM with Core NRM will have the following benefits:
• The system architecture of EPC evolves from Core network and the existing Core network NRM is proven in operation. Therefore, the alignment will result in a specification that has a higher chance of being bug free when compared to a “brand new” designed specification.
• It will minimise both the standardisation and product development efforts and maintenance efforts (i.e. the cost and time for development including testing and reduction of training cost when the management paradigms for EPC and Core network remained similar);
• It will shorten the time to market for EPC systems;
• It will facilitate a seamless coexistence with Core network management systems.
4 Objective
Define EPC NRM using the same principles as for the UMTS Core network NRM. The definition will be captured in a new NRM IRP called EPC NRM IRP. The defined NRM should have identical characteristics as those defined for other NRMs such as UMTS Core network NRM.
For example: the DN of its instances uses the same name convention as all instances whose IOCs are defined in various NRM IRPs.
For example: Its IOCs will integrate, in identical manner as other NRM such as those defined in UMTS/GSM NRM IRP, with the IOCs defined in Generic NRM IRP.
For example: operations and notifications defined in various Interface IRPs that work with existing instances of various NRM IRPs must work, without change, with the new instances of EPC.
Similar to existing 3GPP NRM IRPs such as UTRAN and Core Network NRM IRP, the proposed new EPC NRM IRP focuses only on the representation of the network resources in question.
This NRM IRP does not deal with the applications or usage of the IOCs.
The objective of this work item is to define the NRM for EPC, e.g.: MME, HSS, Serving GW, PDN GW
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
Not known. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 6.2 BB: EPC Charging | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#38(07)0736
Meeting #38, 03 - 06 December 2007, Cancun, MEXICO
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: New WID on EPC Charging
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.21 (SAES) - 3GPP System Architecture Evolution Specification - Evolved Packet System (non RAN aspects)
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-072005
Meeting SA5#56, 22 - 26 October 2007, Guangzhou, CHINA
Work Item Description
Title
Evolved Packet Core (EPC) Charging UID_380038
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): No
1 3GPP Work Area
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
UID_320005 3GPP System Architecture Evolution Specification - Evolved Packet System (non RAN aspects)
3 Justification
The Evolved 3GPP System needs reliable and efficient charging solutions. As the Evolved 3GPP System is an evolvement of UMTS, also the charging solutions for the Evolved 3GPP System should evolve from UMTS. Following the recommendations of the Study on Charging Aspects of 3GPP System Evolution a re-use of the existing UMTS charging standard solutions will have the following benefits:
• It is proven in operation;
• It will minimise both the standardisation and product development efforts (i.e. the cost and time);
• It provides a base, on which more functionality can be developed;
• It will shorten the time to market for Evolved 3GPP systems;
• It will facilitate a seamless coexistence with UMTS charging systems.
• It will also consider non-3GPP access;
• It will enable an easy migration for the Operator to the new solution.
4 Objective
This work item proposes to introduce Charging for the EPC Architecture by following the recommendations given in TR 32.820.
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
This work item will cover Charging for EPC.
8 Security Aspects
Further investigation needed. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 7 Feature: IMS Multimedia Telephony and Supplementary Services UID_370059 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 7.1 BB: AoC support in IMS Charging | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#38(07)0739
Meeting #38, 03 - 06 December 2007, Cancun, MEXICO
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: New WID on Advice of Charge (AoC) support in IMS Charging
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.26 (CH8) - Charging Management small Enhancements
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-072012
Meeting SA5#56, 22 - 26 October 2007, Guangzhou, CHINA
Work Item Description
Title
Advice of Charge (AoC) support in IMS Charging UID_380042
The AoC service is standardized in 3GPP and available for CS and PS networks based on Charge Advice Information (CAI).
TISPAN introduced AoC based on Tariff Information according to ITU recommendations and ETSI specifications.
It is becoming available in 3G IMS networks. The usage of AoC in IMS based networks should be defined in 3GPP.
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): No
1 3GPP Work Area
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
• UID_370059 IMS Multimedia Telephony and Supplementary Services (Acronym: IMSTSS)
3 Justification
AoC is currently listed in the charging requirements for 3GPP in TS 22.115.
The high level description on AoC Information and Charging levels is in TS 22.086 and TS 23.086. AoC is based on the Charge Advise Information (CAI) defined in TS 22.024.
The support of subscribed AoC in CAMEL for CS and PS networks is specified in TS 23.078.
The requirement for AoC support in TISPAN is handled in WID02037 and considers the SIP transfer of charging information in WID 3113.
The transport of tariff information, the evaluation and the advice to the mobile subscriber is not described in IMS.
4 Objective
This work item proposes to introduce AoC in 3GPP IMS Charging and is limited to support AoC information on the corresponding charging interfaces as well as in the OCS.
A new specification will be created with definitions for AoC and description of AoC in IMS Charging. This description will contain the AoC Information for charging purposes.
The determination for SIP transport of tariff information will follow the requirements from TS 22.273.
The mechanism for the tariff change and the support of the tariff format will adhere on the existing 3GPP principles.
Additions, e.g. for different use case or simplifications is For Further Study.
5 Service Aspects
The AoC service provision and information transfer should be made available as a SIP based IMS services. The transfer of tariff information is outside the scope of this WID but is For Further Study in other 3GPP groups.
6 MMI-Aspects
The presentation of the AoC information at the UE/ME is outside the scope of this WID and shall be considered in other 3GPP groups.
7 Charging Aspects
This is a Charging Work Item
8 Security Aspects
Further investigation needed |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 7.2 BB: IMS Multimedia Telephony Service UID_370062 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#38(07)0749
Meeting #38, 03 - 06 December 2007, Cancun, MEXICO
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: New WID on Multimedia Telephony Service and Supplementary Services (MMTel) Charging
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.26 (CH8) - Charging Management small Enhancements
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-072014
Meeting SA5#56, 22 - 26 Oct 2007, Guangzhou, CHINA
Work Item Description
Title:
Multimedia Telephony Service and Supplementary Services (MMTel) Charging UID_380041
Supplementary services are a critical part of IMS. The current IMS charging specifications do not fully support supplementary services and associated charging records. This work proposal recommends adding MMTel charging
Is this Work Item a "Study Item"? (Yes / No): No
1 3GPP Work Area
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
Feature UID_370059 IMS Multimedia Telephony and Supplementary Services (Acronym: IMSTSS)
BB: UID_370062 IMS Multimedia Telephony Service (Acronym: IMS-MMTel)
3 Justification
The current 3GPP IMS charging documents do not fully cover MMTel supplementary services. The supplementary services are important to network operators since majority of voice calls involves supplementary services, such as call forwarding, call waiting, conference call, etc. Thus, supplementary service charging should be included in IMS session charging.
4 Objective
This work item proposes to introduce MMTel charging in 3GPP IMS. A new specification will be created with definitions for multimedia telephony service charging in IMS. Also this work item will enhance existing SA5 TS 32.298 and TS 32.299 by adding MMTel supplementary services AVPs from Telephone Application Server and corresponding charging fields in the charging data records.
NOTE : MMtel online charging was initially part of this Work Item. It is proposed to handle MMTel online charging in a separate Work Item.
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
This is a charging Work Item
8 Security Aspects
None |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 8 Feature: UTRA HNB UID_390033 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 8.1 BB: 3G Home NodeB OAM&P (type 1 definition) (HNB-3G_OAM) UID_420037 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#42(08)0708
Meeting #42, 8 - 11 December 2008,
Athens, Greece
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-082488
Meeting SA5#62, 17~21 November 2008, Miami, USA
Source: Huawei Technologies, Nokia Siemens Network, Ericsson
Title: New WT-level WID on 3G Home NodeB OAM&P (Interface Type 1 Management)
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 6.2
Parent Building Block
Unique ID
Title
TS
UID_380065
Home NodeB / eNodeB
HomeNB |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3 Justification | In order to complement the work done in RAN, it’s SA5 responsibility to provide corresponding OAM solution for 3G Home NodeB. SA5 will need to standardize management services that are specific to Home NodeB because of the following Home NodeB characteristics:
• The quantity of Home NodeB is likely to be large
• There may be many Home NodeB vendors
• Home NodeB may be purchased easily by end users in market
• The location of Home NodeB could be in a private residence which may not be accessible for frequent on-site maintenance
SA5 has studied Home NodeB OAM and SON aspects for some time. The management differences between Home NodeB and macro NodeB are listed in TR32.821. The requirements for managing Home NodeB have been provided in the TR32.821 and the consequences on the management interface for Home NodeB are also described.
Based on the study in SA5, it was agreed the interface type 1 and type 2 shown in the following diagram are to be standardized for Home NodeB OAM&P. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 4 Objective | This work Item is to define corresponding OAM solution for 3G Home NodeB on interface type 1 management. The workitem will include (but not necessarily limited to):
4.1 Management on Standard Interfaces type 1 for 3G Home NodeB:
• Investigate what management standardization work are needed for management of 3G Home NodeB over interface type 1.
• Define the standardization work mentioned above for 3G Home NodeB management over interface type 1.
