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652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 8.4 Memory-safety and Type-safety | |
652ecd1d958ab409e65f46628d5f61d5 | 104 239-1 | 8.4.1 Concept | Memory-safe code prevents the occurrence of errors and vulnerabilities due to issues with memory management, for example buffer overflows. Type-safety is a stronger property than memory-safety, which in addition ensures that all variables are handled as the correct type of information, for example not trying to store a... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 1 Scope | The scope of the present document is limited to discussion of the implementation guidelines and characteristics of Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs), with an emphasis on what may require standardization and why. A set of informative annexes is also included in the present document to provide a survey of the curr... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 2 References | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 3.1 Terms | Void. |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ACL Access Control List ADC Analog-to-Digital Convertor AES Advanced Encryption Standard AI Artificial Intelligence AIS Additional Information Sequence ANSSI Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (French National Agency fo... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 4 Theory of quantum random number generation | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 4.0 Introduction | The purpose of this clause is to show a theoretical basis for random number generation and what this might mean in practical implementations. |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 4.1 The definition of randomness | QRNGs are devices that use quantum mechanics' inherent unpredictability to produce true random numbers, i.e. numbers that are -close to being uniformly random and independent of all prior information [i.1] to [i.10]. Definition 1. A QRNG's outcome is -secure (or -truly-random) if: , || ⊗ ≤ , 1 where: 1... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 4.2 Main components of a QRNG | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 4.2.0 Introduction | QRNGs are comprised of two main modules: a Quantum Entropy Source (QES), where an inherently random process is probed to produce raw outcomes with some degree of unpredictability, and a classical randomness-extraction procedure which transforms the raw outcomes into a, usually shorter, sequence satisfying Eq. (1) for s... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 4.2.1 Quantum entropy source | On every use of a QRNG, the action of its QES can be described as the preparation of a quantum system in some state followed by its measurement to produce some classical outcome . The outcome statistics are described by some Positive Operator-Valued Measure (POVM) { } and they satisfy the Born rule: Pr = =... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 4.2.2 Randomness extractor | The randomness extractor component of a QRNG is in charge of extracting ,-secure strings from the QES's outcomes. In this clause, a succinct description of the theory is shown. For an in-depth review of the subject in the context of quantum information theory, the reader is referred to [i.16]. In simple terms, a random... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5 Implementation Guidelines for QRNGs | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.0 Introduction | The purpose of the following clauses is to point out some of the practical implications of building quantum random number generators and to identify some possible areas in which normative specifications might be applicable. |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1 Quantum entropy sources | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.1 Quantum integrity | The claim that the outcomes of a purported QRNG are -secure should be based on a physical model of its QES, as discussed in the preceding clause. Devices should not use marketing terminology such as "quantum-enhanced" unless accompanied by supporting evidence and alignment with the EZT model (see clause 5.1.6). |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.2 Online conditional min-entropy estimation | As stated in Definition 3, the physical model of a QRNG will, in general, depend on some set of parameters. In general, the parameters' values for which the claim of -security holds (for some fixed target ) will only be a proper subset of the set of all values. Therefore, a QRNG should provide an online method to det... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.3 Statistical monitoring | Definition 1 implies that the probability of distinguishing a QRNG's output from a uniformly random (and, independent of the side information) string is bounded above by 1 + /2, which, for typical values of ≈10 , implies indistinguishability for all practical purposes. Nevertheless, statistical testing of the sai... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.4 Shielding and Side-Channel attacks protection | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.4.1 Introduction | The quantum source should be adequately shielded from environmental noise (shock, vibration, electromagnetic fields, temperature fluctuations) that could introduce bias or predictability. |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.4.2 Environmental and Physical Vulnerabilities in QRNGs | Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) QRNGs that utilize photonic components, such as laser diodes and photodetectors [i.4], [i.5], can be vulnerable to electromagnetic interference. An out-of-band electromagnetic injection attack can manipulate the QRNG's output, forcing predictable patterns or known sequences, thereby c... