Farseen0/scar-weights
Feature Extraction • Updated • 1
query large_stringlengths 39 1.7k | ground_truth_code large_stringlengths 26 116k | severity large_stringclasses 3
values | vuln_type large_stringclasses 95
values | report_name large_stringclasses 16
values | audit_firm large_stringclasses 7
values | report_date large_stringclasses 10
values | source large_stringclasses 10
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
HIGH severity: 18_deploy_RollupRevenueVault.ts – Deployment Script Leaves Contract Uninitialized; fallback Does Not Enforce msg.value > 0. The deployment script for the RollupRevenueVault contract attempts to call a non-existent zero-parameter initialize() function, which causes the call to be routed to the fallback fu... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import { AccessControlUpgradeable } from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { L2MessageService } from "../messaging/l2/L2MessageS... | HIGH | CWE-691|CWE-705|CWE-584 | Linea - Burn Mechanism _ Consensys Diligence.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: RollupRevenueVault - Deployment and Initialization Flow. The RollupRevenueVault contract implements two initialization functions: an initial 'initialize' with the 'initializer' modifier and a 'reinitializer(2)' function intended for upgrades. However, the use of a reinitializer that becomes immediately... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import { AccessControlUpgradeable } from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { L2MessageService } from "../messaging/l2/L2MessageS... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-362 | Linea - Burn Mechanism _ Consensys Diligence.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Potential for Arbitrary Application in Message Verification. This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the application identifier during message verification. The issue arises because the broadcast message does not include the application address in its hash, despite the `source` field in the p... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
import { IAttester } from "../../../interfaces/IAttester.sol";
import { LibAddress } from "../../../libs/LibAddress.sol";
import { MessageEncodingLib } from "../../../libs/MessageEncodingLib.sol";
import { BaseInputOracle } from "../../../oracles/BaseInputOracle... | HIGH | CWE-693|CWE-345|CWE-346 | OIF Broadcaster Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Prover Copies Cannot Be Updated. The `updateBlockHashProverCopy` function in the `Receiver` contract fails to update prover copies due to a revert when attempting to read the version from the zero address. This occurs because the `_blockHashProverCopies` mapping is initialized to address(0), and the func... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.27;
import {IReceiver} from "./interfaces/IReceiver.sol";
import {IBlockHashProver} from "./interfaces/IBlockHashProver.sol";
import {IBlockHashProverPointer} from "./interfaces/IBlockHashProverPointer.sol";
import {BLOCK_HASH_PROVER_POINTER_SLOT} from "./BlockHashP... | HIGH | CWE-703|CWE-755|CWE-248 | OIF Broadcaster Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Custom Fees Settable up to 100% in fulfillFastRedeems Can Seize Redemptions. The fulfillFastRedeems function allows a caller with the FULFILL_MANAGER_ROLE to specify a customFees array. While the code checks that the fee does not exceed 100% (feeBps <= BASIS_POINTS), it lacks a stricter, more reasonabl... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import {SafeERC20} from "@openzeppelin/c... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1284 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Unsafe Type Conversion for Refund Recipient Can Lead to Funds Lost to 0xdead Address. In the lzCompose function's catch block, the logic to determine the refund recipient contains an unsafe type conversion. The code extracts a bytes32 value (extractedRecipient) and checks if it is non-zero before conve... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {SafeERC20, IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol";
i... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-179 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Critical Oracle Parameters Lack Timelock Protection. The setPriceId and setPriceIds functions in PythPriceOracle.sol, which configure Pyth price feed IDs and decimals, are only protected by PRICE_MANAGER_ROLE and lack timelock protection. A compromised or malicious price manager could instantly change ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {IPriceOracle} from "./interfaces/IPriceOracle.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@open... | MEDIUM | CWE-693 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Oracle Manipulation Enables Attackers Unfair Share Minting and Inflated Redemptions. The protocol uses spot prices from PythPriceOracle for asset valuation, making it vulnerable to price manipulation via flash loans or other means. Attackers can exploit this during deposits (to mint excessive shares) o... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {IPriceOracle} from "./interfaces/IPriceOracle.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@open... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Timelock Admin Can Instantly Change Delays, Bypassing Governance Safeguards. The VaultTimelockController's setFunctionDelay and setDefaultFunctionDelay functions are protected only by DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE without any timelock, allowing immediate changes to delay periods. This undermines the entire purpos... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {TimelockControllerUpgradeable} from
"@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/governance/TimelockControllerUpgradeable.sol";
/**
* @title VaultTimelockController
* @notice Enhanced timelock controlle... | MEDIUM | CWE-693 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Privileged Role Can Arbitrarily Set NAV and Drain Instant Redeemable Funds Due to Circumventable & Missing Safeguards. The NAVOracle contract allows the VALUATION_MANAGER_ROLE to call setTotalAssets and directly overwrite the Net Asset Value (NAV). While a maxPercentageIncrease check exists, it can be ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {Math} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from ... | MEDIUM | CWE-693 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Incorrect Performance Fee Calculation. 1. **Description:** The collectPerformanceFee function in the FeeManager contract fails to differentiate between actual yield generated by the vault's investment strategies and new capital deposited by users. This leads to inaccurate performance fee calculations.
... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ReentrancyG... | MEDIUM | CWE-682 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: High-Water Mark Logic Penalizes Performance Fee Collection. The collectPerformanceFee function in FeeManager updates the lastSupplyForPerformance state variable before minting fee shares. This causes the high-water mark to be set pre-dilution, so the next fee calculation interprets the dilution as a pe... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ReentrancyG... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-670 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
End of preview. Expand in Data Studio
SCAR Evaluation Set
838 held-out contrastive pairs for evaluating smart contract vulnerability retrieval models. Constructed as a 10% stratified holdout from training sources plus the 91 original FORGE-Curated pairs (temporal holdout).
Known issue (September 2026) — this split is contaminated
This set overlaps scar-pairs: 800 of the 838 (query, positive) pairs appear verbatim in the training set, and all 838 evaluation positives appear as training positives. The report-level split and the hash check described below did not catch this. Any number reported against this set by a model trained on scar-pairs or scar-pairs-extended — including the headline table below — measures memorisation, not retrieval.
A rebuilt, disjoint training pool (scar-pairs-clean, 6,202 pairs, document-level removal of every evaluation target and hard negative) and a held-out, time-split test set are released with the corrected preprint in October 2026. Until then, use this set only as a development set for models trained on the clean pool.
The split is performed at the report level — not the finding level — to prevent information leakage. Hash-based verification (SHA-256 on normalized source) confirms zero code overlap with scar-pairs.
Source Breakdown
| Source | Pairs |
|---|---|
| Solodit | 228 |
| msc-audits-with-reasons | 178 |
| msc-smart-contract-auditing | 131 |
| FORGE-Curated (original) | 91 |
| DeFiHackLabs | 67 |
| FORGE-Artifacts | 59 |
| FORGE-Curated-v2 | 36 |
| EVuLLM | 32 |
| SmartBugs-Curated | 14 |
| GitmateAI | 2 |
| Total | 838 |
Headline Results on this Eval Set
| Method | R@1 | R@10 | nDCG@10 | MRR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BM25 | 0.504 | 0.689 | 0.591 | 0.566 |
| E5-base-v2 | 0.456 | 0.656 | 0.554 | 0.530 |
| SPLADE (Qwen) | 0.809 | 0.963 | 0.892 | 0.869 |
| SCAR (25 epochs) | 0.894 | 0.977 | 0.939 | 0.927 |
| SCAR + BM25 hybrid | 0.825 | 0.983 | 0.908 | 0.884 |
Improvement over BM25 statistically significant at p < 0.0001 (paired bootstrap, n = 10,000).
Usage
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("Farseen0/scar-eval", split="train")
Related
- 🗂️ All SCAR artifacts (Collection)
scar-pairs— 7,552 training pairsscar-corpus— 231k contract corpusscar-weights— trained model weights
Paper
This dataset accompanies SCAR: Sparse Code Audit Retriever via SAE-LoRA Adaptation (Farseen Shaikh, 2026).
- Paper: arXiv preprint, corrected version October 2026 (see Known issue)
- Code: github.com/FarseenSh/scar-retrieval
- Model: Farseen0/scar-weights
Citation
@misc{shaikh2026scar,
title = {SCAR: Sparse Code Audit Retriever via SAE-LoRA Adaptation},
author = {Shaikh, Farseen},
year = {2026},
note = {Preprint; corrected version October 2026},
url = {https://github.com/FarseenSh/scar-retrieval}
}
License
Apache 2.0 — free for research and commercial use with attribution.
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