repo_name string | dataset string | owner string | lang string | func_name string | code string | docstring string | url string | sha string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | pack_sign_cp | int pack_sign_cp(DSA_SIG *s,int order,unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen)
{
*siglen = 2*order;
memset(sig,0,*siglen);
store_bignum(s->s, sig, order);
store_bignum(s->r, sig+order,order);
dump_signature("serialized",sig,*siglen);
DSA_SIG_free(s);
return 1;
} | /*
* Packs signature according to Cryptocom rules
* and frees up DSA_SIG structure
*/
/*
int pack_sign_cc(DSA_SIG *s,int order,unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen)
{
*siglen = 2*order;
memset(sig,0,*siglen);
store_bignum(s->r, sig,order);
store_bignum(s->s, sig + order,order);
dump_signature("serialized",sig,*siglen);
DSA_SIG_free(s);
return 1;
}
*/
/*
* Packs signature according to Cryptopro rules
* and frees up DSA_SIG structure
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c#L119-L128 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | gost_do_verify | int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
{
BIGNUM *md, *tmp=NULL;
BIGNUM *q2=NULL;
BIGNUM *u=NULL,*v=NULL,*z1=NULL,*z2=NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp2=NULL,*tmp3=NULL;
int ok;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (BN_cmp(sig->s,dsa->q)>=1||
BN_cmp(sig->r,dsa->q)>=1)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY,GOST_R_SIGNATURE_PARTS_GREATER_THAN_Q);
return 0;
}
md=hashsum2bn(dgst);
tmp=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
v=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
q2=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
z1=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
z2=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp2=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp3=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
BN_mod(tmp,md,dsa->q,ctx);
if (BN_is_zero(tmp))
{
BN_one(md);
}
BN_copy(q2,dsa->q);
BN_sub_word(q2,2);
BN_mod_exp(v,md,q2,dsa->q,ctx);
BN_mod_mul(z1,sig->s,v,dsa->q,ctx);
BN_sub(tmp,dsa->q,sig->r);
BN_mod_mul(z2,tmp,v,dsa->p,ctx);
BN_mod_exp(tmp,dsa->g,z1,dsa->p,ctx);
BN_mod_exp(tmp2,dsa->pub_key,z2,dsa->p,ctx);
BN_mod_mul(tmp3,tmp,tmp2,dsa->p,ctx);
BN_mod(u,tmp3,dsa->q,ctx);
ok= BN_cmp(u,sig->r);
BN_free(md);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (ok!=0)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY,GOST_R_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH);
}
return (ok==0);
} | /*
* Verifies signature passed as DSA_SIG structure
*
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c#L135-L188 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | gost94_compute_public | int gost94_compute_public(DSA *dsa)
{
/* Now fill algorithm parameters with correct values */
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (!dsa->g)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST94_COMPUTE_PUBLIC,GOST_R_KEY_IS_NOT_INITALIZED);
return 0;
}
/* Compute public key y = a^x mod p */
dsa->pub_key=BN_new();
BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g,dsa->priv_key,dsa->p,ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
} | /*
* Computes public keys for GOST R 34.10-94 algorithm
*
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c#L194-L208 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | fill_GOST94_params | int fill_GOST94_params(DSA *dsa,int nid)
{
R3410_params *params=R3410_paramset;
while (params->nid!=NID_undef && params->nid !=nid) params++;
if (params->nid == NID_undef)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST94_PARAMS,GOST_R_UNSUPPORTED_PARAMETER_SET);
return 0;
}
#define dump_signature(a,b,c)
if (dsa->p) { BN_free(dsa->p); }
dsa->p=NULL;
BN_dec2bn(&(dsa->p),params->p);
if (dsa->q) { BN_free(dsa->q); }
dsa->q=NULL;
BN_dec2bn(&(dsa->q),params->q);
if (dsa->g) { BN_free(dsa->g); }
dsa->g=NULL;
BN_dec2bn(&(dsa->g),params->a);
return 1;
} | /*
* Fill GOST 94 params, searching them in R3410_paramset array
* by nid of paramset
*
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c#L215-L235 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | gost_sign_keygen | int gost_sign_keygen(DSA *dsa)
{
dsa->priv_key = BN_new();
BN_rand_range(dsa->priv_key,dsa->q);
return gost94_compute_public( dsa);
} | /*
* Generate GOST R 34.10-94 keypair
*
*
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c#L242-L247 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | store_bignum | int store_bignum(BIGNUM *bn, unsigned char *buf,int len)
{
int bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
if (bytes>len) return 0;
memset(buf,0,len);
BN_bn2bin(bn,buf+len-bytes);
return 1;
} | /* Pack bignum into byte buffer of given size, filling all leading bytes
* by zeros */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c#L314-L321 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | swap_bytes | static void swap_bytes (byte *w, byte *k)
{
int i,j;
for (i=0;i<4;i++)
for (j=0;j<8;j++)
k[i+4*j]=w[8*i+j];
} | /* Following functions are various bit meshing routines used in
* GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L30-L37 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | circle_xor8 | static void circle_xor8 (const byte *w, byte *k)
{
byte buf[8];
int i;
memcpy(buf,w,8);
memcpy(k,w+8,24);
for(i=0;i<8;i++)
k[i+24]=buf[i]^k[i];
} | /* was A_A */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L40-L48 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | transform_3 | static void transform_3 (byte *data)
{
unsigned short int acc;
acc=(data[0]^data[2]^data[4]^data[6]^data[24]^data[30])|
((data[1]^data[3]^data[5]^data[7]^data[25]^data[31])<<8);
memmove(data,data+2,30);
data[30]=acc&0xff;
data[31]=acc>>8;
} | /* was R_R */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L51-L59 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | add_blocks | static int add_blocks(int n,byte *left, const byte *right)
{
int i;
int carry=0;
int sum;
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{
sum=(int)left[i]+(int)right[i]+carry;
left[i]=sum & 0xff;
carry=sum>>8;
}
return carry;
} | /* Adds blocks of N bytes modulo 2**(8*n). Returns carry*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L62-L74 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | xor_blocks | static void xor_blocks (byte *result,const byte *a,const byte *b,size_t len)
{
size_t i;
for (i=0;i<len;i++) result[i]=a[i]^b[i];
} | /* Xor two sequences of bytes */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L77-L81 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | hash_step | static int hash_step(gost_ctx *c,byte *H,const byte *M)
{
byte U[32],W[32],V[32],S[32],Key[32];
int i;
/* Compute first key */
xor_blocks(W,H,M,32);
swap_bytes(W,Key);
/* Encrypt first 8 bytes of H with first key*/
gost_enc_with_key(c,Key,H,S);
/* Compute second key*/
circle_xor8(H,U);
circle_xor8(M,V);
circle_xor8(V,V);
xor_blocks(W,U,V,32);
swap_bytes(W,Key);
/* encrypt second 8 bytes of H with second key*/
gost_enc_with_key(c,Key,H+8,S+8);
/* compute third key */
circle_xor8(U,U);
U[31]=~U[31]; U[29]=~U[29]; U[28]=~U[28]; U[24]=~U[24];
U[23]=~U[23]; U[20]=~U[20]; U[18]=~U[18]; U[17]=~U[17];
U[14]=~U[14]; U[12]=~U[12]; U[10]=~U[10]; U[ 8]=~U[ 8];
U[ 7]=~U[ 7]; U[ 5]=~U[ 5]; U[ 3]=~U[ 3]; U[ 1]=~U[ 1];
circle_xor8(V,V);
circle_xor8(V,V);
xor_blocks(W,U,V,32);
swap_bytes(W,Key);
/* encrypt third 8 bytes of H with third key*/
gost_enc_with_key(c,Key,H+16,S+16);
/* Compute fourth key */
circle_xor8(U,U);
circle_xor8(V,V);
circle_xor8(V,V);
xor_blocks(W,U,V,32);
swap_bytes(W,Key);
/* Encrypt last 8 bytes with fourth key */
gost_enc_with_key(c,Key,H+24,S+24);
for (i=0;i<12;i++)
transform_3(S);
xor_blocks(S,S,M,32);
transform_3(S);
xor_blocks(S,S,H,32);
for (i=0;i<61;i++)
transform_3(S);
memcpy(H,S,32);
return 1;
} | /*
* Calculate H(i+1) = Hash(Hi,Mi)
* Where H and M are 32 bytes long
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L87-L133 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | init_gost_hash_ctx | int init_gost_hash_ctx(gost_hash_ctx *ctx, const gost_subst_block *subst_block)
{
memset(ctx,0,sizeof(gost_hash_ctx));
ctx->cipher_ctx = (gost_ctx *)MYALLOC(sizeof(gost_ctx));
if (!ctx->cipher_ctx)
{
return 0;
}
gost_init(ctx->cipher_ctx,subst_block);
return 1;
} | /* Initialize gost_hash ctx - cleans up temporary structures and
* set up substitution blocks
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L138-L148 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | done_gost_hash_ctx | void done_gost_hash_ctx(gost_hash_ctx *ctx)
{
/* No need to use gost_destroy, because cipher keys are not really
* secret when hashing */
MYFREE(ctx->cipher_ctx);
} | /*
* Free cipher CTX if it is dynamically allocated. Do not use
* if cipher ctx is statically allocated as in OpenSSL implementation of
* GOST hash algroritm
*
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L156-L161 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | start_hash | int start_hash(gost_hash_ctx *ctx)
{
if (!ctx->cipher_ctx) return 0;
memset(&(ctx->H),0,32);
memset(&(ctx->S),0,32);
ctx->len = 0L;
ctx->left=0;
return 1;
} | /*
* reset state of hash context to begin hashing new message
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L166-L174 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | hash_block | int hash_block(gost_hash_ctx *ctx,const byte *block, size_t length)
{
const byte *curptr=block;
const byte *barrier=block+(length-32);/* Last byte we can safely hash*/
if (ctx->left)
{
/*There are some bytes from previous step*/
unsigned int add_bytes = 32-ctx->left;
if (add_bytes>length)
{
add_bytes = length;
}
memcpy(&(ctx->remainder[ctx->left]),block,add_bytes);
ctx->left+=add_bytes;
if (ctx->left<32)
{
return 1;
}
curptr=block+add_bytes;
hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,ctx->H,ctx->remainder);
add_blocks(32,ctx->S,ctx->remainder);
ctx->len+=32;
ctx->left=0;
}
while (curptr<=barrier)
{
hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,ctx->H,curptr);
add_blocks(32,ctx->S,curptr);
ctx->len+=32;
curptr+=32;
}
if (curptr!=block+length)
{
ctx->left=block+length-curptr;
memcpy(ctx->remainder,curptr,ctx->left);
}
return 1;
} | /*
* Hash block of arbitrary length
*
*
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L181-L219 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | finish_hash | int finish_hash(gost_hash_ctx *ctx,byte *hashval)
{
byte buf[32];
byte H[32];
byte S[32];
ghosthash_len fin_len=ctx->len;
byte *bptr;
memcpy(H,ctx->H,32);
memcpy(S,ctx->S,32);
if (ctx->left)
{
memset(buf,0,32);
memcpy(buf,ctx->remainder,ctx->left);
hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,H,buf);
add_blocks(32,S,buf);
fin_len+=ctx->left;
}
memset(buf,0,32);
bptr=buf;
fin_len<<=3; /* Hash length in BITS!!*/
while(fin_len>0)
{
*(bptr++)=(byte)(fin_len&0xFF);
fin_len>>=8;
};
hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,H,buf);
hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,H,S);
memcpy(hashval,H,32);
return 1;
} | /*
* Compute hash value from current state of ctx
* state of hash ctx becomes invalid and cannot be used for further
* hashing.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c#L226-L255 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_do_write | int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
{
int ret;
int curr_mtu;
unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
{
s->d1->mtu =
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
* (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
{
s->d1->mtu = 0;
s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
s->d1->mtu, NULL);
}
}
#if 0
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( curr_mtu > 0)
mtu = curr_mtu;
else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
return ret;
if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
{
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( ret <= 0)
return ret;
mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0); /* should have something reasonable now */
#endif
if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (s->write_hash)
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
else
mac_size = 0;
if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
else
blocksize = 0;
frag_off = 0;
while( s->init_num)
{
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( ret <= 0)
return ret;
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
mac_size - blocksize;
}
if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
/* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
{
if ( s->init_off != 0)
{
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */
if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
len);
if (ret < 0)
{
/* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
* which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
* really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
* is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
* retransmit
*/
if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
else
return(-1);
}
else
{
/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
* message got sent. but why would this happen? */
OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
{
