text
stringlengths
0
1.99k
a driver. For instance below, we check if we properly enumerated the
service H11ANEIn that, we found handle type 1 User Client, and for selector
0 it expects 96 for the inputStructCnt and outputStructCnt. As seen below,
we can only "talk" to it when all of these values match. First invalid ones:
````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
❯ ./IOVerify -n "H11ANEIn" -t 1 -y "0: [0,1,0,1]"
Starting verification for driver: H11ANEIn
--- [VERIFY] Event Log ---
Driver: H11ANEIn
Connection Type: 1
Method Selector: 0
Result: 0xe00002c2 ((iokit/common) invalid argument)
--- Scalar I/O ---
Scalar In Cnt: 0
Scalar Out Cnt: 0
--- Structure I/O ---
Input Size: 1 bytes
Input Data:
00
Output Size: 1 bytes
Output Data:
00
--- End of Log ---
````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
Now with valid sizes ovserve `0x0 ((os/kern) successful)`:
````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
❯ ./IOVerify -n "H11ANEIn" -t 1 -y "0: [0,96,0,96]"
Starting verification for driver: H11ANEIn
--- [VERIFY] Event Log ---
Driver: H11ANEIn
Connection Type: 1
Method Selector: 0
Result: 0x0 ((os/kern) successful)
--- Scalar I/O ---
Scalar In Cnt: 0
Scalar Out Cnt: 0
--- Structure I/O ---
Input Size: 96 bytes
Input Data:
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Output Size: 96 bytes
Output Data:
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
--- End of Log ---
````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
The tool can be used for testing corpus with the -f corpus.bin flag, and
with a slight adjustment, it can serve as a fuzzer interface.
==========
--[ 3 - Conclusion
============================================================================
In conclusion, the methodology presented in this paper for mapping
IOKit external methods, which combines static analysis with runtime
enumeration, offers an exhaustive approach to identifying the attack
surface in macOS drivers. This process enables the precise enumeration of
all available endpoints, establishing a solid foundation for effective
fuzzing and vulnerability research. The application of the described tools
and techniques—such as KEXT file analysis, user-space and kernel-space call
tracing, and runtime hooking—increases not only the accuracy of the
analysis but also significantly streamlines the process of discovering
potential vulnerabilities. Future work could focus on fully automating this
process with AI and adapting the methodology to new inter-kernel
communication mechanisms introduced by Apple.
================
--[ 4 - Acknowledgements
============================================================================
Thank you to AFINE for supporting this research and enabling me to
dedicate time to it. Your support significantly accelerated my progress!
I also appreciate the macOS security research community for the inspiring
exchange of ideas. You all are amazing!
==========
--[ 5 - References
============================================================================