url
stringlengths 24
122
| repo_url
stringlengths 60
156
| date_extracted
stringdate 2025-08-13 00:00:00
2025-08-13 00:00:00
| root
stringlengths 3
85
| breadcrumbs
listlengths 1
6
| filename
stringlengths 6
60
| stage
stringclasses 33
values | group
stringclasses 81
values | info
stringclasses 22
values | title
stringlengths 3
110
⌀ | description
stringlengths 11
359
⌀ | clean_text
stringlengths 47
3.32M
| rich_text
stringlengths 321
3.32M
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.31
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.31.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.31.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Dropbox long lived API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Dropbox long lived API token was detected. These tokens were deprecated in 2021, see <https://dropbox.tech/developers/migrating-app-permissions-and-access-tokens#introducing-scoped-apps> for more details.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.31 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Dropbox long lived API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Dropbox long lived API token was detected. These tokens were deprecated in 2021, see <https://dropbox.tech/developers/migrating-app-permissions-and-access-tokens#introducing-scoped-apps> for more details.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.31 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.143
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.143.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.143.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab runner registration token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a deprecated GitLab Runner registration token was identified. These tokens allow users to register a runner with the selected project. A malicious actor with access to this token can add a custom runner to the pipeline and possibly compromise the repository if the runner was used.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate a runner registration token:
- Sign in to your GitLab account and visit the project that created the runner registration token
- In the left-hand menu, select "Settings"
- Under the "Settings" options, select "CI/CD"
- Under the "Runners" section, select the kebab menu (vertical ellipsis) next to the "New project runner"
- Select "Reset registration token" from the dropdown list
- When prompted select "Reset token" in the "Reset registration token" dialog
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on using runner authentication tokens instead](https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/register/#register-with-a-runner-authentication-token).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.143 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab runner registration token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a deprecated GitLab Runner registration token was identified. These tokens allow users to register a runner with the selected project. A malicious actor with access to this token can add a custom runner to the pipeline and possibly compromise the repository if the runner was used.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate a runner registration token:
- Sign in to your GitLab account and visit the project that created the runner registration token
- In the left-hand menu, select "Settings"
- Under the "Settings" options, select "CI/CD"
- Under the "Runners" section, select the kebab menu (vertical ellipsis) next to the "New project runner"
- Select "Reset registration token" from the dropdown list
- When prompted select "Reset token" in the "Reset registration token" dialog
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on using runner authentication tokens instead](https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/register/#register-with-a-runner-authentication-token).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.143 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.139
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.139.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.139.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Google (GCP) service account
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GCP service account was identified. Service accounts can be assigned a wide range of permissions or access. A malicious actor with access to the service account can potentially compromise the entire GCP account or have limited access to resources, depending on the access granted.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke the GCP Service account:
- Sign in to your GCP account and go to <https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/serviceaccounts>
- Select the correct project from the list (if given a choice)
- Find the key ID and the associated service account in the "Service accounts" table
- Select the kebab menu (vertical ellipsis) for the identified key and select "Manage keys"
- Select the trash icon next to the identified key
For more information, please see [Googles documentation on creating service account keys](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/keys-create-delete).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.139 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Google (GCP) service account
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GCP service account was identified. Service accounts can be assigned a wide range of permissions or access. A malicious actor with access to the service account can potentially compromise the entire GCP account or have limited access to resources, depending on the access granted.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke the GCP Service account:
- Sign in to your GCP account and go to <https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/serviceaccounts>
- Select the correct project from the list (if given a choice)
- Find the key ID and the associated service account in the "Service accounts" table
- Select the kebab menu (vertical ellipsis) for the identified key and select "Manage keys"
- Select the trash icon next to the identified key
For more information, please see [Googles documentation on creating service account keys](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/keys-create-delete).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.139 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.145
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.145.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.145.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab feed token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab Feed Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate a feed token:
- Sign in to your GitLab account and access the [User settings](../../../../../user/profile/_index.md#access-your-user-settings) left-hand side menu, select "Access tokens"
- Under the "Feed token" section, select the "reset this token" link
- When prompted select "OK" For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on feed tokens](../../../../../security/tokens/_index.md#feed-token).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.145 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab feed token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab Feed Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate a feed token:
- Sign in to your GitLab account and access the [User settings](../../../../../user/profile/_index.md#access-your-user-settings) left-hand side menu, select "Access tokens"
- Under the "Feed token" section, select the "reset this token" link
- When prompted select "OK" For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on feed tokens](../../../../../security/tokens/_index.md#feed-token).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.145 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/98.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/98.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
98.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
PHP Remote File Inclusion
| null |
## Description
The server is vulnerable to PHP Remote File Inclusion (RFI), which enables attackers to load
remote files and have them executed as PHP scripts on the server side. This vulnerability occurs
when untrusted user input is directly used in script inclusion without proper validation. Attackers
can leverage this vulnerability to include and execute arbitrary remote files, potentially
compromising the system's integrity and confidentiality.
## Remediation
Avoid using user-controlled data directly in `include` and `require` statements and instead consider
an allow-list approach for dynamically including scripts.
If possible, also consider setting `allow_url_include=Off` in the server's PHP configuration to
ensure URLs cannot be used in `include` and `require` statements.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 98.1 | false | 98 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html)
- [File inclusion Vulnerability - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_inclusion_vulnerability)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: PHP Remote File Inclusion
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The server is vulnerable to PHP Remote File Inclusion (RFI), which enables attackers to load
remote files and have them executed as PHP scripts on the server side. This vulnerability occurs
when untrusted user input is directly used in script inclusion without proper validation. Attackers
can leverage this vulnerability to include and execute arbitrary remote files, potentially
compromising the system's integrity and confidentiality.
## Remediation
Avoid using user-controlled data directly in `include` and `require` statements and instead consider
an allow-list approach for dynamically including scripts.
If possible, also consider setting `allow_url_include=Off` in the server's PHP configuration to
ensure URLs cannot be used in `include` and `require` statements.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 98.1 | false | 98 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html)
- [File inclusion Vulnerability - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_inclusion_vulnerability)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.5
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.5.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
16.5.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
AspNet header exposes version information
| null |
## Description
The target website returns AspNet headers and version information of this website. By
exposing these values attackers may attempt to identify if the target software is vulnerable to known
vulnerabilities, or catalog known sites running particular versions to exploit in the future when a
vulnerability is identified in the particular version.
## Remediation
To remove the `X-AspNet-Version` header set `<httpRuntime enableVersionHeader="false" />` in the `<system.Web>`
section of the `Web.config` file.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.5 | true | 16 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [IIS Remove Unwanted Headers](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/iis-support-blog/remove-unwanted-http-response-headers/ba-p/369710)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: AspNet header exposes version information
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target website returns AspNet headers and version information of this website. By
exposing these values attackers may attempt to identify if the target software is vulnerable to known
vulnerabilities, or catalog known sites running particular versions to exploit in the future when a
vulnerability is identified in the particular version.
## Remediation
To remove the `X-AspNet-Version` header set `<httpRuntime enableVersionHeader="false" />` in the `<system.Web>`
section of the `Web.config` file.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.5 | true | 16 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [IIS Remove Unwanted Headers](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/iis-support-blog/remove-unwanted-http-response-headers/ba-p/369710)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.166
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.166.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.166.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token PGP private key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a PGP private key was identified. PGP private keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages. A malicious actor with access to this key can encrypt and decrypt all past and future messages. Note that past messages encrypted using this key should be considered compromised, and new messages cannot be considered trusted.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). PGP keys cannot be rotated, a new key must be created. For more information, please see [GnuPG's documentation on generating keys](https://gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN26)
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.166 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token PGP private key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a PGP private key was identified. PGP private keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages. A malicious actor with access to this key can encrypt and decrypt all past and future messages. Note that past messages encrypted using this key should be considered compromised, and new messages cannot be considered trusted.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). PGP keys cannot be rotated, a new key must be created. For more information, please see [GnuPG's documentation on generating keys](https://gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN26)
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.166 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.181
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.181.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.181.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Yandex Cloud IAM cookie v1-1
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of Yandex Cloud IAM Cookie v1.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.181 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Yandex Cloud IAM cookie v1-1
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of Yandex Cloud IAM Cookie v1.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.181 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.3
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.3.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
16.3.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
X-Powered-By header exposes version information
| null |
## Description
The target website returns the `X-Powered-By` header and version information of this website. By
exposing these values, attackers may attempt to identify if the target software is vulnerable to known
vulnerabilities, or catalog known sites running particular versions to exploit in the future when a
vulnerability is identified in the particular version.
## Remediation
We recommend that the version information be removed from the `X-Powered-By` header.
PHP:
For PHP based web sites, set the `expose_php` option to `off` in the `php.ini` configuration file.
For all other server types, consult your product's documentation on how to redact the version
information from the `X-Powered-By` header.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.3 | true | 16 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [PHP `expose_php`](https://www.php.net/manual/en/ini.core.php#ini.expose-php)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: X-Powered-By header exposes version information
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target website returns the `X-Powered-By` header and version information of this website. By
exposing these values, attackers may attempt to identify if the target software is vulnerable to known
vulnerabilities, or catalog known sites running particular versions to exploit in the future when a
vulnerability is identified in the particular version.
## Remediation
We recommend that the version information be removed from the `X-Powered-By` header.
PHP:
For PHP based web sites, set the `expose_php` option to `off` in the `php.ini` configuration file.
For all other server types, consult your product's documentation on how to redact the version
information from the `X-Powered-By` header.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.3 | true | 16 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [PHP `expose_php`](https://www.php.net/manual/en/ini.core.php#ini.expose-php)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.160
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.160.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.160.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token MaxMind License Key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a MaxMind License Key.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.160 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token MaxMind License Key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a MaxMind License Key.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.160 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.12
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.12.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.12.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token AWS access token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an AWS Access Token was detected. AWS Access Tokens are usually paired along with their secret key values. A malicious actor with access to this token can access AWS services with the same permissions as the user which generated the key, provided they have access to both values.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). To delete an access key: - In the "Access keys" section, find the key that was identified - Select "Actions" - Select "Delete" - Follow the instructions in the dialog to first deactivate and then confirm the deletion For information on how to manage and revoke access keys for AWS please see their [documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_access-keys.html#Using_CreateAccessKey).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.12 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token AWS access token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an AWS Access Token was detected. AWS Access Tokens are usually paired along with their secret key values. A malicious actor with access to this token can access AWS services with the same permissions as the user which generated the key, provided they have access to both values.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). To delete an access key: - In the "Access keys" section, find the key that was identified - Select "Actions" - Select "Delete" - Follow the instructions in the dialog to first deactivate and then confirm the deletion For information on how to manage and revoke access keys for AWS please see their [documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_access-keys.html#Using_CreateAccessKey).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.12 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.14
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.14.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.14.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Bitbucket client secret
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Bitbucket client secret.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.14 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Bitbucket client secret
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Bitbucket client secret.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.14 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.68
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.68.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.68.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token LinkedIn client ID
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a LinkedIn Client ID was identified. Client IDs are used in combination with a client secret. A malicious actor with access to this ID can impersonate the client application if they also have access to the client secret.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). Client IDs do not need to be revoked or regenerated. For more information, please see [LinkedIn's documentation on API access](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/linkedin/learning/getting-started/request-access).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.68 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token LinkedIn client ID
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a LinkedIn Client ID was identified. Client IDs are used in combination with a client secret. A malicious actor with access to this ID can impersonate the client application if they also have access to the client secret.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). Client IDs do not need to be revoked or regenerated. For more information, please see [LinkedIn's documentation on API access](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/linkedin/learning/getting-started/request-access).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.68 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.176
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.176.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.176.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Stripe publishable live key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Stripe publishable live key was identified.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.176 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Stripe publishable live key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Stripe publishable live key was identified.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.176 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/209.2
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/209.2.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
209.2.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Generation of database error message containing sensitive information
| null |
## Description
The application was found to return database error messages. Determining the type of database may assist attackers in exploiting
SQL Injection attacks against the system. While debug messages are helpful during development and debugging, they should not be
presented to users when an error occurs.
## Remediation
Applications should handle database error conditions internally and map known failure types to error codes that can be displayed
to a user. These error codes should be customized to the application and returned along with the relevant HTTP error code.
When an error occurs, the application identifies the error type or class, and displays a numerical value to the
user. Requests should also be tracked so when a user is presented with an error code, it has a corresponding request ID.
Support teams can then correlate the HTTP error, the customized error code, and the request ID in the log files to
determine the root cause of the error without leaking details to the end user.
Example of returning customized errors:
```plaintext
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
...
Error [0004] Occurred, please contact support or re-try your request again shortly.
Request ID [a4bc91def12]
...
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 209.2 | false | 209 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/209.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Generation of database error message containing sensitive information
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The application was found to return database error messages. Determining the type of database may assist attackers in exploiting
SQL Injection attacks against the system. While debug messages are helpful during development and debugging, they should not be
presented to users when an error occurs.
## Remediation
Applications should handle database error conditions internally and map known failure types to error codes that can be displayed
to a user. These error codes should be customized to the application and returned along with the relevant HTTP error code.
When an error occurs, the application identifies the error type or class, and displays a numerical value to the
user. Requests should also be tracked so when a user is presented with an error code, it has a corresponding request ID.
Support teams can then correlate the HTTP error, the customized error code, and the request ID in the log files to
determine the root cause of the error without leaking details to the end user.
Example of returning customized errors:
```plaintext
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
...
Error [0004] Occurred, please contact support or re-try your request again shortly.
Request ID [a4bc91def12]
...
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 209.2 | false | 209 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/209.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.170
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.170.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.170.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Brevo SMTP token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Brevo SMTP token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.170 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Brevo SMTP token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Brevo SMTP token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.170 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.78
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.78.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.78.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token MessageBird access key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a MessageBird Access Key.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.78 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token MessageBird access key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a MessageBird Access Key.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.78 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/74.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/74.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
74.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
XSLT Injection
| null |
## Description
It is possible to supply an XSL template to a server-side XSLT processor. XSLT processors can
be abused to read or write files, initiate outbound connections, and in some cases execute
arbitrary code.
## Remediation
Applications should never accept user-supplied style sheets. XSLT processors are not built to
handle potentially malicious stylesheet files. However, some processors do implement or offer
security features which may be available. Consult the documentation for the XSLT processor
used by the target application for security guidelines and hardening steps. It is recommended
that all XML parsers and processors at the very least disable external entity resolution.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 74.1 | false | 74 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/74.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: XSLT Injection
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
It is possible to supply an XSL template to a server-side XSLT processor. XSLT processors can
be abused to read or write files, initiate outbound connections, and in some cases execute
arbitrary code.
## Remediation
Applications should never accept user-supplied style sheets. XSLT processors are not built to
handle potentially malicious stylesheet files. However, some processors do implement or offer
security features which may be available. Consult the documentation for the XSLT processor
used by the target application for security guidelines and hardening steps. It is recommended
that all XML parsers and processors at the very least disable external entity resolution.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 74.1 | false | 74 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/74.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.32
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.32.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.32.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Dropbox short lived API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Dropbox short lived API token was detected. These tokens were deprecated in 2021, see <https://dropbox.tech/developers/migrating-app-permissions-and-access-tokens#introducing-scoped-apps> for more details.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.32 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Dropbox short lived API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Dropbox short lived API token was detected. These tokens were deprecated in 2021, see <https://dropbox.tech/developers/migrating-app-permissions-and-access-tokens#introducing-scoped-apps> for more details.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.32 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.34
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.34.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.34.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Duffel API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Duffel API token was detected. Duffel API Tokens can be either read-write or read-only depending on how they were created. A malicious actor with access to a read-write token can execute orders, book flights or hotels, or view or modify customer lists. A read-only token can view customer lists, list bookings and flight information.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate a token:
- Open and sign in to <https://app.duffel.com/>
- On the top of the page select the Developers dropdown list and then select "Developers"
- On the left-hand menu select "Access tokens"
- Select the access token that was detected
- Note the type of token ("Read and Write" or "Read Only")
- In the "Danger Zone" select "Delete token"
- Recreate a new token with the same settings as the detected token
For more information see their documentation: <https://duffel.com/docs/guides/getting-started-with-the-dashboard#access-tokens>
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.34 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Duffel API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Duffel API token was detected. Duffel API Tokens can be either read-write or read-only depending on how they were created. A malicious actor with access to a read-write token can execute orders, book flights or hotels, or view or modify customer lists. A read-only token can view customer lists, list bookings and flight information.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate a token:
- Open and sign in to <https://app.duffel.com/>
- On the top of the page select the Developers dropdown list and then select "Developers"
- On the left-hand menu select "Access tokens"
- Select the access token that was detected
- Note the type of token ("Read and Write" or "Read Only")
- In the "Danger Zone" select "Delete token"
- Recreate a new token with the same settings as the detected token
For more information see their documentation: <https://duffel.com/docs/guides/getting-started-with-the-dashboard#access-tokens>
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.34 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.48
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.48.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.48.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Frame.io API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Frame.io API token was identified. Frame.io supports external access through scoped API tokens. Tokens are associated with individual user accounts, and have the same access permissions as the user who created them. All API actions in Frame.io are restricted by scopes. A malicious actor with access to this token can execute various functionality depending on scopes assigned to the token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke the API token:
- Sign in and access <https://developer.frame.io/app/tokens>
- Find the token that was identified and take note of the scopes assigned to it
- Select the trash icon to the right of the identified token
- When prompted with "Delete token?" select "Delete"
For more information, please see [Frame.io's documentation on authentication](https://developer.frame.io/docs/getting-started/authentication).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.48 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Frame.io API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Frame.io API token was identified. Frame.io supports external access through scoped API tokens. Tokens are associated with individual user accounts, and have the same access permissions as the user who created them. All API actions in Frame.io are restricted by scopes. A malicious actor with access to this token can execute various functionality depending on scopes assigned to the token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke the API token:
- Sign in and access <https://developer.frame.io/app/tokens>
- Find the token that was identified and take note of the scopes assigned to it
- Select the trash icon to the right of the identified token
- When prompted with "Delete token?" select "Delete"
For more information, please see [Frame.io's documentation on authentication](https://developer.frame.io/docs/getting-started/authentication).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.48 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.146
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.146.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.146.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab OAuth application secret
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab OAuth application secret was identified. OAuth secrets are used when allowing users to sign in to your application. Depending on the scopes assigned, a malicious actor could impersonate the service to access their repositories or data.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate an OAuth secret:
- Sign in to your GitLab account and access the [User settings](../../../../../user/profile/_index.md#access-your-user-settings) left-hand side menu, select "Applications"
- Find the application that uses the identified token and select the name link in the "Name" column - Select "Renew secret" in the application details page
- When prompted, select "Renew secret"
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on configuring an OAuth 2.0 provider](../../../../../integration/oauth_provider.md)
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.146 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab OAuth application secret
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab OAuth application secret was identified. OAuth secrets are used when allowing users to sign in to your application. Depending on the scopes assigned, a malicious actor could impersonate the service to access their repositories or data.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate an OAuth secret:
- Sign in to your GitLab account and access the [User settings](../../../../../user/profile/_index.md#access-your-user-settings) left-hand side menu, select "Applications"
- Find the application that uses the identified token and select the name link in the "Name" column - Select "Renew secret" in the application details page
- When prompted, select "Renew secret"
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on configuring an OAuth 2.0 provider](../../../../../integration/oauth_provider.md)
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.146 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.8
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.8.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.8.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Alibaba Secret Key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Alibaba Secret Key.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.8 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Alibaba Secret Key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Alibaba Secret Key.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.8 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.140
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.140.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.140.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab Personal Access Token (routable)
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab Personal Access Token (routable).
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.140 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab Personal Access Token (routable)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab Personal Access Token (routable).
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.140 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.24
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.24.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.24.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Databricks API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Databricks API token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.24 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Databricks API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Databricks API token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.24 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.58
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.58.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.58.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token HashiCorp Terraform API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a HashiCorp Terraform API token was identified. API tokens can be used to access the HCP Terraform API. A malicious actor with access to this token can perform all actions the user account is entitled to.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke an API token:
- Sign in to the Terraform HCP console and access <https://app.terraform.io/app/settings/tokens>
- Find the token that was identified
- Select the trash icon on the right hand side of the token
- When prompted, select "Confirm" in the "Deleting token ..." dialog
For more information, please see [Terraform's documentation on API tokens](https://app.terraform.io/app/settings/tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.58 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token HashiCorp Terraform API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a HashiCorp Terraform API token was identified. API tokens can be used to access the HCP Terraform API. A malicious actor with access to this token can perform all actions the user account is entitled to.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke an API token:
- Sign in to the Terraform HCP console and access <https://app.terraform.io/app/settings/tokens>
- Find the token that was identified
- Select the trash icon on the right hand side of the token
- When prompted, select "Confirm" in the "Deleting token ..." dialog
For more information, please see [Terraform's documentation on API tokens](https://app.terraform.io/app/settings/tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.58 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.156
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.156.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.156.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Intercom client secret or client ID
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Intercom client secret or client ID was identified. Client secrets are used when allowing users to sign in to your application. Depending on the scopes requested, a malicious actor could impersonate the service to access the user's information.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). It is not possible to rotate client secret or IDs. You must delete your application and recreate it. For more information, please see [Intercom's documentation on setting up applications](https://developers.intercom.com/docs/build-an-integration/getting-started/build-an-app-for-your-messenger/sheets-app#set-up).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.156 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Intercom client secret or client ID
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Intercom client secret or client ID was identified. Client secrets are used when allowing users to sign in to your application. Depending on the scopes requested, a malicious actor could impersonate the service to access the user's information.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). It is not possible to rotate client secret or IDs. You must delete your application and recreate it. For more information, please see [Intercom's documentation on setting up applications](https://developers.intercom.com/docs/build-an-integration/getting-started/build-an-app-for-your-messenger/sheets-app#set-up).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.156 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.150
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.150.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.150.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab deploy token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab deploy token was identified. A deploy token enables authentication of deployment tasks, independent of a user account. With a deploy token, automated tasks can: - Clone Git repositories - Pull from and push to a GitLab container registry - Pull from and push to a GitLab package registry A malicious actor with access to this token can access Git repositories or compromise released packages or containers.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on revoking deploy tokens](../../../../../user/project/deploy_tokens/_index.md).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.150 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab deploy token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab deploy token was identified. A deploy token enables authentication of deployment tasks, independent of a user account. With a deploy token, automated tasks can: - Clone Git repositories - Pull from and push to a GitLab container registry - Pull from and push to a GitLab package registry A malicious actor with access to this token can access Git repositories or compromise released packages or containers.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on revoking deploy tokens](../../../../../user/project/deploy_tokens/_index.md).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.150 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.28
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.28.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.28.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Discord client secret
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Discord client secret.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate a Discord client secret:
- Sign in and visit <https://discord.com/developers/applications/>.
- Select the application which the identified secret belongs to.
- Select the "OAuth 2" menu item in the left-hand side menu.
- Under the "Client information" section of the page, select "Reset Secret".
- When prompted, select "Yes, do it!".
For more information, please see [Discord's documentation on OAuth](https://discord.com/developers/docs/topics/oauth2).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.28 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Discord client secret
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Discord client secret.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate a Discord client secret:
- Sign in and visit <https://discord.com/developers/applications/>.
- Select the application which the identified secret belongs to.
- Select the "OAuth 2" menu item in the left-hand side menu.
- Under the "Client information" section of the page, select "Reset Secret".
- When prompted, select "Yes, do it!".
For more information, please see [Discord's documentation on OAuth](https://discord.com/developers/docs/topics/oauth2).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.28 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.54
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.54.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.54.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitHub app token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitHub App Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.54 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitHub app token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitHub App Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.54 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/94.2
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/94.2.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
94.2.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Server-side code injection (Ruby)
| null |
## Description
The target application was found vulnerable to code injection. A malicious actor could inject arbitrary
Ruby code to be executed on the server. This could lead to a full system compromise by accessing
stored secrets, injecting code to take over accounts, or executing OS commands.