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.4.3 Mitigation Strategies | To enhance the resilience of QRNGs against environmental and physical interferences, the following measures are recommended, depending on system requirements: a) Electromagnetic Shielding: Implementing shielding techniques to protect sensitive components from EMI can prevent unauthorized manipulation of the QRNG output... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.5 AI Driven Attacks and potential mitigation techniques | Artificial intelligence and machine learning are quickly becoming both the greatest threat and potentially the most powerful defense in cybersecurity [i.30]. Unfortunately, attackers are also leveraging AI. They use it to automate and scale attacks, create more sophisticated malware that can adapt to certain defenses, ... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.6 Entropy Zero Trust (EZT) - ETSI EZT Profile for QRNG Security | To address evolving post-quantum threats and entropy forgery scenarios, QRNGs deployed in regulated or high-security domains should implement the Entropy Zero Trust (EZT) model, which incorporates layered assurance beyond the entropy source. ETSI ETSI TR 104 171 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 22 A QRNG system compliant with EZT shou... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.1.7 Entropy Provenance and Usability Assurance | To ensure that the entropy output of a QRNG is both quantum-origin and usable for critical applications, the following layered guarantees should be enforced: a) Source-Specific Cryptographic Proof-of-Origin: Entropy values should be tagged or traceable back to an attested quantum source, using TPM-bound cryptographic s... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.2 Security of Implementation | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.2.1 Tamper Resistance | The QRNG device should be designed to be tamper-evident and possibly have continuous self-diagnostics, as per clause 5.1.4.3 above, so that any attempts to manipulate it are detectable and that appropriate countermeasures may be taken. |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.3 Classification of QRNGs | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.3.1 What to classify | The objective of classification is to provide both the manufacturer and user with a common way of thinking about the domain of quantum random number generators along with their intended application. There are characteristics that can easily be classified, such as throughput rates and power consumption, but also size in... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.3.2 Throughput | Various techniques for implementing QRNGs mean that the rate of number generation may be drastically different between implementations. Because the QRNG is designed to meet the required throughput requirements for the intended application, it may be desirable to describe QRNG capabilities as having a certain "throughpu... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.3.3 Power Consumption | Another criterion may be the implementation of power consumption classes, providing another means of comparison between devices and their applications. For example: Table 3 Class Power Range Typical Deployment Class A ≤ 100 mW Low-power QRNGs for embedded cryptographic coprocessors and PCB/modules Class B 100 mW-500 mW... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.3.4 Volume | QRNG solutions should specify volume constraints for target environments, particularly in embedded and mobile systems. Standardized classifications could be as follows: a) Class S: < 100 mm3 (e.g. M.2 modules for embedded systems) b) Class M: 100 mm3 - 1 000 mm3 (compact modules, PCIe) c) Class L: > 1 000 mm³ (rack-mou... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.3.5 Weight | QRNGs intended for deployment in airborne, space, or mobile platforms should define operational weight constraints. Suggested classification: a) Light: ≤ 20 g b) Medium: 20 g - 200 g c) Heavy: > 200 g The classification provides a practical basis for integration and compliance with Size-Weight-Power (SWaP) constraints ... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.3.6 Interface Specifications | The commercial implementation of QRNGs is still relatively new at this date, to the point that manufacturers tend to use proprietary interfaces. This fact severely limits interoperability among manufacturers and even between product lines within a single manufacturer, in addition to requiring expensive and time-consumi... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.3.7 Scalability | It is important to consider the scalability of the QRNG design to meet potential future demands. For example, a firm who generates cryptographic certificates may find it challenging to continue to meet the demand for cryptographic keys as its customer base grows. With scalability also comes the notion of extensibility,... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.4 Compliance and Certification | |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.4.1 Industry Standards | QRNG development and deployment should adhere to relevant industry standards and best practices to ensure security, reliability, and interoperability. These standards serve as benchmarks for design assurance, entropy quality, cryptographic integration, and compliance validation. Key references include: a) FIPS 140-3 [i... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 5.4.2 Certifications | To ensure trustworthiness, compliance, and broad market acceptance, it is critical that QRNG systems obtain certifications from reputable and recognized authorities. These certifications validate that the QRNG's entropy source, processing methods, physical implementation, and integration practices conform to establishe... |