4.2 This WI shall include:
• Stage 1 Requirements specified in TS 32.XX1
◦ Configuration Management (CM)
◦ Fault Management
◦ Performance Management
◦ Security aspects of OAM
◦ Note: Input for this TS is derived from TS25.467, TR32.821, SA5 contributions & Specification
• Stage 2 specified in TS 32.XX2
◦ Architecture for HNB Management (derived from TS25.467, TR32.821, SA5 contributions & Specification) for CM, FM and PM
◦ Object Classes for
▪ Configuration Management (CM) for
• HNB Access Network
• Core Network (related to HNB)
• Transport Network (related to HNB)
▪ Fault Management
▪ Performance Management
◦ Stage 2 for contents definition for CM, FM, PM & Logging
◦ Note: Input for this TS is derived from TS25.467, TR32.821, bbf2008 851 00 (BBF contribution), SA5 contributions & Specification
• The HNB to ACS procedure flow document TS 32.xx3
◦ OAM Procedural flows for HNB Discovery, registration, config updates
◦ OAM Procedural flows for FM
◦ OAM Procedural flows for PM
◦ Note: Input for this TS is derived from TS25.467, TR32.821, SA5 contributions & Specification
• Stage 3 specified in TS 32.XX4
◦ Data Format for CM, FM & PM (specified or referenced if required by stage-2)
4.3 The standardization work for management on interface type 2 will not be covered in this workitem. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale | New specifications
[If Study Item, one TR is anticipated]
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.581
Home NodeB OAM&P concepts and requirements(for interface type1)
SA5
SA#43 Mar 2009
SA#43 Mar 2009
32.582
Home NodeB OAM&P Stage2(for interface type1)
SA5
SA#43 Mar 2009
SA#43 Mar 2009
32.583
HNB to ACS procedure flow
SA5
SA#43 Mar 2009
SA#43 Mar 2009
32.584
Home NodeB OAM&P Stage3(for interface type1)
SA5
SA#44 Mar 2009
SA#44 Mar 2009
Affected existing specifications
[None in the case of Study Items]
Spec No.
CR
Subject
Approved at plenary#
Comments
11 Work item rapporteur(s)
Huawei Technologies.(zlan@huawei.com)
12 Work item leadership
SA5
13 Supporting Individual Members
Supporting IM name
Huawei Technologies.
Nokia Siemens Networks
Ericsson
Vodafone
T-Mobile
Telefonica
Alcatel-Lucent
IPAccess
China Mobile
Telecom Italia
Airvana
Motorola
ZTE
Qualcomm
Samsung
14 Classification of the WI (if known)
Study Item (no further information required)
Feature (go to 14a)
X
Building Block (go to 14b)
Work Task (go to 14c) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14b The WI is a Building Block: parent | Feature UID_390033 UTRA HNB (Acronym: HNB)
Annex A:
List of SA5 Release 8 specifications
Type
Number
Title
rapporteur
TR
30.818
Project scheduling and open issues for SA5, Release 8
ZOICAS, Adrian
TS
32.121
Advanced alarming on Itf-N Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements
SUERBAUM, Clemens
TS
32.122
Advanced alarming on Itf-N Integration Reference Point (IRP); Information Service (IS)
SUERBAUM, Clemens
TS
32.123
Advanced alarming on Itf-N Integration Reference Point (IRP); Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) Solution Set (SS)
SUERBAUM, Clemens
TS
32.153
IRP technology specific template
TOVINGER, Thomas
TS
32.154
Backward and Forward Compatibility (BFC); Concept and definitions
TOVINGER, Thomas
TS
32.155
Requirements template
TOVINGER, Thomas
TS
32.274
Charging management; Short Message Service (SMS) charging
WONG, Gavin
TS
32.275
Charging management; MultiMedia Telephony (MMTel) charging
GARDELLA, Maryse
TS
32.280
Charging management; Advice of Charge (AoC) service
GÖRMER, Gerald
TS
32.410
Telecommunication management; Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for UMTS and GSM
LIANG, Shuangchun
TS
32.450
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for E-UMTS: Definitions
HÜBINETTE, Ulf
TS
32.451
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for E-UMTS: Requirements
HÜBINETTE, Ulf
TS
32.500
Self-Organizing Networks (SON); Concepts and requirements
GOMPAKIS, Panagiotis
TS
32.501
Self-Organizing Networks (SON); Self-establishment of eNodeBs; Concepts and requirements
SUERBAUM, Clemens
TS
32.502
Self-Organizing Networks (SON); Self-establishment of eNodeBs; Stage 2
SUERBAUM, Clemens
TS
32.511
Self-Organizing Networks (SON); Automatic Neighbour Relation (ANR) management; Concepts and requirements
TSE, Edwin
TS
32.521
Self-Organizing Networks (SON); Self-optimization and self-healing; Concepts and requirements
WANG, Xuelong
TS
32.531
Telecommunication management; Software management; Concepts and Integration Reference Point (IRP) Requirements
TS
32.532
Telecommunication management; Software management Integration Reference Point (IRP); Information Service (IS)
TS
32.533
Telecommunication management; Software management Integration Reference Point (IRP); Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) Solution Set (SS)
TS
32.537
Telecommunication management; Software management Integration Reference Point (IRP); SOAP Solution Set (SS)
TS
32.581
Home Node B (HNB) Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P); Concepts and requirements for Type 1 interface HNB to HNB Management System (HMS)
Zou Lan
TS
32.582
Home Node B (HNB) Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P); Information model for Type 1 interface HNB to HNB Management System (HMS)
SUDARSAN, Padma
TS
32.583
Telecommunications management; Home Node B (HNB) Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P); Procedure flows for Type 1 interface HNB to HNB Management System (HMS)
Malviya, Manish
TS
32.584
Home Node B (HNB) Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P); XML definitions for Type 1 interface HNB to HNB Management System (HMS)
ANDRIANOV, Anatoly
TS
32.751
EPC NRM IRP Requirements
LOU, Min
TS
32.752
EPC NRM IRP Information Service
WANG, Xuelong
TS
32.753
EPC NRM IRP CORBA Solution Set
LOU, Min
TS
32.755
EPC NRM IRP Bulk CM XML file format definition
WANG, Xuelong
TS
32.761
E-UTRAN NRM IRP Requirements
ELMDAHL, Per
TS
32.762
E-UTRAN NRM IRP Information Service
ELMDAHL, Per
TS
32.763
E-UTRAN NRM IRP CORBA Solution Set
ELMDAHL, Per
TS
32.765
E-UTRAN NRM IRP Bulk CM XML file format definition
ELMDAHL, Per
TR
32.808
Study of Common Profile Storage (CPS) Framework of User Data for network services and management
ABA, Istvan
TR
32.816
Study on management of Long Term Evolution (LTE) and System Architecture Evolution (SAE)
PETERSEN, Robert
TR
32.818
Study on 3GPP SA5 / MTOSI XML harmonization
DUGUAY, Jean
TR
32.819
Telecommunications management; Element management layer - Operation System Function (E-OSF) definition
YANG, Li
TR
32.820
Charging management; 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE): Charging aspects
GÖRMER, Gerald
Annex B:
Change history
Change history
Date
TSG #
TSG Doc.
CR
Rev
Subject/Comment
Old
New
2010-09
SA#49
SP-100524
--
--
Presentation to SA for Information and Approval
---
1.0.0
2010-10
--
--
--
--
Publication
1.0.0
8.0.0 |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 1 Scope | This document studies the security architecture, i.e. the security features and the security mechanisms for inter-access mobility between 3GPP access system and non-3GPP access systems. For the general architecture for inter-access mobility cf. TR 23.882. This report is meant to provide more detail on the security aspects of inter-access mobility.
The scope should be extended to the mobility between two non-3GPP access systems, which interwork with 3GPP core entities. An example would be the mobility between two WLAN access systems providing 3GPP IP access.
Disclaimer: This TR reflects the discussions held in 3GPP SA3 while 3GPP SA3 was working towards TS 33.402 [14]. This TR may therefore be useful to better understand the basis on which decisions in TS 33.402 [14] were taken, and which alternatives were under discussion. However, none of the text in this TR shall be quoted as reflecting 3GPP’s position in any way. Rather, 3GPP’s position on security for non-3GPP access to EPS is reflected in the normative text in TS 33.402 [14]. Information in the TR may be inaccurate and outdated. One example of outdated text can be found in clauses 4.1 and 4.2 on alternatives for authentication protocols. The choices of authentication protocols finally made by 3GPP can be found in TS 33.401 [13] and TS 33.402 [14] respectively. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 23.882: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; 3GPP System Architecture Evolution: Report on Technical Options and Conclusions".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.234: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking security".
[3] 3GPP TS 29.061: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Interworking between the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) supporting packet based services and Packet Data Networks (PDN)".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security".
[5] “IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE)”, draft-ietf-mobike-protocol-03.txt, Sep 2005.
[6] RFC 3957 “Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Registration Keys for Mobile IPv4”.
[7] "NETLMM protocol", draft-giaretta-netlmm-dt-protocol-00.txt, June 2006.
[8] RFC 4285 “Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6”.
[9] “Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping for the Authentication Option Protocol”, draft-devarapalli-mip6-authprotocol-bootstrap-03.txt, September 2007.
[10] “Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for Home Agent to Diameter Server Interaction”, draft-ietf-dime-mip6-split-05.txt, September 2007.
[11] “Proxy Mobile IPv6”, draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-06.txt, September 2007.
[12] RFC4832 “Security threats of network based mobility management”.
[13] 3GPP TS 33.401: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security Architecture".
[14] 3GPP TS 33.402: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security aspects of non- 3GPP accesses". |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following apply:
Access network: one of following access network: GPRS IP access, WLAN 3GPP IP access, WLAN Direct IP access LTE, WiMax, etc.
Data origin authentication: The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed.
WLAN 3GPP IP Access: Access to an IP network via the 3GPP system.
WLAN Direct IP Access: Access to an IP network is direct from the WLAN AN.
3GPP - WLAN Interworking: Used generically to refer to interworking between the 3GPP system and the WLAN family of standards.
Trusted Access: A non-3GPP IP Access Network is defined as a “trusted non-3GPP IP Access Network” if the 3GPP EPC system chooses to trust such non-3GPP IP access network. The 3GPP EPC system may choose to trust the non-3GPP IP access network operated by the same or different operators, e.g. based on business agreements. Specific security mechanisms may be in place between the trusted non-3GPP IP Access Network and the 3GPP EPC to avoid security threats. The decision whether a specific non-3GPP IP Access Network is trusted or untrusted is up to the 3GPP EPC operator, and is not based on the specific link-layer technology adopted by the non-3GPP IP Access Network.