## Remediation
Never pass user input directly into functions which evaluate string data as code, such as `eval`,
`send`, `public_send`, `instance_eval` or `class_eval`. There is almost no benefit of passing string
values to these methods, as such the best recommendation is to replace the current logic with more safe
implementations of dynamically evaluating logic with user input. If using `send` or `public_send` ensure
the first argument is to a known, hardcoded method/symbol and does not come from user input.
For `eval`, `instance_eval` and `class_eval`, user input should never be sent directly to these methods.
One alternative is to store functions or methods in a Hash that can be looked up using a key. If the key
exists, the function can be executed.
```ruby
def func_to_run
puts 'hello world'
end
input = 'fn'
function_map = { fn: method(:func_to_run) }
if function_map.key?(input.to_sym)
function_map[input.to_sym].call
else
puts 'invalid input'
end
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 94.2 | false | 94 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Server-side code injection (Ruby)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target application was found vulnerable to code injection. A malicious actor could inject arbitrary
Ruby code to be executed on the server. This could lead to a full system compromise by accessing
stored secrets, injecting code to take over accounts, or executing OS commands.
## Remediation
Never pass user input directly into functions which evaluate string data as code, such as `eval`,
`send`, `public_send`, `instance_eval` or `class_eval`. There is almost no benefit of passing string
values to these methods, as such the best recommendation is to replace the current logic with more safe
implementations of dynamically evaluating logic with user input. If using `send` or `public_send` ensure
the first argument is to a known, hardcoded method/symbol and does not come from user input.
For `eval`, `instance_eval` and `class_eval`, user input should never be sent directly to these methods.
One alternative is to store functions or methods in a Hash that can be looked up using a key. If the key
exists, the function can be executed.
```ruby
def func_to_run
puts 'hello world'
end
input = 'fn'
function_map = { fn: method(:func_to_run) }
if function_map.key?(input.to_sym)
function_map[input.to_sym].call
else
puts 'invalid input'
end
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 94.2 | false | 94 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.52
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.52.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.52.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitHub personal access token (classic)
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitHub personal access token (classic) was identified. Personal access tokens can be used to access GitHub services as the user who created them. In most cases these tokens are given read-write access to all repositories. A malicious actor with access to this token can execute functionality on behalf of the user with the given permissions of the token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate a personal access token:
- Sign in to your GitHub account and access <https://github.com/settings/tokens>
- Find the token that was identified and select the name
- Select "Regenerate token" at the top of the page Alternatively, you could select "Delete this token" at the bottom of the page and create a new one. Be sure to note the scopes and permissions set before doing this action.
For more information, please see [GitHubs documentation on personal access tokens](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/managing-your-personal-access-tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.52 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitHub personal access token (classic)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitHub personal access token (classic) was identified. Personal access tokens can be used to access GitHub services as the user who created them. In most cases these tokens are given read-write access to all repositories. A malicious actor with access to this token can execute functionality on behalf of the user with the given permissions of the token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate a personal access token:
- Sign in to your GitHub account and access <https://github.com/settings/tokens>
- Find the token that was identified and select the name
- Select "Regenerate token" at the top of the page Alternatively, you could select "Delete this token" at the bottom of the page and create a new one. Be sure to note the scopes and permissions set before doing this action.
For more information, please see [GitHubs documentation on personal access tokens](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/managing-your-personal-access-tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.52 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/94.4
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/94.4.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
94.4.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Server-side code injection (NodeJS)
| null |
## Description
The target application was found vulnerable to code injection. A malicious actor could inject arbitrary
JavaScript code to be executed on the server. This could lead to a full system compromise by accessing
stored secrets, injecting code to take over accounts, or executing OS commands.
## Remediation
Never pass user input directly into functions which evaluate string data as code, such as `eval`, `setTimeout`
or `setInterval`. There is almost no benefit of passing string values to these methods, as such the best
recommendation is to replace the current logic with more safe implementations of dynamically evaluating
logic with user input. One alternative is to store functions or methods in a Map that can be looked
up using a key. If the key exists, the function can be executed.
```javascript
const function_map = new Map();
function_map.set('fn', function() {
console.log('hello world');
})
const input = 'fn2';
const fn = function_map.get(input)
if (fn) {
fn();
} else {
console.log('invalid input');
}
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 94.4 | false | 94 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Server-side code injection (NodeJS)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target application was found vulnerable to code injection. A malicious actor could inject arbitrary
JavaScript code to be executed on the server. This could lead to a full system compromise by accessing
stored secrets, injecting code to take over accounts, or executing OS commands.
## Remediation
Never pass user input directly into functions which evaluate string data as code, such as `eval`, `setTimeout`
or `setInterval`. There is almost no benefit of passing string values to these methods, as such the best
recommendation is to replace the current logic with more safe implementations of dynamically evaluating
logic with user input. One alternative is to store functions or methods in a Map that can be looked
up using a key. If the key exists, the function can be executed.
```javascript
const function_map = new Map();
function_map.set('fn', function() {
console.log('hello world');
})
const input = 'fn2';
const fn = function_map.get(input)
if (fn) {
fn();
} else {
console.log('invalid input');
}
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 94.4 | false | 94 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/78.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/78.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
78.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
OS Command Injection
| null |
## Description
It is possible to execute arbitrary OS commands on the target application server.
OS Command Injection is a critical vulnerability that can lead to a full system
compromise.
## Remediation
User input should never be used in constructing commands or command arguments
to functions which execute OS commands. This includes filenames supplied by
user uploads or downloads.
Ensure your application does not:
- Use user-supplied information in the process name to execute.
- Use user-supplied information in an OS command execution function which does
not escape shell meta-characters.
- Use user-supplied information in arguments to OS commands.
The application should have a hardcoded set of arguments that are to be passed
to OS commands. If filenames are being passed to these functions, it is
recommended that a hash of the filename be used instead, or some other unique
identifier. It is strongly recommended that a native library that implements
the same functionality be used instead of using OS system commands due to the
risk of unknown attacks against third party commands.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 78.1 | false | 78 | Active | high |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Command_Injection)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: OS Command Injection
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
It is possible to execute arbitrary OS commands on the target application server.
OS Command Injection is a critical vulnerability that can lead to a full system
compromise.
## Remediation
User input should never be used in constructing commands or command arguments
to functions which execute OS commands. This includes filenames supplied by
user uploads or downloads.
Ensure your application does not:
- Use user-supplied information in the process name to execute.
- Use user-supplied information in an OS command execution function which does
not escape shell meta-characters.
- Use user-supplied information in arguments to OS commands.
The application should have a hardcoded set of arguments that are to be passed
to OS commands. If filenames are being passed to these functions, it is
recommended that a hash of the filename be used instead, or some other unique
identifier. It is strongly recommended that a native library that implements
the same functionality be used instead of using OS system commands due to the
risk of unknown attacks against third party commands.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 78.1 | false | 78 | Active | high |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Command_Injection)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.42
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.42.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.42.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Finicity API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Finicity API token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.42 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Finicity API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Finicity API token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.42 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.130
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.130.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.130.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Anthropic API key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Anthropic API key was detected. Anthropic keys are used to access generative AI services. Malicious actors could use these keys to build up excessive charges to your account.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To remediate a leaked Anthropic key, you should delete it from the list of API keys for your organization.
- Sign in to your [Anthropic account](https://console.anthropic.com/)
- Go to "API settings" by selecting your profile icon and then selecting "API Keys" or through the Settings tab
- Identify the leaked API key and select the meatball menu (three horizontal dots) next to the key you want to delete
- Select "Delete API Key"
- Note: Deleting an API key is a permanent action and cannot be undone
- Generate a new key by selecting "Create Key" and give it a descriptive name
For more information, please see Anthropic's website: <https://support.anthropic.com/en/articles/8384961-what-should-i-do-if-i-suspect-my-api-key-has-been-compromised>.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.130 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Anthropic API key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Anthropic API key was detected. Anthropic keys are used to access generative AI services. Malicious actors could use these keys to build up excessive charges to your account.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To remediate a leaked Anthropic key, you should delete it from the list of API keys for your organization.
- Sign in to your [Anthropic account](https://console.anthropic.com/)
- Go to "API settings" by selecting your profile icon and then selecting "API Keys" or through the Settings tab
- Identify the leaked API key and select the meatball menu (three horizontal dots) next to the key you want to delete
- Select "Delete API Key"
- Note: Deleting an API key is a permanent action and cannot be undone
- Generate a new key by selecting "Create Key" and give it a descriptive name
For more information, please see Anthropic's website: <https://support.anthropic.com/en/articles/8384961-what-should-i-do-if-i-suspect-my-api-key-has-been-compromised>.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.130 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.2
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.2.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.2.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Adobe Client ID (OAuth Web)
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Adobe Client ID (OAuth Web).
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.2 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Adobe Client ID (OAuth Web)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Adobe Client ID (OAuth Web).
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.2 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.136
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.136.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.136.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token DigitalOcean personal access token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a DigitalOcean Personal Access Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.136 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token DigitalOcean personal access token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a DigitalOcean Personal Access Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.136 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.4
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.4.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.4.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Age secret key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an age encryption secret key was detected. Age is a modern and secure file encryption tool, format, and Go library. It features small explicit keys, no configuration options, and UNIX-style composability. These keys are usually used for encrypting sensitive files. A malicious actor with access to this key can decrypt any file or message encrypted with it.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). To generate a new age key, run the following command: ```console age-keygen -o new_key.age``` Consider protecting the identity file with a passphrase. This may not be possible if this key is intended to be used in automated systems: ```console age-keygen | age -p > new_key.age```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.4 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Age secret key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an age encryption secret key was detected. Age is a modern and secure file encryption tool, format, and Go library. It features small explicit keys, no configuration options, and UNIX-style composability. These keys are usually used for encrypting sensitive files. A malicious actor with access to this key can decrypt any file or message encrypted with it.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). To generate a new age key, run the following command: ```console age-keygen -o new_key.age``` Consider protecting the identity file with a passphrase. This may not be possible if this key is intended to be used in automated systems: ```console age-keygen | age -p > new_key.age```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.4 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.106
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.106.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.106.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Shopify custom app access token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Shopify custom app access token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.106 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Shopify custom app access token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Shopify custom app access token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.106 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.74
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.74.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.74.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Mailgun private API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Mailgun private API token was identified. This key allows you to perform read, write, and delete operations through various API endpoints and for any of your sending domains. A malicious actor with access to this key can perform any API request to Mailgun without restriction.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate a private API token:
- Sign in to your Mailgun account and access the dashboard at <https://app.mailgun.com/>
- On the top right-hand side, select your account profile and then select "API Security"
- Find the identified key and select the trash icon
- If you cannot select the trash icon, you must first generate a new key by selecting "Add new key"
- When prompted, select "Delete" in the "Delete API Key" dialog
For more information, please see [Mailgun's documentation on API keys](https://documentation.mailgun.com/docs/mailgun/user-manual/get-started/#primary-account-api-key).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.74 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Mailgun private API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Mailgun private API token was identified. This key allows you to perform read, write, and delete operations through various API endpoints and for any of your sending domains. A malicious actor with access to this key can perform any API request to Mailgun without restriction.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate a private API token:
- Sign in to your Mailgun account and access the dashboard at <https://app.mailgun.com/>
- On the top right-hand side, select your account profile and then select "API Security"
- Find the identified key and select the trash icon
- If you cannot select the trash icon, you must first generate a new key by selecting "Add new key"
- When prompted, select "Delete" in the "Delete API Key" dialog
For more information, please see [Mailgun's documentation on API keys](https://documentation.mailgun.com/docs/mailgun/user-manual/get-started/#primary-account-api-key).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.74 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.93
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.93.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.93.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Postman API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Postman API token was identified. An API key provides access to any Postman data the account has permissions to. A malicious actor with access to this token can access all data stored in the Postman service that the user who created the API key has access to.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate an API token:
- Sign in to your Postman account at <https://www.postman.com/>
- Select the profile picture in the top right-hand side, and select "Settings"
- Select "API keys" in the left-hand menu
- Find the key that was identified, and select the ellipsis next to the status column in the "API keys" section
- Select "Regenerate"
- When prompted, select "Regenerate API Key" in the "Regenerate API key" dialog
For more information, please see [Postman's documentation on API keys](https://learning.postman.com/docs/developer/postman-api/authentication/).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.93 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Postman API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Postman API token was identified. An API key provides access to any Postman data the account has permissions to. A malicious actor with access to this token can access all data stored in the Postman service that the user who created the API key has access to.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate an API token:
- Sign in to your Postman account at <https://www.postman.com/>
- Select the profile picture in the top right-hand side, and select "Settings"
- Select "API keys" in the left-hand menu
- Find the key that was identified, and select the ellipsis next to the status column in the "API keys" section
- Select "Regenerate"
- When prompted, select "Regenerate API Key" in the "Regenerate API key" dialog
For more information, please see [Postman's documentation on API keys](https://learning.postman.com/docs/developer/postman-api/authentication/).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.93 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/598.3
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/598.3.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
598.3.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Use of GET request method with sensitive query strings (Authorization header details)
| null |
## Description
The authorization header value was identified in the request URL. These headers typically contain
usernames and passwords or JWT tokens. These values should never be sent in GET requests as they
maybe captured by proxy systems, stored in browser history, or stored in log files. If an attacker
were to get access to these logs or logging systems, they would be able to gain access to the
target account.
## Remediation
Authorization header details should never be sent in GET requests. When transmitting sensitive information
such as JWT tokens, always use `POST` requests or headers to transmit the sensitive data.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 598.3 | true | 598 | Passive | Medium |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Information_exposure_through_query_strings_in_url)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/598.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Use of GET request method with sensitive query strings (Authorization header
details)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The authorization header value was identified in the request URL. These headers typically contain
usernames and passwords or JWT tokens. These values should never be sent in GET requests as they
maybe captured by proxy systems, stored in browser history, or stored in log files. If an attacker
were to get access to these logs or logging systems, they would be able to gain access to the
target account.
## Remediation
Authorization header details should never be sent in GET requests. When transmitting sensitive information
such as JWT tokens, always use `POST` requests or headers to transmit the sensitive data.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 598.3 | true | 598 | Passive | Medium |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Information_exposure_through_query_strings_in_url)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/598.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.72
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.72.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.72.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Mailchimp API key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Mailchimp API key was identified. API keys can be used send emails, create and send marketing campaigns, access customer lists and email addresses. A malicious actor with access to this key can perform any API request to Mailchimp without restriction.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke an API key:
- Sign in to your Mailchimp account at <https://login.mailchimp.com/>
- Select your profile icon then select Profile
- Select the Extras dropdown list then choose "API keys"
- Find the identified key and select "Revoke"
- When prompted, type "REVOKE" to confirm and select "Revoke" in the "Revoke API Key" dialog
For more information, please see [Mailchimp's documentation on API key security](https://mailchimp.com/help/about-api-keys/#api+key+security).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.72 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Mailchimp API key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Mailchimp API key was identified. API keys can be used send emails, create and send marketing campaigns, access customer lists and email addresses. A malicious actor with access to this key can perform any API request to Mailchimp without restriction.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke an API key:
- Sign in to your Mailchimp account at <https://login.mailchimp.com/>
- Select your profile icon then select Profile
- Select the Extras dropdown list then choose "API keys"
- Find the identified key and select "Revoke"
- When prompted, type "REVOKE" to confirm and select "Revoke" in the "Revoke API Key" dialog
For more information, please see [Mailchimp's documentation on API key security](https://mailchimp.com/help/about-api-keys/#api+key+security).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.72 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.95
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.95.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.95.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Pulumi API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Pulumi API token was identified. Personal access tokens map to the permissions of a user. A malicious actor with access to this token can delete stacks, tags, updates, and webhooks as the owner of the access token. Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). To revoke the API token:
- Sign in to your Pulumi account and access <https://app.pulumi.com/>
- In the top right corner, select the profile picture and select "Personal access tokens"
- Find the identified token and select the ellipsis in the "Actions" column of the key and select "Delete token"
- When prompted, select "Delete token" in the "Delete token" dialog
For more information, please see [Pulumi's documentation on Personal access tokens](https://www.pulumi.com/docs/pulumi-cloud/access-management/access-tokens/#personal-access-tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.95 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Pulumi API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Pulumi API token was identified. Personal access tokens map to the permissions of a user. A malicious actor with access to this token can delete stacks, tags, updates, and webhooks as the owner of the access token. Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). To revoke the API token:
- Sign in to your Pulumi account and access <https://app.pulumi.com/>
- In the top right corner, select the profile picture and select "Personal access tokens"
- Find the identified token and select the ellipsis in the "Actions" column of the key and select "Delete token"
- When prompted, select "Delete token" in the "Delete token" dialog
For more information, please see [Pulumi's documentation on Personal access tokens](https://www.pulumi.com/docs/pulumi-cloud/access-management/access-tokens/#personal-access-tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.95 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.110
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.110.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.110.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Slack webhook
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Slack webhook URL was detected. Slack webhook URLs are used to post messages from external sources into Slack. They make use of HTTP requests with a JSON payload, which includes the message and a few other optional details. You can include message attachments to display richly-formatted messages. A malicious actor with access to this URL can post messages to the Slack channel it is bound to.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate the Slack webhook URL:
- Sign in to Slack and access <https://api.slack.com/apps>
- Find the application with the identified webhook URL and select the name
- In the left-hand menu, select "Incoming Webhooks"
- In the "Webhook URL" table, select the trash icon next to the webhook URL that was identified.
- When prompted, select "Remove" in the confirmation dialog
For more information, please see [Slack's documentation on webhooks](https://api.slack.com/messaging/webhooks).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.110 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Slack webhook
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Slack webhook URL was detected. Slack webhook URLs are used to post messages from external sources into Slack. They make use of HTTP requests with a JSON payload, which includes the message and a few other optional details. You can include message attachments to display richly-formatted messages. A malicious actor with access to this URL can post messages to the Slack channel it is bound to.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate the Slack webhook URL:
- Sign in to Slack and access <https://api.slack.com/apps>
- Find the application with the identified webhook URL and select the name
- In the left-hand menu, select "Incoming Webhooks"
- In the "Webhook URL" table, select the trash icon next to the webhook URL that was identified.
- When prompted, select "Remove" in the confirmation dialog
For more information, please see [Slack's documentation on webhooks](https://api.slack.com/messaging/webhooks).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.110 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.9
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.9.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
16.9.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only analysis
| null |
## Description
A `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only` (CSPRO) was identified on the target site. CSP-Report-Only headers
aid in determining how to implement a `Content-Security-Policy` that does not disrupt normal use of the target
site.
## Remediation
Follow the recommendations to determine if any actions are necessary to harden this `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`.
After all alerts have been resolved, we recommend that this header be changed to `Content-Security-Policy`.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.9 | true | 16 | Passive | Info |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [OWASP](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP)
- [Content Security Policy Level 3](https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/)
- [CSP Evaluator](https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only analysis
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
A `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only` (CSPRO) was identified on the target site. CSP-Report-Only headers
aid in determining how to implement a `Content-Security-Policy` that does not disrupt normal use of the target
site.
## Remediation
Follow the recommendations to determine if any actions are necessary to harden this `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`.
After all alerts have been resolved, we recommend that this header be changed to `Content-Security-Policy`.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.9 | true | 16 | Passive | Info |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [OWASP](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP)
- [Content Security Policy Level 3](https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/)
- [CSP Evaluator](https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.83
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.83.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.83.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token New Relic ingest browser API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a New Relic ingest browser API token was identified..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.83 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token New Relic ingest browser API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a New Relic ingest browser API token was identified..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.83 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/829.2
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/829.2.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
829.2.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Invalid Sub-Resource Integrity values detected
| null |
## Description
JavaScript or CSS source files were found to contain invalid
[Sub-Resource Integrity (SRI)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Subresource_Integrity)
`integrity` values or a missing `crossorigin` value. These scripts or links should be investigated to
ensure they have not been maliciously altered. If in doubt, contact the owner of the scripts or replace
them with known good versions.
## Remediation
All identified resources should be sourced from the same domain as the target application. If this is not
possible, it is strongly recommended that all `script` tags that implement `src` values, or `link` tags
that implement the `href` values include Sub-Resource Integrity. To generate SRI integrity values the
[SRI hash](https://www.srihash.org/) tool can be used, or by running one of the following commands:
- `cat FILENAME.js | openssl dgst -sha384 -binary | openssl base64 -A`
- `shasum -b -a 384 FILENAME.js | awk '{ print $1 }' | xxd -r -p | base64`
The output of these tools must be added as additional attributes, in particular: `integrity` and either
`crossorigin=anonymous` or `crossorigin=use-credentials`.
An example of a valid SRI protected script tag can be found below:
```html
<script src="https://example.com/example-framework.js"
integrity="sha384-oqVuAfXRKap7fdgcCY5uykM6+R9GqQ8K/uxy9rx7HNQlGYl1kPzQho1wx4JwY8wC"
crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 829.2 | true | 829 | Passive | Medium |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Third_Party_Javascript_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html#subresource-integrity)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/829.html)
- [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Subresource_Integrity)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Invalid Sub-Resource Integrity values detected
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
JavaScript or CSS source files were found to contain invalid
[Sub-Resource Integrity (SRI)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Subresource_Integrity)
`integrity` values or a missing `crossorigin` value. These scripts or links should be investigated to
ensure they have not been maliciously altered. If in doubt, contact the owner of the scripts or replace
them with known good versions.
## Remediation
All identified resources should be sourced from the same domain as the target application. If this is not
possible, it is strongly recommended that all `script` tags that implement `src` values, or `link` tags
that implement the `href` values include Sub-Resource Integrity. To generate SRI integrity values the
[SRI hash](https://www.srihash.org/) tool can be used, or by running one of the following commands:
- `cat FILENAME.js | openssl dgst -sha384 -binary | openssl base64 -A`
- `shasum -b -a 384 FILENAME.js | awk '{ print $1 }' | xxd -r -p | base64`
The output of these tools must be added as additional attributes, in particular: `integrity` and either
`crossorigin=anonymous` or `crossorigin=use-credentials`.
An example of a valid SRI protected script tag can be found below:
```html
<script src="https://example.com/example-framework.js"
integrity="sha384-oqVuAfXRKap7fdgcCY5uykM6+R9GqQ8K/uxy9rx7HNQlGYl1kPzQho1wx4JwY8wC"
crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 829.2 | true | 829 | Passive | Medium |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Third_Party_Javascript_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html#subresource-integrity)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/829.html)
- [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Subresource_Integrity)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.171
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.171.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.171.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Shippo Test API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Shippo Test API token was identified. API tokens can be used to access the Shippo API which is used for shipping services. A malicious actor with access to this token can access billing and order information and modify shipping data.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke an API token:
- Sign in to your Shippo account and access <https://apps.goshippo.com/>
- In the top right-hand side, select the "gear" icon to go to the "Settings" page
- Scroll down in the left hand menu to "Advanced" and select "API"
- Under the "Token" section, select "Manage your token"
- Find the identified token and select the trash icon
- When prompted, select "Yes, remove token" in the "Manage Your Tokens" dialog
For more information, please see [Shippo's documentation on API keys](https://portal.goshippo.com/api-config/api).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.171 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Shippo Test API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Shippo Test API token was identified. API tokens can be used to access the Shippo API which is used for shipping services. A malicious actor with access to this token can access billing and order information and modify shipping data.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke an API token:
- Sign in to your Shippo account and access <https://apps.goshippo.com/>
- In the top right-hand side, select the "gear" icon to go to the "Settings" page
- Scroll down in the left hand menu to "Advanced" and select "API"
- Under the "Token" section, select "Manage your token"
- Find the identified token and select the trash icon
- When prompted, select "Yes, remove token" in the "Manage Your Tokens" dialog
For more information, please see [Shippo's documentation on API keys](https://portal.goshippo.com/api-config/api).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.171 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.177
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.177.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.177.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Stripe secret test key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Stripe secret test key was identified. Test secret keys are used for accessing and executing test data and functionality. A malicious actor with access to this test key can only simulate access, account objects do not return sensitive fields.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate your Stripe secret test key:
- Sign in to your Stripe account and access <https://dashboard.stripe.com/apikeys>
- Ensure "Test mode" is enabled by selecting the toggle in the top menu
- In the "Standard keys" section, find the key that was identified and select the ellipsis in the right-hand side
- Select "Roll key..."
