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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
33.116
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the MME network product class
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.116/33116-j00.zip
|
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the MME network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the MME network product class.
|
33.117
|
Catalogue of general security assurance requirements
|
TS
|
19.2.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.117/33117-j20.zip
|
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are deemed applicable, possibly after adaptation, to several network product classes.
Several network product classes share very similar if not identical security requirements for some aspects. Therefore, these are collected in this "catalogue" document applicable to many network product classes. In addition to this catalogue, requirements specific to different network product classes will be captured in separate documents.
|
32.611
|
Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Bulk CM Integration Reference Point (IRP): Requirements
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.611/32611-j00.zip
| |
33.126
|
Lawful Interception requirements
|
TS
|
19.3.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.126/33126-j30.zip
|
The present document specifies Stage 1 Lawful Interception requirements for 3GPP networks and services.
Regional interception requirements can be satisfied by meeting the correct subset of requirements from the present document. Which CSP services are subject to Lawful Interception is defined by national regulations.
The presence of a requirement in the present document does not in itself imply or mandate that a 3GPP operator has an obligation to implement any network service capability, which is not otherwise required to meet LI obligation compliance in relation to specific regulated services, offered by that 3GPP operator. Only those specific requirements and sub-clauses of the present document which are applicable to specific network and/or service capabilities implemented in a 3GPP operator's network will be considered in scope for that operator. In all cases, laws and regulations define which requirements are applicable to 3GPP operators in each country relative to the services offered by each 3GPP operator.
As such not all requirements in the present document will apply in all national jurisdictions or to all 3GPP operator deployments (e.g. if an operator does not offer voice services, then voice LI requirement in the present document do not apply).
The interception system defined in the present document provides LI based on specific target identifiers.
|
32.606
|
Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Basic CM Integration Reference Point (IRP); Solution Set (SS) definitions
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.606/32606-j00.zip
| |
32.661
|
Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Kernel CM Requirements
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.661/32661-j00.zip
| |
32.662
|
Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Kernel CM Information Service (IS)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.662/32662-j00.zip
| |
32.666
|
Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Kernel CM Integration Reference Point (IRP); Solution Set (SS) definitions
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.666/32666-j00.zip
| |
32.690
|
Telecommunication management; Inventory Management (IM); Requirements
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.690/32690-j00.zip
| |
32.616
|
Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Bulk CM Integration Reference Point (IRP); Solution Set (SS) definitions
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.616/32616-j00.zip
| |
32.901
|
Telecommunication management; Study on User Data Convergence (UDC) information model handling and provisioning: Example use cases
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.901/32901-j00.zip
| |
32.612
|
Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Bulk CM Integration Reference Point (IRP): Information Service (IS)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.612/32612-j00.zip
| |
33.105
|
3G Security; Cryptographic algorithm requirements
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.105/33105-j00.zip
| |
33.203
|
3G security; Access security for IP-based services
|
TS
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.203/33203-j10.zip
|
The scope for this technical specification is to specify the security features and mechanisms for secure access to the IM subsystem (IMS) for the 3G mobile telecommunication system.
Since the scope also encompasses the use of these security features and mechanisms for secure access to IMS in the context of fixed broadband networks and 3GPP2 networks, Annex L and Annex S specify how the material in the main body and other normative Annexes of this document apply to the fixed broadband networks and 3GPP2 networks respectively.
The IMS supports IP Multimedia applications such as video, audio and multimedia conferences. SIP, Session Initiation Protocol, was chosen as the signalling protocol for creating and terminating Multimedia sessions, cf. RFC 3261 [6]. This specification only deals with how the SIP signalling is protected between the subscriber and the IMS, how the subscriber is authenticated and how the subscriber authenticates the IMS.
|
33.106
|
3G security; Lawful interception requirements
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.106/33106-j00.zip
| |
33.110
|
Key establishment between a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) and a terminal
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.110/33110-j00.zip
| |
33.216
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the evolved Node B (eNB) network product class
|
TS
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.216/33216-j10.zip
|
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the eNB network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the eNB network product class.