Source access system: in handover situations, this is the access system, from which the UE is handed over.
Target access system: in handover situations, this is the access system, to which the UE is handed over. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
Gi Reference point between GPRS and an external packet data network
Wi Reference point is similar to the Gi reference point, applies to WLAN 3GPP IP Access
Wm Reference point is located between 3GPP AAA Server and Packet Data Gateway respectively between 3GPP AAA Proxy and Packet Data Gateway
Wu Reference point is located between the WLAN UE and the PDG. It represents the WLAN UE-initiated tunnel between the WLAN UE and the PDG
Gi+/Wi+ Mobile IP signalling and bearer plane between the Gateway (i.e. GGSN or PDG) and the MIP HA; |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
AAA Authentication Authorisation Accounting
AN Access network
APN Access Point Name
BSF Bootstrapping Function
DS-MIPv6 Dual stack MIP
FA Foreign Agent
GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node
HA Home agency
HN Home network
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec IP Security protocol
I-WAN Interworking Wireless Local Area Network
MIP IP mobility
MOBIKE IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
MS Mobile Station
MN Mobile Node
NAI Network Access Identifier
NAT Network Address Translation
NAF Network Application Function
NETLMM Network-based localized mobility management
PDG Packet Data Gateway
PDP Packet Data Protocol
RFC Request For Comments
RRQ MIPv4 Registration Request
RRP MIPv4 Registration Response
SAE System Architecture Evolution
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
SPI Security Parameter Index
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
USIM UMTS subscriber identity module
UE User Equipment |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4 Authentication protocols across access systems | Editor’s note: it will be decided later if this section is needed in the final report.
It is assumed that an SAE user has a USIM which is used as user credential in authentication.
Authentication protocols are assumed to be run between the UE and an authentication server in the home network. It is likely there will always be a 3G AAA server to terminate authentication protocols in SAE, but this is still to be decided by SA2 (i.e. it is still to be decided whether always AAA protocols, e.g. DIAMETER, will be used to carry authentication data, or whether MAP may still be used). When AKA is used then the 3G AAA server will interface with a 3G Authentication Centre.
Even for one user, the type of authentication protocol depends on the type of access network. E.g. for I-WLAN EAP-AKA may be used, whereas for UTRAN UMTS AKA will be used. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.1 UMTS AKA | UMTS AKA will be used across UTRAN. It is still to be decided by SA3 whether UMTS AKA or EAP-AKA will be used over LTE. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.2 EAP-AKA | EAP-AKA may be used across I-WLAN and for WiMAX. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.3 Others | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5 Establishment of security contexts in the target access system | Each type of access system may require there own security contexts, which may need to be available to protect the access network. An example is an MSK key in a WLAN access system using an EAP method for authentication and key agreement. The MSK is then used to derive further keys.
An example of an access system more complex than WLAN and requiring more security contexts to be set up is WiMAX. WiMAX does not only need keys for the protection of the link layer, but e.g. also keys to protect Mobile IP signalling of the WiMAX-internal Mobile IP (CMIP or PMIP) layer providing WiMAX-internal mobility, which is different from the SAE Mobile IP layer providing mobility between access systems, of which at least one is non-3GPP.
There may also be access systems, which do not require any security context, e.g. a DSL-based access system relying on physical security.
The establishment of these security contexts in the access system may be done in two ways:
with the support of SAE;
without the support of SAE. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5.1 Establishment of security contexts with the support of SAE | In this case, the credentials the UE shares with the 3G AAA server are used to establish security contexts in the access system. An example of this case is I-WLAN Direct IP access, where the SIM or USIM are used to establish MSK required to protect the WLAN link layer. Another example is likely WiMAX: the WiMAX Forum is currently working on solutions for 3G-WiMAX interworking, which would allow to bootstrap WiMAX-internal security contexts from a key derived from a run of EAP-AKA between the UE and the 3G AAA server. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5.2 Establishment of security contexts without the support of SAE | In this case, credentials other than those available in 3G networks are used to establish security contexts in the non-3GPP access system. An example of this case is WiMAX when WiMAX-specific credentials are used to set up IP connectivity across WiMAX. SAE plays no role in this set up, so the establishment of these security contexts is out of scope of SAE.
It is assumed that the SAE user always uses a USIM on UICC to perform mutual authentication and establish security contexts with the Home Network.
It is to be decided by SA3 whether a UE-PDG tunnel is required. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6 Establishment of IPsec tunnel between UE and PDG across the target non-3GPP access system (if required) | One of the two variants of the S2 interface in the SAE architecture, cf. TR 23.882, allows to connect an access system to the evolved SAE packet core via an IPsec tunnel between the UE and a PDG. WLAN 3GPP IP access is an example of the use of such a tunnel, but WLAN is not the only access system which may be connected in this way. This section deals with the roaming of a UE between an access system (old) to another access system (new), for the case that at least the target access system requires such a UE-PDG tunnel.
The level of security achieved in certain deployments of non-3GPP IP access networks though internal security mechanisms (including confidentiality, integrity protection, protection of signalling, key management, etc) of some such non-3GPP IP access networks may be trusted by the 3GPP Evolved Packet Core (EPC) operator. In such case, no additional security mechanisms (e.g. IPSec tunnels from the UE to the EPC) are required. in the sense that the non-3GPP IP access network can interwork with the 3GPP EPC without relying on an IPsec tunnel to the UE. Such non-3GPP IP access networks are referred to here as "trusted non-3GPP IP access networks". The decision whether a specific non-3GPP IP access network is trusted or untrusted is up to the 3GPP EPC operator and is not based on the specific link-layer technology adopted by the non-3GPP IP access network.
If the non-3GPP IP access network is trusted (i.e. based on business, roaming and interconnection agreements), the need for a PDG functionality to connect the non-3GPP IP access to the EPC is FFS. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6.1 The source access system has a UE-PDG tunnel | An example of this case is mobility between two I-WLAN 3GPP IP access systems. The problem to be solved is to retain the IPsec tunnel even when the IP address of the UE changes due to mobility.
There are two cases here: the PDG remains the same or the PDG changes.
If PDG remains the same, the existing IPsec tunnel could be maintained. In order to achieve this, a mechanism proposed in TR 23.882, Annex E, is MOBIKE. For MOBIKE to work, it is required that the PDG remains the same while the UE moves.
If the PDG changes, then it is not a matter of maintaining the IPSec tunnel, but creating a new one with the target PDG. In such case, the focus becomes the mechanisms on the S2 interface, not what happens between the new PDG and the UE.
Another possible solution to retain the IPsec tunnel when the PDG remains fixed would be the use of an IP mobility mechanism (e.g. Mobile IP). The Mobile IP Home Agent would have to be e.g. located between the PDG and the UE, but close to the PDG, ensuring that the outer IP address of the IPsec tunnel remains constant, even while the UE moves and acquires a new local IP address. The adoption of MIP for mobility is FFS.
If the PDG changes, then it is not a matter of maintaining the IPSec tunnel, but creating a new one with the target PDG. In such case, in addition, to the establishment of the new IPsec tunnel, the mobility of the PDG has to be handled by the S2 interface. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6.2 The source access system does not have a UE-PDG tunnel | An example of this case is mobility between a 3GPP access system, such as LTE or UTRAN, and an I-WLAN 3GPP IP access system. The problem to be solved is to set up the IPsec tunnel in the target system in an efficient way.
Neither MOBIKE nor an additional layer of Mobile IP will help here. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7 Security for IP based mobility | There may be several layers of Mobile IP being used in a complete SAE system, including access networks. E.g. there is a WiMAX-internal Mobile IP layer. The considerations in this section are concerned with the outermost such layer, where the related Home Agent 3GPP HA resides in the 3G network. It is still to be decided if the HA is located in the SAE anchor, cf. architecture in section 4. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.1 General requirement | Major security threats related to IP mobility, when the procedures are not properly secured, are:
- IP address ownership needs to be verified else redirection attacks will happen
- Traffic sent to a target redirected elsewhere
- Attacker can blackhole traffic to a victim
- Attacker can insert itself on-path as a Man-in-the-Middle
- Redirecting traffic for someone to a victim
- Leads to (D)DoS (distributed denial of service) 3rd party bombing
- Consequently charging can be confused
- (D)Dos attack on mobility anchor
Key handling principle for inter-3GPP HO:
Before handover from EUTRAN to non-3GPP IP access network and/or from non-3GPP IP access network to EUTRAN, UE and EPS core network use the present key and the same key derivation function to derive the new key, which is to be used after handover.
(From S3-070732)
Some of the main problems that need to be considered when defining secuity context transfer optimizations for non-3GPP/3GPP handovers are:
• Security (avoiding negative impact on LTE/UMTS security)
• User privacy related to identity management
• AAA architecure misaligmnent between 3GPP and non-3GPP accesses
• Difficulty of defining a unique reference point for (secure) inter-access security context transfer.
• Possible standardization impact outside 3GPP (IETF, IEEE).
These shall be taken into account when looking at optimizations for handovers between 3GPP and non-3GPP accesses.
There are different kinds of make-before-break solutions using pre-authentication. This pre-authentication could take place either at the time of hand-over preparation, or (for e.g. single-radio terminals) the authentication could (perhaps) be prepared at the initial attach. It is an agreed working assumption that solutions based on pre-authentication should be the focus of the SA3 study for authentication optimizations for handovers between 3GPP and non-3GPP accesses |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2 Host based Mobility | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2.1 Security associations used with Mobile IP | Figure 1 gives an overview of the MIP security associations which need to be present irrespective of the version of Mobile IP used. More security associations may be required for certain versions of Mobile IP. E.g. for Mobile IP v4 with a Foreign Agent, security associations between MN and FA, and FA and HA are needed.
