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Who commented that the super-boom got out of hand when products became so complicated that risk could not be accurately calculated? | <text>Who commented that the super-boom got out of hand when products became so complicated that risk could not be accurately calculated?</text><reasoning>As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."</reasoning><output>George Soros</output> |
What happened to financial assets that made them harder to value? | <text>What happened to financial assets that made them harder to value?</text><reasoning>As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."</reasoning><output>more complex</output> |
Who did rating agencies rely on for information to rate financial innovation products? | <text>Who did rating agencies rely on for information to rate financial innovation products?</text><reasoning>As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."</reasoning><output>the originators of synthetic products</output> |
When authorities could no longer calculate the risks of complex financial innovation products, who did they rely on for information? | <text>When authorities could no longer calculate the risks of complex financial innovation products, who did they rely on for information?</text><reasoning>As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."</reasoning><output>the banks</output> |
Who reassured investors by showing the risk of complex financial innovation products was actually less than they proved to be? | <text>Who reassured investors by showing the risk of complex financial innovation products was actually less than they proved to be?</text><reasoning>As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."</reasoning><output>international bond rating agencies</output> |
What island besides St. Barts was granted COM status by France in 2007? | <text>What island besides St. Barts was granted COM status by France in 2007?</text><reasoning>On 7 February 2007, the French Parliament passed a bill granting COM status to both St. Barthélemy and (separately) to the neighbouring Saint Martin. The new status took effect on 15 July 2007, when the first territorial council was elected, according to the law. The island has a president (elected every five years), a unicameral Territorial Council of nineteen members who are elected by popular vote and serve for five-year terms, and an executive council of seven members. Elections to these councils were first held on 1 July 2007 with the last election in March 2012.</reasoning><output>Saint Martin</output> |
How many years does a president have in office in St. Barts? | <text>How many years does a president have in office in St. Barts?</text><reasoning>On 7 February 2007, the French Parliament passed a bill granting COM status to both St. Barthélemy and (separately) to the neighbouring Saint Martin. The new status took effect on 15 July 2007, when the first territorial council was elected, according to the law. The island has a president (elected every five years), a unicameral Territorial Council of nineteen members who are elected by popular vote and serve for five-year terms, and an executive council of seven members. Elections to these councils were first held on 1 July 2007 with the last election in March 2012.</reasoning><output>five</output> |
When was the last election held for the executive council positions? | <text>When was the last election held for the executive council positions?</text><reasoning>On 7 February 2007, the French Parliament passed a bill granting COM status to both St. Barthélemy and (separately) to the neighbouring Saint Martin. The new status took effect on 15 July 2007, when the first territorial council was elected, according to the law. The island has a president (elected every five years), a unicameral Territorial Council of nineteen members who are elected by popular vote and serve for five-year terms, and an executive council of seven members. Elections to these councils were first held on 1 July 2007 with the last election in March 2012.</reasoning><output>in March 2012</output> |
When did the COM status for St. Barts take effect? | <text>When did the COM status for St. Barts take effect?</text><reasoning>On 7 February 2007, the French Parliament passed a bill granting COM status to both St. Barthélemy and (separately) to the neighbouring Saint Martin. The new status took effect on 15 July 2007, when the first territorial council was elected, according to the law. The island has a president (elected every five years), a unicameral Territorial Council of nineteen members who are elected by popular vote and serve for five-year terms, and an executive council of seven members. Elections to these councils were first held on 1 July 2007 with the last election in March 2012.</reasoning><output>15 July 2007</output> |
How many people are on the Territorial Council? | <text>How many people are on the Territorial Council?</text><reasoning>On 7 February 2007, the French Parliament passed a bill granting COM status to both St. Barthélemy and (separately) to the neighbouring Saint Martin. The new status took effect on 15 July 2007, when the first territorial council was elected, according to the law. The island has a president (elected every five years), a unicameral Territorial Council of nineteen members who are elected by popular vote and serve for five-year terms, and an executive council of seven members. Elections to these councils were first held on 1 July 2007 with the last election in March 2012.</reasoning><output>nineteen</output> |
Who was the former director of the CFTC that testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008? | <text>Who was the former director of the CFTC that testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008?</text><reasoning>In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.</reasoning><output>Michael Greenberger</output> |
Who did Michael Greenberger erronesously name as a key player in speculative run-up of oil futures? | <text>Who did Michael Greenberger erronesously name as a key player in speculative run-up of oil futures?</text><reasoning>In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.</reasoning><output>IntercontinentalExchange</output> |
