Daily Papers

Enabling large language model (LLM) agents to accumulate and reuse experience from past interactions remains a central challenge in real-world applications. A promising solution is to treat skills as trainable states and optimize them in the same way as model parameters in neural network training. However, data-driven skill optimization is prone to overfitting to the limited trajectories collected from real environments. Overexploiting these trajectories overfits the current batch, while unconstrained exploration causes regression on previously solved cases. This tension motivates a constrained search view of skill self-evolution, governed by an exploration--exploitation trade-off. We propose SkillBoost, a three-stage framework that mitigates both risks: structured exploitation localizes observed failures to editable skill components, prior-guided exploration draws on prior knowledge in the LLM to generate diverse repair candidates, and verified acceptance commits a candidate only when it improves performance within a regression bound. Experiments across 23 model--benchmark configurations show that SkillBoost achieves state-of-the-art performance while mitigating overfitting, outperforming both human-crafted and LLM-generated skills. Transfer experiments further show that optimized skills can be reused by other agents on similar tasks.

Large discrete action spaces (LDAS) remain a central challenge in reinforcement learning. Existing solution approaches can handle unstructured LDAS with up to a few million actions. However, many real-world applications in logistics, production, and transportation systems have combinatorial action spaces, whose size grows well beyond millions of actions, even on small instances. Fortunately, such action spaces exhibit structure, e.g., equally spaced discrete resource units. With this work, we focus on handling structured LDAS (SLDAS) with sizes that cannot be handled by current benchmarks: we propose Dynamic Neighborhood Construction (DNC), a novel exploitation paradigm for SLDAS. We present a scalable neighborhood exploration heuristic that utilizes this paradigm and efficiently explores the discrete neighborhood around the continuous proxy action in structured action spaces with up to 10^{73} actions. We demonstrate the performance of our method by benchmarking it against three state-of-the-art approaches designed for large discrete action spaces across two distinct environments. Our results show that DNC matches or outperforms state-of-the-art approaches while being computationally more efficient. Furthermore, our method scales to action spaces that so far remained computationally intractable for existing methodologies.

The proficiency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in processing structured data and adhering to syntactic rules is a capability that drives their widespread adoption but also makes them paradoxically vulnerable. In this paper, we investigate this vulnerability through BreakFun, a jailbreak methodology that weaponizes an LLM's adherence to structured schemas. BreakFun employs a three-part prompt that combines an innocent framing and a Chain-of-Thought distraction with a core "Trojan Schema"--a carefully crafted data structure that compels the model to generate harmful content, exploiting the LLM's strong tendency to follow structures and schemas. We demonstrate this vulnerability is highly transferable, achieving an average success rate of 89% across 13 foundational and proprietary models on JailbreakBench, and reaching a 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) on several prominent models. A rigorous ablation study confirms this Trojan Schema is the attack's primary causal factor. To counter this, we introduce the Adversarial Prompt Deconstruction guardrail, a defense that utilizes a secondary LLM to perform a "Literal Transcription"--extracting all human-readable text to isolate and reveal the user's true harmful intent. Our proof-of-concept guardrail demonstrates high efficacy against the attack, validating that targeting the deceptive schema is a viable mitigation strategy. Our work provides a look into how an LLM's core strengths can be turned into critical weaknesses, offering a fresh perspective for building more robustly aligned models.

Scaling test-time compute with multi-path chain-of-thought improves reasoning accuracy, but its effectiveness depends critically on the exploration-exploitation trade-off. Existing approaches address this trade-off in rigid ways: tree-structured search hard-codes exploration through brittle expansion rules that interfere with post-trained reasoning, while parallel reasoning over-explores redundant hypothesis paths and relies on weak answer selection. Motivated by the observation that the optimal balance is phase-dependent and that correct and incorrect reasoning paths often diverge only at late stages, we reformulate test-time scaling as a dynamic expand-reduce control problem over a pool of hypotheses. We propose HyPER, a training-free online control policy for multi-path decoding in mixture-of-experts models that reallocates computation under a fixed budget using lightweight path statistics. HyPER consists of an online controller that transitions from exploration to exploitation as the hypothesis pool evolves, a token-level refinement mechanism that enables efficient generation-time exploitation without full-path resampling, and a length- and confidence-aware aggregation strategy for reliable answer-time exploitation. Experiments on four mixture-of-experts language models across diverse reasoning benchmarks show that HyPER consistently achieves a superior accuracy-compute trade-off, improving accuracy by 8 to 10 percent while reducing token usage by 25 to 40 percent.

Medical deep learning models depend heavily on domain-specific knowledge to perform well on knowledge-intensive clinical tasks. Prior work has primarily leveraged unimodal knowledge graphs, such as the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS), to enhance model performance. However, integrating multimodal medical knowledge graphs remains largely underexplored, mainly due to the lack of resources linking imaging data with clinical concepts. To address this gap, we propose MEDMKG, a Medical Multimodal Knowledge Graph that unifies visual and textual medical information through a multi-stage construction pipeline. MEDMKG fuses the rich multimodal data from MIMIC-CXR with the structured clinical knowledge from UMLS, utilizing both rule-based tools and large language models for accurate concept extraction and relationship modeling. To ensure graph quality and compactness, we introduce Neighbor-aware Filtering (NaF), a novel filtering algorithm tailored for multimodal knowledge graphs. We evaluate MEDMKG across three tasks under two experimental settings, benchmarking twenty-four baseline methods and four state-of-the-art vision-language backbones on six datasets. Results show that MEDMKG not only improves performance in downstream medical tasks but also offers a strong foundation for developing adaptive and robust strategies for multimodal knowledge integration in medical artificial intelligence.

Deep search requires agents to answer complex questions through multi-step web search, browsing, evidence comparison, and synthesis. A central challenge is deciding how to search when several directions look plausible but only some will later lead to reliable evidence. If an agent greedily follows the current best-looking direction, it may keep extending a weak continuation. If it explores without discipline, it may waste budget on disconnected trials. We propose TreeSeeker, an inference-time framework for controlled trial-and-error in deep search. TreeSeeker organizes search as branch-and-return search over tree-structured states, where each branch is a tentative direction for a sub-goal. At each round, TreeSearch reads all sub-goal trees, identifies active goals, and uses textual UCB signals of value, uncertainty, and risk to select among exploiting a promising branch, exploring an uncertain alternative, or pruning an unproductive continuation and returning to an earlier branch point. TreeMem supports this control loop by keeping evidence, uncertainty, conflicts, progress, and failure cues attached to the branches that produced them, so trial outcomes can guide later decisions. Experiments on XBench-DeepSearch, BrowseComp, and BrowseComp-ZH show that TreeSeeker consistently outperforms strong open-source baselines, suggesting that explicit branch-and-return control complements stronger reasoning and tool execution.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in assisting cybersecurity tasks, yet existing approaches struggle with automatic vulnerability discovery and exploitation due to limited interaction, weak execution grounding, and a lack of experience reuse. We propose Co-RedTeam, a security-aware multi-agent framework designed to mirror real-world red-teaming workflows by integrating security-domain knowledge, code-aware analysis, execution-grounded iterative reasoning, and long-term memory. Co-RedTeam decomposes vulnerability analysis into coordinated discovery and exploitation stages, enabling agents to plan, execute, validate, and refine actions based on real execution feedback while learning from prior trajectories. Extensive evaluations on challenging security benchmarks demonstrate that Co-RedTeam consistently outperforms strong baselines across diverse backbone models, achieving over 60% success rate in vulnerability exploitation and over 10% absolute improvement in vulnerability detection. Ablation and iteration studies further confirm the critical role of execution feedback, structured interaction, and memory for building robust and generalizable cybersecurity agents.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as an effective method for training reasoning models. However, existing RL approaches typically bias the model's output distribution toward reward-maximizing paths without introducing external knowledge. This limits their exploration capacity and results in a narrower reasoning capability boundary compared to base models. To address this limitation, we propose TAPO (Thought-Augmented Policy Optimization), a novel framework that augments RL by incorporating external high-level guidance ("thought patterns"). By adaptively integrating structured thoughts during training, TAPO effectively balances model-internal exploration and external guidance exploitation. Extensive experiments show that our approach significantly outperforms GRPO by 99% on AIME, 41% on AMC, and 17% on Minerva Math. Notably, these high-level thought patterns, abstracted from only 500 prior samples, generalize effectively across various tasks and models. This highlights TAPO's potential for broader applications across multiple tasks and domains. Our further analysis reveals that introducing external guidance produces powerful reasoning models with superior explainability of inference behavior and enhanced output readability.

Referring Multi-Object Tracking has attracted increasing attention due to its human-friendly interactive characteristics, yet it exhibits limitations in low-visibility conditions, such as nighttime, smoke, and other challenging scenarios. To overcome this limitation, we propose a new RGB-Thermal RMOT task, named RT-RMOT, which aims to fuse RGB appearance features with the illumination robustness of the thermal modality to enable all-day referring multi-object tracking. To promote research on RT-RMOT, we construct the first Referring Multi-Object Tracking dataset under RGB-Thermal modality, named RefRT. It contains 388 language descriptions, 1,250 tracked targets, and 166,147 Language-RGB-Thermal (L-RGB-T) triplets. Furthermore, we propose RTrack, a framework built upon a multimodal large language model (MLLM) that integrates RGB, thermal, and textual features. Since the initial framework still leaves room for improvement, we introduce a Group Sequence Policy Optimization (GSPO) strategy to further exploit the model's potential. To alleviate training instability during RL fine-tuning, we introduce a Clipped Advantage Scaling (CAS) strategy to suppress gradient explosion. In addition, we design Structured Output Reward and Comprehensive Detection Reward to balance exploration and exploitation, thereby improving the completeness and accuracy of target perception. Extensive experiments on the RefRT dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed RTrack framework.

While model serving has unlocked unprecedented capabilities, the high cost of serving large-scale models continues to be a significant barrier to widespread accessibility and rapid innovation. Compiler optimizations have long driven substantial performance improvements, but existing compilers struggle with neural workloads due to the exponentially large and highly interdependent space of possible transformations. Although existing stochastic search techniques can be effective, they are often sample-inefficient and fail to leverage the structural context underlying compilation decisions. We set out to investigate the research question of whether reasoning with large language models (LLMs), without any retraining, can leverage the context-aware decision space of compiler optimizations to significantly improve sample efficiency. To that end, we introduce a novel compilation framework (dubbed REASONING COMPILER) that formulates optimization as a sequential, context-aware decision process guided by a large language model and structured Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS). The LLM acts as a proposal mechanism, suggesting hardware-informed transformations that reflect the current program state and accumulated performance feedback. MCTS incorporates the LLM-generated proposals to balance exploration and exploitation, facilitating a structured, context-sensitive traversal of the expansive compiler optimization space. By achieving substantial speedups with markedly fewer samples than leading neural compilers, our approach demonstrates the potential of LLM-guided reasoning to transform the landscape of compiler optimization.

Test-time scaling has become an effective paradigm for improving the reasoning ability of large language models by allocating additional computation during inference. Recent structured approaches have further advanced this paradigm by organizing inference across multiple trajectories, refinement rounds, and verification-based feedback. However, existing structured test-time scaling methods either weakly coordinate parallel reasoning trajectories or rely on noisy historical information without explicitly deciding what should be retained and reused, limiting their ability to balance exploration and exploitation. In this work, we propose TMAS, a framework for scaling test-time compute via multi-agent synergy. TMAS organizes inference as a collaborative process among specialized agents, enabling structured information flow across agents, trajectories, and refinement iterations. To support effective cross-trajectory collaboration, TMAS introduces hierarchical memories: the experience bank reuses low-level reliable intermediate conclusions and local feedback, while the guideline bank records previously explored high-level strategies to steer subsequent rollouts away from redundant reasoning patterns. Furthermore, we design a hybrid reward reinforcement learning scheme tailored to TMAS, which jointly preserves basic reasoning capability, enhances experience utilization, and encourages exploration beyond previously attempted solution strategies. Extensive experiments on challenging reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that TMAS achieves stronger iterative scaling than existing test-time scaling baselines, while hybrid reward training further improves scaling effectiveness and stability across iterations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/george-QF/TMAS-code.

Multivector retrieval models achieve state-of-the-art effectiveness through fine-grained token-level representations, but their deployment incurs substantial computational and memory costs. Current solutions, based on the well-known k-means clustering algorithm, group similar vectors together to enable both effective compression and efficient retrieval. However, standard k-means scales poorly with the number of clusters and dataset size, and favours frequent tokens during training while underrepresenting rare, discriminative ones. In this work, we introduce TACHIOM, a multivector retrieval system that exploits token-level structure to significantly accelerate both clustering and retrieval. By accounting for tokens' distribution during centroid allocation, TACHIOM easily scales to millions of centroids, enabling highly accurate document scoring using only centroids, avoiding expensive token-level computation. TACHIOM combines a graph-based index over centroids with an optimized Product Quantization layout for efficient final scoring. Experiments on MS-MARCOv1 and LoTTE show that TACHIOM achieves up to 247times faster clustering than k-means and up to 9.8times retrieval speedup over state-of-the-art systems while maintaining comparable or superior effectiveness.