- In the "Roll API key" dialog, select an expiration date, for example "now"
- Select "Roll API Key"
For more information, please see [Stripe's documentation on rotating API keys](https://docs.stripe.com/keys#rolling-keys).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.177 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Stripe secret test key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Stripe secret test key was identified. Test secret keys are used for accessing and executing test data and functionality. A malicious actor with access to this test key can only simulate access, account objects do not return sensitive fields.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate your Stripe secret test key:
- Sign in to your Stripe account and access <https://dashboard.stripe.com/apikeys>
- Ensure "Test mode" is enabled by selecting the toggle in the top menu
- In the "Standard keys" section, find the key that was identified and select the ellipsis in the right-hand side
- Select "Roll key..."
- In the "Roll API key" dialog, select an expiration date, for example "now"
- Select "Roll API Key"
For more information, please see [Stripe's documentation on rotating API keys](https://docs.stripe.com/keys#rolling-keys).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.177 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.79
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.79.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.79.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token MessageBird API client ID
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a MessageBird API client ID.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.79 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token MessageBird API client ID
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a MessageBird API client ID.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.79 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.2
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.2.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
16.2.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Server header exposes version information
| null |
## Description
The target website returns the `Server` header and version information of this website. By
exposing these values, attackers may attempt to identify if the target software is vulnerable to known
vulnerabilities, or catalog known sites running particular versions to exploit in the future when a
vulnerability is identified in the particular version.
## Remediation
We recommend that the version information be removed from the `Server` header.
Apache:
For Apache-based web sites, set the `ServerTokens` to `Prod` in the `httpd.conf` configuration file.
NGINX:
For NGINX-based websites, set the `server_tokens` configuration value to `off` in the `nginx.conf` file.
IIS:
For IIS-based websites version 10 and later, you can use the `removeServerHeader` element to the `requestFiltering`
section of the `Web.config` file.
For all other server types, consult your product's documentation on how to redact the version information from
the `Server` header.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.2 | true | 16 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [Apache ServerTokens](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2016/08/26/mitigating-mime-confusion-attacks-in-firefox/)
- [NGINX `server_tokens`](https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_core_module.html#server_tokens)
- [IIS 10 Remove Server Header](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/configuration/system.webserver/security/requestfiltering/#attributes)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Server header exposes version information
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target website returns the `Server` header and version information of this website. By
exposing these values, attackers may attempt to identify if the target software is vulnerable to known
vulnerabilities, or catalog known sites running particular versions to exploit in the future when a
vulnerability is identified in the particular version.
## Remediation
We recommend that the version information be removed from the `Server` header.
Apache:
For Apache-based web sites, set the `ServerTokens` to `Prod` in the `httpd.conf` configuration file.
NGINX:
For NGINX-based websites, set the `server_tokens` configuration value to `off` in the `nginx.conf` file.
IIS:
For IIS-based websites version 10 and later, you can use the `removeServerHeader` element to the `requestFiltering`
section of the `Web.config` file.
For all other server types, consult your product's documentation on how to redact the version information from
the `Server` header.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.2 | true | 16 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [Apache ServerTokens](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2016/08/26/mitigating-mime-confusion-attacks-in-firefox/)
- [NGINX `server_tokens`](https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_core_module.html#server_tokens)
- [IIS 10 Remove Server Header](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/configuration/system.webserver/security/requestfiltering/#attributes)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/79.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/79.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
79.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Cross Site Scripting
| null |
## Description
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is an attack which exploits a web application or system to treat user input
as markup or script code. It is important to encode the data depending on the specific context it
is used in. There are at least six context types:
- Inside HTML tags `<div>context 1</div>`
- Inside attributes: ```<div class="context 2"></div>```
- Inside event attributes ```<button onclick="context 3">button</button>```
- Inside script blocks: ```<script>var x = "context 4"</script>```
- Unsafe element HTML assignment: ```element.innerHTML = "context 5"```
- Inside URLs: ```<iframe src="context 6"></iframe><a href="context 6">link</a>```
Script blocks alone can be encoded in multiple ways. Exercise caution if user
input must be written outside script tags.
## Remediation
User input displayed in the application must be encoded, sanitized, or validated
so it isn't treated as HTML or executed as JavaScript code. Be careful not to
mix server-side templating with client-side templating, because the server-side doesn't encode
text like `{{ 7*7 }}`, which might execute client-side features.
Do not encode user input before inserting it into a data store. The data must be
encoded based on its output context. It is much safer to force the displaying system to
handle the encoding.
Consider using built-in framework capabilities for automatically encoding user input. If you can't
automatically encode input, be careful to use the proper output encoding. The following recommendations
are a best effort, and might not work in all circumstances.
- Encode the following inside HTML tags, excluding `script`:
- `<` to `<`
- `>` to `>`
- `'` to `'`
- `"` to `"`
- `=` to `=`
- Encode the following inside attributes, excluding event attributes:
- `<` to `<`
- `>` to `>`
- `'` to `'`
- `"` to `"`
- `=` to `=`
- Encode the following inside event attributes, script blocks, and unsafe HTML assignment:
- Literal tab (`\t`) to `\\t`
- Literal new line (`\n`) to `\\n`
- Literal vertical tab (`\v`) to `\u000b`
- Literal form feed (`\f`) to `\\f`
- Literal carriage return (`\r`) to `\\r`
- Literal equal sign (`=`) to `\u0061`
- Literal back tick (`\`) to `\u0060`
- Literal double quote (`"`) to `\u0022`
- Literal ampersand (`&`) to `\u0026`
- Literal single quote (`'`) to `\u0027`
- Literal plus symbol (`+`) to `\u002b`
- Literal forward slash (`/`) to `\/`
- Literal less than symbol (`<`) to `\u003c`
- Literal greater than symbol (`>`) to `\u003e`
- Literal open parenthesis (`(`) to `\u0028`
- Literal close parenthesis (`)`) to `\u0029`
- Literal open bracket (`[`) to `\u005b`
- Literal close bracket (`]`) to `\u005d`
- Literal open brace (`{`) to `\u007b`
- Literal close brace (`}`) to `\u007d`
- Literal back slash (`\`) to `\\`
This list is not exhaustive. You might need to encode additional characters depending on context.
- Inside URLs:
- Never allow user input to be printed in URLs. Attackers could inject `javascript:...` code or malicious links.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 79.1 | false | 79 | Active | high |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Cross Site Scripting
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is an attack which exploits a web application or system to treat user input
as markup or script code. It is important to encode the data depending on the specific context it
is used in. There are at least six context types:
- Inside HTML tags `<div>context 1</div>`
- Inside attributes: ```<div class="context 2"></div>```
- Inside event attributes ```<button onclick="context 3">button</button>```
- Inside script blocks: ```<script>var x = "context 4"</script>```
- Unsafe element HTML assignment: ```element.innerHTML = "context 5"```
- Inside URLs: ```<iframe src="context 6"></iframe><a href="context 6">link</a>```
Script blocks alone can be encoded in multiple ways. Exercise caution if user
input must be written outside script tags.
## Remediation
User input displayed in the application must be encoded, sanitized, or validated
so it isn't treated as HTML or executed as JavaScript code. Be careful not to
mix server-side templating with client-side templating, because the server-side doesn't encode
text like `{{ 7*7 }}`, which might execute client-side features.
Do not encode user input before inserting it into a data store. The data must be
encoded based on its output context. It is much safer to force the displaying system to
handle the encoding.
Consider using built-in framework capabilities for automatically encoding user input. If you can't
automatically encode input, be careful to use the proper output encoding. The following recommendations
are a best effort, and might not work in all circumstances.
- Encode the following inside HTML tags, excluding `script`:
- `<` to `<`
- `>` to `>`
- `'` to `'`
- `"` to `"`
- `=` to `=`
- Encode the following inside attributes, excluding event attributes:
- `<` to `<`
- `>` to `>`
- `'` to `'`
- `"` to `"`
- `=` to `=`
- Encode the following inside event attributes, script blocks, and unsafe HTML assignment:
- Literal tab (`\t`) to `\\t`
- Literal new line (`\n`) to `\\n`
- Literal vertical tab (`\v`) to `\u000b`
- Literal form feed (`\f`) to `\\f`
- Literal carriage return (`\r`) to `\\r`
- Literal equal sign (`=`) to `\u0061`
- Literal back tick (`\`) to `\u0060`
- Literal double quote (`"`) to `\u0022`
- Literal ampersand (`&`) to `\u0026`
- Literal single quote (`'`) to `\u0027`
- Literal plus symbol (`+`) to `\u002b`
- Literal forward slash (`/`) to `\/`
- Literal less than symbol (`<`) to `\u003c`
- Literal greater than symbol (`>`) to `\u003e`
- Literal open parenthesis (`(`) to `\u0028`
- Literal close parenthesis (`)`) to `\u0029`
- Literal open bracket (`[`) to `\u005b`
- Literal close bracket (`]`) to `\u005d`
- Literal open brace (`{`) to `\u007b`
- Literal close brace (`}`) to `\u007d`
- Literal back slash (`\`) to `\\`
This list is not exhaustive. You might need to encode additional characters depending on context.
- Inside URLs:
- Never allow user input to be printed in URLs. Attackers could inject `javascript:...` code or malicious links.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 79.1 | false | 79 | Active | high |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.161
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.161.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.161.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Meta access token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Meta access token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.161 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Meta access token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Meta access token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.161 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.4
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.4.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
16.4.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
X-Backend-Server header exposes server information
| null |
## Description
The target website returns the `X-Backend-Server` header which includes potentially internal/hidden IP addresses
or hostnames. By exposing these values, attackers may attempt to circumvent security proxies and access these
hosts directly.
## Remediation
Consult your proxy/load balancer documentation or provider on how to disable revealing the
`X-Backend-Server` header value.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.4 | true | 16 | Passive | Info |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: X-Backend-Server header exposes server information
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target website returns the `X-Backend-Server` header which includes potentially internal/hidden IP addresses
or hostnames. By exposing these values, attackers may attempt to circumvent security proxies and access these
hosts directly.
## Remediation
Consult your proxy/load balancer documentation or provider on how to disable revealing the
`X-Backend-Server` header value.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.4 | true | 16 | Passive | Info |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.167
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.167.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.167.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token PKCS8 private key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a PKCS8 private key was identified. PKCS #8 is a standard syntax for storing private key information. A malicious actor with access to this key can encrypt and decrypt all past and future messages. Note that past messages encrypted using this key should be considered compromised, and new messages cannot be considered trusted.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). A PKCS8 key cannot be rotated, a new key must be generated. For more information, please see [openssl.org's documentation on examples of generating keys](https://docs.openssl.org/3.4/man1/openssl-genpkey/#examples).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.167 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token PKCS8 private key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a PKCS8 private key was identified. PKCS #8 is a standard syntax for storing private key information. A malicious actor with access to this key can encrypt and decrypt all past and future messages. Note that past messages encrypted using this key should be considered compromised, and new messages cannot be considered trusted.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). A PKCS8 key cannot be rotated, a new key must be generated. For more information, please see [openssl.org's documentation on examples of generating keys](https://docs.openssl.org/3.4/man1/openssl-genpkey/#examples).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.167 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.180
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.180.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.180.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Tailscale key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of Tailscale keys.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.180 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Tailscale key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of Tailscale keys.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.180 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.69
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.69.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.69.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token LinkedIn client secret
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a LinkedIn client secret was identified. Client secrets are used when allowing users to sign in to your application. Depending on the scopes requested, a malicious actor could impersonate the service to access users' information.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate your client secret:
- Sign in to your LinkedIn account and visit <https://www.linkedin.com/developers/apps/>
- Find the application that contains the identified secret and select its name
- Select the "Auth" tab
- Select "Generate a new Client Secret" in the "Application credentials" section
- If "Generate a new Client Secret" does not exist, you most likely have two active secrets, delete one, and it should appear
- Select the "X" next to the secret that was identified to remove it
- When prompted, select "Confirm" in the "Remove the Primary Client Secret" dialog
For more information, please see [LinkedIn's documentation on API access](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/linkedin/learning/getting-started/request-access).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.69 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token LinkedIn client secret
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a LinkedIn client secret was identified. Client secrets are used when allowing users to sign in to your application. Depending on the scopes requested, a malicious actor could impersonate the service to access users' information.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate your client secret:
- Sign in to your LinkedIn account and visit <https://www.linkedin.com/developers/apps/>
- Find the application that contains the identified secret and select its name
- Select the "Auth" tab
- Select "Generate a new Client Secret" in the "Application credentials" section
- If "Generate a new Client Secret" does not exist, you most likely have two active secrets, delete one, and it should appear
- Select the "X" next to the secret that was identified to remove it
- When prompted, select "Confirm" in the "Remove the Primary Client Secret" dialog
For more information, please see [LinkedIn's documentation on API access](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/linkedin/learning/getting-started/request-access).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.69 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.13
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.13.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.13.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Bitbucket client ID
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Bitbucket client ID.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.13 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Bitbucket client ID
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Bitbucket client ID.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.13 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.59
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.59.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.59.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Heroku API key or application authorization token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Heroku API key or application authorization token was identified. API keys and authorization tokens can be used to perform API calls on behalf of a user or account. A malicious actor with access to these tokens can access the Heroku API platform and all deployed applications.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate an API key for the identified user:
- Sign in to your account and visit <https://dashboard.heroku.com/account>
- Under the "API Key" section, select "Regenerate API Key"
- When prompted, select "Regenerate API Key" in the "Regenerate API Key" dialog
To regenerate an application authorization token:
- Sign in to your account and visit <https://dashboard.heroku.com/account/applications>
- Under the "Authorizations" section, find the registered authorization that contains the identified token
- Select the pencil icon
- Select "Regenerate token"
For more information on API keys, see [their FAQ on generating API keys](https://help.heroku.com/PBGP6IDE/how-should-i-generate-an-api-key-that-allows-me-to-use-the-heroku-platform-api).
Heroku does not have any documentation on application authorization tokens.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.59 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Heroku API key or application authorization
token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Heroku API key or application authorization token was identified. API keys and authorization tokens can be used to perform API calls on behalf of a user or account. A malicious actor with access to these tokens can access the Heroku API platform and all deployed applications.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate an API key for the identified user:
- Sign in to your account and visit <https://dashboard.heroku.com/account>
- Under the "API Key" section, select "Regenerate API Key"
- When prompted, select "Regenerate API Key" in the "Regenerate API Key" dialog
To regenerate an application authorization token:
- Sign in to your account and visit <https://dashboard.heroku.com/account/applications>
- Under the "Authorizations" section, find the registered authorization that contains the identified token
- Select the pencil icon
- Select "Regenerate token"
For more information on API keys, see [their FAQ on generating API keys](https://help.heroku.com/PBGP6IDE/how-should-i-generate-an-api-key-that-allows-me-to-use-the-heroku-platform-api).
Heroku does not have any documentation on application authorization tokens.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.59 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.23
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.23.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.23.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Contentful delivery API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Contentful delivery API token was identified. The Contentful Delivery API (CDA) is a read-only API for delivering content from Contentful to apps, websites and other media. Content is delivered as JSON data, and images, videos and other media as files. A malicious actor with access to this token has read only access to entries.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke the delivery API token:
- Sign in and visit <https://app.contentful.com/>
- Select the gear icon in the top right corner, and then select "API Keys"
- Find the API key that was detected, and select the name in the table of API keys
- Select "Delete" in the top right corner
- When prompted, select "Delete" Note this also deletes the preview API token. Generating a new set of API keys is required.
For more information, please see the developer [documentation on authentication](https://www.contentful.com/developers/docs/references/authentication/#the-content-delivery-and-preview-api).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.23 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Contentful delivery API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Contentful delivery API token was identified. The Contentful Delivery API (CDA) is a read-only API for delivering content from Contentful to apps, websites and other media. Content is delivered as JSON data, and images, videos and other media as files. A malicious actor with access to this token has read only access to entries.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke the delivery API token:
- Sign in and visit <https://app.contentful.com/>
- Select the gear icon in the top right corner, and then select "API Keys"
- Find the API key that was detected, and select the name in the table of API keys
- Select "Delete" in the top right corner
- When prompted, select "Delete" Note this also deletes the preview API token. Generating a new set of API keys is required.
For more information, please see the developer [documentation on authentication](https://www.contentful.com/developers/docs/references/authentication/#the-content-delivery-and-preview-api).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.23 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.151
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.151.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.151.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab SCIM OAuth token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab SCIM token was identified. The SCIM token is used to configure third party Identity providers (IdP). A malicious actor with access to this token can configure an IdP and add users to gain access to the GitLab system..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate the SCIM token:
- Sign in to your GitLab account as an administrator
- On the left sidebar, at the bottom, select Admin
- Select "Settings" and then "General"
- Expand the SCIM Token section and select "Generate a SCIM token"
- Under "Your SCIM token" select "reset it" to generate a new token
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on SCIM configuration](../../../../../administration/settings/scim_setup.md#configure-gitlab).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.151 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab SCIM OAuth token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab SCIM token was identified. The SCIM token is used to configure third party Identity providers (IdP). A malicious actor with access to this token can configure an IdP and add users to gain access to the GitLab system..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate the SCIM token:
- Sign in to your GitLab account as an administrator
- On the left sidebar, at the bottom, select Admin
- Select "Settings" and then "General"
- Expand the SCIM Token section and select "Generate a SCIM token"
- Under "Your SCIM token" select "reset it" to generate a new token
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on SCIM configuration](../../../../../administration/settings/scim_setup.md#configure-gitlab).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.151 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/287.2
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/287.2.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
287.2.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Insecure authentication over HTTP (Digest Authentication)
| null |
## Description
The target application was found to authenticate users using the Digest Authentication scheme over HTTP.
Digest Authentication uses an insecure hashing algorithm (MD5) to hash the username and password and sends
it in the `Authentication` header. Attackers who are in between the communication path (or on the same
local network) of the client and server could use packet sniffers to modify the server's response parameters
to downgrade the security of the digest access authentication mode. Additionally, the server stores the
hashed credentials, usually in a file called `.htpasswd`. Tools are readily available to crack these passwords.
## Remediation
If possible, switch to a more robust method to authenticate users such as OAuth 2.0, or storing usernames
and passwords in a data store protected by the Argon2id algorithm. If Digest Authentication must be used,
ensure credentials are only transmitted over secure channels such as HTTPS/TLS.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 287.2 | false | 287 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [OAuth 2.0](https://oauth.net/2/)
- [CWE-287](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html)
- [RFC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2069)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Insecure authentication over HTTP (Digest Authentication)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target application was found to authenticate users using the Digest Authentication scheme over HTTP.
Digest Authentication uses an insecure hashing algorithm (MD5) to hash the username and password and sends
it in the `Authentication` header. Attackers who are in between the communication path (or on the same
local network) of the client and server could use packet sniffers to modify the server's response parameters
to downgrade the security of the digest access authentication mode. Additionally, the server stores the
hashed credentials, usually in a file called `.htpasswd`. Tools are readily available to crack these passwords.
## Remediation
If possible, switch to a more robust method to authenticate users such as OAuth 2.0, or storing usernames
and passwords in a data store protected by the Argon2id algorithm. If Digest Authentication must be used,
ensure credentials are only transmitted over secure channels such as HTTPS/TLS.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 287.2 | false | 287 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [OAuth 2.0](https://oauth.net/2/)
- [CWE-287](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html)
- [RFC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2069)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.157
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.157.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.157.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Ionic personal access token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Ionic personal access token was identified. Personal access tokens can be used to authenticate the Ionic CLI, Appflow CLI, or any third party application. A malicious actor with access to this token can gain full access to linked repositories and pipelines.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke your API token:
- Sign in to your Ionic account and visit <https://dashboard.ionicframework.com/settings/personal-access-tokens>
- Find the API token that was identified
- Select "Delete"
- When prompted, select "I'm sure, delete this personal access token" in the "Are you sure?" dialog
For more information, please see [Ionic's documentation on access tokens](https://ionic.io/docs/appflow/personal-access-tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.157 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Ionic personal access token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Ionic personal access token was identified. Personal access tokens can be used to authenticate the Ionic CLI, Appflow CLI, or any third party application. A malicious actor with access to this token can gain full access to linked repositories and pipelines.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke your API token:
- Sign in to your Ionic account and visit <https://dashboard.ionicframework.com/settings/personal-access-tokens>
- Find the API token that was identified
- Select "Delete"
- When prompted, select "I'm sure, delete this personal access token" in the "Are you sure?" dialog
For more information, please see [Ionic's documentation on access tokens](https://ionic.io/docs/appflow/personal-access-tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:--------|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.157 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.35
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.35.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.35.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Dynatrace API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Dynatrace API token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.35 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Dynatrace API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Dynatrace API token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.35 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/943.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/943.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
943.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Improper neutralization of special elements in data query logic
| null |
## Description
The application generates a query intended to interact with MongoDB,
but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements
that can modify the intended logic of the query.
## Remediation
Refactor find or search queries to use standard
filtering operators such as `$gt` or `$in` instead of broad operators such
as `$where`. If possible, disable the MongoDB JavaScript interface entirely.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 943.1 | false | 943 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/943.html)
- [Disabling MongoDB Server Side JS](https://www.mongodb.com/docs/manual/core/server-side-javascript/#std-label-disable-server-side-js)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Improper neutralization of special elements in data query logic
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The application generates a query intended to interact with MongoDB,
but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements
that can modify the intended logic of the query.
## Remediation
Refactor find or search queries to use standard
filtering operators such as `$gt` or `$in` instead of broad operators such
as `$where`. If possible, disable the MongoDB JavaScript interface entirely.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 943.1 | false | 943 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/943.html)
- [Disabling MongoDB Server Side JS](https://www.mongodb.com/docs/manual/core/server-side-javascript/#std-label-disable-server-side-js)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.141
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.141.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.141.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab Personal Access Token (routable)
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab Personal Access Token (routable).
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.141 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab Personal Access Token (routable)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab Personal Access Token (routable).
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.141 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.147
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.147.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.147.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab feed token v2
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab feed token was identified. Your feed token authenticates you when your RSS reader loads a personalized RSS feed or when your calendar application loads a personalized calendar. It is visible in those feed URLs. It cannot be used to access any other data. A malicious actor with access to this token can read your personalized RSS feed and issue RSS feeds to your calendar feed as if they were you.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate a feed token:
- Sign in to your GitLab account and access the [User settings](../../../../../user/profile/_index.md#access-your-user-settings) left-hand side menu, select "Access tokens"
- Under the "Feed token" section, select the "reset this token" link
- When prompted select "OK"
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on feed tokens](../../../../../security/tokens/_index.md#feed-token).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.147 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitLab feed token v2
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitLab feed token was identified. Your feed token authenticates you when your RSS reader loads a personalized RSS feed or when your calendar application loads a personalized calendar. It is visible in those feed URLs. It cannot be used to access any other data. A malicious actor with access to this token can read your personalized RSS feed and issue RSS feeds to your calendar feed as if they were you.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To regenerate a feed token:
- Sign in to your GitLab account and access the [User settings](../../../../../user/profile/_index.md#access-your-user-settings) left-hand side menu, select "Access tokens"
- Under the "Feed token" section, select the "reset this token" link
- When prompted select "OK"
For more information, please see [GitLabs documentation on feed tokens](../../../../../security/tokens/_index.md#feed-token).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.147 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.9
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.9.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.9.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Asana client ID
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Asana Client ID was detected. This ID is used in conjunction with the client secret. A malicious actor with access to this ID can impersonate the client application if they also have access to the client secret..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
An Asana client ID cannot be rotated, only a new OAuth client application can be created to get a new Client ID. For more information please [see their documentation on configuring OAuth](https://developers.asana.com/docs/oauth)
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.9 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Asana client ID
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Asana Client ID was detected. This ID is used in conjunction with the client secret. A malicious actor with access to this ID can impersonate the client application if they also have access to the client secret..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
An Asana client ID cannot be rotated, only a new OAuth client application can be created to get a new Client ID. For more information please [see their documentation on configuring OAuth](https://developers.asana.com/docs/oauth)
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.9 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/614.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/614.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
614.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Sensitive cookie without Secure attribute
| null |
## Description
The cookie was transmitted in a `Set-Cookie` response without the `Secure` attribute set.