Who founded the Atlanta-based Intercontinental Exchange? | <text>Who founded the Atlanta-based Intercontinental Exchange?</text><reasoning>In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.</reasoning><output>Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP</output> |
Who purchased the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001? | <text>Who purchased the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001?</text><reasoning>In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.</reasoning><output>IntercontinentalExchange (ICE)</output> |
Where are regulated future exchanges located? | <text>Where are regulated future exchanges located?</text><reasoning>In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.</reasoning><output>London and New York</output> |
Which products created more complexity in the financial markets? | <text>Which products created more complexity in the financial markets?</text><reasoning>This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]</reasoning><output>innovative financial products</output> |
What effect did the introduction of innovative financial products have on a single mortgage? | <text>What effect did the introduction of innovative financial products have on a single mortgage?</text><reasoning>This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]</reasoning><output>multiplied the number of actors connected</output> |
What did institutions rely more on as increasing distance from underlying assets occurred? | <text>What did institutions rely more on as increasing distance from underlying assets occurred?</text><reasoning>This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]</reasoning><output>indirect information</output> |
What is a type of indirect information that financial institutions and investors used to judge the risk? | <text>What is a type of indirect information that financial institutions and investors used to judge the risk?</text><reasoning>This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]</reasoning><output>computer models of rating agencies</output> |
In what year did a group of computer scientists build a model for ratings produced by rating agencies that turned out to be accurate for what happened in 2006-2008? | <text>In what year did a group of computer scientists build a model for ratings produced by rating agencies that turned out to be accurate for what happened in 2006-2008?</text><reasoning>This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators, the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse. In 2005 a group of computer scientists built a computational model for the mechanism of biased ratings produced by rating agencies, which turned out to be adequate to what actually happened in 2006–2008.[citation needed]</reasoning><output>2005</output> |
Who is one of the feminist economists that believe the financial crisis revealed a crisis of mainstream economics and call for a complete reshaping of the economy? | <text>Who is one of the feminist economists that believe the financial crisis revealed a crisis of mainstream economics and call for a complete reshaping of the economy?</text><reasoning>Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet.</reasoning><output>Ailsa McKay</output> |
Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjornhold believe that the financial crisis and response reveal a crisis of ideas in this? | <text>Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjornhold believe that the financial crisis and response reveal a crisis of ideas in this?</text><reasoning>Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet.</reasoning><output>mainstream economics</output> |
According to feminist economists McKay and Bjornholt, would type economics should be included in a reshaping? | <text>According to feminist economists McKay and Bjornholt, would type economics should be included in a reshaping?</text><reasoning>Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet.</reasoning><output>feminist economics</output> |
What do economists McKay and Bjornholt want to occur in the economy, economic theory, and economics profession? | <text>What do economists McKay and Bjornholt want to occur in the economy, economic theory, and economics profession?</text><reasoning>Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet.</reasoning><output>a reshaping</output> |
What is the growth forecast for Cambodia in 2009? | <text>What is the growth forecast for Cambodia in 2009?</text><reasoning>Some developing countries that had seen strong economic growth saw significant slowdowns. For example, growth forecasts in Cambodia show a fall from more than 10% in 2007 to close to zero in 2009, and Kenya may achieve only 3–4% growth in 2009, down from 7% in 2007. According to the research by the Overseas Development Institute, reductions in growth can be attributed to falls in trade, commodity prices, investment and remittances sent from migrant workers (which reached a record $251 billion in 2007, but have fallen in many countries since). This has stark implications and has led to a dramatic rise in the number of households living below the poverty line, be it 300,000 in Bangladesh or 230,000 in Ghana. Especially states with a fragile political system have to fear that investors from Western states withdraw their money because of the crisis. Bruno Wenn of the German DEG recommends to provide a sound economic policymaking and good governance to attract new investors</reasoning><output>close to zero</output> |