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is exploitation: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete security impact, such as unauthorized file access or code execution. Exploitation is a particularly challenging task because it requires low-level program reasoning (e.g., about memory layout), runtime adaptation, and sustained progress over long horizons. Meanwhile, it is inherently dual-use, supporting defensive workflows while lowering the barrier for offense. Despite its importance and diagnostic value, exploitation remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce ExploitGym, a large-scale, diverse, realistic benchmark on the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Given a program input that triggers a vulnerability, ExploitGym tasks agents with progressively extending it into a working exploit. The benchmark comprises 898 instances sourced from real-world vulnerabilities across three domains, including userspace programs, Google's V8 JavaScript engine, and the Linux kernel. We vary the security protections applied to each instance, isolating their impact on agent performance. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments. Our evaluation shows that while exploitation remains challenging, frontier models can successfully exploit a non-trivial fraction of vulnerabilities. For example, the strongest configurations are Anthropic's latest model Claude Mythos Preview and OpenAI's GPT-5.5, which produce working exploits for 157 and 120 instances, respectively. Notably, even with widely used defenses enabled, models retain non-trivial success rates. These results establish ExploitGym as an effective testbed for exploitation and highlight the growing cybersecurity risks posed by increasingly capable AI agents.

Structured pruning is a commonly used technique in deploying deep neural networks (DNNs) onto resource-constrained devices. However, the existing pruning methods are usually heuristic, task-specified, and require an extra fine-tuning procedure. To overcome these limitations, we propose a framework that compresses DNNs into slimmer architectures with competitive performances and significant FLOPs reductions by Only-Train-Once (OTO). OTO contains two keys: (i) we partition the parameters of DNNs into zero-invariant groups, enabling us to prune zero groups without affecting the output; and (ii) to promote zero groups, we then formulate a structured-sparsity optimization problem and propose a novel optimization algorithm, Half-Space Stochastic Projected Gradient (HSPG), to solve it, which outperforms the standard proximal methods on group sparsity exploration and maintains comparable convergence. To demonstrate the effectiveness of OTO, we train and compress full models simultaneously from scratch without fine-tuning for inference speedup and parameter reduction, and achieve state-of-the-art results on VGG16 for CIFAR10, ResNet50 for CIFAR10 and Bert for SQuAD and competitive result on ResNet50 for ImageNet. The source code is available at https://github.com/tianyic/only_train_once.

We study learning to learn for the multi-task structured bandit problem where the goal is to learn a near-optimal algorithm that minimizes cumulative regret. The tasks share a common structure and an algorithm should exploit the shared structure to minimize the cumulative regret for an unseen but related test task. We use a transformer as a decision-making algorithm to learn this shared structure from data collected by a demonstrator on a set of training task instances. Our objective is to devise a training procedure such that the transformer will learn to outperform the demonstrator's learning algorithm on unseen test task instances. Prior work on pretraining decision transformers either requires privileged information like access to optimal arms or cannot outperform the demonstrator. Going beyond these approaches, we introduce a pre-training approach that trains a transformer network to learn a near-optimal policy in-context. This approach leverages the shared structure across tasks, does not require access to optimal actions, and can outperform the demonstrator. We validate these claims over a wide variety of structured bandit problems to show that our proposed solution is general and can quickly identify expected rewards on unseen test tasks to support effective exploration.

The goal of this thesis is to investigate the structural properties of certain sequential problems in order to bring the solutions closer to a practical use. In the first part, we put a special emphasis on structures that can be represented as graphs on actions. In the second part, we study the large action spaces that can be of exponential size in the number of base actions or even infinite. For graph bandits, we consider the settings of smoothness of rewards (spectral bandits), side observations, and influence maximization. For large structured domains, we cover kernel bandits, polymatroid bandits, bandits for function optimization (including unknown smoothness), and infinitely many-arms bandits. The thesis aspires to be a survey of the author's contributions on graph and structured bandits.

The remarkable performance of deep Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) is generally attributed to their deeper and wider architectures, which can come with significant computational costs. Pruning neural networks has thus gained interest since it effectively lowers storage and computational costs. In contrast to weight pruning, which results in unstructured models, structured pruning provides the benefit of realistic acceleration by producing models that are friendly to hardware implementation. The special requirements of structured pruning have led to the discovery of numerous new challenges and the development of innovative solutions. This article surveys the recent progress towards structured pruning of deep CNNs. We summarize and compare the state-of-the-art structured pruning techniques with respect to filter ranking methods, regularization methods, dynamic execution, neural architecture search, the lottery ticket hypothesis, and the applications of pruning. While discussing structured pruning algorithms, we briefly introduce the unstructured pruning counterpart to emphasize their differences. Furthermore, we provide insights into potential research opportunities in the field of structured pruning. A curated list of neural network pruning papers can be found at https://github.com/he-y/Awesome-Pruning

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however, formalize hierarchies of only three or four levels, treat all violations as equally severe, and rarely evaluate the full set of pairwise level interactions. We formalize a k-level instruction hierarchy problem and instantiate it for k=5, yielding ten pairwise priority relations that a compliant model must enforce. We then introduce Gravity-Weighted DPO (GW-DPO), a preference-optimization objective whose per-sample offset scales with the structural distance between conflicting levels under a linear or bilateral schedule, the latter weighting severity by both the privilege gap and the privilege of the victim level. Combined with hierarchy-specific delimiter tokens (Chen et al., 2025) and Instructional Segment Embeddings (ISE; Wu et al., 2025), GW-DPO with the bilateral schedule Pareto-improves over standard DPO and the linear variant on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, raising macro pairwise priority adherence while keeping over-refusal at half the standard DPO rate. Ablations isolate ISE as a refusal-threshold calibrator and recast five- versus three-level training as a generality-specialization tradeoff.

Structured access is an emerging paradigm for the safe deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). Instead of openly disseminating AI systems, developers facilitate controlled, arm's length interactions with their AI systems. The aim is to prevent dangerous AI capabilities from being widely accessible, whilst preserving access to AI capabilities that can be used safely. The developer must both restrict how the AI system can be used, and prevent the user from circumventing these restrictions through modification or reverse engineering of the AI system. Structured access is most effective when implemented through cloud-based AI services, rather than disseminating AI software that runs locally on users' hardware. Cloud-based interfaces provide the AI developer greater scope for controlling how the AI system is used, and for protecting against unauthorized modifications to the system's design. This chapter expands the discussion of "publication norms" in the AI community, which to date has focused on the question of how the informational content of AI research projects should be disseminated (e.g., code and models). Although this is an important question, there are limits to what can be achieved through the control of information flows. Structured access views AI software not only as information that can be shared but also as a tool with which users can have arm's length interactions. There are early examples of structured access being practiced by AI developers, but there is much room for further development, both in the functionality of cloud-based interfaces and in the wider institutional framework.

The popularity of LLaMA (Touvron et al., 2023a;b) and other recently emerged moderate-sized large language models (LLMs) highlights the potential of building smaller yet powerful LLMs. Regardless, the cost of training such models from scratch on trillions of tokens remains high. In this work, we study structured pruning as an effective means to develop smaller LLMs from pre-trained, larger models. Our approach employs two key techniques: (1) targeted structured pruning, which prunes a larger model to a specified target shape by removing layers, heads, and intermediate and hidden dimensions in an end-to-end manner, and (2) dynamic batch loading, which dynamically updates the composition of sampled data in each training batch based on varying losses across different domains. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach by presenting the Sheared-LLaMA series, pruning the LLaMA2-7B model down to 1.3B and 2.7B parameters. Sheared-LLaMA models outperform state-of-the-art open-source models of equivalent sizes, such as Pythia, INCITE, and OpenLLaMA models, on a wide range of downstream and instruction tuning evaluations, while requiring only 3% of compute compared to training such models from scratch. This work provides compelling evidence that leveraging existing LLMs with structured pruning is a far more cost-effective approach for building smaller LLMs.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Structured pruning is a popular method to reduce the cost of convolutional neural networks, that are the state of the art in many computer vision tasks. However, depending on the architecture, pruning introduces dimensional discrepancies which prevent the actual reduction of pruned networks. To tackle this problem, we propose a method that is able to take any structured pruning mask and generate a network that does not encounter any of these problems and can be leveraged efficiently. We provide an accurate description of our solution and show results of gains, in energy consumption and inference time on embedded hardware, of pruned convolutional neural networks.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at function calling, but inference scaling has been explored mainly for unstructured generation. We propose an inference-scaling framework for structured outputs that combines fine-grained beam search with ToolPRM, a process reward model scoring each intra-call decision (function name and argument filling). We build the first fine-grained intra-call supervision dataset via function masking, rollout collection, and step-level annotation. ToolPRM outperforms outcome and coarse-grained reward models in predictive accuracy and yields consistent test-time gains on multiple function-calling benchmarks. We further show that structured generation follows ``explore more but retain less'', since early JSON errors are unrecoverable.

Smart contract vulnerabilities have led to billions in losses, yet finding actionable exploits remains challenging. Traditional fuzzers rely on rigid heuristics and struggle with complex attacks, while human auditors are thorough but slow and don't scale. Large Language Models offer a promising middle ground, combining human-like reasoning with machine speed. Early studies show that simply prompting LLMs generates unverified vulnerability speculations with high false positive rates. To address this, we present A1, an agentic system that transforms any LLM into an end-to-end exploit generator. A1 provides agents with six domain-specific tools for autonomous vulnerability discovery, from understanding contract behavior to testing strategies on real blockchain states. All outputs are concretely validated through execution, ensuring only profitable proof-of-concept exploits are reported. We evaluate A1 across 36 real-world vulnerable contracts on Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain. A1 achieves a 63% success rate on the VERITE benchmark. Across all successful cases, A1 extracts up to \8.59 million per exploit and 9.33 million total. Using Monte Carlo analysis of historical attacks, we demonstrate that immediate vulnerability detection yields 86-89% success probability, dropping to 6-21% with week-long delays. Our economic analysis reveals a troubling asymmetry: attackers achieve profitability at \6,000 exploit values while defenders require 60,000 -- raising fundamental questions about whether AI agents inevitably favor exploitation over defense.

While learning models are typically studied for inputs in the form of a fixed dimensional feature vector, real world data is rarely found in this form. In order to meet the basic requirement of traditional learning models, structural data generally have to be converted into fix-length vectors in a handcrafted manner, which is tedious and may even incur information loss. A common form of structured data is what we term "semantic tree-structures", corresponding to data where rich semantic information is encoded in a compositional manner, such as those expressed in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and eXtensible Markup Language (XML). For tree-structured data, several learning models have been studied to allow for working directly on raw tree-structure data, However such learning models are limited to either a specific tree-topology or a specific tree-structured data format, e.g., synthetic parse trees. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for end-to-end learning on generic semantic tree-structured data of arbitrary topology and heterogeneous data types, such as data expressed in JSON, XML and so on. Motivated by the works in recursive and recurrent neural networks, we develop exemplar neural implementations of our framework for the JSON format. We evaluate our approach on several UCI benchmark datasets, including ablation and data-efficiency studies, and on a toy reinforcement learning task. Experimental results suggest that our framework yields comparable performance to use of standard models with dedicated feature-vectors in general, and even exceeds baseline performance in cases where compositional nature of the data is particularly important. The source code for a JSON-based implementation of our framework along with experiments can be downloaded at https://github.com/EndingCredits/json2vec.

Reinforcement learning (RL) trained language model agents with tool access are increasingly deployed in coding assistants, research tools, and autonomous systems. We introduce the Reward Hacking Benchmark (RHB), a suite of multi-step tasks requiring sequential tool operations with naturalistic shortcut opportunities such as skipping verification steps, inferring answers from task-adjacent metadata, or tampering with evaluation-relevant functions. RHB supports independent and chained task regimes, where chain length acts as a proxy for longer-horizon agent behavior. We evaluate 13 frontier models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and DeepSeek. Exploit rates range from 0% (Claude Sonnet 4.5) to 13.9% (DeepSeek-R1-Zero), varying sharply by post-training style. A controlled sibling comparison (DeepSeek-V3 vs. DeepSeek-R1-Zero) shows RL post-training is associated with substantially higher reward hacking (0.6% vs. 13.9%), with consistent gaps across all four task families. We identify six exploit categories and find that 72% of reward hacking episodes include explicit chain-of-thought rationale, suggesting models often frame exploits as legitimate problem-solving. Simple environmental hardening reduces exploit rates by 5.7 percentage points (87.7% relative) without degrading task success. Models with near-zero exploit rates on standard tasks show elevated rates on harder variants, suggesting that production-aligned post-training appears to suppress reward hacking only below a complexity threshold where honest solutions remain tractable.

Structured outputs are essential for large language models (LLMs) in critical applications like agents and information extraction. Despite their capabilities, LLMs often generate outputs that deviate from predefined schemas, significantly hampering reliable application development. We present SLOT (Structured LLM Output Transformer), a model-agnostic approach that transforms unstructured LLM outputs into precise structured formats. While existing solutions predominantly rely on constrained decoding techniques or are tightly coupled with specific models, SLOT employs a fine-tuned lightweight language model as a post-processing layer, achieving flexibility across various LLMs and schema specifications. We introduce a systematic pipeline for data curation and synthesis alongside a formal evaluation methodology that quantifies both schema accuracy and content fidelity. Our results demonstrate that fine-tuned Mistral-7B model with constrained decoding achieves near perfect schema accuracy (99.5%) and content similarity (94.0%), outperforming Claude-3.5-Sonnet by substantial margins (+25 and +20 percentage points, respectively). Notably, even compact models like Llama-3.2-1B can match or exceed the structured output capabilities of much larger proprietary models when equipped with SLOT, enabling reliable structured generation in resource-constrained environments.