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
int xlen;
if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
/* reconstruct message header is if it
* is being sent in single fragment */
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
l2n3(0,p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret;
}
else
{
p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
}
if (ret == s->init_num)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
s->init_num = 0;
return(1);
}
s->init_off+=ret;
s->init_num-=ret;
frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
}
return(0);
} | /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c#L224-L402 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_get_message | long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
{
int i, al;
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long msg_len;
/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
* by the absence of an optional handshake message */
if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
*ok=1;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
return s->init_num;
}
msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
again:
i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */
goto again;
else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
return i;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
/* reconstruct message header */
*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_len,p);
s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
l2n3(0,p);
l2n3(msg_len,p);
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
p, msg_len,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
/* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
* this means that we don't need to retransmit of the
* buffered messages.
* XDTLS: may be able clear out this
* buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order
* handshake message/record is received at the record
* layer.
* XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to
* know that change cipher spec and finished messages
* have been received by the client before clearing this
* buffer. this can simply be done by waiting for the
* first data segment, but is there a better way? */
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
return s->init_num;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
*ok = 0;
return -1;
} | /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
* maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
* Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in
* fragments.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c#L410-L489 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec | int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == a)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
s->init_num+=2;
}
s->init_off=0;
dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
s->state=b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
} | /* for these 2 messages, we need to
* ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
* ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
* ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
* ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
* ssl->session->read_compression assign
* ssl->session->read_hash assign
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c#L963-L993 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_clear_record_buffer | void
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
{
dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
} | /* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c#L1307-L1318 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_set_message_header_int | static void
dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
unsigned long frag_len)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
msg_hdr->type = mt;
msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
} | /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c#L1339-L1351 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | satsub64be | static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
{ int ret,sat,brw,i;
if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
{ const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
long l;
if (is_endian.little) break;
/* not reached on little-endians */
/* following test is redundant, because input is
* always aligned, but I take no chances... */
if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
l = *((long *)v1);
l -= *((long *)v2);
if (l>128) return 128;
else if (l<-128) return -128;
else return (int)l;
} while (0);
ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
sat = 0;
brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
if (ret & 0x80)
{ for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
{ brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
sat |= ~brw;
brw >>= 8;
}
}
else
{ for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
{ brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
sat |= brw;
brw >>= 8;
}
}
brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
} | /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c#L126-L167 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_copy_record | static int
dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
s->packet = rdata->packet;
s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
return(1);
} | /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c#L185-L204 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_get_record | int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. */
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
{
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
return(1);
} | /* Call this to get a new input record.
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
* ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
* ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
*/
/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c#L524-L683 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_read_bytes | int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
{
int al,i,j,ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
return(-1);
/* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
return ret;
/* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
{
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
/* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
/* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
* so process data buffered during the last handshake
* in advance, if any.
*/
if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
{
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
if (item)
{
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
/* Check for timeout */
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
goto start;
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
{
ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0)
{
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
if (ret <= 0)
return(ret);
else
goto start;
}
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
{
/* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
* Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
* buffer the application data for later processing rather
* than dropping the connection.
*/
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
* (even in 'peek' mode) */
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
{
rr->length=0;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(0);
}
if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
{
/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
* are doing a handshake for the first time */
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
goto f_err;
}
if (len <= 0) return(len);
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
n = rr->length;
else
n = (unsigned int)len;
memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
if (!peek)
{
rr->length-=n;
rr->off+=n;
if (rr->length == 0)
{
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
rr->off=0;
}
}
return(n);
}
/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
* message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
* fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
*/
{
unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
{
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
}
else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
{
dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
}
/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
{
/* Application data while renegotiating
* is allowed. Try again reading.
*/
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
{
BIO *bio;
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
/* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
if (dest_maxlen > 0)
{
/* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
* may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
{
#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
/*
* for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
* dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
* non-existing alert...
*/
FIX ME
#endif
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
{
dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
rr->length--;
}
*dest_len = dest_maxlen;
}
}
/* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&
(s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
{
s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
/* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate)
{
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
{
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
{
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
{
BIO *bio;
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
}
}
}
/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
* now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
goto start;
}
if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
{
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
{
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
{
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return(0);
}
#if 0
/* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
/* now check if it's a missing record */
if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
{
unsigned short seq;
unsigned int frag_off;
unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
n2s(p, seq);
n2l3(p, frag_off);
dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
frag_off, &found);
if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
{
/* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
/* requested a message not yet sent,
send an alert ourselves */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
}
}
#endif
}
else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
{
char tmp[16];
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
return(0);
}
else
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
goto start;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
{
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
rr->length=0;
return(0);
}
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
{
struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
ccs_hdr_len = 3;
/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
* exactly what the record payload has to look like */
/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
{
i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto err;
}
rr->length=0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
* messages are still missing, so just drop it.
*/
if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
{
goto start;
}
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
goto err;
/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
goto start;
}
/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
!s->in_handshake)
{
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
/* this may just be a stale retransmit */
dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
{
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
* client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
*/
if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
{
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
{
#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
* because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
* protocol violations): */
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#else
s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#endif
s->new_session=1;
}
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
{
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
{
BIO *bio;
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
}
goto start;
}
switch (rr->type)
{
default:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
{
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
#endif
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
* of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
* should not happen when type != rr->type */
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
* but have application data. If the library was
* running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
* is set) and it makes sense to read application data
* at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
* we will indulge it.