To prevent sensitive cookie values being accidentally transmitted over clear-text HTTP we
recommended that cookies are declared with the `Secure` attribute.
## Remediation
Most web application frameworks allow configuring how cookies are sent to user agents. Consult your framework's
documentation for more information on how to enable various security attributes when assigning cookies to clients.
If the application is assigning cookies via writing to the response headers directly, ensure all responses include
the `Secure` attribute. By enabling this protection, the application will no longer send sensitive cookies over
HTTP.
Example:
```http
Set-Cookie: {cookie_name}=<random secure value>; Secure
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 614.1 | false | 614 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/SecureCookieAttribute)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/614.html)
- [Mozilla MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies#restrict_access_to_cookies)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Sensitive cookie without Secure attribute
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The cookie was transmitted in a `Set-Cookie` response without the `Secure` attribute set.
To prevent sensitive cookie values being accidentally transmitted over clear-text HTTP we
recommended that cookies are declared with the `Secure` attribute.
## Remediation
Most web application frameworks allow configuring how cookies are sent to user agents. Consult your framework's
documentation for more information on how to enable various security attributes when assigning cookies to clients.
If the application is assigning cookies via writing to the response headers directly, ensure all responses include
the `Secure` attribute. By enabling this protection, the application will no longer send sensitive cookies over
HTTP.
Example:
```http
Set-Cookie: {cookie_name}=<random secure value>; Secure
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 614.1 | false | 614 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/SecureCookieAttribute)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/614.html)
- [Mozilla MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies#restrict_access_to_cookies)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.39
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.39.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.39.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Facebook token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Facebook token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.39 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Facebook token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Facebook token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.39 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.137
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.137.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.137.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token DigitalOcean refresh token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a DigitalOcean OAuth Refresh Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.137 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token DigitalOcean refresh token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a DigitalOcean OAuth Refresh Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.137 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.131
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.131.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.131.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token CircleCI access token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a CircleCI project token was identified. CircleCI project tokens can be given one of three scopes: - Status - Read Only - Admin Depending on the access level of this detected token, a malicious actor with access to this token may be able to gain full access to the project and CI/CD pipelines.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate a project token:
- In the CircleCI application select Projects in the sidebar, then the ellipsis (...) next to your project, and select "Project Settings".
- Select API Permissions.
- Select the "X" in the Remove column for the token you wish to replace. When the confirmation window appears, enter the text DELETE in the form and then select "Delete API Token".
- Select "Create API Token".
- Choose the same scope used for the old token from the dropdown list.
- In the Label field, type a label for the token.
It can be the same name given to the old token.
- Select "Add API Token".
For more information please see their [documentation on rotating project tokens](https://circleci.com/docs/managing-api-tokens/#rotating-a-project-api-token).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.131 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token CircleCI access token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a CircleCI project token was identified. CircleCI project tokens can be given one of three scopes: - Status - Read Only - Admin Depending on the access level of this detected token, a malicious actor with access to this token may be able to gain full access to the project and CI/CD pipelines.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate a project token:
- In the CircleCI application select Projects in the sidebar, then the ellipsis (...) next to your project, and select "Project Settings".
- Select API Permissions.
- Select the "X" in the Remove column for the token you wish to replace. When the confirmation window appears, enter the text DELETE in the form and then select "Delete API Token".
- Select "Create API Token".
- Choose the same scope used for the old token from the dropdown list.
- In the Label field, type a label for the token.
It can be the same name given to the old token.
- Select "Add API Token".
For more information please see their [documentation on rotating project tokens](https://circleci.com/docs/managing-api-tokens/#rotating-a-project-api-token).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.131 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.3
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.3.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.3.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Adobe client secret
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Adobe client secret was detected. Adobe client secrets are used to connect to various API or webhook event based services. Depending on which type of service was defined for a project, a malicious actor with access to the secret can use it to gain access to various APIs or events that may contain sensitive information.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
Remediation steps depend on which type of client secret was leaked, please see the following types of remediation steps below and use the one that applies to the secret that was detected.
OAuth (Server-to-Server):
- Sign in to your account at <https://developer.adobe.com/console>
- Select the project or "All projects" to find the project that is impacted - On the left-hand side, under "Credentials", select "OAuth Server-to-Server"
- Under "Client Secret" select "Retrieve client secret"
- After the table of secrets is visible, below the table, select "Add new client secret"
- After the new secret has been created, find the leaked token value and select the trash icon to remove it
- Copy the secret value and update all services with the new client secret
OAuth Web App (Event based project):
- Select the project or select "All projects" to find the project that is impacted
- On the left-hand side, under "Credentials", select "OAuth Web App".
- Select "Retrieve client secret"
- Verify this is the leaked secret
- If this project is configured for events, copy all event details before removing it. You can do this by finding the event listed on the right hand side and selecting on it. You should be brought to a dashboard that shows its details such as event delivery methods, providers, subscribed events, and connected Credentials.
- To remove the event, select "..." in the event, which is on the right hand side of the project page, above "Connect another service".
- Select "remove"
- When prompted, type in the project name and select "Delete Events Registration"
- In the top right-hand corner, select "Delete credential"
- When prompted, type in the project name and select "Delete Credential"
- Re-add the event with the same details as before
- When prompted to add back the Credentials, be sure to use "User Authentication" OAuth
- Select "Web App" for OAuth 2.0 authentication and authorization
- After the event has been re-added, under "Credentials" on left hand side, select "OAuth Web App"
- Select "Retrieve client secret"
- Copy the secret value and update all services with the new client secret
OAuth Web App (API Service based project):
- Sign in to your account at <https://developer.adobe.com/console>
- Select the project or select "All projects" to find the project that is impacted
- On the left-hand side, under "Credentials", select "OAuth Web App"
- Select "Retrieve client secret"
- If this project is configured for API, select the trash icon "Remove" to remove the connected product and service.
- When prompted, enter the project name and select "Remove API"
- In the top right-hand corner, select "Delete credential"
- When prompted, type in the project name and select "Delete Credential"
- Re-add the API with the same details as before
- Select "Web App" for OAuth 2.0 authentication and authorization
- After the service has been re-added, on the left-hand side under "Credentials", select "OAuth Web App"
- Select "Retrieve client secret"
- Copy the secret value and update all services with the new client secret
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.3 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Adobe client secret
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an Adobe client secret was detected. Adobe client secrets are used to connect to various API or webhook event based services. Depending on which type of service was defined for a project, a malicious actor with access to the secret can use it to gain access to various APIs or events that may contain sensitive information.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
Remediation steps depend on which type of client secret was leaked, please see the following types of remediation steps below and use the one that applies to the secret that was detected.
OAuth (Server-to-Server):
- Sign in to your account at <https://developer.adobe.com/console>
- Select the project or "All projects" to find the project that is impacted - On the left-hand side, under "Credentials", select "OAuth Server-to-Server"
- Under "Client Secret" select "Retrieve client secret"
- After the table of secrets is visible, below the table, select "Add new client secret"
- After the new secret has been created, find the leaked token value and select the trash icon to remove it
- Copy the secret value and update all services with the new client secret
OAuth Web App (Event based project):
- Select the project or select "All projects" to find the project that is impacted
- On the left-hand side, under "Credentials", select "OAuth Web App".
- Select "Retrieve client secret"
- Verify this is the leaked secret
- If this project is configured for events, copy all event details before removing it. You can do this by finding the event listed on the right hand side and selecting on it. You should be brought to a dashboard that shows its details such as event delivery methods, providers, subscribed events, and connected Credentials.
- To remove the event, select "..." in the event, which is on the right hand side of the project page, above "Connect another service".
- Select "remove"
- When prompted, type in the project name and select "Delete Events Registration"
- In the top right-hand corner, select "Delete credential"
- When prompted, type in the project name and select "Delete Credential"
- Re-add the event with the same details as before
- When prompted to add back the Credentials, be sure to use "User Authentication" OAuth
- Select "Web App" for OAuth 2.0 authentication and authorization
- After the event has been re-added, under "Credentials" on left hand side, select "OAuth Web App"
- Select "Retrieve client secret"
- Copy the secret value and update all services with the new client secret
OAuth Web App (API Service based project):
- Sign in to your account at <https://developer.adobe.com/console>
- Select the project or select "All projects" to find the project that is impacted
- On the left-hand side, under "Credentials", select "OAuth Web App"
- Select "Retrieve client secret"
- If this project is configured for API, select the trash icon "Remove" to remove the connected product and service.
- When prompted, enter the project name and select "Remove API"
- In the top right-hand corner, select "Delete credential"
- When prompted, type in the project name and select "Delete Credential"
- Re-add the API with the same details as before
- Select "Web App" for OAuth 2.0 authentication and authorization
- After the service has been re-added, on the left-hand side under "Credentials", select "OAuth Web App"
- Select "Retrieve client secret"
- Copy the secret value and update all services with the new client secret
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.3 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.53
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.53.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.53.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitHub OAuth Access Token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitHub OAuth Access Token was identified. Unlike a traditional OAuth token, user access tokens do not use scopes. Instead, it uses fine-grained permissions. A user access token only has permissions that both the user and the app have. If a malicious actor gains access to the token and the app was granted permission to write the contents of a repository, but the user can only read the contents, then the user access token can only read the contents.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). For more information, please see [GitHubs documentation to revoke an OAuth access tokens](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/apps/oauth-applications?apiVersion=2022-11-28#delete-an-app-token). Also note, GitHub Apps are preferred over OAuth apps, please see [GitHubs documentation for more details](https://docs.github.com/en/apps/oauth-apps/building-oauth-apps/differences-between-github-apps-and-oauth-apps).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.53 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitHub OAuth Access Token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitHub OAuth Access Token was identified. Unlike a traditional OAuth token, user access tokens do not use scopes. Instead, it uses fine-grained permissions. A user access token only has permissions that both the user and the app have. If a malicious actor gains access to the token and the app was granted permission to write the contents of a repository, but the user can only read the contents, then the user access token can only read the contents.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). For more information, please see [GitHubs documentation to revoke an OAuth access tokens](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/apps/oauth-applications?apiVersion=2022-11-28#delete-an-app-token). Also note, GitHub Apps are preferred over OAuth apps, please see [GitHubs documentation for more details](https://docs.github.com/en/apps/oauth-apps/building-oauth-apps/differences-between-github-apps-and-oauth-apps).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.53 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.29
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.29.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.29.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Doppler API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Doppler personal access token was detected.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke the Doppler personal access token:
- Open and sign in to <https://dashboard.doppler.com/>
- Select "Tokens" on the right-hand side menu
- Select the "Personal" tab
- Find the personal token and select "Roll" in the Action column
- After the "Roll Personal Token" dialog is displayed select "Roll"
- Copy the new token's value
For more information please see their documentation: <https://docs.doppler.com/docs/start>
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.29 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Doppler API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Doppler personal access token was detected.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke the Doppler personal access token:
- Open and sign in to <https://dashboard.doppler.com/>
- Select "Tokens" on the right-hand side menu
- Select the "Personal" tab
- Find the personal token and select "Roll" in the Action column
- After the "Roll Personal Token" dialog is displayed select "Roll"
- Copy the new token's value
For more information please see their documentation: <https://docs.doppler.com/docs/start>
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.29 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.55
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.55.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.55.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token GitHub refresh token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitHub Refresh Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.55 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token GitHub refresh token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a GitHub Refresh Token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.55 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/94.3
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/94.3.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
94.3.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Server-side code injection (Python)
| null |
## Description
The target application was found vulnerable to code injection. A malicious actor could inject arbitrary
Python code to be executed on the server. This could lead to a full system compromise by accessing
stored secrets, injecting code to take over accounts, or executing OS commands.
## Remediation
Never pass user input directly into functions which evaluate string data as code, such as `eval`,
or `exec`. There is almost no benefit of passing string values to these methods, as such the best
recommendation is to replace the current logic with more safe implementations of dynamically evaluating
logic with user input. One alternative is to store functions or methods in a hashmap that can be looked
up using a key. If the key exists, the function can be executed.
```python
def func_to_run():
print('hello world')
function_map = {'fn': func_to_run}
input = 'fn'
if input in function_map:
function_map[input]()
else:
print('invalid input')
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 94.3 | false | 94 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Server-side code injection (Python)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target application was found vulnerable to code injection. A malicious actor could inject arbitrary
Python code to be executed on the server. This could lead to a full system compromise by accessing
stored secrets, injecting code to take over accounts, or executing OS commands.
## Remediation
Never pass user input directly into functions which evaluate string data as code, such as `eval`,
or `exec`. There is almost no benefit of passing string values to these methods, as such the best
recommendation is to replace the current logic with more safe implementations of dynamically evaluating
logic with user input. One alternative is to store functions or methods in a hashmap that can be looked
up using a key. If the key exists, the function can be executed.
```python
def func_to_run():
print('hello world')
function_map = {'fn': func_to_run}
input = 'fn'
if input in function_map:
function_map[input]()
else:
print('invalid input')
```
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 94.3 | false | 94 | Active | high |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/319.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/319.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
319.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Mixed Content
| null |
## Description
The target application was found to request resources over insecure transport protocols (HTTP). This is usually due to HTML
elements which load resources using the `http://` scheme instead of `https://`. It should be noted that most modern browsers
block these requests automatically so there is limited risk.
Some parts of the application may not behave correctly because these files are not being properly loaded.
## Remediation
Ensure all HTML elements which load resources from a URL (JavaScript, stylesheets, images, video and other media) are set to
use the `https://` scheme instead of `http://`. Alternatively, developers may use the `//` scheme, which will only load resources
over the same protocol that the originating page was loaded.
A browser visiting the website `https://example.com` with the HTML loading a file using
`<script src="//example.com/cdn/bundle.js"></script>`, would ensure the `example.com/cdn/bundle.js` file was loaded over
HTTPS.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 319.1 | true | 319 | Passive | Info |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Insecure_Transport)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/319.html)
- [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Mixed_content)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Mixed Content
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target application was found to request resources over insecure transport protocols (HTTP). This is usually due to HTML
elements which load resources using the `http://` scheme instead of `https://`. It should be noted that most modern browsers
block these requests automatically so there is limited risk.
Some parts of the application may not behave correctly because these files are not being properly loaded.
## Remediation
Ensure all HTML elements which load resources from a URL (JavaScript, stylesheets, images, video and other media) are set to
use the `https://` scheme instead of `http://`. Alternatively, developers may use the `//` scheme, which will only load resources
over the same protocol that the originating page was loaded.
A browser visiting the website `https://example.com` with the HTML loading a file using
`<script src="//example.com/cdn/bundle.js"></script>`, would ensure the `example.com/cdn/bundle.js` file was loaded over
HTTPS.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 319.1 | true | 319 | Passive | Info |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Insecure_Transport)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/319.html)
- [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Mixed_content)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.121
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.121.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.121.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token X token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an X secret access token was identified. An access secret are user-specific credentials used to authenticate OAuth 1.0a API requests. They specify the X account the request is made on behalf of. A malicious actor with access to this token can impersonate requests on behalf of a user.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.121 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token X token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an X secret access token was identified. An access secret are user-specific credentials used to authenticate OAuth 1.0a API requests. They specify the X account the request is made on behalf of. A malicious actor with access to this token can impersonate requests on behalf of a user.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.121 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.8
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/16.8.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
16.8.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Content-Security-Policy analysis
| null |
## Description
A missing or invalid `Content-Security-Policy` (CSP) was identified on the target site. CSP can aid in
hardening a website against various client side attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
## Remediation
If the target site is missing a CSP, investigate the relevant URLs for enabling CSP. Otherwise,
follow the recommendations to determine if any actions are necessary.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.8 | true | 16 | Passive | Info |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [OWASP](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP)
- [Content Security Policy Level 3](https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/)
- [CSP Evaluator](https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Content-Security-Policy analysis
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
A missing or invalid `Content-Security-Policy` (CSP) was identified on the target site. CSP can aid in
hardening a website against various client side attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
## Remediation
If the target site is missing a CSP, investigate the relevant URLs for enabling CSP. Otherwise,
follow the recommendations to determine if any actions are necessary.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 16.8 | true | 16 | Passive | Info |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html)
- [OWASP](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP)
- [Content Security Policy Level 3](https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/)
- [CSP Evaluator](https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.117
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.117.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.117.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Twilio API key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Twilio API Key.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.117 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Twilio API key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Twilio API Key.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.117 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/359.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/359.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
359.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of Private Personal Information (PII) to an unauthorized actor (credit card)
| null |
## Description
The target application was found to return credit card information in the response. Organizations
found returning such information may be in violation of industry regulations and could face fines.
## Remediation
PII such as credit cards should never be directly returned to the user. The majority of the information should masked except
the last few digits or characters of the identifier. For example, credit card numbers should
only return the last four digits: `****-****-****-1234`. Ensure this masking is done on the server
and only then send the masked data back to the client. Do not rely on client side JavaScript or other methods
to mask these values as the data could still be intercepted or unmasked.
Additionally, credit card information should never be stored un-encrypted in files or databases.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 359.1 | true | 359 | Passive | Medium |
## Links
- [OWASP Top 10 A3 2017 - Sensitive Data Exposure](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A3_2017-Sensitive_Data_Exposure)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/359.html)
- [PCI-DSS](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_fs_data_storage.pdf)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of Private Personal Information (PII) to an unauthorized actor (credit
card)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The target application was found to return credit card information in the response. Organizations
found returning such information may be in violation of industry regulations and could face fines.
## Remediation
PII such as credit cards should never be directly returned to the user. The majority of the information should masked except
the last few digits or characters of the identifier. For example, credit card numbers should
only return the last four digits: `****-****-****-1234`. Ensure this masking is done on the server
and only then send the masked data back to the client. Do not rely on client side JavaScript or other methods
to mask these values as the data could still be intercepted or unmasked.
Additionally, credit card information should never be stored un-encrypted in files or databases.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 359.1 | true | 359 | Passive | Medium |
## Links
- [OWASP Top 10 A3 2017 - Sensitive Data Exposure](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A3_2017-Sensitive_Data_Exposure)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/359.html)
- [PCI-DSS](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_fs_data_storage.pdf)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.111
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.111.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.111.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Stripe live secret key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Stripe live secret key was identified. Live secret keys authenticate requests on your server when in live mode. By default, you can use this key to perform any API request without restriction. A malicious actor who gained access to this key could gain read/write access to all data in Stripe for this account.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate your Stripe live secret key:
- Sign in to your Stripe account and access <https://dashboard.stripe.com/apikeys>
- Ensure "Test mode" is disabled
- In the "Standard keys" section, find the key that was identified and select the ellipsis in the right-hand side
- Select "Roll key..." - In the "Roll API key" dialog, select an expiration date, for example "now"
- Select "Roll API Key"
For more information, please see [Stripe's documentation on rotating API keys](https://docs.stripe.com/keys#rolling-keys).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.111 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Stripe live secret key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Stripe live secret key was identified. Live secret keys authenticate requests on your server when in live mode. By default, you can use this key to perform any API request without restriction. A malicious actor who gained access to this key could gain read/write access to all data in Stripe for this account.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate your Stripe live secret key:
- Sign in to your Stripe account and access <https://dashboard.stripe.com/apikeys>
- Ensure "Test mode" is disabled
- In the "Standard keys" section, find the key that was identified and select the ellipsis in the right-hand side
- Select "Roll key..." - In the "Roll API key" dialog, select an expiration date, for example "now"
- Select "Roll API Key"
For more information, please see [Stripe's documentation on rotating API keys](https://docs.stripe.com/keys#rolling-keys).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.111 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.84
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.84.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.84.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token npm access token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an npm access token was identified. Access tokens can either be classic or granular, both of which allow customization of permissions. Depending on the permissions, a malicious actor with access to this token can read packages and package information, or create new packages and publish them under the account that created them.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke an access token from the UI:
- Sign in to your npm account at <https://www.npmjs.com/login>
- In the top right corner, select your profile picture and then select "Access Tokens"
- Find the token that was identified and select "x" in the "Delete" column
- When prompted, select "OK" in the dialog
For more information, please see [npm's documentation on revoking access tokens](https://docs.npmjs.com/revoking-access-tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.84 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token npm access token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an npm access token was identified. Access tokens can either be classic or granular, both of which allow customization of permissions. Depending on the permissions, a malicious actor with access to this token can read packages and package information, or create new packages and publish them under the account that created them.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To revoke an access token from the UI:
- Sign in to your npm account at <https://www.npmjs.com/login>
- In the top right corner, select your profile picture and then select "Access Tokens"
- Find the token that was identified and select "x" in the "Delete" column
- When prompted, select "OK" in the dialog
For more information, please see [npm's documentation on revoking access tokens](https://docs.npmjs.com/revoking-access-tokens).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.84 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/200.1
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/200.1.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
200.1.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor (private IP address)
| null |
## Description
A private RFC 1918/RFC 4193 address was identified in the target application. Public facing websites should not be issuing
requests to private IP Addresses. Attackers attempting to execute subsequent attacks, such as Server-Side
Request Forgery (SSRF), may be able to use this information to identify additional internal targets.
## Remediation
Identify the resource that is incorrectly specifying an internal IP address and replace it with it's public
facing version, or remove the reference from the target application.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 200.1 | true | 200 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html)
- [RFC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1918)
- [RFC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4193)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor (private IP address)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
A private RFC 1918/RFC 4193 address was identified in the target application. Public facing websites should not be issuing
requests to private IP Addresses. Attackers attempting to execute subsequent attacks, such as Server-Side
Request Forgery (SSRF), may be able to use this information to identify additional internal targets.
## Remediation
Identify the resource that is incorrectly specifying an internal IP address and replace it with it's public
facing version, or remove the reference from the target application.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 200.1 | true | 200 | Passive | Low |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html)
- [RFC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1918)
- [RFC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4193)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.82
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.82.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.82.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token New Relic user API ID
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a New Relic user API ID.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). For more information, please see [New Relic's documentation on rotating API keys](https://docs.newrelic.com/docs/apis/intro-apis/new-relic-api-keys/#rotate-keys).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.82 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token New Relic user API ID
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a New Relic user API ID.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet). For more information, please see [New Relic's documentation on rotating API keys](https://docs.newrelic.com/docs/apis/intro-apis/new-relic-api-keys/#rotate-keys).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.82 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.107
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.107.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.107.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Shopify private app access token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Shopify private app access token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.107 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Shopify private app access token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Shopify private app access token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.107 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.101
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.101.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.101.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token SendGrid API token
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a SendGrid API token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.101 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token SendGrid API token
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a SendGrid API token.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.101 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/598.2
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/598.2.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
598.2.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Use of GET request method with sensitive query strings (password)
| null |
## Description
The user's password was identified in the request URL. Passwords should never be sent in GET
requests as they maybe captured by proxy systems, stored in browser history, or stored in
log files. If an attacker were to get access to these logs or logging systems, they would
be able to gain access to the target account.