eba9ba0222f6e6a499510350f0ca5c38 | 104 171 | 6 Conclusions | Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) represent a critical building block in quantum-resilient and post-quantum cryptographic infrastructures. To effectively transition from classical to provably quantum entropy platforms, implementers should go beyond mere claims of quantum sourcing and instead establish layered, v... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 1 Scope | The present document provides an overview of the technology known as 'Certificate Transparency (CT)' and explains its application to ensure transparency and traceability in the issuance of certificates. It enumerates the objectives associated with CT, provides a mapping of the underlying ecosystem and identifies the un... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 2 References | |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI EN 319 401 [i.1], ETSI EN 319 411-1 [i.2] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [i.3] apply. |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI EN 319 401 [i.1], ETSI EN 319 411-1 [i.2], ETSI EN 319 411-2 [i.3] and the following apply: CT Certificate Transparency SCT Signed Certificate Timestamp |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4 Certificate Transparency | |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.1 Introduction | Certificate Transparency (CT) is an Internet security framework that enhances the integrity, accountability, and transparency of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). It does so by requiring that all issued digital certificates be publicly recorded in cryptographically verifiable, append-only logs. These publicly audita... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.2 Objectives of Certificate Transparency | The following objectives are identified as central to the CT framework: a) Detection of certificate misissuance CT enables the timely identification of certificates that have been issued incorrectly or fraudulently by TSPs acting as CAs. Such misissuance may result from technical misconfigurations, non-compliance with ... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.3 Functionality and participants in the CT ecosystem | |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.3.1 Functional Overview | The core functions of CT are described below: a) Certificate Submission Trust Service Providers (TSPs) acting as Certification Authorities (CAs) are responsible for submitting either the final certificate or a corresponding precertificate to one or more publicly accessible Certificate Transparency logs. This submission... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.3.2 Ecosystem Roles | The CT ecosystem involves several distinct functional roles, each contributing to the overall integrity, auditability, and transparency of certificate issuance: a) Trust Service Provider acting as Certification Authority (TSP-CA) An entity that issues X.509 certificates in accordance with applicable certificate policie... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.4 Policies, norms, standards and initiatives | |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.4.1 Policies | Trust and interoperability in the CT ecosystem will be ensured by common policies on all ecosystem roles. |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.4.2 Norms and standards | The following standards currently exist, although IETF RFC 9162 [i.8] has seen limited deployment to date. IETF RFC 6962 [i.7] - Certificate Transparency (June 2013) IETF RFC 6962 [i.7] introduces an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issu... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 4.4.3 Initiatives | The Static Certificate Transparency API (Static-CT-API) Static-CT-API is an experimental extension of Certificate Transparency introduced within the Chromium project and discussed in the CT Policy mailing list. Unlike the embedded SCT mechanism defined in IETF RFC 6962 [i.7] / IETF RFC 9162 [i.8], the Static-CT-API spe... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5 Certificate Transparency | |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.1 Use of Certificate Transparency with TLS | |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.1.1 Introduction | CT is a mandatory policy component for publicly trusted Certification Authorities (CAs) issuing TLS server authentication certificates, as required by major browser vendors. |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.1.2 Precertificate and SCT Workflow | The issuance of a CT-compliant TLS certificate involves the following steps: a) Precertificate Generation Prior to the issuance of the final certificate, the CA generates a precertificate, which is structurally identical to the final certificate but includes a special X.509 extension (CT Poison extension) to indicate i... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.1.3 SCT Delivery Methods | The CT framework supports three delivery mechanisms for SCTs to the relying party (e.g. browser or TLS client): • Embedded SCT (Static CT): SCTs are embedded directly in the X.509 certificate in a dedicated extension (1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2). This is commonly used in environments where server support for dynamic SCT d... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.1.4 Log Requirements and Client Validation | CT logs are required to: • Operate as publicly accessible, append-only, cryptographically verifiable Merkle Trees. • Provide inclusion and consistency proofs as defined in IETF RFC 6962 [i.7] or IETF RFC 9162 [i.8]. • Meet operational parameters such as Maximum Merge Delay (MMD) and availability thresholds. Relying par... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.1.5 Browser Enforcement Policies | Browser enforcement (informative; policies subject to change). As of August 2025: • Google® Chrome (Chromium): Enforces CT for publicly trusted TLS certificates in accordance with the Chrome CT Policy; acceptance criteria (including recognized logs and SCT delivery methods) are defined by the program policy. • Apple Sa... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.2.1 Background | CT logs are expected to: i) incorporate accepted entries within the log's configured Maximum Merge Delay (MMD); and ii) meet ≥ 99 % per-endpoint availability measured over a rolling 90-day window. Where expectations are not met, operators commonly communicate incident status, adjust operations, or, where appropriate, t... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.2.2 Incident taxonomy (operator-neutral) | The following incidents classes were identified: A. Submission errors / service unavailability. Periods of elevated HTTP errors or temporary rejection of submissions (sometimes source-network specific) caused issuance delays until submitters failed over to alternate endpoints. B. MMD breaches and inclusion gaps. Logs a... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.2.3 Chronology of representative incidents (anonymized) | The following entries are operator-neutral and time-ordered; they illustrate the incident classes above without naming specific operators or shards. • 2018-11-30 - Submission failures affecting CT endpoints. Elevated errors for submissions from a single CA network subsided after failover to an alternate site. Impact: t... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 5.3 Summary | Certificate Transparency is a mandatory mechanism in the issuance and validation of public TLS certificates. By mandating certificate disclosure to verifiable logs and enabling independent monitoring, CT significantly strengthens the accountability of CAs and the integrity of the PKI ecosystem. Proper implementation an... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 6.2.1 Recommendation for the use of existing standards | It is proposed that implementers build and operate the CT ecosystem in conformity with IETF RFC 6962 [i.7] as the primary basis for interoperability. This includes the generation and submission of precertificates or certificates to IETF RFC 6962 [i.7] conformant logs, the issuance and delivery of SCTs (embedded in the ... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 6.2.2 Recommendation to consider Static-CT-API (tiled logs) | It is proposed that the Static-CT-API (tiled-log architecture), currently maintained as a community specification, be considered as input to future standardization of CT formats and operations, alongside IETF RFC 6962 [i.7] and IETF RFC 9162 [i.8]. The approach offers operational advantages, most notably inclusion-befo... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 6.3.1 Introduction | In order to ensure the reliable, secure, and auditable operation of the Certificate Transparency (CT) ecosystem, it is essential that each participating entity operates under a clearly defined and standardized policy framework. To this end, ETSI should develop role-specific policy frameworks that define minimum require... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 6.3.3 Policy Framework for Relying Parties | A relying-party policy framework should define: • Transparent trust criteria including its publication (e.g. a versioned CT policy disclosing conditions for trusting a certificate). • SCT verification rules. • Incident and privacy handling. |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 6.3.4 Policy Framework for Supervisory Bodies | A supervisory policy framework should define: • Ecosystem governance and role definitions, including baseline obligations for TSP-CAs, CT log operators, monitors, auditors, and relying parties. • Admission and lifecycle rules for CT logs (registration, qualification, state transitions, delisting) with machine-readable ... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 6.3.5 Policy Framework for CT Log Operators | The framework for CT log operators should define requirements related to: • Log service behaviour, including the Maximum Merge Delay (MMD), certificate inclusion guarantees, and log integrity. • Cryptographic controls, such as signing algorithms, hash functions, and key lifecycle management. • Audit procedures, frequen... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 6.3.6 Policy Framework for CT Monitors | A monitoring policy framework should define: • Scope and frequency of log observation. • Alerting mechanisms for affected credential owners or stakeholders in case of anomalies. • Criteria for identifying relevant certificate entries. • Data handling and protection practices, particularly regarding the processing of cr... |