Frontier coding agents are increasingly used in workflows where users supervise progress primarily through repeated improvement of a public score, namely the reported score on a public evaluation file with labels in the workspace, rather than through direct inspection of the agent's intermediate outputs. We study whether multi-round user pressure to improve that score induces public score exploitation: behavior that raises the public score through shortcuts without improving hidden private evaluation. We begin with a preliminary single-script tabular classification task, where GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6 both exploit label information within 10 rounds of user-agent interaction. We then build AgentPressureBench, a 34-task machine-learning repository benchmark spanning three input modalities, and collect 1326 multi-round trajectories from 13 coding agents. On our benchmark, we observe 403 exploitative runs, spanning across all tasks. We also find that stronger models have higher exploitation rates, supported by a significant Spearman rank correlation of 0.77. Our ablation experiments show that higher user pressure leads to earlier exploitation, reducing the average first exploit round by 15.6 rounds (i.e., 19.67 to 4.08). As a mitigation, adding explicit anti-exploit wordings in prompt mostly eliminates exploitation (100% to 8.3%). We hope that our work can bring attention to more careful use of coding agents workflow, and developing more robust coding agents under user pressure. Our project page is at https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/AgentPressureBench .

LLM agents increasingly rely on reusable skills, capability packages that combine instructions, control flow, constraints, and tool calls. In most current agent systems, however, skills are still represented by text-heavy artifacts, including SKILL.md-style documents and structured records whose machine-usable evidence remains embedded largely in natural-language descriptions. This poses a challenge for skill-centered agent systems: managing skill collections and using skills to support agent both require reasoning over invocation interfaces, execution structure, and concrete side effects that are often entangled in a single textual surface. An explicit representation of skill knowledge may therefore help make these artifacts easier for machines to acquire and leverage. Drawing on Memory Organization Packets, Script Theory, and Conceptual Dependency from Schank and Abelson's classical work on linguistic knowledge representation, we introduce what is, to our knowledge, the first structured representation for agent skill artifacts that disentangles skill-level scheduling signals, scene-level execution structure, and logic-level action and resource-use evidence: the Scheduling-Structural-Logical (SSL) representation. We instantiate SSL with an LLM-based normalizer and evaluate it on a corpus of skills in two tasks, Skill Discovery and Risk Assessment, and superiorly outperform the text-only baselines: in Skill Discovery, SSL improves MRR from 0.573 to 0.707; in Risk Assessment, it improves macro F1 from 0.744 to 0.787. These findings reveal that explicit, source-grounded structure makes agent skills easier to search and review. They also suggest that SSL is best understood as a practical step toward more inspectable, reusable, and operationally actionable skill representations for agent systems, rather than as a finished standard or an end-to-end mechanism for managing and using skills.

Network pruning is widely used for reducing the heavy inference cost of deep models in low-resource settings. A typical pruning algorithm is a three-stage pipeline, i.e., training (a large model), pruning and fine-tuning. During pruning, according to a certain criterion, redundant weights are pruned and important weights are kept to best preserve the accuracy. In this work, we make several surprising observations which contradict common beliefs. For all state-of-the-art structured pruning algorithms we examined, fine-tuning a pruned model only gives comparable or worse performance than training that model with randomly initialized weights. For pruning algorithms which assume a predefined target network architecture, one can get rid of the full pipeline and directly train the target network from scratch. Our observations are consistent for multiple network architectures, datasets, and tasks, which imply that: 1) training a large, over-parameterized model is often not necessary to obtain an efficient final model, 2) learned "important" weights of the large model are typically not useful for the small pruned model, 3) the pruned architecture itself, rather than a set of inherited "important" weights, is more crucial to the efficiency in the final model, which suggests that in some cases pruning can be useful as an architecture search paradigm. Our results suggest the need for more careful baseline evaluations in future research on structured pruning methods. We also compare with the "Lottery Ticket Hypothesis" (Frankle & Carbin 2019), and find that with optimal learning rate, the "winning ticket" initialization as used in Frankle & Carbin (2019) does not bring improvement over random initialization.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become a dominant post-training paradigm, enabling large language models (LLMs) to learn from rewards. We observe that societal regulations are structurally similar to reward functions. They define measurable outcomes, thresholds, and exceptions, while often leaving institutional intent only partially specified. We hypothesise that the RL training process may exploit these gaps and therefore ask whether models' well-known tendency to hack reward functions during RL can scale into a more consequential failure mode named societal hacking: discovering loopholes in the rules society runs on. To study this phenomenon, we introduce SocioHack, a sandbox of 72 societal environments, and find that within these environments, reward hacking naturally emerges and leads to regulatory loophole discovery. Models learn to hack the social rules and generate strategies that remain technically compliant while defeating regulatory intent, and current LLM safeguards provide only limited mitigation. Therefore, collecting in-the-wild feedback for model training requires greater caution, and we need a next-generation post-training paradigm for safely iterating LLMs in real society.=

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly coordinate real workloads by selecting and chaining third-party tools based on text-visible metadata such as tool names, descriptions, and return messages. We show that this convenience creates a supply-chain attack surface: a malicious MCP tool server can be co-registered alongside normal tools and induce overthinking loops, where individually trivial or plausible tool calls compose into cyclic trajectories that inflate end-to-end tokens and latency without any single step looking abnormal. We formalize this as a structural overthinking attack, distinguishable from token-level verbosity, and implement 14 malicious tools across three servers that trigger repetition, forced refinement, and distraction. Across heterogeneous registries and multiple tool-capable models, the attack causes severe resource amplification (up to 142.4times tokens) and can degrade task outcomes. Finally, we find that decoding-time concision controls do not reliably prevent loop induction, suggesting defenses should reason about tool-call structure rather than tokens alone.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have become a core technology for tasks such as question-answering (QA) and content generation. RAG poisoning is an attack method to induce LLMs to generate the attacker's expected text by injecting poisoned documents into the database of RAG systems. Existing research can be broadly divided into two classes: white-box methods and black-box methods. White-box methods utilize gradient information to optimize poisoned documents, and black-box methods use a pre-trained LLM to generate them. However, existing white-box methods require knowledge of the RAG system's internal composition and implementation details, whereas black-box methods are unable to utilize interactive information. In this work, we propose the RIPRAG attack framework, an end-to-end attack pipeline that treats the target RAG system as a black box and leverages our proposed Reinforcement Learning from Black-box Feedback (RLBF) method to optimize the generation model for poisoned documents. We designed two kinds of rewards: similarity reward and attack reward. Experimental results demonstrate that this method can effectively execute poisoning attacks against most complex RAG systems, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) improvement of up to 0.72 compared to baseline methods. This highlights prevalent deficiencies in current defensive methods and provides critical insights for LLM security research.

With the rapid scaling of large language models (LLMs), structured pruning has become a widely used technique to learn efficient, smaller models from larger ones, delivering superior performance compared to training similarly sized models from scratch. In this paper, we move beyond the traditional static pruning approach of determining a fixed pruning mask for a model, and propose a dynamic approach to structured pruning. In our method, the pruning mask is input-dependent and adapts dynamically based on the information described in a user instruction. Our approach, termed "instruction-following pruning", introduces a sparse mask predictor that takes the user instruction as input and dynamically selects the most relevant model parameters for the given task. To identify and activate effective parameters, we jointly optimize the sparse mask predictor and the LLM, leveraging both instruction-following data and the pre-training corpus. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a wide range of evaluation benchmarks. For example, our 3B activated model improves over the 3B dense model by 5-8 points of absolute margin on domains such as math and coding, and rivals the performance of a 9B model.

We release Terminal Wrench, a subset of 331 terminal-agent benchmark environments, copied from the popular open benchmarks that are demonstrably reward-hackable. The data set includes 3,632 hack trajectories and 2,352 legitimate baseline trajectories across three frontier models (Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4). Each entry preserves the original task definition alongside full attack trajectories that show how the verifier was bypassed. It also includes cases where the task was not solved as intended. The tasks span system administration, machine learning, software engineering, and security challenges; the exploits range from simple output spoofing to stack-frame introspection, standard-library patching, and rootkit-style binary hijacking. Crucially, these exploits are specific to each task, rather than the evaluation harness, making them harder to patch. We also present a monitorability study in which hack trajectories are sanitized or stripped of reasoning traces and then scored by an LLM judge, showing that detection degrades meaningfully when chain-of-thought is removed (AUC drops from 0.97 to 0.92). The data set is publicly available at https://github.com/few-sh/terminal-wrench.

Often we wish to predict a large number of variables that depend on each other as well as on other observed variables. Structured prediction methods are essentially a combination of classification and graphical modeling, combining the ability of graphical models to compactly model multivariate data with the ability of classification methods to perform prediction using large sets of input features. This tutorial describes conditional random fields, a popular probabilistic method for structured prediction. CRFs have seen wide application in natural language processing, computer vision, and bioinformatics. We describe methods for inference and parameter estimation for CRFs, including practical issues for implementing large scale CRFs. We do not assume previous knowledge of graphical modeling, so this tutorial is intended to be useful to practitioners in a wide variety of fields.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and related alignment paradigms have become central to steering large language models (LLMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs) toward human-preferred behaviors. However, these approaches introduce a systemic vulnerability: reward hacking, where models exploit imperfections in learned reward signals to maximize proxy objectives without fulfilling true task intent. As models scale and optimization intensifies, such exploitation manifests as verbosity bias, sycophancy, hallucinated justification, benchmark overfitting, and, in multimodal settings, perception--reasoning decoupling and evaluator manipulation. Recent evidence further suggests that seemingly benign shortcut behaviors can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic gaming of oversight mechanisms. In this survey, we propose the Proxy Compression Hypothesis (PCH) as a unifying framework for understanding reward hacking. We formalize reward hacking as an emergent consequence of optimizing expressive policies against compressed reward representations of high-dimensional human objectives. Under this view, reward hacking arises from the interaction of objective compression, optimization amplification, and evaluator--policy co-adaptation. This perspective unifies empirical phenomena across RLHF, RLAIF, and RLVR regimes, and explains how local shortcut learning can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic manipulation of oversight mechanisms. We further organize detection and mitigation strategies according to how they intervene on compression, amplification, or co-adaptation dynamics. By framing reward hacking as a structural instability of proxy-based alignment under scale, we highlight open challenges in scalable oversight, multimodal grounding, and agentic autonomy.

Structured pruning is a promising hardware-friendly compression technique for large language models (LLMs), which is expected to be retraining-free to avoid the enormous retraining cost. This retraining-free paradigm involves (1) pruning criteria to define the architecture and (2) distortion reconstruction to restore performance. However, existing methods often emphasize pruning criteria while using reconstruction techniques that are specific to certain modules or criteria, resulting in limited generalizability. To address this, we introduce the Linear Interpolation-based Adaptive Reconstruction (LIAR) framework, which is both efficient and effective. LIAR does not require back-propagation or retraining and is compatible with various pruning criteria and modules. By applying linear interpolation to the preserved weights, LIAR minimizes reconstruction error and effectively reconstructs the pruned output. Our evaluations on benchmarks such as GLUE, SQuAD, WikiText, and common sense reasoning show that LIAR enables a BERT model to maintain 98% accuracy even after removing 50% of its parameters and achieves top performance for LLaMA in just a few minutes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved significant success across various NLP tasks. However, their massive computational costs limit their widespread use, particularly in real-time applications. Structured pruning offers an effective solution by compressing models and directly providing end-to-end speed improvements, regardless of the hardware environment. Meanwhile, different components of the model exhibit varying sensitivities towards pruning, calling for non-uniform model compression. However, a pruning method should not only identify a capable substructure, but also account for post-compression training. To this end, we propose \sysname, a method for training-aware structured pruning. \sysname builds upon an evolutionary search process, generating multiple offspring models in each generation through mutation, and selecting the fittest for survival. To assess the effect of post-training, we incorporate a lightweight, multistep training process within the offspring population, progressively increasing the number of tokens and eliminating poorly performing models in each selection stage. We validate our method through extensive experiments on Llama-2-7B, Llama-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-14B-Instruct, achieving state-of-the-art performance for structured pruning. For instance, \sysname surpasses ShearedLlama while requiring 5times less training data during post-compression training.

We introduce a new method for extracting structured threat behaviors from threat intelligence text. Our method is based on a multi-stage ranking architecture that allows jointly optimizing for efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, we believe this problem formulation better aligns with the real-world nature of the task considering the large number of adversary techniques and the extensive body of threat intelligence created by security analysts. Our findings show that the proposed system yields state-of-the-art performance results for this task. Results show that our method has a top-3 recall performance of 81\% in identifying the relevant technique among 193 top-level techniques. Our tests also demonstrate that our system performs significantly better (+40\%) than the widely used large language models when tested under a zero-shot setting.