|
32.972
|
Telecommunication management;Study on system and functional aspects of energy efficiency in 5G networks
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S5
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.972/32972-j00.zip
| |
33.122
|
Security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) for 3GPP northbound APIs
|
TS
|
19.2.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.122/33122-j20.zip
| |
33.141
|
Presence service; Security
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.141/33141-j00.zip
| |
33.185
|
Security aspect for LTE support of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.185/33185-j00.zip
| |
33.187
|
Security aspects of Machine-Type Communications (MTC) and other mobile data applications communications enhancements
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.187/33187-j00.zip
| |
33.204
|
3G Security; Network Domain Security (NDS); Transaction Capabilities Application Part (TCAP) user security
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.204/33204-j00.zip
| |
33.221
|
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Support for subscriber certificates
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.221/33221-j00.zip
| |
33.246
|
3G Security; Security of Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.246/33246-j00.zip
|
The Technical Specification covers the security procedures of the Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) for 3GPP systems (UTRAN, GERAN and E-UTRAN). MBMS is a 3GPP system network bearer service over which many different applications could be carried. The actual method of protection may vary depending on the type of MBMS application.
|
33.250
|
Security assurance specification for the PGW network product class
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.250/33250-j00.zip
|
The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the PGW network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the PGW network product class.
|
33.256
|
Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS)
|
TS
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.256/33256-j10.zip
|
The present document specifies the security features in support of the architecture enhancements for supporting Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) connectivity, identification, tracking and pairing authorization defined in TS 23.256 [3], according to the use cases and service requirements defined in TS 22.125 [6].
|
33.210
|
Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security
|
TS
|
19.2.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.210/33210-j20.zip
| |
33.129-2
|
Security Assurance Specification for 3GPP Lawful Interception Functions; NF Embedded LI Functions
|
TS
|
0.0.11
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.129-2/33129-2-00b.zip
| |
33.163
|
Battery Efficient Security for very low throughput Machine Type Communication (MTC) devices (BEST)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.163/33163-j00.zip
| |
33.129-1
|
Security Assurance Specification for 3GPP Lawful Interception Functions; Common Baseline
|
TS
|
0.0.9
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.129-1/33129-1-009.zip
| |
33.222
|
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.222/33222-j00.zip
| |
33.223
|
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Push function
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.223/33223-j00.zip
| |
33.224
|
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) push layer
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.224/33224-j00.zip
| |
33.226
|
Security assurance for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.226/33226-j00.zip
| |
33.259
|
Key establishment between a UICC hosting device and a remote device
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.259/33259-j00.zip
| |
33.434
|
Security aspects of Service Enabler Architecture Layer (SEAL) for verticals
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.434/33434-j00.zip
|
The present document specifies the security features and mechanisms to support the Service Enabler Architecture Layer (SEAL) in 5G. Specifically security architecture, functional model(s), security aspects of SEAL reference points (e.g. SEAL-UU, etc.), Key Management (KM) procedures, Identity Management (IdM) procedures and SEAL access authentication and authorization for supporting efficient use and deployment of vertical applications over the 3GPP systems are specified.
|
33.180
|
Security of the Mission Critical (MC) service
|
TS
|
19.3.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.180/33180-j30.zip
| |
33.220
|
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.220/33220-j00.zip
| |
33.326
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization Function (NSSAAF) network product class
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.326/33326-j00.zip
| |
33.512
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Access and Mobility management Function (AMF)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.512/33512-j00.zip
|
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the AMF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AMF network product class.
|
33.513
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); User Plane Function (UPF)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.513/33513-j00.zip
|
The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UPF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases. It also specifies the requirements and test cases unique to the UPF network product class.
|
33.514
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Management (UDM) network product class
|
TS
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.514/33514-j10.zip
|
The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UDM network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases. It also specifies the requirements and test cases unique to the UDM network product class.
