text stringlengths 0 1.99k |
|---|
Ideally we would like to just overwrite our own processes' uid to be 0 |
to become root. |
Unfortunately for us, the check in 'ptrace_peek()' is correct. So, |
while we can write in the kernel, we can't read anything anywhere in it. |
---[ 6.1 - No KASLR |
ToaruOS doesn't have KASLR, so we know exactly where in memory the |
kernel is ahead of time. But what does that gain us? |
We could try to overwrite a global pointer, for example the current |
process and point it into our user space memory to a fake data |
structure. |
This would probably work since ToaruOS doesn't have SMAP. |
We could overwrite the address of an interrupt handler or a syscall or |
some other function pointer and redirect it so that we can run our own |
code in ring 0. |
This, too, would probably work since ToaruOS doesn't have SMEP. |
But both of these strategies require some extra effort in faking a data |
structure or writing C code that works properly in ring 0. |
---[ 6.2 - SUIDn't |
The exploit strategy I ended up using was a lot simpler to implement. |
We can alter kernel memory anywhere, even the .text section and we know |
where everything is since there's no KASLR. |
Remember the SUID check in 'elf_exec' that I talked about in 5.3? |
Because we know the exact version of the kernel, we can simply look at |
the kernel image or read /proc/kallsyms in our local instance to find |
out at which address in virtual memory that function is. |
local@livecd ~$ sudo cat /proc/kallsyms | grep elf_exec |
000000000010f300 elf_exec |
Disassembling the function with 'objdump' we can find the exact jump |
instruction that implements the if statement for SUID binaries. |
It is compiled to a 'jne' (jump not equal) conditional |
jump instruction that skips past the uid assignment if the binary isn't |
SUID. |
10f365: 0f 85 48 01 00 00 jne 0x10f4b3 |
To turn 'jne' into 'je' we just need to flip the 0x85 into a 0x84 byte. |
10f365: 0f 84 48 01 00 00 je 0x10f4b3 |
This negates the check so that now only non-SUID binary will assign |
their owners uid. |
Afterwards, simply running '/bin/esh' turns you into root and you can |
read the flag. |
---[ 7 - In Closing |
I hope this article can help some curious people get started in the |
kernel security space. If nothing else maybe it can give somebody an |
appreciation for it. |
I also hope it doesn't seem like I am disparaging ToaruOS in any way. |
I really like the project. Security is not its main focus and still it |
is likely more stable and secure than many other hobby OSes. |
Kernel security is very very hard and even harder on defense. |
Kernel security has many pitfalls. Both because it is the core of what |
protects everything on any OS and also because there are many low level |
details that we usually have the luxury of ignoring in user space. |
I want to thank the HXP team for the fun CTF they hosted and my friends |
who I forced to proof-read for me. In particular Lukas Ratz, who |
motivated me to participate in the first place. |
---[ 8 - References |
[1] https://github.com/klange/toaruos/tree/a54a0cbbee1ac18bceb2371e4987 |
6eab9abb3a11 |
[2] https://github.com/klange/toaruos |
[3] https://wiki.osdev.org/Paging |
---[ A - Exploit Code |
#include <stdio.h> |
#include <unistd.h> |
#include <sys/ptrace.h> |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.