*/
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
((
(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
) || (
(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
)
))
{
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
return(-1);
}
else
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* not reached */
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
} | /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
* 'type' is one of the following:
*
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
*
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
*
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
* a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
* Change cipher spec protocol
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
* Alert protocol
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
* Handshake protocol
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c#L712-L1256 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | have_handshake_fragment | static int
have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
{
unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
unsigned char *dst = buf;
unsigned int k,n;
/* peek == 0 */
n = 0;
while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
{
*dst++ = *src++;
len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
n++;
}
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
return n;
}
return 0;
} | /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
* is started. */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c#L1287-L1314 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dtls1_write_bytes | int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
{
int i;
OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
return i;
} | /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
* It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c#L1322-L1330 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | load_krb5_dll | void
load_krb5_dll(void)
{
HANDLE hKRB5_32;
krb5_loaded++;
hKRB5_32 = LoadLibrary(TEXT("KRB5_32"));
if (!hKRB5_32)
return;
(FARPROC) p_krb5_free_data_contents =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_data_contents" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_free_context =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_context" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_free =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_free" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_free_principal =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_principal" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_mk_req_extended =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_mk_req_extended" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_get_credentials =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_get_credentials" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_cc_get_principal =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_cc_get_principal" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_cc_default =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_cc_default" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_sname_to_principal =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_sname_to_principal" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_init_context =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_init_context" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_free_ticket =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_ticket" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_rd_req =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rd_req" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_principal_compare =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_principal_compare" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_timeofday =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_timeofday" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_default =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_default" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_initialize =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_initialize" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_get_lifespan" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_destroy =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_destroy" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_default =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_default" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_resolve =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_resolve" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_init =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_init" );
(FARPROC) p_valid_cksumtype =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "valid_cksumtype" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_checksum_size =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_checksum_size" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_free_entry =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_free_entry" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_setrcache" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_get_server_rcache =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_get_server_rcache" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_getrcache" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_close =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_close" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_get_entry =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_get_entry" );
} | /* only attempt to initialize func ptrs once */
/* Function to Load the Kerberos 5 DLL and initialize function pointers */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L290-L360 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_krb5_free_data_contents | void
kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context CO, krb5_data * data)
{
if (!krb5_loaded)
load_krb5_dll();
if ( p_krb5_free_data_contents )
p_krb5_free_data_contents(CO,data);
} | /* Stubs for each function to be dynamicly loaded */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L363-L371 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal | krb5_error_code
kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal
(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache cache,
krb5_principal *principal)
{
if ( p_krb5_cc_get_principal )
return(p_krb5_cc_get_principal(context,cache,principal));
else
return(krb5_x
((cache)->ops->get_princ,(context, cache, principal)));
} | /* NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L720-L730 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_test_confound | static int kssl_test_confound(unsigned char *p)
{
int len = 2;
int xx = 0, yy = 0;
if (*p++ != 0x62) return 0;
if (*p > 0x82) return 0;
switch(*p) {
case 0x82: p++; xx = (*p++ << 8); xx += *p++; break;
case 0x81: p++; xx = *p++; break;
case 0x80: return 0;
default: xx = *p++; break;
}
if (*p++ != 0x30) return 0;
if (*p > 0x82) return 0;
switch(*p) {
case 0x82: p++; len+=2; yy = (*p++ << 8); yy += *p++; break;
case 0x81: p++; len++; yy = *p++; break;
case 0x80: return 0;
default: yy = *p++; break;
}
return (xx - len == yy)? 1: 0;
} | /* Return true:1 if p "looks like" the start of the real authenticator
** described in kssl_skip_confound() below. The ASN.1 pattern is
** "62 xx 30 yy" (APPLICATION-2, SEQUENCE), where xx-yy =~ 2, and
** xx and yy are possibly multi-byte length fields.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L843-L866 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_err_set | void
kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text)
{
if (kssl_err == NULL) return;
kssl_err->reason = reason;
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, "%s", text);
return;
} | /* Set kssl_err error info when reason text is a simple string
** kssl_err = struct { int reason; char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX+1]; }
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L939-L947 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | print_krb5_data | void
print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata)
{
int i;
printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
for (i=0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++)
{
if (0 && isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
printf( "%c ", kdata->data[i]);
else
printf( "%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
}
printf("\n");
} | /* Display contents of krb5_data struct, for debugging
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L952-L966 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | print_krb5_authdata | void
print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata)
{
if (adata == NULL)
{
printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label);
return;
}
printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
#if 0
{
int i;
printf("%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
for (i=0; i < adata->length; i++)
{
printf((isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
adata->contents[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
#endif
} | /* Display contents of krb5_authdata struct, for debugging
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L971-L992 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | print_krb5_keyblock | void
print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
{
int i;
if (keyblk == NULL)
{
printf("%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
return;
}
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
keyblk->keyvalue->length);
for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
{
printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
}
printf("\n");
#else
printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++)
{
printf("%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
}
printf("\n");
#endif
} | /* Display contents of krb5_keyblock struct, for debugging
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L997-L1023 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | print_krb5_princ | static void
print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
{
int i, ui, uj;
printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
if (princ == NULL) return;
for (ui=0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++) putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
for (i=0; i < (int)princ->length; i++)
{
printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
for (uj=0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++) {
putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]);
}
printf("\n");
}
return;
} | /* Display contents of krb5_principal_data struct, for debugging
** (krb5_principal is typedef'd == krb5_principal_data *)
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1029-L1047 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_cget_tkt | krb5_error_code
kssl_cget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
/* OUT */ krb5_data **enc_ticketp,
/* UPDATE */ krb5_data *authenp,
/* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL;
krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
krb5_data krb5_app_req;
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
if (!kssl_ctx)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
goto err;
}
else if (!kssl_ctx->service_host)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"kssl_ctx service_host undefined.\n");
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0)
{
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text,KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"krb5_init_context() fails: %d\n", krb5rc);
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context,
kssl_ctx->service_host,
(kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0)
{
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text,KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"krb5_sname_to_principal() fails for %s/%s\n",
kssl_ctx->service_host,
(kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name:
KRB5SVC);
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC,
"krb5_cc_default fails.\n");
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef,
&krb5creds.client)) != 0)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC,
"krb5_cc_get_principal() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef,
&krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED,
"krb5_get_credentials() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
*enc_ticketp = &krb5credsp->ticket;
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->session.keytype;
#else
kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->keyblock.enctype;
#endif
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
/* caller should free data of krb5_app_req */
/* 20010406 VRS deleted for real KerberosWrapper
** 20010605 VRS reinstated to offer Authenticator to KerberosWrapper
*/
krb5_app_req.length = 0;
if (authenp)
{
krb5_data krb5in_data;
const unsigned char *p;
long arlen;
KRB5_APREQBODY *ap_req;
authenp->length = 0;
krb5in_data.data = NULL;
krb5in_data.length = 0;
if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context,
&krb5auth_context, 0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp,
&krb5_app_req)) != 0)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ,
"krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
arlen = krb5_app_req.length;
p = (unsigned char *)krb5_app_req.data;
ap_req = (KRB5_APREQBODY *) d2i_KRB5_APREQ(NULL, &p, arlen);
if (ap_req)
{
authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
ap_req->authenticator, NULL);
if (authenp->length &&
(authenp->data = malloc(authenp->length)))
{
unsigned char *adp = (unsigned char *)authenp->data;
authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
ap_req->authenticator, &adp);
}
}
if (ap_req) KRB5_APREQ_free((KRB5_APREQ *) ap_req);
if (krb5_app_req.length)
kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5context,&krb5_app_req);
}
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
"kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
}
#else
if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
"kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
}
#endif
else krb5rc = 0;
err:
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (krb5creds.client) krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
krb5creds.client);
if (krb5creds.server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
krb5creds.server);
if (krb5auth_context) krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context,
krb5auth_context);
if (krb5context) krb5_free_context(krb5context);
return (krb5rc);
} | /* Given krb5 service (typically "kssl") and hostname in kssl_ctx,
** Return encrypted Kerberos ticket for service @ hostname.
** If authenp is non-NULL, also return encrypted authenticator,
** whose data should be freed by caller.
** (Originally was: Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.)
**
** 19990628 VRS Started; Returns Kerberos AP_REQ message.
** 20010409 VRS Modified for RFC2712; Returns enc tkt.
** 20010606 VRS May also return optional authenticator.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1060-L1214 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_TKT2tkt | static krb5_error_code
kssl_TKT2tkt( /* IN */ krb5_context krb5context,
/* IN */ KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket,
/* OUT */ krb5_ticket **krb5ticket,
/* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krb5_ticket *new5ticket = NULL;
ASN1_GENERALSTRING *gstr_svc, *gstr_host;
*krb5ticket = NULL;
if (asn1ticket == NULL || asn1ticket->realm == NULL ||
asn1ticket->sname == NULL ||
sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_num(asn1ticket->sname->namestring) < 2)
{
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"Null field in asn1ticket.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
if ((new5ticket = (krb5_ticket *) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_ticket)))==NULL)
{
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"Unable to allocate new krb5_ticket.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
return ENOMEM; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
}
gstr_svc = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 0);
gstr_host = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 1);
if ((krb5rc = kssl_build_principal_2(krb5context,
&new5ticket->server,
asn1ticket->realm->length, (char *)asn1ticket->realm->data,
gstr_svc->length, (char *)gstr_svc->data,
gstr_host->length, (char *)gstr_host->data)) != 0)
{
free(new5ticket);
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"Error building ticket server principal.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
return krb5rc; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
}
krb5_princ_type(krb5context, new5ticket->server) =
asn1ticket->sname->nametype->data[0];
new5ticket->enc_part.enctype = asn1ticket->encdata->etype->data[0];
new5ticket->enc_part.kvno = asn1ticket->encdata->kvno->data[0];
new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.length =
asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length;
if ((new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data =
calloc(1, asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length)) == NULL)
{
free(new5ticket);
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"Error allocating cipher in krb5ticket.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
else
{
memcpy(new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data,
asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->data,
asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length);
}
*krb5ticket = new5ticket;
return 0;
} | /* Given d2i_-decoded asn1ticket, allocate and return a new krb5_ticket.
