text stringlengths 0 1.99k |
|---|
a driver. For instance below, we check if we properly enumerated the |
service H11ANEIn that, we found handle type 1 User Client, and for selector |
0 it expects 96 for the inputStructCnt and outputStructCnt. As seen below, |
we can only "talk" to it when all of these values match. First invalid ones: |
```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` |
❯ ./IOVerify -n "H11ANEIn" -t 1 -y "0: [0,1,0,1]" |
Starting verification for driver: H11ANEIn |
--- [VERIFY] Event Log --- |
Driver: H11ANEIn |
Connection Type: 1 |
Method Selector: 0 |
Result: 0xe00002c2 ((iokit/common) invalid argument) |
--- Scalar I/O --- |
Scalar In Cnt: 0 |
Scalar Out Cnt: 0 |
--- Structure I/O --- |
Input Size: 1 bytes |
Input Data: |
00 |
Output Size: 1 bytes |
Output Data: |
00 |
--- End of Log --- |
```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` |
Now with valid sizes ovserve `0x0 ((os/kern) successful)`: |
```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` |
❯ ./IOVerify -n "H11ANEIn" -t 1 -y "0: [0,96,0,96]" |
Starting verification for driver: H11ANEIn |
--- [VERIFY] Event Log --- |
Driver: H11ANEIn |
Connection Type: 1 |
Method Selector: 0 |
Result: 0x0 ((os/kern) successful) |
--- Scalar I/O --- |
Scalar In Cnt: 0 |
Scalar Out Cnt: 0 |
--- Structure I/O --- |
Input Size: 96 bytes |
Input Data: |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
Output Size: 96 bytes |
Output Data: |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
--- End of Log --- |
```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` |
The tool can be used for testing corpus with the -f corpus.bin flag, and |
with a slight adjustment, it can serve as a fuzzer interface. |
========== |
--[ 3 - Conclusion |
============================================================================ |
In conclusion, the methodology presented in this paper for mapping |
IOKit external methods, which combines static analysis with runtime |
enumeration, offers an exhaustive approach to identifying the attack |
surface in macOS drivers. This process enables the precise enumeration of |
all available endpoints, establishing a solid foundation for effective |
fuzzing and vulnerability research. The application of the described tools |
and techniques—such as KEXT file analysis, user-space and kernel-space call |
tracing, and runtime hooking—increases not only the accuracy of the |
analysis but also significantly streamlines the process of discovering |
potential vulnerabilities. Future work could focus on fully automating this |
process with AI and adapting the methodology to new inter-kernel |
communication mechanisms introduced by Apple. |
================ |
--[ 4 - Acknowledgements |
============================================================================ |
Thank you to AFINE for supporting this research and enabling me to |
dedicate time to it. Your support significantly accelerated my progress! |
I also appreciate the macOS security research community for the inspiring |
exchange of ideas. You all are amazing! |
========== |
--[ 5 - References |
============================================================================ |
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