Once visual content enters an AI pipeline, its owner often retains little technical control over how it is used. Legal and regulatory remedies can address misuse, but many technical interventions must be applied earlier, when content is released or accessed. This survey examines the protective paradigm that has grown around this intervention point, which we call adversarial attacks for good. Perturbations and structured signals long studied as attacks on learned models are instead applied by data owners, creators, platforms, or auditors to disrupt unauthorized automation or support later accountability. Five research communities have arrived at this inversion largely independently, each addressing a different stage of a visual asset's lifecycle: privacy filters against unwanted recognition at sharing time, unlearnable examples against unauthorized training, generative safeguards against malicious editing or imitation, adversarial CAPTCHAs for access control against automated agents, and provenance mechanisms for post-circulation attribution. Although developed in separate venues with incompatible success criteria, many of these methods exploit persistent gaps between human perception, semantic interpretation, and machine inference, suggesting that the paradigm remains relevant as visual pipelines evolve toward multimodal models and autonomous agents. To make their claims comparable, we evaluate all five families along shared axes of transferability, adaptability, and deployment readiness. Across the lifecycle, we find that most protections are still validated mainly against static or weakly adaptive adversaries, while evidence beyond controlled benchmarks remains scarce. We close by consolidating cross-stage countermeasures and open problems for robust, composable, and deployable owner-side protection.

Neural network pruning serves as a critical technique for enhancing the efficiency of deep learning models. Unlike unstructured pruning, which only sets specific parameters to zero, structured pruning eliminates entire channels, thus yielding direct computational and storage benefits. However, the diverse patterns for coupling parameters, such as residual connections and group convolutions, the diverse deep learning frameworks, and the various time stages at which pruning can be performed make existing pruning methods less adaptable to different architectures, frameworks, and pruning criteria. To address this, we introduce Structurally Prune Anything (SPA), a versatile structured pruning framework that can prune neural networks with any architecture, from any framework, and at any stage of training. SPA leverages a standardized computational graph and ONNX representation to prune diverse neural network architectures without the need for manual intervention. SPA employs a group-level importance estimation method, which groups dependent computational operators, estimates their importance, and prunes unimportant coupled channels. This enables the transfer of various existing pruning criteria into a structured group style. As a result, SPA supports pruning at any time, either before training, after training with fine-tuning, or after training without fine-tuning. In the context of the latter, we introduce Optimal Brain SPA (OBSPA), an algorithm that achieves state-of-the-art pruning results needing neither fine-tuning nor calibration data. In extensive experiments, SPA shows competitive to state-of-the-art pruning performance across various architectures, from popular frameworks, at different pruning times.

Structured pruning is a hardware-friendly way to compress LLMs, but it is mostly validated on multiple-choice recognition tasks, while the same compressed checkpoints can collapse on the free-form generation that deployment actually requires. Two observations trace this gap. First, greedy pass@1 nearly vanishes after compression, yet pass@k recovers substantially under repeated sampling: useful generations are demoted, not erased. Second, the recoverable regime fails mainly through suffix repetition. Recovery should therefore train on the compressed model's own on-policy states with dense token-level supervision, which On-Policy Distillation (OPD) provides by reusing the pre-compression model as a frozen teacher. However, long on-policy rollouts spend early recovery budget on low-information repetitive suffixes, delaying loss descent. To mitigate this waste, we propose \shortopd, a short-to-long OPD schedule that detects teacher-confirmed repetitive suffixes, treats the surviving prefix as each rollout's effective length, and allocates future rollout budgets to the effective lengths the policy can currently use. Across math, code, and open-ended generation, \shortopd\ raises the compressed model's score to about 9times its unrecovered value and 1.6--4.4times standard recovery recipes (SFT w/o KD, KD, and SeqKD), and it matches a fixed 8192-token rollout horizon within two points using a quarter of the training time (8.5 vs.\ 35.9 hours) and 71% fewer rollout tokens. We hope this recipe helps move structured pruning beyond marginal gains on perplexity and multiple-choice benchmarks, a step closer to deployment-ready generation quality.

Network Pruning is a promising way to address the huge computing resource demands of the deployment and inference of Large Language Models (LLMs). Retraining-free is important for LLMs' pruning methods. However, almost all of the existing retraining-free pruning approaches for LLMs focus on unstructured pruning, which requires specific hardware support for acceleration. In this paper, we propose a novel retraining-free structured pruning framework for LLMs, named FLAP (FLuctuation-based Adaptive Structured Pruning). It is hardware-friendly by effectively reducing storage and enhancing inference speed. For effective structured pruning of LLMs, we highlight three critical elements that demand the utmost attention: formulating structured importance metrics, adaptively searching the global compressed model, and implementing compensation mechanisms to mitigate performance loss. First, FLAP determines whether the output feature map is easily recoverable when a column of weight is removed, based on the fluctuation pruning metric. Then it standardizes the importance scores to adaptively determine the global compressed model structure. At last, FLAP adds additional bias terms to recover the output feature maps using the baseline values. We thoroughly evaluate our approach on a variety of language benchmarks. Without any retraining, our method significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art methods, including LLM-Pruner and the extension of Wanda in structured pruning. The code is released at https://github.com/CASIA-IVA-Lab/FLAP.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities through Agent Skills: modular filesystem packages whose SKILL.md files describe when and how agents should use them. While this design enables scalable, on-demand capability expansion, it also introduces a semantic supply-chain risk in which natural-language metadata and instructions can affect which skills are admitted, surfaced, selected, and loaded. We study SKILL.md - only attacks across three registry-facing stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle, using real ClawHub skills and realistic registry mechanisms. In Discovery, short textual triggers can manipulate embedding-based retrieval and improve adversarial skill visibility, achieving up to 86% pairwise win rate and 80% Top-10 placement. In Selection, description-only framing biases agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants, which are selected in 77.6% of paired trials on average. In Governance, semantic evasion strategies cause malicious skills to avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%-100% of cases. Overall, our results show that SKILL.md is not passive documentation but operational text that shapes which third-party capabilities agents find, trust, and use.

We introduce the concept of "universal password model" -- a password model that, once pre-trained, can automatically adapt its guessing strategy based on the target system. To achieve this, the model does not need to access any plaintext passwords from the target credentials. Instead, it exploits users' auxiliary information, such as email addresses, as a proxy signal to predict the underlying password distribution. Specifically, the model uses deep learning to capture the correlation between the auxiliary data of a group of users (e.g., users of a web application) and their passwords. It then exploits those patterns to create a tailored password model for the target system at inference time. No further training steps, targeted data collection, or prior knowledge of the community's password distribution is required. Besides improving over current password strength estimation techniques and attacks, the model enables any end-user (e.g., system administrators) to autonomously generate tailored password models for their systems without the often unworkable requirements of collecting suitable training data and fitting the underlying machine learning model. Ultimately, our framework enables the democratization of well-calibrated password models to the community, addressing a major challenge in the deployment of password security solutions at scale.

Organized crime inflicts human suffering on a genocidal scale: the Mexican drug cartels have murdered 150,000 people since 2006, upwards of 700,000 people per year are "exported" in a human trafficking industry enslaving an estimated 40 million people. These nefarious industries rely on sophisticated money laundering schemes to operate. Despite tremendous resources dedicated to anti-money laundering (AML) only a tiny fraction of illicit activity is prevented. The research community can help. In this brief paper, we map the structural and behavioral dynamics driving the technical challenge. We review AML methods, current and emergent. We provide a first look at scalable graph convolutional neural networks for forensic analysis of financial data, which is massive, dense, and dynamic. We report preliminary experimental results using a large synthetic graph (1M nodes, 9M edges) generated by a data simulator we created called AMLSim. We consider opportunities for high performance efficiency, in terms of computation and memory, and we share results from a simple graph compression experiment. Our results support our working hypothesis that graph deep learning for AML bears great promise in the fight against criminal financial activity.

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,152), Custom Agent: Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,422). Codex CLI: o3-high, Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

Reinforcement learning (RL) paradigms have demonstrated strong performance on reasoning-intensive tasks such as code generation. However, limited trajectory diversity often leads to diminishing returns, which constrains the achievable performance ceiling. Search-enhanced RL alleviates this issue by introducing structured exploration, which remains constrained by the single-agent policy priors. Meanwhile, leveraging multiple interacting policies can acquire more diverse exploratory signals, but existing approaches are typically decoupled from structured search. We propose MARS^2 (Multi-Agent Reinforced Tree-Search Scaling), a unified RL framework in which multiple independently-optimized agents collaborate within a shared tree-structured search environment. MARS^2 models the search tree as a learnable multi-agent interaction environment, enabling heterogeneous agents to collaboratively generate and refine candidate solutions within a shared search topology. To support effective learning, we introduce a path-level group advantage formulation based on tree-consistent reward shaping, which facilitates effective credit assignment across complex search trajectories. Experiments on code generation benchmarks show that MARS^2 consistently improves performance across diverse model combinations and training settings, demonstrating the effectiveness of coupling multi-agent collaboration with tree search for enhancing reinforcement learning. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/TsinghuaC3I/MARTI.

Conversational scams, such as romance and investment scams, are emerging as a major form of online fraud. Unlike one-shot scam lures such as fake lottery or unpaid toll messages, they unfold through multi-turn conversations in which scammers gradually manipulate victims using evolving psychological techniques. However, existing research mainly focuses on static scam detection or synthetic scams, leaving open whether language models can understand how real-world scams progress over time. We introduce PreScam, a benchmark for modeling scam progression from early conversations. Built from user-submitted scam reports, PreScam filters and structures 177,989 raw reports into 11,573 conversational scam instances spanning 20 scam categories. Each instance is hierarchically structured according to the scam lifecycle defined by the proposed scam kill chain, and further annotated at the turn level with scammer psychological actions and victim responses. We benchmark models on two tasks: real-time termination prediction, which estimates whether a conversation is approaching the termination stage, and scammer action prediction, which forecasts the scammer's subsequent actions. Results show a clear gap between surface-level fluency and progression modeling: supervised encoders substantially outperform zero-shot LLMs on real-time termination prediction, while next-action prediction remains only moderately successful even for strong LLMs. Taken together, these results show that current models can capture some scam-related cues, yet still struggle to track how risk escalates and how manipulation unfolds across turns.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) enable scientific progress and broad deployment. However, they make it difficult to control access to sensitive capabilities. Current practice either suppresses dangerous capabilities before release or mediates access through closed services that use specialized model variants, input/output monitors, and API permissions. The former is susceptible to jailbreaks while sacrificing capability for all users to mitigate the risks posed by a few, and the latter is fundamentally incompatible with open-weight release. In this paper, we propose Tiered Language Models (TLMs), where a single set of released weights supports multiple capability levels. In its default public configuration, a TLM behaves as a conventional LLM. A compact secret key specifies a permutation over a small parameter subset, inducing an alternative computation graph over the same weights that exposes additional capabilities. We develop a training protocol that jointly pretrains both configurations from scratch, then fine-tunes the keyed configuration on private data with regularization to preserve the public model's behavior. We pretrain 180M- and 650M-parameter TLMs and demonstrate that the keyed configuration can acquire a new language, gain instruction-following ability, and memorize private factual knowledge, whereas the public configuration exhibits none of these capabilities. Moreover, we show that our approach extends naturally to multiple hierarchical tiers. Because authorization operates on the model's weight structure rather than in the input space, the mechanism resists fine-tuning-based extraction and partial key compromise. In general, TLMs take a step toward reconciling open-weight release with selective capability control.

The rapid evolution of modern malware presents significant challenges to the development of effective defense mechanisms. Traditional cyber deception techniques often rely on static or manually configured parameters, limiting their adaptability to dynamic and sophisticated threats. This study leverages Generative AI (GenAI) models to automate the creation of adaptive cyber deception ploys, focusing on structured prompt engineering (PE) to enhance relevance, actionability, and deployability. We introduce a systematic framework (SPADE) to address inherent challenges large language models (LLMs) pose to adaptive deceptions, including generalized outputs, ambiguity, under-utilization of contextual information, and scalability constraints. Evaluations across diverse malware scenarios using metrics such as Recall, Exact Match (EM), BLEU Score, and expert quality assessments identified ChatGPT-4o as the top performer. Additionally, it achieved high engagement (93%) and accuracy (96%) with minimal refinements. Gemini and ChatGPT-4o Mini demonstrated competitive performance, with Llama3.2 showing promise despite requiring further optimization. These findings highlight the transformative potential of GenAI in automating scalable, adaptive deception strategies and underscore the critical role of structured PE in advancing real-world cybersecurity applications.

