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---
license: mit
tags:
- security
- vulnerability-report
---
# Vulnerability Report: Unauthenticated RCE in TensorRT-LLM (MGMN Leader Node)
## Summary
I have identified a Critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the TensorRT-LLM Multi-GPU Multi-Node (MGMN) launcher. The vulnerability exists in the `mgmn_leader_node.py` script, which initializes an IPC server without enforcing HMAC authentication. Combined with insecure environment variable handling, this allows a local or network attacker to force the server to bind to an external interface and execute arbitrary code.
## Vulnerability Details
**Component:** `tensorrt_llm/llmapi/mgmn_leader_node.py` and `tensorrt_llm/llmapi/mpi_session.py`
**Root Cause:**
1. **Insecure Default Initialization:**
In `tensorrt_llm/llmapi/mgmn_leader_node.py`, the `RemoteMpiCommSessionServer` is initialized without passing an `hmac_key`.
```python
# mgmn_leader_node.py
server = RemoteMpiCommSessionServer(
comm=sub_comm,
n_workers=num_ranks,
addr=get_spawn_proxy_process_ipc_addr_env(),
is_comm=True) # MISSING hmac_key
Security Fallback Failure: In tensorrt_llm/llmapi/mpi_session.py, the __init__ method sets use_hmac_encryption to False if no key is provided.
Python
# mpi_session.py
self.queue = ZeroMqQueue(..., use_hmac_encryption=bool(hmac_key))
This disables the signature check on the IPC socket, allowing unauthenticated pickle.loads deserialization.
Insecure Environment Variable Handling: The bind address is derived from TLLM_SPAWN_PROXY_PROCESS_IPC_ADDR (in utils.py), which can be controlled by any user on the system before the service starts.
Attack Scenario
An attacker sets the environment variable: export TLLM_SPAWN_PROXY_PROCESS_IPC_ADDR="tcp://0.0.0.0:4444"
The victim (or automated orchestration system) executes mgmn_leader_node.py.
The server binds to port 4444 on all interfaces with HMAC Encryption Disabled.
The attacker connects to port 4444 and sends a malicious Pickle payload containing shell commands (e.g., reverse shell).
The ZeroMqQueue class deserializes the payload without verification, executing the attacker's code with the privileges of the TensorRT-LLM process.
Impact
This vulnerability allows for Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE). In shared cluster environments (e.g., Slurm/Kubernetes), this allows a low-privileged user to escalate privileges or move laterally to other nodes running TensorRT-LLM.