Figure 1: Overview of the security architecture for MIP
The needed security associations are:
- A security association between the UE and 3GPP AAA. It is assumed that the 3GPP AAA in HPLMN is in charge of user authentication and authorization. This security association is based on a long-term secret.
- A security association between the UE and 3GPP MIP HA. This security association is established dynamically.
- A security association between 3GPP MIP HA and 3GPP AAA server in the same network. Typically, this security association is static. NDS/IP could be used when proxy AAA is used in roaming case. See TS 33.210 for more detail information [4]. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2.2 Security protocols used with Mobile IP | 1. The security association between the MN and 3GPP AAA is used for (mutual) authentication. In our context, the authentication protocol may be e.g. EAP-AKA. This protocol is independent of Mobile IP, but keys derived from a run of this protocol may be used for Mobile IP purposes.
2. The security association between the MN and 3GPP MIP HA is used for MIP signalling integrity protection. The protocols used depend on the version of Mobile IP. To give examples:
MIPv4: Home agent and mobile nodes shall be able to perform message authentication according to RFC 3344. MN-HA key agreed between HA and MN during MIP authentication is used to compute the digest in the Mobile-Home Authentication Extension according to RFC3344. The Mobile-Home Authentication Extension is used to provide integrity of signalling between Mobile Node and Home Agent. HMAC-MD5 shall be used as authentication algorithm with a key size 128 bit. HA will compute the UDP payload (RRQ or RRP data), all prior extensions, the type, length and SPI of the extension with MN-HA key in MIP Req-resp. MN uses with HMAC-MD5 to verify the received message from HA.
For MIPv4 with a foreign agent, more security associations are needed, as mentioned in the previous subsection. RFC3344 can also be used for these. The foreign agent shall be able to support message authentication using HMAC-MD5 and key size of 128 bits, with a key distribution mechanism (FFS).
MIPv6: IPsec is specified as the means of securing signalling messages between the Mobile Node and Home Agent for Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) in RFC3776. RFC4285 proposes an alternate method for securing MIPv6 signalling messages between Mobile Nodes and Home Agents. The alternate method consists of a MIPv6-specific mobility message authentication option that can be added to MIPv6 signalling messages.
The alternate method is entirely based on shared secrets and does not use IPsec.
3. The security association between 3GPP MIP HA and 3GPP AAA server in the same network is used to securely transport the MN-HA keys from AAA server to MIP HA. It may not be needed if the interface between AAA server and HA is secured by other means.
Home agent and mobile nodes may perform message authentication whenever it is needed. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3 Bootstrapping of Mobile IP parameters | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.1 General | It would be undesirable for SAE if the UE had to obtain security credentials to be used specifically for Mobile IP signalling security. Rather, the security associations required for Mobile IP should be able to be derived from security credentials already available. In the case of SAE, this means that it should be possible to derive the security associations required for Mobile IP from the USIM.
Authentication between the MN and the network shall be performed as. A subscriber, who wants to use MIP, will have its subscriber profile located in the 3GPP AAA in the Home Network. The subscriber profile will contain information on the subscriber that may not be revealed to an external partner, At MIP registration , during a change of location between different access networks by matching the request with the subscriber profile, if the subscriber is allowed to continue with the request or not. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.2 RFC3957 used in conjunction with GBA | NOTE: this subsection applies only to MIPv4.
MN-HA key generation & distribution based on RFC 3957. This method uses pre-shared secret between MS and AAA server to establish a shared secret between MS and HA and / or MS and FA.
Figure 2: MN-HA key generation & distribution
1. During initial MIPv4 registration, MS includes a new extension (called the MN-HA Key Generation Nonce Request extension [RFC 3957]) in RRQ to request for a nonce from HAAA. The RRQ also contains the MS’s credential in the MN-AAA authenticator extension.
2. FA sends DIAMETER/RADIUS Access-Request to HAAA to authenticate the MS credential.
3. If the MS is authenticated successfully, the HAAA returns DIAMETER/RADIUS Access-Accept.
4. FA forwards the RRQ to the HA.
NOTE: If co-located care-of address mode is used, then RRQ message will be sent from MS to HA directly without FA in above picture
5. HA sends DIAMETER/RADIUS Access-Request to HAAA. In case of Roaming, the message will send through VAAA to HAAA. The DIAMETER/RADIUS Access-Request contains the MN-HA SPI attribute to request for a MN-HA key to HAAA that the MN-HA key needs to be derived. The HA may include the MS credential in the DIAMETER/RADIUS Access-Request.
Editor’s note: it’s FFS if it’s possible for a HA in the visited network.
6. HAAA selects a nonce and derives the MN-HA key from the MN-AAA shared secret, MS’s NAI, and the nonce.
7. HAAA returns DIAMETER/RADIUS Access-Accept that contains the MN-HA key and the nonce.
8. The HA sends RRP with a new extension (called the Generalized MN-HA Key Generation Nonce Reply Extension [RFC 3957]) carrying the key generation nonce, and the MN-HA authenticator computed from the MN-HA key. The new extension must precede the MN-HA authenticator. (FA forwards the RRP to the MS)
9. The MS derives the MN-HA key and uses it to verify the MN-HA authenticator in the RRP.
One possible way is to use GBA in conjunction with RFC 3957. In this case HAAA is associated with NAF.
Figure 3: Using GBA to derive and distribute MN-HA Keys (HAAA as NAF)
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) allows bootstrapping of shared secrets between a UE/MN and the home network (Bootstrapping Service Function, BSF), which can then be used to derive further shared secrets to be used between MS and a Network Application Function(NAF).
Two options for using GBA in the inter access mobility authentication are considered:
- using GBA to derive the MN-HA Keys, in which case the HA is used as NAF and.
- using GBA to provision MN-AAA Keys, in which case HAAA is used as a NAF.
Figure 5 shows how GBA could be used to derive and distribute MN-HA Keys when HAAA as NAF, i.e. HAAA is associated with a Network Application Function (NAF).
1. The MN performs a bootstrapping procedure with the BSF and generates a (master) shared secret, Ks. Bootstrapping procedure is performed between the UE/MS and the BSF (which is located in the home network). During bootstrapping, mutual authentication is performed between the MS and the home network, and a bootstrapping key, Ks, will be generated by both the UE/MS and the BSF. Associated with the Ks include a Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier (B-TID) and a lifetime of the Ks.
NOTE: This procedure is only needed during initial registration (and it can be done before the MIP registration). It is not repeated at every HO (Handover). The only time it needs to be repeated is when the key is about to expire. But even in this case, the GAA procedure is done “offline”—i.e. the next MIP registration does not need to wait for GAA procedure to complete.
2. MN can then start MIP related signalling with the HA, which in turn contacts the HAAA.
3. HA then contacts to HAAA using Diameter/ RADIUS. Note: in the baseline document only RADIUS message is shown in the figure and the text. However, both Diameter and RADIUS can be used.
4. The HAAA, acting as a NAF, does not have the MN-AAA key, as the MN-AAA key is supposed to be generated by the BSF using Ks and other inputs to a KDF (key derivation function). Therefore, the HAAA will contact the BSF and fetch the MN-AAA key (Ks_(ext/int)_NAF of the HAAA) needed to authenticate the MN.
5. MN-HA keys are then derived from the MN-AAA Key using RFC 3957.
NOTE: If foreign agents (FA) are used, then foreign agent use Diameter/RADIUS to communication with HAAA.
Editor’s note: it needs to check how to send the B-TID in MIP registration message. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.3 Use GBA to generate MN-HA key | NOTE: This subsection applies to MIPv4and MIPv6.
In this alternative authentication method, HA is associated with NAF.
Home Agent (HA) is associated with a NAF, and Ks_(ext/int)_NAF would be used as MN-HA key: the MN performs a bootstrapping procedure with the BSF and generates a (master) shared secret, Ks. After that, the MN can start MIP related signalling with the HA, which in turn contacts the BSF to fetch MN-HA key.
Figure 4: Overview of GBA operations
1. Bootstrapping procedure is performed between the UE/MS and the BSF (which is located in the home network). During bootstrapping, mutual authentication is performed between the MS and the home network, and a bootstrapping key, Ks, will be generated by both the UE/MS and the BSF. Associated with the Ks include a Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier (B-TID) and a lifetime of the Ks.
NOTE: This procedure is only needed during initial registration (and it can be done before the MIP registration). It is not repeated at every HO (Handover). The only time it needs to be repeated is when the key is about to expire. But even in this case, the GAA procedure is done “offline”—i.e. the next MIP registration does not need to wait for GAA procedure to complete.
2. Once bootstrapping is completed, UE/MS can make use of the bootstrapped security association with a network application server, called the Network Application Function (NAF). To do so, the UE/MS communicates with the NAF. The UE/MS conveys to the NAF the B-TID.
3. The UE/MS derives the application specific session keys Ks_(ext/int)_NAF using a pre-defined key derivation function (KDF), with Ks, identifier of the NAF (NAF_Id), as well as other information as input. Upon receiving the request from UE/MS in step 2, the NAF contacts the BSF over the Zn to request the Ks_(ext/int)_NAF. The NAF provides the B-TID received from the UE/MS, and provides its own identity (NAF_Id). The BSF derives the Ks_(ext/int)_NAF in the same way as the UE/MS, and returns the derived key to the NAF. The Ks_(ext/int)_NAF can then be used as the shared secret between the MS and the NAF for any further security operations.
NOTE: If foreign agents (FA) are used, then foreign agent implements GAA NAF to get the MN-FA key. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.4 Use partial GBA to derive MN-HA Keys | NOTE: This subsection applies to MIPv4 and MIPv6.