|
33.515
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Session Management Function (SMF) network product class
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.515/33515-j00.zip
|
The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the SMF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the SMF network product class.
|
33.234
|
3G security; Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking security
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.234/33234-j00.zip
| |
33.517
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) network product class
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.517/33517-j00.zip
|
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the SEPP network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the SEPP network product class.
|
33.518
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Repository Function (NRF) network product class
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.518/33518-j00.zip
|
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the NRF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the NRF network product class.
|
33.127
|
Lawful Interception (LI) architecture and functions
|
TS
|
19.4.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.127/33127-j40.zip
| |
33.310
|
Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)
|
TS
|
19.5.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.310/33310-j50.zip
| |
33.320
|
Security of Home Node B (HNB) / Home evolved Node B (HeNB)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.320/33320-j00.zip
| |
33.369
|
Security aspects of Ambient Internet of Things (AIoT) services for isolated private networks
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.369/33369-j00.zip
| |
33.523
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Split gNB product classes
|
TS
|
19.2.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.523/33523-j20.zip
|
The gNB can be deployed as more than one entity by splitting the gNB into gNB-CU and gNB-DU(s) and possibly further splitting the gNB-CU into gNB-CU-CP and gNB-CU-UP(s) (see TS 38.401 [5]). The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the various split gNB network product classes. Test cases for such deployments are provided, are based upon and borrow heavily from the specification for the gNB product class (see TS 33.511 [6]). The main differences are the inclusion of cases for the F1 signalling and user plane connection and the E1 signalling connection on the top of the gNB cases as well as some revised cases to account for the split functionality. The present document also refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements (see TS 33.117 [2]) and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the various split gNB network product class.
|
33.328
|
IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) media plane security
|
TS
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.328/33328-j10.zip
| |
33.527
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 3GPP virtualized network products
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.527/33527-j00.zip
|
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases to virtualized network product classes.
Several virtualized network product classes share very similar if not identical security requirements for some aspects. Therefore, these are collected in the present document applicable to many virtualized network product classes. In addition to this catalogue, requirements specific to different network product classes will be captured in separate documents.
|
33.511
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next generation Node B (gNodeB) network product class
|
TS
|
19.3.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.511/33511-j30.zip
| |
33.529
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF) network product class
|
TS
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.529/33529-j10.zip
|
The present document contains objectives, security assurance requirements and test cases specific to the SMSF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements. It formulates specific adaptations of the requirements and test cases given in the catalogue. It also specifies requirements derived from other technical specifications and test cases unique to the SMSF network product class.
|
33.530
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.530/33530-j00.zip
|
The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UDR network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements [2] and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the UDR network product class.
|
33.303
|
Proximity-based Services (ProSe); Security aspects
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.303/33303-j00.zip
| |
33.519
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Exposure Function (NEF) network product class
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.519/33519-j00.zip
| |
33.516
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) network product class
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.516/33516-j00.zip
| |
33.537
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function (AAnF)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.537/33537-j00.zip
|
The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the AAnF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AAnF network product class.
|
33.520
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.520/33520-j00.zip
| |
33.558
|
Security aspects of enhancement of support for enabling edge applications
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.558/33558-j00.zip
|
The present document specifies the security features and mechanisms to support the application architecture for enabling Edge Applications in 5G, i.e. security for the interfaces, procedures for the authentication and authorization between the entities of the application architecture, and procedures for the EES capability exposure.
|
33.522
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Service Communication Proxy (SCP)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.522/33522-j00.zip
| |
33.700-29
|
Study on security aspects of 5G satellite access in the 5G architecture phase 3
|
TR
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-29/33700-29-j10.zip
|
The present document studies the security and privacy aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3. It is comprised of the following parts:
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of the regenerative payload generic architecture in 5GS/EPS.
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of the Store and Forward (S&F) Satellite operation both for NR NTN (5GS) and for IoT NTN (EPS).
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of UE-Satellite-UE communication enhancements for 5GS.