How much were remittances sent from migrant workers in 2007? | <text>How much were remittances sent from migrant workers in 2007?</text><reasoning>Some developing countries that had seen strong economic growth saw significant slowdowns. For example, growth forecasts in Cambodia show a fall from more than 10% in 2007 to close to zero in 2009, and Kenya may achieve only 3–4% growth in 2009, down from 7% in 2007. According to the research by the Overseas Development Institute, reductions in growth can be attributed to falls in trade, commodity prices, investment and remittances sent from migrant workers (which reached a record $251 billion in 2007, but have fallen in many countries since). This has stark implications and has led to a dramatic rise in the number of households living below the poverty line, be it 300,000 in Bangladesh or 230,000 in Ghana. Especially states with a fragile political system have to fear that investors from Western states withdraw their money because of the crisis. Bruno Wenn of the German DEG recommends to provide a sound economic policymaking and good governance to attract new investors</reasoning><output>$251 billion</output> |
How many people live below the poverty line in Bangladesh? | <text>How many people live below the poverty line in Bangladesh?</text><reasoning>Some developing countries that had seen strong economic growth saw significant slowdowns. For example, growth forecasts in Cambodia show a fall from more than 10% in 2007 to close to zero in 2009, and Kenya may achieve only 3–4% growth in 2009, down from 7% in 2007. According to the research by the Overseas Development Institute, reductions in growth can be attributed to falls in trade, commodity prices, investment and remittances sent from migrant workers (which reached a record $251 billion in 2007, but have fallen in many countries since). This has stark implications and has led to a dramatic rise in the number of households living below the poverty line, be it 300,000 in Bangladesh or 230,000 in Ghana. Especially states with a fragile political system have to fear that investors from Western states withdraw their money because of the crisis. Bruno Wenn of the German DEG recommends to provide a sound economic policymaking and good governance to attract new investors</reasoning><output>300,000</output> |
What does Bruno Wenn of the German DEG recommend to attract new investors? | <text>What does Bruno Wenn of the German DEG recommend to attract new investors?</text><reasoning>Some developing countries that had seen strong economic growth saw significant slowdowns. For example, growth forecasts in Cambodia show a fall from more than 10% in 2007 to close to zero in 2009, and Kenya may achieve only 3–4% growth in 2009, down from 7% in 2007. According to the research by the Overseas Development Institute, reductions in growth can be attributed to falls in trade, commodity prices, investment and remittances sent from migrant workers (which reached a record $251 billion in 2007, but have fallen in many countries since). This has stark implications and has led to a dramatic rise in the number of households living below the poverty line, be it 300,000 in Bangladesh or 230,000 in Ghana. Especially states with a fragile political system have to fear that investors from Western states withdraw their money because of the crisis. Bruno Wenn of the German DEG recommends to provide a sound economic policymaking and good governance to attract new investors</reasoning><output>sound economic policymaking and good governance</output> |
According to Overseas Development Institute, what is one reason for the reduction in growth in developing countries? | <text>According to Overseas Development Institute, what is one reason for the reduction in growth in developing countries?</text><reasoning>Some developing countries that had seen strong economic growth saw significant slowdowns. For example, growth forecasts in Cambodia show a fall from more than 10% in 2007 to close to zero in 2009, and Kenya may achieve only 3–4% growth in 2009, down from 7% in 2007. According to the research by the Overseas Development Institute, reductions in growth can be attributed to falls in trade, commodity prices, investment and remittances sent from migrant workers (which reached a record $251 billion in 2007, but have fallen in many countries since). This has stark implications and has led to a dramatic rise in the number of households living below the poverty line, be it 300,000 in Bangladesh or 230,000 in Ghana. Especially states with a fragile political system have to fear that investors from Western states withdraw their money because of the crisis. Bruno Wenn of the German DEG recommends to provide a sound economic policymaking and good governance to attract new investors</reasoning><output>falls in trade</output> |
Who wrote the 2007 book The Black Swan? | <text>Who wrote the 2007 book The Black Swan?</text><reasoning>Stock trader and financial risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility". He also took action against the establishment view by making a big financial bet on banking stocks and making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money"). According to David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming."</reasoning><output>Nassim Nicholas Taleb</output> |
What journalist from the New York Times stated his believe in Nassim Nicholas Taleb? | <text>What journalist from the New York Times stated his believe in Nassim Nicholas Taleb?</text><reasoning>Stock trader and financial risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility". He also took action against the establishment view by making a big financial bet on banking stocks and making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money"). According to David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming."</reasoning><output>David Brooks</output> |
What did Nassim Nicholas Taleb warn about for years prior to the financial crisis of 2007? | <text>What did Nassim Nicholas Taleb warn about for years prior to the financial crisis of 2007?</text><reasoning>Stock trader and financial risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility". He also took action against the establishment view by making a big financial bet on banking stocks and making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money"). According to David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming."</reasoning><output>the breakdown of the banking system</output> |