GBA was designed for a situation where a UE wants to securely access potentially many application servers (NAFs), while having to be authenticated to the home network (and consume authentication vectors) in the Ub protocol run only once. Furthermore, the NAFs the UE wants to access may and need not be known at the time of the Ub protocol run. These requirements do not apply to MIP bootstrapping: the number of MIP servers with which the UE needs to share a key is limited to one, namely the Home AAA or Home Agent (when no Foreign Agent is used), and two, when an FA is used (or three, when two FAs are involved in a handover situation). In addition, the addresses of HA and FA cannot be chosen by the UE any time later, but are assigned by the home network (HA) and the visited network (FA), respectively. Therefore, the full functionality of GBA may not be needed.
A disadvantage of the use of GBA for MIP bootstrapping is that the HA, and, if applicable, the FA, need to support NAF functionality. An off-the-shelf HA or FA does not do that.
Editor’s note: the intention of this GBA extension is a subset of GBA and should not be a problem.
We consider two cases below. For both cases, the following is assumed:
- a UE has to run the Ub protocol with the BSF before starting MIP registration.
- the BSF is integrated with the AAA server (as in the current baseline document).
- the AAA server distributes keys to HA and FA using standard AAA procedures (for MIPv4: RFC4004: DIAMETER Mobile IPv4 application, and for MIPv6: draft-ietf-dime-mip6-split-03), and does not use the Zn interface.
- the distributed keys are used with the Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 authentication mechanisms defined in RFC 3344 and RFC 4285 respectively
Editor’s note: it’s FFS whether RADIUS extension also needs to be supported.
With these assumptions, HA and FA can be off-the-shelf, and need not be GBA-aware. The Ua and the Zn interfaces are not needed.
Case 1: HA and FA addresses and/or names are acquired by the UE independently of the Ub protocol run
In this case, the BSF and the UE derive keys Ks_(ext/int)_NAF to be shared between UE and HA, and UE and FA, respectively, as specified in TS 33.220.
Editor’s note: no change to Ub in Case 1.
Case 2: The HA address and/or name is acquired by the UE as part of the Ub protocol run
In this case, the BSF can send the FQDN, and possibly also the IP address, of the HA to the UE in a new element in the XML body of the “200OK” message, which is the last message in the Ub protocol run. This provides an alternative to SAE HA address assignment. Note that it may not be obvious for all access systems how to let the UE acquire the SAE HA address.
Editor’s note: the Ub interface will be affected in Case 2.
The FA address needs to be acquired by the UE locally.
The use of partial GBA for MIP bootstrapping is captured in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Partial GBA for MIP bootstrapping |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.5 Using IKEv2 | Authentication between the MN and the network and IPsec SA setup between the MN and the HA for MIPv6 shall be performed using IKEv2 as defined in the IETF draft [draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-02.txt]. In SAE, the home agent communicates with the AAA server to perform mutual authentication. The IKEv2 authentication is performed using EAP-AKA.
Figure 6: MN-Network authentication and MN-HA IPsec SA setup for MIPv6
Editor’s note 1: adding relatively heavy protocol of IKEv2 should be considered to be for further study if cost efficiency is in appropriate level.
Editor’s note 2: this is only one of multiple different options.
Editor’s note 3: both I-WLAN scenarios 2 and 3 should be studied
(From S3-070820)
The first procedure that must be performed by the MN is the discovery of the HA address, which in case of EPS is the IP address of the PDN GW.
As soon as the Mobile Node has discovered the PDN GW address, it establishes an IPsec Security Association with the Home Agent itself through IKEv2. The detailed description of this procedure is provided in RFC4877. The IKEv2 Mobile Node to Home Agent authentication is performed using Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP).
When the Mobile Node runs IKEv2 with its Home Agent, it shall request an IPv6 Home Address through the Configuration Payload in the IKE_AUTH exchange by including an INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute. When the Home Agent processes the message, it allocates a HoA and sends it a CFG_REPLY message. The IPv6 Home Address allocation through IKEv2 allows to bind the Home Address with the IPsec security association so that the MN can only send Binding Updates for its own Home Address and not for other MN’s Home Addresses.
Figure 7 provides the flow for the initial DS-MIPv6 bootstrapping.
Figure 7: DS-MIPv6 bootstrapping based on IKEv2
1) The UE discovers the PDN GW address based on the procedure specified in 23.401.
2) The UE starts an IKEv2 exchange with the PDN GW. The first part of this exchange is an IKE_SA_INIT exchange.
3) The UE indicates that EAP is used for IKEv2 authentication and an EAP exchange is performed. EAP is carried over IKEv2 between the UE and the PDN GW and over the AAA protocol between the PDN GW and the AAA server.
4) During the IKEv2 exchange, the PDN GW allocates an IPv6 Home Address and send it to the UE in a IKEv2 Configuration Payload.
5) As a result of the previous steps, an IPsec SA is established to protect DS-MIPv6 signalling.
6) The UE sends the MIP Binding Update message to the PDN GW.
7) The PDN GW processes the binding update. The PDN GW sends the MIP Binding Ack to the UE.
8) As a result of the above steps a MIPv6 tunnel is established and the UE can start using its home address at the application level. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.6 Security bootstrapping for DS MIPv6 using MIP options | (From S3-070748)
This procedure uses the MIP authentication options defined in RFC4285 [8] to provide authentication of Binding Update and Binding Acknowledgement messages, namely the
• MN-HA Mobility Message Authentication Option and the
• MN-AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option.
The AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option is used when the MN and the HA do not yet have a shared key, i.e. in the situation requiring bootstrapping of the MN-HA key.
It is assumed that the MN and the AAA server share a long-lived security association.
NOTE: It is ffs whether there is a need to dynamically generate the MN-AAA key and, if so, how to do it. Alternatives would include derivation during network access authentication and GBA.
The MN-HA key is derived from the MN-AAA key and a nonce. The nonce is requested by the MN in a Key Generation Nonce Request option and provided by the AAA server to the MN in a Key Generation Nonce Reply option. These options are described in draft-devarapalli-mip6-authprotocol-bootstrap [9].
NOTE: Instead of using a nonce for generating the MN-HA key from the MN-AAA key, also the timestamp from the Mobility Message Replay Protection Option, cf. below, could be used. This is ffs.
The HA may provide a Home Address to the MN using the Home Address Options defined in draft-devarapalli-mip6-authprotocol-bootstrap [9].
The communication between the Home Agent and the AAA server is based on DIAMETER extensions described in draft-ietf-dime-mip6-split [10]. This communication is assumed to be authenticated (integrity-protected).
Figure 8: Bootstrapping using Mobile IP options
Description of the information flow in Figure 8:
1. When the Mobile Node (MN) does not yet share a key with the Home Agent (HA) the MN sends a DSMIPv6 Binding Update (BU) including the MN-AAA authentication mobility option. The MN also includes a Key Generation Nonce Request Option. If the MN does not yet have a Home Address (HoA) it also includes the Home Address Request Option in the BU. The MN shall include the Mobility Message Replay Protection Option defined in RFC 4285 [8] containing a timestamp.
2. When the Home Agent receives a BU with the MN-AAA mobility message authentication option, the HA forwards the BU to the AAA server for authentication.
3. The AAA server authenticates the BU by verifying the message authentication code in the MN-AAA authentication mobility option, using the MN-AAA shared key and the timestamp in the Mobility Message Replay Protection Option.
4. Upon successful authentication of the BU, the AAA server sends the parameters of the MN-HA security association (key, algorithm) to the HA. The AAA server also returns a nonce and algorithm identifier in the Key Generation Nonce Reply Option.
5. The HA sends a Binding Acknowledge (BA) message protected with the MN-HA security association received from the AAA server to the MN. The HA forwards the Key Generation Nonce Reply Option as part of the BA. The HA also includes the Assigned Home Address Option in the BU if the MN requested a HoA. The HA checks the validity of the timestamp and, if necessary, includes an indication of a timestamp mismatch, as described in RFC 4285 [8]. In the latter case, HA deletes the MN-HA security association after sending the BA.
6. The MN generates the MN-HA key from the MN-AAA key and the nonce. The MN then verifies the BA using the MN-HA authentication mobility option. If the BA contains an indication of a timestamp mismatch the MN resends the BU from step 1, but with the message authentication code in the MN-AAA authentication mobility option computed over the corrected timestamp.
7. For subsequent BUs, the MN uses the established MN-HA security association and does not include an MN-AAA authentication mobility option. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4 Network based Mobility | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1 PMIP | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.1 Introduction | This section looks at how PMIP messages need to be protected within the Evolved Packet Core and how PMIP protection needs to be handled if the PMIP messages originate from a trusted non-3GPP network node.
This analysis is based on draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-06.txt [11] from which in particular the sections 4 and 11 have been used from a security viewpoint. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.2 Overview of PMIP usage in 3GPP | (From S3-070756)
PMIPv6 defines a MAG (Mobile Access Gateway) and an LMA (Local Mobility Anchor) from which the LMA will be integrated in the PDN Gateway or Serving Gateway (for the roaming case).
Figure 9: Protocols for MM control and user planes of S2a for the PMIPv6 option
TS 23.402v130 section 5 is relevant in this respect and specifies that PMIPv6 may be used on following reference points:
• S2a: Between a node in the trusted non-3GPP access network (Foreign agent) and the LMA (Home Agent)
• S2b: Between the ePDG and the LMA (Home Agent).