- The impact on regulatory services in the context of 5G satellite access. In particular, the assessment of the potential impact to lawful intercept in regenerative, Store and Forward (S&F), and UE-satellite-UE communication enhancement architecture.
|
33.700-32
|
Study on security aspects of user identities and authentication
|
TR
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-32/33700-32-j10.zip
|
The present document studies the security and privacy aspects for the creation and usage of user identities as studied in 3GPP TR 23.700-32 [2], with the following focus:
1) Study authentication and authorization of:
a) a user identifier associated with a subscription and used on a UE (i.e., human user) and
b) an identifier associated with a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG.
2) Study privacy and security impacts of usage of user identifiers associated with a subscription or with a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG, including exposure of user profile related information.
|
33.700-41
|
Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256bits
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-41/33700-41-j00.zip
|
The present document aims to address key requirements for introducing support for 256-bit symmetric algorithms into the 5G System as well as the coexistence of 128-bit and 256-bit cryptographic algorithms. Considering findings and conclusions from preceding work, the following points should be addressed as part of the present document:
Studying key issues and candidate solutions concerning the negotiation (selection) of key sizes between UE and network, including:
- Potential risks and impacts to the current system when supporting both 128-bit and 256-bit algorithms in parallel and the adoption of 256-bit algorithms in existing deployments where 128 bits is already supported, e.g. handover scenarios within 5G system.
- How to prioritise the use of 256-bit algorithms and mitigate bidding-down attacks when negotiating key sizes.
- How to ensure 256-bit security is achieved concerning varying levels of support for 256-bit algorithms by different UEs and within the network; potential dependencies in key-length selection of AS and NAS layers.
- Study the implications and requirements for the key hierarchies to support 256-bit cryptographic algorithms.
- Study the implications and requirements to AKA procedures.
|
33.701
|
Study on mitigations against bidding down Attacks
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.701/33701-j00.zip
|
The present document focuses on mitigating bidding down attack, i.e. how to prevent UEs that are currently connected to LTE/5G from establishing a connection with a GERAN/UTRAN FBS considering for example the decommissioning of GERAN and UTRAN networks. In particular, the present document aims at:
- Identifying attack scenarios and threats in the context of decommissioning of GERAN and UTRAN networks, e.g. cell (re)selection or forced handovers on GERAN or UTRAN once LTE and 5G signalling are blocked when GERAN/UTRAN networks are decommissioned; and
- Documenting solutions for the identified security threats and requirements.
|
33.702
|
Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.702/33702-j00.zip
|
The following objectives are studied in the present document:
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support UE connecting to a new target TNAP within the same TNGF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support AUN3 connecting to a new target RG under the same WAGF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support N5CW devices connecting to a new target Trusted WLAN AP within the same TWIF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support UE connecting to a new WLAN AP that shares the same NSWOF without performing full authentication.
The present document does not cover actual mobility, where call/session continuity is maintained. I.e. when UE/device is moving from one AP/TNAP/TWAP to another, connectivity can break, and then UE will reconnect.
|
33.402
|
3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security aspects of non-3GPP accesses
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.402/33402-j00.zip
| |
33.521
|
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS);Network Data Analytics Function (NWDAF)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.521/33521-j00.zip
| |
33.727
|
Lawful Intercept Handling of Protected Services
|
TR
|
0.0.1
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.727/33727-001.zip
|
Offering communication services with end-to-end (E2E) cryptographic protection is becoming more desirable and more common. 3GPP-defined services (such as those of the IMS framework) have so far largely relied on trustworthy network infrastructure, complemented by strong cryptographic access security and hop-by-hop protection in the core and service domains. However, also here, E2E protected services are gaining attractivity. Indeed, the solution defined in TS 33.535, Authentication and Key Management for Applications based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (AKMA), can be leveraged as a basis for protecting basically any IP-based service provided to a UE (an ME with USIM-credentials). While this trend is both natural and desirable from a user privacy point of view, it creates problems related to regulatory obligations for CSPs to provide Lawful Interception (LI). The problems are particularly emphasised in roaming scenarios, where each of two different CSPs in distinct jurisdictions might independently need to provide LI without reliance on co-operation by the other CSP and/or law enforcement in the other jurisdiction.