86bc764236405bb45cba74ca3b973c6d | 119 411-9 | 6.3.7 Policy Framework for CT Log Auditors | The auditing policy framework should address: • Verification methodology for inclusion and consistency proofs. • Audit intervals and coverage scope. • Procedures for reporting and publishing results. • Processes for dealing with inconsistencies, including stakeholder notification and incident escalation. ETSI ETSI TR 1... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the stage two description of the Subscriber Identity Module Application Programming Interface (SIM API) internal to the SIM. This stage two describes the functional capabilities and the information flow for the SIM API implemented on the Java Card 2.1 API specification [6]. The present docu... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • Fo... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: Applet : An Applet is an application built up using a number of classes which will run under the control of the Java Card virtual machine. Applets designed for smart cards are sometimes referred to as Cardlets. Bytecode : Machine indep... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply, in addition to those listed in GSM 01.04 [2]: AC Application Code AID Application Identifier APDU Application Protocol Data Unit API Application Programming Interface CAD Card Acceptance Device FFS For Further Study IFD Interface Device JCRE J... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 4 Description | The present document describes an API for the GSM SIM. This API allows application programmers access to the functions and data described in GSM 11.11 [2] and GSM 11.14 [3], such that SIM based services can be developed and loaded onto SIMs, quickly and, if necessarily, remotely, after the card has been issued. This AP... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 4.1 GSM Java Card Architecture | The over all architecture of the SIM Toolkit API based on Java Card 2.1 is: Applets Applets Toolkit Applets Toolkit Applets JCRE File System GSM Applet SIM Toolkit Framework Toolkit Registry Toolkit Handler Toolkit Applets Applets Loader Applet shareable interface Figure 1: GSM Java Card Architecture SIM Toolkit Framew... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 4.2 Java Card Selection Mechanism | The Java Card selection mechanism is defined in the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [8]. |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 5 GSM Framework | |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 5.1 Overview | The GSM Framework consists of the GSM applet and the JCRE File System Object. The GSM Framework is based on two packages: - The GSM low level package [FFS]; - The sim.access package, which allows applets to access the GSM files. |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 5.2 GSM file data access | The following methods shall be offered by the API to card applets, to allow access to the GSM data: select Select a file without changing the current file of any other applet or of the subscriber session. At the invocation of the processToolkit method of a toolkit applet, the current file is the MF. The toolkit applet ... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 5.3 Access control | The Access Control privileges of the applet are granted during installation according to the level of trust. When an applet requests access to GSM or operator specific files, the SIM Toolkit Framework checks if this access is allowed by examination of the file control information stored on the card. If access is grante... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 5.4 GSM low Level API | [FFS. This API allows the implementation of the GSM applet] |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 6 SIM Toolkit Framework | |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 6.1 Overview | The SIM API shall consist of APIs for GSM 11.14 [3] (pro-active functions) and GSM 11.11 [2] (transport functions). Toolkit Applet 1 Applet 2 Toolkit Applet 3 Applet n Proactive Command handler GSM Framework Files Toolkit Framework Applet install/uninstall Security Applet triggering Applet security manager Activation P... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 6.2 Applet Triggering | The application triggering portion of the SIM Toolkit Framework is responsible for the activation of toolkit applets, based on the APDU received by the GSM application. APDU Applet Triggering Menu Selected SMS Received Terminal Profile ... Figure 3: toolkit applet triggering diagram The ME shall not be adversely affect... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 6.3 Registration | During it's installation the toolkit applet shall register to the JCRE and the SIM Toolkit Framework so that it can be triggered by both selection mechanisms. The toolkit applet will have to call the getEntry() method to get a reference to it's registry and then to explicitly register to each event it requires. The too... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 6.4 Proactive command handling | The SIM application toolkit protocol (i.e. 91xx, Fetch, Terminal Response) is handled by the GSM applet and the Toolkit Handler, the toolkit applet shall not handle those events. The SIM Toolkit Framework shall provide a reference of the sim.toolkit.ViewHandler.EditHandler.ProactiveHandler to the toolkit applet so that... |
88a8e2c2930b947aed767e9a70370cfe | 101 476 | 6.5 Envelope response handling | To allow atoolkit applet to answer to some specific events (e.g. EVENT_CALL_CONTROL_BY_SIM) the SIM Toolkit Framework shall provide the sim.toolkit.ViewHandler.EditHandler.EnvelopeResponseHandler. The toolkit applet can then post a response to some events with the post() or the postAsBERTLV() methods, the toolkit apple... |
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