Modern large language models (LLMs) are typically secured by auditing data, prompts, and refusal policies, while treating the forward pass as an implementation detail. We show that intermediate activations in decoder-only LLMs form a vulnerable attack surface for behavioral control. Building on recent findings on attention sinks and compression valleys, we identify a high-gain region in the residual stream where small, well-aligned perturbations are causally amplified along the autoregressive trajectory--a Causal Amplification Effect (CAE). We exploit this as an attack surface via Sensitivity-Scaled Steering (SSS), a progressive activation-level attack that combines beginning-of-sequence (BOS) anchoring with sensitivity-based reinforcement to focus a limited perturbation budget on the most vulnerable layers and tokens. We show that across multiple open-weight models and four behavioral axes, SSS induces large shifts in evil, hallucination, sycophancy, and sentiment while preserving high coherence and general capabilities, turning activation steering into a concrete security concern for white-box and supply-chain LLM deployments.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

We propose a novel interpretation technique to explain the behavior of structured output models, which learn mappings between an input vector to a set of output variables simultaneously. Because of the complex relationship between the computational path of output variables in structured models, a feature can affect the value of output through other ones. We focus on one of the outputs as the target and try to find the most important features utilized by the structured model to decide on the target in each locality of the input space. In this paper, we assume an arbitrary structured output model is available as a black box and argue how considering the correlations between output variables can improve the explanation performance. The goal is to train a function as an interpreter for the target output variable over the input space. We introduce an energy-based training process for the interpreter function, which effectively considers the structural information incorporated into the model to be explained. The effectiveness of the proposed method is confirmed using a variety of simulated and real data sets.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

E-commerce search and recommendation usually operate on structured data such as product catalogs and taxonomies. However, creating better search and recommendation systems often requires a large variety of unstructured data including customer reviews and articles on the web. Traditionally, the solution has always been converting unstructured data into structured data through information extraction, and conducting search over the structured data. However, this is a costly approach that often has low quality. In this paper, we envision a solution that does entirely the opposite. Instead of converting unstructured data (web pages, customer reviews, etc) to structured data, we instead convert structured data (product inventory, catalogs, taxonomies, etc) into textual data, which can be easily integrated into the text corpus that trains LLMs. Then, search and recommendation can be performed through a Q/A mechanism through an LLM instead of using traditional information retrieval methods over structured data.

Structured pruning and quantization are fundamental techniques used to reduce the size of deep neural networks (DNNs) and typically are applied independently. Applying these techniques jointly via co-optimization has the potential to produce smaller, high-quality models. However, existing joint schemes are not widely used because of (1) engineering difficulties (complicated multi-stage processes), (2) black-box optimization (extensive hyperparameter tuning to control the overall compression), and (3) insufficient architecture generalization. To address these limitations, we present the framework GETA, which automatically and efficiently performs joint structured pruning and quantization-aware training on any DNNs. GETA introduces three key innovations: (i) a quantization-aware dependency graph (QADG) that constructs a pruning search space for generic quantization-aware DNN, (ii) a partially projected stochastic gradient method that guarantees layerwise bit constraints are satisfied, and (iii) a new joint learning strategy that incorporates interpretable relationships between pruning and quantization. We present numerical experiments on both convolutional neural networks and transformer architectures that show that our approach achieves competitive (often superior) performance compared to existing joint pruning and quantization methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Large, pre-trained models are problematic to use in resource constrained applications. Fortunately, task-aware structured pruning methods offer a solution. These approaches reduce model size by dropping structural units like layers and attention heads in a manner that takes into account the end-task. However, these pruning algorithms require more task-specific data than is typically available. We propose a framework which combines structured pruning with transfer learning to reduce the need for task-specific data. Our empirical results answer questions such as: How should the two tasks be coupled? What parameters should be transferred? And, when during training should transfer learning be introduced? Leveraging these insights, we demonstrate that our framework results in pruned models with improved generalization over strong baselines.

The rise of AI agent frameworks has introduced agent skills, modular packages containing instructions and executable code that dynamically extend agent capabilities. While this architecture enables powerful customization, skills execute with implicit trust and minimal vetting, creating a significant yet uncharacterized attack surface. We conduct the first large-scale empirical security analysis of this emerging ecosystem, collecting 42,447 skills from two major marketplaces and systematically analyzing 31,132 using SkillScan, a multi-stage detection framework integrating static analysis with LLM-based semantic classification. Our findings reveal pervasive security risks: 26.1% of skills contain at least one vulnerability, spanning 14 distinct patterns across four categories: prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and supply chain risks. Data exfiltration (13.3%) and privilege escalation (11.8%) are most prevalent, while 5.2% of skills exhibit high-severity patterns strongly suggesting malicious intent. We find that skills bundling executable scripts are 2.12x more likely to contain vulnerabilities than instruction-only skills (OR=2.12, p<0.001). Our contributions include: (1) a grounded vulnerability taxonomy derived from 8,126 vulnerable skills, (2) a validated detection methodology achieving 86.7% precision and 82.5% recall, and (3) an open dataset and detection toolkit to support future research. These results demonstrate an urgent need for capability-based permission systems and mandatory security vetting before this attack vector is further exploited.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

The interaction between users and applications is increasingly shifted toward natural language by deploying Large Language Models (LLMs) as the core interface. The capabilities of these so-called agents become more capable the more tools and services they serve as an interface for, ultimately leading to agentic systems. Agentic systems use LLM-based agents as interfaces for most user interactions and various integrations with external tools and services. While these interfaces can significantly enhance the capabilities of the agentic system, they also introduce a new attack surface. Manipulated integrations, for example, can exploit the internal LLM and compromise sensitive data accessed through other interfaces. While previous work primarily focused on attacks targeting a model's alignment or the leakage of training data, the security of data that is only available during inference has escaped scrutiny so far. In this work, we demonstrate how the integration of LLMs into systems with external tool integration poses a risk similar to established prompt-based attacks, able to compromise the confidentiality of the entire system. Introducing a systematic approach to evaluate these confidentiality risks, we identify two specific attack scenarios unique to these agentic systems and formalize these into a tool-robustness framework designed to measure a model's ability to protect sensitive information. Our analysis reveals significant vulnerabilities across all tested models, highlighting an increased risk when models are combined with external tools.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in natural language generation and reasoning. However, their integration into automated software ecosystems is often hindered by the "Structure Gap" - the inherent tension between the probabilistic nature of token generation and the deterministic requirements of structured data formats (e.g., JSON, XML). Traditional Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) often fails to enforce strict syntactic constraints, leading to "hallucinated" keys or malformed structures, while constrained decoding methods impose significant inference latency. In this paper, we propose a lightweight, efficient Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework to bridge this gap. We introduce a novel Multi-dimensional Reward Function that decomposes the structured output task into a hierarchy of constraints: structural integrity, format correctness, content accuracy, and validity. Leveraging Gradient Regularized Policy Optimization (GRPO), we enable the model to internalize these constraints without the need for a separate critic network, reducing peak VRAM usage by 40% compared to PPO. We validate our approach on multiple tasks, including complex recipe generation and structured math reasoning (GSM8K-JSON). Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves 89.7% structural accuracy and 92.1% JSON validity, significantly outperforming both zero-shot baselines (e.g., GPT-3.5) and SFT on larger models like LLaMA-3-8B. Furthermore, we provide a detailed analysis of training dynamics, revealing a distinct self-paced curriculum where the model sequentially acquires syntactic proficiency before semantic accuracy. Our model is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/Freakz3z/Qwen-JSON.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have advanced Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) by enriching node representations with semantic features, giving rise to LLM-enhanced GNNs that achieve notable performance gains. However, the robustness of these models against poisoning attacks, which manipulate both graph structures and textual attributes during training, remains unexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose a robustness assessment framework that systematically evaluates LLM-enhanced GNNs under poisoning attacks. Our framework enables comprehensive evaluation across multiple dimensions. Specifically, we assess 24 victim models by combining eight LLM- or Language Model (LM)-based feature enhancers with three representative GNN backbones. To ensure diversity in attack coverage, we incorporate six structural poisoning attacks (both targeted and non-targeted) and three textual poisoning attacks operating at the character, word, and sentence levels. Furthermore, we employ four real-world datasets, including one released after the emergence of LLMs, to avoid potential ground truth leakage during LLM pretraining, thereby ensuring fair evaluation. Extensive experiments show that LLM-enhanced GNNs exhibit significantly higher accuracy and lower Relative Drop in Accuracy (RDA) than a shallow embedding-based baseline across various attack settings. Our in-depth analysis identifies key factors that contribute to this robustness, such as the effective encoding of structural and label information in node representations. Based on these insights, we outline future research directions from both offensive and defensive perspectives, and propose a new combined attack along with a graph purification defense. To support future research, we release the source code of our framework at~https://github.com/CyberAlSec/LLMEGNNRP.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

Although large-scale self-supervised learning (SSL) models like WavLM have achieved state-of-the-art performance in speech processing, their significant size impedes deployment on resource-constrained devices. While structured pruning is a key technique for model compression, existing methods typically separate it from task-specific fine-tuning. This multi-stage approach struggles to create optimal architectures tailored for diverse downstream tasks. In this work, we introduce a unified framework that integrates structured pruning into the downstream fine-tuning process. Our framework unifies these steps, jointly optimizing for task performance and model sparsity in a single stage. This allows the model to learn a compressed architecture specifically for the end task, eliminating the need for complex multi-stage pipelines and knowledge distillation. Our pruned models achieve up to a 70\% parameter reduction with negligible performance degradation on large-scale datasets, achieving equal error rates of 0.7\%, 0.8\%, and 1.6\% on Vox1-O, -E, and -H, respectively. Furthermore, our approach demonstrates improved generalization in low-resource scenarios, reducing overfitting and achieving a state-of-the-art 3.7\% EER on ASVspoof5.

Reward hacking arises when a model improves a proxy reward by exploiting shortcuts rather than solving the intended task. We study this failure mode through the geometry of reinforcement learning updates in language models and argue that hacking emerges when optimization drifts away from a stable low-dimensional learning trajectory. We analyze this drift through dominant singular directions of parameter updates and show that reward-hacking runs exhibit substantially larger directional change than clean runs. Motivated by this observation, we introduce trusted-direction projection, which constrains gradients to remain within a clean reference subspace. Across reward-hacking experiments on mathematical reasoning, the proposed approach delays shortcut exploitation and better preserves task performance.

As large language models (LLMs) are trained on increasingly opaque corpora, membership inference attacks (MIAs) have been proposed to audit whether copyrighted texts were used during training, despite growing concerns about their reliability under realistic conditions. We ask whether MIAs can serve as admissible evidence in adversarial copyright disputes where an accused model developer may obfuscate training data while preserving semantic content, and formalize this setting through a judge-prosecutor-accused communication protocol. To test robustness under this protocol, we introduce SAGE (Structure-Aware SAE-Guided Extraction), a paraphrasing framework guided by Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) that rewrites training data to alter lexical structure while preserving semantic content and downstream utility. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art MIAs degrade when models are fine-tuned on SAGE-generated paraphrases, indicating that their signals are not robust to semantics-preserving transformations. While some leakage remains in certain fine-tuning regimes, these results suggest that MIAs are brittle in adversarial settings and insufficient, on their own, as a standalone mechanism for copyright auditing of LLMs.

We introduce the Self-Evolving Agentic Operating System (SE-AOS): a new class of AI agent that treats exploit capability as a mutable, versioned kernel it extends at runtime, observing its own failures, synthesising new capabilities, proving them against a live target, and hot-loading them back into itself. Mako is the first SE-AOS instance for security research and the autonomous web exploitation engine developed within LaunchSafe. LaunchSafe builds autonomous security agents for continuous offensive testing and agent-driven security research; Mako is the core engine behind that platform. On the public XBOW validation-benchmarks, 104 containerised, CTF-style web applications spanning 26 vulnerability classes across three difficulty tiers, Mako achieves full-suite coverage: it drives every one of the 104 targets to emit a cryptographically fresh, per-build flag, under a verification regime that makes fabricated or memorised results impossible. Our central result is a law of autonomous exploitation: once a capability exists and is discoverable, difficulty collapses; capability, not reasoning, is what is scarce, together with an architecture and formalism that turn that law into a self-improving system. Mako further runs a gated self-evolution loop that proposes, sandboxes, and commits improvements to its own agents and rules when fitness does not regress. We deliberately withhold the operational results, payloads, exploit chains, and tool source, because a system that reduces full-spectrum web exploitation to a repeatable, machine-speed pipeline is dual-use research of concern. We publish the science; we withhold the weapon.

These lecture notes give a statistical perspective on the foundations of reinforcement learning and interactive decision making. We present a unifying framework for addressing the exploration-exploitation dilemma using frequentist and Bayesian approaches, with connections and parallels between supervised learning/estimation and decision making as an overarching theme. Special attention is paid to function approximation and flexible model classes such as neural networks. Topics covered include multi-armed and contextual bandits, structured bandits, and reinforcement learning with high-dimensional feedback.