The currently dominant approach to tackle these issues has been to simply not activate the protection (encryption) when it potentially conflicts with LI requirements. Going forward, this is most likely not a sustainable solution. For example, it potentially exposes the traffic to any 3rd party and, moreover, it typically also results in data integrity being disabled, while the issues are predominantly tied to data confidentiality.
The present document provides a technical study on how to enable protected services without negative consequences for LI. The CSP’s LI obligation to provide communication with the encryption removed only applies when the CSP also provides the technical means enabling the protection (e.g. key management), and therefore the scope is limited to that use case.
|
33.743
|
Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity-based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) phase 3
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.743/33743-j00.zip
|
The present document investigates and identifies the security (including privacy) threats, corresponding security (including privacy) requirements and potential solutions for Proximity Based Services (ProSe) in 5G System (5GS) phase 3, based on the architecture and system level enhancements studied in TR 23.700-03 [1], including
- ProSe multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay (both Layer-2 and Layer-3 Relays).
- ProSe multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay (Layer-3 Relay only).
|
33.745
|
Study on security aspects of 5G Next Radio (NR) Femto
|
TR
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.745/33745-j10.zip
|
The present document studies the potential security enhancements for supporting 5G NR Femto. More specifically, the study investigates potential security enhancements in the following areas:
- With the gap analysis, study the potential updates or enhancements needed for 5G NR Femto over TS 33.320[2].
- Study the security impacts for interworking between CAG and CSG cells.
- Study the security impacts of enabling provisioning of subscribers allowed to access 5G NR Femto cells and how to manage 5G NR Femto access control by the Closed Access Group (CAG) owner or an authorized administrator.
|
33.749
|
Study on security aspects of enhancement of support for edge computing in the 5G Core (5GC) phase 3
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.749/33749-j00.zip
|
The present document studies the security enhancements on the support for Edge Computing in the 5G Core network defined in TR 23.700-49 [2], and enhanced architecture for enabling Edge Applications defined in TS 23.558 [3]. Specifically, the present document focuses on the following:
1) Study the security aspects on the enhancements for EAS (re)discovery and UPF (re)selection with reducing impact on central 5GC NFs, enhancement of EAS and local UPF (re)selection, and EC Traffic Routing between local part of DN and central part of DN the Edge Hosting Environment information management.
2) Study the security on the enhancements to Edge Enabler layer (EEL) to support additional scenarios for edge services.
3) Study the authorization between EESes for both Application Context Relocation (ACR) and Edge Node Sharing (ENS) scenarios.
4) Study the secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information in the EDGE.
The study is based on the work done in the TS 33.558 [4], TR 33.839 [5], TR 33.739 [6].
|
33.754
|
Study on security aspects for multi-access(DualSteer +Access Traffic Steering, Switch and Splitting support in the 5G system architecture phase 4 (ATSSS Ph-4)
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.754/33754-j00.zip
|
The present document aims to address the security aspects of Multi-Access, focusing on DualSteer devices and ATSSS Phase 4 (ATSSS Ph-4) enhancements, as identified in the FS_MASSS study in TR 23.700-54 [2].
The scope of this study includes the following key areas:
- Examine the security implications of a simplified architecture over non-3GPP access, where non-3GPP access does not rely on the current TNGF/N3IWF architecture. This involves assessing:
- Whether to keep NAS security context on non-3GPP access.
- Whether to keep IPsec on the user plane and/or control plane of non-3GPP access.
- Whether new security mechanisms are to be considered in UE procedures, particularly regarding registration and connectivity to the 5G system in the context of ATSSS between 3GPP and non-3GPP access without 5G NAS.