** Return Kerberos error code and kssl_err struct on error.
** Allocates krb5_ticket and krb5_principal; caller should free these.
**
** 20010410 VRS Implemented krb5_decode_ticket() as
** old_krb5_decode_ticket(). Missing from MIT1.0.6.
** 20010615 VRS Re-cast as openssl/asn1 d2i_*() functions.
** Re-used some of the old krb5_decode_ticket()
** code here. This tkt should alloc/free just
** like the real thing.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1228-L1298 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_sget_tkt | krb5_error_code
kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
/* IN */ krb5_data *indata,
/* OUT */ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes,
/* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
static krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
static krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
krb5_ticket *krb5ticket = NULL;
KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket = NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL;
krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry;
krb5_principal krb5server;
krb5_rcache rcache = NULL;
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
if (!kssl_ctx)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
goto err;
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (!krb5context && (krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_init_context() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
if (krb5auth_context &&
(krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context)))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_auth_con_free() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
else krb5auth_context = NULL;
if (!krb5auth_context &&
(krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_init(krb5context, &krb5auth_context)))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_auth_con_init() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context,
&rcache)))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_auth_con_getrcache() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL,
(kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5server)) != 0)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_sname_to_principal() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
if (rcache == NULL)
{
if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5context,
krb5_princ_component(krb5context, krb5server, 0),
&rcache)))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_get_server_rcache() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context, rcache)))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_auth_con_setrcache() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
/* kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default
*/
if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)
{
krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file,
&krb5keytab);
if (krb5rc)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_kt_resolve() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
}
else
{
krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context,&krb5keytab);
if (krb5rc)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"krb5_kt_default() fails.\n");
goto err;
}
}
/* Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
** unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
** o send "0" msg if all OK
*/
/* 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
**
** if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
** &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
** &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error }
*/
p = (unsigned char *)indata->data;
if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,
(long) indata->length)) == NULL)
{
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"d2i_KRB5_TICKET() ASN.1 decode failure.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
goto err;
}
/* Was: krb5rc = krb5_decode_ticket(krb5in_data,&krb5ticket)) != 0) */
if ((krb5rc = kssl_TKT2tkt(krb5context, asn1ticket, &krb5ticket,
kssl_err)) != 0)
{
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"Error converting ASN.1 ticket to krb5_ticket.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
goto err;
}
if (! krb5_principal_compare(krb5context, krb5server,
krb5ticket->server)) {
krb5rc = KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH;
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"server principal != ticket principal\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab,
krb5ticket->server, krb5ticket->enc_part.kvno,
krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype, &kt_entry)) != 0) {
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"krb5_kt_get_entry() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc);
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5context, &kt_entry.key,
krb5ticket)) != 0) {
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"krb5_decrypt_tkt_part() failed.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
goto err;
}
else {
krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &kt_entry);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
int i; krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
&(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
if (paddr)
{
printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
for (i=0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++)
{
krb5_data d;
d.length=paddr[i]->length;
d.data=paddr[i]->contents;
print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
}
}
printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
}
krb5rc = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED;
if (!krb5ticket || !krb5ticket->enc_part2 ||
!krb5ticket->enc_part2->client ||
!krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data ||
!krb5ticket->enc_part2->session)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
"bad ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
}
else if (kssl_ctx_setprinc(kssl_ctx, KSSL_CLIENT,
&krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->realm,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->length))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
"kssl_ctx_setprinc() fails.\n");
}
else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, krb5ticket->enc_part2->session))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
"kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
}
else if (krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INVALID)
{
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
"invalid ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
}
else krb5rc = 0;
kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype;
ttimes->authtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
ttimes->starttime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime;
ttimes->endtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime;
ttimes->renew_till = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till;
err:
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (asn1ticket) KRB5_TICKET_free((KRB5_TICKET *) asn1ticket);
if (krb5keytab) krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
if (krb5ticket) krb5_free_ticket(krb5context, krb5ticket);
if (krb5server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5server);
return (krb5rc);
} | /* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
** and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
** Return Kerberos session key and client principle
** to SSL Server in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx.
**
** 19990702 VRS Started.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1308-L1558 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_ctx_setprinc | krb5_error_code
kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity, int nentities)
{
char **princ;
int length;
int i;
if (kssl_ctx == NULL || entity == NULL) return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
switch (which)
{
case KSSL_CLIENT: princ = &kssl_ctx->client_princ; break;
case KSSL_SERVER: princ = &kssl_ctx->service_host; break;
default: return KSSL_CTX_ERR; break;
}
if (*princ) kssl_free(*princ);
/* Add up all the entity->lengths */
length = 0;
for (i=0; i < nentities; i++)
{
length += entity[i].length;
}
/* Add in space for the '/' character(s) (if any) */
length += nentities-1;
/* Space for the ('@'+realm+NULL | NULL) */
length += ((realm)? realm->length + 2: 1);
if ((*princ = kssl_calloc(1, length)) == NULL)
return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
else
{
for (i = 0; i < nentities; i++)
{
strncat(*princ, entity[i].data, entity[i].length);
if (i < nentities-1)
{
strcat (*princ, "/");
}
}
if (realm)
{
strcat (*princ, "@");
(void) strncat(*princ, realm->data, realm->length);
}
}
return KSSL_CTX_OK;
} | /* Given an array of (krb5_data *) entity (and optional realm),
** set the plain (char *) client_princ or service_host member
** of the kssl_ctx struct.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1595-L1644 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_ctx_setstring | krb5_error_code
kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text)
{
char **string;
if (!kssl_ctx) return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
switch (which)
{
case KSSL_SERVICE: string = &kssl_ctx->service_name; break;
case KSSL_SERVER: string = &kssl_ctx->service_host; break;
case KSSL_CLIENT: string = &kssl_ctx->client_princ; break;
case KSSL_KEYTAB: string = &kssl_ctx->keytab_file; break;
default: return KSSL_CTX_ERR; break;
}
if (*string) kssl_free(*string);
if (!text)
{
*string = '\0';
return KSSL_CTX_OK;
}
if ((*string = kssl_calloc(1, strlen(text) + 1)) == NULL)
return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
else
strcpy(*string, text);
return KSSL_CTX_OK;
} | /* Set one of the plain (char *) string members of the kssl_ctx struct.
** Default values should be:
** which == KSSL_SERVICE => "khost" (KRB5SVC)
** which == KSSL_KEYTAB => "/etc/krb5.keytab" (KRB5KEYTAB)
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1652-L1681 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_ctx_setkey | krb5_error_code
kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session)
{
int length;
krb5_enctype enctype;
krb5_octet FAR *contents = NULL;
if (!kssl_ctx) return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
if (kssl_ctx->key)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
kssl_free(kssl_ctx->key);
}
if (session)
{
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
length = session->keyvalue->length;
enctype = session->keytype;
contents = session->keyvalue->contents;
#else
length = session->length;
enctype = session->enctype;
contents = session->contents;
#endif
kssl_ctx->enctype = enctype;
kssl_ctx->length = length;
}
else
{
kssl_ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
kssl_ctx->length = 0;
return KSSL_CTX_OK;
}
if ((kssl_ctx->key =
(krb5_octet FAR *) kssl_calloc(1, kssl_ctx->length)) == NULL)
{
kssl_ctx->length = 0;
return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
}
else
memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, contents, length);
return KSSL_CTX_OK;
} | /* Copy the Kerberos session key from a (krb5_keyblock *) to a kssl_ctx
** struct. Clear kssl_ctx->key if Kerberos session key is NULL.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1687-L1734 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_ctx_show | void
kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
{
int i;
printf("kssl_ctx: ");
if (kssl_ctx == NULL)
{
printf("NULL\n");
return;
}
else
printf("%p\n", (void *)kssl_ctx);
printf("\tservice:\t%s\n",
(kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: "NULL");
printf("\tclient:\t%s\n",
(kssl_ctx->client_princ)? kssl_ctx->client_princ: "NULL");
printf("\tserver:\t%s\n",
(kssl_ctx->service_host)? kssl_ctx->service_host: "NULL");
printf("\tkeytab:\t%s\n",
(kssl_ctx->keytab_file)? kssl_ctx->keytab_file: "NULL");
printf("\tkey [%d:%d]:\t",
kssl_ctx->enctype, kssl_ctx->length);
for (i=0; i < kssl_ctx->length && kssl_ctx->key; i++)
{
printf("%02x", kssl_ctx->key[i]);
}
printf("\n");
return;
} | /* Display contents of kssl_ctx struct
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1739-L1770 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | get_rc_clockskew | static krb5_deltat get_rc_clockskew(krb5_context context)
{
krb5_rcache rc;
krb5_deltat clockskew;
if (krb5_rc_default(context, &rc)) return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
if (krb5_rc_initialize(context, rc, 0)) return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
if (krb5_rc_get_lifespan(context, rc, &clockskew)) {
clockskew = KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
}
(void) krb5_rc_destroy(context, rc);
return clockskew;
} | /* Helper function for kssl_validate_times().