TS 23.402v130 section 4.2.1 mentions the use of PMIP based S5 reference point between the Serving Gateway and the PDN Gateway. The S5 reference point may also apply GTP, and is an intra-operator interface. PMIP usage over S5/S8b is currently included in the description of PMIP use over S2b, and (see section 5.4.2.4.3 TS 23.402) in case of roaming, the S-GW is the LMA for PMIP procedure in S2b between the ePDG and the S-GW and the PDN GW is the LMA for PMIP procedure in S8b between the S-GW and the PDN GW. In addition, PMIP over S5/S8b is discussed in section 5.4.2.6 TS 23.402 for E-UTRAN access. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.3 PMIP trust model | PMIPv6 is an IETF based network-based mobility management mechanism, and has applied the same trust model properties as the use of GTP for mobility management in UMTS and the EPC (for the S5 and S2b reference points). This means the MAG i.e. the Serving Gateway (S5) or ePDG (S2b), is sufficiently trusted by the LMA to register only those Mobile Nodes that are attached.
However when the MAG is located in a trusted non-3GPP network (S2a), there is a little bit of a difference to the current 3GPP or PMIPv6 draft [11] trust model where a 3GPP network component (SGSN, S-GW) is trusted to register only attached MNs. Here, the MAG could e.g. be located in a WLAN AP which can much more easily be tampered with than an SGSN or S-GW. The implication of this scenario is for ffs (see also proposed decision at the end of this section).
The trust between the LMA and the MAG is verified by the LMA by allowing only those MAGs to perform Binding Updates which are known by the LMA i.e. by the use of IKEv2 authentication. This measure defends against a Network Node trying to impersonate another MAG, and thus will protect against Denial-Of-Service attacks from the Mobile Node's viewpoint.
The PMIPv6 draft [11] recognizes the threat of a compromised MAG that would send PMIP messages on behalf of a Mobile Node with a Mobile Node not present on the local link. From section 11 of [PMIPv6 draft]:
"To eliminate the threats related to a compromised mobile access gateway, this specification recommends that the local mobility anchor before accepting a Proxy Binding Update message for a given mobile node, should ensure the mobile node is definitively attached to the mobile access gateway that sent the binding registration request.
The issues related to a compromised mobile access gateway in the scenario where the local mobility anchor and the mobile access gateway in different domains, is outside the scope of this document. This scenario is beyond the applicability of this document."
The last sentence from the extract is an indication for the fact that the S2a use is not covered by PMIPv6 draft [11] and needs additional considerations.
Although required by PMIPv6 draft [11] it is unclear how the LMA should be able to verify that the MN has attached, rather this seems to be a property of the PMIP model that the MAG is trusted to apply those requirements. The authorization mechanisms on the MAG-LMA interfaces are inadequate for this.
The effect of a potential misuse by the MAG could be limited to those MAGs on which the Mobile Node is authorized to attach. This authorization shall then be verified by the LMA. However, this explicit authorization-check may be cumbersome to administrate per user (and therefore not very effective), and if not administrated per user but per roaming partner, the authorization check rather takes place between the MAG and the LMA (via the lack of shared secrets for IKEv2, or certificate authorization checks), and this fits the PMIP trust model applying to S5 and S2b.
Extending PMIPv6 by involving the UE in order to produce a fresh user involvement on the MAG that can be used towards the LMA, is a contradiction to the design guidelines of PMIPv6: "This protocol enables mobility support to a host without requiring its participation in any mobility related signaling." Furthermore verifying the user involvement would also increase the amount of signaling needed. So there is a trade-off between trust/security and amount of signaling.
NOTE 1: For the other network based mobility management protocols e.g. GTP this has worked well in the past. The operator should be able to trace down suspicious registrations as long as the links are secured (physical or by NDS/IP).
In case of S5, the node implementing the MAG may already be trusted to receive an EPS security context for a user, without proof of user involvement.
NOTE 2: In case S-GW and MME are implemented on the same physical node.
The risk caused by a misuse of the received key material is greater than the risk due the use of the PMIPv6 trust model. Verifying user involvement during mobility management registration would need to involve an additional authentication verifiable by the LMA only such that the compromised MAG cannot impersonate the user, where then we are back to the DSMIPv6 solution.
Conclusion:
a) use PMIPv6 as defined by IETF [draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-06.txt] for S5 and S2b
b) if the trust relation between the MAG and the LMA is not there then additional security measures are needed. These security measures are for ffs. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.4 Security measures on the Reference points between the LMA and the MAG that have a trust relation | PMIPv6 draft [11] section 4 recommends the use of IPsec ESP in Transport Mode (RFC4303) as default security mechanism for integrity protection and data origin authentication for PMIP messages and IKEv2 end-to-end between the MAG and the LMA to establish IPsec security associations. Confidentiality protection of PMIP messages is not required.
Section 5.5.1 allows the use of one security tunnel between the MAG and the LMA instead of a dynamic set-up.
"The bi-directional tunnel is established after accepting the ProxyBinding Update request message. The created tunnel may be shared with other mobile nodes attached to the same mobile access gateway and with the local mobility anchor having a Binding Cache entryfor those mobile nodes. Implementations MAY choose to use static tunnels instead of dynamically creating and tearing them down on a need basis."
Therefore alternatives to the IKEv2 usage like NDS/IP (TS 33.210) should still be possible (RFC 2406 and IKEv1) and can provide the same security services.
The only difference is the hop-by-hop approach with SEGs (requiring tunnel mode towards the SEG), which should not be a problem in viewpoint of security if the network owning the SEG and the LMA is sufficiently trusted. The use of TS 33.310 is needed when LMA and MAG belong to a different operator.
The PDN gateway may already implement IKEv1/IPsec for protecting the signaling towards the AAA/HSS in case of DSMIPv6 and may already implement IKEv2 in case that such mechanism would be selected for DSMIPv6 protection towards the Mobile Node (which is for ffs at SA3#49). The ePDG already requires IKEv2 implementation towards the UE.
Conclusion:
SA3#49 agreed that the choice between IKEv1 (as defined by NDS/IP) or IKEv2 (as proposed by PMIPv2] for PMIP message protection between the MAG and the LMA needs further study
a) Both IKEv2 and IKEv1 can provide the necessary security features.
b) Referring to NDS/IP (TS 33.210) and NDS/AF (TS 33.310) allows a hop-by-hop security model.
c) The difference between RFC2406 [which is referred by NDS/IP] and RFC4303 [which is referred by PMIPV6] is not essential for the decision. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.5 The need for using strong access authentication with Proxy Mobile IP | Clause 7.4.1.3 discusses the need for trust of the LMA in the correct operation of the MAG. Trust in the MAG means that the LMA can be ensured that the operation of MAG is not somehow influenced by an attacker. Clause 7.4.1.4 discusses the security on the reference point between the MAG and the LMA. Security on this reference point ensures that PMIP messages are originating from a trusted entity, and that no attacker could tamper with them in transit. This subclause discusses an additional requirement for the secure operation of PMIP: strong access authentication. In the context of PMIP, the authentication scheme shall be considered sufficiently strong by all stakeholders involved, in particular by the operators of MAG and LMA. In EPS the LMA is the PDN GW owned by a 3GPP EPS operator. This implies that the authentication scheme shall satisfy also 3GPP security requirements, i.e. it shall use a USIM.
PMIP is based on the assumption that a MAG can securely identify which user is attached to the access network served by the MAG. This secure identification is realised by access authentication. If access authentication was weak then an attacker could impersonate a user in the access network. If this happened, a MAG would report in good faith to the LMA that a certain user was present in the access network, while in fact the attacker was present. This could result in Denial of Service to the impersonated user through the use of PMIP because all traffic destined to this user would then be routed to a wrong destination.
An impersonation attack exploiting a weakness in access authentication could occur by attacking any part of the access network. Neither the trusted operation of the MAG nor the security on the reference point between the MAG and the LMA would prevent such an attack if access authentication was weak. In this sense, the requirement of using strong access authentication with PMIP is complementary to the requirements addressed in clauses 7.4.1.3 and 7.4.1.4.
Section 4 of TR 33.922 requires USIM-based authentication also for non-3GPP access. Currently, AKA is the only authentication scheme known to use the USIM. As AKA-based authentication is considered sufficiently strong, also the requirement introduced in this subclause is considered fulfilled in EPS.
Conclusion:
When PMIP is used within EPS, strong access authentication is required. In EPS and as per clause 4 of TR 33.922, this requirement is fulfilled since the USIM-based authentication for non-3GPP access is mandated. The USIM-based authentication implies the use of the AKA protocol, which is considered sufficiently strong. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6 No trust relation between LMA and MAG on S2a | NOTE：This section describes the case when there is no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA. However, what this section describes is not aligned with the assumption of TS33.402v100 section 9.3.1.2. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6.1 Security risks | MAG lies in the trusted non-3gpp IP access system in S2a. There may be no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA since they may belong to different operators. In this case, a compromised MAG may make an attack to UE in other MAG’s domain. Also, a compromised MAG may send fake PBU message to update the binding of UE who is served by other MAG. In this case,
-the victim UE cannot receive the data since the data is routed to the compromised MAG;
-the compromised MAG can eavesdrop the data of UE who is served by other MAG;
-the compromised MAG may send a large amount of PBU to make the LMA in burden and a DoS attack may occur;
PMIPv6 [draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-11] defines to use IPsec to protect PBU/PBA. However, the prerequisite is that there should be trust relation between the MAG and the LMA. PMIPv6 security mechanism cannot work for the condition of no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6.2 Possible measures | One possible way is to have the mapping between the UE and the serving MAG in one of network servers. When a MAG sends a PBU to a LMA, the LMA can ask this server to check whether this MAG is currently serving the UE. In this way, it will be avoided that a compromised MAG represents UE served by other MAGs to send the fake PBU.
UE should run an EAP-AKA with MAG before PMIPv6 procedure. The AAA server in UE’s home network can record which MAG executed EAP-AKA procedure. In the meanwhile, AAA can keep the mapping between UE and its serving MAG. In this way, when a MAG sends a PBU message to a LMA, the LMA can ask the AAA server to have a check whether this MAG is serving the UE in the current time according to the identity of UE in PBU message. When UE moves to other MAG, AAA should know the change since AAA will be involved in changing MAG’s procedure. So the AAA can update the mapping between UE and the serving MAG.