## Remediation
Passwords should never be sent in GET requests. When authenticating users or requesting users
reset their passwords, always use `POST` requests to transmit sensitive data.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 598.2 | true | 598 | Passive | Medium |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Information_exposure_through_query_strings_in_url)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/598.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Use of GET request method with sensitive query strings (password)
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The user's password was identified in the request URL. Passwords should never be sent in GET
requests as they maybe captured by proxy systems, stored in browser history, or stored in
log files. If an attacker were to get access to these logs or logging systems, they would
be able to gain access to the target account.
## Remediation
Passwords should never be sent in GET requests. When authenticating users or requesting users
reset their passwords, always use `POST` requests to transmit sensitive data.
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 598.2 | true | 598 | Passive | Medium |
## Links
- [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Information_exposure_through_query_strings_in_url)
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/598.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.73
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.73.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.73.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Mailgun public verification key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Mailgun public verification key was identified. These keys are deprecated and you should use the v4 verification service instead. A malicious with access to this key can use it to validate email addresses.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate your public verification key:
- Sign in to your Mailgun account and access the dashboard at <https://app.mailgun.com/>
- On the top right-hand side, select your account profile and then select "API Security"
- In the "Verification public key" section, select the rotate arrow icon in the right-hand side
- When prompted, select "Reset Key" in the "Reset public verification key" dialog
For more information, please see [Mailgun's documentation on API keys](https://mailchimp.com/help/about-api-keys).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.73 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Mailgun public verification key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Mailgun public verification key was identified. These keys are deprecated and you should use the v4 verification service instead. A malicious with access to this key can use it to validate email addresses.
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate your public verification key:
- Sign in to your Mailgun account and access the dashboard at <https://app.mailgun.com/>
- On the top right-hand side, select your account profile and then select "API Security"
- In the "Verification public key" section, select the rotate arrow icon in the right-hand side
- When prompted, select "Reset Key" in the "Reset public verification key" dialog
For more information, please see [Mailgun's documentation on API keys](https://mailchimp.com/help/about-api-keys).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.73 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.94
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.94.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.94.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token SSH private key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an SSH private key was identified. Private SSH keys are used for authentication and symmetric key exchange. A malicious actor with access to this key can use it to impersonate an application or service..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To generate a new ed25519 key (recommended) use the `ssh-keygen` tool:
```console ssh-keygen -t ed25519```
To generate a new ECDSA key, use the `ssh-keygen` tool:
```console ssh-keygen -t ecdsa```
To generate a new DSA key, use the `ssh-keygen` tool:
```console ssh-keygen -t dsa```
For more information, please see the [`ssh-keygen` documentation](https://linux.die.net/man/1/ssh-keygen).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.94 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token SSH private key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of an SSH private key was identified. Private SSH keys are used for authentication and symmetric key exchange. A malicious actor with access to this key can use it to impersonate an application or service..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To generate a new ed25519 key (recommended) use the `ssh-keygen` tool:
```console ssh-keygen -t ed25519```
To generate a new ECDSA key, use the `ssh-keygen` tool:
```console ssh-keygen -t ecdsa```
To generate a new DSA key, use the `ssh-keygen` tool:
```console ssh-keygen -t dsa```
For more information, please see the [`ssh-keygen` documentation](https://linux.die.net/man/1/ssh-keygen).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.94 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.75
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/798.75.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/checks
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"checks"
] |
798.75.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Exposure of confidential secret or token Mailgun webhook signing key
| null |
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Mailgun webhook signing key was identified. This key is used by Mailgun to sign all incoming webhook message payloads. A malicious actor with access to this key can potentially sign fake webhook events and send it to your service to pass validation and be processed..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate your HTTP webhook signing key:
- Sign in to your Mailgun account and access the dashboard at <https://app.mailgun.com/>
- On the top right-hand side, select your account profile and select "API Security"
- In the "HTTP webhook signing key" section, select the rotate arrow icon in the right hand side
- When prompted, select "Reset Key" in the "Reset HTTP webhook signing key" dialog
For more information, please see [Mailgun's documentation on webhooks](https://documentation.mailgun.com/docs/mailgun/user-manual/tracking-messages/#securing-webhooks).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.75 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
---
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Exposure of confidential secret or token Mailgun webhook signing key
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- checks
---
## Description
The response body contains content that matches the pattern of a Mailgun webhook signing key was identified. This key is used by Mailgun to sign all incoming webhook message payloads. A malicious actor with access to this key can potentially sign fake webhook events and send it to your service to pass validation and be processed..
Exposing this value could allow attackers to gain access to all resources granted by this token.
## Remediation
For general guidance on handling security incidents with regards to leaked keys, please see the GitLab documentation on [Credential exposure to the internet](../../../../../security/responding_to_security_incidents.md#credential-exposure-to-public-internet).
To rotate your HTTP webhook signing key:
- Sign in to your Mailgun account and access the dashboard at <https://app.mailgun.com/>
- On the top right-hand side, select your account profile and select "API Security"
- In the "HTTP webhook signing key" section, select the rotate arrow icon in the right hand side
- When prompted, select "Reset Key" in the "Reset HTTP webhook signing key" dialog
For more information, please see [Mailgun's documentation on webhooks](https://documentation.mailgun.com/docs/mailgun/user-manual/tracking-messages/#securing-webhooks).
## Details
| ID | Aggregated | CWE | Type | Risk |
|:---|:-----------|:----|:-----|:-----|
| 798.75 | false | 798 | Passive | High |
## Links
- [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/authentication
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/authentication.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/configuration
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"configuration"
] |
authentication.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Authentication
| null |
For complete coverage, the DAST analyzer must authenticate with the application being tested. This
requires configuring the authentication credentials and authentication method in the DAST CI/CD job.
DAST requires authentication to:
- Simulate real-world attacks and identify vulnerabilities that might be exploited by
attackers.
- Test user-specific features and custom behavior that may only be visible after authentication.
The DAST job authenticates itself to the application, most commonly by filling in and submitting a
login form on a browser. After the form is submitted, the DAST job confirms that authentication was
successful. If authentication was successful, the DAST job continues and also saves the credentials
for reuse when crawling the target application. If not, the DAST job stops.
Authentication methods supported by DAST include:
- Single-step login form
- Multi-step login form
- Authenticating to URLs outside the configured target URL
When choosing authentication credentials:
- **DO NOT** use credentials that are valid for production systems, production servers, or used to access production data.
- **DO NOT** run an authenticated scan against a production server. Authenticated scans may perform
**any** function that the authenticated user can, including modifying or deleting data, submitting
forms, and following links. Only run an authenticated scan against non-production systems or
servers.
- Provide credentials that allow DAST to test the entire application.
- Note the credentials' expiry date, if any, for future reference. For example, with a password
manager such as 1Password.
The following diagram illustrates the usage of authentication variables at different stages of authentication:
```mermaid
%%{init: { "fontFamily": "GitLab Sans" }}%%
sequenceDiagram
accTitle: Authentication variables
accDescr: A sequence diagram showing authentication variables at different stages of authentication.
participant DAST
participant Browser
participant Target
Note over DAST,Target: Initialization
DAST->>Browser: Initialize browser with proxy
DAST->>Browser: Navigate to DAST_AUTH_URL
Browser->>Target: Load initial page
Target-->>Browser: Return page content (may not contain login form)
Note over DAST,Target: Process before-login actions
DAST->>Browser: Click elements specified in DAST_AUTH_BEFORE_LOGIN_ACTIONS
Browser->>Target: Send click actions
Target-->>Browser: Render login form (modal/page)
Note over DAST,Target: Authentication
DAST->>Browser: Fill DAST_AUTH_USERNAME & DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD
DAST->>Browser: Click "submit"
Browser->>Target: Submit form
Target-->>Browser: Process authentication
Target-->>Browser: Set auth tokens
Note over DAST,Target: Process after-login actions (if specified)
DAST->>Browser: Execute DAST_AUTH_AFTER_LOGIN_ACTIONS
Browser->>Target: Actions after login but before login verification
Note over DAST,Target: Verification
DAST->>Browser: Check URL matches DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL (if configured)
DAST->>Browser: Check element exists DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND (if configured)
DAST->>Browser: Check login form absent DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_NO_LOGIN_FORM (default is true)
```
## Getting started
{{< alert type="note" >}}
You should periodically confirming that the analyzer's authentication is still working, as this tends to break over
time due to changes to the application.
{{< /alert >}}
To run a DAST authenticated scan:
- Read the [prerequisite](#prerequisites) conditions for authentication.
- [Update your target website](#update-the-target-website) to a landing page of an authenticated user.
- If your login form has the username, password and submit button on a single page, use the [CI/CD variables](#available-cicd-variables) to configure [single-step](#configuration-for-a-single-step-login-form) login form authentication.
- If your login form has the username and password fields on different pages, use the [CI/CD variables](#available-cicd-variables) to configure [multi-step](#configuration-for-a-multi-step-login-form) login form authentication.
- Make sure the user isn't [logged out](#excluding-logout-urls) during the scan.
### Prerequisites
- You have the username and password of the user you would like to authenticate as during the scan.
- You have checked the [known issues](#known-issues) to ensure DAST can authenticate to your application.
- You have satisfied the prerequisites if you're using [form authentication](#form-authentication).
- You have satisfied the additional prerequisites if your form authentication flow includes a [time-based one-time password](#totp-authentication).
- You have thought about how you can [verify](#verifying-authentication-is-successful) whether or not authentication was successful.
#### Form authentication
- You know the URL of the login form of your application. Alternatively, you know how to go to the login form from the authentication URL (see [clicking to go to the login form](#clicking-to-go-to-the-login-form)).
- You know the [selectors](#finding-an-elements-selector) of the username and password HTML fields that DAST uses to input the respective values.
- You know the element's [selector](#finding-an-elements-selector) that submits the login form when selected.
#### TOTP authentication
{{< history >}}
- [Introduced](https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/13633) in scanner version 6.9.
{{< /history >}}
- You have the secret key for the test user's TOTP enrollment, encoded in Base32.
- You have confirmed that the auth provider supports the following TOTP configuration (same as Google Authenticator):
- HMAC algorithm: SHA-1
- Time step: 30 seconds
- Token length: 6
- You know the [selectors](#finding-an-elements-selector) of the TOTP field that DAST uses to input the generated TOTP token.
- You know the element's [selector](#finding-an-elements-selector) that submits the TOTP token, if it is submitted separately from the password.
### Available CI/CD variables
For a list of DAST Authentication CI/CD variables, see [Authentication variables](variables.md#authentication).
The DAST CI/CD variable table is generated by the Rake task `bundle exec rake gitlab:dast_variables:compile_docs`. It uses variable metadata defined in [`lib/gitlab/security/dast_variables.rb`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/lib/gitlab/security/dast_variables.rb).
### Update the target website
The target website, defined using the CI/CD variable `DAST_TARGET_URL`, is the URL DAST uses to begin crawling your application.
For best crawl results on an authenticated scan, the target website should be a URL accessible only after the user is authenticated.
Often, this is the URL of the page the user lands on after they're logged in.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com/dashboard/welcome"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
```
### Configuration for HTTP authentication
To use an [HTTP authentication scheme](https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/http-authentication/) such as Basic Authentication you can set the `DAST_AUTH_TYPE` value to `basic-digest`.
Other schemes such as Negotiate or NTLM may work but aren't officially supported due to current lack of automated test coverage.
Configuration requires the CI/CD variables `DAST_AUTH_TYPE`, `DAST_AUTH_URL`, `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME`, `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD` to be defined for the DAST job. If you don't have a unique login URL, set `DAST_AUTH_URL` to the same URL as `DAST_TARGET_URL`.
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_TYPE: "basic-digest"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com"
```
Do **not** define `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME` and `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD` in the YAML job definition file as this could present a security risk. Instead, create them as masked CI/CD variables using the GitLab UI.
See [Custom CI/CD variables](../../../../../ci/variables/_index.md#for-a-project) for more information.
### Configuration for a single-step login form
A single-step login form has all login form elements on a single page.
Configuration requires the CI/CD variables `DAST_AUTH_URL`, `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME`, `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD`, `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD`, `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD`, and `DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD` to be defined for the DAST job.
You should set up the URL and selectors of fields in the job definition YAML, for example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "css:[name=username]"
DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD: "css:[name=password]"
DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:button[type=submit]"
```
Do **not** define `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME` and `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD` in the YAML job definition file as this could present a security risk. Instead, create them as masked CI/CD variables using the GitLab UI.
See [Custom CI/CD variables](../../../../../ci/variables/_index.md#for-a-project) for more information.
### Configuration for a multi-step login form
A multi-step login form has two pages. The first page has a form with the username and a next submit button.
If the username is valid, a second form on the subsequent page has the password and the form submit button.
Configuration requires the CI/CD variables to be defined for the DAST job:
- `DAST_AUTH_URL`
- `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME`
- `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD`
- `DAST_AUTH_FIRST_SUBMIT_FIELD`
- `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD`
- `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD`
- `DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD`.
You should set up the URL and selectors of fields in the job definition YAML, for example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "css:[name=username]"
DAST_AUTH_FIRST_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:button[name=next]"
DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD: "css:[name=password]"
DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:button[type=submit]"
```
Do **not** define `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME` and `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD` in the YAML job definition file as this could present a security risk. Instead, create them as masked CI/CD variables using the GitLab UI.
See [Custom CI/CD variables](../../../../../ci/variables/_index.md#for-a-project) for more information.
### Configuration for Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP)
Configuration for TOTP requires these CI/CD variables to be defined for the DAST job:
- `DAST_AUTH_OTP_FIELD`
- `DAST_AUTH_OTP_KEY`
If the TOTP token is submitted in its own form after the password has been submitted, you must also define this variable:
- `DAST_AUTH_OTP_SUBMIT_FIELD`
The `_FIELD` selector variables can be defined in the job definition YAML, for example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "css:[name=username]"
DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD: "css:[name=password]"
DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:button[type=submit]"
DAST_AUTH_OTP_FIELD: "name:otp"
DAST_AUTH_OTP_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:input[type=submit]"
```
Do **not** define `DAST_AUTH_OTP_KEY` in the YAML job definition file as this could present a security risk. Instead, create it as a masked CI/CD variable using the GitLab UI.
See [Custom CI/CD variables](../../../../../ci/variables/_index.md#for-a-project) for more information.
### Configuration for Single Sign-On (SSO)
If a user can sign in to an application, then in most cases, DAST is also able to sign in.
Even when an application uses Single Sign-on. Applications using SSO solutions should configure DAST
authentication using the [single-step](#configuration-for-a-single-step-login-form) or [multi-step](#configuration-for-a-multi-step-login-form) login form configuration guides.
DAST supports authentication processes where a user is redirected to an external Identity Provider's site to sign in.
Check the [known issues](#known-issues) of DAST authentication to determine if your SSO authentication process is supported.
### Configuration for Windows integrated authentication (Kerberos)
Windows integrated authentication (Kerberos) is a common authentication mechanism for line of business (LOB) applications hosted inside a Windows domain. It provides promptless authentication using the user's computer login.
To configure this form of authentication perform the following steps:
1. Collect the necessary information with assistance from your IT/operations team.
1. Create or update the `dast` job definition in your `.gitlab-ci.yml` file.
1. Populate the example `krb5.conf` file using the information collected.
1. Set the necessary job variables.
1. Set the necessary secret variables by using the project **Settings** page.
1. Test and verify authentication is functioning.
Collect the following information with assistance from your IT/Operations department:
- Name of Windows domain or Kerberos Realm (must have a period in the name like `EXAMPLE.COM`)
- Hostname for Windows/Kerberos domain controller
- For Kerberos the auth server name. For Windows domains this is the domain controller.
Create the `krb5.conf` file:
```ini
[libdefaults]
# Realm is another name for domain name
default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM
# These settings are not needed for Windows Domains
# they support other Kerberos implementations
kdc_timesync = 1
ccache_type = 4
forwardable = true
proxiable = true
rdns = false
fcc-mit-ticketflags = true
[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
# Domain controller or KDC
kdc = kdc.example.com
# Domain controller or admin server
admin_server = kdc.example.com
}
[domain_realm]
# Mapping DNS domains to realms/Windows domain
# DNS domains provided by DAST_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_DELEGATION
# should also be represented here (but without the wildcard)
.example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
```
This configuration makes use of the `DAST_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_DELEGATION` variable.
This variable sets the following Chromium policies needed to allow integrated authentication:
- [AuthServerAllowlist](https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#AuthServerAllowlist)
- [AuthNegotiateDelegateAllowlist](https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#AuthNegotiateDelegateAllowlist)
The settings for this variable are the DNS domains associated with your Windows domain or Kerberos realm.
You should provide them:
- In both lowercase and also upper case.
- With a wildcard pattern and just the domain name.
For our example the Windows domain is `EXAMPLE.COM` and the DNS domain is `example.com`.
This gives us a value of `*.example.com,example.com,*.EXAMPLE.COM,EXAMPLE.COM` for `DAST_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_DELEGATION`.
Pull it all together into a job definition:
```yaml
# This job will extend the dast job defined in
# the DAST template which must also be included.
dast:
image:
name: "$SECURE_ANALYZERS_PREFIX/dast:$DAST_VERSION$DAST_IMAGE_SUFFIX"
docker:
user: root
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: https://target.example.com
DAST_AUTH_URL: https://target.example.com
DAST_AUTH_TYPE: basic-digest
DAST_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_DELEGATION: '*.example.com,example.com,*.EXAMPLE.COM,EXAMPLE.COM'
# Not shown -- DAST_AUTH_USERNAME, DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD set via Settings -> CI -> Variables
before_script:
- KRB5_CONF='
[libdefaults]
default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM
kdc_timesync = 1
ccache_type = 4
forwardable = true
proxiable = true
rdns = false
fcc-mit-ticketflags = true
[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
kdc = ad1.example.com
admin_server = ad1.example.com
}
[domain_realm]
.example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
'
- cat "$KRB5_CONF" > /etc/krb5.conf
- echo '$DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD' | kinit $DAST_AUTH_USERNAME
- klist
```
Expected output:
The job console output contains the output from the `before` script. It will look similar to the following if authentication was successful. The job should fail if it was unsuccessful without running a scan.
```plaintext
Password for mike@EXAMPLE.COM:
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_1000
Default principal: mike@EXAMPLE.COM
Valid starting Expires Service principal
11/11/2024 21:50:50 11/12/2024 07:50:50 krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
renew until 11/12/2024 21:50:50
```
The DAST scanner will also output the following, indicating success:
```plaintext
2024-11-08T17:03:09.226 INF AUTH attempting to authenticate find_auth_fields="basic-digest"
2024-11-08T17:03:09.226 INF AUTH loading login page LoginURL="https://target.example.com"
2024-11-08T17:03:10.619 INF AUTH verifying if login attempt was successful true_when="HTTP status code < 400 and has authentication token and no login form found (auto-detected)"
2024-11-08T17:03:10.619 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, HTTP login request returned status code 200 want="HTTP status code < 400" url="https://target.example.com/"
2024-11-08T17:03:10.623 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, did not detect a login form want="no login form found (auto-detected)"
2024-11-08T17:03:10.623 INF AUTH authentication token cookies names=""
2024-11-08T17:03:10.623 INF AUTH authentication token storage events keys=""
2024-11-08T17:03:10.623 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, basic authentication detected want="has authentication token"
2024-11-08T17:03:11.230 INF AUTH login attempt succeeded
```
### Clicking to go to the login form
Define `DAST_AUTH_BEFORE_LOGIN_ACTIONS` to provide a path of elements to click on from the `DAST_AUTH_URL` so that DAST can access the
login form. This method is suitable for applications that show the login form in a pop-up (modal) window or when the login form does not
have a unique URL.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_BEFORE_LOGIN_ACTIONS: "css:.navigation-menu,css:.login-menu-item"
```
### Taking additional actions after submitting the login form
Define `DAST_AUTH_AFTER_LOGIN_ACTIONS` to provide a sequence of actions to perform
after submitting the sign-in form, but before verification, when authentication details are recorded.
This can be used to proceed past a "keep me signed in" dialog.
| Action | Format |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Click on an element | `click(on=<selector>)` |
| Select an option from a dropdown | `select(option=<selector>)` |
Actions are comma-separated. For information about selectors, see [finding an element's selector](#finding-an-elements-selector).
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_AFTER_LOGIN_ACTIONS: "select(option=id:accept-yes),click(on=id:continue-button)"
```
### Excluding logout URLs
If DAST crawls the logout URL while running an authenticated scan, the user is logged out, resulting in the remainder of the scan being unauthenticated.
It is therefore recommended to exclude logout URLs using the CI/CD variable `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS`. DAST isn't accessing any excluded URLs, ensuring the user remains logged in.
Provided URLs can be either absolute URLs, or regular expressions of URL paths relative to the base path of the `DAST_TARGET_URL`. For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com/welcome/home"
DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS: "https://example.com/logout,/user/.*/logout"
```
### Finding an element's selector
Selectors are used by CI/CD variables to specify the location of an element displayed on a page in a browser.
Selectors have the format `type`:`search string`. DAST searches for the selector using the search string based on the type.
| Selector type | Example | Description |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `css` | `css:.password-field` | Searches for a HTML element having the supplied CSS selector. Selectors should be as specific as possible for performance reasons. |
| `id` | `id:element` | Searches for an HTML element with the provided element ID. |
| `name` | `name:element` | Searches for an HTML element with the provided element name. |
| `xpath` | `xpath://input[@id="my-button"]/a` | Searches for a HTML element with the provided XPath. XPath searches are expected to be less performant than other searches. |
#### Find selectors with Google Chrome
Chrome DevTools element selector tool is an effective way to find a selector.
1. Open Chrome and go to the page where you would like to find a selector, for example, the login page for your site.
1. Open the `Elements` tab in Chrome DevTools with the keyboard shortcut `Command + Shift + c` in macOS or `Ctrl + Shift + c` in Windows or Linux.
1. Select the `Select an element in the page to select it` tool.
1. Select the field on your page that you would like to know the selector for.
1. After the tool is active, highlight a field you wish to view the details of.
1. Once highlighted, you can see the element's details, including attributes that would make a good candidate for a selector.
In this example, the `id="user_login"` appears to be a good candidate. You can use this as a selector as the DAST username field by setting
`DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "id:user_login"`.
#### Choose the right selector
Judicious choice of selector leads to a scan that is resilient to the application changing.
In order of preference, you should choose as selectors:
- `id` fields. These fields generally unique on a page, and rarely change.
- `name` fields. These fields generally unique on a page, and rarely change.
- `class` values specific to the field, such as the selector `"css:.username"` for the `username` class on the username field.
- Presence of field specific data attributes, such as the selector, `"css:[data-username]"` when the `data-username` field has any value on the username field.
- Multiple `class` hierarchy values, such as the selector `"css:.login-form .username"` when there are multiple elements with class `username` but only one nested inside the element with the class `login-form`.
When using selectors to locate specific fields you should avoid searching on:
- Any `id`, `name`, `attribute`, `class` or `value` that is dynamically generated.
- Generic class names, such as `column-10` and `dark-grey`.
- XPath searches as they are less performant than other selector searches.
- Unscoped searches, such as those beginning with `css:*` and `xpath://*`.
## Verifying authentication is successful
After DAST has submitted the login form, a verification process takes place
to determine if authentication succeeded. The scan halts with an error if authentication is unsuccessful.
Following the submission of the login form, authentication is determined to be unsuccessful when:
- The login submit HTTP response has a `400` or `500` series status code.
- Any [verification check](#verification-checks) fails.
- An [authentication token](#authentication-tokens) with a sufficiently random value is not set during the authentication process.
### Verification checks
Verification checks run checks on the state of the browser once authentication is complete
to determine further if authentication succeeded.
DAST tests for the absence of a login form if no verification checks are configured.
#### Verify based on the URL
Define `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL` as the URL displayed in the browser tab after the login form is successfully submitted.
DAST compares the verification URL to the URL in the browser after authentication.