** We need context->clockskew, but krb5_context is an opaque struct.
** So we try to sneek the clockskew out through the replay cache.
** If that fails just return a likely default (300 seconds).
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1932-L1944 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_validate_times | krb5_error_code kssl_validate_times( krb5_timestamp atime,
krb5_ticket_times *ttimes)
{
krb5_deltat skew;
krb5_timestamp start, now;
krb5_error_code rc;
krb5_context context;
if ((rc = krb5_init_context(&context))) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
skew = get_rc_clockskew(context);
if ((rc = krb5_timeofday(context,&now))) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
krb5_free_context(context);
if (atime && labs(atime - now) >= skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW;
if (! ttimes) return 0;
start = (ttimes->starttime != 0)? ttimes->starttime: ttimes->authtime;
if (start - now > skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV;
if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<- | %d - %d | < %d ->| %d\n",
start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
return 0;
} | /* kssl_validate_times() combines (and more importantly exposes)
** the MIT KRB5 internal function krb5_validate_times() and the
** in_clock_skew() macro. The authenticator client time is checked
** to be within clockskew secs of the current time and the current
** time is checked to be within the ticket start and expire times.
** Either check may be omitted by supplying a NULL value.
** Returns 0 for valid times, SSL_R_KRB5* error codes otherwise.
** See Also: (Kerberos source)/krb5/lib/krb5/krb/valid_times.c
** 20010420 VRS
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1957-L1984 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_check_authent | krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(
/* IN */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
/* IN */ krb5_data *authentp,
/* OUT */ krb5_timestamp *atimep,
/* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc = 0;
KRB5_ENCDATA *dec_authent = NULL;
KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *auth = NULL;
krb5_enctype enctype;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *unenc_authent;
int outl, unencbufsize;
struct tm tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g;
time_t now, tl, tg, tr, tz_offset;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
*atimep = 0;
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
authentp = NULL;
#else
#if KRB5CHECKAUTH == 0
authentp = NULL;
#endif
#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
if (authentp == NULL || authentp->length == 0) return 0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
unsigned int ui;
printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
p = authentp->data;
for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++) printf("%02x ",p[ui]);
printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
unencbufsize = 2 * authentp->length;
if ((unenc_authent = calloc(1, unencbufsize)) == NULL)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"Unable to allocate authenticator buffer.\n");
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
goto err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)authentp->data;
if ((dec_authent = d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA(NULL, &p,
(long) authentp->length)) == NULL)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"Error decoding authenticator.\n");
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
goto err;
}
enctype = dec_authent->etype->data[0]; /* should = kssl_ctx->enctype */
#if !defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
switch ( enctype ) {
case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */
case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
krb5rc = 0; /* Skip, can't handle derived keys */
goto err;
}
#endif
enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (enc == NULL)
{
/* Disable kssl_check_authent for ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1.
** This enctype indicates the authenticator was encrypted
** using key-usage derived keys which openssl cannot decrypt.
*/
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv,0))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"EVP_CipherInit error decrypting authenticator.\n");
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
goto err;
}
outl = dec_authent->cipher->length;
if (!EVP_Cipher(&ciph_ctx,unenc_authent,dec_authent->cipher->data,outl))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"EVP_Cipher error decrypting authenticator.\n");
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
int padl;
printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if ((p = kssl_skip_confound(enctype, unenc_authent)) == NULL)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"confounded by authenticator.\n");
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
goto err;
}
outl -= p - unenc_authent;
if ((auth = (KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_AUTHENT(NULL, &p,
(long) outl))==NULL)
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
"Error decoding authenticator body.\n");
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
goto err;
}
memset(&tm_time,0,sizeof(struct tm));
if (k_gmtime(auth->ctime, &tm_time) &&
((tr = mktime(&tm_time)) != (time_t)(-1)))
{
now = time(&now);
tm_l = localtime(&now); tl = mktime(tm_l);
tm_g = gmtime(&now); tg = mktime(tm_g);
tz_offset = tg - tl;
*atimep = (krb5_timestamp)(tr - tz_offset);
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
if (auth && auth->ctime && auth->ctime->length && auth->ctime->data)
printf("%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
else printf("NULL\n");
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
err:
if (auth) KRB5_AUTHENT_free((KRB5_AUTHENT *) auth);
if (dec_authent) KRB5_ENCDATA_free(dec_authent);
if (unenc_authent) free(unenc_authent);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
return krb5rc;
} | /* Decode and decrypt given DER-encoded authenticator, then pass
** authenticator ctime back in *atimep (or 0 if time unavailable).
** Returns krb5_error_code and kssl_err on error. A NULL
** authenticator (authentp->length == 0) is not considered an error.
** Note that kssl_check_authent() makes use of the KRB5 session key;
** you must call kssl_sget_tkt() to get the key before calling this routine.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L1994-L2147 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | kssl_build_principal_2 | krb5_error_code kssl_build_principal_2(
/* UPDATE */ krb5_context context,
/* OUT */ krb5_principal *princ,
/* IN */ int rlen, const char *realm,
/* IN */ int slen, const char *svc,
/* IN */ int hlen, const char *host)
{
krb5_data *p_data = NULL;
krb5_principal new_p = NULL;
char *new_r = NULL;
if ((p_data = (krb5_data *) calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_data))) == NULL ||
(new_p = (krb5_principal) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_principal_data)))
== NULL) goto err;
new_p->length = 2;
new_p->data = p_data;
if ((new_r = calloc(1, rlen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
memcpy(new_r, realm, rlen);
krb5_princ_set_realm_length(context, new_p, rlen);
krb5_princ_set_realm_data(context, new_p, new_r);
if ((new_p->data[0].data = calloc(1, slen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
memcpy(new_p->data[0].data, svc, slen);
new_p->data[0].length = slen;
if ((new_p->data[1].data = calloc(1, hlen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
memcpy(new_p->data[1].data, host, hlen);
new_p->data[1].length = hlen;
krb5_princ_type(context, new_p) = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
*princ = new_p;
return 0;
err:
if (new_p && new_p[0].data) free(new_p[0].data);
if (new_p && new_p[1].data) free(new_p[1].data);
if (new_p) free(new_p);
if (new_r) free(new_r);
return ENOMEM;
} | /* Replaces krb5_build_principal_ext(), with varargs length == 2 (svc, host),
** because I dont't know how to stub varargs.
** Returns krb5_error_code == ENOMEM on alloc error, otherwise
** passes back newly constructed principal, which should be freed by caller.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/kssl.c#L2155-L2195 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl23_read_bytes | int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n)
{
unsigned char *p;
int j;
if (s->packet_length < (unsigned int)n)
{
p=s->packet;
for (;;)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
j=BIO_read(s->rbio,(char *)&(p[s->packet_length]),
n-s->packet_length);
if (j <= 0)
return(j);
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->packet_length+=j;
if (s->packet_length >= (unsigned int)n)
return(s->packet_length);
}
}
return(n);
} | /* return regularly only when we have read (at least) 'n' bytes */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s23_pkt.c#L93-L116 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | client_certificate | static int client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned int n;
int cert_ch_len;
unsigned char *cert_ch;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* We have a cert associated with the SSL, so attach it to
* the session if it does not have one */
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A)
{
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num);
if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,i));
s->init_num += i;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* REQUEST-CERTIFICATE */
/* type=buf[0]; */
/* type eq x509 */
if (buf[1] != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE);
return(-1);
}
if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
{
s->state=SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
}
else
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
}
cert_ch = buf + 2;
cert_ch_len = s->init_num - 2;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE)
{
X509 *x509=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
/* If we get an error we need to
* ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(error);
* We should then be retried when things are ok and we
* can get a cert or not */
i=0;
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb != NULL)
{
i=s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,&(x509),&(pkey));
}
if (i < 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return(-1);
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
{
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
{
i=0;
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
else if (i == 1)
{
if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
i=0;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* We have no client certificate to respond with
* so send the correct error message back */
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B;
p=buf;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_ERROR;
s2n(SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE,p);
s->init_off=0;
s->init_num=3;
/* Write is done at the end */
}
}
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B)
{
return(ssl2_do_write(s));
}
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
/* ok, now we calculate the checksum
* do it first so we can reuse buf :-) */
p=buf;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_SignInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
s->s2->key_material_length);
EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,cert_ch,(unsigned int)cert_ch_len);
i=i2d_X509(s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509,&p);
/* Don't update the signature if it fails - FIXME: probably should handle this better */
if(i > 0)
EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,buf,(unsigned int)i);
p=buf;
d=p+6;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
*(p++)=SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
n=i2d_X509(s->cert->key->x509,&d);
s2n(n,p);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&ctx,d,&n,s->cert->key->privatekey))
{
/* this is not good. If things have failed it
* means there so something wrong with the key.
* We will continue with a 0 length signature
*/
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
s2n(n,p);
d+=n;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D;
s->init_num=d-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D) */
return(ssl2_do_write(s));
} | /* read the data and then respond */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c#L746-L895 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl2_set_certificate | int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc=NULL;
int i;
X509 *x509=NULL;
int ret=0;
x509=d2i_X509(NULL,&data,(long)len);
if (x509 == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk,x509))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/* server's cert for this session */
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert=sc;
sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509=x509;
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
x509=NULL;
if (pkey == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_set_peer_cert_type(sc,SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE))
goto err;
ret=1;
err:
sk_X509_free(sk);
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return(ret);
} | /* loads in the certificate from the server */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c#L1025-L1091 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl2_enc | void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
unsigned long l;
int bs;
if (send)
{
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
l=s->s2->wlength;
}
else
{
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
l=s->s2->rlength;
}
/* check for NULL cipher */
if (ds == NULL) return;
bs=ds->cipher->block_size;
/* This should be using (bs-1) and bs instead of 7 and 8, but
* what the hell. */
if (bs == 8)
l=(l+7)/8*8;
EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l);
} | /* read/writes from s->s2->mac_data using length for encrypt and
* decrypt. It sets s->s2->padding and s->[rw]length
* if we are encrypting */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c#L121-L149 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl2_read_internal | static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
{
int n;
unsigned char mac[MAX_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char *p;
int i;
int mac_size;
ssl2_read_again:
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
{
n=s->handshake_func(s);
if (n < 0) return(n);
if (n == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
}
clear_sys_error();
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
if (len <= 0) return(len);
if (s->s2->ract_data_length != 0) /* read from buffer */
{
if (len > s->s2->ract_data_length)
n=s->s2->ract_data_length;
else
n=len;
memcpy(buf,s->s2->ract_data,(unsigned int)n);
if (!peek)
{
s->s2->ract_data_length-=n;
s->s2->ract_data+=n;
if (s->s2->ract_data_length == 0)
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
}
return(n);
}
/* s->s2->ract_data_length == 0
*
* Fill the buffer, then goto ssl2_read_again.