The present document leverages insights from the requirements and architectural considerations outlined in the TR 23.700-54 [2].
|
33.757
|
Study on security for a PLMN hosting a Non-Public Network (NPN)
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.757/33757-j00.zip
|
The present document studies the security when a PLMN hosts an NPN with dedicated NFs deployed in the customer domain. A NPN customer may deploy on-premises NFs, or hosted NFs which reside in third-party premises, or both. A PLMN hosting an NPN is an example of a Public Network Integrated NPN (PNI-NPN). The term PNI-NPN applies to this study of a PLMN hosting an NPN.
More specifically, the present document:
- identifies key issues and potential security requirements for the scenarios of PLMN hosting an NPN with dedicated NFs deployed in the customer domain. Related dedicated NFs may be described in the key issues.
- when necessary, develops solutions to address the identified requirements.
|
33.759
|
Study on security enhancements of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) Phase 3
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.759/33759-j00.zip
|
The present document identifies potential security and privacy issues and provides potential security solutions to support additional scenarios and requirements for UAV (Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle) and UAM (Urban Air Mobility) including:
- identify potential security issues and provide solutions for the enhanced NEF services to support service exposure and interactions between MNOs and UTM functions, e.g. security impact of supporting multiple USS.
- identify potential security and privacy issues related to network-assisted/ground-based mechanism for DAA (Detect And Avoid).
- identify potential security and privacy issues related to no-transmit zones for UAVs
Furthermore, the present document makes potential recommendations for possible normative work taking into consideration the conclusions of TR 23.700-59 [2].
|
33.766
|
Study on security aspects of energy savings in 5G
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.766/33766-j00.zip
|
The present document studies the security and privacy aspects of energy savings. More especially the document:
- Identifies key issues concerning the privacy and security aspects of collecting energy related information.
- Identifies key issues concerning the privacy and security impacts of exposure of energy related information.
- If required, develops solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
33.776
|
Study of Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA)
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.776/33776-j00.zip
|
The scope of this document is to identify key issues and study solutions addressed using ACME for automated certificate management in SBA.
Areas of study include:
- Automated certificate management protocol and procedures for certificate life cycle events (i.e., enrolment, renewal, and revocation) within 5G SBA (i.e., to be used by operator CAs and all 5GC NFs including NRF, SCP, SEPP, etc.), including the following:
- ACME transport and request/response messages for 5G SBA use cases
- ACME certificate profiles for all 5G SBA entities
- Mechanisms for establishing initial trust and chain of trust of Certificate Authority hierarchies, including the following:
- Existing ACME challenge types and if any new challenge types are needed for 3GPP use cases:
- Creation, deletion, rotation, revocation and storage of the certificates
- Ability to automate ACME challenge validation
- Suitability of existing mechanisms when 5G SBA is for standalone NPN (SNPN)
- Call flow of the messages exchanged between different entities in the chain of trust.
NOTE: Certificate management for the external interface of the SEPP is out of scope.
|
33.784
|
Study on security aspects of core network enhanced support for Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML)
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.784/33784-j00.zip
|
The present document studies the security aspects of enablers for network automation for the 5G system based on the outcome of TR 38.843[2] and TR 23.700-84[3]. More specifically, this document identifies security issues and requirements and provides corresponding security solutions related to the following scenarios:
- Security aspects on enhancements to LCS to support AI/ML based Positioning considering the conclusions in TR 38.843[2] and TR 23.700-84[3].
- Security aspects of cross-domain (i.e. 5G Core and AF) Vertical Federated Learning, including authorization of members of the VFL group and security aspects of enhancements on the architecture in TR 23.700-84 [3] to support VFL.
|
33.526
|
Security assurance specification for the Management Function (MnF)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.526/33526-j00.zip
| |
33.794
|
Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security
|
TR
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.794/33794-j10.zip
|
The present document studies enablers for Zero-Trust Security in the 5G System. The document specifically includes security analysis with recommendations, key issues, potential security requirements and solutions with respect to the following objectives:
1. Data exposure for security evaluation and monitoring
- Identify potential threats and attacks on the 5G SBA layer intended to identify which data may be relevant to be exposed, and whether additional data exposure is necessary to detect the threats and attacks.