If they are not the same, authentication is unsuccessful.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL: "https://example.com/user/welcome"
```
#### Verify based on presence of an element
Define `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND` as a [selector](#finding-an-elements-selector) that finds one or many elements on the page
displayed after the login form is successfully submitted. If no element is found, authentication is unsuccessful.
Searching for the selector on the page displayed when login fails should return no elements.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND: "css:.welcome-user"
```
#### Verify based on absence of a login form
Define `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_NO_LOGIN_FORM` as `"true"` to indicate that DAST should search for the login form on the
page displayed after the login form is successfully submitted. If a login form is still present after logging in, authentication is unsuccessful.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_NO_LOGIN_FORM: "true"
```
### Authentication tokens
DAST records authentication tokens set during the authentication process.
Authentication tokens are loaded into new browsers when DAST opens them so the user can remain logged in throughout the scan.
To record tokens, DAST takes a snapshot of cookies, local storage, and session storage values set by the application before
the authentication process. DAST does the same after authentication and uses the difference to determine which were created
by the authentication process.
DAST considers cookies, local storage and session storage values set with sufficiently "random" values to be authentication tokens.
For example, `sessionID=HVxzpS8GzMlPAc2e39uyIVzwACIuGe0H` would be viewed as an authentication token, while `ab_testing_group=A1` would not.
The CI/CD variable `DAST_AUTH_COOKIE_NAMES` can be used to specify the names of authentication cookies and bypass the randomness check used by DAST.
Not only can this make the authentication process more robust, but it can also increase vulnerability check accuracy for checks that
inspect authentication tokens.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_COOKIE_NAMES: "sessionID,refreshToken"
```
## Known issues
- DAST cannot bypass a CAPTCHA if the authentication flow includes one.
Turn these off for the configured user in the testing environment for the application being scanned.
- DAST cannot authenticate with one-time passwords (OTP) using SMS or biometrics.
Turn these off for the configured user in the testing environment for the application being scanned; or change the type of MFA for the user to TOTP.
- DAST cannot authenticate to applications that do not set an [authentication token](#authentication-tokens) during login.
- DAST cannot authenticate to applications that require more text inputs than username, password, and optional TOTP.
## Troubleshooting
The [logs](#read-the-logs) provide insight into what DAST is doing and expecting during the authentication process. For more detailed
information, configure the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report).
For more information about particular error messages or situations see [known problems](#known-problems).
The browser-based analyzer is used to authenticate the user. For advanced troubleshooting, see [browser-based troubleshooting](../troubleshooting.md).
### Read the logs
The console output of the DAST CI/CD job shows information about the authentication process using the `AUTH` log module.
For example, the following log shows failed authentication for a multi-step login form.
Authentication failed because a home page should be displayed after login. Instead, the login form was still present.
```plaintext
2022-11-16T13:43:02.000 INF AUTH attempting to authenticate
2022-11-16T13:43:02.000 INF AUTH loading login page LoginURL=https://example.com/login
2022-11-16T13:43:10.000 INF AUTH multi-step authentication detected
2022-11-16T13:43:15.000 INF AUTH verifying if user submit was successful true_when="HTTP status code < 400"
2022-11-16T13:43:15.000 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, no login HTTP message detected want="HTTP status code < 400"
2022-11-16T13:43:20.000 INF AUTH verifying if login attempt was successful true_when="HTTP status code < 400 and has authentication token and no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[id=email] or css:[id=password] or css:[id=submit])"
2022-11-24T14:43:20.000 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, HTTP login request returned status code 200 url=https://example.com/user/login?error=invalid%20credentials want="HTTP status code < 400"
2022-11-16T13:43:21.000 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, login form was found want="no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[id=email] or css:[id=password] or css:[id=submit])"
2022-11-16T13:43:21.000 INF AUTH login attempt failed error="authentication failed: failed to authenticate user"
```
### Configure the authentication report
{{< alert type="warning" >}}
The authentication report can contain sensitive information such as the credentials used to perform the login.
{{< /alert >}}
An authentication report can be saved as a CI/CD job artifact to assist with understanding the cause of an authentication failure.
The report contains steps performed during the login process, HTTP requests and responses, the Document Object Model (DOM) and screenshots.
An example configuration where the authentication debug report is exported may look like the following:
```yaml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_REPORT: "true"
```
### Known problems
#### Login form not found
DAST failed to find a login form when loading the login page, often because the authentication URL could not be loaded.
The log reports a fatal error such as:
```plaintext
2022-12-07T12:44:02.838 INF AUTH loading login page LoginURL=[authentication URL]
2022-12-07T12:44:11.119 FTL MAIN authentication failed: login form not found
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) to inspect HTTP response.
- Check the target application authentication is deployed and running.
- Check the `DAST_AUTH_URL` is correct.
- Check the GitLab Runner can access the `DAST_AUTH_URL`.
- Check the `DAST_AUTH_BEFORE_LOGIN_ACTIONS` is valid if used.
#### Scan doesn't crawl authenticated pages
If DAST captures the wrong [authentication tokens](#authentication-tokens) during the authentication process then
the scan can't crawl authenticated pages. Names of cookies and storage authentication tokens are written to the log. For example:
```plaintext
2022-11-24T14:42:31.492 INF AUTH authentication token cookies names=["sessionID"]
2022-11-24T14:42:31.492 INF AUTH authentication token storage events keys=["token"]
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and look at the screenshot from the `Login submit` to verify that the login worked as expected.
- Verify the logged authentication tokens are those used by your application.
- If using cookies to store authentication tokens, set the names of the authentication token cookies using `DAST_AUTH_COOKIE_NAMES`.
#### Unable to find elements with selector
DAST failed to find the username, password, first submit button, or submit button elements. The log reports a fatal error such as:
```plaintext
2022-12-07T13:14:11.545 FTL MAIN authentication failed: unable to find elements with selector: css:#username
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) to use the screenshot from the `Login page` to verify that the page loaded correctly.
- Load the login page in a browser and verify the [selectors](#finding-an-elements-selector) configured in `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD`, `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD`, `DAST_AUTH_FIRST_SUBMIT_FIELD`, and `DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD` are correct.
#### Failed to authenticate user
DAST failed to authenticate due to a failed login verification check. The log reports a fatal error such as:
```plaintext
2022-12-07T06:39:49.483 INF AUTH verifying if login attempt was successful true_when="HTTP status code < 400 and has authentication token and no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[name=username] or css:[name=password] or css:button[type=\"submit\"])"
2022-12-07T06:39:49.484 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, HTTP login request returned status code 303 url=http://auth-manual:8090/login want="HTTP status code < 400"
2022-12-07T06:39:49.513 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, login form was found want="no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[name=username] or css:[name=password] or css:button[type=\"submit\"])"
2022-12-07T06:39:49.589 INF AUTH login attempt failed error="authentication failed: failed to authenticate user"
2022-12-07T06:39:53.626 FTL MAIN authentication failed: failed to authenticate user
```
Suggested actions:
- Look in the log for the `requirement is unsatisfied`. Respond to the appropriate error.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, login form was found
Applications typically display a dashboard when the user logs in and the login form with an error message when the
username or password is incorrect.
This error occurs when DAST detects the login form on the page displayed after authenticating the user,
indicating that the login attempt failed.
```plaintext
2022-12-07T06:39:49.513 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, login form was found want="no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[name=username] or css:[name=password] or css:button[type=\"submit\"])"
```
Suggested actions:
- Verify that the username and password/authentication credentials used are correct.
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and verify the `Request` for the `Login submit` is correct.
- It's possible that the authentication report `Login submit` request and response are empty. This occurs when there is no request that would result
in a full page reload, such as a request made when submitting a HTML form. This occurs when using websockets or AJAX to submit the login form.
- If the page displayed following user authentication genuinely has elements matching the login form selectors, configure `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL`
or `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND` to use an alternate method of verifying the login attempt.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, selector returned no results
DAST cannot find an element matching the selector provided in `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND` on the page displayed following user login.
```plaintext
2022-12-07T06:39:33.239 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, searching DOM using selector returned no results want="has element css:[name=welcome]"
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and look at the screenshot from the `Login submit` to verify that the expected page is displayed.
- Ensure the `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND` [selector](#finding-an-elements-selector) is correct.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, browser not at URL
DAST detected that the page displayed following user login has a URL different to what was expected according to `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL`.
```plaintext
2022-12-07T11:28:00.241 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, browser is not at URL browser_url="https://example.com/home" want="is at url https://example.com/user/dashboard"
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and look at the screenshot from the `Login submit` to verify that the expected page is displayed.
- Ensure the `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL` is correct.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, HTTP login request status code
The HTTP response when loading the login form or submitting the form had a status code of 400 (client error)
or 500 (server error).
```plaintext
2022-12-07T06:39:53.626 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, HTTP login request returned status code 502 url="https://example.com/user/login" want="HTTP status code < 400"
```
- Verify that the username and password/authentication credentials used are correct.
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and verify the `Request` for the `Login submit` is correct.
- Verify the target application works as expected.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, no authentication token
DAST could not detect an [authentication token](#authentication-tokens) created during the authentication process.
```plaintext
2022-12-07T11:25:29.010 INF AUTH authentication token cookies names=[]
2022-12-07T11:25:29.010 INF AUTH authentication token storage events keys=[]
2022-12-07T11:25:29.010 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, no basic authentication, cookie or storage event authentication token detected want="has authentication token"
```
Suggestion actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and look at the screenshot from the `Login submit` to verify that the login worked as expected.
- Using the browser's developer tools, investigate the cookies and local/session storage objects created while logging in. Ensure there is an authentication token created with sufficiently random value.
- If using cookies to store authentication tokens, set the names of the authentication token cookies using `DAST_AUTH_COOKIE_NAMES`.
|
---
type: reference, howto
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Authentication
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- configuration
---
For complete coverage, the DAST analyzer must authenticate with the application being tested. This
requires configuring the authentication credentials and authentication method in the DAST CI/CD job.
DAST requires authentication to:
- Simulate real-world attacks and identify vulnerabilities that might be exploited by
attackers.
- Test user-specific features and custom behavior that may only be visible after authentication.
The DAST job authenticates itself to the application, most commonly by filling in and submitting a
login form on a browser. After the form is submitted, the DAST job confirms that authentication was
successful. If authentication was successful, the DAST job continues and also saves the credentials
for reuse when crawling the target application. If not, the DAST job stops.
Authentication methods supported by DAST include:
- Single-step login form
- Multi-step login form
- Authenticating to URLs outside the configured target URL
When choosing authentication credentials:
- **DO NOT** use credentials that are valid for production systems, production servers, or used to access production data.
- **DO NOT** run an authenticated scan against a production server. Authenticated scans may perform
**any** function that the authenticated user can, including modifying or deleting data, submitting
forms, and following links. Only run an authenticated scan against non-production systems or
servers.
- Provide credentials that allow DAST to test the entire application.
- Note the credentials' expiry date, if any, for future reference. For example, with a password
manager such as 1Password.
The following diagram illustrates the usage of authentication variables at different stages of authentication:
```mermaid
%%{init: { "fontFamily": "GitLab Sans" }}%%
sequenceDiagram
accTitle: Authentication variables
accDescr: A sequence diagram showing authentication variables at different stages of authentication.
participant DAST
participant Browser
participant Target
Note over DAST,Target: Initialization
DAST->>Browser: Initialize browser with proxy
DAST->>Browser: Navigate to DAST_AUTH_URL
Browser->>Target: Load initial page
Target-->>Browser: Return page content (may not contain login form)
Note over DAST,Target: Process before-login actions
DAST->>Browser: Click elements specified in DAST_AUTH_BEFORE_LOGIN_ACTIONS
Browser->>Target: Send click actions
Target-->>Browser: Render login form (modal/page)
Note over DAST,Target: Authentication
DAST->>Browser: Fill DAST_AUTH_USERNAME & DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD
DAST->>Browser: Click "submit"
Browser->>Target: Submit form
Target-->>Browser: Process authentication
Target-->>Browser: Set auth tokens
Note over DAST,Target: Process after-login actions (if specified)
DAST->>Browser: Execute DAST_AUTH_AFTER_LOGIN_ACTIONS
Browser->>Target: Actions after login but before login verification
Note over DAST,Target: Verification
DAST->>Browser: Check URL matches DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL (if configured)
DAST->>Browser: Check element exists DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND (if configured)
DAST->>Browser: Check login form absent DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_NO_LOGIN_FORM (default is true)
```
## Getting started
{{< alert type="note" >}}
You should periodically confirming that the analyzer's authentication is still working, as this tends to break over
time due to changes to the application.
{{< /alert >}}
To run a DAST authenticated scan:
- Read the [prerequisite](#prerequisites) conditions for authentication.
- [Update your target website](#update-the-target-website) to a landing page of an authenticated user.
- If your login form has the username, password and submit button on a single page, use the [CI/CD variables](#available-cicd-variables) to configure [single-step](#configuration-for-a-single-step-login-form) login form authentication.
- If your login form has the username and password fields on different pages, use the [CI/CD variables](#available-cicd-variables) to configure [multi-step](#configuration-for-a-multi-step-login-form) login form authentication.
- Make sure the user isn't [logged out](#excluding-logout-urls) during the scan.
### Prerequisites
- You have the username and password of the user you would like to authenticate as during the scan.
- You have checked the [known issues](#known-issues) to ensure DAST can authenticate to your application.
- You have satisfied the prerequisites if you're using [form authentication](#form-authentication).
- You have satisfied the additional prerequisites if your form authentication flow includes a [time-based one-time password](#totp-authentication).
- You have thought about how you can [verify](#verifying-authentication-is-successful) whether or not authentication was successful.
#### Form authentication
- You know the URL of the login form of your application. Alternatively, you know how to go to the login form from the authentication URL (see [clicking to go to the login form](#clicking-to-go-to-the-login-form)).
- You know the [selectors](#finding-an-elements-selector) of the username and password HTML fields that DAST uses to input the respective values.
- You know the element's [selector](#finding-an-elements-selector) that submits the login form when selected.
#### TOTP authentication
{{< history >}}
- [Introduced](https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/13633) in scanner version 6.9.
{{< /history >}}
- You have the secret key for the test user's TOTP enrollment, encoded in Base32.
- You have confirmed that the auth provider supports the following TOTP configuration (same as Google Authenticator):
- HMAC algorithm: SHA-1
- Time step: 30 seconds
- Token length: 6
- You know the [selectors](#finding-an-elements-selector) of the TOTP field that DAST uses to input the generated TOTP token.
- You know the element's [selector](#finding-an-elements-selector) that submits the TOTP token, if it is submitted separately from the password.
### Available CI/CD variables
For a list of DAST Authentication CI/CD variables, see [Authentication variables](variables.md#authentication).
The DAST CI/CD variable table is generated by the Rake task `bundle exec rake gitlab:dast_variables:compile_docs`. It uses variable metadata defined in [`lib/gitlab/security/dast_variables.rb`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/lib/gitlab/security/dast_variables.rb).
### Update the target website
The target website, defined using the CI/CD variable `DAST_TARGET_URL`, is the URL DAST uses to begin crawling your application.
For best crawl results on an authenticated scan, the target website should be a URL accessible only after the user is authenticated.
Often, this is the URL of the page the user lands on after they're logged in.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com/dashboard/welcome"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
```
### Configuration for HTTP authentication
To use an [HTTP authentication scheme](https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/http-authentication/) such as Basic Authentication you can set the `DAST_AUTH_TYPE` value to `basic-digest`.
Other schemes such as Negotiate or NTLM may work but aren't officially supported due to current lack of automated test coverage.
Configuration requires the CI/CD variables `DAST_AUTH_TYPE`, `DAST_AUTH_URL`, `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME`, `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD` to be defined for the DAST job. If you don't have a unique login URL, set `DAST_AUTH_URL` to the same URL as `DAST_TARGET_URL`.
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_TYPE: "basic-digest"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com"
```
Do **not** define `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME` and `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD` in the YAML job definition file as this could present a security risk. Instead, create them as masked CI/CD variables using the GitLab UI.
See [Custom CI/CD variables](../../../../../ci/variables/_index.md#for-a-project) for more information.
### Configuration for a single-step login form
A single-step login form has all login form elements on a single page.
Configuration requires the CI/CD variables `DAST_AUTH_URL`, `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME`, `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD`, `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD`, `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD`, and `DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD` to be defined for the DAST job.
You should set up the URL and selectors of fields in the job definition YAML, for example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "css:[name=username]"
DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD: "css:[name=password]"
DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:button[type=submit]"
```
Do **not** define `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME` and `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD` in the YAML job definition file as this could present a security risk. Instead, create them as masked CI/CD variables using the GitLab UI.
See [Custom CI/CD variables](../../../../../ci/variables/_index.md#for-a-project) for more information.
### Configuration for a multi-step login form
A multi-step login form has two pages. The first page has a form with the username and a next submit button.
If the username is valid, a second form on the subsequent page has the password and the form submit button.
Configuration requires the CI/CD variables to be defined for the DAST job:
- `DAST_AUTH_URL`
- `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME`
- `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD`
- `DAST_AUTH_FIRST_SUBMIT_FIELD`
- `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD`
- `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD`
- `DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD`.
You should set up the URL and selectors of fields in the job definition YAML, for example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "css:[name=username]"
DAST_AUTH_FIRST_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:button[name=next]"
DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD: "css:[name=password]"
DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:button[type=submit]"
```
Do **not** define `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME` and `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD` in the YAML job definition file as this could present a security risk. Instead, create them as masked CI/CD variables using the GitLab UI.
See [Custom CI/CD variables](../../../../../ci/variables/_index.md#for-a-project) for more information.
### Configuration for Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP)
Configuration for TOTP requires these CI/CD variables to be defined for the DAST job:
- `DAST_AUTH_OTP_FIELD`
- `DAST_AUTH_OTP_KEY`
If the TOTP token is submitted in its own form after the password has been submitted, you must also define this variable:
- `DAST_AUTH_OTP_SUBMIT_FIELD`
The `_FIELD` selector variables can be defined in the job definition YAML, for example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "css:[name=username]"
DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD: "css:[name=password]"
DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:button[type=submit]"
DAST_AUTH_OTP_FIELD: "name:otp"
DAST_AUTH_OTP_SUBMIT_FIELD: "css:input[type=submit]"
```
Do **not** define `DAST_AUTH_OTP_KEY` in the YAML job definition file as this could present a security risk. Instead, create it as a masked CI/CD variable using the GitLab UI.
See [Custom CI/CD variables](../../../../../ci/variables/_index.md#for-a-project) for more information.
### Configuration for Single Sign-On (SSO)
If a user can sign in to an application, then in most cases, DAST is also able to sign in.
Even when an application uses Single Sign-on. Applications using SSO solutions should configure DAST
authentication using the [single-step](#configuration-for-a-single-step-login-form) or [multi-step](#configuration-for-a-multi-step-login-form) login form configuration guides.
DAST supports authentication processes where a user is redirected to an external Identity Provider's site to sign in.
Check the [known issues](#known-issues) of DAST authentication to determine if your SSO authentication process is supported.
### Configuration for Windows integrated authentication (Kerberos)
Windows integrated authentication (Kerberos) is a common authentication mechanism for line of business (LOB) applications hosted inside a Windows domain. It provides promptless authentication using the user's computer login.
To configure this form of authentication perform the following steps:
1. Collect the necessary information with assistance from your IT/operations team.
1. Create or update the `dast` job definition in your `.gitlab-ci.yml` file.
1. Populate the example `krb5.conf` file using the information collected.
1. Set the necessary job variables.
1. Set the necessary secret variables by using the project **Settings** page.
1. Test and verify authentication is functioning.
Collect the following information with assistance from your IT/Operations department:
- Name of Windows domain or Kerberos Realm (must have a period in the name like `EXAMPLE.COM`)
- Hostname for Windows/Kerberos domain controller
- For Kerberos the auth server name. For Windows domains this is the domain controller.
Create the `krb5.conf` file:
```ini
[libdefaults]
# Realm is another name for domain name
default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM
# These settings are not needed for Windows Domains
# they support other Kerberos implementations
kdc_timesync = 1
ccache_type = 4
forwardable = true
proxiable = true
rdns = false
fcc-mit-ticketflags = true
[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
# Domain controller or KDC
kdc = kdc.example.com
# Domain controller or admin server
admin_server = kdc.example.com
}
[domain_realm]
# Mapping DNS domains to realms/Windows domain
# DNS domains provided by DAST_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_DELEGATION
# should also be represented here (but without the wildcard)
.example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
```
This configuration makes use of the `DAST_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_DELEGATION` variable.
This variable sets the following Chromium policies needed to allow integrated authentication:
- [AuthServerAllowlist](https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#AuthServerAllowlist)
- [AuthNegotiateDelegateAllowlist](https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#AuthNegotiateDelegateAllowlist)
The settings for this variable are the DNS domains associated with your Windows domain or Kerberos realm.
You should provide them:
- In both lowercase and also upper case.
- With a wildcard pattern and just the domain name.
For our example the Windows domain is `EXAMPLE.COM` and the DNS domain is `example.com`.
This gives us a value of `*.example.com,example.com,*.EXAMPLE.COM,EXAMPLE.COM` for `DAST_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_DELEGATION`.
Pull it all together into a job definition:
```yaml
# This job will extend the dast job defined in
# the DAST template which must also be included.
dast:
image:
name: "$SECURE_ANALYZERS_PREFIX/dast:$DAST_VERSION$DAST_IMAGE_SUFFIX"
docker:
user: root
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: https://target.example.com
DAST_AUTH_URL: https://target.example.com
DAST_AUTH_TYPE: basic-digest
DAST_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_DELEGATION: '*.example.com,example.com,*.EXAMPLE.COM,EXAMPLE.COM'
# Not shown -- DAST_AUTH_USERNAME, DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD set via Settings -> CI -> Variables
before_script:
- KRB5_CONF='
[libdefaults]
default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM
kdc_timesync = 1
ccache_type = 4
forwardable = true
proxiable = true
rdns = false
fcc-mit-ticketflags = true
[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
kdc = ad1.example.com
admin_server = ad1.example.com
}
[domain_realm]
.example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
'
- cat "$KRB5_CONF" > /etc/krb5.conf
- echo '$DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD' | kinit $DAST_AUTH_USERNAME
- klist
```
Expected output:
The job console output contains the output from the `before` script. It will look similar to the following if authentication was successful. The job should fail if it was unsuccessful without running a scan.
```plaintext
Password for mike@EXAMPLE.COM:
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_1000
Default principal: mike@EXAMPLE.COM
Valid starting Expires Service principal
11/11/2024 21:50:50 11/12/2024 07:50:50 krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
renew until 11/12/2024 21:50:50
```
The DAST scanner will also output the following, indicating success:
```plaintext
2024-11-08T17:03:09.226 INF AUTH attempting to authenticate find_auth_fields="basic-digest"
2024-11-08T17:03:09.226 INF AUTH loading login page LoginURL="https://target.example.com"
2024-11-08T17:03:10.619 INF AUTH verifying if login attempt was successful true_when="HTTP status code < 400 and has authentication token and no login form found (auto-detected)"
2024-11-08T17:03:10.619 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, HTTP login request returned status code 200 want="HTTP status code < 400" url="https://target.example.com/"
2024-11-08T17:03:10.623 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, did not detect a login form want="no login form found (auto-detected)"
2024-11-08T17:03:10.623 INF AUTH authentication token cookies names=""
2024-11-08T17:03:10.623 INF AUTH authentication token storage events keys=""
2024-11-08T17:03:10.623 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, basic authentication detected want="has authentication token"
2024-11-08T17:03:11.230 INF AUTH login attempt succeeded
```
### Clicking to go to the login form
Define `DAST_AUTH_BEFORE_LOGIN_ACTIONS` to provide a path of elements to click on from the `DAST_AUTH_URL` so that DAST can access the
login form. This method is suitable for applications that show the login form in a pop-up (modal) window or when the login form does not
have a unique URL.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_BEFORE_LOGIN_ACTIONS: "css:.navigation-menu,css:.login-menu-item"
```
### Taking additional actions after submitting the login form
Define `DAST_AUTH_AFTER_LOGIN_ACTIONS` to provide a sequence of actions to perform
after submitting the sign-in form, but before verification, when authentication details are recorded.