What did Nassim Nicholas Taleb make a fortune on by making a big financial bet? | <text>What did Nassim Nicholas Taleb make a fortune on by making a big financial bet?</text><reasoning>Stock trader and financial risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility". He also took action against the establishment view by making a big financial bet on banking stocks and making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money"). According to David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming."</reasoning><output>banking stocks</output> |
How many of the poorest families did not have any wealth decline during the financial crisis? | <text>How many of the poorest families did not have any wealth decline during the financial crisis?</text><reasoning>Typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease.</reasoning><output>half</output> |
In a Federal Reserve survey of 4,000 households, what percent reported wealth decline between 2007 and 2009? | <text>In a Federal Reserve survey of 4,000 households, what percent reported wealth decline between 2007 and 2009?</text><reasoning>Typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease.</reasoning><output>63</output> |
How many of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth between 2007 and 2009? | <text>How many of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth between 2007 and 2009?</text><reasoning>Typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease.</reasoning><output>77</output> |
How many families at the bottom of the pyramid had a decrease in total wealth between 2007 and 2009? | <text>How many families at the bottom of the pyramid had a decrease in total wealth between 2007 and 2009?</text><reasoning>Typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease.</reasoning><output>50</output> |
Which families experienced the least decline in wealth between 2007 and 2009? | <text>Which families experienced the least decline in wealth between 2007 and 2009?</text><reasoning>Typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease.</reasoning><output>poorest families</output> |
When did the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report its findings? | <text>When did the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report its findings?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels".</reasoning><output>January 2011</output> |
What was one of the conclusions of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission regarding the financial crisis of 2007? | <text>What was one of the conclusions of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission regarding the financial crisis of 2007?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels".</reasoning><output>the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation</output> |
What agency failed to stem the tide of toxic mortgages contributing to the financial crisis of 2007? | <text>What agency failed to stem the tide of toxic mortgages contributing to the financial crisis of 2007?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels".</reasoning><output>Federal Reserve</output> |
Who was not prepared for the financial crisis in 2007 by lacking a full understanding of the financial system? | <text>Who was not prepared for the financial crisis in 2007 by lacking a full understanding of the financial system?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels".</reasoning><output>key policy makers</output> |
Which business sector contributed to the financial crisis by acting recklessly and taking on too much risk? | <text>Which business sector contributed to the financial crisis by acting recklessly and taking on too much risk?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels".</reasoning><output>financial firms</output> |
Which magazine ran a cover story claiming that most economists failed to the the financial crisis? | <text>Which magazine ran a cover story claiming that most economists failed to the the financial crisis?</text><reasoning>A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to predict the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to predict a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to predict the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom".</reasoning><output>BusinessWeek</output> |
The financial crisis of 2007 was the worst economic crisis since which crisis that occurred in the 1930s? | <text>The financial crisis of 2007 was the worst economic crisis since which crisis that occurred in the 1930s?</text><reasoning>A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to predict the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to predict a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to predict the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom".</reasoning><output>Great Depression</output> |
Which school at University of Pennsylvania examined in their online business journal why economists failed to predict the crisis? | <text>Which school at University of Pennsylvania examined in their online business journal why economists failed to predict the crisis?</text><reasoning>A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to predict the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to predict a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to predict the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom".</reasoning><output>The Wharton School</output> |
Which economist did the New York Times state warned of a crisis as early as September 2006? | <text>Which economist did the New York Times state warned of a crisis as early as September 2006?</text><reasoning>A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to predict the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to predict a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to predict the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom".</reasoning><output>Nouriel Roubini</output> |