Modern language models (LMs) tend to memorize portions of their training data and emit verbatim spans. When the underlying sources are sensitive or copyright-protected, such reproduction raises issues of consent and compensation for creators and compliance risks for developers. We propose Anchored Decoding, a plug-and-play inference-time method for suppressing verbatim copying: it enables decoding from any risky LM trained on mixed-license data by keeping generation in bounded proximity to a permissively trained safe LM. Anchored Decoding adaptively allocates a user-chosen information budget over the generation trajectory and enforces per-step constraints that yield a sequence-level guarantee, enabling a tunable risk-utility trade-off. To make Anchored Decoding practically useful, we introduce a new permissively trained safe model (TinyComma 1.8B), as well as Anchored_{Byte} Decoding, a byte-level variant of our method that enables cross-vocabulary fusion via the ByteSampler framework (Hayase et al., 2025). We evaluate our methods across six model pairs on long-form evaluations of copyright risk and utility. Anchored and Anchored_{Byte} Decoding define a new Pareto frontier, preserving near-original fluency and factuality while eliminating up to 75% of the measurable copying gap (averaged over six copying metrics) between the risky baseline and a safe reference, at a modest inference overhead.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agent ecosystems, centralized skill marketplaces have emerged as pivotal infrastructure for augmenting agent capabilities. However, these marketplaces face unprecedented security challenges, primarily stemming from semantic-behavioral inconsistency and inter-skill combinatorial risks, where individually benign skills induce malicious behaviors during collaborative invocation. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose SkillProbe, a multi-stage security auditing framework driven by multi-agent collaboration. SkillProbe introduces a "Skills-for-Skills" design paradigm, encapsulating auditing processes into standardized skill modules to drive specialized agents through a rigorous pipeline, including admission filtering, semantic-behavioral alignment detection, and combinatorial risk simulation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation using 8 mainstream LLM series across 2,500 real-world skills from ClawHub. Our results reveal a striking popularity-security paradox, where download volume is not a reliable proxy for security quality, as over 90% of high-popularity skills failed to pass rigorous auditing. Crucially, we discovered that high-risk skills form a single giant connected component within the risk-link dimension, demonstrating that cascaded risks are systemic rather than isolated occurrences. We hope that SkillProbe will inspire researchers to provide a scalable governance infrastructure for constructing a trustworthy Agentic Web. SkillProbe is accessible for public experience at skillhub.holosai.io.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by outdated information and a tendency to generate incorrect data, commonly referred to as "hallucinations." Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) addresses these limitations by combining the strengths of retrieval-based methods and generative models. This approach involves retrieving relevant information from a large, up-to-date dataset and using it to enhance the generation process, leading to more accurate and contextually appropriate responses. Despite its benefits, RAG introduces a new attack surface for LLMs, particularly because RAG databases are often sourced from public data, such as the web. In this paper, we propose to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks on retrieval parts (RAG database) and their indirect attacks on generative parts (LLMs). Specifically, we identify that poisoning several customized content passages could achieve a retrieval backdoor, where the retrieval works well for clean queries but always returns customized poisoned adversarial queries. Triggers and poisoned passages can be highly customized to implement various attacks. For example, a trigger could be a semantic group like "The Republican Party, Donald Trump, etc." Adversarial passages can be tailored to different contents, not only linked to the triggers but also used to indirectly attack generative LLMs without modifying them. These attacks can include denial-of-service attacks on RAG and semantic steering attacks on LLM generations conditioned by the triggers. Our experiments demonstrate that by just poisoning 10 adversarial passages can induce 98.2\% success rate to retrieve the adversarial passages. Then, these passages can increase the reject ratio of RAG-based GPT-4 from 0.01\% to 74.6\% or increase the rate of negative responses from 0.22\% to 72\% for targeted queries.

A software supply chain attack is characterized by the injection of malicious code into a software package in order to compromise dependent systems further down the chain. Recent years saw a number of supply chain attacks that leverage the increasing use of open source during software development, which is facilitated by dependency managers that automatically resolve, download and install hundreds of open source packages throughout the software life cycle. This paper presents a dataset of 174 malicious software packages that were used in real-world attacks on open source software supply chains, and which were distributed via the popular package repositories npm, PyPI, and RubyGems. Those packages, dating from November 2015 to November 2019, were manually collected and analyzed. The paper also presents two general attack trees to provide a structured overview about techniques to inject malicious code into the dependency tree of downstream users, and to execute such code at different times and under different conditions. This work is meant to facilitate the future development of preventive and detective safeguards by open source and research communities.

Recent LLM agents benefit from skills for solving complex tasks. Skills encapsulate modular packages of procedural knowledge and instructions for performing specialized tasks, such as setting up a sandboxed environment, running a test suite, or refactoring a function across multiple files. As skill libraries grow and become reusable across tasks and domains, selecting an appropriate skill composition has emerged as a central bottleneck. Existing approaches fall into two categories. One exposes the agent's reasoning to the entire skill collection; the other performs skill retrieval via embeddings or LLM-based rerankers. Both provide useful insights; however, they miss the structural nature of skill composition, which is a joint decision over which skills, how many, and in what order -- three dimensions that cannot be decoupled. We formalize this as structured skill composition: given a task and a skill library, predict an executable skill plan that jointly specifies the activated subset, count, and execution order. We propose SkillComposer, which instantiates structured skill composition as task-conditioned skill sequence prediction. SkillComposer uses a constrained autoregressive decoder over skill identifiers, so subset, count, and order emerge jointly from a single decoding pass, and dependencies between successive skills are captured naturally. We build a training set of task-composition pairs from a real, human-curated skill library. We then evaluate SkillComposer along two axes: composition quality on a held-out test set, and downstream task success on SkillsBench across two production-grade coding agents. On GPT-5.2-Codex, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, SkillComposer raises the pass rate by +23.1, +18.2pp over the no-skill baseline, surpassing top-3 retrieval and matching the gold-skill retrieval upper bound at lower prompt-token cost.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

The scientific literature's exponential growth makes it increasingly challenging to navigate and synthesize knowledge across disciplines. Large language models (LLMs) are powerful tools for understanding scientific text, but they fail to capture detailed relationships across large bodies of work. Unstructured approaches, like retrieval augmented generation, can sift through such corpora to recall relevant facts; however, when millions of facts influence the answer, unstructured approaches become cost prohibitive. Structured representations offer a natural complement -- enabling systematic analysis across the whole corpus. Recent work enhances LLMs with unstructured or semistructured representations of scientific concepts; to complement this, we try extracting structured representations using LLMs. By combining LLMs' semantic understanding with a schema of scientific concepts, we prototype a system that answers precise questions about the literature as a whole. Our schema applies across scientific fields and we extract concepts from it using only 20 manually annotated abstracts. To demonstrate the system, we extract concepts from 30,000 papers on arXiv spanning astrophysics, fluid dynamics, and evolutionary biology. The resulting database highlights emerging trends and, by visualizing the knowledge graph, offers new ways to explore the ever-growing landscape of scientific knowledge. Demo: abby101/surveyor-0 on HF Spaces. Code: https://github.com/chiral-carbon/kg-for-science.

Web agents powered by large language models (LLMs) must process lengthy web page observations to complete user goals; these pages often exceed tens of thousands of tokens. This saturates context limits and increases computational cost processing; moreover, processing full pages exposes agents to security risks such as prompt injection. Existing pruning strategies either discard relevant content or retain irrelevant context, leading to suboptimal action prediction. We introduce FocusAgent, a simple yet effective approach that leverages a lightweight LLM retriever to extract the most relevant lines from accessibility tree (AxTree) observations, guided by task goals. By pruning noisy and irrelevant content, FocusAgent enables efficient reasoning while reducing vulnerability to injection attacks. Experiments on WorkArena and WebArena benchmarks show that FocusAgent matches the performance of strong baselines, while reducing observation size by over 50%. Furthermore, a variant of FocusAgent significantly reduces the success rate of prompt-injection attacks, including banner and pop-up attacks, while maintaining task success performance in attack-free settings. Our results highlight that targeted LLM-based retrieval is a practical and robust strategy for building web agents that are efficient, effective, and secure.

Different from the flow semantics of natural languages, programming languages are inherently rigid in structure and grammar. Existing fine-tuning methodologies for code vulnerability detection generally treat code as long text sequences, stripping away structural elements such as newlines ('/n') and whitespace. However, this approach inadvertently results in the loss of crucial structural information, diminishing the distinct characteristics of code and impairing the accuracy of vulnerability detection. To address these challenges, we propose a novel network architecture method based on pre-trained code models, which incorporates structural information awareness. We propose an enhanced code text processing workflow that retains structural elements prior to modeling. This refinement allows the model to retain and exploit line-level structural information and semantic information during the modeling process. Furthermore, we introduce a new network architecture, the Code Structure-Aware Network through Line-level Semantic Learning (CSLS), which integrates three key components: global vulnerability awareness, line-structural awareness, and sensitive-line awareness. We have conducted comprehensive experiments using vulnerability detection datasets from real-world projects. Extensive experiments were conducted on vulnerability detection datasets derived from real-world projects. The results demonstrate that our new code pre-processing flow significantly improves existing baselines (e.g., a 3\% accuracy improvement on the Devign dataset when applied to popular models such as CoderBert and UniXcoder). The proposed network architecture also demonstrates superior accuracy in detecting vulnerabilities, surpassing newly established benchmarks. These findings underscore the importance of structural information in enhancing the efficacy of code vulnerability detection models.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has attracted significant attention due to its ability to combine the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with knowledge obtained through efficient retrieval mechanisms over large-scale data collections. Currently, the majority of existing approaches overlook the risks associated with exposing sensitive or access-controlled information directly to the generation model. Only a few approaches propose techniques to instruct the generative model to refrain from disclosing sensitive information; however, recent studies have also demonstrated that LLMs remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can override intended behavioral constraints. For these reasons, we propose a novel approach to Selective Disclosure in Retrieval-Augmented Generation, called SD-RAG, which decouples the enforcement of security and privacy constraints from the generation process itself. Rather than relying on prompt-level safeguards, SD-RAG applies sanitization and disclosure controls during the retrieval phase, prior to augmenting the language model's input. Moreover, we introduce a semantic mechanism to allow the ingestion of human-readable dynamic security and privacy constraints together with an optimized graph-based data model that supports fine-grained, policy-aware retrieval. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the superiority of SD-RAG over baseline existing approaches, achieving up to a 58% improvement in the privacy score, while also showing a strong resilience to prompt injection attacks targeting the generative model.

Structured pruning is essential for efficient deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs). The varying sensitivity of LLM sub-blocks to pruning necessitates the identification of optimal non-uniformly pruned models. Existing methods evaluate the importance of layers, attention heads, or weight channels in isolation. Such localized focus ignores the complex global structural dependencies that exist across the model. Training-aware structured pruning addresses global dependencies, but its computational cost can be just as expensive as post-pruning training. To alleviate the computational burden of training-aware pruning and capture global structural dependencies, we propose TraceNAS, a training-free Neural Architecture Search (NAS) framework that jointly explores structured pruning of LLM depth and width. TraceNAS identifies pruned models that maintain a high degree of loss landscape alignment with the pretrained model using a scale-invariant zero-shot proxy, effectively selecting models that exhibit maximal performance potential during post-pruning training. TraceNAS is highly efficient, enabling high-fidelity discovery of pruned models on a single GPU in 8.5 hours, yielding a 10times reduction in GPU-hours compared to training-aware methods. Evaluations on the Llama and Qwen families demonstrate that TraceNAS is competitive with training-aware baselines across commonsense and reasoning benchmarks.

Pruning is a standard technique for reducing the computational cost of deep networks. Many advances in pruning leverage concepts from the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis (LTH). LTH reveals that inside a trained dense network exists sparse subnetworks (tickets) able to achieve similar accuracy (i.e., win the lottery - winning tickets). Pruning at initialization focuses on finding winning tickets without training a dense network. Studies on these concepts share the trend that subnetworks come from weight or filter pruning. In this work, we investigate LTH and pruning at initialization from the lens of layer pruning. First, we confirm the existence of winning tickets when the pruning process removes layers. Leveraged by this observation, we propose to discover these winning tickets at initialization, eliminating the requirement of heavy computational resources for training the initial (over-parameterized) dense network. Extensive experiments show that our winning tickets notably speed up the training phase and reduce up to 51% of carbon emission, an important step towards democratization and green Artificial Intelligence. Beyond computational benefits, our winning tickets exhibit robustness against adversarial and out-of-distribution examples. Finally, we show that our subnetworks easily win the lottery at initialization while tickets from filter removal (the standard structured LTH) hardly become winning tickets.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate structured outputs, such as JSON, is crucial for their use in Compound AI Systems. However, evaluating and improving this capability remains challenging. In this work, we introduce StructuredRAG, a benchmark of six tasks designed to assess LLMs' proficiency in following response format instructions. We evaluate two state-of-the-art LLMs, Gemini 1.5 Pro and Llama 3 8B-instruct with 4-bit quantization using two distinct prompting strategies. We introduce these prompting strategies as f-String and Follow the Format (FF) prompting. Across 24 experiments, we find an average success rate of 82.55%. We further find a high variance in performance across tasks, models, and prompting strategies with success rates ranging from 0 to 100%. We find that Llama 3 8B-instruct often performs competitively with Gemini 1.5 Pro. We observe that task complexity significantly influences performance, with tasks involving lists or composite object outputs proving more challenging. Our findings highlight the need for further research into improving the reliability and consistency of structured output generation in LLMs. We have open-sourced our experimental code and results at github.com/weaviate/structured-rag.

The data landscape is rich with structured data, often of high value to organizations, driving important applications in data analysis and machine learning. Recent progress in representation learning and generative models for such data has led to the development of natural language interfaces to structured data, including those leveraging text-to-SQL. Contextualizing interactions, either through conversational interfaces or agentic components, in structured data through retrieval-augmented generation can provide substantial benefits in the form of freshness, accuracy, and comprehensiveness of answers. The key question is: how do we retrieve the right table(s) for the analytical query or task at hand? To this end, we introduce TARGET: a benchmark for evaluating TAble Retrieval for GEnerative Tasks. With TARGET we analyze the retrieval performance of different retrievers in isolation, as well as their impact on downstream tasks. We find that dense embedding-based retrievers far outperform a BM25 baseline which is less effective than it is for retrieval over unstructured text. We also surface the sensitivity of retrievers across various metadata (e.g., missing table titles), and demonstrate a stark variation of retrieval performance across datasets and tasks. TARGET is available at https://target-benchmark.github.io.