This can be used to proceed past a "keep me signed in" dialog.
| Action | Format |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Click on an element | `click(on=<selector>)` |
| Select an option from a dropdown | `select(option=<selector>)` |
Actions are comma-separated. For information about selectors, see [finding an element's selector](#finding-an-elements-selector).
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_URL: "https://example.com/login"
DAST_AUTH_AFTER_LOGIN_ACTIONS: "select(option=id:accept-yes),click(on=id:continue-button)"
```
### Excluding logout URLs
If DAST crawls the logout URL while running an authenticated scan, the user is logged out, resulting in the remainder of the scan being unauthenticated.
It is therefore recommended to exclude logout URLs using the CI/CD variable `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS`. DAST isn't accessing any excluded URLs, ensuring the user remains logged in.
Provided URLs can be either absolute URLs, or regular expressions of URL paths relative to the base path of the `DAST_TARGET_URL`. For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com/welcome/home"
DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS: "https://example.com/logout,/user/.*/logout"
```
### Finding an element's selector
Selectors are used by CI/CD variables to specify the location of an element displayed on a page in a browser.
Selectors have the format `type`:`search string`. DAST searches for the selector using the search string based on the type.
| Selector type | Example | Description |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `css` | `css:.password-field` | Searches for a HTML element having the supplied CSS selector. Selectors should be as specific as possible for performance reasons. |
| `id` | `id:element` | Searches for an HTML element with the provided element ID. |
| `name` | `name:element` | Searches for an HTML element with the provided element name. |
| `xpath` | `xpath://input[@id="my-button"]/a` | Searches for a HTML element with the provided XPath. XPath searches are expected to be less performant than other searches. |
#### Find selectors with Google Chrome
Chrome DevTools element selector tool is an effective way to find a selector.
1. Open Chrome and go to the page where you would like to find a selector, for example, the login page for your site.
1. Open the `Elements` tab in Chrome DevTools with the keyboard shortcut `Command + Shift + c` in macOS or `Ctrl + Shift + c` in Windows or Linux.
1. Select the `Select an element in the page to select it` tool.
1. Select the field on your page that you would like to know the selector for.
1. After the tool is active, highlight a field you wish to view the details of.
1. Once highlighted, you can see the element's details, including attributes that would make a good candidate for a selector.
In this example, the `id="user_login"` appears to be a good candidate. You can use this as a selector as the DAST username field by setting
`DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "id:user_login"`.
#### Choose the right selector
Judicious choice of selector leads to a scan that is resilient to the application changing.
In order of preference, you should choose as selectors:
- `id` fields. These fields generally unique on a page, and rarely change.
- `name` fields. These fields generally unique on a page, and rarely change.
- `class` values specific to the field, such as the selector `"css:.username"` for the `username` class on the username field.
- Presence of field specific data attributes, such as the selector, `"css:[data-username]"` when the `data-username` field has any value on the username field.
- Multiple `class` hierarchy values, such as the selector `"css:.login-form .username"` when there are multiple elements with class `username` but only one nested inside the element with the class `login-form`.
When using selectors to locate specific fields you should avoid searching on:
- Any `id`, `name`, `attribute`, `class` or `value` that is dynamically generated.
- Generic class names, such as `column-10` and `dark-grey`.
- XPath searches as they are less performant than other selector searches.
- Unscoped searches, such as those beginning with `css:*` and `xpath://*`.
## Verifying authentication is successful
After DAST has submitted the login form, a verification process takes place
to determine if authentication succeeded. The scan halts with an error if authentication is unsuccessful.
Following the submission of the login form, authentication is determined to be unsuccessful when:
- The login submit HTTP response has a `400` or `500` series status code.
- Any [verification check](#verification-checks) fails.
- An [authentication token](#authentication-tokens) with a sufficiently random value is not set during the authentication process.
### Verification checks
Verification checks run checks on the state of the browser once authentication is complete
to determine further if authentication succeeded.
DAST tests for the absence of a login form if no verification checks are configured.
#### Verify based on the URL
Define `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL` as the URL displayed in the browser tab after the login form is successfully submitted.
DAST compares the verification URL to the URL in the browser after authentication.
If they are not the same, authentication is unsuccessful.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL: "https://example.com/user/welcome"
```
#### Verify based on presence of an element
Define `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND` as a [selector](#finding-an-elements-selector) that finds one or many elements on the page
displayed after the login form is successfully submitted. If no element is found, authentication is unsuccessful.
Searching for the selector on the page displayed when login fails should return no elements.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND: "css:.welcome-user"
```
#### Verify based on absence of a login form
Define `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_NO_LOGIN_FORM` as `"true"` to indicate that DAST should search for the login form on the
page displayed after the login form is successfully submitted. If a login form is still present after logging in, authentication is unsuccessful.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_NO_LOGIN_FORM: "true"
```
### Authentication tokens
DAST records authentication tokens set during the authentication process.
Authentication tokens are loaded into new browsers when DAST opens them so the user can remain logged in throughout the scan.
To record tokens, DAST takes a snapshot of cookies, local storage, and session storage values set by the application before
the authentication process. DAST does the same after authentication and uses the difference to determine which were created
by the authentication process.
DAST considers cookies, local storage and session storage values set with sufficiently "random" values to be authentication tokens.
For example, `sessionID=HVxzpS8GzMlPAc2e39uyIVzwACIuGe0H` would be viewed as an authentication token, while `ab_testing_group=A1` would not.
The CI/CD variable `DAST_AUTH_COOKIE_NAMES` can be used to specify the names of authentication cookies and bypass the randomness check used by DAST.
Not only can this make the authentication process more robust, but it can also increase vulnerability check accuracy for checks that
inspect authentication tokens.
For example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_COOKIE_NAMES: "sessionID,refreshToken"
```
## Known issues
- DAST cannot bypass a CAPTCHA if the authentication flow includes one.
Turn these off for the configured user in the testing environment for the application being scanned.
- DAST cannot authenticate with one-time passwords (OTP) using SMS or biometrics.
Turn these off for the configured user in the testing environment for the application being scanned; or change the type of MFA for the user to TOTP.
- DAST cannot authenticate to applications that do not set an [authentication token](#authentication-tokens) during login.
- DAST cannot authenticate to applications that require more text inputs than username, password, and optional TOTP.
## Troubleshooting
The [logs](#read-the-logs) provide insight into what DAST is doing and expecting during the authentication process. For more detailed
information, configure the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report).
For more information about particular error messages or situations see [known problems](#known-problems).
The browser-based analyzer is used to authenticate the user. For advanced troubleshooting, see [browser-based troubleshooting](../troubleshooting.md).
### Read the logs
The console output of the DAST CI/CD job shows information about the authentication process using the `AUTH` log module.
For example, the following log shows failed authentication for a multi-step login form.
Authentication failed because a home page should be displayed after login. Instead, the login form was still present.
```plaintext
2022-11-16T13:43:02.000 INF AUTH attempting to authenticate
2022-11-16T13:43:02.000 INF AUTH loading login page LoginURL=https://example.com/login
2022-11-16T13:43:10.000 INF AUTH multi-step authentication detected
2022-11-16T13:43:15.000 INF AUTH verifying if user submit was successful true_when="HTTP status code < 400"
2022-11-16T13:43:15.000 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, no login HTTP message detected want="HTTP status code < 400"
2022-11-16T13:43:20.000 INF AUTH verifying if login attempt was successful true_when="HTTP status code < 400 and has authentication token and no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[id=email] or css:[id=password] or css:[id=submit])"
2022-11-24T14:43:20.000 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, HTTP login request returned status code 200 url=https://example.com/user/login?error=invalid%20credentials want="HTTP status code < 400"
2022-11-16T13:43:21.000 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, login form was found want="no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[id=email] or css:[id=password] or css:[id=submit])"
2022-11-16T13:43:21.000 INF AUTH login attempt failed error="authentication failed: failed to authenticate user"
```
### Configure the authentication report
{{< alert type="warning" >}}
The authentication report can contain sensitive information such as the credentials used to perform the login.
{{< /alert >}}
An authentication report can be saved as a CI/CD job artifact to assist with understanding the cause of an authentication failure.
The report contains steps performed during the login process, HTTP requests and responses, the Document Object Model (DOM) and screenshots.
An example configuration where the authentication debug report is exported may look like the following:
```yaml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_REPORT: "true"
```
### Known problems
#### Login form not found
DAST failed to find a login form when loading the login page, often because the authentication URL could not be loaded.
The log reports a fatal error such as:
```plaintext
2022-12-07T12:44:02.838 INF AUTH loading login page LoginURL=[authentication URL]
2022-12-07T12:44:11.119 FTL MAIN authentication failed: login form not found
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) to inspect HTTP response.
- Check the target application authentication is deployed and running.
- Check the `DAST_AUTH_URL` is correct.
- Check the GitLab Runner can access the `DAST_AUTH_URL`.
- Check the `DAST_AUTH_BEFORE_LOGIN_ACTIONS` is valid if used.
#### Scan doesn't crawl authenticated pages
If DAST captures the wrong [authentication tokens](#authentication-tokens) during the authentication process then
the scan can't crawl authenticated pages. Names of cookies and storage authentication tokens are written to the log. For example:
```plaintext
2022-11-24T14:42:31.492 INF AUTH authentication token cookies names=["sessionID"]
2022-11-24T14:42:31.492 INF AUTH authentication token storage events keys=["token"]
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and look at the screenshot from the `Login submit` to verify that the login worked as expected.
- Verify the logged authentication tokens are those used by your application.
- If using cookies to store authentication tokens, set the names of the authentication token cookies using `DAST_AUTH_COOKIE_NAMES`.
#### Unable to find elements with selector
DAST failed to find the username, password, first submit button, or submit button elements. The log reports a fatal error such as:
```plaintext
2022-12-07T13:14:11.545 FTL MAIN authentication failed: unable to find elements with selector: css:#username
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) to use the screenshot from the `Login page` to verify that the page loaded correctly.
- Load the login page in a browser and verify the [selectors](#finding-an-elements-selector) configured in `DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD`, `DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD`, `DAST_AUTH_FIRST_SUBMIT_FIELD`, and `DAST_AUTH_SUBMIT_FIELD` are correct.
#### Failed to authenticate user
DAST failed to authenticate due to a failed login verification check. The log reports a fatal error such as:
```plaintext
2022-12-07T06:39:49.483 INF AUTH verifying if login attempt was successful true_when="HTTP status code < 400 and has authentication token and no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[name=username] or css:[name=password] or css:button[type=\"submit\"])"
2022-12-07T06:39:49.484 INF AUTH requirement is satisfied, HTTP login request returned status code 303 url=http://auth-manual:8090/login want="HTTP status code < 400"
2022-12-07T06:39:49.513 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, login form was found want="no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[name=username] or css:[name=password] or css:button[type=\"submit\"])"
2022-12-07T06:39:49.589 INF AUTH login attempt failed error="authentication failed: failed to authenticate user"
2022-12-07T06:39:53.626 FTL MAIN authentication failed: failed to authenticate user
```
Suggested actions:
- Look in the log for the `requirement is unsatisfied`. Respond to the appropriate error.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, login form was found
Applications typically display a dashboard when the user logs in and the login form with an error message when the
username or password is incorrect.
This error occurs when DAST detects the login form on the page displayed after authenticating the user,
indicating that the login attempt failed.
```plaintext
2022-12-07T06:39:49.513 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, login form was found want="no login form found (no element found when searching using selector css:[name=username] or css:[name=password] or css:button[type=\"submit\"])"
```
Suggested actions:
- Verify that the username and password/authentication credentials used are correct.
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and verify the `Request` for the `Login submit` is correct.
- It's possible that the authentication report `Login submit` request and response are empty. This occurs when there is no request that would result
in a full page reload, such as a request made when submitting a HTML form. This occurs when using websockets or AJAX to submit the login form.
- If the page displayed following user authentication genuinely has elements matching the login form selectors, configure `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL`
or `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND` to use an alternate method of verifying the login attempt.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, selector returned no results
DAST cannot find an element matching the selector provided in `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND` on the page displayed following user login.
```plaintext
2022-12-07T06:39:33.239 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, searching DOM using selector returned no results want="has element css:[name=welcome]"
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and look at the screenshot from the `Login submit` to verify that the expected page is displayed.
- Ensure the `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_ELEMENT_FOUND` [selector](#finding-an-elements-selector) is correct.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, browser not at URL
DAST detected that the page displayed following user login has a URL different to what was expected according to `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL`.
```plaintext
2022-12-07T11:28:00.241 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, browser is not at URL browser_url="https://example.com/home" want="is at url https://example.com/user/dashboard"
```
Suggested actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and look at the screenshot from the `Login submit` to verify that the expected page is displayed.
- Ensure the `DAST_AUTH_SUCCESS_IF_AT_URL` is correct.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, HTTP login request status code
The HTTP response when loading the login form or submitting the form had a status code of 400 (client error)
or 500 (server error).
```plaintext
2022-12-07T06:39:53.626 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, HTTP login request returned status code 502 url="https://example.com/user/login" want="HTTP status code < 400"
```
- Verify that the username and password/authentication credentials used are correct.
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and verify the `Request` for the `Login submit` is correct.
- Verify the target application works as expected.
#### Requirement unsatisfied, no authentication token
DAST could not detect an [authentication token](#authentication-tokens) created during the authentication process.
```plaintext
2022-12-07T11:25:29.010 INF AUTH authentication token cookies names=[]
2022-12-07T11:25:29.010 INF AUTH authentication token storage events keys=[]
2022-12-07T11:25:29.010 INF AUTH requirement is unsatisfied, no basic authentication, cookie or storage event authentication token detected want="has authentication token"
```
Suggestion actions:
- Generate the [authentication report](#configure-the-authentication-report) and look at the screenshot from the `Login submit` to verify that the login worked as expected.
- Using the browser's developer tools, investigate the cookies and local/session storage objects created while logging in. Ensure there is an authentication token created with sufficiently random value.
- If using cookies to store authentication tokens, set the names of the authentication token cookies using `DAST_AUTH_COOKIE_NAMES`.
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/overriding_analyzer_jobs
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/overriding_analyzer_jobs.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/configuration
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"configuration"
] |
overriding_analyzer_jobs.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Overriding DAST jobs
| null |
To override a job definition, (for example, change properties like `variables`, `dependencies`, or [`rules`](../../../../../ci/yaml/_index.md#rules)),
declare a job with the same name as the DAST job to override. Place this new job after the template
inclusion and specify any additional keys under it. For example, this enables authentication debug logging for the analyzer:
```yaml
include:
- template: Security/DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_LOG_CONFIG: auth:debug
```
|
---
type: reference, howto
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Overriding DAST jobs
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- configuration
---
To override a job definition, (for example, change properties like `variables`, `dependencies`, or [`rules`](../../../../../ci/yaml/_index.md#rules)),
declare a job with the same name as the DAST job to override. Place this new job after the template
inclusion and specify any additional keys under it. For example, this enables authentication debug logging for the analyzer:
```yaml
include:
- template: Security/DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_LOG_CONFIG: auth:debug
```
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/offline_configuration
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/offline_configuration.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/configuration
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"configuration"
] |
offline_configuration.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Offline configuration
| null |
{{< details >}}
- Tier: Ultimate
- Offering: GitLab Self-Managed
{{< /details >}}
For instances in an environment with limited, restricted, or intermittent access
to external resources through the internet, some adjustments are required for the DAST job to
successfully run. For more information, see [Offline environments](../../../offline_deployments/_index.md).
## Requirements for offline DAST support
You can use any version of DAST in an offline environment. To do this, you need:
- GitLab Runner with the [`docker` or `kubernetes` executor](../_index.md).
The runner must have network access to the target application.
- Docker container registry with a locally available copy of the DAST
[container image](https://gitlab.com/security-products/dast), found in the
[DAST container registry](https://gitlab.com/security-products/dast/container_registry).
See [Loading Docker images onto your offline host](../../../offline_deployments/_index.md#loading-docker-images-onto-your-offline-host).
GitLab Runner has a [default `pull policy` of `always`](https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/executors/docker.html#using-the-always-pull-policy),
meaning the runner tries to pull Docker images from the GitLab container registry even if a local
copy is available. The GitLab Runner [`pull_policy` can be set to `if-not-present`](https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/executors/docker.html#using-the-if-not-present-pull-policy)
in an offline environment if you prefer using only locally available Docker images. However, we
recommend keeping the pull policy setting to `always` if not in an offline environment, as this
enables the use of updated scanners in your CI/CD pipelines.
## Make GitLab DAST analyzer images available inside your Docker registry
For DAST, import the following default DAST analyzer image from `registry.gitlab.com` to your [local Docker container registry](../../../../packages/container_registry/_index.md):
- `registry.gitlab.com/security-products/dast:latest`
The process for importing Docker images into a local offline Docker registry depends on
**your network security policy**. Consult your IT staff to find an accepted and approved
process by which external resources can be imported or temporarily accessed.
These scanners are [periodically updated](../../../detect/vulnerability_scanner_maintenance.md)
with new definitions, and you may be able to make occasional updates on your own.
For details on saving and transporting Docker images as a file, see the Docker documentation on
[`docker save`](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/save/),
[`docker load`](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/load/),
[`docker export`](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/container/export/), and
[`docker import`](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/import/).
## Set DAST CI/CD job variables to use local DAST analyzers
Add the following configuration to your `.gitlab-ci.yml` file. You must replace `image` to refer to
the DAST Docker image hosted on your local Docker container registry:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
image: registry.example.com/namespace/dast:latest
```
The DAST job should now use local copies of the DAST analyzers to scan your code and generate
security reports without requiring internet access.
Alternatively, you can use the CI/CD variable `SECURE_ANALYZERS_PREFIX` to override the base registry address of the `dast` image.
|
---
type: reference, howto
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Offline configuration
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- configuration
---
{{< details >}}
- Tier: Ultimate
- Offering: GitLab Self-Managed
{{< /details >}}
For instances in an environment with limited, restricted, or intermittent access
to external resources through the internet, some adjustments are required for the DAST job to
successfully run. For more information, see [Offline environments](../../../offline_deployments/_index.md).
## Requirements for offline DAST support
You can use any version of DAST in an offline environment. To do this, you need:
- GitLab Runner with the [`docker` or `kubernetes` executor](../_index.md).
The runner must have network access to the target application.
- Docker container registry with a locally available copy of the DAST
[container image](https://gitlab.com/security-products/dast), found in the
[DAST container registry](https://gitlab.com/security-products/dast/container_registry).
See [Loading Docker images onto your offline host](../../../offline_deployments/_index.md#loading-docker-images-onto-your-offline-host).
GitLab Runner has a [default `pull policy` of `always`](https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/executors/docker.html#using-the-always-pull-policy),
meaning the runner tries to pull Docker images from the GitLab container registry even if a local
copy is available. The GitLab Runner [`pull_policy` can be set to `if-not-present`](https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/executors/docker.html#using-the-if-not-present-pull-policy)
in an offline environment if you prefer using only locally available Docker images. However, we
recommend keeping the pull policy setting to `always` if not in an offline environment, as this
enables the use of updated scanners in your CI/CD pipelines.
## Make GitLab DAST analyzer images available inside your Docker registry
For DAST, import the following default DAST analyzer image from `registry.gitlab.com` to your [local Docker container registry](../../../../packages/container_registry/_index.md):
- `registry.gitlab.com/security-products/dast:latest`
The process for importing Docker images into a local offline Docker registry depends on
**your network security policy**. Consult your IT staff to find an accepted and approved
process by which external resources can be imported or temporarily accessed.
These scanners are [periodically updated](../../../detect/vulnerability_scanner_maintenance.md)
with new definitions, and you may be able to make occasional updates on your own.
For details on saving and transporting Docker images as a file, see the Docker documentation on
[`docker save`](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/save/),
[`docker load`](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/load/),
[`docker export`](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/container/export/), and
[`docker import`](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/import/).
## Set DAST CI/CD job variables to use local DAST analyzers
Add the following configuration to your `.gitlab-ci.yml` file. You must replace `image` to refer to
the DAST Docker image hosted on your local Docker container registry:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
image: registry.example.com/namespace/dast:latest
```
The DAST job should now use local copies of the DAST analyzers to scan your code and generate
security reports without requiring internet access.
Alternatively, you can use the CI/CD variable `SECURE_ANALYZERS_PREFIX` to override the base registry address of the `dast` image.
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/requirements
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/requirements.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/configuration
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"configuration"
] |
requirements.md
| null | null | null | null | null |
<!-- markdownlint-disable -->
This document was moved to [another location](../application_deployment_options.md).
<!-- This redirect file can be deleted after <2025-09-17>. -->
<!-- Redirects that point to other docs in the same project expire in three months. -->
<!-- Redirects that point to docs in a different project or site (for example, link is not relative and starts with `https:`) expire in one year. -->
<!-- Before deletion, see: https://docs.gitlab.com/development/documentation/redirects -->
|
---
redirect_to: ../application_deployment_options.md
remove_date: '2025-09-17'
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- configuration
---
<!-- markdownlint-disable -->
This document was moved to [another location](../application_deployment_options.md).
<!-- This redirect file can be deleted after <2025-09-17>. -->
<!-- Redirects that point to other docs in the same project expire in three months. -->
<!-- Redirects that point to docs in a different project or site (for example, link is not relative and starts with `https:`) expire in one year. -->
<!-- Before deletion, see: https://docs.gitlab.com/development/documentation/redirects -->
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/enabling_the_analyzer
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/enabling_the_analyzer.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/configuration
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"configuration"
] |
enabling_the_analyzer.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Enabling the analyzer
| null |
To run a DAST scan:
- Read the [requirements](../_index.md) conditions for running a DAST scan.
- Create a [DAST job](#create-a-dast-cicd-job) in your CI/CD pipeline.
- [Authenticate](authentication.md) as a user if your application requires it.
The DAST job runs in a Docker container defined by the `image` keyword in the DAST CI/CD template file.
When you run the job, DAST connects to the target application specified by the `DAST_TARGET_URL` variable
and crawls the site using an embedded browser.
## Create a DAST CI/CD job
{{< history >}}
- This template was [updated](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/87183) to DAST_VERSION: 3 in GitLab 15.0.
- This template was updated to DAST_VERSION: 4 in GitLab 16.0.
- This template was [updated](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/151910) to DAST_VERSION: 5 in GitLab 17.0.
- This template was [updated](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/188703) to DAST_VERSION: 6 in GitLab 18.0.
{{< /history >}}
To add DAST scanning to your application, use the DAST job defined
in the GitLab DAST CI/CD template file. Updates to the template are provided with GitLab
upgrades, allowing you to benefit from any improvements and additions.
To create the CI/CD job:
1. Include the appropriate CI/CD template:
- [`DAST.gitlab-ci.yml`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/lib/gitlab/ci/templates/Security/DAST.gitlab-ci.yml):
Stable version of the DAST CI/CD template.
- [`DAST.latest.gitlab-ci.yml`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/lib/gitlab/ci/templates/Security/DAST.latest.gitlab-ci.yml):
Latest version of the DAST template.
{{< alert type="warning" >}}
The latest version of the template may include breaking changes. Use the
stable template unless you need a feature provided only in the latest template.
{{< /alert >}}
1. Add a `dast` stage to your GitLab CI/CD stages configuration.
1. Define the URL to be scanned by DAST by using one of these methods:
- Set the `DAST_TARGET_URL` [CI/CD variable](../../../../../ci/yaml/_index.md#variables).
If set, this value takes precedence.
- Adding the URL in an `environment_url.txt` file at your project's root is great for testing in
dynamic environments. To run DAST against an application dynamically created during a GitLab CI/CD
pipeline, write the application URL to an `environment_url.txt` file. DAST automatically reads the
URL to find the scan target.