*/
if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_HEADER)
{
if (s->first_packet)
{
n=read_n(s,5,SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2,0);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
s->first_packet=0;
p=s->packet;
if (!((p[0] & 0x80) && (
(p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
(p[2] == SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO))))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET);
return(-1);
}
}
else
{
n=read_n(s,2,SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2,0);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
}
/* part read stuff */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
/* Do header */
/*s->s2->padding=0;*/
s->s2->escape=0;
s->s2->rlength=(((unsigned int)p[0])<<8)|((unsigned int)p[1]);
if ((p[0] & TWO_BYTE_BIT)) /* Two byte header? */
{
s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
s->s2->rlength&=TWO_BYTE_MASK;
}
else
{
s->s2->three_byte_header=1;
s->s2->rlength&=THREE_BYTE_MASK;
/* security >s2->escape */
s->s2->escape=((p[0] & SEC_ESC_BIT))?1:0;
}
}
if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
{
n=s->s2->rlength+2+s->s2->three_byte_header;
if (n > (int)s->packet_length)
{
n-=s->packet_length;
i=read_n(s,(unsigned int)n,(unsigned int)n,1);
if (i <= 0) return(i); /* ERROR */
}
p= &(s->packet[2]);
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
if (s->s2->three_byte_header)
s->s2->padding= *(p++);
else s->s2->padding=0;
/* Data portion */
if (s->s2->clear_text)
{
mac_size = 0;
s->s2->mac_data=p;
s->s2->ract_data=p;
if (s->s2->padding)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
return(-1);
}
}
else
{
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if (mac_size < 0)
return -1;
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= MAX_MAC_SIZE);
s->s2->mac_data=p;
s->s2->ract_data= &p[mac_size];
if (s->s2->padding + mac_size > s->s2->rlength)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
return(-1);
}
}
s->s2->ract_data_length=s->s2->rlength;
/* added a check for length > max_size in case
* encryption was not turned on yet due to an error */
if ((!s->s2->clear_text) &&
(s->s2->rlength >= (unsigned int)mac_size))
{
ssl2_enc(s,0);
s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
if ( (memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,
(unsigned int)mac_size) != 0) ||
(s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
return(-1);
}
}
INC32(s->s2->read_sequence); /* expect next number */
/* s->s2->ract_data is now available for processing */
/* Possibly the packet that we just read had 0 actual data bytes.
* (SSLeay/OpenSSL itself never sends such packets; see ssl2_write.)
* In this case, returning 0 would be interpreted by the caller
* as indicating EOF, so it's not a good idea. Instead, we just
* continue reading; thus ssl2_read_internal may have to process
* multiple packets before it can return.
*
* [Note that using select() for blocking sockets *never* guarantees
* that the next SSL_read will not block -- the available
* data may contain incomplete packets, and except for SSL 2,
* renegotiation can confuse things even more.] */
goto ssl2_read_again; /* This should really be
* "return ssl2_read(s,buf,len)",
* but that would allow for
* denial-of-service attacks if a
* C compiler is used that does not
* recognize end-recursion. */
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_STATE);
return(-1);
}
} | /* SSL 2.0 imlementation for SSL_read/SSL_peek -
* This routine will return 0 to len bytes, decrypted etc if required.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c#L127-L307 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | request_certificate | static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *cp;
unsigned char *p,*p2,*buf2;
unsigned char *ccd;
int i,j,ctype,ret= -1;
unsigned long len;
X509 *x509=NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
ccd=s->s2->tmp.ccl;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE;
*(p++)=SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
return -1;
memcpy(p,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B;
s->init_num=SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2;
s->init_off=0;
}
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B)
{
i=ssl2_do_write(s);
if (i <= 0)
{
ret=i;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C;
}
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),6-s->init_num); /* try to read 6 octets ... */
if (i < 3-s->init_num) /* ... but don't call ssl2_part_read now if we got at least 3
* (probably NO-CERTIFICATE-ERROR) */
{
ret=ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,i);
goto end;
}
s->init_num += i;
if ((s->init_num >= 3) && (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR))
{
n2s(p,i);
if (i != SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE)
{
/* not the error message we expected -- let ssl2_part_read handle it */
s->init_num -= 3;
ret = ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, 3);
goto end;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, 3, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* ERROR */
/* this is the one place where we can recover from an SSL 2.0 error */
if (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
goto end;
}
ret=1;
goto end;
}
if ((*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) || (s->init_num < 6))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_SHORT_READ);
goto end;
}
if (s->init_num != 6)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
/* ok we have a response */
/* certificate type, there is only one right now. */
ctype= *(p++);
if (ctype != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT);
goto end;
}
n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.clen=i;
n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.rlen=i;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D;
}
/* SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D */
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
len = 6 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clen + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.rlen;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
goto end;
}
j = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),j);
if (i < j)
{
ret=ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,i);
goto end;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-CERTIFICATE */
p += 6;
cp = p;
x509=(X509 *)d2i_X509(NULL,&cp,(long)s->s2->tmp.clen);
if (x509 == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto msg_end;
}
if (((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(sk,x509)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto msg_end;
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if (i > 0) /* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
s->s2->key_material_length);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
buf2=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i);
if (buf2 == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto msg_end;
}
p2=buf2;
i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&p2);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i);
OPENSSL_free(buf2);
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
if (pkey == NULL) goto end;
i=EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,cp,s->s2->tmp.rlen,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (i > 0)
{
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=x509;
CRYPTO_add(&x509->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
ret=1;
goto end;
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM);
goto msg_end;
}
}
else
{
msg_end:
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
}
end:
sk_X509_free(sk);
X509_free(x509);
return(ret);
} | /* send the request and check the response */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c#L920-L1110 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl3_do_write | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
{
int ret;
ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
s->init_num);
if (ret < 0) return(-1);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
if (ret == s->init_num)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
return(1);
}
s->init_off+=ret;
s->init_num-=ret;
return(0);
} | /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c#L128-L149 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec | int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == a)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*p=SSL3_MT_CCS;
s->init_num=1;
s->init_off=0;
s->state=b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
} | /* for these 2 messages, we need to
* ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
* ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
* ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
* ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
* ssl->session->read_compression assign
* ssl->session->read_hash assign
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c#L281-L297 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl3_get_message | long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long l;
long n;
int i,al;
if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
*ok=1;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
return s->init_num;
}
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
{
int skip_message;
do
{
while (s->init_num < 4)
{
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
&p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
s->init_num+=i;
}
skip_message = 0;
if (!s->server)
if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
* if their format is correct. Does not count for
* 'Finished' MAC. */
if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
{
s->init_num = 0;
skip_message = 1;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
}
while (skip_message);
/* s->init_num == 4 */
if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
(st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
(stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
{
/* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
* hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
* start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
* Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
* we have not completed the handshake. */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
}
s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
n2l3(p,l);
if (l > (unsigned long)max)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
s->state=stn;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
s->init_num = 0;
}
/* next state (stn) */
p = s->init_msg;
n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
while (n > 0)
{
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
s->init_num += i;
n -= i;
}
ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
*ok=1;
return s->init_num;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
*ok=0;
return(-1);
} | /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
* maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
* The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
* the body is read in state 'stn'.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c#L394-L527 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | if | else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
{
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
int keytype;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
if (!peer_cert)
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
if (!peer_cert) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
/* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
/* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
/* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
* would be used
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
* context data */
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
8,shared_ukm)<0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*Encapsulate it into sequence */
*(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen=255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80)
{
*(p++)=0x81;
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
n=msglen+3;
}
else
{
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
n=msglen+2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
{
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
} | /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c#L2464-L2553 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl3_get_record | static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
int mac_size;
int clear=0;
size_t extra;
int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess=s->session;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
else
extra=0;
if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
{
/* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
* set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
n2s(p,rr->length);
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
#endif
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
s->version = (unsigned short)version;
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
}
if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto err;
}
if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
*/
rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
* rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
* need to be copied into rr->data by either
* the decryption or by the decompression
* When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
* rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
* rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
/* check is not needed I believe */
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
if (enc_err <= 0)
{
if (enc_err == 0)
/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
goto err;
/* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
* (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
* the MAC computation anyway. */
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
clear=1;
if (!clear)
{
/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
{
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
#else
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
#endif
}
/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
{
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
}
else
{
/* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
#else
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
rr->length = 0;
#endif
}
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
{
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
}
if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
{
/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
* SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
* failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
* we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
* might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
goto f_err;
}
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
rr->off=0;
/* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length=0;
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
#endif
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(ret);
} | /* Call this to get a new input record.