NOTE 1: The external security evaluation and monitoring is up to operator’s implementation and outside the 3GPP domain. The aspects to enable OAM based data collection are not in scope of the present document. The necessary adaptations specific to exposure services for providing data to the external security function.
2. Security mechanism for dynamic policy enforcement
|
33.528
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Policy Control Function (PCF)
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.528/33528-j00.zip
| |
33.503
|
Security Aspects of Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS)
|
TS
|
19.2.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.503/33503-j20.zip
| |
33.401
|
3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture
|
TS
|
19.1.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.401/33401-j10.zip
| |
33.533
|
Security aspects of ranging based services and sidelink positioning
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.533/33533-j00.zip
| |
33.926
|
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes
|
TR
|
19.4.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.926/33926-j40.zip
|
The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.
|
33.545
|
Security aspects of NR Femto
|
TS
|
19.2.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.545/33545-j20.zip
| |
33.536
|
Security aspects of 3GPP support for advanced Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services
|
TS
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.536/33536-j00.zip
| |
33.929-1
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based services
|
TR
|
0.0.1
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-1/33929-1-001.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based services that focus on illustrating the LI aspects of session-based IMS sessions which include the architecture topologies and the call flows covering basic sessions, redirected sessions, target non-local ID, conferencing, roaming (Local Breakout and Home-routed) scenarios. The IMS based STIR/SHAKEN related LI reporting are illustrated in TR 33.929-2 [10].
The LI for IMS-based services is agnostic to the packet core network.
|
33.929-2
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based STIR/SHAKEN
|
TR
|
0.0.1
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-2/33929-2-001.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based STIR/SHAKEN that focus on illustrating various STIR/SHAKEN related LI reporting scenarios that go along with the LI for IMS based services (TR 33.929-1 [10]).
|
33.929-3
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for messaging services
|
TR
|
0.0.1
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-3/33929-3-001.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the illustrations related LI for Messaging Services that include SMS over NAS and SMS over IP.
|
33.929-4
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for data in 5G core
|
TR
|
0.0.2
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-4/33929-4-002.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3], TS 33.128 [4] and TR 33.928 [5].
The present document that covers the illustrations for LI for Data in 5G Core include the LI aspects of data interception focussing on the PDU session related events including the handover cases.
|
33.929-5
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for ID association caching
|
TR
|
0.0.2
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-5/33929-5-002.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3], TS 33.128 [4] and TR 33.928 [5].
The present document that covers illustrations of ID Association Caching focus on the capabilities used to provide the temporary identity to permanent identity (and vice-versa) associations known to the CSP network. The illustrations include the architectural concepts and few examples of use-cases encountering various timing scenarios.
|
33.929-6
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based RCS
|
TR
|
0.0.2
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-6/33929-6-002.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based RCS that include the illustrations covering the architecture topologies and the call flows when the RCS service is offered by the CSP or by a Third Party Provider. The LI for IMS based services are illustrated in TR 33.929-1 [10].
The LI for IMS-based RCS is agnostic to the packet core network.
|
33.929-7
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI location acquisition capabilities
|
TR
|
0.0.2
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-7/33929-7-002.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for Location Services that include the illustrations covering the conceptual overview and the flow diagrams for location reporting, LALS and Location Acquisition.
|
33.929-8
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for MMS
|
TR
|
0.0.2
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-8/33929-8-002.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for MMS that include the illustrations covering the conceptual overview and the flow diagrams for MMS.
|
33.929-9
|
Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for PTC
|
TR
|
0.0.1
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-9/33929-9-001.zip
|
The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for PTC that include the illustrations covering the conceptual overview and the flow diagrams for MCPTT and PoC commonly referred to as Push to Talk over Cellular.
|
33.905
|
Recommendations for Trusted Open Platforms
|
TR
|
19.0.0
|
S3
|
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.905/33905-j00.zip
|
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