What was economist Roubini called by the New York Times for predicting a collapse of the housing market? | <text>What was economist Roubini called by the New York Times for predicting a collapse of the housing market?</text><reasoning>A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to predict the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to predict a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to predict the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom".</reasoning><output>"Dr. Doom"</output> |
What have central banks around the world done to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral? | <text>What have central banks around the world done to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to expand money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity.</reasoning><output>expand money supplies</output> |
What have governments done to offset the reduction in private sector demand? | <text>What have governments done to offset the reduction in private sector demand?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to expand money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity.</reasoning><output>enacted large fiscal stimulus packages</output> |
What is the U.S. Federal Reserve's traditional role during a crisis? | <text>What is the U.S. Federal Reserve's traditional role during a crisis?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to expand money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity.</reasoning><output>lender-of-last-resort</output> |
What did the U.S. Federal Reserve do to increase access to liquidity? | <text>What did the U.S. Federal Reserve do to increase access to liquidity?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to expand money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity.</reasoning><output>expanded liquidity facilities</output> |
What type decline does lower wages and higher unemployment lead to? | <text>What type decline does lower wages and higher unemployment lead to?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to expand money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity.</reasoning><output>self-reinforcing decline</output> |
What economist testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010? | <text>What economist testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010?</text><reasoning>Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."</reasoning><output>Mark Zandi</output> |
In January 2010, what markets did Mark Zandi testify about that remain impaired and investors anticipate more loan losses? | <text>In January 2010, what markets did Mark Zandi testify about that remain impaired and investors anticipate more loan losses?</text><reasoning>Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."</reasoning><output>securitization markets</output> |
What was the value of CDOs at their peak in 2006? | <text>What was the value of CDOs at their peak in 2006?</text><reasoning>Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."</reasoning><output>close to $2 trillion</output> |
What was the private issuance of CDOs in 2009? | <text>What was the private issuance of CDOs in 2009?</text><reasoning>Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."</reasoning><output>less than $150 billion</output> |
Almost all of the asset-backed issuance in 2009 was supported by what Federal Reserve program? | <text>Almost all of the asset-backed issuance in 2009 was supported by what Federal Reserve program?</text><reasoning>Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."</reasoning><output>TALF</output> |
Who was one of the only mainstream economist to predict the financial crisis? | <text>Who was one of the only mainstream economist to predict the financial crisis?</text><reasoning>The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.</reasoning><output>Raghuram Rajan</output> |
What did Raghuram Rajan speak of? | <text>What did Raghuram Rajan speak of?</text><reasoning>The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.</reasoning><output>Great Moderation</output> |
Who credit 12 heterodox economists with predicting the crisis in his research credits? | <text>Who credit 12 heterodox economists with predicting the crisis in his research credits?</text><reasoning>The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.</reasoning><output>Dirk Bezemer</output> |
How did the Austrian economic school regard the crisis? | <text>How did the Austrian economic school regard the crisis?</text><reasoning>The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.</reasoning><output>as a vindication</output> |
Which former Fed Chair confessed in Congressional testimony to being forced to return to lax monetary supply? | <text>Which former Fed Chair confessed in Congressional testimony to being forced to return to lax monetary supply?</text><reasoning>The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.</reasoning><output>Alan Greenspan</output> |
What was introduced by President Barack Obama in June 2009? | <text>What was introduced by President Barack Obama in June 2009?</text><reasoning>United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank financial cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes.</reasoning><output>a series of regulatory proposals</output> |
What was one of the items important to consumers that was addressed by the new regulatory proposals introduced in June 2009? | <text>What was one of the items important to consumers that was addressed by the new regulatory proposals introduced in June 2009?</text><reasoning>United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank financial cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes.</reasoning><output>consumer protection</output> |
Regulations were proposed by Obama in January 2010 to limit the ability of banks to engage in which type trading? | <text>Regulations were proposed by Obama in January 2010 to limit the ability of banks to engage in which type trading?</text><reasoning>United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank financial cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes.</reasoning><output>proprietary</output> |