You can see an [example of this in our Auto DevOps CI YAML](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/lib/gitlab/ci/templates/Jobs/Deploy.gitlab-ci.yml).
For example:
```yaml
stages:
- dast
include:
- template: Security/DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME: "test_user"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "name:user[login]"
DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD: "name:user[password]"
```
|
---
type: reference, howto
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Enabling the analyzer
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- configuration
---
To run a DAST scan:
- Read the [requirements](../_index.md) conditions for running a DAST scan.
- Create a [DAST job](#create-a-dast-cicd-job) in your CI/CD pipeline.
- [Authenticate](authentication.md) as a user if your application requires it.
The DAST job runs in a Docker container defined by the `image` keyword in the DAST CI/CD template file.
When you run the job, DAST connects to the target application specified by the `DAST_TARGET_URL` variable
and crawls the site using an embedded browser.
## Create a DAST CI/CD job
{{< history >}}
- This template was [updated](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/87183) to DAST_VERSION: 3 in GitLab 15.0.
- This template was updated to DAST_VERSION: 4 in GitLab 16.0.
- This template was [updated](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/151910) to DAST_VERSION: 5 in GitLab 17.0.
- This template was [updated](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/188703) to DAST_VERSION: 6 in GitLab 18.0.
{{< /history >}}
To add DAST scanning to your application, use the DAST job defined
in the GitLab DAST CI/CD template file. Updates to the template are provided with GitLab
upgrades, allowing you to benefit from any improvements and additions.
To create the CI/CD job:
1. Include the appropriate CI/CD template:
- [`DAST.gitlab-ci.yml`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/lib/gitlab/ci/templates/Security/DAST.gitlab-ci.yml):
Stable version of the DAST CI/CD template.
- [`DAST.latest.gitlab-ci.yml`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/lib/gitlab/ci/templates/Security/DAST.latest.gitlab-ci.yml):
Latest version of the DAST template.
{{< alert type="warning" >}}
The latest version of the template may include breaking changes. Use the
stable template unless you need a feature provided only in the latest template.
{{< /alert >}}
1. Add a `dast` stage to your GitLab CI/CD stages configuration.
1. Define the URL to be scanned by DAST by using one of these methods:
- Set the `DAST_TARGET_URL` [CI/CD variable](../../../../../ci/yaml/_index.md#variables).
If set, this value takes precedence.
- Adding the URL in an `environment_url.txt` file at your project's root is great for testing in
dynamic environments. To run DAST against an application dynamically created during a GitLab CI/CD
pipeline, write the application URL to an `environment_url.txt` file. DAST automatically reads the
URL to find the scan target.
You can see an [example of this in our Auto DevOps CI YAML](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/lib/gitlab/ci/templates/Jobs/Deploy.gitlab-ci.yml).
For example:
```yaml
stages:
- dast
include:
- template: Security/DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://example.com"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME: "test_user"
DAST_AUTH_USERNAME_FIELD: "name:user[login]"
DAST_AUTH_PASSWORD_FIELD: "name:user[password]"
```
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dast/browser/customize_settings
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/tree/master/doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/customize_settings.md
|
2025-08-13
|
doc/user/application_security/dast/browser/configuration
|
[
"doc",
"user",
"application_security",
"dast",
"browser",
"configuration"
] |
customize_settings.md
|
Application Security Testing
|
Dynamic Analysis
|
To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
|
Customize analyzer settings
| null |
## Managing scope
Scope controls what URLs DAST follows when crawling the target application. Properly managed scope minimizes scan run time while ensuring only the target application is checked for vulnerabilities.
### Types of scope
There are three types of scope:
- in scope
- out of scope
- excluded from scope
#### In scope
DAST follows in-scope URLs and searches the DOM for subsequent actions to perform to continue the crawl.
Recorded in-scope HTTP messages are passively checked for vulnerabilities and used to build attacks when running a full scan.
#### Out of scope
DAST follows out-of-scope URLs for non-document content types such as image, stylesheet, font, script, or AJAX request.
[Authentication](#scope-works-differently-during-authentication) aside, DAST does not follow out-of-scope URLs for full page loads, such as when clicking a link to an external website.
Except for passive checks that search for information leaks, recorded HTTP messages for out-of-scope URLs are not checked for vulnerabilities.
#### Excluded from scope
DAST does not follow excluded-from-scope URLs. Except for passive checks that search for information leaks, recorded HTTP messages for excluded-from-scope URLs are not checked for vulnerabilities.
### Scope works differently during authentication
Many target applications have an authentication process that depends on external websites, such as when using an identity access management provider for single sign on (SSO).
To ensure that DAST can authenticate with these providers, DAST follows out-of-scope URLs for full page loads during authentication. DAST does not follow excluded-from-scope URLs.
### How DAST blocks HTTP requests
DAST instructs the browser to make the HTTP request as usual when blocking a request due to scope rules. The request is subsequently intercepted and rejected with the reason `BlockedByClient`.
This approach allows DAST to record the HTTP request while ensuring it never reaches the target server. Passive checks such as [200.1](../checks/200.1.md) use these recorded requests to verify information sent to external hosts.
### How to configure scope
By default, URLs matching the host of the target application are considered in-scope. All other hosts are considered out-of-scope.
Scope is configured using the following variables:
- Use `DAST_SCOPE_ALLOW_HOSTS` to add in-scope hosts.
- Use `DAST_SCOPE_IGNORE_HOSTS` to add to out-of-scope hosts.
- Use `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_HOSTS` to add to excluded-from-scope hosts.
- Use `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS` to set specific URLs to be excluded-from-scope.
Rules:
- Excluding a host is given priority over ignoring a host, which is given priority over allowing a host.
- Configuring scope for a host does not configure scope for the subdomains of that host.
- Configuring scope for a host does not configure scope for all ports on that host.
The following could be a typical configuration:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://my.site.com" # my.site.com URLs are considered in-scope by default
DAST_SCOPE_ALLOW_HOSTS: "api.site.com:8443" # include the API as part of the scan
DAST_SCOPE_IGNORE_HOSTS: "analytics.site.com" # explicitly disregard analytics from the scan
DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_HOSTS: "ads.site.com" # don't visit any URLs on the ads subdomain
DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS: "https://my.site.com/user/logout" # don't visit this URL
```
## Vulnerability detection
DAST detects vulnerabilities through our comprehensive [browser-based vulnerability checks](../checks/_index.md). These checks identify security issues in your web applications during scanning.
The crawler runs the target website in a browser with DAST configured as the proxy server. This
ensures that all requests and responses made by the browser are passively scanned by DAST. When
running a full scan, active vulnerability checks executed by DAST do not use a browser. This
difference in how vulnerabilities are checked can cause issues that require certain features of the
target website to be disabled to ensure the scan works as intended.
For example, for a target website that contains forms with Anti-CSRF tokens, a passive scan works as
intended because the browser displays pages and forms as if a user is viewing the page. However,
active vulnerability checks that run in a full scan cannot submit forms containing Anti-CSRF tokens.
In such cases, we recommend you disable Anti-CSRF tokens when running a full scan.
## Managing scan time
It is expected that running the browser-based crawler results in better coverage for many web applications, when compared to the standard GitLab DAST solution.
This can come at a cost of increased scan time.
You can manage the trade-off between coverage and scan time with the following measures:
- Vertically scale the runner and use a higher number of browsers with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_WORKER_COUNT`. The default is dynamically set to the number of usable logical CPUs.
- Limit the number of actions executed by the browser with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_MAX_ACTIONS`. The default is `10,000`.
- Limit the page depth that the browser-based crawler checks coverage on with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_MAX_DEPTH`. The crawler uses a breadth-first search strategy, so pages with smaller depth are crawled first. The default is `10`.
- Limit the time taken to crawl the target application with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_TIMEOUT`. The default is `24h`. Scans continue with passive and active checks when the crawler times out.
- Build the crawl graph with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_GRAPH` to see what pages are being crawled.
- Prevent pages from being crawled using the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS`.
- Prevent elements being selected using the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_ELEMENTS`. Use with caution, as defining this variable causes an extra lookup for each page crawled.
- If the target application has minimal or fast rendering, consider reducing the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_PAGE_DOM_STABLE_WAIT` to a smaller value. The default is `500ms`.
## Timeouts
Due to poor network conditions or heavy application load, the default timeouts may not be applicable to your application.
Browser-based scans offer the ability to adjust various timeouts to ensure it continues smoothly as it transitions from one page to the next. These values are configured using a [Duration string](https://pkg.go.dev/time#ParseDuration), which allow you to configure durations with a prefix: `m` for minutes, `s` for seconds, and `ms` for milliseconds.
Navigations, or the act of loading a new page, usually require the most amount of time because they are
loading multiple new resources such as JavaScript or CSS files. Depending on the size of these resources, or the speed at which they are returned, the default `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT` may not be sufficient.
Stability timeouts, such as those configurable with `DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT` or `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT`, can also be configured. Stability timeouts determine when browser-based scans consider
a page fully loaded. Browser-based scans consider a page loaded when:
1. The [DOMContentLoaded](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/DOMContentLoaded_event) event has fired.
1. There are no open or outstanding requests that are deemed important, such as JavaScript and CSS. Media files are usually deemed unimportant.
1. Depending on whether the browser executed a navigation, was forcibly transitioned, or action:
- There are no new Document Object Model (DOM) modification events after the `DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT` or `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT` durations.
After these events have occurred, browser-based scans consider the page loaded and ready, and attempt the next action.
If your application experiences latency or returns many navigation failures, consider adjusting the timeout values such as in this example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://my.site.com"
DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT: "45s"
DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT: "15s"
DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT: "15s"
```
{{< alert type="note" >}}
Adjusting these values may impact scan time because they adjust how long each browser waits for various activities to complete.
{{< /alert >}}
### Page readiness timeouts
Page readiness refers to the state when a page has loaded completely, its DOM has stabilized, and interactive elements are available. Proper page readiness detection is crucial for:
- **Scanning accuracy**: Analyzing pages before they're fully loaded can miss content or produce false negatives.
- **Crawl efficiency**: Waiting too long wastes scanning time, while not waiting enough misses dynamic content.
- **Modern web application support**: Single-page applications, AJAX-heavy sites, and progressive loading patterns require sophisticated readiness detection.
Using a sequence of optional configurable timeouts, the DAST scanner can detect when different parts of a page have loaded completely.
#### Timeout variables
Use the following CI/CD variables to customize DAST page readiness timeouts.
For a comprehensive list, see [Available CI/CD variables](variables.md).
| Timeout Variable | Default | Description |
|:-----------------|:--------|:------------|
| `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT` | `15s` | The maximum amount of time to wait for a browser to navigate from one page to another. Used during the Document Load phase for full page loads. |
| `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT` | `7s` | The maximum amount of time to wait for a browser to consider a page loaded and ready for analysis. Used as an alternative to `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT` for in-page actions that don't trigger a full page load. |
| `DAST_PAGE_DOM_STABLE_WAIT` | `500ms` | Define how long to wait for updates to the DOM before checking a page is stable. Used at the beginning of the client-side render phase. |
| `DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT` | `6s` | The maximum amount of time to wait for a browser to consider a page loaded and ready for analysis after a navigation completes. Controls waiting for background data fetching and DOM rendering. |
| `DAST_PAGE_IS_LOADING_ELEMENT` | None | Selector that when no longer visible on the page, indicates to the analyzer that the page has finished loading and the scan can continue. Marks the end of the client-side render process. |
#### Page loading workflow
Modern web applications load in multiple stages. The DAST scanner has specific timeouts for
each step in the process:
1. **Document loading**: The browser fetches and processes the basic page structure.
1. Fetch HTML content from the server.
1. Load referenced CSS and JavaScript files.
1. Parse content and renders the initial page.
1. Trigger the standard "document ready" event.
This phase uses either `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT` (for full page loads) or `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT` (for in-page actions), which sets the maximum wait time for document loading.
1. **Client-Side rendering**: After initial loading, many single-page applications:
- Perform initial JavaScript execution (`DAST_PAGE_DOM_STABLE_WAIT`).
- Fetch background data with AJAX or other API calls.
- Render a DOM and performs updates based on fetched data (`DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT`).
- Display page loading indicators (`DAST_PAGE_IS_LOADING_ELEMENT`).
The scanner monitors these activities to determine when the page is ready for interaction.
The following chart illustrates the sequence timeouts used when crawling a page:
```mermaid
%%{init: {
"gantt": {
"leftPadding": 250,
"sectionFontSize": 15,
"topPadding": 40,
"fontFamily": "GitLab Sans"
}
}}%%
gantt
dateFormat YYYY-MM-DD
axisFormat
section Document load
DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT :done, nav1, 2024-01-01, 6d
Fetch HTML :active, nav1, 2024-01-01, 3d
Fetch CSS&JS :active, nav1, 2024-01-04, 3d
DocumentReady :milestone, nav1, 2024-01-07, 0d
section Load Data / Client-side render
DAST_PAGE_DOM_STABLE_WAIT :done, dom1, 2024-01-07, 3d
Initial JS Execution :active, dom1, 2024-01-07, 3d
DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT :done, ready1, 2024-01-10, 4d
Fetch Data :active, dom1, 2024-01-10, 2d
Render DOM :active, dom1, 2024-01-10, 2d
DAST_PAGE_IS_LOADING_ELEMENT :milestone, load1, 2024-01-14, 0d
```
|
---
type: reference, howto
stage: Application Security Testing
group: Dynamic Analysis
info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with
this page, see https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
title: Customize analyzer settings
breadcrumbs:
- doc
- user
- application_security
- dast
- browser
- configuration
---
## Managing scope
Scope controls what URLs DAST follows when crawling the target application. Properly managed scope minimizes scan run time while ensuring only the target application is checked for vulnerabilities.
### Types of scope
There are three types of scope:
- in scope
- out of scope
- excluded from scope
#### In scope
DAST follows in-scope URLs and searches the DOM for subsequent actions to perform to continue the crawl.
Recorded in-scope HTTP messages are passively checked for vulnerabilities and used to build attacks when running a full scan.
#### Out of scope
DAST follows out-of-scope URLs for non-document content types such as image, stylesheet, font, script, or AJAX request.
[Authentication](#scope-works-differently-during-authentication) aside, DAST does not follow out-of-scope URLs for full page loads, such as when clicking a link to an external website.
Except for passive checks that search for information leaks, recorded HTTP messages for out-of-scope URLs are not checked for vulnerabilities.
#### Excluded from scope
DAST does not follow excluded-from-scope URLs. Except for passive checks that search for information leaks, recorded HTTP messages for excluded-from-scope URLs are not checked for vulnerabilities.
### Scope works differently during authentication
Many target applications have an authentication process that depends on external websites, such as when using an identity access management provider for single sign on (SSO).
To ensure that DAST can authenticate with these providers, DAST follows out-of-scope URLs for full page loads during authentication. DAST does not follow excluded-from-scope URLs.
### How DAST blocks HTTP requests
DAST instructs the browser to make the HTTP request as usual when blocking a request due to scope rules. The request is subsequently intercepted and rejected with the reason `BlockedByClient`.
This approach allows DAST to record the HTTP request while ensuring it never reaches the target server. Passive checks such as [200.1](../checks/200.1.md) use these recorded requests to verify information sent to external hosts.
### How to configure scope
By default, URLs matching the host of the target application are considered in-scope. All other hosts are considered out-of-scope.
Scope is configured using the following variables:
- Use `DAST_SCOPE_ALLOW_HOSTS` to add in-scope hosts.
- Use `DAST_SCOPE_IGNORE_HOSTS` to add to out-of-scope hosts.
- Use `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_HOSTS` to add to excluded-from-scope hosts.
- Use `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS` to set specific URLs to be excluded-from-scope.
Rules:
- Excluding a host is given priority over ignoring a host, which is given priority over allowing a host.
- Configuring scope for a host does not configure scope for the subdomains of that host.
- Configuring scope for a host does not configure scope for all ports on that host.
The following could be a typical configuration:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://my.site.com" # my.site.com URLs are considered in-scope by default
DAST_SCOPE_ALLOW_HOSTS: "api.site.com:8443" # include the API as part of the scan
DAST_SCOPE_IGNORE_HOSTS: "analytics.site.com" # explicitly disregard analytics from the scan
DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_HOSTS: "ads.site.com" # don't visit any URLs on the ads subdomain
DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS: "https://my.site.com/user/logout" # don't visit this URL
```
## Vulnerability detection
DAST detects vulnerabilities through our comprehensive [browser-based vulnerability checks](../checks/_index.md). These checks identify security issues in your web applications during scanning.
The crawler runs the target website in a browser with DAST configured as the proxy server. This
ensures that all requests and responses made by the browser are passively scanned by DAST. When
running a full scan, active vulnerability checks executed by DAST do not use a browser. This
difference in how vulnerabilities are checked can cause issues that require certain features of the
target website to be disabled to ensure the scan works as intended.
For example, for a target website that contains forms with Anti-CSRF tokens, a passive scan works as
intended because the browser displays pages and forms as if a user is viewing the page. However,
active vulnerability checks that run in a full scan cannot submit forms containing Anti-CSRF tokens.
In such cases, we recommend you disable Anti-CSRF tokens when running a full scan.
## Managing scan time
It is expected that running the browser-based crawler results in better coverage for many web applications, when compared to the standard GitLab DAST solution.
This can come at a cost of increased scan time.
You can manage the trade-off between coverage and scan time with the following measures:
- Vertically scale the runner and use a higher number of browsers with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_WORKER_COUNT`. The default is dynamically set to the number of usable logical CPUs.
- Limit the number of actions executed by the browser with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_MAX_ACTIONS`. The default is `10,000`.
- Limit the page depth that the browser-based crawler checks coverage on with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_MAX_DEPTH`. The crawler uses a breadth-first search strategy, so pages with smaller depth are crawled first. The default is `10`.
- Limit the time taken to crawl the target application with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_TIMEOUT`. The default is `24h`. Scans continue with passive and active checks when the crawler times out.
- Build the crawl graph with the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_CRAWL_GRAPH` to see what pages are being crawled.
- Prevent pages from being crawled using the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_URLS`.
- Prevent elements being selected using the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_SCOPE_EXCLUDE_ELEMENTS`. Use with caution, as defining this variable causes an extra lookup for each page crawled.
- If the target application has minimal or fast rendering, consider reducing the [variable](variables.md) `DAST_PAGE_DOM_STABLE_WAIT` to a smaller value. The default is `500ms`.
## Timeouts
Due to poor network conditions or heavy application load, the default timeouts may not be applicable to your application.
Browser-based scans offer the ability to adjust various timeouts to ensure it continues smoothly as it transitions from one page to the next. These values are configured using a [Duration string](https://pkg.go.dev/time#ParseDuration), which allow you to configure durations with a prefix: `m` for minutes, `s` for seconds, and `ms` for milliseconds.
Navigations, or the act of loading a new page, usually require the most amount of time because they are
loading multiple new resources such as JavaScript or CSS files. Depending on the size of these resources, or the speed at which they are returned, the default `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT` may not be sufficient.
Stability timeouts, such as those configurable with `DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT` or `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT`, can also be configured. Stability timeouts determine when browser-based scans consider
a page fully loaded. Browser-based scans consider a page loaded when:
1. The [DOMContentLoaded](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/DOMContentLoaded_event) event has fired.
1. There are no open or outstanding requests that are deemed important, such as JavaScript and CSS. Media files are usually deemed unimportant.
1. Depending on whether the browser executed a navigation, was forcibly transitioned, or action:
- There are no new Document Object Model (DOM) modification events after the `DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT` or `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT` durations.
After these events have occurred, browser-based scans consider the page loaded and ready, and attempt the next action.
If your application experiences latency or returns many navigation failures, consider adjusting the timeout values such as in this example:
```yaml
include:
- template: DAST.gitlab-ci.yml
dast:
variables:
DAST_TARGET_URL: "https://my.site.com"
DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT: "45s"
DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT: "15s"
DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT: "15s"
```
{{< alert type="note" >}}
Adjusting these values may impact scan time because they adjust how long each browser waits for various activities to complete.
{{< /alert >}}
### Page readiness timeouts
Page readiness refers to the state when a page has loaded completely, its DOM has stabilized, and interactive elements are available. Proper page readiness detection is crucial for:
- **Scanning accuracy**: Analyzing pages before they're fully loaded can miss content or produce false negatives.
- **Crawl efficiency**: Waiting too long wastes scanning time, while not waiting enough misses dynamic content.
- **Modern web application support**: Single-page applications, AJAX-heavy sites, and progressive loading patterns require sophisticated readiness detection.
Using a sequence of optional configurable timeouts, the DAST scanner can detect when different parts of a page have loaded completely.
#### Timeout variables
Use the following CI/CD variables to customize DAST page readiness timeouts.
For a comprehensive list, see [Available CI/CD variables](variables.md).
| Timeout Variable | Default | Description |
|:-----------------|:--------|:------------|
| `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT` | `15s` | The maximum amount of time to wait for a browser to navigate from one page to another. Used during the Document Load phase for full page loads. |
| `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT` | `7s` | The maximum amount of time to wait for a browser to consider a page loaded and ready for analysis. Used as an alternative to `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT` for in-page actions that don't trigger a full page load. |
| `DAST_PAGE_DOM_STABLE_WAIT` | `500ms` | Define how long to wait for updates to the DOM before checking a page is stable. Used at the beginning of the client-side render phase. |
| `DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT` | `6s` | The maximum amount of time to wait for a browser to consider a page loaded and ready for analysis after a navigation completes. Controls waiting for background data fetching and DOM rendering. |
| `DAST_PAGE_IS_LOADING_ELEMENT` | None | Selector that when no longer visible on the page, indicates to the analyzer that the page has finished loading and the scan can continue. Marks the end of the client-side render process. |
#### Page loading workflow
Modern web applications load in multiple stages. The DAST scanner has specific timeouts for
each step in the process:
1. **Document loading**: The browser fetches and processes the basic page structure.
1. Fetch HTML content from the server.
1. Load referenced CSS and JavaScript files.
1. Parse content and renders the initial page.
1. Trigger the standard "document ready" event.
This phase uses either `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT` (for full page loads) or `DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_ACTION_TIMEOUT` (for in-page actions), which sets the maximum wait time for document loading.
1. **Client-Side rendering**: After initial loading, many single-page applications:
- Perform initial JavaScript execution (`DAST_PAGE_DOM_STABLE_WAIT`).
- Fetch background data with AJAX or other API calls.
- Render a DOM and performs updates based on fetched data (`DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT`).
- Display page loading indicators (`DAST_PAGE_IS_LOADING_ELEMENT`).
The scanner monitors these activities to determine when the page is ready for interaction.
The following chart illustrates the sequence timeouts used when crawling a page:
```mermaid
%%{init: {
"gantt": {
"leftPadding": 250,
"sectionFontSize": 15,
"topPadding": 40,
"fontFamily": "GitLab Sans"
}
}}%%
gantt
dateFormat YYYY-MM-DD
axisFormat
section Document load
DAST_PAGE_READY_AFTER_NAVIGATION_TIMEOUT :done, nav1, 2024-01-01, 6d
Fetch HTML :active, nav1, 2024-01-01, 3d
Fetch CSS&JS :active, nav1, 2024-01-04, 3d
DocumentReady :milestone, nav1, 2024-01-07, 0d
section Load Data / Client-side render
DAST_PAGE_DOM_STABLE_WAIT :done, dom1, 2024-01-07, 3d
Initial JS Execution :active, dom1, 2024-01-07, 3d
DAST_PAGE_DOM_READY_TIMEOUT :done, ready1, 2024-01-10, 4d
Fetch Data :active, dom1, 2024-01-10, 2d
Render DOM :active, dom1, 2024-01-10, 2d
DAST_PAGE_IS_LOADING_ELEMENT :milestone, load1, 2024-01-14, 0d
```
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.