The rise of model sharing through frameworks and dedicated hubs makes Machine Learning significantly more accessible. Despite its benefits, loading shared models exposes users to underexplored security risks, while security awareness remains limited among both practitioners and developers. To enable a more security-conscious approach in Machine Learning model sharing, in this paper, we evaluate the security posture of frameworks and hubs, assess whether security-oriented mechanisms offer real protection, and survey how users perceive the security narratives surrounding model sharing. Our evaluation shows that most frameworks and hubs address security risks partially at best, often by shifting responsibility to the user. More concerningly, our analysis of frameworks advertising security-oriented settings and complete model sharing uncovered multiple 0-day vulnerabilities enabling arbitrary code execution. Through this analysis, we show that, despite the recent narrative, securely loading Machine Learning models is far from being a solved problem and cannot be guaranteed by the file format used for sharing. Our survey shows that the security narrative leads users to consider security-oriented settings as trustworthy, despite the weaknesses shown in this work. From this, we derive suggestions to strengthen the security of model-sharing ecosystems.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems put more and more emphasis on grounding their responses in user-generated content found on the Web, amplifying both their usefulness and their attack surface. Most notably, indirect prompt injection and retrieval poisoning attack the web-native carriers that survive ingestion pipelines and are very concerning. We provide OpenRAG-Soc, a compact, reproducible benchmark-and-harness for web-facing RAG evaluation under these threats, in a discrete data package. The suite combines a social corpus with interchangeable sparse and dense retrievers and deployable mitigations - HTML/Markdown sanitization, Unicode normalization, and attribution-gated answered. It standardizes end-to-end evaluation from ingestion to generation and reports attacks time of one of the responses at answer time, rank shifts in both sparse and dense retrievers, utility and latency, allowing for apples-to-apples comparisons across carriers and defenses. OpenRAG-Soc targets practitioners who need fast, and realistic tests to track risk and harden deployments.

Large language model (LLM)-based AI agents extend LLM capabilities by enabling access to tools such as data sources, APIs, search engines, code sandboxes, and even other agents. While this empowers agents to perform complex tasks, LLMs may invoke unintended tool interactions and introduce risks, such as leaking sensitive data or overwriting critical records, which are unacceptable in enterprise contexts. Current approaches to mitigate these risks, such as model-based safeguards, enhance agents' reliability but cannot guarantee system safety. Methods like information flow control (IFC) and temporal constraints aim to provide guarantees but often require extensive human annotation. We propose a process that starts with applying System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to identify hazards in agent workflows, derive safety requirements, and formalize them as enforceable specifications on data flows and tool sequences. To enable this, we introduce a capability-enhanced Model Context Protocol (MCP) framework that requires structured labels on capabilities, confidentiality, and trust level. Together, these contributions aim to shift LLM-based agent safety from ad hoc reliability fixes to proactive guardrails with formal guarantees, while reducing dependence on user confirmation and making autonomy a deliberate design choice.

Tool Calling and Structured Output are two core capabilities of modern Agent systems, yet their interaction under joint deployment conditions remains insufficiently understood. This paper reports a reproducible phenomenon observed in a production Agent system: when Tool Calling and JSON Schema constraints are simultaneously enabled, multiple open-weight models cease invoking tools despite maintaining high schema compliance. We refer to this behavior as Tool Suppression. Through controlled experiments across multiple model families and deployment settings, we consistently reproduce Tool Suppression under joint constraints, while tool execution and schema compliance remain functional when evaluated independently. Further analysis reveals that JSON Schema constraints are compiled into grammar-based token masks, causing tool-call tokens to become unreachable during decoding. This provides an implementation-level explanation for the observed behavior. To interpret the phenomenon, we formulate the Constraint Priority Inversion (CPI) hypothesis, which suggests that schema satisfaction may dominate action-selection behavior under multiple simultaneous constraints. We present CPI as a behavioral hypothesis consistent with the observed evidence rather than a verified internal mechanism. To mitigate the problem, we propose Transparent Two-Pass Execution, an inference-time strategy that decouples tool execution from schema-constrained response generation. Experimental results show that this approach restores tool invocation while preserving structured output guarantees without requiring model retraining. These findings suggest that evaluating tool use and structured output separately may overlook important reliability issues in production Agent systems. Code, data, and docs will be released at https://github.com/Fzsama/Constrain-Tax-26-06.git.

Large Language Model agents increasingly operate external systems through programmatic interfaces, yet practitioners lack empirical guidance on how to structure the context these agents consume. Using SQL generation as a proxy for programmatic agent operations, we present a systematic study of context engineering for structured data, comprising 9,649 experiments across 11 models, 4 formats (YAML, Markdown, JSON, Token-Oriented Object Notation [TOON]), and schemas ranging from 10 to 10,000 tables. Our findings challenge common assumptions. First, architecture choice is model-dependent: file-based context retrieval improves accuracy for frontier-tier models (Claude, GPT, Gemini; +2.7%, p=0.029) but shows mixed results for open source models (aggregate -7.7%, p<0.001), with deficits varying substantially by model. Second, format does not significantly affect aggregate accuracy (chi-squared=2.45, p=0.484), though individual models, particularly open source, exhibit format-specific sensitivities. Third, model capability is the dominant factor, with a 21 percentage point accuracy gap between frontier and open source tiers that dwarfs any format or architecture effect. Fourth, file-native agents scale to 10,000 tables through domain-partitioned schemas while maintaining high navigation accuracy. Fifth, file size does not predict runtime efficiency: compact or novel formats can incur a token overhead driven by grep output density and pattern unfamiliarity, with the magnitude depending on model capability. These findings provide practitioners with evidence-based guidance for deploying LLM agents on structured systems, demonstrating that architectural decisions should be tailored to model capability rather than assuming universal best practices.

For over a decade, cybersecurity has relied on human labor scarcity to limit attackers to high-value targets manually or generic automated attacks at scale. Building sophisticated exploits requires deep expertise and manual effort, leading defenders to assume adversaries cannot afford tailored attacks at scale. AI agents break this balance by automating vulnerability discovery and exploitation across thousands of targets, needing only small success rates to remain profitable. Current developers focus on preventing misuse through data filtering, safety alignment, and output guardrails. Such protections fail against adversaries who control open-weight models, bypass safety controls, or develop offensive capabilities independently. We argue that AI-agent-driven cyber attacks are inevitable, requiring a fundamental shift in defensive strategy. In this position paper, we identify why existing defenses cannot stop adaptive adversaries and demonstrate that defenders must develop offensive security intelligence. We propose three actions for building frontier offensive AI capabilities responsibly. First, construct comprehensive benchmarks covering the full attack lifecycle. Second, advance from workflow-based to trained agents for discovering in-wild vulnerabilities at scale. Third, implement governance restricting offensive agents to audited cyber ranges, staging release by capability tier, and distilling findings into safe defensive-only agents. We strongly recommend treating offensive AI capabilities as essential defensive infrastructure, as containing cybersecurity risks requires mastering them in controlled settings before adversaries do.

The advancement of AI technologies, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), has transformed computing while introducing new security and privacy risks. Prior research shows that cybercriminals are increasingly leveraging uncensored LLMs (ULLMs) as backends for malicious services. Understanding these ULLMs has been hindered by the challenge of identifying them among the vast number of open-source LLMs hosted on platforms like Hugging Face. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of ULLMs, overcoming this challenge by modeling relationships among open-source LLMs and between them and related data, such as fine-tuning, merging, compressing models, and using or generating datasets with harmful content. Representing these connections as a knowledge graph, we applied graph-based deep learning to discover over 11,000 ULLMs from a small set of labeled examples and uncensored datasets. A closer analysis of these ULLMs reveals their alarming scale and usage. Some have been downloaded over a million times, with one over 19 million installs. These models -- created through fine-tuning, merging, or compression of other models -- are capable of generating harmful content, including hate speech, violence, erotic material, and malicious code. Evidence shows their integration into hundreds of malicious applications offering services like erotic role-play, child pornography, malicious code generation, and more. In addition, underground forums reveal criminals sharing techniques and scripts to build cheap alternatives to commercial malicious LLMs. These findings highlight the widespread abuse of LLM technology and the urgent need for effective countermeasures against this growing threat.

The ideal LLM content moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be explained to users) and steerable (to reflect a community's values or align to safety standards). However, current systems fall short on both of these dimensions. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel LLM safety moderation framework. Given a prompt, SafetyAnalyst creates a structured "harm-benefit tree," which identifies 1) the actions that could be taken if a compliant response were provided, 2) the harmful and beneficial effects of those actions (along with their likelihood, severity, and immediacy), and 3) the stakeholders that would be impacted by those effects. It then aggregates this structured representation into a harmfulness score based on a parameterized set of safety preferences, which can be transparently aligned to particular values. Using extensive harm-benefit features generated by SOTA LLMs on 19k prompts, we fine-tuned an open-weight LM to specialize in generating harm-benefit trees through symbolic knowledge distillation. On a comprehensive set of prompt safety benchmarks, we show that our system (average F1=0.75) outperforms existing LLM safety moderation systems (average F1<0.72) on prompt harmfulness classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability and steerability.

AI-assisted software generation has increased development speed, but it has also amplified a persistent engineering problem: systems that are functionally correct may still be structurally insecure. In practice, prompt-based security review with large language models often suffers from uneven coverage, weak reproducibility, unsupported findings, and the absence of an immutable audit trail. The ESAA architecture addresses a related governance problem in agentic software engineering by separating heuristic agent cognition from deterministic state mutation through append-only events, constrained outputs, and replay-based verification. This paper presents ESAA-Security, a domain-specific specialization of ESAA for agent-assisted security auditing of software repositories, with particular emphasis on AI-generated or AI-modified code. ESAA-Security structures auditing as a governed execution pipeline with four phases reconnaissance, domain audit execution, risk classification, and final reporting and operationalizes the workflow into 26 tasks, 16 security domains, and 95 executable checks. The framework produces structured check results, vulnerability inventories, severity classifications, risk matrices, remediation guidance, executive summaries, and a final markdown/JSON audit report. The central idea is that security review should not be modeled as a free-form conversation with an LLM, but as an evidence-oriented audit process governed by contracts and events. In ESAA-Security, agents emit structured intentions under constrained protocols; the orchestrator validates them, persists accepted outputs to an append-only log, reprojects derived views, and verifies consistency through replay and hashing. The result is a traceable, reproducible, and risk-oriented audit architecture whose final report is auditable by construction.

We propose STRuCT-LLM, a unified framework for training large language models (LLMs) to perform structured reasoning over both relational and graph-structured data. Our approach jointly optimizes Text-to-SQL and Text-to-Cypher tasks using reinforcement learning (RL) combined with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) supervision. To support fine-grained optimization in graph-based parsing, we introduce a topology-aware reward function based on graph edit distance. Unlike prior work that treats relational and graph formalisms in isolation, STRuCT-LLM leverages shared abstractions between SQL and Cypher to induce cross-formalism transfer, enabling SQL training to improve Cypher performance and vice versa - even without shared schemas. Our largest model (QwQ-32B) achieves substantial relative improvements across tasks: on semantic parsing, Spider improves by 13.5\% and Text2Cypher by 73.1\%. The model also demonstrates strong zero-shot generalization, improving performance on downstream tabular QA (TableBench: 8.5\%) and knowledge graph QA (CR-LT-KGQA: 1.7\%) without any QA-specific supervision. These results demonstrate both the effectiveness of executable queries as scaffolds for structured reasoning and the synergistic benefits of jointly training on SQL and Cypher (code available at https://github.com/bouv/STRuCT-LLM).

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

The colossal parameters and computational overhead of Large Language Models (LLMs) challenge their real-world applications. Network pruning, which targets unstructured or structured sparsity by removing redundant parameters, has recently been explored for LLM acceleration. Existing LLM pruning works focus on unstructured pruning, which typically requires special hardware support for a practical speed-up. In contrast, structured pruning can reduce latency on general devices. However, it remains a challenge to perform structured pruning efficiently and maintain performance, especially at high sparsity ratios. To this end, we introduce an efficient structured pruning framework named CFSP, which leverages both Coarse (interblock) and Fine-grained (intrablock) activation information as an importance criterion to guide pruning. The pruning is highly efficient, as it only requires one forward pass to compute feature activations. Specifically, we first allocate the sparsity budget across blocks based on their importance and then retain important weights within each block. In addition, we introduce a recovery fine-tuning strategy that adaptively allocates training overhead based on coarse-grained importance to further improve performance. Experimental results demonstrate that CFSP outperforms existing methods on diverse models across various sparsity budgets. Our code will be available at https://github.com/wyxscir/CFSP.

Aligning autonomous agents with human intent remains a central challenge in modern AI. A key manifestation of this challenge is reward hacking, whereby agents appear successful under the evaluation signal while violating the intended objective. Reward hacking has been observed across a wide range of settings, yet methods for reliably measuring it at scale remain lacking. In this work, we introduce a new evaluation paradigm for measuring reward hacking. Whereas prior studies have primarily analyzed it post hoc by inspecting agent trajectories, we instead embed detectable reward hacking opportunities directly into environments. This makes their exploitation verifiable by design, enabling deterministic and automated measurement of whether and how agents exploit such vulnerabilities. We instantiate this approach in TextArena and release Hack-Verifiable TextArena, a testbed in which reward hacking can be measured reliably. Using this benchmark, we analyze reward hacking behavior across language models in diverse environments and settings. We open source the code at https://github.com/MajoRoth/hack-verifiable-environments/.