Who were proposed new regulations called "The Volcker Rule" named after? | <text>Who were proposed new regulations called "The Volcker Rule" named after?</text><reasoning>United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank financial cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes.</reasoning><output>Paul Volcker</output> |
Who publicly argued for changes limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading? | <text>Who publicly argued for changes limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading?</text><reasoning>United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank financial cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes.</reasoning><output>Paul Volcker</output> |
What are MBS as related to the housing and credit booms? | <text>What are MBS as related to the housing and credit booms?</text><reasoning>As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses.</reasoning><output>mortgage-backed securities</output> |
What are CDO as related to the housing and credit booms? | <text>What are CDO as related to the housing and credit booms?</text><reasoning>As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses.</reasoning><output>collateralized debt obligations</output> |
When housing prices declined, who reported significant losses from being heavily invested in subprime MBS? | <text>When housing prices declined, who reported significant losses from being heavily invested in subprime MBS?</text><reasoning>As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses.</reasoning><output>major global financial institutions</output> |
Who could invest in the U.S. housing market through MBS and CDO? | <text>Who could invest in the U.S. housing market through MBS and CDO?</text><reasoning>As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses.</reasoning><output>institutions and investors around the world</output> |
MBS and CDO derive their value from? | <text>MBS and CDO derive their value from?</text><reasoning>As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses.</reasoning><output>mortgage payments and housing prices</output> |
When did the U.S. Senate first pass a financial reform bill? | <text>When did the U.S. Senate first pass a financial reform bill?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill in December 2009. These bills must now be reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama administration. For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit these trades.</reasoning><output>May 2010</output> |
When did the U.S. House first pass a financial reform bill? | <text>When did the U.S. House first pass a financial reform bill?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill in December 2009. These bills must now be reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama administration. For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit these trades.</reasoning><output>December 2009</output> |
What rule against proprietary trading was not part of legislation passed by either the Senate or House? | <text>What rule against proprietary trading was not part of legislation passed by either the Senate or House?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill in December 2009. These bills must now be reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama administration. For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit these trades.</reasoning><output>Volcker Rule</output> |
Which bill gave regulators the discretion to prohibit proprietary trades? | <text>Which bill gave regulators the discretion to prohibit proprietary trades?</text><reasoning>The U.S. Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill in December 2009. These bills must now be reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama administration. For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit these trades.</reasoning><output>Senate</output> |
Who is the market strategist that believes distinctions exist between the current crisis and the Great Depression? | <text>Who is the market strategist that believes distinctions exist between the current crisis and the Great Depression?</text><reasoning>Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is similar to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16 months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow. Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past two years ranked third, however.</reasoning><output>Phil Dow</output> |
How much did the Dow Jones average fall during a period of 17 months? | <text>How much did the Dow Jones average fall during a period of 17 months?</text><reasoning>Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is similar to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16 months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow. Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past two years ranked third, however.</reasoning><output>50%</output> |
What was the percentage the Dow Jones fell in the Great Depression? | <text>What was the percentage the Dow Jones fell in the Great Depression?</text><reasoning>Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is similar to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16 months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow. Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past two years ranked third, however.</reasoning><output>54.7%</output> |
Who was the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times in March 2009? | <text>Who was the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times in March 2009?</text><reasoning>Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is similar to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16 months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow. Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past two years ranked third, however.</reasoning><output>Floyd Norris</output> |
Who was the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India that predicted the crisis in 2005? | <text>Who was the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India that predicted the crisis in 2005?</text><reasoning>Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."</reasoning><output>Raghuram Rajan</output> |
