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So, in this section, let me introduce two classic examples that you |
shouldn't miss when talking about PHP 0days born in CTFs! |
------[ 5.1 - Hack the Scoreboard! |
Whenever I talk to people outside the Infosec community about hacking |
competitions, they often jokingly say, "Come on, real hackers wouldn't |
follow the rules - they'd just hack and change their scores, right?" Well, |
to be fair, they're actually right! There's indeed plenty of history where |
scoreboards got hacked (and to be honest, I've contributed a few myself). |
But if we're talking about the most legendary case, I'd say it's |
definitely the PHP-CGI 0day discovered by Eindbazen team - right there on |
a CTF scoreboard [82]! |
During Nullcon HackIM CTF, the organizers directly used a CGI environment |
provided by their cloud provider. Since the CGI-spec itself is inherently |
vulnerable to argument injection by design, it became even more |
unfortunate (or fortunate - choose your side) when PHP developers forgot |
about this and completely removed the defensive logic. These coincidences |
combined ultimately allowed Eindbazen team to control PHP's command-line |
arguments directly through the query string. For example, they can simply |
append a `?-s` at the end of the URL to leak any PHP source code on the |
remote server - and escalating it further into full RCE is just as |
trivial! |
This vulnerability impacted a huge number of websites back then - |
especially those web hosting providers heavily relying on CGI for |
privilege isolation and PHP version switching. And because this |
vulnerability was so ridiculously easy to exploit, it quickly became |
notorious worldwide. Even Facebook - famous for its PHP-based |
infrastructure at the time - put an Easter egg right on its homepage |
(linking the URL to their security engineer recruitment page) to |
acknowledge this vulnerability, too! |
----------------------[ Easter Egg on facebook.com! ]---------------------- |
$ curl https://www.facebook.com/?-s |
<?php |
include_once 'https://www.facebook.com/careers/ |
department?dept=engineering&req=a2KA0000000Lt8LMAS'; |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
This vulnerability was eventually patched and assigned CVE-2012-1823. The |
PHP team solved this issue by checking that the query string can't start |
with a hyphen `-` (0x2D). This fix kept PHP safe for about 12 years - |
until I broke it again last year. |
=> The patch of CVE-2012-1823: PHP-CGI Argument Injection |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
if((qs = getenv("QUERY_STRING")) != NULL && strchr(qs, '=') == NULL) { |
/* ... omitted ... */ |
for (p = decoded_qs; *p && *p <= ' '; p++) {/* skip leading spaces */} |
if (*p == '-') { |
skip_getopt = 1; |
} |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
While revisiting PHP's source code, I found that by leveraging the Windows |
"BestFit" feature, I could completely bypass this fix. "BestFit" is |
basically a backward-compatibility feature introduced by Windows. It tries |
to minimize garbled characters through a series of weird character |
mappings when dealing with older ANSI APIs (thanks a lot, Microsoft). This |
mechanism also came with some strange side effects - for example, you can |
use the infinity symbol `∞` (U+221E) to represent the digit `8` (U+0038) |
right on the command line: |
=> Microsoft maps the characters to their "lookalikes" |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
C:\Users\Orange> type Hello.c |
int main(int argc, char* argv[], char* envp[]) { |
printf("Hello %s!\n", argv[1]); |
} |
C:\Users\Orange> cl.exe Hello.c |
Microsoft (R) C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 19.29.30140 for x64 |
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. |
[...] |
C:\Users\Orange> Hello.exe World |
Hello World! |
C:\Users\Orange> Hello.exe √π⁷≤∞ |
Hello vp7=8! |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
So, by simply replacing the originally blocked hyphen (0x2D) with a "soft |
hyphen" (0xAD), the original attack could be revived effortlessly! This |
bypass affects practically every PHP version running on Windows - even a |
default XAMPP installation was vulnerable. This vulnerability has also |
earned its CVE number (CVE-2024-4577). If you're curious about the |
technical details behind it, you should definitely check out WorstFit |
Attack [46] - a joint work with the brilliant @splitline! |
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