Skill ecosystems for LLM agents have matured rapidly, yet recent benchmarks show that providing agents with more skills does not monotonically improve performance -- focused sets of 2-3 skills outperform comprehensive documentation, and excessive skills actually hurt. The bottleneck has shifted from skill availability to skill orchestration: agents need not more skills, but a structural mechanism to select, compose, and execute them with explicit causal dependencies. We propose GraSP, the first executable skill graph architecture that introduces a compilation layer between skill retrieval and execution. GraSP transforms flat skill sets into typed directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) with precondition-effect edges, executes them with node-level verification, and performs locality-bounded repair through five typed operators -- reducing replanning from O(N) to O(d^h). Across ALFWorld, ScienceWorld, WebShop, and InterCode with eight LLM backbones, GraSP outperforms ReAct, Reflexion, ExpeL, and flat skill baselines in every configuration, improving reward by up to +19 points over the strongest baseline while cutting environment steps by up to 41%. GraSP's advantage grows with task complexity and is robust to both skill over-retrieval and quality degradation, confirming that structured orchestration -- not larger skill libraries -- is the key to reliable agent execution.

Extracting meaningful insights from large and complex datasets poses significant challenges, particularly in ensuring the accuracy and relevance of retrieved information. Traditional data retrieval methods such as sequential search and index-based retrieval often fail when handling intricate and interconnected data structures, resulting in incomplete or misleading outputs. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Structured-GraphRAG, a versatile framework designed to enhance information retrieval across structured datasets in natural language queries. Structured-GraphRAG utilizes multiple knowledge graphs, which represent data in a structured format and capture complex relationships between entities, enabling a more nuanced and comprehensive retrieval of information. This graph-based approach reduces the risk of errors in language model outputs by grounding responses in a structured format, thereby enhancing the reliability of results. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Structured-GraphRAG by comparing its performance with that of a recently published method using traditional retrieval-augmented generation. Our findings show that Structured-GraphRAG significantly improves query processing efficiency and reduces response times. While our case study focuses on soccer data, the framework's design is broadly applicable, offering a powerful tool for data analysis and enhancing language model applications across various structured domains.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities -- particularly to external prompt injection -- we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

While large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities, their reliance on parametric knowledge often leads to factual inaccuracies. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates this by leveraging external documents, yet existing approaches treat retrieved passages as isolated chunks, ignoring valuable structure that is crucial for document organization. Motivated by this gap, we propose Retrieve-DocumentRoute-Read (RDR2), a novel framework that explicitly incorporates structural information throughout the RAG process. RDR2 employs an LLM-based router to dynamically navigate document structure trees, jointly evaluating content relevance and hierarchical relationships to assemble optimal evidence. Our key innovation lies in formulating document routing as a trainable task, with automatic action curation and structure-aware passage selection inspired by human reading strategies. Through comprehensive evaluation on five challenging datasets, RDR2 achieves state-of-the-art performance, demonstrating that explicit structural awareness significantly enhances RAG systems' ability to acquire and utilize knowledge, particularly in complex scenarios requiring multi-document synthesis.

We study how to train personalized models for different tasks on decentralized devices with limited local data. We propose "Structured Cooperative Learning (SCooL)", in which a cooperation graph across devices is generated by a graphical model prior to automatically coordinate mutual learning between devices. By choosing graphical models enforcing different structures, we can derive a rich class of existing and novel decentralized learning algorithms via variational inference. In particular, we show three instantiations of SCooL that adopt Dirac distribution, stochastic block model (SBM), and attention as the prior generating cooperation graphs. These EM-type algorithms alternate between updating the cooperation graph and cooperative learning of local models. They can automatically capture the cross-task correlations among devices by only monitoring their model updating in order to optimize the cooperation graph. We evaluate SCooL and compare it with existing decentralized learning methods on an extensive set of benchmarks, on which SCooL always achieves the highest accuracy of personalized models and significantly outperforms other baselines on communication efficiency. Our code is available at https://github.com/ShuangtongLi/SCooL.

Large language models have exhibited intriguing in-context learning capability, achieving promising zero- and few-shot performance without updating the parameters. However, conventional in-context learning is usually restricted by length constraints, rendering it ineffective to absorb supervision from a large number of examples. In order to go beyond few shots, we introduce structured prompting that breaks the length limit and scales in-context learning to thousands of examples. Specifically, demonstration examples are separately encoded with well-designed position embeddings, and then they are jointly attended by the test example using a rescaled attention mechanism. So we can scale the number of exemplars with linear complexity instead of quadratic complexity with respect to length. Experimental results on a diverse set of tasks show that our approach improves end-task performance and reduces evaluation variance over conventional in-context learning as the number of demonstration examples increases. Code has been released at https://aka.ms/structured-prompting.

Agentic AI pipelines suffer from a hidden inefficiency: they frequently reconstruct identical intermediate logic, such as metric normalization or chart scaffolding, even when the user's natural language phrasing is entirely novel. Conventional boundary caching fails to capture this inefficiency because it treats inference as a monolithic black box. We introduce SemanticALLI, a pipeline-aware architecture within Alli (PMG's marketing intelligence platform), designed to operationalize redundant reasoning. By decomposing generation into Analytic Intent Resolution (AIR) and Visualization Synthesis (VS), SemanticALLI elevates structured intermediate representations (IRs) to first-class, cacheable artifacts. The impact of caching within the agentic loop is substantial. In our evaluation, baseline monolithic caching caps at a 38.7% hit rate due to linguistic variance. In contrast, our structured approach allows for an additional stage, the Visualization Synthesis stage, to achieve an 83.10% hit rate, bypassing 4,023 LLM calls with a median latency of just 2.66 ms. This internal reuse reduces total token consumption, offering a practical lesson for AI system design: even when users rarely repeat themselves, the pipeline often does, at stable, structured checkpoints where caching is most reliable.

Mixture-of-experts (MoEs) have been adopted for reducing inference costs by sparsely activating experts in Large language models (LLMs). Despite this reduction, the massive number of experts in MoEs still makes them expensive to serve. In this paper, we study how to address this, by pruning MoEs. Among pruning methodologies, unstructured pruning has been known to achieve the highest performance for a given pruning ratio, compared to structured pruning, since the latter imposes constraints on the sparsification structure. This is intuitive, as the solution space of unstructured pruning subsumes that of structured pruning. However, our counterintuitive finding reveals that expert pruning, a form of structured pruning, can actually precede unstructured pruning to outperform unstructured-only pruning. As existing expert pruning, requiring O(k^n{n}) forward passes for n experts, cannot scale for recent MoEs, we propose a scalable alternative with O(1) complexity, yet outperforming the more expensive methods. The key idea is leveraging a latent structure between experts, based on behavior similarity, such that the greedy decision of whether to prune closely captures the joint pruning effect. Ours is highly effective -- for Snowflake Arctic, a 480B-sized MoE with 128 experts, our method needs only one H100 and two hours to achieve nearly no loss in performance with 40% sparsity, even in generative tasks such as GSM8K, where state-of-the-art unstructured pruning fails to. The code will be made publicly available.

Model developers implement safeguards in frontier models to prevent misuse, for example, by employing classifiers to filter dangerous outputs. In this work, we demonstrate that even robustly safeguarded models can be used to elicit harmful capabilities in open-source models through elicitation attacks. Our elicitation attacks consist of three stages: (i) constructing prompts in adjacent domains to a target harmful task that do not request dangerous information; (ii) obtaining responses to these prompts from safeguarded frontier models; (iii) fine-tuning open-source models on these prompt-output pairs. Since the requested prompts cannot be used to directly cause harm, they are not refused by frontier model safeguards. We evaluate these elicitation attacks within the domain of hazardous chemical synthesis and processing, and demonstrate that our attacks recover approximately 40% of the capability gap between the base open-source model and an unrestricted frontier model. We then show that the efficacy of elicitation attacks scales with the capability of the frontier model and the amount of generated fine-tuning data. Our work demonstrates the challenge of mitigating ecosystem level risks with output-level safeguards.

The growing misuse of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has led providers to deploy multiple safeguards, including alignment tuning, system prompts, and content moderation. However, the real-world robustness of these defenses against adversarial attacks remains underexplored. We introduce Multi-Faceted Attack (MFA), a framework that systematically exposes general safety vulnerabilities in leading defense-equipped VLMs such as GPT-4o, Gemini-Pro, and Llama-4. The core component of MFA is the Attention-Transfer Attack (ATA), which hides harmful instructions inside a meta task with competing objectives. We provide a theoretical perspective based on reward hacking to explain why this attack succeeds. To improve cross-model transferability, we further introduce a lightweight transfer-enhancement algorithm combined with a simple repetition strategy that jointly bypasses both input-level and output-level filters without model-specific fine-tuning. Empirically, we show that adversarial images optimized for one vision encoder transfer broadly to unseen VLMs, indicating that shared visual representations create a cross-model safety vulnerability. Overall, MFA achieves a 58.5% success rate and consistently outperforms existing methods. On state-of-the-art commercial models, MFA reaches a 52.8% success rate, surpassing the second-best attack by 34%. These results challenge the perceived robustness of current defense mechanisms and highlight persistent safety weaknesses in modern VLMs. Code: https://github.com/cure-lab/MultiFacetedAttack

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have intensified the need to understand and reliably curb their harmful behaviours. We introduce a multidimensional framework for probing and steering harmful content in model internals. For each of 55 distinct harmfulness subconcepts (e.g., racial hate, employment scams, weapons), we learn a linear probe, yielding 55 interpretable directions in activation space. Collectively, these directions span a harmfulness subspace that we show is strikingly low-rank. We then test ablation of the entire subspace from model internals, as well as steering and ablation in the subspace's dominant direction. We find that dominant direction steering allows for near elimination of harmfulness with a low decrease in utility. Our findings advance the emerging view that concept subspaces provide a scalable lens on LLM behaviour and offer practical tools for the community to audit and harden future generations of language models.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will increasingly be used to cause harm as they grow more capable. In fact, AI systems are already starting to be used to automate fraudulent activities, violate human rights, create harmful fake images, and identify dangerous toxins. To prevent some misuses of AI, we argue that targeted interventions on certain capabilities will be warranted. These restrictions may include controlling who can access certain types of AI models, what they can be used for, whether outputs are filtered or can be traced back to their user, and the resources needed to develop them. We also contend that some restrictions on non-AI capabilities needed to cause harm will be required. Though capability restrictions risk reducing use more than misuse (facing an unfavorable Misuse-Use Tradeoff), we argue that interventions on capabilities are warranted when other interventions are insufficient, the potential harm from misuse is high, and there are targeted ways to intervene on capabilities. We provide a taxonomy of interventions that can reduce AI misuse, focusing on the specific steps required for a misuse to cause harm (the Misuse Chain), and a framework to determine if an intervention is warranted. We apply this reasoning to three examples: predicting novel toxins, creating harmful images, and automating spear phishing campaigns.

The illusion phenomenon of large language models (LLMs) is the core obstacle to their reliable deployment. This article formalizes the large language model as a probabilistic Turing machine by constructing a "computational necessity hierarchy", and for the first time proves the illusions are inevitable on diagonalization, incomputability, and information theory boundaries supported by the new "learner pump lemma". However, we propose two "escape routes": one is to model Retrieval Enhanced Generations (RAGs) as oracle machines, proving their absolute escape through "computational jumps", providing the first formal theory for the effectiveness of RAGs; The second is to formalize continuous learning as an "internalized oracle" mechanism and implement this path through a novel neural game theory framework. Finally, this article proposes a feasible new principle for artificial intelligence security - Computational Class Alignment (CCA), which requires strict matching between task complexity and the actual computing power of the system, providing theoretical support for the secure application of artificial intelligence.

Structured pruning is one of the most popular approaches to effectively compress the heavy deep neural networks (DNNs) into compact sub-networks while retaining performance. The existing methods suffer from multi-stage procedures along with significant engineering efforts and human expertise. The Only-Train-Once (OTO) series has been recently proposed to resolve the many pain points by streamlining the workflow by automatically conducting (i) search space generation, (ii) structured sparse optimization, and (iii) sub-network construction. However, the built-in sparse optimizers in the OTO series, i.e., the Half-Space Projected Gradient (HSPG) family, have limitations that require hyper-parameter tuning and the implicit controls of the sparsity exploration, consequently requires intervening by human expertise. To address such limitations, we propose a Hybrid Efficient Structured Sparse Optimizer (HESSO). HESSO could automatically and efficiently train a DNN to produce a high-performing subnetwork. Meanwhile, it is almost tuning-free and enjoys user-friendly integration for generic training applications. To address another common issue of irreversible performance collapse observed in pruning DNNs, we further propose a Corrective Redundant Identification Cycle (CRIC) for reliably identifying indispensable structures. We numerically demonstrate the efficacy of HESSO and its enhanced version HESSO-CRIC on a variety of applications ranging from computer vision to natural language processing, including large language model. The numerical results showcase that HESSO can achieve competitive even superior performance to varying state-of-the-arts and support most DNN architectures. Meanwhile, CRIC can effectively prevent the irreversible performance collapse and further enhance the performance of HESSO on certain applications. The code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/only_train_once.