Editor’s Note: Another solution is that AAA sends a key to MAG which is related to the UE after EAP-AKA procedure. UE will participate in the EAP-AKA. So the MAG can obtain this key only when this MAG really serves the UE. This key can be used to protect the integrity of PBU messages. LMA interacts with AAA to check the integrity of PBU message. In this way, a compromised MAG cannot get the related key. So it can not send valid PBU message. When UE moves to other MAG, AAA should know the change since AAA will be involved in changing MAG’s procedure. So the AAA can update the related key and send the key to the current serving MAG. This solution may need clarify and FFS. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.2 NetLMM | In Network based Localized Mobility Management (NetLMM) the Localized Mobility Anchor (LMA) is configured with a globally routable network prefix which the IP address assigned to UE is composed of, and packets to/from the UE are tunnelled between LMA and Mobile Access Gateways (MAGs). MAG shares the same network prefix as LMA’s one, therefore, when the MN moves from one MAG to another, neither the subnet nor the MN IP address are changing. Here the LMA handles the packets incoming from Internet to the operator’s domain. Each MAG is configured with the information needed to contact the LMA. This is also depicted in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Proxy mobility protocol scenario
NetLMM does not bring any additional security threats. The protocol does face the general security threat of IP address ownership that is valid for all mobility protocols. Solution for this threat is to:
- Secure Link Layer attachment (Packet Data Protocol Context secured by 3G AKA)
- IP address allocation by the network over secured attachment.
For NetLMM the countermeasure regarding the security threats in Section 7.1 are:
- IP address ownership
- Enforce IP address ownership at network attachment. IP address is allocated by network (e.g., DHCP, PDP) over secure network attachment (e.g., 3G AKA). IP address binding is enforced during communication.
- (D)DoS attack
- Attack on forwarding resources
- Requires knowledge of the network prefix allocated for MNs
- Outside Correspondent Node and MNs are aware
- Attack on control plane endpoint resources
- Requires knowledge of the anchor point IP address
- NetLMM LMA IP address is hidden from MNs and outside CNs.
- NetLMM shall be resilient to DoS because only the forwarding resources can be attacked. Those can be dealt with by over-provisioning the forwarding capacity.
Editor’s note: further details should be added. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8 Specific aspects of security for mobility between 3GPP access systems and non-3GPP access systems | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.1 Security for mobility between pre-SAE 3GPP access systems and non-3GPP access systems | It needs to be clarified in the course of the work on SAE mobility to what extent mobility, and, in particular the related security aspects involving pre-SAE 3GPP access systems require a different handling. The goal is, of course, to minimise or completely avoid the differences, but it is currently not clear in how far this goal can be achieved. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.2 Security context transfer between 3GPP and trusted non-3GPP access networks | Security context is the information on the current state of a UE in the serving system required to re-establish the security association in the target system. Security context includes
1. Agreed security algorithms between the UE and the serving network,
2. Agreed/derived encryption and/or integrity protection keys and key identifiers.
3. Security association related information like key lifetime, sequence number, count values etc.
4. The temporary identity issued by the serving network
NOTE: In 3GPP, temporary identity is used by the target network to identify the serving network, but it’s FFS for handover between 3GPP and non-3GPP networks whether temp IDs to be used for identifying the pervious access network.
As 3GPP has already adopted security context transfer procedures for optimizing authentication during handover, it is reasonable for SAE to enable security context transfer between the 3GPP and non-3GPP networks.
Editor’s note: the content of security context is FFS. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.3 ANDSF Security | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.3.1 General | ANDSF (Access Network Discovery and Selection Function) is a mechanism of access network discovery and selection. It is provided in order to control the UE's inter-system handover decisions and in order to reduce the battery consumption for inter-system mobility. See TS23.402 for more details. However, the privacy of UE and the operator needs to be protected if private information will be sent between UE and ANDSF server. Reusing GBA and PSK TLS to establish SA between UE and ANDSF server will be easily implemented by both operators and vendors. PSK TLS can be used for the security association between UE and ANDSF server. It can provide confidentiality and integrity protection for ANDSF security.
8.3.2 Procedure
Figure 11: ANDSF security using GBA
1. The UE and the BSF will process bootstrapping procedure. The master key Ks will be derived in this procedure.
Editor’s note: It is FFS if 3GPP AAA can be the BSF in this scenario to be easily deployed by the operator.
2. The UE discovers the ANDSF server. See more details in TS23.402. Then the UE derives the Ks_ANDSF.
3. The UE starts communication with ANDSF server. UE sends application request to ANDSF server.
4. ANDSF server sends authentication request to the BSF for the key,
5. The BSF derives the Ks_ANDSF based the master key Ks. The derivation function is the same with Ks_NAF. And then BSF sends Ks_ANDSF and the key lifetime to the ANDSF server.
6. ANDSF server will inform UE that it gets the key Ks_ANDSF and can continue the ANDSF function,
7. The UE and the ANDSF server establish the security association based on the Ks_ANDSF. The detailed method i.e. PSK TLS, can be referenced to TS24.109.
Editor’s note: It is FFS which method can also be used to establish the security association between the UE and the ANDSF server.
8. The UE and ANDSF server runs handover with ANDSF procedure after the SA was successfully established to protect the communication between them.
Annex A:
RFC 3957
From RFC 3957: “When the mobile node shares an AAA Security Association with its home AAA server, however, it is possible to use that AAA Security Association to create derived Mobility Security Associations between the mobile node and its home agent, and again between the mobile node and the foreign agent currently offering connectivity to the mobile node. …[RFC3957] specifies extensions to Mobile IP registration messages that can be used to create Mobility Security Associations between the mobile node and its home agent, and/or between the mobile node and a foreign agent.”
Appendix B of RFC3957 contains message flows for Requesting and Receiving Key Generation Nonce:
MN FA AAA Infrastructure
<--- Advertisement-----
(if needed)
- RReq+AAA Key Req.-->
--- RReq + AAA Key Req.--->
<--- RRep + AAA Key Rep.---
<-- RRep+AAA Key Rep.--
Annex B:
Change history
Change history
Date
TSG #
TSG Doc.
CR
Rev
Subject/Comment
Old
New
2006-02
Creation of document
0.0.0
0.0.1
2006-07
Revision of the document
0.0.1
0.0.2
2006-11
Revision of the document
0.0.2
0.0.3
2007-05
Including 3.1of S3-070399
0.0.3
0.0.4
2007-07
Including 2.1of S3-070506, and S3-070531
0.0.4
0.0.5
2007-10
Including S3-070748 and S3-070820, S3-070732 and S3-070756
0.0.5
0.1.0
2007-12
Including S3a070980.
0.1.0
0.2.0
2008-02
Including S3-080049, S3-080129.
0.2.0
0.3.0
2008-03
Correct the release number.
0.3.0
0.3.1
2008-04
Including S3-080362.
0.3.0
0.4.0
2008-06
Including S3-080725, S3-080765.
0.4.0
0.5.0
2008
MCC clean up for presentation to SA
0.5.0
1.0.0
Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#41(08)0479
Meeting #41, 15 - 18 September 2008,
Kobe, Japan
Presentation of Specification to TSG
Presentation to: TSG SA Meeting #41
Document for presentation: TR 33.922, Version 1.0.0
Presented for: Information
Abstract of document:
TR 33.922 is currently in inconsistent shape. It was useful during a certain period of the work towards TS 33.402, but the material in TR 33.922 was not updated when decisions contradicting or superseding the text in the TR were taken. Nevertheless, TR 33.922 can serve a useful purpose similar to TR 33.821 in relation to TS 33.401 on E-UTRAN security, namely to document the discussion process in 3GPP SA3, which led to the final version of the TS.
In SA3 #52 meeting it was agreed to add a disclaimer to the “Scope” section of TR 33.922 to make it clear that text in the TR may be inaccurate or outdated.
Changes since last presentation:
This is the first time that the document is presented.
Outstanding Issues:
There are no outstanding issues.
Contentious Issues:
There are no contentious issues. |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 1 Scope | The purpose of this document is to contain the updated Work Item Descriptions (WIDs) and capture status of all TSG SA WG5 work items of the current 3GPP Release in order for the group to get an overview of current ongoing work.