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
* ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
* ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
*/
/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c#L282-L531 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl3_write_bytes | int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
{
const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
unsigned int tot,n,nw;
int i;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
tot=s->s3->wnum;
s->s3->wnum=0;
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
{
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
n=(len-tot);
for (;;)
{
if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
nw=s->max_send_fragment;
else
nw=n;
i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->s3->wnum=tot;
return i;
}
if ((i == (int)n) ||
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
{
/* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
* in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
return tot+i;
}
n-=i;
tot+=i;
}
} | /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
* It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c#L574-L624 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl3_write_pending | int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int len)
{
int i;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
/* XXXX */
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return(-1);
}
for (;;)
{
clear_sys_error();
if (s->wbio != NULL)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
(char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
(unsigned int)wb->left);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
i= -1;
}
if (i == wb->left)
{
wb->left=0;
wb->offset+=i;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
}
else if (i <= 0) {
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
point in using a datagram service */
wb->left = 0;
}
return(i);
}
wb->offset+=i;
wb->left-=i;
}
} | /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c#L814-L866 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl3_read_bytes | int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
{
int al,i,j,ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return(-1);
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
{
unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
unsigned char *dst = buf;
unsigned int k;
/* peek == 0 */
n = 0;
while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
{
*dst++ = *src++;
len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
n++;
}
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
return n;
}
/* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
{
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
/* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
{
ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
goto f_err;
}
/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
* (even in 'peek' mode) */
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
{
rr->length=0;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(0);
}
if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
{
/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
* are doing a handshake for the first time */
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
goto f_err;
}
if (len <= 0) return(len);
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
n = rr->length;
else
n = (unsigned int)len;
memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
if (!peek)
{
rr->length-=n;
rr->off+=n;
if (rr->length == 0)
{
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
rr->off=0;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
}
}
return(n);
}
/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
* message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
* fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
*/
{
unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
{
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
}
else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
{
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
}
if (dest_maxlen > 0)
{
n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
if (rr->length < n)
n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
while (n-- > 0)
{
dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
rr->length--;
}
if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
goto start; /* fragment was too small */
}
}
/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&
(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
{
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate)
{
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
{
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
{
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
{
BIO *bio;
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
}
}
}
/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
* now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
goto start;
}
/* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
* allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
* WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
*/
if (s->server &&
SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
(s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
/*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
rr->length = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto start;
}
if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
{
int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
{
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
{
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
{
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return(0);
}
/* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
* a fatal alert because if application tried to
* renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
* expects it to succeed.
*
* In future we might have a renegotiation where we
* don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
*/
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
{
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto f_err;
}
}
else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
{
char tmp[16];
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
return(0);
}
else
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
goto start;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
{
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
rr->length=0;
return(0);
}
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
{
/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
* exactly what the record payload has to look like */
if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
rr->length=0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
goto err;
else
goto start;
}
/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
{
if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
{
#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
* because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
* protocol violations): */
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#else
s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#endif
s->new_session=1;
}
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
{
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
{
BIO *bio;
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
}
goto start;
}
switch (rr->type)
{
default:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
{
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
#endif
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
* of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
* should not happen when type != rr->type */
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
* but have application data. If the library was
* running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
* is set) and it makes sense to read application data
* at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
* we will indulge it.
*/
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
((
(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
) || (
(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
)
))
{
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
return(-1);
}
else
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* not reached */
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
} | /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
* 'type' is one of the following:
*
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
*
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
*
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
* a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
* Change cipher spec protocol
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
* Alert protocol
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
* Handshake protocol
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c#L895-L1353 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack | int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
int ret=1;
int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
if (in == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) goto err;
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
X509_NAME_free(xn);
else
sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (0)
{
err:
ret=0;
}
if(in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if(x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
(void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
return ret;
} | /*!
* Add a file of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to add to.
* \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
* already in the stack will be added.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c#L723-L773 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack | int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *dir)
{
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
const char *filename;
int ret = 0;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
{
char buf[1024];
int r;
if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
#else
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
#endif
if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
goto err;
if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
goto err;
}
if (errno)
{
SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
return ret;
} | /*!
* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to append to.
* \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
* examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
* SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
* included.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c#L786-L833 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_CIPHER_get_bits | int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
{
int ret=0;
if (c != NULL)
{
if (alg_bits != NULL) *alg_bits = c->alg_bits;
ret = c->strength_bits;
}
return(ret);
} | /* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c#L1643-L1653 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version | int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
ctx->method=meth;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
return(0);
}
return(1);
} | /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L255-L270 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_get_finished | size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL)
{
ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
} | /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L717-L729 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_get_peer_finished | size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL)
{
ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
} | /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L732-L744 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_copy_session_id | void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
{
CERT *tmp;
/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));
/* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
* vice-versa */
if (t->method != f->method)
{
t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
t->method=f->method; /* change method */
t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
}
tmp=t->cert;
if (f->cert != NULL)
{
CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
t->cert=f->cert;
}
else
t->cert=NULL;
if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
} | /* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
* modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L845-L871 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_CTX_check_private_key | int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if ( (ctx == NULL) ||
(ctx->cert == NULL) ||
(ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return(0);
}
if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return(0);
}
return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
} | /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L874-L889 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_check_private_key | int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
{
if (ssl == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return(0);
}
if (ssl->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return(0);
}
if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return(0);
}
return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
} | /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L892-L916 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list | int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
* was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
* (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
* has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
* ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
* ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
* updated. */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
} | /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L1265-L1286 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_set_cipher_list | int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
&s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
} | /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L1289-L1304 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl_session_cmp | static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
{
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
return(1);
if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
return(1);
return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
} | /* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
* SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
* able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
* with a matching session ID. */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L1498-L1505 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN | static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
if (meth == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
return(NULL);
} | /* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
* SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
* variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
* ssl.h. */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L1511-L1522 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_set_accept_state | void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server=1;
s->shutdown=0;
s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
/* clear the current cipher */
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
} | /* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
* one of these calls will reset it */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L2376-L2386 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_use_PrivateKey | int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
int ret;
if (pkey == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return(0);
}
if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(0);
}
ret=ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert,pkey);
return(ret);
} | /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c#L295-L311 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey | int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (pkey == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return(0);
}
if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(0);
}
return(ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert,pkey));
} | /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c#L617-L630 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file | int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
int ret=0;
X509 *x=NULL;
ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
if (in == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto end;
}
x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
if (x == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
goto end;
}
ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
ret = 0; /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply ret==0 ... */
if (ret)
{
/* If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to
* the CA certificates.
*/
X509 *ca;
int r;
unsigned long err;
if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
}
while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
!= NULL)
{
r = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
if (!r)
{
X509_free(ca);
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
/* Note that we must not free r if it was successfully
* added to the chain (while we must free the main
* certificate, since its reference count is increased
* by SSL_CTX_use_certificate). */
}
/* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */
err = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)
ERR_clear_error();
else
ret = 0; /* some real error */
}
end:
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
return(ret);
} | /* Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format,
* possibly followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be
* sent to the peer in the Certificate message.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c#L705-L778 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | get | static int get ( io_channel chan, char *buffer, int maxlen, int *length )
{
int status;
struct io_status iosb;
status = SYS$QIOW ( 0, chan, IO$_READVBLK, &iosb, 0, 0,
buffer, maxlen, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
if ( (status&1) == 1 ) status = iosb.status;
if ( (status&1) == 1 ) *length = iosb.count;
return status;
} | /*****************************************************************************/
/* Decnet I/O routines.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_task.c#L167-L176 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | general_request | static int general_request ( io_channel chan, struct rpc_msg *msg, int length )
{
return 48;
} | /***************************************************************************/
/* Handle operations on the 'G' channel.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_task.c#L190-L193 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | main | int main ( int argc, char **argv )
{
int status, length;
io_channel chan;
struct rpc_msg msg;
char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL;
int badop=0;
int ret=1;
int client_auth=0;
int server_auth=0;
SSL_CTX *s_ctx=NULL;
/*
* Confirm logical link with initiating client.
*/
LIB$INIT_TIMER();
status = SYS$ASSIGN ( &sysnet, &chan, 0, 0, 0 );
printf("status of assign to SYS$NET: %d\n", status );
/*
* Initialize standard out and error files.
*/
if (bio_err == NULL)
if ((bio_err=BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
BIO_set_fp(bio_err,stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (bio_stdout == NULL)
if ((bio_stdout=BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
BIO_set_fp(bio_stdout,stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE);
/*
* get the preferred cipher list and other initialization
*/
if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER");
printf("cipher list: %s\n", cipher ? cipher : "{undefined}" );
SSL_load_error_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
/* DRM, this was the original, but there is no such thing as SSLv2()
s_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2());
*/
s_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_server_method());
if (s_ctx == NULL) goto end;
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx,TEST_SERVER_CERT,SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(s_ctx,TEST_SERVER_CERT,SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
printf("Loaded server certificate: '%s'\n", TEST_SERVER_CERT );
/*
* Take commands from client until bad status.
*/
LIB$SHOW_TIMER();
status = doit ( chan, s_ctx );
LIB$SHOW_TIMER();
/*
* do final cleanup and exit.
*/
end:
if (s_ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
LIB$SHOW_TIMER();
return 1;
} | /***************************************************************************/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssl_task.c#L195-L255 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | opaque_prf_input_cb | int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg_)
{
struct cb_info_st *arg = arg_;
if (arg == NULL)
return 1;
if (!SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, arg->input, arg->len))
return 0;
return arg->ret;
} | /* insist on oqaque PRF input */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c#L435-L445 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | psk_key2bn | static int psk_key2bn(const char *pskkey, unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int max_psk_len)
{
int ret;
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, pskkey);
if (!ret)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n", pskkey);
if (bn)
BN_free(bn);
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
BN_free(bn);
return 0;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
BN_free(bn);
return ret;
} | /* convert the PSK key (psk_key) in ascii to binary (psk) */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c#L2346-L2370 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | tls1_P_hash | static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
int sec_len,
const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
unsigned char *out, int olen)
{
int chunk;
unsigned int j;
HMAC_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int A1_len;
int ret = 0;
chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
goto err;
if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
goto err;
if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
goto err;
if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
goto err;
if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
goto err;
if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
goto err;
if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
goto err;
if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
goto err;
if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
goto err;
if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
goto err;
if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
goto err;
if (olen > chunk)
{
if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j))
goto err;
out+=j;
olen-=j;
if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */
goto err;
}
else /* last one */
{
if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
memcpy(out,A1,olen);
break;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
return ret;
} | /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c#L151-L234 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | tls1_PRF | static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
unsigned char *out1,
unsigned char *out2, int olen)
{
int len,i,idx,count;
const unsigned char *S1;
long m;
const EVP_MD *md;
int ret = 0;
/* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
count=0;
for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
}
len=slen/count;
S1=sec;
memset(out1,0,olen);
for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
if (!md) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
out2,olen))
goto err;
S1+=len;
for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
{
out1[i]^=out2[i];
}
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
return ret;
} | /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c#L237-L282 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | if | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
{
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|| (size > 0))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
} | /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c#L1086-L1101 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | tls1_process_ticket | int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
* to permit stateful resumption.