When did Raghuram Rajan become chief economist the the International Monetary Fund? | <text>When did Raghuram Rajan become chief economist the the International Monetary Fund?</text><reasoning>Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."</reasoning><output>2005</output> |
In 2005, where did Rajan deliver a controversial paper that was critical of the financial paper? | <text>In 2005, where did Rajan deliver a controversial paper that was critical of the financial paper?</text><reasoning>Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."</reasoning><output>at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan</output> |
What was the name of Raghuram Rajan's controversial paper delivered in 2005? | <text>What was the name of Raghuram Rajan's controversial paper delivered in 2005?</text><reasoning>Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."</reasoning><output>"Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?"</output> |
What are risks called that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but generous compensation the rest of the time? | <text>What are risks called that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but generous compensation the rest of the time?</text><reasoning>Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised."</reasoning><output>tail risks</output> |
On November 3, 2008, who predicted extremely weak GDP growth for the Eurozone in 2009? | <text>On November 3, 2008, who predicted extremely weak GDP growth for the Eurozone in 2009?</text><reasoning>On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even negative number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies.</reasoning><output>European Commission at Brussels</output> |
How much did the European Commission estimate the GDP growth for Eurozone countries would be in 2009? | <text>How much did the European Commission estimate the GDP growth for Eurozone countries would be in 2009?</text><reasoning>On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even negative number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies.</reasoning><output>0.1%</output> |
How much did the European Commission estimate the GDP growth for the UK would be in 2009? | <text>How much did the European Commission estimate the GDP growth for the UK would be in 2009?</text><reasoning>On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even negative number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies.</reasoning><output>−1.0%</output> |
On November 6, in Washington, D.C., who predicted a worldwide recession for 2009? | <text>On November 6, in Washington, D.C., who predicted a worldwide recession for 2009?</text><reasoning>On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even negative number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies.</reasoning><output>the IMF</output> |
On November 5, 2008, the Bank of England reduced their interest rate from 4.5% to what? | <text>On November 5, 2008, the Bank of England reduced their interest rate from 4.5% to what?</text><reasoning>On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even negative number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies.</reasoning><output>3%</output> |
Following the collapse in the housing bubble, what happened to a number of commodity prices? | <text>Following the collapse in the housing bubble, what happened to a number of commodity prices?</text><reasoning>Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.</reasoning><output>Rapid increases</output> |
How much did the price of oil increase from early 2007 to 2008? | <text>How much did the price of oil increase from early 2007 to 2008?</text><reasoning>Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.</reasoning><output>nearly tripled from $50 to $147</output> |
What did the price of oil began doing when the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008? | <text>What did the price of oil began doing when the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008?</text><reasoning>Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.</reasoning><output>plunging</output> |
What is one of the reasons experts believe contributed to the volatilaty in oil prices in 2008? | <text>What is one of the reasons experts believe contributed to the volatilaty in oil prices in 2008?</text><reasoning>Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.</reasoning><output>monetary policy</output> |
Consumers tend to have less money to spend on other goods, when the price of which commodity is higher? | <text>Consumers tend to have less money to spend on other goods, when the price of which commodity is higher?</text><reasoning>Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.</reasoning><output>gasoline</output> |
How much are total losses estimated to be from falling home prices? | <text>How much are total losses estimated to be from falling home prices?</text><reasoning>Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally.</reasoning><output>trillions of U.S. dollars</output> |
What is the financial incentive when a home is worth less than the mortgage loan? | <text>What is the financial incentive when a home is worth less than the mortgage loan?</text><reasoning>Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally.</reasoning><output>foreclosure</output> |
What year did the foreclosure epidemic begin? | <text>What year did the foreclosure epidemic begin?</text><reasoning>Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally.</reasoning><output>late 2006</output> |
What other financial instruments had significant defaults and losses as a result of the crisis expanding from housing to other parts of the economy? | <text>What other financial instruments had significant defaults and losses as a result of the crisis expanding from housing to other parts of the economy?</text><reasoning>Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally.</reasoning><output>other loan types</output> |
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