This TR is used as a mean to provide input to the complete 3GPP work plan that is handled by MCC. |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Information/WORK_PLAN/
[2] http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Information/WI_Sheet/
SA5 Work Plan snapshoot
Unique_ID
Name
Acronym
% Cpl
Impacted TSs and TRs
Rapporteur
35041
OAM&P
OAM7
28%
Christian TOCHE
35042
Network Infrastructure Management
OAM7-NIM
28%
35044
Enhance NRM to accommodate NGN (IMS as basis of the Next Generation Network)
OAM7-NIM-NGN
10%
32.632, 32.633, 32.634, 32.635
BT
35045
IRP usage scenarios
OAM7-NIM
0%
new TR 32.8xy
Lucent
35046
Co-operative Element Management interface (CO-OP)
OAM7-NIM-COOP
75%
new TR 32.8xy, 32.101
Motorola
35047
Network Management (NM) Itf-N performance criteria
OAM7-NIM
30%
new TS 32.yzx
China Mobile
35048
Delta synchronization between IRP Manager and IRP Agent
OAM7-NIM
55%
new TR 32.8xy,new TSs 32.111-n,32.60n; For n = 1 to 5
Siemens
35049
Subscription Management (SuM) IRP Solution Sets
OAM7-NIM-SuM
55%
32.101,32.175, new TSs 32.161,32.307,32.317,32.607,32.617,32.667
Ericsson
35050
Integration Reference Point (IRP) Security Management
OAM7-NIM
40%
New TSs 32.372,32.373,32.374; 32.111,32.30x,32.32x,32.33x,32.34x,32.35x,32.36x,32.41x,32.60x,32.61x,32.66x
Huawei
35051
Integration Reference Point (IRP) Methodology
OAM7-NIM
15%
New TSs 32.15w,32.15x,32.15y,32.15z; 32.150,32.151,32.152
Ericsson
35052
Partial suspension of Itf-N during maintenance/testing
OAM7-NIM
50%
new TR 32.8xy, new TSs 32.30n,32.60n,32.61n; For n = 1 to 5
Siemens
35053
Advanced Alarming on Itf-N
OAM7-NIM
35%
new TR 32.8xy ; New TSs 32.111-n,32.30n; For n = 1 to 5
Siemens
35054
Management of Legacy Equipment
OAM7-NIM
20%
new TS 32.xxx, New TSs 32.62n,32.63n,32.64n,32.65n,32.71n,32.74n,32.69n; For n = 1 to 5
Siemens
35055
Rules for Vendor Specific Extensions
OAM7-NIM
20%
32.62n; For n = 1 to 5
Siemens
35056
CN CS Bearer Transport Network (BTN) relative NRM
OAM7-NIM
45%
New Tss TS 32.xx1,TS 32.xx2,TS 32.xx3,TS 32.xx4
China Mobile
35064
Backward and Forward Compatibility of IRP systems
OAM7-NIM-BFC
10%
TR 32.805. new TS 32.15X
Ericsson
35065
Study of Element Operations Systems Function (EOSF) definition
OAM7-NIM- EOSF
15%
new TR 32.8xy
China Mobile
35066
Study of SOAP/HTTP IRP Solution Sets
OAM7-NIM-SOAP
20%
new TR 32.8xy
Nortel
35067
Study of Itf-N Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) template
OAM7-NIM-ICS
15%
new TR 32.8xy
China Mobile
35068
Study of IRP Information Model
OAM7-NIM-IM
30%
new TR 32.8xy
Motorola
35071
Repeater Network Ressource Model (NRM) definition
OAM7-NIM
5%
32.64n; For n = 1 to 5
China Mobile
35072
UTRAN radio channel power monitoring
OAM7-NIM
20%
32.403, 32.64n; For n = 1 to 5
China Mobile
35074
NEW Study on SA5 MTOSI XML Harmonization
OAM7-NIM-XML
0%
new TR 32.8xy
Nortel
35043
Performance Management
OAM7-PM
33%
35057
Performance measurements definition for CN CS
OAM7-PM
65%
New TS 32.xyz
China Mobile
35058
Enhancement UTRAN performance measurements definition
OAM7-PM
20%
32.403
China Mobile
35059
Add TDD specific counters in Performance measurement
OAM7-PM
75%
32.403
CATT
35060
ATM bearer network Performance measurements
OAM7-PM
30%
32.403
ZTE
35061
IP bearer network Performance measurement definitions
OAM7-PM
20%
32.403
China Mobile
35069
Performance measurements definition for IMS
OAM7-PM-IMS
5%
new TS 32.xyz
China Mobile
35073
HSDPA performance measurements
OAM7-PM
5%
32.403
China Mobile
35039
Trace Management
OAM7-Trace
20%
35040
Trace Management for IMS
OAM7-Trace-IMS
0%
32.421,32.422,32.423
Nortel
35062
End-to-end Service Level tracing for IMS
OAM7-Trace-IMS
20%
32.101,32.421,32.422,32.423
Vodafone
35070
IRP for Subscriber and Equipment Trace Management
OAM7-Trace-IRP
10%
32.421,32.422,32.423. 3 new TS 32.4x1,2,3
Nokia
35063
Trace record content for UTRAN TDD
OAM7-Trace-TDD
75%
32.421,32.422,32.423
CATT
Feature: Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning - OAM&P (OAM7) Unique_ID: 35041
Building Block: Network Infrastructure Management (OAM7-NIM) Unique_ID: 35042
Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#28(05)0302
Meeting #28, Quebec, CANADA, 06-08 June 2005
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID WT Enhance NRM to accommodate NGN (IMS as basis of the Next Generation Network)
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 7.5.3
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-050280
Meeting #42, Montreal, CANADA, 09 - 13 May 2005
Work Item Description
Title:
Enhance NRM to accommodate NGN (IMS as basis of the Next Generation Network) Unique_ID: 35044
Acronym: OAM7-NIM-NGN
1 3GPP Work Area
X
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
OAM&P (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning) (Feature: OAM7)
WI
Unique_ID
OAM7
35041
Network Infrastructure Management (BB: OAM7-NIM)
WI
Unique_ID
OAM7-NIM
35042
3 Justification
The IMS has been adopted as the basis of the Next Generation Network (NGN).
It is proposed to enhance the 3GPP NRM in TS 32.63x Configuration Management (CM); Core Network Resources Integration Reference Point (IRP) - to accommodate any additional requirements identified.
4 Objective
In liaison with other groups (e.g. ETSI TISPAN, TeleManagement Forum (TMF), ITU-T SG4, Multiservice Switching Forum (MSF) to enhance the Core Network Resource Model to support the requirements of NGN Release 1 and Voice over IP (VoIP).
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 9 Impacts | Affects:
UICC apps
ME
AN
CN
Others
Yes
X
X
No
X
X
Don't know
X |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale (to be updated at each plenary) | New specifications
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.4xy
Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace Management Integration Reference Point (IRP): Requirements
SA5
3GPPSA#31
13 - 15 Mar 200625 - 27 Sep 2006
3GPPSA#34
Dec 2006
32.4xy
Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace Management IRP Information Service
SA5
3GPPSA#33
25 - 27 Sep 2006
3GPPSA#34
Dec 2006
32.4xy
Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace Management Integration Reference Point (IRP): CORBA Solution Set
SA5
3GPPSA#33
25 - 27 Sep 2006
3GPPSA#34
Dec 2006
Affected existing specifications
Spec No.
CR
Subject
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.421
3GPPSA#34
4 - 6 Dec 2006
32.422
3GPPSA#34
4 - 6 Dec 2006
32.423
3GPPSA#34
4 - 6 Dec 2006
Reason for re-scheduling:
Recently SA5 identified some interworking between the Trace IRP and the Service Level Tracing (SLT).
For SLT, SA5 just agreed on the Requirements and the Trace IRP got some input to the IRP requirement.
11 Work item rapporteur(s)
Gyula.Bodog@NOKIA.COMChristian Toche
12 Work item leadership
SA5
13 Supporting Companies
Nortel, Nokia, Lucent Technologies, Huawei, Ericsson
14 Classification of the WI (if known)
Feature (go to 14a)
Building Block (go to 14b)
X
Work Task (go to 14c) |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 14c The WI is a Work Task: parent Building Block | Trace Management (BB: OAM7-Trace)
WI
Unique_ID
OAM7-Trace
35039 |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.307 Notification IRP SOAP SS | |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.317 Generic IRP Management SOAP SS | |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.607 Basic CM IRP SOAP SS | |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.617 Bulk CM IRP SOAP SS | |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 32.667 Kernel CM IRP SOAP SS | 5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 1 3GPP Work Area | Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
OAM&P (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning) (Feature: OAM7)
WI
Unique_ID
OAM7
35041
Network Infrastructure Management (BB: OAM7-NIM)
WI
Unique_ID
OAM7-NIM
35042
3 Justification
Circuit is a logic link between two exchange network nodes which bear the user data such as voice, e.g. 64K slot of one 2M E1. Traffic route represents the route via which bearer flow to a specific destination.
To learn the detailed circuit connection relationship between network nodes and traffic route configuration status of the CN CS, bearer transport network related NRM need to be defined, such as circuit, traffic route, etc.
4 Objective
To define Bearer Transport Network (BTN) related NRM which are applicable to CN CS of UMTS.
To specify Bearer Transport Network (BTN) relative NRM definition of the CN CS:
• Specify BTN relative NRM management requirements
• Specify BTN Network Resource Models (NRMs)
• Specify CORBA Solution Set (SS)
• Specify CMIP Solution Set (SS)
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 3.2 Principle of radio channel power monitoring | The transport channels and physical channels have mapping relations. The following is mapping of transport channels onto physical channels.
25.211
From the figure above, the mapping from transport channel to physical channel is mostly one to one. So, in most cases, we just need to monitor the physical channels.
It is proposed to monitor the power of the following channels:
• Transport channel: FACH、PCH
• Uplink physical channel: DPCH (DPDCH/DPCCH)、PRACH
• Downlink physical channel: DPCH (DPDCH/DPCCH)、CPICH、P-CCPCH、S-CCPCH、SCH、AICH、PICH
In the above channel list, DPCH、PRACH、PDSCH are involved in power control. So, we should record the maximum and mean value of power level for those channels as performance measurements. For other channels, only the configured value will be retrieved.
The following channel power parameters are already present in TS 32.642:
• primaryCpichPower(1)
• maximumTransmissionPower(2)
• bchPower(3)
• primaryCcpchPower(4)
• dlpchPower(5)
• schPower(6)
The following parameters should be added:
• fachPower (7)
• dpchPower(8)
• prachPower (9)
• sccpchPower(10)
• pdschPower(11)
• pichPower(12)
• aichPower(13)
(8)、(9)、(11) are channels which are involved in power control.
4 Objective
Add (7) (10) (12) (13) to TS 32.642
Add (8) (9) (11) to TS 32.403
Update UTRAN Network Resource Model (NRM) Requirements (if needed)
Update UTRAN Network Resource Model (NRM)
Update UTRAN NRM CORBA Solution Set (SS)
Update UTRAN NRM CMIP Solution Set (SS)
Update UTRAN NRM XML format definition
Add UTRAN channel Measurements
5 Service Aspects
None
6 MMI-Aspects
None
7 Charging Aspects
None
8 Security Aspects
None |
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