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My XDP scanner completed the same task in 68.3 seconds. In this scenario, |
where the bottleneck is spread across millions of IPs, masscan's years of |
optimization give it a clear edge. |
However, the high-density scan against a single host tells a different |
story. Here, masscan's active scanning time was ~2 seconds (12 seconds of |
total time minus the 10-second delay). |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
real 0m12.163s |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
My AF_XDP scanner finished in just ~1.3 seconds. ~ The victory for the |
AF_XDP scanner here was not just in speed, but also in accuracy. My scanner |
consistently identified all four open ports on the target in every run: |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
OPEN: 45.33.32.156:22 |
OPEN: 45.33.32.156:9929 |
OPEN: 45.33.32.156:80 |
OPEN: 45.33.32.156:31337 |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
In contrast, masscan's high rate caused it to miss ports, finding a |
different number of open ports on different runs: |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
1st scan: 0.00-kpps, 100.00% done, waiting 0-secs, found=3 |
2nd scan: 0.00-kpps, 100.00% done, waiting 0-secs, found=2 |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
This outcome directly validates the AF_XDP architecture. The performance |
gains are a result of several combined optimizations. The kernel-level eBPF |
filter drops unwanted traffic at the earliest possible point. The zero-copy |
UMEM and batched ring operations nearly eliminate syscall overhead. This is |
why the PoC excels in the high-density test: the per-packet overhead is so |
low that it can saturate a single target more effectively and reliably than |
a tool tuned for internet-wide distribution. |
While the XDP scanner is just a proof-of-concept, it shows that with |
further development, this architecture holds potential. |
--[ 5 - Extending the AF_XDP Framework |
---[ 5.0 - High-Speed HTTP/HTTPS Application Fuzzing and L7 DDoS |
The architecture developed for this scanner serves as a foundation for |
other high-performance network applications, particularly for security |
research and testing. The framework can be extended to handle stateful |
protocols by implementing a TCP stack in userspace. This involves managing |
sequence numbers, ACKs, windowing, and state transitions. This userspace |
TCP stack then serves as a transport layer for higher-level protocols. |
To interact with HTTPS services, a TLS library (e.g., OpenSSL) can be |
integrated by redirecting its I/O from kernel sockets to the userspace TCP |
stack. In OpenSSL, this can be done using a custom BIO (Basic I/O |
abstraction). The BIO_read and BIO_write callbacks would then interface |
with the userspace TCP stack's send/receive buffers, not with read() or |
write() syscalls. |
With such a setup, you could use AF_XDP to create a high-speed |
application-layer fuzzer. For content discovery, one could pipeline a |
massive number of fuzzed HTTP requests over multiple, persistent HTTPS |
connections, achieving a request-per-second rate far higher than |
conventional tools like ffuf or gobuster. This same capability can be used |
for Layer 7 DDoS attacks, exhausting resources by flooding it with the |
highest RPS you can achieve. |
---[ 5.1 - Stateless UDP Fuzzing and DDoS Amplification |
UDP protocols are an even simpler target due to their stateless nature. |
For these, the packet crafting engine can be adapted to fuzz any UDP |
service or execute DDoS reflection/amplification attacks by spoofing the |
source IP and generating requests at a massive rate. There's no complex |
state to maintain, just packet generation. |
This lays the foundation that creating AF_XDP programs to interact with |
UDP protocols is architecturally easier to implement. Several tools already |
use this concept to bruteforce DNS records in a faster way for example (e.g |
sanicdns, pugdns). |
--[ 6 - Caveats and Considerations |
This approach has several requirements and trade-offs. Root privileges are |
mandatory to load eBPF programs and create AF_XDP sockets so you wouldn't |
be able to use it on a unprivileged session. The implementation complexity |
is high, as your application is now responsible for everything from ARP |
resolution to MAC address management. Performance is also heavily reliant |
on having a modern kernel and a NIC driver that supports native AF_XDP and |
since that's a relatively recent feature on the kernel, you won't be able |
to run it on any system. |
--[ 7 - Conclusion |
By combining the filtering capabilities of eBPF at the XDP hook with the |
zero-copy architecture of AF_XDP, it is possible to build network |
applications that far exceed the performance of traditional socket-based |
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