The dataset viewer is not available for this dataset.
Error code: JWTInvalidSignature
Exception: InvalidSignatureError
Message: Signature verification failed
Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/libs/libapi/src/libapi/jwt_token.py", line 286, in validate_jwt
decoded = jwt.decode(
jwt=token,
...<2 lines>...
options=options,
)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/jwt/api_jwt.py", line 368, in decode
decoded = self.decode_complete(
jwt,
...<8 lines>...
leeway=leeway,
)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/jwt/api_jwt.py", line 265, in decode_complete
decoded = self._jws.decode_complete(
jwt,
...<3 lines>...
detached_payload=detached_payload,
)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/jwt/api_jws.py", line 270, in decode_complete
self._verify_signature(
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
signing_input,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
...<4 lines>...
options=merged_options,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
)
^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/jwt/api_jws.py", line 417, in _verify_signature
raise InvalidSignatureError("Signature verification failed")
jwt.exceptions.InvalidSignatureError: Signature verification failedNeed help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
AppSecBench Dataset Card
Dataset Summary
AppSecBench is an original benchmark of 406 vulnerable/secure code pairs spanning 12 programming languages, 18 frameworks, 34 vulnerability classes, and 5 difficulty levels. Each record is a self-contained evaluation case: a vulnerable snippet, its secure counterpart, an exploit sketch, and the "ground truth" a detector/model is expected to produce (CWE, OWASP, severity, CVSS 3.1, explainability, fix, and false-positive/false-negative priors).
The dataset supports measuring whether an LLM or security tool can detect, classify, explain, score severity, recommend a fix, and generate secure code for real-world application-security weaknesses — including modern AI/LLM risks (prompt injection, RAG, MCP, agent security) and infrastructure misconfigurations.
Supported Tasks
| Task | Input | Expected output |
|---|---|---|
| Vulnerability detection | vulnerable_code |
vulnerability flagged + location |
| CWE/OWASP mapping | code | expected_cwe / expected_owasp |
| Severity estimation | code | expected_severity + expected_cvss_score |
| Exploit explanation | code | exploitability_explanation |
| Secure fix / secure code gen | code | expected_secure_code |
| False-positive / false-negative analysis | code | expected_false_positive_probability / expected_false_negative_probability |
Languages & Frameworks
Python, Java, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go, Rust, PHP, C#, Kotlin, Swift, C, C++ (code); plus Infrastructure-as-Code in YAML / Dockerfile / Bash. Frameworks: Flask, FastAPI, Django, Spring Boot, Express, NestJS, Next.js, Laravel, ASP.NET Core, Gin, Echo, Fiber, Android, iOS.
Data Fields
Each record is a JSON object (see README.md for the field list). metadata carries
difficulty, category, cwe, owasp, owasp_api, owasp_llm, cvss_vector, cvss_score,
source, license, and schema_version.
Distribution (v1.1.0)
- 17 languages, 18 frameworks, 27 unique CWEs, 9 unique OWASP Top-10 (2021) classes, 34 vulnerability types.
- Difficulty: Beginner, Intermediate, Advanced, Expert, Real-world enterprise.
- Source type:
syntheticfor all records (original, non-derived). - Full per-dimension counts:
statistics/summary.jsonandstatistics/statistics.md.
Methodology
Records are generated deterministically (scripts/build.py, seed=42) from an original catalog
(scripts/vuln_catalog.py) and per-language generators (scripts/generators.py). CVSS 3.1 base
scores are computed from the official FIRST formulas (scripts/cvss.py). See docs/methodology.md.
Quality & Validation
An automated QA suite (scripts/validate.py) enforces: JSON validity, no duplicate IDs, required
field presence, enum conformance, CWE/OWASP/CVSS format + recomputation consistency, label
consistency vs the catalog, vulnerable_code != secure_code, reference well-formedness, and real
syntax/compile checks. Result for v1.1.0: PASS (0 errors) over 572 records. Report: validation/validation_report.md.
Intended Uses
- Evaluating and comparing LLMs on secure-code understanding.
- Benchmarking SAST / SCA / secret-scanning / IaC-scanning tools.
- Training and fine-tuning secure-coding assistants (with proper licensing).
- Academic reproducible experiments in application security.
Limitations & Out-of-Scope
- Snippets are minimal/synthetic, not full applications; they isolate one weakness at a time.
- Some languages are checked with heuristic balance (not compiled) when no toolchain is present.
- The benchmark measures recognition/explanation, not end-to-end offensive capability.
- Not a substitute for manual security review or threat modeling.
See docs/LIMITATIONS.md and docs/INTENDED_USES.md.
Ethical Considerations & Responsible Disclosure
docs/ETHICAL_CONSIDERATIONS.md and docs/RESPONSIBLE_DISCLOSURE.md. The vulnerable code is
educational, synthetic, and non-weaponized.
Licensing
MIT. Code snippets are original and provided for defensive use.
Citation (BibTeX)
@dataset{tasdelen2026appsecbench,
title = {AppSecBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark Dataset for Application Security Evaluation, Secure Code Review, AI Security Research, LLM Evaluation, and Secure Software Engineering},
author = {Taşdelen, İsmail},
year = {2026},
version= {1.1.0},
publisher = {Hugging Face}
}
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