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 1;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
return 1;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
i = *(p++);
p+= i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
p+= i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p > limit)
return -1;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if ((p + 2) >= limit)
return 1;
n2s(p, i);
while ((p + 4) <= limit)
{
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (p + size > limit)
return 1;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
{
/* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
* trigger a full handshake
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 1;
/* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
* and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
*/
if (size == 0)
{
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 0; /* Cache miss */
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
/* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
* generating the session from ticket now,
* trigger abbreviated handshake based on
* external mechanism to calculate the master
* secret later. */
return 0;
}
return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
ret);
}
p += size;
}
return 1;
} | /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
* hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
* session ticket extension at the same time.
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c#L1572-L1648 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext | int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
int maxlen)
{
if(p)
{
if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len+1) > maxlen)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
/* Length byte */
*p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
p++;
memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by client\n",
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
#endif
}
*len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1;
return 1;
} | /* Add the client's renegotiation binding */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c#L116-L143 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext | int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
int *al)
{
int ilen;
/* Parse the length byte */
if(len < 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
*al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
ilen = *d;
d++;
/* Consistency check */
if((ilen+1) != len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
*al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
/* Check that the extension matches */
if(ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
}
if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by server\n",
ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
#endif
s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
return 1;
} | /* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not
right */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c#L147-L193 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext | int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
int maxlen)
{
if(p)
{
if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1) > maxlen)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
/* Length byte */
*p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
p++;
memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
p += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by server\n",
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
#endif
}
*len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1;
return 1;
} | /* Add the server's renegotiation binding */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c#L196-L228 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext | int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
int *al)
{
int expected_len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
int ilen;
/* Check for logic errors */
OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
/* Parse the length byte */
if(len < 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
*al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
ilen = *d;
d++;
/* Consistency check */
if(ilen+1 != len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
*al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
/* Check that the extension matches */
if(ilen != expected_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
}
if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
}
d += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by client\n",
ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
#endif
s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
return 1;
} | /* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not
right */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c#L232-L292 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | main | int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
X *x = NULL;
unsigned char **pp = NULL;
M_ASN1_I2D_vars(x);
M_ASN1_I2D_len_SEQUENCE_opt_type(X509_EXTENSION, x->ext,
i2d_X509_EXTENSION);
M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
M_ASN1_I2D_put_SEQUENCE_opt_type(X509_EXTENSION, x->ext,
i2d_X509_EXTENSION);
M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
} | /* This isn't meant to run particularly, it's just to test type checking */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl/test/asn1test.c#L10-L22 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | args_from_file | int args_from_file(char *file, int *argc, char **argv[])
{
FILE *fp;
int num,i;
unsigned int len;
static char *buf=NULL;
static char **arg=NULL;
char *p;
struct stat stbuf;
if (stat(file,&stbuf) < 0) return(0);
fp=fopen(file,"r");
if (fp == NULL)
return(0);
*argc=0;
*argv=NULL;
len=(unsigned int)stbuf.st_size;
if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
buf=(char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len+1);
if (buf == NULL) return(0);
len=fread(buf,1,len,fp);
if (len <= 1) return(0);
buf[len]='\0';
i=0;
for (p=buf; *p; p++)
if (*p == '\n') i++;
if (arg != NULL) OPENSSL_free(arg);
arg=(char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *)*(i*2));
*argv=arg;
num=0;
p=buf;
for (;;)
{
if (!*p) break;
if (*p == '#') /* comment line */
{
while (*p && (*p != '\n')) p++;
continue;
}
/* else we have a line */
*(arg++)=p;
num++;
while (*p && ((*p != ' ') && (*p != '\t') && (*p != '\n')))
p++;
if (!*p) break;
if (*p == '\n')
{
*(p++)='\0';
continue;
}
/* else it is a tab or space */
p++;
while (*p && ((*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t') || (*p == '\n')))
p++;
if (!*p) break;
if (*p == '\n')
{
p++;
continue;
}
*(arg++)=p++;
num++;
while (*p && (*p != '\n')) p++;
if (!*p) break;
/* else *p == '\n' */
*(p++)='\0';
}
*argc=num;
return(1);
} | /* never finished - probably never will be :-) */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl_android/apps/apps.c#L157-L232 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | make_revoked | int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str)
{
char *tmp = NULL;
int reason_code = -1;
int i, ret = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
ASN1_ENUMERATED *rtmp = NULL;
ASN1_TIME *revDate = NULL;
i = unpack_revinfo(&revDate, &reason_code, &hold, &comp_time, str);
if (i == 0)
goto err;
if (rev && !X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(rev, revDate))
goto err;
if (rev && (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS))
{
rtmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
if (!rtmp || !ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rtmp, reason_code))
goto err;
if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(rev, NID_crl_reason, rtmp, 0, 0))
goto err;
}
if (rev && comp_time)
{
if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(rev, NID_invalidity_date, comp_time, 0, 0))
goto err;
}
if (rev && hold)
{
if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(rev, NID_hold_instruction_code, hold, 0, 0))
goto err;
}
if (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)
ret = 2;
else ret = 1;
err:
if (tmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold);
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(rtmp);
ASN1_TIME_free(revDate);
return ret;
} | /* Convert revocation field to X509_REVOKED entry
* return code:
* 0 error
* 1 OK
* 2 OK and some extensions added (i.e. V2 CRL)
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl_android/apps/ca.c#L2805-L2857 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | cms_cb | static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int error;
error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
if ((error != X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
&& ((error != X509_V_OK) || (ok != 2)))
return ok;
policies_print(NULL, ctx);
return ok;
} | /* Minimal callback just to output policy info (if any) */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl_android/apps/cms.c#L1196-L1210 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | add_certs_from_file | static int add_certs_from_file(STACK_OF(X509) *stack, char *certfile)
{
struct stat st;
BIO *in=NULL;
int count=0;
int ret= -1;
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk=NULL;
X509_INFO *xi;
if ((stat(certfile,&st) != 0))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"unable to load the file, %s\n",certfile);
goto end;
}
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in,certfile) <= 0))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error opening the file, %s\n",certfile);
goto end;
}
/* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */
sk=PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in,NULL,NULL,NULL);
if (sk == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error reading the file, %s\n",certfile);
goto end;
}
/* scan over it and pull out the CRL's */
while (sk_X509_INFO_num(sk))
{
xi=sk_X509_INFO_shift(sk);
if (xi->x509 != NULL)
{
sk_X509_push(stack,xi->x509);
xi->x509=NULL;
count++;
}
X509_INFO_free(xi);
}
ret=count;
end:
/* never need to OPENSSL_free x */
if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_INFO_free(sk);
return(ret);
} | /*
*----------------------------------------------------------------------
* int add_certs_from_file
*
* Read a list of certificates to be checked from a file.
*
* Results:
* number of certs added if successful, -1 if not.
*----------------------------------------------------------------------
*/ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl_android/apps/crl2p7.c#L296-L344 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | dh_cb | static int MS_CALLBACK dh_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
char c='*';
if (p == 0) c='.';
if (p == 1) c='+';
if (p == 2) c='*';
if (p == 3) c='\n';
BIO_write(cb->arg,&c,1);
(void)BIO_flush(cb->arg);
#ifdef LINT
p=n;
#endif
return 1;
} | /* dh_cb is identical to dsa_cb in apps/dsaparam.c */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl_android/apps/dhparam.c#L541-L555 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | get_cert_chain | int get_cert_chain (X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
{
X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *chn;
int i = 0;
/* FIXME: Should really check the return status of X509_STORE_CTX_init
* for an error, but how that fits into the return value of this
* function is less obvious. */
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL);
if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) <= 0) {
i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error (&store_ctx);
if (i == 0)
/* avoid returning 0 if X509_verify_cert() did not
* set an appropriate error value in the context */
i = -1;
chn = NULL;
goto err;
} else
chn = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&store_ctx);
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
*chain = chn;
return i;
} | /* Given a single certificate return a verified chain or NULL if error */
/* Hope this is OK .... */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl_android/apps/pkcs12.c#L819-L844 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1 | github_2023 | v2v3v4 | c | cert_load | int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
int ret;
X509 *cert;
ret = 0;
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
CRYPTO_push_info("cert_load(): reading one cert");
#endif
while((cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
ret = 1;
sk_X509_push(sk, cert);
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
CRYPTO_push_info("cert_load(): reading one cert");
#endif
}
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
if(ret) ERR_clear_error();
return ret;
} | /* Load all certificates from a given file */ | https://github.com/v2v3v4/BigWorld-Engine-14.4.1/blob/4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb/programming/bigworld/third_party/openssl_android/apps/pkcs12.c#L863-L886 | 4389085c8ce35cff887a4cc18fc47d1133d89ffb |
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